Work of the Stalin in english (3 tematicas) Correspondencia con Lenin y otros...

Correspondencia con el Presidente Mao Tse Tung Prohi ici!n de la armas at!micas

J.V. Stalin

Telegram to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pu lished# Proletarskaya Revolutsia$ %o. &$ '(3)* Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works, ,olume -$ pages ''. / ''(. "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 Transcription# 0ari 3umar for 4lliance/ML 0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882 4rri9ed in Tsaritsyn on the )th. (') :espite the confusion in e9ery sphere of economic life$ order can e esta lished. 6n Tsaritsyn$ 4strakhan and Sarato9 the grain monopoly and fi;ed prices 1ere a olished y the So9iets* and there is chaos and profiteering. 0a9e secured the introduction of rationing and fi;ed prices in Tsaritsyn. The same must e done in 4strakhan and Sarato9$ other1ise all grain 1ill flo1 a1ay through these profiteering channels. Let the Central <;ecuti9e Committee and the Council of People=s Commissars also demand that these So9iets put a stop to profiteering. >ail transport is completely dislocated o1ing to the efforts of the multiplicity of collegiums and re9olutionary committees. 6 ha9e een o liged to appoint special commissars* they are already esta lishing order despite the protests of the collegiums. The commissars are disco9ering heaps of locomoti9es in places 1here the collegiums did not suspect their e;istence. 6n9estigation has sho1n that eight or more through trains a day can e sent y the Tsaritsyn/Po9orino/5alasho9/3o?lo9/ >ya?an/Mosco1 line. 4m no1 accumulating trains in Tsaritsyn. Within a 1eek 1e shall proclaim a @Arain Week@ and shall dispatch to Mosco1 right a1ay a out one million poods 1ith a special escort of rail1aymen$ of 1hich 6 shall gi9e you due notice. The hold/up in ri9er transport is due to the fact that %i?hni/%o9gorod has not een sending steamers$ presuma ly ecause of the C?echoslo9aks. Ai9e orders that steamers e sent to Tsaritsyn immediately. We ha9e information that in the 3u an$ in Sta9ropol$ there are fully relia le purchasing agents 1ho are usy getting out the grain from the South. 4 line is already eing laid from 3i?lyar to the sea* the 0asa9 BurtPetro9sk line has not yet een restored. Let us ha9e Shlyapniko9$ ci9il engineers$ intelligent 1orkmen$ also locomoti9e cre1s. 0a9e sent a messenger to 5aku$ and shall e lea9ing for the South myself in a day or t1o. Chief Trade 4gent Caitse9 1ill e arrested today for ag/trading and speculating in go9ernment goods. Tell Schmidt not to send any more scoundrels. Let 3o o?e9 see to it that the fi9e/man collegium in ,orone?h (7) in its o1n interests does not create difficulties for my agents.

6t is reported that 5ataisk has een captured y the Aermans. People=s Commissar Stalin (') Dn May 7($ '('.$ the Council of Peoples Commissars appointed +.,.Stalin Aeneral :irector of "ood 4ffairs in South >ussia. 0is mandate read# @People=s Commissar +ospeh ,issarionio9ich Stalin$ Mem er of the Council of Peoples Commissars has een appointed y the Council of Peoples Commissars Aeneral :irector of "ood 4ffairs in South >ussia and is 9ested 1ith e;traordinary po1ers. Local and regional Councils of Peoples Commissars So9iets$ >e9olutionary Committees$ military staffs and chiefs of detachments$ rail1ay organi?ations and station masters$ organisations of the ri9er and maritime merchant fleet$ post and telegraph$ and food organi?ations and all commissars and emissaries are here y ordered to carry out the instructions of Comrade Stalin. Chairman$ Council of Peoples Commissars "V.Ulyanov (Lenin)". (7) The fi9e/man collegium 1as the administrati9e and technical directing ody of the 5oars of the Mosco1/3ie9/,orone?h other rail1ays 1ith head offices in ,orone?h.

Letter to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pu lished# 6n part$ in Pravda %o. 38'$ :ecem er 7'$'(7( Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works, ,olume -$ pages '78 / '7'. "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 Transcription# 0ari 3umar for 4lliance/ML 0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882 To Comrade Lenin. 6 am hurrying to the front$ and 1riting only on usiness. ') The rail1ay south of Tsaritsyn has not yet een restored. 6 am firing or telling off all 1ho deser9e it$ and 6 hope 1e shall ha9e it restored soon. Bou may rest assured that 1e shall spare no ody$ neither oursel9es nor others$ and shall deli9er the grain in spite of e9erything. 6f our military @e;perts@ ( unglersE) had not een asleep or loafing a out the line 1ould not ha9e een cut$ and if the line is restored it 1ill not e thanks to$ ut in spite of$ the military. 7) Large Fuantities of grain ha9e accumulated on rail south of Tsaritsyn. 4s soon as the line is cleared 1e shall e sending you grain y through trains. 3) 0a9e recei9ed your communication.(') <9erything 1ill e done to forestall possi le surprises. Bou may rest assured that our hand 1ill not flinch... -) 6 ha9e sent a letter y messenger to 5aku. (7) 2) Things in Turkestan are ad* 5ritain is operating through 4fghanistan. Ai9e some ody (or me)

special authority (military) to take urgent measures in South >ussia efore it is too late. 5ecause of the ad communications et1een the order regions and the centre someone 1ith road po1ers is needed here on the spot so that urgent measures can e taken promptly. 6f you appoint someone (1hoe9er it is) of# this purpose$ let us kno1 y direct 1ire$ and send his credentials also y direct 1ire$ other1ise 1e risk ha9ing another Murmansk. (3) 6 send you a telegraphic tape on Turkestan. That is all for the present. Bours$ Stalin Tsaritsyn$ +uly &$ '('. (') Dn the night of +uly )$ '('.$ Lenin informed Stalin of the re9olt of the @left@ Socialist >e9olutionaries (S>) in Mosco1. Lenin=s note$ 1hich 1as recei9ed in Tsaritsyn o9er direct 1ire y Stalin personally$ stated# @ these 1retched hysterical ad9enturers$ 1ho ha9e ecome a tool of the counterre9olutionaries$ must e ruthlessly suppressed e9ery1here..... Therefore sho1 no mercy to the Left S>=s and keep us regularly informed@* Lenin Pravda no. 7'* +anuary 7) '(3). (7) 4ddressed to S.A.Shaumyan$ Chairman of the 5aku Council of Peoples Commissars$ see :ocuments on the 0istory of the Ci9il War in the GSS> ,olume 7$ '(-8$ p.7.8. (3) The reference is to the occupation of Murmansk y 5ritish troops in '('..

Letter to V I Lenin
July 10, 1918

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. Comrade Lenin$ +ust a fe1 1ords. ') 6f Trotsky is going to hand out credentials right and left 1ithout thinkingIto Trifono9 (:on region)$ to 49tonomo9 (3u an region)$ to 3oppe (Sta9ropol)$ to mem ers of the "rench Mission (1ho deser9e to e arrested)$ etc.I it may e safely said that 1ithin a month e9erything here in the %orth Caucasus 1ill go to pieces$ and 1e shall lose this region altogether. Trotsky is eha9ing in the 1ay 4ntono9 did at one time. 3nock it into his head that he must make no appointments 1ithout the kno1ledge of the local people$ other1ise the result 1ill e to discredit the So9iet po1er. 7) 6f you don=t let us ha9e aeroplanes and airmen$ armoured cars and )/inch guns$ the Tsaritsyn "ront cannot hold out and the rail1ay 1ill e lost for a long time.

3) There is plenty of grain in the South$ ut to get it 1e need a smoothly/1orking machine 1hich does not meet 1ith o stacles from troop trains$ army commanders and so on. More$ the military must assist the food agents. The food Fuestion is naturally ound up -) 1ith the military Fuestion. "or the good of the 1ork$ 6 need military po1ers. 6 ha9e already 1ritten a out this$ ut ha9e had no reply. ,ery 1ell$ in that case 6 shall myself$ 1ithout any formalities$ dismiss army commanders and commissars 1ho are ruining the 1ork. The interests of the 1ork dictate this$ and$ of course$ not ha9ing a paper from Trotsky is not going to deter me. J. Stalin Tsaritsyn$ +uly '8$ '('.

Letter to V I Lenin
August 4, 1918

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. The situation in the South is no easy one. The Military Council inherited a state of utter disruption$ caused partly y the inertness of the former commander$ and partly y a conspiracy on the part of persons appointed y him to the 9arious di9isions of the Military 4rea. <9erything had to e started afresh# 1e got the supply ser9ices properly organi?ed$ instituted an operations di9ision$ esta lished contact 1ith all sectors of the front$ rescinded the old and$ in my opinion$ criminal orders$ and only after this launched an offensi9e on 3alach and south1ard to1ards Tikhoretskaya. We launched the offensi9e in the hope that Mirono9=s and 3ik9id?e=s sectors in the %orth$ including the Po9orino sector$ 1ere securely guaranteed against defeat. 5ut it turned out that these sectors 1ere the 1eakest and the least secure. Bou kno1 of the retreat of Mirono9 and the others to the %orth/<ast$ of the capture of the 1hole rail1ay line from Lipki to 4le;iko9o y the Cossacks$ and of the dispatch of Cossack guerilla groups to the ,olga and their attempts to cut communication along the ,olga et1een 3amyshin and Tsaritsyn. "urthermore$ the >osto9 "ront and 3alnin=s groups generally lost their stamina o1ing to lack of shells and cartridges and ha9e surrendered Tikhoretskaya and Torgo9aya$ and are apparently in process of complete disintegration (6 say @apparently$@ ecause 1e ha9e still een una le to recei9e accurate information a out the 3alnin group). 6 say nothing a out the critical position of 3i?/lyar$ 5ryanskoye and 5aku. The pro/5ritish orientation is definitely discredited$ ut the situation on that front is anything ut fa9oura le. 3i?lyar$ Prokhladnaya$ %o9o/Aeorgie9skoye and Sta9ropol are in the hands of Cossack insurgents. Dnly 5ryanskoye$ Petro9sk$ Mineral/niye ,ody$ ,ladika9ka?$ Pyatigorsk and$ 6 elie9e$ Bekaterinodar are still holding out.

Thus$ a situation has een created in 1hich communications 1ith the food areas of the South ha9e een se9ered$ and the Tsaritsyn area itself$ 1hich connects the centre 1ith the %orth Caucasus$ has in its turn een cut off$ or practically cut off$ from the centre. 6t 1as in 9ie1 of this that 1e decided to call off the offensi9e in the direction of Tikhoretskaya$ to take up a defensi9e position$ 1ithdra1 the com at units from the Tsaritsyn "ront and from them form a northern striking force of a out si; thousand men$ and direct them along the left ank of the :on as far as the 3hoper >i9er. The aim of this mo9e is to clear the Tsaritsyn/Po9orino line$ turn the enemy=s flank$ disorgani?e him and hurl him ack. We ha9e e9ery reason to elie9e that 1e shall e a le to e;ecute this plan in the 9ery near future. The unfa9oura le situation descri ed a o9e is to e attri uted # ') To the fact that the front/line soldier$ the @competent mu?hik$@ 1ho in Dcto er fought for the So9iet po1er$ has no1 turned against it (he heartily detests the grain monopoly$ the fi;ed prices$ the reFuisitions and the measures against ag/trading). 7) To the Cossack make/up of Mirono9=s troops (the Cossack units 1hich call themsel9es So9iet are una le and un1illing to 1age a resolute fight against the Cossack counter/re9olutionaries* the Cossacks came o9er in 1hole regiments to Mirono9 in order to recei9e 1eapons$ acFuaint themsel9es 1ith the disposition of our forces on the spot$ and then desert to 3rasno9$ carrying 1hole regiments along 1ith them* the Cossacks surrounded Mirono9 three times$ ecause they kne1 e9ery inch of his sector$ and$ of course$ utterly routed him). 3) To the fact that 3ik9id?e=s units are uilt on the detachment principle$ 1hich makes liaison and coordinated action impossi le. -) To the isolation$ ecause of all these reasons$ of Sie9ers= forces$ 1hich ha9e lost their support on the left flank. Dne fa9oura le factor on the Tsaritsyn/Aashun "ront is the complete elimination of the muddle due to the detachment principle$ and the timely remo9al of the so/called e;perts (staunch supporters either of the Cossacks or of the 5ritish and "rench)$ 1hich has made it possi le to 1in the sympathy of the military units and esta lish iron discipline in them. %o1 that communications 1ith the %orth Caucasus ha9e een cut$ the position as regards food has ecome hopeless. D9er se9en hundred 1agon/loads are standing on rail in the %orth Caucasus$ and o9er a million and a half poods are ready for dispatch$ ut it is Fuite impossi le to get the freight out ecause of the interruption of communications oth y rail and y sea (3i?lyar and 5ryan/skoye are no longer in our hands). There is Fuite a lot of grain in the Tsaritsyn$ 3otelniko9o and Aashun districts$ ut it has to e har9ested$ and Chokprod ' is not adapted for this 1ork$ and has een una le to adapt itself to this day. The crop must e gathered and hay must e pressed and accumulated in one spot$ ut Chok/ prod has no presses. The grain har9est must e organi?ed on a large scale$ ut Chokprod=s organi?ers are utterly incompetent. The result is that food deli9eries are in a ad 1ay. With the capture of 3alach 1e secured se9eral tens of thousands of poods of grain. 6 ha9e sent t1el9e lorries to 3alach$ and as soon as 1e can get it to the rail1ay 6 shall send it to Mosco1. Aood or ad$ har9esting is proceeding. 6 hope to secure se9eral tens of thousands of poods of grain in the ne;t fe1 days and send it to you also. We ha9e more cattle here than 1e need$ ut there is 9ery little hay$ and 1ithout hay dispatch of cattle in large Fuantities is impossi le. 6t 1ould e 1ell to organi?e at least one canning factory$ esta lish a slaughter/house$ etc. 5ut$ unfortunately$ so far 6 ha9e een una le to find men of kno1ledge and initiati9e. 6 ordered the 3otelniko9o agent to arrange for the salting of meat on a large scale* the 1ork has egun and there are already results$ and if the usiness de9elops there 1ill e enough meat for the 1inter (-8$888 head of cattle ha9e accumulated in the 3otelniko9o district alone).

There is no less cattle in 4strakhan than in 3otelniko9o$ ut the local food commissariat is doing nothing. The representati9es of the Perisha le "oods Procurements 5oard are fast asleep$ and it may e confidently prophesied that they 1ill procure no meat. 6 ha9e sent an agent named Calmaye9 there to procure meat and fish$ ut 6 ha9e had no 1ord from him yet. The Sarato9 and Samara gu ernias are far more promising as far as food is concerned# there is plenty of grain there$ and 6 elie9e Baku o9=s e;pedition 1ill e a le to get out half a million poods or e9en more. 6n general$ it should e said that until communications 1ith the %orth Caucasus are restored$ 1e cannot count (9ery much) on the Tsaritsyn area (as far as food is concerned). Bours$ J. Stalin Tsaritsyn$ 4ugust -$ '('.

Notes '.Chokprod I <;traordinary >egional "ood Committee in South >ussia.

Letter to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pu lished# "irst pu lished in '(3.$ in the maga?ine 5olshe9ik$ %o.7$ Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works, ,olume -$ pages '7(. "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 Transcription# 0ari 3umar for 4lliance/ML 0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882 :ear Comrade Lenin$(') The fight is on for the South and the Caspian. 6n order to keep all this area (and 1e can keep itE) 1e need se9eral light destroyers and a couple of su marines (ask 4rtyom a out the details). 6 implore you$ reak do1n all o stacles and so facilitate the immediate deli9ery of 1hat 1e reFuest. 5aku$ Turkestan and the %orth Caucasus 1ill e ours (unFuestiona lyE)$ if our demands are immediately met. Things at the front are going 1ell. 6 ha9e no dou t that they 1ill go e9en etter (the Cossacks are ecoming completely demorali?ed). Warmest greetings$ my dear and elo9ed 6lyich. Bours$ Stalin 4ugust 3'$ '('. (') Dn recei9ing +.,.Stalin=s letter$ ,.6.Lenin deleted the superscripsion and su scription and sent it to Petrograd as his personal directi9e.

Report to V. I. Lenin
January 19, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To Comrade Lenin. We ha9e recei9ed your ciphered telegram. We ha9e already informed you of the reasons for the catastrophe as re9ealed y the in9estigation# ' an army 1ith fatigued units and 1ith no reser9es nor a firm command$ and$ moreo9er$ occupying a flank position open to en9elopment from the %orthIsuch an army could not ut collapse in the face of a serious assault of superior and fresh enemy forces. 6n our opinion$ the trou le lay not only in the 1eakness of the Third 4rmy agencies and the immediate rear$ ut also ') 6n the Aeneral Staff and the 4rea Military Commissariats$ 1hich formed and sent to the front units 1hich 1ere patently unrelia le* 7) 6n the 4ll/>ussian Commissars 5ureau$ 1hich supplied the units eing formed in the rear 1ith callo1 youths$ not commissars* 3) 6n the >e9olutionary Military Council of the >epu lic$ 1hose so/called instructions and orders disorgani?ed the control of the front and the armies. Gnless the necessary changes are made at central headFuarters$ there can e no guarantee of success at the fronts. 0ere are our replies to the military. '. The two re i!ents. T1o regiments surrendered# the 'st So9iet and a regiment of sailors from Petro/ grad. They did not egin any hostile actions against us. 6t 1as the '8th Ca9alry >egiment of the '8th :i9ision stationed in the 9illage of 6lyinskoye$ 1hich had een formed y the Gral 4rea Military Commissariat$ that started hostile actions. "urther$ 1e managed to forestall a mutiny of the '8th >egiment of <ngineers$ stationed at Dchersky Ca9od$ 1hich had also een formed y the 4rea Military Commissariat. The reason for the desertions to the enemy$ as 1ell as for the hostile actions$ 1as the counter/re9olutionary spirit of the regiments$ 1hich is to e attri uted to the old methods of mo ili?ation and formation$ under 1hich no preliminary sifting 1as made of the men called up for ser9ice$ and also to the a sence of e9en a minimum of political educational 1ork in the regiments. 7. "otovilikha. The machinery of the plant and the eFuipment of the electrical shop 1ere dismantled and in9entori?ed in proper time and loaded on rail* ut they 1ere not mo9ed out$ nor 1ere they destroyed. The responsi ility lies 1ith the Central Collegium$ 7 the chief transportation officer and the >e9olutionary Military Council of the army$ 1hich displayed incredi le mismanagement. "i9e/si;ths of Moto9ilikha=s 1orkers 1ere left ehind in Perm$ as also 1ere the entire technical staff of the plant and its ra1 materials. 4ccording to a9aila le information$ the plant can e restarted in a out a month and a half. >umours of a re9olt of the Moto9ilikha 1orkers on the e9e of the fall of Perm are not

confirmed* there 1as only serious unrest due to ad food supply. 3. #e!olition o$ the %rid e and valua%le installations. The ridge$ etc.$ 1ere not lo1n up o1ing to mismanagement on the part of the >e9olutionary Military Council of the army and lack of liaison et1een the retreating units and army headFuarters. 6t is asserted that the comrade 1hose duty it 1as to lo1 up the ridge could not accomplish his mission ecause he 1as killed y 1hiteguards a fe1 minutes efore the charge 1as to e fired. 6t has een impossi le so far to 9erify this 9ersion ecause of the flight of the ridge guards and the departure of a 1hole num er of @So9iet@ officials @no one kno1s 1hereto.@ -. Reserves at Per!. The reser9es consisted of one still 1eak and unrelia le @So9iet regiment$@ 1hich upon its arri9al at the front immediately 1ent o9er to the enemy. There 1ere no other reser9es. 2. Losses o$ !ateriel and !en. 6t is still impossi le to construct a full picture of the losses ecause of the disappearance of a num er of documents and the desertion to the enemy of a num er of the @So9iet@ specialists concerned. 4ccording to the scanty data a9aila le$ our losses 1ere# 7(& locomoti9es (of 1hich$ .) in disrepair)$ a out 3$888 rail1ay 1agons (pro a ly more)$ (88$888 poods of oil and paraffin$ se9eral hundred thousand poods of caustic soda$ t1o million poods of salt$ fi9e million ru les= 1orth of medical supplies$ the storehouses of the Moto9ilikha plant and the Perm rail1ayshops 1ith the 9ast amount of materials they contained$ the machinery and parts of the Moto9ilikha plant$ the machinery of the steamers of the 3ama flotilla$ )2 1agon/loads of leather$ '28 1agon/loads of food elonging to the army supply di9ision$ the huge 1arehouse of the :istrict/ Water Transport 5oard containing cotton 1ool$ te;tiles$ mineral oil$ etc.$ ten cars of 1ounded$ the a;le stores of the rail1ays 1hich included large stocks of 4merican a;les$ 7( guns$ '8$888 shells$ 7$888 rifles$ . million cartridges* o9er .$888 men killed$ 1ounded or missing in the period :ecem er 77 to 7(. The rail1ay specialists and practically all the supply specialists ha9e remained in Perm. The counting of losses continues. ). Present $i htin stren th o$ the ar!y. The Third 4rmy consists at present of t1o di9isions (7(th and 38th)$ 1ith '-$888 ayonets and 3$888 sa res$ 373 machine guns and &. guns. >eser9es# a rigade of the &th :i9ision sent from >ussia 1hich has not yet een sent into action ecause of its unrelia ility and need of thorough sifting. The three regiments promised y ,atsetis ha9e not yet arri9ed (and 1ill not$ ecause yesterday$ it appears$ they 1ere redirected to %ar9a). 3 The units in action are attered and 1orn out and are holding their positions 1ith difficulty. &. &ontrol syste! o$ the Third 'r!y. Dut1ardly$ the system of control seems the usual one and @according to the manual.@ 4ctually$ there is no system at allIthe administration is utterly incompetent$ has no liaison 1ith the com at area$ and the di9isions are 9irtually autonomous. .. (ave ade)uate !easures %een taken to halt the retreat* Df the measures taken$ the follo1ing may e considered of serious 9alue# ') ad9ance of the Second 4rmy to1ards 3ungur$ 1hich is undou tedly of great support to the Third 4rmy$ and 7) the dispatch to the front$ thanks to the efforts of Stalin and :?er?hinsky$ of (88 fresh and fully relia le ayonets 1ith the o Ject of raising the fallen morale of the Third 4rmy. Within a couple of days 1e shall dispatch to the front t1o sFuadrons of ca9alry and the )7nd >egiment of the 3rd 5rigade (already sifted). 4nother regiment 1ill e lea9ing in ten days. The front of the Third 4rmy kno1s this and sees the solicitude of the rear$ and its morale is stiffening. Without a dou t$ the situation is etter than it 1as a fortnight ago. 6n places the army is e9en assuming the offensi9e$ and not 1ithout success. 6f the enemy allo1s us another couple of 1eeks= respite$ that is$ if he does not ring up fresh forces to the front$ there is hope that a sta le situation 1ill e created in the Third 4rmy=s area. We are at present engaged in liFuidating a northern en9eloping mo9ement of se9eral enemy

detachments in the direction of ,yatka$ along the road that runs through 3aigorod. Dne reason$ incidentally$ 1hy 1e ha9e come to ,yatka is to send a ski detachment to 3aigorod$ 1hich 1e shall do. 4s to other measures (for strengthening the rear)$ 1e are mo ili?ing personnel$ rank/and/file and other1ise$ and appointing them to the army units in the rear$ and are purging the Ala?o9 and ,yatka So9iets. 5ut$ of course$ the results of this 1ork 1ill not make themsel9es felt for some time. This e;hausts the measures taken. They can y no means e considered adeFuate$ ecause the 1eary units of the Third 4rmy cannot hold on for long 1ithout at least partial replacement. 6t is therefore necessary to send us at least t1o regiments. Dnly then may the sta ility of the front e considered guaranteed. 4part from this$ it is necessary# ') To replace the army commander* 7) To send three efficient political 1orkers* 3) To dissol9e immediately the >egional Party Committee$ >egional So9iet$ etc.$ 1ith a 9ie1 to the speedy mo ili?ation of the e9acuated officials. J. Stalin F. Dzerzhinsky ,yatka$ +anuary '($ '('( P. S. We shall e returning to Ala?o9 in a fe1 days to complete the in9estigation.

Notes '. Dn +anuary '3$ '('($ +. ,. Stalin and ". <. :?er?hinsky sent ,. 6. Lenin and the Party Central Committee a @5rief Preliminary >eport@ on the progress of the inFuiry into the reasons for the Perm disaster. 6t also outlined the measures proposed y the commission for restoring the situation in the Third 4rmy sector and to ena le the army to pass to the offensi9e. 6n response to the report$ ,. 6. Lenin$ on +anuary '-$ sent the follo1ing telegram# @To Stalin and :?er?hinsky at their address in Ala?o9. @0a9e recei9ed and read your first ciphered dispatch. <arnestly reFuest oth of you personally to super9ise the carrying out of the proposed measures on the spot$ other1ise there 1ill e no guarantee of success.ILenin.@ 7. Central CollegiumIthe local agency of the 4ll/>ussian <9acuation Commission. 3. This refers to the three regiments 1hich 1ere to e sent to the Third 4rmy y the Commander/in/ Chief in response to the reFuest of +. ,. Stalin and ". <. :?er?hinsky. When for/ 1arding this report to the >e9olutionary Military Council of the >epu lic$ ,. 6. Lenin 1rote in the margin# @. . . 6n my opinion it is simply outrageous that ,atsetis ordered the three regiments to %ar9a. CountermanditE E@ (see Lenin Miscellany$ KKK6,$ p. (8).

Note to V.I. Lenin from Petrograd y Dire!t "ire

Written# May 72$ '('( (') "irst Pu lished# in the symposium #ocu!ents on the (eroic #e$ence o$ Petro rad in +,+,$ Mosco1$ '(-' Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works, ,olume -$ page 7)./7&8. "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 Transcription# 0ari 3umar for 4lliance/ML 0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882 The dispatch of units is undou tedly etter organi?ed no1 than it 1as some three months ago$ ut it is also clear to me that neither the Commander/in/Chief nor his chief of staff kno1 anything a out the units 1hich are eing sent to Petrograd. 0ence such surprises as the arri9al of mere handfuls of men under the guise of regiments of the 7nd 5rigade or the Ca9alry 5rigade from 3a?an. 4t any rate$ Petrograd has recei9ed so far only si; hundred men from military schools 1ho are really fit for action. 5ut the chief thing$ of course$ is not the Fuantity$ ut the Fuality of the units. 4ll 1e need to dri9e the 1hole pack eyond %ar9a is three infantry regiments I fit for action$ of course I and at least one ca9alry regiment. 6f you could ha9e seen your 1ay to meet this small reFuest in time$ the <stonians 1ould ha9e een dri9en ack efore no1. 0o1e9er$ there is no cause for alarm$ since the situation at the front has ecome sta le$ the front line has stiffened$ and in places our forces are already ad9ancing. Today 6 inspected our 3arelian fortifications and on the 1hole found the situation tolera le. The "inns are maintaining a stu orn silence and$ strangely enough$ ha9e not taken ad9antage of the opportunity. 5ut this is to e attri uted to the fact that their o1n position at home is gro1ing more and more unsta le$ as 1e are assured y "innish comrades familiar 1ith the state of affairs. 6 1as sho1n today a proposal of the Commander/in/Chief to cut do1n the na9y on account of the fuel crisis. 6 conferred on this su Ject 1ith all our na9al men and ha9e arri9ed at the con9iction that the Commander/in/Chief=s proposal is a solutely incorrect. >easons# first$ if ig units are to e con9erted into floating rafts it 1ill e impossi le to operate their guns$ that is$ the latter 1ill simply not shoot$ ecause there is a direct connection et1een the mo9ement of a ship and the action of its guns* secondly$ it is not true that 1e ha9e no large/cali re shells / the other day t1el9e arge/loads of shells 1ere @disco9ered@* thirdly$ the fuel crisis is passing$ ecause 1e ha9e already succeeded in accumulating four hundred and t1enty thousand poods of coal$ apart from ma?ut$ and are recei9ing a trainload of coal daily* fourthly$ 6 ha9e con9inced myself that our na9y is eing turned into a real na9y$ 1ith 1ell/disciplined sailors 1ho are prepared to defend Petrograd might and main. 6 do not 1ant to mention here the num er of attle units already fit for action$ ut 6 consider it my duty to say that 1ith the na9al forces a9aila le 1e could defend Petrograd 1ith credit against any attack from the sea. 6n 9ie1 of this$ 6$ and all the Petrograd comrades$ insist that the Commander/in/Chief=s proposal e reJected. "urther$ 6 consider it a solutely essential that coal deli9eries e increased to t1o trainloads a day for a period of three or four 1eeks. This$ our na9al men assure us$ 1ill ena le us to put our su marine and surface fleet definitely in fighting trim. Stalin (') 6n connection 1ith Budenich=s offensi9e of May '('( and the threat of encirclement and capture of Petrograd y the Whites$ +.,.Stalin 1as sent to the Petrograd "ront as plenipotentiary of the Council of

:efense$ 1hich furnished him 1ith a mandate$ dated May '&th '('($ stating that he 1as eing sent on a mission to the Petrograd and other areas of the Western "ront for @the adoption of all urgent measures necessitated y the situation on the Western "ront.@ +.,.Stalin arri9ed in Petrograd on May '($ '('(.

Telegram to V.I. Lenin

"irst Pu lished# Pravda %o. 38'$ :ecem er 7'$'(7( Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Works, ,olume -$ page 7&'. "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 Transcription# 0ari 3umar for 4lliance/ML 0TML# Mike 5. for M64$ 7882 "ollo1ing the capture of 3rasnaya Aorka$ Seraya Loshad(') has een taken. Their guns are in perfect order. 4 rapid check of all the forts and fortresses is under 1ay. %a9al e;perts assert that the capture of 3rasnaya Aorka from the sea runs counter to na9al science. 6 can only deplore such so/called science. The s1ift capture of Aorka 1as due to the grossest interference in the operations y me and ci9ilians generally$ e9en to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing our o1n. 6 consider it my duty to declare that 6 shall continue to act in this 1ay in future$ despite all my re9erence for science. Stalin +une ')$ '('( (') Succum ing to the counter/re9olutionary agitation of 1hite guards connected 1ith the Socialist/ >e9olutionaries and Menshe9iks$ the garrisons of 3rasnya Aorka and Seraya Loshad$ t1o forts near Petrograd$ mutinied against the So9iet Ao9ernment on +une '3 '('(. That day$ on +.,.Stalin=s orders$ 9essels of the 5altic "leet put out to sea to take action against the mutineers.$ 4t the same time a core$ 1as formed in Dranien aum. Dn +une '-$ +.,. Stalin arri9ed in Dranien aum$ and conferred 1ith representati9es of the na9al and army commands and commanders and commissars of units and detachments. The plan he proposed for the capture of 3rasnaya Aorka y a simultaneous lo1 from sea and land 1as adopted. The attack 1as launched on +une '2 y the Coastal Aroup and other units$ supported y 9essels of the 5altic "leet$ the operation eing personally directed y +.,.Stalin from the attle lines. The mutineers 1ere o9er1helmed at the approaches to 3ranaya Aorka$ and at 8.38 am on +une ') the fort 1as captured. Seraya Loshad 1as taken a fe1 hours later.

Note to V. I. Lenin from Petrograd y Dire!t "ire

June 18, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. 6 consider it necessary to dra1 your attention to the follo1ing Fuestions. -irst. 3olchak is the most serious enemy$ ecause he has sufficient space for retreat$ sufficient man po1er for his army$ and a rear a ounding in food. Compared 1ith 3olchak$ Aeneral >od?yanko is a mere gnat$ ecause he has neither food in his rear$ nor space for retreat$ nor sufficient man po1er. The mo ili?ation of t1enty age classes$ to 1hich he is no1 compelled to resort in his t1o or three uye?ds o1ing to lack of man po1er$ 1ill mean the end of him$ since the peasants cannot stand mo ili?ation on such a scale and are ound to turn a1ay from him. ConseFuently$ under no circumstances should forces e 1ithdra1n from the <astern "ront for the Petrograd "ront in such num ers as might compel us to halt our offensi9e on the <astern "ront. 6n order to force >od?yanko ack to the <stland frontier (there is no point in our going any further) one di9ision 1ill e sufficient$ and its remo9al 1ill not in9ol9e halting the offensi9e on the <astern "ront. Please gi9e this your special attention. Second. We ha9e unearthed a ig conspiracy in the 3ronstadt area. The attery commanders of all the forts in the entire 3ronstadt fortified area are implicated. The aim of the conspiracy 1as to sei?e possession of the fortress$ take control of the fleet$ open fire on the rear of our troops$ and clear the road to Petrograd for >od?yan/ko. The rele9ant documents ha9e fallen into our hands. 6t is no1 clear to me 1hy >od?yank$ 1ith his relati9ely small forces$ ad9anced so ra?enly on Petro/ grad. The insolence of the "inns is no1 also understanda le. Gnderstanda le$ too$ are the 1holesale desertions of our com at officers. So is the strange fact that at the moment of the etrayal of 3rasnaya Aorka the 5ritish 1arships 9anished from the scene* the 5ritish$ o 9iously$ considered that direct interference on their part (inter9entionE) 1ould not e @con9enient$@ and preferred to turn up after the fortress and the fleet had fallen into the hands of the Whites$ 1ith the o Ject of @helping the >ussian people@ to esta lish a ne1$ @democratic system.@ D 9iously$ >od?yanko and Budenich (to the latter can e traced all the threads of the conspiracy$ 1hich 1as financed y 5ritain through the 6talian$ S1iss and :anish em assies) ased their 1hole scheme on the e;pectation of a successful issue of the conspiracy$ 1hich$ 6 hope$ 1e ha9e nipped in the ud (all persons implicated ha9e een arrested and the in9estigation is proceeding). My reFuest# make no rela;ations in regard to the arrested em assy officials$ keep them in strict confinement until the completion of the in9estigation$ 1hich is re9ealing a host of ne1 threads. 6 shall gi9e you a more detailed account 1ithin three or four days$ y 1hich time 6 hope to come to Mosco1 for a day$ if you ha9e no o Jection. 6 am sending the map. 6 could not do so until no1 simply ecause 6 1as a1ay all the time on front/line usiness$ mostly at the front itself. Stalin +une '.$ '('($ 3 a. m. "irst pu lished in Pra9da$ %o. 23$ "e ruary 73$ '(-'

Note to V. I. Lenin from Petrograd y Dire!t "ire

June 18, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. 6 consider it necessary to dra1 your attention to the follo1ing Fuestions. -irst. 3olchak is the most serious enemy$ ecause he has sufficient space for retreat$ sufficient man po1er for his army$ and a rear a ounding in food. Compared 1ith 3olchak$ Aeneral >od?yanko is a mere gnat$ ecause he has neither food in his rear$ nor space for retreat$ nor sufficient man po1er. The mo ili?ation of t1enty age classes$ to 1hich he is no1 compelled to resort in his t1o or three uye?ds o1ing to lack of man po1er$ 1ill mean the end of him$ since the peasants cannot stand mo ili?ation on such a scale and are ound to turn a1ay from him. ConseFuently$ under no circumstances should forces e 1ithdra1n from the <astern "ront for the Petrograd "ront in such num ers as might compel us to halt our offensi9e on the <astern "ront. 6n order to force >od?yanko ack to the <stland frontier (there is no point in our going any further) one di9ision 1ill e sufficient$ and its remo9al 1ill not in9ol9e halting the offensi9e on the <astern "ront. Please gi9e this your special attention. Second. We ha9e unearthed a ig conspiracy in the 3ronstadt area. The attery commanders of all the forts in the entire 3ronstadt fortified area are implicated. The aim of the conspiracy 1as to sei?e possession of the fortress$ take control of the fleet$ open fire on the rear of our troops$ and clear the road to Petrograd for >od?yan/ko. The rele9ant documents ha9e fallen into our hands. 6t is no1 clear to me 1hy >od?yank$ 1ith his relati9ely small forces$ ad9anced so ra?enly on Petro/ grad. The insolence of the "inns is no1 also understanda le. Gnderstanda le$ too$ are the 1holesale desertions of our com at officers. So is the strange fact that at the moment of the etrayal of 3rasnaya Aorka the 5ritish 1arships 9anished from the scene* the 5ritish$ o 9iously$ considered that direct interference on their part (inter9entionE) 1ould not e @con9enient$@ and preferred to turn up after the fortress and the fleet had fallen into the hands of the Whites$ 1ith the o Ject of @helping the >ussian people@ to esta lish a ne1$ @democratic system.@ D 9iously$ >od?yanko and Budenich (to the latter can e traced all the threads of the conspiracy$ 1hich 1as financed y 5ritain through the 6talian$ S1iss and :anish em assies) ased their 1hole scheme on the e;pectation of a successful issue of the conspiracy$ 1hich$ 6 hope$ 1e ha9e nipped in the ud (all persons implicated ha9e een arrested and the in9estigation is proceeding). My reFuest# make no rela;ations in regard to the arrested em assy officials$ keep them in strict confinement until the completion of the in9estigation$ 1hich is re9ealing a host of ne1 threads. 6 shall gi9e you a more detailed account 1ithin three or four days$ y 1hich time 6 hope to come to Mosco1 for a day$ if you ha9e no o Jection.

6 am sending the map. 6 could not do so until no1 simply ecause 6 1as a1ay all the time on front/line usiness$ mostly at the front itself. Stalin +une '.$ '('($ 3 a. m. "irst pu lished in Pra9da$ %o. 23$ "e ruary 73$ '(-'

Letter to V. I. Lenin a o#t the Sit#ation on the "estern Front $

August 11, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To Comrade Lenin. The situation on the Western "ront is ecoming more and more ominous. The old$ attered and 1eary units of the Si;teenth 4rmy$ 1hich is eing hard pressed y the most acti9e enemy on the Western "rontIthe PolesIare not only una le to 1ithstand the onslaught$ are not only una le to defend themsel9es$ ut ha9e e9en ecome incapa le of co9ering the retreat of their atteries$ 1hich are$ naturally$ falling into the hands of the enemy. 6 am afraid that$ 1ith its units in such a state$ the Si;teenth 4rmy in its retreat to the 5ere?ina 1ill find itself 1ithout guns or aggage trains. There is also the danger that the attered and a solutely demorali?ed cadres of the maJority of the regiments may soon e incapa le of assimilating replenishments$ 1hich moreo9er I it must e said I are arri9ing 1ith preposterous delay. The enemy is dri9ing to1ards the 5ere?ina along t1o main directions# to1ards 5oriso9$ and to1ards Slutsk and 5o ruisk. 4nd he is dri9ing successfully$ for he has already ad9anced some thirty 9ersts in the direction of 5oriso9$ and in the South$ 1ith the capture of Slutsk$ he has sei?ed possession of the key to 5o ruiskIthe splendid high1ay$ the only one in the area. 6f 5oriso9 is captured$ and if$ as is likely$ the se9erely attered '&th :i9ision of the Si;teenth 4rmy rolls ack as a result$ the "ifteenth 4rmy 1ill e in Jeopardy$ and Polotsk and :9insk 1ill e directly menaced. 4nd if 5o ruisk is captured and the enemy strikes at >echitsa (1hich is his direct aim)$ the entire Pripyat group of the Si;teenth 4rmy$ that is$ the .th :i9ision$ 1ill automatically suffer disaster$ Aomel 1ill e directly threatened$ and the flank of the T1elfth 4rmy 1ill e laid are. 6n rief$ if 1e allo1 the enemy to knock out our Si;teenth 4rmy$ and he is already doing it$ 1e shall e letting do1n the "ifteenth and T1elfth 4rmies$ and 1e shall then ha9e to repair not only the Si;teenth

4rmy ut the 1hole front$ and at a far hea9ier cost. <9idently$ 1e are appro;imately in the same position as that of the <astern "ront last year$ 1hen ,a/ tsetis and 3ostyae9 allo1ed 3olchak to knock out first our Third 4rmy$ then the Second and then the "ifth$ there y Fuite unnecessarily 1recking the 1ork of the 1hole front for a good half year. Dn the Western "ront$ this prospect has e9ery chance of ecoming a reality. 6 ha9e already 1ritten efore that the Western "ront represents a thread are garment 1hich cannot e patched up 1ithout trained reser9es$ and that the enemy has only to deli9er one serious lo1 at one of the important points to make the 1hole front reel$ or rather$ shake. Gnfortunately$ these apprehensions of mine are no1 eginning to e orne out. Bet the enemy in the West$ 1ho is united under a single command$ has not yet rought into action those Russian corps 1hich he has ready$ or nearly ready$ in >iga$ Warsa1 and 3ishine9. 4 out three 1eeks ago 6 elie9ed that one di9ision 1ould e enough to ena le us to launch an offensi9e and occupy the Molodechno and 5arano9ichi Junctions. %o1 one di9ision may not e enough e9en to ena le us to hold the 5oriso9/5o ruisk/Mo?yr line. 4 successful offensi9e is not e9en to e thought of$ ecause for this 1e should no1 (4ugust '') need at least t1o or three di9isions. %o1 decide yourself# can you let us ha9e one di9ision$ if only in successi9e rigades$ or are you going to allo1 the enemy to smash the already crum ling Si;teenth 4rmyL 5ut decide 1ithout delay$ ecause e9ery hour is precious. Bours$ +. Stalin P. S. This letter has een read and appro9ed y all the mem ers of the >e9olutionary Military Council of the Western "ront$ not e;cluding the "ront Commander. 4 similar statement 1ill e sent in a day or t1o to the >e9olutionary Military Council of the >epu lic. J. St. Smolensk$ 4ugust ''$ '('(

Notes '.4t the eginning of +uly '('( the Polish 1hiteguards launched a general offensi9e and created a direct threat to the So9iet >epu lic from the West. +. ,. Stalin 1as instructed y the Central Committee of the Party to take o9er personal direction of the Western "ront. 0e 1as appointed a mem er of the >e9olutionary Military Council of the Western "ront$ and he arri9ed at front headFuarters in Smolensk on +uly ($ '('(.

Letter to T% V. I. Lenin from the So#thern Front $

October 15, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. Comrade Lenin$ 4 out t1o months ago Aeneral 0eadFuarters did not o Ject in principle to the main lo1 eing deli9ered from 1est to east$ through the :onets 5asin. 4nd if it reJected it ne9ertheless$ it 1as on the plea of the @legacy@ left y the retreat of the southern troops in the summer$ that is$ the hapha?ard grouping of troops in the area of the present South/<astern "ront$ the reforming of 1hich (the grouping) 1ould entail considera le loss of time$ to :enikin=s ad9antage. 6t 1as only for this reason that 6 did not o Ject to the officially adopted direction of the lo1. 5ut no1 the situation has radically changed$ and 1ith it the grouping of forces# the <ighth 4rmy (the maJor army on the former Southern "ront) has mo9ed into the area of the Southern "ront and is directly facing the :onets 5asin* 5udyonny=s Ca9alry Corps (another maJor force) has like1ise mo9ed into the Southern "ront area* and a ne1 force has een addedIthe Lat9ian :i9ision$ 1hich 1ithin a month 1ill ha9e een replenished and 1ill again represent a formida le force to :enikin. Bou see that the old grouping (the @legacy@) no longer e;ists. What then induces Aeneral 0eadFuarters to insist on the old planL %othing$ apparently$ ut o stinacy I if you like$ factionalism$ factionalism of the most o tuse kind and most dangerous to the >epu lic$ 1hich is culti9ated in Aeneral 0eadFuarters y that @strategic@ antam cock Ause9. The other day Aeneral 0eadFuarters issued instructions to Shorin to ad9ance from the Tsaritsyn area on %o9orossiisk through the :on steppe y a line along 1hich it may e con9enient for our a9iators to fly$ ut along 1hich our infantry and our artillery 1ill find it Fuite impossi le to plod. 6t does not need to e pro9ed that this insane (proJected) campaign through a hostile en9ironment and 1here there are a solutely no roads threatens us 1ith utter disaster. 6t should not e difficult to understand that such a campaign against Cossack 9illages$ as recent e;perience has sho1n$ can only rally the Cossacks around :enikin and against us in defence of their 9illages$ can only ser9e to set up :enikin as the sa9iour of the :on$ can only create a Cossack army for :enikin$ that is$ can only strengthen :enikin. Precisely for this reason it is essential at once$ 1ithout loss of time$ to change the old plan$ 1hich has already een a olished in practice$ and replace it y a plan under 1hich the main lo1 1ill e directed from the ,orone?h area$ through 3harko9 and the :onets 5asin$ on >osto9. "irstly$ here 1e shall ha9e an en9ironment that is not hostile$ ut on the contrary$ sympathetic to us$ 1hich 1ill facilitate our ad9ance. Secondly$ 1e shall secure a most important rail1ay net1ork (:onets) and the maJor supply artery of :enikin=s armyIthe ,orone?h/>osto9 line (the loss of 1hich 1ill lea9e the Cossack army 1ithout supplies in the 1inter$ ecause the :on >i9er$ y 1hich the :on 4rmy is supplied$ 1ill ha9e

fro?en o9er$ and the <ast :onets >ail1ay$ Likhaya/Tsaritsyn$ 1ill e cut). Thirdly$ y this ad9ance 1e shall e cutting :enikin=s army in t1o$ one part of 1hich$ the ,olunteer 4rmy$ 1e shall lea9e to Makhno to de9our$ 1hile the Cossack armies 1e shall threaten 1ith the danger of eing outflanked. "ourthly$ 1e shall e in a position to set the Cossacks at loggerheads 1ith :enikin$ 1ho$ if our ad9ance is successful$ 1ill endea9our to mo9e the Cossack units 1est1ard$ to 1hich the maJority of the Cossacks 1ill not agree$ if$ of course$ y that time 1e put efore them the issue of peace$ of negotiations for peace$ and so on. "ifthly$ 1e shall secure coal$ and :enikin 1ill e left 1ithout coal. This plan must e adopted 1ithout delay$ since Aeneral 0eadFuarters= plan of transfer and distri ution of regiments threatens to nullify our recent successes on the Southern "ront. 6 say nothing of the fact that Aeneral 0eadFuarters is ignoring$ and* has 9irtually rescinded$ the recent decision of the Central Committee and the Ao9ernmentI@<9erything for the Southern "ront.@ 6n short$ the old plan$ 1hich has already een a olished in reality$ must under no circumstances e gal9ani?ed into life. That 1ould e dangerous to the >epu lic* it 1ould most certainly impro9e :enikin=s position. 6t must e replaced y another plan. Conditions and circumstances are not only ripe for such a change$ they imperati9ely dictate it. 6n that e9ent the distri ution of regiments 1ill also proceed on different lines. Without this$ my 1ork on the Southern "ront 1ill ecome meaningless$ criminal and futile$ 1hich 1ill gi9e me the right$ or rather 1ill force me$ to go any1here$ e9en to the de9il himself$ only not to remain on the Southern "ront. Bours$ Stalin Serpukho9$ Dcto er '2$ '('( "irst pu lished in Pravda$ %o. 38'$ :ecem er 7'$ '(7(

Notes '.5y decision of the C.C.$ >.C.P.(5.) of Septem er 7)$ '('($ +. ,. Stalin 1as sent to the Southern "ront to organi?e the defeat of :enikin. 0e arri9ed at front headFuarters on Dcto er 3. The plan he proposed for routing :enikin 1as appro9ed y the Central Committee of the Party.

Telegram to V. I. Lenin
October 26, 1919

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source.

The Ca9alry Corps of Shkuro and Mamonto9$ created after such long effort y the <ntente and :enikin as the ack one of the counter/re9olution$ ha9e een utterly routed at ,orone?h y Comrade 5udyonnyMs Ca9alry Corps. ,orone?h is in the hands of the >ed heroes. 4 mass of trophies has een captured and is no1 eing counted. 6t is already ascertained that all the enemyMs personally named armoured trains ha9e een captured$ the Aeneral Shkuro 4rmoured Train first among them. Pursuit of the routed enemy continues. The halo of in9inci ility created around the names of Aenerals Mamonto9 and Shkuro has een shattered y the 9alour of the >ed heroes of Comrade 5udyonnyMs Ca9alry Corps. >e9olutionary Military Council of the Southern "ront Stalin Dcto er 72$ '('( Petro radskaya Pravda, %o. 7--$ Dcto er 7)$ '('(

Lenin as the organiser and leader of the R#ssian &omm#nist Party

April 23, 1920

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. There are t1o groups of Mar;ists. 5oth 1ork under the flag of Mar;ism and consider themsel9es @genuinely@ Mar;ist. %e9ertheless$ they are y no means identical. More$ a 9erita le gulf di9ides them$ for their methods of 1ork are diametrically opposed to each other. The first group usually confines itself to an out1ard acceptance$ to a ceremonial a9o1al of Mar;ism. 5eing una le or un1illing to grasp the essence of Mar;ism$ eing una le or un1illing to put it into practice$ it con9erts the li9ing$ re9olutionary principles of Mar;ism into lifeless$ meaningless formulas. 6t does not ase its acti9ities on e;perience$ on 1hat practical 1ork teaches$ ut on Fuotations from Mar;. 6t does not deri9e its instructions and directions from an analysis of li9ing reality$ ut from analogies and historical parallels. :iscrepancy et1een 1ord and deed is the chief malady of this group. 0ence the disillusionment and perpetual grudge against fate$ 1hich time and again lets it do1n and makes a @dupe@ of it. The name for this group is Menshe9ism (in >ussia)$ opportunism (in <urope). Comrade Tys?ka (+ogiches) descri ed this group 9ery aptly at the London Congress ' 1hen he said that it does not stand y$ ut lies do1n on the point of 9ie1 of Mar;ism. The second group$ on the contrary$ attaches prime importance not to the out1ard acceptance of Mar;ism$ ut to its reali?ation$ its application in practice. What this group chiefly concentrates its attention on is determining the 1ays and means of reali?ing Mar;ism that est ans1er the situation$ and changing these 1ays and means as the situation changes. 6t does not deri9e its directions and instructions from historical analogies and parallels$ ut from a study of surrounding conditions. 6t does

not ase its acti9ities on Fuotations and ma;ims$ ut on practical e;perience$ testing e9ery step y e;perience$ learning from its mistakes and teaching others ho1 to uild a ne1 life. That$ in fact$ e;plains 1hy there is no discrepancy et1een 1ord and deed in the acti9ities of this group$ and 1hy the teachings of Mar; completely retain their li9ing$ re9olutionary force. To this group may e fully applied Mar;=s saying that Mar;ists cannot rest content 1ith interpreting the 1orld$ ut must go further and change it. 7 The name for this group is 5olshe9ism$ communism. The organi?er and leader of this group is ,. 6. Lenin. I Lenin as the organiser of the R#ssian &omm#nist Party The formation of the proletarian party in >ussia took place under special conditions$ differing from those pre9ailing in the West at the time the 1orkers= party 1as formed there. Whereas in the West$ in "rance and in Aermany$ the 1orkers= party emerged from the trade unions at a time 1hen trade unions and parties 1ere legal$ 1hen the ourgeois re9olution had already taken place$ 1hen ourgeois parliaments e;isted$ 1hen the ourgeoisie$ ha9ing clim ed into po1er$ found itself confronted y the proletariatIin >ussia$ on the contrary$ the formation of the proletarian party took place under a most ferocious a solutism$ in e;pectation of a ourgeois/democratic re9olution* at a time 1hen$ on the one hand$ the Party organi?ations 1ere filled to o9erflo1ing 1ith ourgeois @legal Mar;ists@ 1ho 1ere thirsting to utili?e the 1orking class for the ourgeois re9olution$ and 1hen$ on the other hand$ the tsarist gendarmerie 1as ro ing the Party=s ranks of its est 1orkers$ 1hile the gro1th of a spontaneous re9olutionary mo9ement called for the e;istence of a staunch$ compact and sufficiently secret fighting core of re9olutionaries$ capa le of directing the mo9ement to the o9erthro1 of a solutism. The task 1as to separate the sheep from the goats$ to dissociate oneself from alien elements$ to organi?e cadres of e;perienced re9olutionaries in the localities$ to pro9ide them 1ith a clear programme and firm tactics$ and$ lastly$ to gather these cadres into a single$ militant organi?ation of professional re9olutionaries$ sufficiently secret to 1ithstand the onslaughts of the gendarmes$ ut at the same time sufficiently connected 1ith the masses to lead them into attle at the reFuired moment. The Menshe9iks$ the people 1ho @lie do1n@ on the point of 9ie1 of Mar;ism$ settled the Fuestion 9ery simply# inasmuch as the 1orkers= party in the West had emerged from non/party trade unions fighting for the impro9ement of the economic conditions of the 1orking class$ the same$ as far as possi le$ should happen in >ussia* that is$ the @economic struggle of the 1orkers against the employers and the go9ernment@ in the localities 1as enough for the time eing$ no all/>ussian militant organi?ation should e created$ and later . . . 1ell$ later$ if trade unions did not arise y that time$ a non/party la our congress should e called and proclaimed as the party. That this @Mar;ist@ @plan@ of the Menshe9iks$ utopian though it 1as under >ussian conditions$ ne9ertheless entailed e;tensi9e agitational 1ork designed to disparage the notion of the Party principle$ to destroy the Party cadres$ to lea9e the proletariat 1ithout its o1n party and to surrender the 1orking class to the tender mercies of the li eralsIthe Menshe9iks$ and perhaps a good many 5olshe9iks too$ hardly suspected at the time. The immense ser9ice Lenin rendered the >ussian proletariat and its Party 1as that he e;posed the 1hole danger of the Menshe9iks= @plan@ of organi?ation at a time 1hen this @plan@ 1as still in em ryo$ 1hen e9en its authors percei9ed its outlines 1ith difficulty$ and$ ha9ing e;posed it$ opened a furious attack on the la;ity of the Menshe9iks in matters of organi?ation and concentrated the 1hole attention of the Party=s practical 1orkers on this Fuestion. "or the 9ery e;istence of the Party 1as at stake* it 1as a matter of life or death for the Party.

To esta lish an all/>ussian political ne1spaper as a rallying centre of Party forces$ to organi?e staunch Party cadres in the localities as @regular units@ of the Party$ to organi?e these cadres into one entity through the medium of the ne1spaper$ and to 1eld them into an all/>ussian militant party 1ith sharply/ defined limits$ 1ith a clear programme$ firm tactics and a single 1illIsuch 1as the plan that Lenin de9eloped in his famous ooks$ What .s To /e #one* 3 and 0ne Ste1 -orward, Two Ste1s /ack. - The merit of this plan lay in the fact that it fully conformed to >ussian realities$ and that it generali?ed in masterly fashion the organi?ational e;perience of the est of the practical 1orkers. 6n the struggle for this plan$ the maJority of the >ussian practical 1orkers resolutely follo1ed Lenin and 1ere not deterred y a possi le split. The 9ictory of this plan laid the foundation for that close/knit and steeled Communist Party 1hich has no eFual in the 1orld. Dur comrades (not only the Menshe9iksE) often accused Lenin of an e;cessi9e inclination to1ards contro9ersy and splits$ of eing relentless in his struggle against conciliators$ and so on. 4t one time this 1as undou tedly the case. 5ut it 1ill e easily understood that our Party could not ha9e rid itself of internal 1eakness and diffuseness$ that it could not ha9e attained its characteristic 9igour and strength if it had not e;pelled the non/proletarian$ opportunist elements from its midst. 6n the epoch of ourgeois rule$ a proletarian party can gro1 and gain strength only to the e;tent that it com ats the opportunist$ anti/re9olutionary and anti/party elements in its o1n midst and 1ithin the 1orking class. Lassalle 1as right 1hen he said# @The party ecomes strong y purging itself.@ 2 The accusers usually cited the Aerman party$ in 1hich @unity@ at that time flourished. 5ut$ in the first place$ not e9ery kind of unity is a sign of strength$ and secondly$ one has only to glance at the late Aerman party$ rent into three parties$) to reali?e the utter falsity and fictitiousness of @unity@ et1een Scheidemann and %oske$ on the one hand$ and Lie knecht and Lu;em urg$ on the other. 4nd 1ho kno1s 1hether it 1ould not ha9e een etter for the Aerman proletariat if the re9olutionary elements of the Aerman party had split a1ay from its anti/re9olutionary elements in timeL . . . %o$ Lenin 1as a thousand times right in leading the Party along the path of uncompromising struggle against the anti/ Party and anti/re9olutionary elements. "or it 1as only ecause of such a policy of organi?ation that our Party 1as a le to create that internal unity and astonishing cohesion 1hich ena led it to emerge unscathed from the +uly crisis during the 3erensky regime$ to ear the runt of the Dcto er uprising$ to pass through the crisis of the 5rest period unshaken$ to organi?e the 9ictory o9er the <ntente$ and$ lastly$ to acFuire that unparalleled fle;i ility 1hich permits it at any moment to re/form its ranks and to concentrate hundreds of thousands of its mem ers on any ig task 1ithout causing confusion in its midst. II Lenin as the leader of the R#ssian &omm#nist Party 5ut the merits of the >ussian Communist Party in the field of organi?ation are only one aspect of the matter. The Party could not ha9e gro1n and ecome strong so Fuickly if the political content of its 1ork$ its programme and tactics had not conformed to >ussian realities$ if its slogans had not fired the masses of the 1orkers and had not impelled the re9olutionary mo9ement for1ard. Let us pass to this aspect of the matter. The >ussian ourgeois/democratic re9olution ('(82) took place under conditions differing from those that pre9ailed during the re9olutionary uphea9als in the West$ in "rance and Aermany$ for e;ample. Whereas the re9olution in the West took place under the conditions of the manufacturing period of capitalism and of an unde9eloped class struggle$ 1hen the proletariat 1as 1eak and numerically small and did not ha9e its o1n party to formulate its demands$ 1hile the ourgeoisie 1as sufficiently re9olutionary to 1in the confidence of the 1orkers and peasants and to lead them into the struggle against the aristocracyIin >ussia$ on the other hand$ the re9olution egan ('(82) under the conditions

of the machine/industry period of capitalism and of a de9eloped class struggle$ 1hen the >ussian proletariat$ relati9ely numerous and 1elded together y capitalism$ had already fought a num er of attles 1ith the ourgeoisie$ had its o1n party$ 1hich 1as more united than the ourgeois party$ and its o1n class demands$ 1hile the >ussian ourgeoisie$ 1hich$ moreo9er$ su sisting on go9ernment contracts$ 1as sufficiently scared y the re9olutionary temper of the proletariat to seek an alliance 1ith the go9ernment and the landlords against the 1orkers and peasants. The fact that the >ussian re9olution roke out as a result of the military re9erses suffered on the fields of Manchuria only accelerated e9ents 1ithout essentially changing the state of affairs. The situation demanded that the proletariat should take the lead of the re9olution$ rally the re9olutionary peasants around itself and 1age a determined fight against tsardom and the ourgeoisie simultaneously$ 1ith a 9ie1 to esta lishing complete democracy in the country and ensuring its o1n class interests. 5ut the Menshe9iks$ the people 1ho @lie do1n@ on the point of 9ie1 of Mar;ism$ settled the Fuestion in their o1n fashion# since the >ussian re9olution is a ourgeois re9olution$ and since it is the representati9es of the ourgeoisie that lead ourgeois re9olutions (see the @history@ of the "rench and Aerman re9olutions)$ the proletariat cannot e;ercise hegemony in the >ussian re9olution$ the leadership should e left to the >ussian ourgeoisie (the 9ery ourgeoisie that 1as etraying the re9olution)* the peasantry should also e handed o9er to the tutelage of the ourgeoisie$ 1hile the proletariat should remain an e;treme Left opposition. 4nd that 9ulgar medley of the tunes of the 1retched li erals the Menshe9iks passed off as the last 1ord in @genuine@ Mar;ismE . . . The immense ser9ice Lenin rendered the >ussian re9olution 1as that he utterly e;posed the futility of the Menshe9iks= historical parallels and the 1hole danger of the Menshe9ik @scheme of re9olution@ 1hich surrendered the cause of the 1orkers to the tender mercies of the ourgeoisie. The re9olutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry$ instead of the dictatorship of the ourgeoisie* oycott of the 5ulygin :uma & and armed uprising$ instead of participating in the :uma and carrying on organic 1ork 1ithin it* the idea of a @Left loc$@ 1hen the :uma 1as after all con9ened$ and the utili?ation of the :uma platform for the struggle outside the :uma$ instead of a Cadet Ministry and the reactionary @cherishing@ of the :uma* the fight against the Cadet Party as a counter/re9olutionary force$ instead of forming a @ loc@ 1ith itIsuch 1as the tactical plan 1hich Lenin de9eloped in his famous pamphlets$ Two Tactics o$ Social2#e!ocracy in the #e!ocratic Revolution . and The Victory o$ the &adets and the Tasks o$ the Workers3 Party. ( The merit of this plan lay in the fact that it luntly and resolutely formulated the class demands of the proletariat in the epoch of the %our eois2de!ocratic revolution in >ussia$ facilitated the transition to the socialist re9olution$ and contained in em ryo the idea of the dictatorshi1 o$ the 1roletariat. The maJority of the >ussian practical 1orkers resolutely and uns1er9ingly follo1ed Lenin in the struggle for this tactical plan. The 9ictory of this plan laid the foundation for those re9olutionary tactics thanks to 1hich our Party is no1 shaking the foundations of 1orld imperialism. The su seFuent de9elopment of e9ents* the four years of imperialist 1ar and the shattering of the 1hole economic life of the country* the "e ruary >e9olution and the cele rated dual po1er* the Pro9isional Ao9ernment$ 1hich 1as a hot ed of ourgeois counter/re9olution$ and the Petrograd So9iet of :eputies$ 1hich 1as the form of the incipient proletarian dictatorship* the Dcto er >e9olution and the dispersal of the Constituent 4ssem ly* the a olition of ourgeois parliamentarism and the proclamation of the >epu lic of So9iets* the transformation of the imperialist 1ar into a ci9il 1ar and the offensi9e of 1orld imperialism$ together 1ith the professed @Mar;ists$@ against the proletarian re9olution* and$ lastly$ the pitia le position of the Men/she9iks$ 1ho clung to the Constituent 4ssem ly and 1ho 1ere

thro1n o9er oard y the proletariat and dri9en y the 1a9es of re9olution to the shores of capitalism I all this only confirmed the correctness of the principles of the re9olutionary tactics formulated y Lenin in his Two Tactics. 4 party 1ith such a heritage could sail oldly for1ard$ 1ithout fear of su merged rocks. 6n our time of proletarian re9olution$ 1hen e9ery Party slogan and e9ery utterance of a leader is tested in action$ the proletariat makes special demands of its leaders. 0istory kno1s of proletarian leaders 1ho 1ere leaders in times of storm$ practical leaders$ self/sacrificing and courageous$ ut 1ho 1ere 1eak in theory. The names of such leaders are not soon forgotten y the masses. Such$ for e;ample$ 1ere Lassalle in Aermany and 5lan/Fui in "rance. 5ut the mo9ement as a 1hole cannot li9e on reminiscences alone# it must ha9e a clear goal (a programme)$ and a firm line (tactics). There is another type of leaderIpeacetime leaders$ 1ho are strong in theory$ ut 1eak in matters of organi?ation and practical 1ork. Such leaders are popular only among an upper layer of the proletariat$ and then only up to a certain time. When the epoch of re9olution sets in$ 1hen practical re9olutionary slogans are demanded of the leaders$ the theoreticians Fuit the stage and gi9e 1ay to ne1 men. Such$ for e;ample$ 1ere Plekhano9 in >ussia and 3autsky in Aermany. To retain the post of leader of the proletarian re9olution and of the proletarian party$ one must com ine strength in theory 1ith e;perience in the practical organi?ation of the proletarian mo9ement. P. 4;elrod$ 1hen he 1as a Mar;ist$ 1rote of Lenin that he @happily com ines the e;perience of a good practical 1orker 1ith a theoretical education and a road political outlook@ (see P. 4;el/rod=s preface to Lenin=s pamphlet# The Tasks o$ the Russian Social2#e!ocrats'8). What Mr. 4;elrod$ the ideologist of @ci9ili?ed@ capitalism$ 1ould say no1 a out Lenin is not difficult to guess. 5ut 1e 1ho kno1 Lenin 1ell and can Judge matters o Jecti9ely ha9e no dou t that Lenin has fully retained this old Fuality. 6t is here$ incidentally$ that one must seek the reason 1hy it is Lenin$ and no one else$ 1ho is today the leader of the strongest and most steeled proletarian party in the 1orld. Signed# J. Stalin Pra9da$ %o. .)$ 4pril 73$ '(78

Notes '.The London CongressIthe "ifth Congress of the >ussian Social/:emocratic La our Party$ 1hich met from 4pril 38 to May '($ '(8&$ in London. 7.See 3arl Mar; and "rederick <ngels$ Selected Works$ ,ol. 66$ Mosco1 '(2'$ p. 3)2. 3.See ,. 6. Lenin$ Works, -th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 2$ pp. 3'(/-(-. -.See ,. 6. Lenin$ Works, -th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. &$ pp. '.2/3(7. 2.These 1ords$ 1hich occur in a letter from Lassalle to 3arl Mar; dated +une 7-$ '.27$ 1ere taken y ,. 6. Lenin as an epigraph to his What .s To /e #one*(see Works, -th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 2$ p. 3'(). ).The three parties resulting from the split of the old Aerman Social/:emocratic Party 1ere# the Social/ :emocratic Party$ the 6ndependent Social/:emocratic Party and the Communist Party of Aermany. &.The 5ulygin :umaIa consultati9e representati9e assem ly 1hich the tsarist go9ernment intended to con9ene in '(82. The la1 instituting the :uma and the regulations go9erning the elections to it 1ere drafted y a commission of 1hich Minister of the 6nterior 5ulygin 1as the chairman$ and 1ere

pu lished simultaneously 1ith the tsar=s Manifesto of 4ugust )$ '(82. The 5olshe9iks proclaimed an acti9e oycott of the 5ulygin :uma. @. . . The 5ulygin :uma 1as ne9er con9ened. 6t 1as s1ept a1ay y the re9olutionary storm efore it 1as con9ened.@ (,. 6. Lenin$ Works, -th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 73$ p. 73(.) ..See ,. 6 . Lenin$ Works$ -th >uss. ed$ ,ol. ($ pp. '/''(. (. See ,. 6. Lenin$ Works, -th >uss ed.$ ,ol. '8$ pp. '&2/728. '8. ,. 6. Lenin 1rote the pamphlet$ The Tasks o$ the Russian Social2#e!ocrats, at the end of '.(&$ 1hile he 1as in e;ile. The first edition$ 1ith a preface y P. 4;elrod$ 1as pu lished in Aene9a in '.(. y the League of >ussian Social/:emocrats (see ,. 6. Lenin$ Works, -th >uss. ed.$ ,ol. 7$ pp. 7((/37)).

Spee!h deli'ered at a meeting !alled y the (os!o) &ommittee* R.&.P. +,.- on the o!!asion of V. I. Lenin.s Fiftieth ,irthday
April 23, 1920

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. 4fter the speeches and reminiscences 1e ha9e heard here$ 9ery little remains for me to say. 6 should like only to mention one feature of Comrade Lenin=s of 1hich no ody has yet spoken$ namely$ his modesty and his courage in ackno1ledging mistakes. 6 recall t1o occasions 1hen Lenin$ that giant$ admitted that he had een in the 1rong. The first episode relates to the decision on oycotting the Witte :uma$ taken in Tammerfors$ "inland$ in :ecem er '(82$ at the 4ll/>ussian 5olshe9ik Conference. ' The Fuestion of oycotting the Witte :uma had then to e decided. 4 group of se9en$ closely associated 1ith Comrade Lenin$ and on 1hom 1e pro9incial delegates used to esto1 all kinds of epithets$ had assured us that 6lyich 1as opposed to oycotting the :uma and in fa9our of taking part in the elections. This$ as it turned out later$ 1as actually so. 5ut the de ate opened$ and the pro/ oycotters from the pro9inces$ from St. Peters urg$ Mosco1$ Si eria and the Caucasus 1ent into the attack$ and 1hat 1as our surprise 1hen$ after 1e had spoken$ Lenin got up and declared that he had een in fa9our of taking part in the elections$ ut he sa1 no1 that he had een 1rong and associated himself 1ith the delegates from the pro9inces. We 1ere astounded. 6t had the effect of an electric shock. We cheered him to the echo. 0ere is another episode of a similar character. 6n Septem er '(''$ under 3erensky$ at the time 1hen the :emocratic Conference had een con9ened and the Men/she9iks and Socialist/>e9olutionaries 1ere contri9ing a ne1 institution$ the Pre/parliament$ 1hich 1as to pa9e the 1ay for a transition from the So9iets to a Constituent 4ssem ly$ at that moment 1e in the Central Committee in Petrograd decided not to disperse the :emocratic Conference$ and to go ahead strengthening the So9iets$ to con9ene a

Congress of So9iets$ start an uprising and proclaim the Congress of So9iets the organ of state po1er. 6lyich$ 1ho at that time 1as li9ing in hiding outside Petrograd$ did not agree 1ith the Central Committee and 1rote that the scum (meaning the :emocratic Conference) should e dispersed and arrested right a1ay. 6t seemed to us that the matter 1as not Fuite so simple$ for 1e kne1 that a half$ or at least a third$ of the mem ers of the :emocratic Conference 1ere delegates from the front$ and that y arresting and dispersing the Conference 1e might only spoil matters and damage our relations 1ith the front. We considered that all the umps and pitfalls on our path 1ere clearer to us$ the practical 1orkers. 5ut 6lyich 1as a great man* he 1as not afraid of umps and pitfalls$ he did not fear danger$ and said# @>ise and march straight to the goalE@ We$ the practical 1orkers$ on the other hand$ elie9ed that no good could come of acting in this 1ay at that time$ that the thing to do 1as to skirt around the o stacles in order to take the ull y the horns later. 4nd despite all 6lyich=s insistence$ 1e did not listen to him and 1ent on strengthening the So9iets$ and to such effect as to end up 1ith the Congress of So9iets of Dcto er 72 and the successful uprising. 6lyich 1as already in Petrograd y then. Smiling and glancing at us slyly$ he said# @Bes$ it seems you 1ere right.@ 4gain 1e 1ere astounded. Comrade Lenin 1as not afraid of ackno1ledging his mistakes. 6t 1as this modesty and courage that particularly capti9ated us. ('11lause.) "irst pu lished in the symposium$ The -i$tieth /irthday o$ Vladi!ir .lyich Ulyanov2Lenin, Mosco1$ '(78

Notes '.The Tammerfors ConferenceIthe first conference of the 5olshe9iks$ held :ecem er '7/'&$ '(82. 6t 1as at this conference that ,. 6. Lenin and +. ,. Stalin met for the first time* until then they had maintained contact y correspondence or through comrades. The agenda of the conference 1as as follo1s# ') >eports from the local organi?ations* 7) >eport on the current situation* 3) Drgani?ational report of the C.C.* -) Merging of the t1o sections of the >.S.:.L.P.* 2) >e/organi?ation of the Party* )) The agrarian Fuestion* &) The State :uma. The reports on the current situation and on the agrarian Fuestion 1ere deli9ered y ,. 6. Lenin$ 1ho also spoke on the attitude to1ards the Witte :uma. +. ,. Stalin reported on the acti9ities of the Transcaucasian 5olshe9ik organi?ation and spoke in support of Lenin=s tactics of acti9ely oycotting the :uma. The conference adopted a decision on the re/unification of the Party$ 1hich 1as 9irtually split into t1o separate parties$ and appro9ed ,. 6. Lenin=s resolution on the agrarian Fuestion. +. ,. Stalin and ,. 6. Lenin 1ere mem ers of the commission 1hich drafted the resolution on the attitude to1ards the :uma. The resolution called upon the Party and the 1orking class to oycott the :uma and recommended all the Party organi?ations to make 1ide use of the election meetings for the purpose of e;tending the re9olutionary organi?ation of the proletariat and for conducting agitation among all sections of the people in fa9our of an armed uprising.

Telegram to V. I. Lenin
June 25, 1920

Source # Works$ ,ol. -$ %o9em er$ '('& / '(78 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(23 TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. >e9ishin$ a front/line general$ 1ho 1as taken prisoner y our forces on the Crimean "ront on +une '8$ has stated in my presence# a) Wrangel=s army is getting its clothing$ guns$ rifles$ tanks and sa res chiefly from the 5ritish$ and also from the "rench* ) Wrangel is eing aided from the sea y ig 5ritish ships and small "rench ships* c) Wrangel is getting fuel (liFuid) from 5atum (this means that 5aku must not supply fuel to Tiflis$ 1hich can sell it to 5atum)* d) Aeneral <rdeli$ 1ho 1as interned y Aeorgia and 1as to e turned o9er to us$ 1as already in the Crimea in May (1hich means that Aeorgia is playing false and decei9ing us). Aeneral >e9ishin=s testimony on 5ritish and "rench aid to Wrangel is eing stenographed and a copy signed y him 1ill e sent you as material for Chicherin. Stalin +une 72$ '(78

/ Letter to V. I. Lenin
March 1921

Source # Works$ ,ol. 2$ '(7' / '(73 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(2TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788. Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788.). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. Comrade Lenin$ :uring the last three days 6 ha9e had the opportunity to read the symposium# ' Plan $or the 4lectri$ication o$ Russia. ' My illness made this possi le (it is an ill 1ind that lo1s no ody any goodE). 4n e;cellent$ 1ell/compiled ook. 4 masterly draft of a really sin le and really state economic plan$ not in )uotation !arks. The only Mar;ist attempt in our time to place the So9iet superstructure of economically ack1ard >ussia on a really practical technical and production asis$ the only possi le one under present conditions. Bou remem er Trotsky=s @plan@ (his theses) of last year for the @economic re9i9al@ of >ussia on the asis of the mass application of the la our of unskilled 1easant/1orker masses (the la our army) to the remnants of pre/1ar industry. 0o1 1retched$ ho1 ack1ard$ compared 1ith the Aoelro planE 4 medie9al handicraftsman 1ho imagines he is an 6 sen hero called to @sa9e@ >ussia y an ancient saga. . . . 4nd of 1hat 9alue are the do?ens of @single plans@ 1hich to our shame appear from time to time in

our pressIthe childish prattle of preparatory/school pupils. . . . Dr again$ the philistine @realism@ (in fact "anilovis!) of >yko9$ 1ho continues to @criticise@ the Aoelro and is immersed to his ears in routine. . . . 6n my opinion# ') %ot a single minute more must e 1asted on idle talk a out the plan. 7) 4 1ractical start on the 1ork !ust %e !ade immediately. 3) To this start must e de9oted at least one/third of our 1ork (t1o/thirds 1ill e reFuired for @current@ needs) in transporting materials and men$ restoring enterprises$ distri uting la our forces$ deli9ering foodstuffs$ organising supply ases and supply itself$ and so on. -) Since the staff of the Aoelro$ for all their e;cellent Fualities$ lack a sound practical outlook (a professorial impotence can e detected in the articles)$ 1e must 1ithout fail include in the planning commission li9e practical men 1ho act on the principle I @>eport the fulfilment$@ @"ulfil on time$@ etc. 2) Pravda, .5vestia, and especially 4kono!icheskaya 6hi5n 7 must e instructed to popularise the Plan for the <lectrification oth as a 1hole and as regards its concrete points dealing 1ith indi9idual parts$ earing in mind that there is only one @single economic plan@ I the Plan $or the 4lectri$ication, and that all other @plans@ are Just idle talk$ empty and harmful. Bours$ Stalin "irst pu lished in # Stalin. 4 Symposium on 0is "iftieth 5irthday. Mosco1/Leningrad$ '(7(

Note '. The symposium entitled ' Plan $or the 4lectri$ication o$ the R.S.-.S.R. Re1ort o$ the State &o!!ission $or the 4lectri$ication o$ Russia to the 4i hth &on ress o$ Soviets 1as pu lished in :ecem er '(78 y the Scientific and Technical :epartment of the Supreme Council of %ational <conomy. 7. 4kono!icheskaya 6hi5n (4cono!ic Li$e)Ia daily ne1spaper$ organ of the economic and financial People=s Commissariats and institutions of the >.S.".S.>. and G.S.S.>. (Supreme Council of %ational <conomy$ Council of La our and :efence$ State Planning Commission$ State 5ank$ People=s Commissariat of "inance$ and others)* it 1as pu lished from %o9em er '('. to %o9em er '(3&.

&omrade Lenin on 'a!ation Notes

epte!ber 15, 1922

Source # Works$ ,ol. 2$ '(7' / '(73 Pu lisher # "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(2TranscriptionHMarkup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788.

Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788.). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. 6t seems to me that it 1ould not e fitting no1 to 1rite of @Comrade Lenin on ,acation$@ 1hen the 9acation is coming to an end and Comrade Lenin 1ill soon return to 1ork. 5esides$ my impressions are so many and so precious that it is not Fuite e;pedient to 1rite a out them in a rief note$ as the editorial oard of Pravda reFuests. 0o1e9er$ 6 must 1rite$ for the editorial oard insists on it. 6 had occasion to meet at the front 9eteran fighters 1ho$ after fighting continuously for se9eral days @on end$@ 1ithout sleep or rest$ 1ould come ack from the firing line looking like shado1s and drop like logs$ ut after ha9ing @slept the clock round@ they 1ould rise refreshed and eager for ne1 attles$ 1ithout 1hich they @cannot li9e.@ When 6 first 9isited Comrade Lenin in +uly$ not ha9ing seen him for si; 1eeks$ that 1as Just the impression he made on meIthat of a 9eteran fighter 1ho had managed to get some rest after incessant and e;hausting attles$ and 1ho had een refreshed y his rest. 0e looked fresh and recuperated$ ut still ore traces of o9er1ork and fatigue. @6 am not allo1ed to read the ne1spapers$@ Comrade Lenin remarked ironically$ @and 6 must not talk politics. 6 carefully a9oid e9ery scrap of paper lying on the ta le$ lest it turn out to e a ne1spaper and lead to a reach of discipline.@ 6 laughed heartily and praised him to the skies for his o edience to discipline. We proceeded to make merry o9er the doctors$ 1ho cannot understand that 1hen professional men of politics get together they cannot help talking politics. What struck one in Comrade Lenin 1as his thirst for information and his cra9ing$ his insupera le cra9ing for 1ork. 6t is clear that he had een famished. The trial of the Socialist/>e9olutionaries$ ' Aenoa and The 0ague$ 7 the har9est prospects$ industry and finance all these Fuestions came up in s1ift succession. 0e 1as in no hurry to e;press his opinion$ complaining that he 1as out of touch 1ith e9ents* for the most part he asked Fuestions and took silent note. 0e ecame 9ery cheerful on learning that the har9est prospects 1ere good. 6 found an entirely different picture a month later. This time Comrade Lenin 1as surrounded y stacks of ooks and ne1spapers (he had een gi9en permission to read and talk politics to his heart=s content). There 1as no longer any trace of fatigue$ of o9er1ork. There 1as no sign of that ner9ous cra9ing for 1orkI he 1as no longer famished. Calmness and self/assurance had fully returned. This 1as our old Lenin$ scre1ing up his eyes and ga?ing shre1dly at his interlocutor.... 4nd this time our talk$ too$ 1as of a more li9ely character. 0ome affairs ... the har9est ... the state of industry ... the rate of e;change of the ru le ... the udget. ... @The situation is difficult. 5ut the 1orst is o9er. The har9est 1ill make a fundamental difference. 6t is ound to e follo1ed y an impro9ement in industry and finance. The thing no1 is to relie9e the state of unnecessary e;penditure y retrenchment in our institutions and enterprises and y impro9ing them. We must e particularly firm in this matter$ and 1e shall sFuee?e through$ 1e shall most certainly sFuee?e through.@ "oreign affairs ... the <ntente ... "rance=s eha9iour ... 5ritain and Aermany ... the role of 4merica .... @They are greedy$ and they hate one another profoundly. They 1ill e at loggerheads yet. We need e in no hurry. Durs is a sure road# 1e are for peace and for agreement$ ut 1e are against ensla9ement and ensla9ing terms of agreement. We must keep a firm hand on the 1heel and steer our o1n course$

1ithout yielding to either flattery or intimidation.@ The Socialist/>e9olutionaries and Menshe9iks$ and their ra id agitation against So9iet >ussia . ... @Bes$ they ha9e made it their aim to defame So9iet >ussia. They are facilitating the imperialists= fight against So9iet >ussia. They ha9e een caught in the mire of capitalism$ and are sliding into an a yss. Let them flounder. They ha9e long een dead as far as the 1orking class is concerned.@ The 1hiteguard press ... the emigres ... the incredi le fairy/tales a out Lenin=s death$ 1ith full details . ... Comrade Lenin smiled and remarked# @Let them lie if it is any consolation to them* one should not ro the dying of their last consolation.@ &o!rade Lenin on Vacation, 6llustrated supplement to Pravda$ %o. 7'2$ Septem er 7-$ '(77

Notes '. The trial of the Socialist/>e9olutionaries y the Supreme >e9olutionary Tri unal took place in Mosco1$ in '(77$ from +une . to 4ugust &. Df the 3- accused$ '' 1ere mem ers of the Central Committee of the Socialist/>e9olutionary Party. The trial esta lished that from the 9ery first days of the Dcto er Socialist >e9olution$ the Socialist/>e9olutionary Party had fought against the So9iet po1er$ had organised armed re9olts and conspiracies$ had supported the foreign inter9entionists and had committed terroristic acts against leaders of the 5olshe9ik Party and the So9iet Ao9ernment. 7.. This refers to the international economic conferences held in Aenoa (4pril '8/May '($ '(77) and at The 0ague (+une '2/ +uly 78$ '(77). The Aenoa Conference 1as called for the purpose of determining the relations et1een the capitalist 1orld and So9iet >ussia. The conference 1as attended$ on the one side$ y representati9es of Areat 5ritain$ "rame$ 6taly$ +apan and of other capitalist states$ and$ on the other side$ y representati9es of So9iet >ussia. The representati9es of the capitalist countries presented the So9iet delegation 1ith demands 1hich$ if conceded$ 1ould ha9e meant transforming the land of So9iets into a colony of West/<uropean capital (the demand for payment of all 1ar and pre/1ar de ts$ for restitution to foreigners of nationalised property formerly o1ned y them$ etc.). The So9iet delegation reJected the claims of the foreign capitalists. The matter 1as referred to a conference of e;perts that 1as con9ened at The 0ague. The 0ague Conference also failed to reach agreement o1ing to the irreconcila ility of the points of 9ie1 of the t1o sides.

Lenin
/ Spee!h Deli'ered at a (emorial (eeting of the 0remlin (ilitary S!hool
Jan#ary 12* $314 Source# Works$ ,ol. )$ +anuary/%o9em er$ '(7-$ pp. 2-/)) Pu lisher# "oreign Languages Pu lishing 0ouse$ Mosco1$ '(2"irst Pu lished# Pravda$ %o. 3-$ "e ruary '7$ '(7-

TranscriptionHMarkup# 5rian >eid Pu lic :omain# Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788.). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit NMar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9eO as your source. Comrades$ 6 am told that you ha9e arranged a Lenin memorial meeting here this e9ening and that 6 ha9e een in9ited as one of the speakers. 6 do not think there is any need for me to deli9er a set speech on LeninMs acti9ities. 6t 1ould e etter$ 6 think$ to confine myself to a fe1 facts to ring out certain of LeninMs characteristics as a man and a leader. There may$ perhaps$ e no inherent connection et1een these facts$ ut that is not of 9ital importance as far as gaining a general idea of Lenin is concerned. 4t any rate$ 6 am una le on this occasion to do more than 1hat 6 ha9e Just promised.

The (o#ntain 5agle

6 first ecame acFuainted 1ith Lenin in '(83. True$ it 1as not a personal acFuaintance$ ut 1as y correspondence. 5ut it made an indeli le impression upon me$ one 1hich has ne9er left me throughout all my 1ork in the Party. 6 1as in e;ile in Si eria at the time. My kno1ledge of LeninMs re9olutionary acti9ities since the end of the nineties$ and especially after '(8'$ after the appearance of .skra$' had con9inced me that in Lenin 1e had a man of e;traordinary cali re. 4t that time 6 did not regard him merely as a leader of the Party$ ut as its actual founder$ for he alone understood the inner essence and urgent needs of our Party. When 6 compared him 1ith the other leaders of our Party$ it al1ays seemed to me that he 1as head and shoulders a o9e his colleaguesIPlekhano9$ Marto9$ 4;elrod and the others* that$ compared 1ith them$ Lenin 1as not Just one of the leaders$ ut a leader of the highest rank$ a mountain eagle$ 1ho kne1 no fear in the struggle$ and 1ho oldly led the Party for1ard along the une;plored paths of the >ussian re9olutionary mo9ement. This impression took such a deep hold of me that 6 felt impelled to 1rite a out it to a close friend of mine 1ho 1as li9ing as a political e;ile a road$ reFuesting him to gi9e me his opinion. Some time later$ 1hen 6 1as already in e;ile in Si eriaIthis 1as at the end of '(83I6 recei9ed an enthusiastic reply from my friend and a simple$ ut profoundly e;pressi9e letter from Lenin$ to 1hom$ it turned out$ my friend had sho1n my letter. LeninMs note 1as comparati9ely short$ ut it contained a old and fearless criticism of the practical 1ork of our Party$ and a remarka ly clear and concise account of the entire plan of 1ork of the Party in the immediate future. Dnly Lenin could 1rite of the most intricate things so simply and clearly$ so concisely and oldly$ that e9ery sentence did not so much speak as ring out like a rifle shot. This simple and old letter still further strengthened me in my opinion that Lenin 1as the mountain eagle of our Party. 6 cannot forgi9e myself for ha9ing$ from the ha it of an old underground 1orker$ consigned this letter of LeninMs$ like many other letters$ to the flames. My acFuaintance 1ith Lenin dates from that time.

(odesty

6 first met Lenin in :ecem er '(82 at the 5olshe9ik conference in Tammerfors ("inland). 6 1as hoping to see the mountain eagle of our Party$ the great man$ great not only politically$ ut$ if you 1ill$ physically$ ecause in my imagination 6 had pictured Lenin as a giant$ stately and imposing. What$ then$ 1as my disappointment to see a most ordinary/looking man$ elo1 a9erage height$ in no 1ay$ literally in no 1ay$ distinguisha le from ordinary mortals. . . .

6t is accepted as the usual thing for a Ngreat manO to come late to meetings so that the assem ly may a1ait$ his appearance 1ith ated reath* and then$ Just efore the Ngreat manO enters$ the 1arning 1hisper goes up# N0ushE . . . SilenceE . . . heMs coming.O This ritual did not seem to me superfluous$ ecause it creates an impression$ inspires respect. What$ then$ 1as my disappointment to learn that Lenin had arri9ed at the conference efore the delegates$ had settled himself some1here in a corner$ and 1as unassumingly carrying on a con9ersation$ a most ordinary con9ersation 1ith the most ordinary delegates at the conference. 6 1ill not conceal from you that at that time this seemed to me to e something of a 9iolation of certain essential rules. Dnly later did 6 realise that this simplicity and modesty$ this stri9ing to remain uno ser9ed$ or$ at least$ not to make himself conspicuous and not to emphasise his high position$ this feature 1as one of LeninMs strongest points as the ne1 leader of the ne1 masses$ of the simple and ordinary masses of the Nrank and fileO of humanity.

For!e of Logi!

The t1o speeches Lenin deli9ered at this conference 1ere remarka le# one 1as on the current situation and the other on the agrarian Fuestion. Gnfortunately$ they ha9e not een preser9ed. They 1ere inspired$ and they roused the 1hole conference to a pitch of stormy enthusiasm. The e;traordinary po1er of con9iction$ the simplicity and clarity of argument$ the rief and easily understood sentences$ the a sence of affectation$ of di??ying gestures and theatrical phrases aiming at effectIall this made LeninMs speeches a fa9oura le contrast to the speeches of the usual NparliamentaryO orators. 5ut 1hat capti9ated me at the time 1as not this aspect of LeninMs speeches. 6 1as capti9ated y that irresisti le force of logic in them 1hich$ although some1hat terse$ gained a firm hold on his audience$ gradually electrified it$ and then$ as one might say$ completely o9erpo1ered it. 6 remem er that many of the delegates said# NThe logic of LeninMs speeches is like a mighty tentacle 1hich t1ines all round you and holds you as in a 9ice and from 1hose grip you are po1erless to tear yourself a1ay# you must either surrender or resign yourself to utter defeat.O 6 think that this characteristic of LeninMs speeches 1as the strongest feature of his art as an orator.

No "hining

The second time 6 met Lenin 1as in '(8) at the Stockholm Congress7 of our Party. Bou kno1 that the 5olshe9iks 1ere in the minority at this congress and suffered defeat. This 1as the first time 6 sa1 Lenin in the role of the 9anFuished. 5ut he 1as not in the least like those leaders 1ho 1hine and lose heart after a defeat. Dn the contrary$ defeat transformed Lenin into a spring of compressed energy 1hich inspired his supporters for ne1 attles and for future 9ictory. 6 said that Lenin 1as defeated. 5ut 1hat sort of defeat 1as itL Bou had only to look at his opponents$ the 9ictors at the Stockholm CongressI Plekhano9$ 4;elrod$ Marto9 and the rest. They had little of the appearance of real 9ictors$ for LeninMs merciless criticism of Menshe9ism had not left one 1hole one in their ody$ so to speak. 6 remem er that 1e$ the 5olshe9ik delegates$ huddled together in a group$ ga?ing at Lenin and asking his ad9ice. The speeches of some of the delegates etrayed a note of 1eariness and deJection. 6 recall that to these speeches Lenin itingly replied through clenched teeth# N:onMt 1hine$ comrades$ 1e are ound to 1in$ for 1e are right.O 0atred of the 1hining intellectual$ faith in our o1n strength$ confidence in 9ictoryI that is 1hat Lenin impressed upon us. 6t 1as felt that the 5olshe9iksM defeat 1as temporary$ that they 1ere ound to 1in in the 9ery near future.

N%o 1hining o9er defeatOIthis 1as the feature of LeninMs acti9ities that helped him to rally around himself an army faithful to the end and confident in its strength.

No ,oasting

4t the ne;t congress$ held in 7(8& in London$3 the 5olshe9iks pro9ed 9ictorious. This 1as the first time 6 sa1 Lenin in the role of 9ictor. ,ictory turns the heads of some leaders and makes them haughty and oastful. They egin in most cases to e triumphant$ to rest on their laurels. 5ut Lenin did not in the least resem le such leaders. Dn the contrary$ it 1as precisely after a 9ictory that he ecame especially 9igilant and cautious. 6 recall that Lenin insistently impressed on the delegates# NThe first thing is not to ecome into;icated y 9ictory and not to oast* the second thing is to consolidate the 9ictory* the third is to gi9e the enemy the finishing stroke$ for he has een eaten$ ut$ y no means crushed.O 0e poured 1ithering scorn on those delegates 1ho fri9olously asserted# N6t is all o9er 1ith the Menshe9iks no1.O 0e had no difficulty in sho1ing that the Menshe9iks still had roots in the 1orking/class mo9ement$ that they had to e fought 1ith skill$ and that all o9erestimation of oneMs o1n strength and$ especially$ all underestimation of the strength of the enemy had to e a9oided. N%o oasting in 9ictoryOIthis 1as the feature of LeninMs character that helped him so erly to 1eigh the strength of the enemy and to insure the Party against possi le surprises.

Fidelity to Prin!iple

Party leaders cannot ut pri?e the opinion of the maJority of their party. 4 maJority is a po1er 1ith 1hich a leader cannot ut reckon. Lenin understood this no less than any other party leader. 5ut Lenin ne9er ecame a capti9e of the maJority$ especially 1hen that maJority had no asis of principle. There ha9e een times in the history of our Party 1hen the opinion of the maJority or the momentary interests of the Party conflicted 1ith the fundamental interests of the proletariat. Dn such occasions Lenin 1ould ne9er hesitate and resolutely took his stand in support of principle as against the maJority of the Party. Moreo9er$ he did not fear on such occasions literally to stand alone against all$ consideringIas he 1ould often sayIthat Na policy ased on principle is the only correct policy.O Particularly characteristic in this respect are the t1o follo1ing facts. -irst $act. 6t 1as in the period '(8(/''$ 1hen the Party$ smashed y the counter/re9olution$ 1as in process of complete disintegration. 6t 1as a period of dis elief in the Party$ of 1holesale desertion from the Party$ not only y the intellectuals$ ut partly e9en y the 1orkers* a period 1hen the necessity for illegal organisation 1as eing denied$ a period of LiFuidationism and collapse. %ot only the Menshe9iks$ ut e9en the 5olshe9iks then consisted of a num er of factions and trends$ for the most part se9ered from the 1orking/class mo9ement. Bou kno1 that it 1as Just at that period that the idea arose of completely liFuidating the illegal organisation and organising the 1orkers into a legal$ li eral Stolypin party. Lenin at that time 1as the only one not to succum to the 1idespread epidemic and to hold high the anner of Party principle$ assem ling the scattered and shattered forces of the Party 1ith astonishing patience and e;traordinary persistence$ com ating each and e9ery anti/Party trend 1ithin the 1orking/class mo9ement and defending the Party principle 1ith unusual courage and unparalleled perse9erance. We kno1 that in this fight for the Party principle$ Lenin later pro9ed the 9ictor. Second $act. 6t 1as in the period '('-/'&$ 1hen the imperialist 1ar 1as in full s1ing$ and 1hen all$ or

nearly all$ the Social/:emocratic and Socialist parties had succum ed to the general patriotic fren?y and had placed themsel9es at the ser9ice of the imperialism of their respecti9e countries. 6t 1as a period 1hen the Second 6nternational had hauled do1n its colours to capitalism$ 1hen e9en people like Plekhano9$ 3autsky$ Auesde and the rest 1ere una le to 1ithstand the tide of chau9inism. Lenin at that time 1as the only one$ or almost the only one$ to 1age a determined struggle against social/chau9inism and social/pacifism$ to denounce the treachery of the Auesdes and 3autskys$ and to stigmatise the half/ heartedness of the et1i;t and et1een Nre9olutionaries.O Lenin kne1 that he 1as acked y only an insignificant minority$ ut to him this 1as not of decisi9e moment$ for he kne1 that the only correct policy 1ith a future efore it 1as the policy of consistent internationalism$ that a policy ased on principle is the only correct policy. We kno1 that in this fight for a ne1 6nternational$ too$ Lenin pro9ed the 9ictor. N4 policy ased on principle is the only correct policyOIthis 1as the formula y means of 1hich Lenin took ne1 Nimpregna leO positions y assault and 1on o9er the est elements of the proletariat to re9olutionary Mar;ism.

Faith in the (asses

Theoreticians and leaders of parties$ men 1ho are acFuainted 1ith the history of nations and 1ho ha9e studied the history of re9olutions from eginning to end$ are sometimes afflicted y a shameful disease. This disease is called fear of the masses$ dis elief in the creati9e po1er of the masses. This sometimes gi9es rise in the leaders to a kind of aristocratic attitude to1ards the masses$ 1ho$ although not 9ersed in the history of re9olutions$ are destined to destroy the old order and uild the ne1. This kind of aristocratic attitude is due to a fear that the elements may reak loose$ that the masses may Ndestroy too muchO* it is due to a desire to play the part of a mentor 1ho tries to teach the masses from ooks$ ut 1ho is a9erse to learning from the masses. Lenin 1as the 9ery antithesis of such leaders. 6 do not kno1 of any other re9olutionary 1ho had so profound a faith in the creati9e po1er of the proletariat and in the re9olutionary efficacy of its class instinct as Lenin. 6 do not kno1 of any other re9olutionary 1ho could scourge the smug critics of the Nchaos of re9olutionO and the Nriot of unauthorised actions of the massesO so ruthlessly as Lenin. 6 recall that 1hen in the course of a con9ersation one comrade said that Nthe re9olution should e follo1ed y the normal order of things$O Lenin sarcastically remarked# N6t is a pity that people 1ho 1ant to e re9olutionaries forget that the most normal order of things in history is the re9olutionary order of things.O 0ence$ LeninMs contempt for all 1ho superciliously looked do1n on the masses and tried to teach them from ooks. 4nd hence$ LeninMs constant precept# learn from the masses$ try to comprehend their actions$ carefully study the practical e;perience of the struggle of the masses. "aith in the creati9e po1er of the massesIthis 1as the feature of LeninMs acti9ities 1hich ena led him to comprehend the spontaneous process and to direct its mo9ement into the channel of the proletarian re9olution.

The 6eni#s of Re'ol#tion

Lenin 1as orn for re9olution. 0e 1as$ in truth$ the genius of re9olutionary out reaks and the greatest master of the art of re9olutionary leadership. %e9er did he feel so free and happy as in a time of

re9olutionary uphea9als. 6 do not mean y this that Lenin appro9ed eFually of all re9olutionary uphea9als$ or that he 1as in fa9our of re9olutionary out reaks at all times and under all circumstances. %ot at all. What 6 do mean is that ne9er 1as the genius of LeninMs insight displayed so fully and distinctly as in a time of re9olutionary out reaks. 6n times of re9olution he literally lossomed forth$ ecame a seer$ di9ined the mo9ement of classes and the pro a le ?ig?ags of the re9olution$ seeing them as if they lay in the palm of his hand. 6t 1as 1ith good reason that it used to e said in our Party circles# NLenin s1ims in the tide of re9olution like a fish in 1ater.O 0ence the Nama?ingO clarity of LeninMs tactical slogans and the N reath/takingO %oldness of his re9olutionary plans. 6 recall t1o facts 1hich are particularly characteristic of this feature of Lenin. -irst $act. 6t 1as in the period Just prior to the Dcto er >e9olution$ 1hen millions of 1orkers$ peasants and soldiers$ impelled y the crisis in the rear and at the front$ 1ere demanding peace and li erty* 1hen the generals and the ourgeoisie 1ere 1orking for a military dictatorship for the sake of N1ar to a finishO* 1hen the 1hole of so/called Npu lic opinionO and all the so/called NSocialist partiesO 1ere hostile to the 5olshe9iks and 1ere randing them as NAerman spiesO* 1hen 3erensky 1as tryingI already 1ith some successIto dri9e the 5olshe9ik Party underground* and 1hen the still po1erful and disciplined armies of the 4ustro/Aerman coalition confronted our 1eary$ disintegrating armies$ 1hile the West/<uropean NSocialistsO li9ed in lissful alliance 1ith their go9ernments for the sake of N1ar to complete 9ictory.O. . . What did starting an uprising at such a moment meanL Starting an uprising in such a situation meant staking e9erything. 5ut Lenin did not fear the risk$ for he kne1$ he sa1 1ith his prophetic eye$ that an uprising 1as ine9ita le$ that it 1ould 1in* that an uprising in >ussia 1ould pa9e the 1ay for ending the imperialist 1ar$ that it 1ould rouse the 1ar/1eary masses of the West$ that it 1ould transform the imperialist 1ar into a ci9il 1ar* that the uprising 1ould usher in a >epu lic of So9iets$ and that the >epu lic of So9iets 1ould ser9e as a ul1ark for the re9olutionary mo9ement throughout the 1orld. We kno1 that LeninMs re9olutionary foresight 1as su seFuently confirmed 1ith unparalleled e;actness. Second $act. 6t 1as in the first days of the Dcto er >e9olution$ 1hen the Council of PeopleMs Commissars 1as trying to compel Aeneral :ukhonin$ the mutinous Commander/in/Chief$ to terminate hostilities and open negotiations for an armistice 1ith the Aermans. 6 recall that Lenin$ 3rylenko (the future Commander/in/Chief) and 6 1ent to Aeneral Staff 0eadFuarters in Petrograd to negotiate 1ith :ukhonin o9er the direct 1ire. 6t 1as a ghastly moment. :ukhonin and "ield 0eadFuarters categorically refused to o ey the order of the Council of PeopleMs Commissars. The army officers 1ere completely under the s1ay of "ield 0eadFuarters. 4s for the soldiers$ no one could tell 1hat this army of fourteen million 1ould say$ su ordinated as it 1as to the so/called army organisations$ 1hich 1ere hostile to the So9iet po1er. 6n Petrograd itself$ as 1e kno1$ a mutiny of the military cadets 1as re1ing. "urthermore$ 3erensky 1as marching on Petrograd. 6 recall that after a pause at the direct 1ire$ LeninMs face suddenly shone 1ith an e;traordinary light. Clearly he had arri9ed at a decision. NLetMs go to the 1ireless station$O he said$ Nit 1ill stand us in good stead. We shall issue a special order dismissing Aeneral :ukhonin$ appoint Comrade 3rylenko Commander/in/Chief in his place and appeal to the soldiers o9er the heads of the officers$ calling upon them to surround the generals$ to cease hostilities$ to esta lish contact 1ith the 4ustro/Aerman soldiers and take the cause of peace into their o1n hands.O This 1as Na leap in the dark.O 5ut Lenin did not shrink from this NleapO* on the contrary$ he made it eagerly$ for he kne1 that the army 1anted peace and 1ould 1in peace$ s1eeping e9ery o stacle from its path* he kne1 that this method of esta lishing peace 1as ound to ha9e its effect on the 4ustro/ Aerman soldiers and 1ould gi9e full rein to the yearning for peace on e9ery front 1ithout e;ception.

We kno1 that here$ too$ LeninMs re9olutionary foresight 1as su seFuently confirmed 1ith the utmost e;actness. The insight of genius$ the a ility rapidly to grasp and di9ine the inner meaning of impending e9ents this 1as the Fuality of Lenin 1hich ena led him to lay do1n the correct strategy and a clear line of conduct at turning points of the re9olutionary mo9ement.

Notes
'. .skra (S1ark)Ithe first all/>ussian illegal Mar;ist ne1spaper$ founded y ,. 6. Lenin in :ecem er '(88. 6t 1as pu lished a road and rought secretly into >ussia (on the significance and role of .skra see (istory o$ the &.P.S.U.(/) Short &ourse$ Mosco1 '(27$ pp. 22/).). 7. The Stockholm Party CongressIthe "ourth (NGnityO) Congress of the >.S.:.L.P.Itook place on 4pril '8/72 (4pril 73/May .)$ '(8) (See (istory o$ the &.P.S.U.(/) Short &ourse$ Mosco1 '(27$ pp. '3)/3(). 3. The "ifth (London) Congress of the >.S.:.L.P. took place from 4pril 38 to May '( (May '3 to +une ')$ '(8& see (istory o$ the &.P.S.U.(/) Short &ourse$ Mosco1 '(27$ pp. '-3/-)).

%n The Death %f Lenin

/ Spee!h Deli'ered at the Se!ond /ll7#nion &ongress of So'iets8$9 "irst Pu lished# Pravda$ +anuary 38$ '(7-* Source# +. ,. Stalin$ Selected Works, The N. %PntoriO Pu lishing 0ouse$ 4l ania$ '(&(* Transcription and Mark/up# 5. and Mike 5.$ 4ugust 788Comrades$ 1e Communists are people of a special mould. We are made of a special stuff. We are those 1ho form the army of the great proletarian strategist$ the army of Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the honour of elonging to this army. There is nothing higher than the title of mem er of the Party 1hose founder and leader 1as Comrade Lenin. 6t is not gi9en to e9eryone to e a mem er of such a party. 6t is the sons of the 1orking class$ the sons of 1ant and struggle$ the sons of incredi le pri9ation and heroic effort 1ho efore all should e mem ers of such a party. That is 1hy the Party of the Leninists$ the Party of the Communists$ is also called the Party of the 1orking class. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD 0DL: 06A0 4%: AG4>: T0< PG>6TB D" T0< A><4T T6TL< D" M<M5<> D" T0< P4>TB$ W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$ W< S04LL "GL"6L BDG> 5<0<ST W6T0 0D%DG>E "or t1enty/fi9e years Comrade Lenin tended our Party and made it into the strongest and most highly steeled 1orkerM party in the 1orld. The lo1s of tsarism and its henchmen$ the fury of the ourgeoisie and the landlords$ the armed attacks of 3olchak and :enikin$ the armed inter9ention of 5ritain and "rance$ the lies and slanders of the hundred/mouthed ourgeois press I all these scorpions constantly chastised our Party for a Fuarter of a century. 5ut our Party stood firm as a rock$ repelling the countless

lo1s of its enemies and leading the 1orking class for1ard$ to 9ictory. 6n fierce attles our Party forged the unity and solidarity of its ranks. 4nd y unity and solidarity it achie9ed 9ictory o9er the enemies of the 1orking class. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD AG4>: T0< G%6TB D" DG> P4>TB 4S T0< 4PPL< D" DG> <B<$ W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$ T04T T06S 5<0<ST$ TDD$ W< S04LL "GL"6L W6T0 0D%DG>E 5urdensome and intolera le has een the lot of the 1orking class. Painful and grie9ous ha9e een the sufferings of the la ouring people. Sla9es and sla9eholders$ serfs and serf/o1ners$ peasants and landlords$ 1orkers and capitalists$ oppressed and oppressors I so the 1orld has een uilt from time immemorial$ and so it remains to this day in the 9ast maJority of countries. Scores and indeed hundreds of times in the course of the centuries the la ouring people ha9e stri9en to thro1 off the oppressors from their acks and to ecome the masters of their o1n destiny. 5ut each time$ defeated and disgraced$ they ha9e een forced to retreat$ har ouring in their reasts resentment and humiliation$ anger and despair$ and lifting up their eyes to an inscruta le hea9en 1here they hoped to find deli9erance. The chains of sla9ery remained intact$ or the old chains 1ere replaced y ne1 ones$ eFually urdensome and degrading. Durs is the only country 1here the oppressed and do1ntrodden la ouring masses ha9e succeeded in thro1ing off the rule of the landlords and capitalists and replacing it y the rule of the 1orkers and peasants. Bou kno1$ comrades$ and the 1hole 1orld no1 admits it$ that this gigantic struggle 1as led y Comrade Lenin and his Party. The greatness of Lenin lies a o9e all in this$ that y creating the >epu lic of So9iets he ga9e a practical demonstration to the oppressed masses of the 1hole 1orld that hope of deli9erance is not lost$ that the rule of the landlords and capitalists is short/li9ed$ that the kingdom of la our can e created y the efforts of the la ouring people themsel9es$ and that the kingdom of la our must e created not in hea9en$ ut on earth. 0e thus fired the hearts of the 1orkers and peasants of the 1hole 1orld 1ith the hope of li eration. That e;plains 1hy LeninMs name has ecome the name most elo9ed of the la ouring and e;ploited masses. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD AG4>: 4%: ST><%AT0<% T0< :6CT4TD>S06P D" T0< P>DL<T4>64T. W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$ T04T W< S04LL SP4>< %D <""D>T TD "GL"6L T06S 5<0<ST$ TDD$ W6T0 0D%DG>E The dictatorship of the proletariat 1as esta lished in our .country on the asis of an alliance et1een the 1orkers and peasants. This is the first and fundamental asis of the >epu lic of So9iets. The 1orkers and peasants could not ha9e 9anFuished the capitalists and landlords 1ithout such an alliance. The 1orkers could not ha9e defeated the capitalists 1ithout the support of the peasants. The peasants could not ha9e defeated the landlords 1ithout the leadership of the 1orkers. This is orne out y the 1hole history of the ci9il 1ar in our country. 5ut the struggle to consolidate the >epu lic of So9iets is y no means at an end I it has only taken on a ne1 form. 5efore$ the alliance of the 1orkers and peasants took the form of a military alliance$ ecause it 1as directed against 3olchak and :enikin. %o1$ the alliance of the 1orkers and peasants must assume the form of economic co/operation et1een to1n and country$ et1een 1orkers and peasants$ ecause it is directed against the merchant and the kulak$ and its aim is the mutual supply y peasants and 1orkers of all they reFuire. Bou kno1 that no ody 1orked for this more persistently than Comrade Lenin. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD ST><%AT0<% W6T0 4LL DG> M6A0T T0< 4LL64%C< D" T0< WD>3<>S 4%: P<4S4%TS. W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$ T04T T06S 5<0<ST$ TDD$ W< S04LL "GL"6L W6T0 0D%DG>E The second asis of the >epu lic of So9iets is the union the 1orking people of the different nationalities of our country. >ussians and Gkrainians$ 5ashkirs and 5yelorussians Aeorgians and 4?er aiJanians$ 4rmenians and :aghestanians$ Tatars and 3irghi?$ G? eks and Turkmenians are all

eFually. interested in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. %ot only does the dictatorship of the proletariat deli9er these peoples from fetters and oppression$ ut these peoples on their part deli9er our >epu lic of So9iets from the intrigues and assaults of the enemies of the 1orking class y their supreme de9otion to the >epu lic of So9iets and their readiness to make sacrifices for it. That is 1hy Comrade Lenin untiringly urged upon us the necessity of the 9oluntary union of the peoples of our country$ the necessity of their fraternal co/operation 1ithin the frame1ork of the Gnion of >epu lics. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD ST><%AT0<% 4%: <KT<%: T0< G%6D% D" ><PG5L6CS. W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$ T04T T06S 5<0<ST$ TDD$ W< S04LL "GL"6L W6T0 0D%DG>E The third asis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is our >ed 4rmy and our >ed %a9y. More than once did Lenin impress upon us that the respite 1e had 1on from the capitalist states might pro9e a short one. More than once did Lenin point out to us that the strengthening of the >ed 4rmy and the impro9ement of its condition is one of the most important tasks of our Party. The e9ents connected 1ith Cur?onMs ultimatum and the crisis in AermanyQ7R once more confirmed that$ as al1ays$ Lenin 1as right. Let us 9o1 then$ comrades$ that 1e shall spare no effort to strengthen our >ed 4rmy and our >ed %a9y. Like a huge rock$ our country stands out amid an ocean of ourgeois states. Wa9e after 1a9e dashes against it$ threatening to su merge it and 1ash it a1ay. 5ut the rock stands unshaka le. Wherein lies its strengthL %ot only in the fact that our country rests on an alliance of the 1orkers and peasants$ that it em odies a union of free nationalities$ that it is protected y the mighty arm of the >ed 4rmy and the >ed %a9y. The strength$ the firmness$ the solidity of our country is due to the profound sympathy and unfailing support it finds in the hearts of the 1orkers and peasants of the 1hole 1orld. The 1orkers and peasants of the 1hole 1orld 1ant to preser9e the >epu lic of So9iets as an arro1 shot y the sure hand of Comrade Lenin into the camp of the enemy$ as the pillar of their hopes of deli9erance from oppression and e;ploitation$ as a relia le eacon pointing the path to their emancipation. They 1ant to preser9e it$ and they 1ill not allo1 the landlords and capitalists to destroy it. Therein lies our strength. Therein lies the strength of the 1orking people of all countries. 4nd therein lies the 1eakness of the ourgeoisie all o9er the 1orld. Lenin ne9er regarded the >epu lic of So9iets as an end in itself. 0e al1ays looked on it as an essential link for strengthening the re9olutionary mo9ement in the countries of the West and the <ast$ an essential link for facilitating the 9ictory of the 1orking people of the 1hole 1orld o9er capitalism. Lenin kne1 that this 1as the only right conception$ oth from the international standpoint and from the standpoint of preser9ing the >epu lic of So9iets itself. Lenin kne1 that this alone could fire the hearts of the 1orking people of the 1hole 1orld 1ith determination to fight the decisi9e attles for their emancipation. That is 1hy$ on the 9ery morro1 of the esta lishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat$ he$ the greatest of the geniuses 1ho ha9e led the proletariat$ laid the foundation of the 1orkersM 6nternational. That is 1hy he ne9er tired of e;tending and strengthening the union of# the 1orking people of the 1hole 1orld I the Communist 6nternational. Bou ha9e seen during the past fe1 days the pilgrimage of scores and hundreds of thousands of 1orking people to Comrade LeninMs ier. 5efore long you 1ill see the pilgrimage of representati9es of millions of 1orking people to Comrade LeninMs tom . Bou need not dou t that the representati9es of millions 1ill e follo1ed y representati9es of scores and hundreds of millions from all parts of the earth$ 1ho 1ill come to testify that Lenin 1as the leader not only of the >ussian proletariat$ not only of the <uropean 1orkers$ not only of the colonial <ast$ ut of all the 1orking people of the glo e. :<P4>T6%A ">DM GS$ CDM>4:< L<%6% <%+D6%<: GS TD ><M46% "46T0"GL TD T0< P>6%C6PL<S D" T0< CDMMG%6ST 6%T<>%4T6D%4L. W< ,DW TD BDG$ CDM>4:< L<%6%$

T04T W< S04LL %DT SP4>< DG> L6,<S TD ST><%AT0<% 4%: <KT<%: T0< G%6D% D" T0< WD>36%A P<DPL< D" T0< W0DL< WD>L: I T0< CDMMG%6ST 6%T<>%4T6D%4LE

N%T5S Q'R The Second 4ll/Gnion Congress of So9iets 1as held in Mosco1 from +anuary 7) to "e ruary 7$ '(7-. 4t the first sitting$ 1hich 1as de9oted to the memory of ,. 6. Lenin$ +. ,. Stalin deli9ered a speech in 1hich$ in the name of the 5olshe9ik Party$ he took a solemn 9o1 to hold sacred and fulfil the ehests of Lenin. 6n connection 1ith the death of Lenin$ the congress adopted an appeal STo Toiling MankindT. To perpetuate the memory of Lenin$ the congress adopted a decision to pu lish Lenin=s Works$ to change the name of Petrograd to Leningrad$ to esta lish a :ay of Mourning$ and to erect a mausoleum for Lenin in the >ed SFuare in Mosco1$ and monuments to him in the capitals of the Gnion >epu lics and also in the cities of Leningrad and Tashkent. Q7R This refers to the economic and political crisis in Aermany in '(73. 4 mass re9olutionary mo9ement spread o9er the country$ as a result of 1hich 1orkers= go9ernments 1ere set up in Sa;ony and Thuringia$ and an armed uprising roke out in 0am urg. 4fter the suppression of the re9olutionary mo9ement in Aermany ourgeois reaction 1as intensified all o9er <urope$ as 1ell as the danger of a ne1 inter9ention against the So9iet >epu lic.

6reetings (essage to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li! (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the t)enty7third anni'ersary of the People.s Li eration /nmy of the People.s Rep#ili! of &hina
$ /#g#st* $3:;

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. Please accept my sincere greetings and est 1ishes on the occasion of the t1enty/third anni9ersary of the People=s Li eration 4rmy of the People=s >epu lic of China. J. ST/LIN ("7ew 8er!any," /erlin 4d., 7o. +9:, + 'u ust, +,;<)

Telegram to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li! (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of. the first anni'ersary of the signing of the So'iet7&hinese Treaty of Friendship* /llian!e and S#pport
$4 Fe r#ary* $3:$

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To the Chairman of the Central People=s Ao9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic$ Comrade Mao Tse Tung. Please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ my sincere good 1ishes on the occasion of the first anni9ersary of the signing of the So9iet/Chinese Treaty of "riendship$ 4lliance and Support. 6 do not dou t that our treaty$ and the friendly alliance of the People=s >epu lic of China and the So9iet Gnion$ 1ill continue in the future to strengthen the peace of the entire 1orld. J. ST/LIN ("Pravda," += -e%ruary, +,;+)

/ns)ering Telegram to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li! (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the si<th anni'ersary of 'i!tory o'en. the Japanese imperialists
1 Septem er* $3:$

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and

perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To the Chairman of the Central People=s Ao9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic$ Comrade Mao Tse Tung. 6 thank you$ Comrade Chairman$ for the high estimation of the role 1hich the So9iet Gnion and its fighting po1er played in the smashing of +apanese aggression. The Chinese people$ and their li eration army ha9e played a great role$ despite the machinations of the 3uomintang$ in the liFuidation of +apanese imperialism. The struggle of the Chinese people and their li eration army has helped the smashing of the +apanese aggression profoundly. 6t cannot e dou ted that the un reaka le friendship of the So9iet Gnion and the Chinese People=s >epu lic ser9es and 1ill ser9e to guarantee peace in the far <ast against all and e9ery aggressor and arsonist of 1ar. Please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ the good 1ishes of the So9iet Gnion and its fighting forces on the si;th anni9ersary of the li eration of <ast 4sia from the yoke of +apanese imperialism. Long li9e the great friendship of the Chinese People=s >epu lic and the So9iet GnionE Long li9e the Chinese People=s Li eration 4rmyE J. ST/LIN &hair!an o$ the &ouncil o$ "inisters o$ the U.S.S.R, ("7ew Ti!es," 7o. >?, ; Se1te!%er, +,;+. P. +)

Telegram to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li!* (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the se!ond anni'ersary of the signing of the So'iet7&hinese Treaty of Friendship* /llian!e and S#pport
$4 Fe r#ary $3:1

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To the Chairman of the Central People=s Ao9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic$ Comrade Mao

Tse Tung. Dn the occasion of the second anni9ersary of the signing of the So9iet/Chinese Treaty of "riendship$ 4lliance and Support$ please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ my sincere congratulations and 1ishes for the further strengthening of the alliance and cooperation et1een the Chinese People=s >epu lic and the So9iet Gnion$ in the interests of 1orld peace. J. ST/LIN ("7ew 8er!any," /erlin 4d., 7o. >,, +; -e%ruary, +,;@)

6reetings Letter to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li!* (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the t)enty7fifth anni'ersary of the fo#nding of the &hinese People.s Li eration /rmy
$ /#g#st* $3:1

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. Comrade Chairman$ please accept my sincere greetings on the occasion of the t1enty/fifth anni9ersary of the founding of the Chinese People=s Li eration 4rmy of the People=s >epu lic of China. 6n the interests of peace and security$ 6 1ish the further strengthening of the Chinese People=s 4rmy. J. ST/LIN ("7ew 8er!any," /erlin 4d., 7o. +9,, + 'u ust, +,;@)

/ns)ering Telegram to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li!* (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the se'enth anni'ersary of the 'i!tory o'er Japanese imperialism
1 Septem er* $3:1

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To the Chairman of the Central People=s Ao9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic$ Comrade Mao Tse Tung. Please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ my thanks for the e;pression of your feelings on the occasion of the se9enth anni9ersary of the 9ictory o9er +apanese imperialism y the So9iet people and the So9iet 4rmy. 6n this historic 9ictory$ the Chinese people and their People=s Li eration 4rmy played a great role y their heroism and sacrifices in the smashing of +apanese aggression. The great friendship et1een the So9iet Gnion and the Chinese People=s >epu lic is a sure guarantee against the danger of a ne1 aggression$ a mighty ul1ark of peace in the far <ast and in the 1hole 1orld. Please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ on the occasion of the se9enth anni9ersary of the li eration of the Chinese people from the yoke of +apanese imperialism$ the good 1ishes of the So9iet Gnion. Long li9e the un reaka le friendship et1een the Chinese People=s >epu lic and the So9iet GnionE Long li9e the People=s Li eration 4rmy of the Chinese People=s >epu licE J. ST/LIN &hair!an o$ the &ouncil o$ "inisters o$ the U.S.S.R. ("7ew 8er!any," /erlin 4d., 7o. @<:, = Se1te!%er, +,;@)

Telegram to the &hairman of the &entral People.s 6o'ernment of the &hinese People.s Rep# li!* (ao Tse T#ng
%n the o!!asion of the third anni'ersary of the pro!lamation of the &hinese People.s Rep# li!
$ %!to er* $3:1

Source # Works$ ,ol. ') Pu lisher # >ed Star Press Ltd.$ London$ '(.) TranscriptionH0TML Markup # Salil Sen for M64$ 788( Pu lic :omain # Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e (788(). Bou may freely copy$ distri ute$ display and perform this 1ork* as 1ell as make deri9ati9e and commercial 1orks. Please credit @Mar;ists 6nternet 4rchi9e@ as your source. To the Chairman of the Central People=s Ao9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic$ Comrade Mao Tse Tung. Please accept$ Comrade Chairman$ my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the third anni9ersary of the proclamation of the Chinese People=s >epu lic. 6 1ish the great Chinese people$ the. go9ernment of the Chinese People=s >epu lic and you personally$ ne1 success in the uilding of a mighty$ people=s democratic Chinese state. May the great friendship et1een the Chinese People= >epu lic and the G.S.S.>.$ the firm ul1ark of peace and security in the far <ast and in the 1hole 1orld$ thri9e and gro1 stronger. J. ST/LIN ("7ew 8er!any," /erlin 4d., 7o. @>+, + 0cto%er, +,;@)

Prohi ition of /tomi! "eapons

%!to er =* $3:$ Source# -or Peace$ul &oeAistenceB Post War .nterviews Pu lisher# 6nternational Pu lishers$ %e1 Bork$ '(2' TranscriptionHMarkup# 5rian >eid Q.nterview with corres1ondent o$ Pra9da$ 0cto%er ?, +,;+R

>#estion? What is your opinion of the hu u raised recently in the foreign press in connection 1ith the test of an atom om in the So9iet GnionL /ns)er? 6ndeed$ one of the types of atom om s 1as recently tested in our country. Tests of atom om s of different cali ers 1ill e conducted in the future as 1ell$ in accordance 1ith the plan for the defense of our country from attack y the 4nglo/4merican aggressi9e loc. >#estion? 6n connection 1ith the test of the atom om $ 9arious personages in the Gnited States are raising alarm and shouting a out the threat to the security of the Gnited States. 4re there any grounds for such alarmL /ns)er? There are no grounds 1hate9er for such alarm. Personages in the Gnited States cannot ut kno1 that the So9iet Gnion is not only opposed to the employment of the atomic 1eapon$ ut that it also stands for its prohi ition and for the termination of its production. 6t is kno1n that the So9iet Gnion has se9eral times demanded the prohi ition of the atomic 1eapon$ ut each time this has een refused y the 4tlantic loc po1ers. This means that$ in the e9ent of an attack y the Gnited States on our country$ the ruling circles of the Gnited States 1ill use the atom om . 6t is this circumstance that has compelled the So9iet Gnion to ha9e the atomic 1eapon in order to meet the aggressors fully prepared. Df course the aggressors 1ant the So9iet Gnion to e unarmed in the e9ent of their attack upon it. The So9iet Gnion$ ho1e9er$ does not agree to this$ and it thinks that it should e fully prepared to meet the aggressor. ConseFuently$ if the Gnited States has no intention of attacking the So9iet Gnion$ the alarm of the personages in the Gnited States should e considered as pointless and false$ ecause the So9iet Gnion does not contemplate e9er attacking the Gnited States or any other country. Personages in the Gnited States are 9e;ed ecause the secret of the atom om is possessed not only y the Gnited States ut also y other countries$ the So9iet Gnion primarily. They 1ould like the Gnited States to e the monopolist of the production of the atom om . They 1ould like the Gnited States to ha9e unlimited po1er to intimidate and lackmail other countries. 5ut on 1hat grounds do they think soL 5y 1hat right do the interests of preser9ing peace reFuire such monopolyL Would it not e more correct to say that matters are directly the opposite$ that it is the interests of preser9ing peace that reFuire first of all the liFuidation of such a monopoly and then the unconditional prohi ition of the atomic 1eapon tooL 6 think that the proponents of the atom om may agree to the prohi ition of the atomic 1eapon only if they see that they are no longer monopolists. >#estion? What is your opinion regarding international control of the atomic 1eaponL /ns)er? The So9iet Gnion stands for prohi iting the atomic 1eapon and terminating the production of the atomic 1eapon. The So9iet Gnion stands for the esta lishment of international control o9er the fully e;act and conscientious implementation of the decision to prohi it the atomic 1eapon$ to terminate the production of the atomic 1eapon and utili?e the already produced atom om s solely for ci9ilian purposes. The So9iet Gnion stands for precisely this kind of international control. 4merican personages also speak of control$ ut their control presupposes not the termination of the production of the atomic 1eapon$ ut the continuation of such production in Fuantities conforming to the amounts of ra1 material at the disposal of different countries. ConseFuently$ the 4merican control presupposes not prohi iting the atomic 1eapon$ ut making it legal and la1ful. There y the right of the 1armongers to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of peaceful inha itants 1ith the help of the atomic 1eapon is made la1ful. 6t is not difficult to understand that this is not control ut a mockery of control and a deception of the peaceful aspirations of the peoples. 6t is clear that such control cannot satisfy the peace/lo9ing peoples 1ho demand the prohi ition of the atomic 1eapon and the termination of its production.