RULE 13: SECTION 36: HEARSAY RULE Case No.

103 PEOPLE V GADDI FACTS: That on or about the 11th day of December, 1981, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without any justifiable cause, qualified with treachery and with evident premeditation (sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one AUGUSTO ESGUERRA y NAVARRO, by then and there stabbing him several times with a knife, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provision of the Civil Code. ISSUE: CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SATISFY CONVICTION HELD: Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such conviction that: 1) there be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court People v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No. L-38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.] Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.

Case No. 104: PEOPLE V FRANCO FACTS: Appellant JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON was charged with 1 and convicted 2 of the crime of robbery with homicide. 3 He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and directed to indemnify Dunkin' Donut and the heirs of Aurelio Cuya, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively. Contending "that the trial court erred in convicting . . . him . . . [based] on evidence illegally obtained," 4 appellant now interposes this appeal. For its part, the Solicitor General recommended appellant's acquittal on the ground that "his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt." 5 ISSUE: HEARSAY EVIDENCE; ORIGINAL AND ADDITIONAL SWORN STATEMENTS OF AFFIANTS NOT CALLED TO THE WITNESS STAND, INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING HEARSAY. HELD: Anent the issue of admissibility of Exhibits "F" and "G" original and additional sworn statements of Maribel Diong, and Exhibits "H" and "I" original and additional sworn statements of Hilda Dolera, it assumes significance to note that their admission in evidence has been seasonably objected to by the appellant on the ground that they are hearsay. Our reading of the assailed decision, however, reveals that the foregoing exhibits were undoubtedly considered by the trial court as establishing the truth of the facts asserted therein. And therein lies another fatal error committed by the trial court because, without Maribel Diong and Hilda Dolera being called to the witness stand to affirm the contents of their sworn statements, the allegations therein are necessarily hearsay and therefore inadmissible. A contrary rule would render nugatory appellant's constitutional right of confrontation which guarantees him the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEASAY RULE: SECTION 37: DYING DECLARATION Case No. 105: PEOPLE V LAQUINON FACTS: Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde, committed as follows: LLjur "That on or about November 13, 1972, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Pablo Remonde with said weapon, inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death." After the trial, the lower Court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him as follows: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code); to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." From the foregoing judgment, accused Gregorio Laquinon interposed the present appeal. ISSUE: EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATION; INADMISSIBLE AS SUCH WHERE DECLARANT DID NOT BELIEVE HIMSELF IN EXTREMIS. HELD: The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an antemortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."

Case No. 106: PEOPLE V SALISON FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr., alias "Loloy," appeals from a judgment in Criminal Case No. 21805-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, which imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of one Rolando Valmoria. The information filed against appellant and the co-accused Tirso Andiente, alias "Sano", Rufino Dignaran, alias "Jongjong"; and Leonilo Fediles, alias "Ondoy," alleges: That on November 30, 1990 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, confederating and mutually helping one another, with abuse of superior strength and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mauled and pummeled with hard wood one Rolando Valmoria. Serious and fatal injuries were inflicted which subsequently caused the death of Rolando Valmoria on December 4, 1990. 1 Upon arraignment, appellant Rey Salison, Jr., assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of "not guilty." 2 Trial then proceeded only against him, because his three other co-accused were and, still are, at large. ISSUE: DYING DECLARATION REDUCED TO WRITING IN PHILIPPINE DIALECT; REQUIREMENT THAT THE SAME MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY TRANSLATION EASED WHEN ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION AND NO PREJUDICE CAUSE. HELD: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained. While such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral form, they are not thereby rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced. More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused. In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here since there was no objection and the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appears to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court. Also, the written document was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.

Case No. 107: MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE FACTS: Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November 28, 2003 Decision 2 and the March 10, 2004 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 25401. The CA affirmed, with modifications as to the award of damages, the Decision 4 of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The RTC had found Celestino Marturillas guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98. ISSUE: Whether the dying declaration was admissible. HELD: As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary." 47 Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.

SECTION 38: DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST Case No. 108: LAZARO V AGUSTIN FACTS: That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag, designated as Lot No. 10675 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag; ISSUE: THE SWORN STATEMENT OF BASILISA S. AGUSTIN IS A DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST WHICH ESTABLISHES THE CO-OWNERSHIP OF LOT NO. 10676 BY AND AMONG THE PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS AS HEIRS OF THE LATE SIMEON C. SANTOS. HELD: In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.

Case No. 109: PEOPLE V MAJURI FACTS: This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later.Girlie Aling, a relative of Airol Aling, stated in her affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she and Daria Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband (p. 4, Record). On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling, 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites) because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. ISSUE: Whether declaration against interest was admissible? HELD: YES. The contention that the accused did not understand fully the nature and effect of his plea of guilty is belied by the record. The trial judge, a Muslim, took pains to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty

Case No. 110: FUENTES V CA FACTS: The defense put up by the accussed in the murder charge is mistaken identity, particularly that the assailant was his cousin Zoilo. In fact, accussed testified that Zoilo admitted to him spontaneously that he stabbed the victim. An uncle also testified to corroborate him. ISSUE: Should the admission of Zoilo be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsey rule being a declaration against penal interest? Held: NO. Under section 38, rule 130 of the rules on evidence, there are 3 requisite for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: 1. The declerant must be available to testify. 2. The declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant 3. The circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. The declaration is untrustworthy. Zoilo who is related to the accussed had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accussed and his uncle.

Case No. 111: CAVITE V HONG FACTS: Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in 1960, respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile, the daughter of Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner spouses), and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6111. Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 involving the subject lots was a nullity since said properties were never owned nor adjudicated in favor of Susana, respondents' predecessor-in-interest. ISSUE: WHETHER THE DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST IS ADMISSIBLE HELD: Herein, despite the admission made by Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition against his own interest, the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents. In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susana's ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance.

SECTION 39: PEDIGREE Case No. 112: TISON V CA FACTS: To prove that she is a niece of the late Teodora Gurrero, Corazon testified to the effect that during Teodoras lifetime, the latter categorically declared that Corazon is her niece. ISSUE: In the absence of any corroborating evidence, is the lone testimony competent to prove the relationship? HELD: YES. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under sec 39 rule 130 of the rules of court, subject to the following conditions: 1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify 2. That the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry 3. That such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4. That the declaration was made ante litem motam That is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarants estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof that the declarations of the declarant as the relationshiop, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.

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Case No. 113: PEOPLE V ALEGADO FACTS: The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 in its decision promulgated on October 26, 1989. ISSUE: PEDIGREE HELD: In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

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SECTION 40: FAMILY TRADITION Case No. 114: FERRER V INCHAUSTI FACTS: This appeal was taken through bill of exceptions by counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of February 12, 1917, whereby the judge of the Court of First Instance held that Rosa Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs, could not have been a legitimate daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, who, on her death, left some legitimate children. The court did not deem it necessary to discuss whether the said Rosa Viademonte could be a daughter of the said Isabel Gonzalez, for the reason given in his decision, and held that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to what they have demanded, and that they should pay the costs. ISSUE: WHETHER SUCH EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE LEGITIMATE FILIATION HELD: The legitimate filiation of a person presupposes the existence of a marriage contracted by the presumed parents in accordance with law and, consequently, a child can not be declared a legitimate daughter of her mother without at the same time presuming that said child was born during the marriage of her supposed parents.

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Case No. 115: PEOPLE V ALBALATE JR FACTS: Appellant Reynaldo Albalate, Jr. was charged with two counts of rape committed against his niece "Maria". ISSUE: Evidence admissible? HELD: NO. Likewise, we afford no evidentiary value to appellant's claim that the filing of the rape charges was orchestrated by the victim's parents, particularly her father who allegedly harbored ill-feelings towards appellant. Other than the fact that this claim was unsubstantiated, we find appellant's claim too general to be believed. He merely claimed that he fought with the victim's father when they were both still young. But he failed to provide any detail as to when this alleged incident happened.

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SECTION 41: COMMON REPUTATION Case No. 116: JISON V CA FACTS: In an action for recognition as an illegitimate child, the plaintiff presented in evidence letters written by relatives of her supposed father attesting to her filiations. ISSUE: Are the letters admissible as part of common reputation under rule 130, sec 41? HELD: NO. it has been observed that: The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Xxx thus matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood ort vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage, which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

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SECTION 42: RES GESTAE Case No. 117: PEOPLE V LUNGAYAN FACTS: This is demonstrated in a review of the conviction of the accused Ceferino Lungayan by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Echague, Isabela for the crime of rape, who was thereby imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and ordered to indemnify the victim Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota in the amount of P12,000.00 for moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, in a decision dated April 8, 1982. ISSUE: Is it part of res gestae? HELD: NO. The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. 1 As the Court observed the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.

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Case No. 118: PEOPLE V PUTIAN FACTS: Guillermo Putian appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, finding him guilty of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Teodulo Panimdim in the sum of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 6762). The peculiarity of this case is that no eyewitness was presented to testify on the assault which resulted in the victim's death (See People vs. Dahino, 88 Phil. 789 as to murder proven by circumstantial evidence). ISSUE: Is it considered as part of res gestae? HELD: YES. We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part of the res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that caused his death five days later in the hospital. "Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae (5 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. pp. 373-4, citing People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601; People vs. Portento, 48 Phil. 971; People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538).

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SECTION 43: ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS Case No. 119: JOSE VS. MICHAELMAR FACTS: *labour case / illegal dismissal Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking 7 dated 2 July 2002 and an employment contract 8 dated 4 July 2002, MSSI through MPI engaged the services of Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar. ISSUE: Admissibility of medical records. HELD: YES. Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity and under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of business, which are transactions made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business. We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes entries made in the ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued and released by the medical officer. The ship's physician at Curacao under whom the tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his handwritten comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test was conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been suggested in this particular case. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

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Case No. 120: LANDBANK V MONETS FACTS: This case is about the evidence required to prove how much a borrower still owes the bank when he has multiple loan accounts with it that had all fallen due. ISSUE: The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC and the CA acted correctly in denying petitioner Land Bank's motion to reopen the hearing to allow it to present the bank's updated Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31, 2006 that reflects respondents Monet and the Tagles' remaining indebtedness to it. HELD: The CA of course places no value on the Consolidated Billing Statement that Land Bank would have adduced in evidence had the RTC granted its motion for reconsideration and reopened the hearing. Apparently, both courts believe that Land Bank needed to present in evidence all original documents evidencing every transaction between Land Bank and Monet to prove the current status of the latter's loan accounts. But a bank statement, properly authenticated by a competent bank officer, can serve as evidence of the status of those accounts and what Monet and the Tagles still owe the bank. Under Section 43, Rule 130 14 of the Rules of Court, entries prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie evidence of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular course of business and shows the net result of such transactions. Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision. If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited. In actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of records. 15

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SECTION 44: OFFCIAL RECORDS Case No. 121: AFRICA V CALTEX FACTS: The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. ISSUE: HEARSAY RULE; REPORTS NOT CONSIDERED EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE. HELD: The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

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Case No. 122: PEOPLE VS. LEONES FACTS: Irene, a salesgirl in the store owned by appellant's parents, accused appellant of having allegedly raped her one afternoon after he and his sister had forced her to take three tablets which rendered her semi-conscious. Charged with rape in the Court of First Instance, appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Medical examination conducted on Irene about two or three hours after the alleged rape disclosed healing lacerations of the hymen, absence of sperm cells and unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity. On the other hand, complainant testified that on the date of the alleged rape she was having her menstrual period. The trial court convicted the appellant of rape. Hence, the present appeal. The Supreme Court held that the moral certainty or degree of proof which produces conviction in our unprejudiced mind has not been established by the prosecution and the constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent must prevail. Judgement REVERSED and appellant is ACQUITTED. ISSUE: EVIDENCE; PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE; ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS. HELD: YES. The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission In the hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital (Rule 130, Sec. 38 of the Rules of Court).

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SECTION 45: COMMERCIAL LISTS Case No. 123: PNOC V CA FACTS: The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV , owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). ISSUE: HEARSAY EVIDENCE; PRICE QUOTATIONS PARTAKE THE NATURE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. HELD: NO. The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation."

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SECTION 47: PRIOR TESTIMONY Case No. 124: MANLICLIC V CALAUNAN FACTS: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. ISSUE: Admissibility HELD: NO. Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI's employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. 23

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SECTION 48-50: OPINION RULE Case No. 125: PEOPLE VS. ADOVISO FACTS: Adoviso was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of murder for feloniously shooting Agunos and Vasquez several times with the use of a firearm in the latter's "camalig" on the night of February 18, 1990. Eyewitnesses said they were able to identify Adoviso from the light emanating from the gas lamp inside the "camalig" at the time. Appellant was correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of murder qualified by treachery because the victims at the time were totally unaware of an impending assault. Appellant was properly identified by the eyewitnesses because of the two gas lamps sufficiently illuminating the place at the time of the crime. Further, the bamboo slats in the "camalig" could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four meters apart. Hence, appellant's alibi crumbled in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. ITAaHc ISSUE: EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY HELD: Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. CTHaSD

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Case No. 126: PEOPLE V ABRIOL FACTS: Appellants were found guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearms (violation of PD No. 1866). In this appeal, appellants questioned their convictions which were based mainly on circumstantial evidence. On the conviction for murder, in the assessment of the Court, the prosecution's evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of appellants. It proved not only the identities of appellants but also their participation and collective responsibility in the murder of the victim Flores. That against the matrix of facts and circumstances, appellants' bare denials cannot stand. On the conviction for illegal possession of firearms, appellants contended that there was illegal seizure of their handguns and ammunitions. The Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrantless search and seizure. The search was incidental to a lawful arrest as it was made after a fatal shooting and in pursuit of a fast moving vehicle believed to be involved in the crime. Thereafter, appellants were caught in flagrante delicto with the firearms and ammunitions without authority to carry the same. At any rate, with the passage of RA No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder is not a separate crime but merely a special aggravating circumstance. aAcDSC ISSUE: RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; EXPERT OPINION; AUTOPSY REPORT UPHELD IN CASE AT BAR. HELD: Appellants claim that the autopsy report of prosecution witness Dr. Ladislao Diola revealed serious ambiguities. We note, however, that during cross-examination, Dr. Diola carefully explained that a firearm's caliber is not the only basis for determining the cause of the gunshot wound. The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's testimony is supported by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller than the firearm's caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the skin (stress supplied). Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim's head and extremities. Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola's findings in this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants' theory that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim. IDASHa

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Case No. 127: PEOPLE V BAID FACTS: Appellant is a nurse-aide in the Holy Spirit Clinic while the victim is a schizophrenic patient confined therein. Appellant was found guilty of raping the victim, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal which questioned the capability of the victim to be a witness. Notwithstanding her mental illness, the victim showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim during her testimony, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, the victim was candid, straightforward and coherent. Furthermore, aside from the doctor's testimony on the victim's consciousness and memory, it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of memory. That the victim agreed to have sex with appellant after the latter gave her a stick of cigarette, suffice it to say that with the victim's mental state, she was in no position to give consent. ISSUE: EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; WITNESS QUALIFIED NOTWITHSTANDING MENTAL ILLNESS IN CASE AT BAR. HELD: Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them. Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim ("inappropriate affect") during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent. Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness and memory, it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of memory. It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.

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Case No. 128: TABAO V PEOPLE FACTS: At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back. 1 Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez' speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelle's body. Bystanders armed with stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez' car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. 2 Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez' car, sat beside him, got his driver's license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. 3 Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelle's body inside Mendez' car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital, 4 where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries. 5 ISSUE: Reliability of the evidence. HELD: The general rule that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him is not without exception, as when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail of the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court. 29 In the present case, we see no substantial contradiction in Victor's affidavit and in his court statements as he declared in both that he saw the petitioner's car ramp on the island divider and bump Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the center island before or after it bumped the victim does not detract from the fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified the petitioner as the driver of the car that ramped on the island divider and hit Rochelle. As earlier discussed, Victor sufficiently explained this inconsistency during the trial.

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RULE 130, SECTION 34, 35, 51: CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE 132, SECTION 14 Case No. 129: PEOPLE V SANTOS FACTS: In prosecution for murder and frustrated murder, one of the documentary exhibits offered was an affidavit of a witness in another criminal case against the same accused. The other case was aldo for murder that occurred in the same spot where the murder case currently on trial happened. Over the objection of accused, considering that the person who executed the affidavit did ot testify, the exhibit was admitted by the trial court. ISSUE: Did the court commit an error in admitting the affidavit? HELD: NO. The trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the affidavit for the limited purpose of proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically that accused knew that the particular corner of two streets in Malabon was good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Sec 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.

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Case No. 130: PEOPLE V NARDO FACTS: Alredo Nardo was convicted by the RTC and sentenced to death for the rape of his daughter, Lorielyn. The conviction was primarily based on the testimony of Loruelyn herself. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or parents permission to leave the house. ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in convincing Alfredo based on the sole testimony of Lorielyn and not taking into account testimonies which showed her lying tendencies? HELD: YES. The sole testimony of Lorielyn was sufficient to establish the guilt of her father, Alfredo. It is settled that a person accused of rape can be convincted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, deed, a daughter, especially one in her minority, would not accuse her own father of such an unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not been aggrieved. While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehood committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are pretty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging ones own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

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Case No. 131: PEOPLE V LEE FACTS: Accused was charged with murder. During trial, he represented evidence of the bad moral character of the victim particularly that the latter was a theft and a drug addict. ISSUE: Is the evidence admissible? If so, what weight should be given to it? HELD: Rule 130, sec 51 of the revised rules on evidence allows proof of the good or bad moral character of the offended party if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. It is commonly used as defense in an assault or homicide case to establish the likelihood that the victim commenced the aggression, or acclaim of consent in a rape case to rebut evidence that the sexual act was made possible through force, threat or intimidation. In this case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused. In light of positive eye witness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by anyone of those from whom he had stolen is, pure and simple speculation.

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Case No. 132: PEOPLE V EDUALINO FACTS: Accused was charged with homicide for killing her fourth husband. Her son and daughter testified that her father and mother were husband and wife. Accused also admitted that they were married before a judge. ISSUE: Can accused be convicted of parricide based on said evidence? HELD: YES. The admission of the accused that she was married to the victim was a confirmation of the simper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

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Case No. 133: PEOPLE V DEOPITA FACTS: Accused was on trial for the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Among the evidence he presented for his defense was that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of Ministerial Servant in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of god. ISSUE: What value should be assigned to the good moral character of the accused? HELD: The fact that accused is endowed with such sterling qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of Ministerial Servant in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused is unveiling.

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