Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

180906 October 7, 2008 THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents. DECISION PUNO, C.J.: While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents." This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5 While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as AmparoPetition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8 On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, viz: WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9 On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz: ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED. The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED: 1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision. 3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision. The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive. SO ORDERED.10 Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents: Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of theirbarangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11 On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12 Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men. 13 The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14 The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15 In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17 On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in

another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18 The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. 19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20 For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21 Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23 For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24 At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25 One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26 From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27 Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz: Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?" Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..." Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno." 28 Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were

afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29 When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32 One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33 After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34 After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks. 35 The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. 36 After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37 On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38 On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. 39 Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. 40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41 From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp,viz: Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy. Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas. Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito. Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy. May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita. xxx xxx xxx Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43 On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44 Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45 Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46 Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47 Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz: 13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48 Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that: 7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP: (1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49 Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following: 3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit. 3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters. 3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ ofAmparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court. 3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50 Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz: 10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive; 11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan; 12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office; 13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino. 51 It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52 Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. 53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54 On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the

alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. 58 Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62 Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. 65 Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68 As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted: III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims. b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU. c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother

Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers. d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers. e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers. f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member. IV. DISCUSSION 5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned. V. CONCLUSION 6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case. 8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69 In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70 The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76 The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz: The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80 Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. 81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of

the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.82 The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process. 85 In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. 87 In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89 While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 91 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz: The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied) Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims bysubstantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95 After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100 We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz: ...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his

command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52) However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established. xxx xxx xxx As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101 We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, 103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108 With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are

physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111 Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" 114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116 In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge... At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. 117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:118 The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. 119 (emphases supplied) While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." 122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123 A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis

supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied) In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, acause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127 Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129 Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz: (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz: ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question. xxx xxx xxx ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132 Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz: (The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.135 This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz: The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied) The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of

Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz: ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied) Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz: Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148 The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or

disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. 151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question. First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court. Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas. Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007. With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown. Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control... In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..." Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of

the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters." With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death. On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary. In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZMADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, Petitioners, - versus June 17, 2008 HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in BoracayIsland, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18thDIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.LOURDES T. SANSON, Respondents. x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x RESOLUTION BRION, J.: Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1] and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2]) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents. The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents: The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the private respondents), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed land); (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and against the objections of the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. G.R. No. 182484

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the private respondents favor. It found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents favor, thus: The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Affidavit of GregorioSanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.). From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wankyand Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D, Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon. The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action. Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic). (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25). The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities. Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex D, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.). The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date. Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property

Promulgated:

of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men. From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy. Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6]. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin). On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents posting of a bond. The writ[7] authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007[8]. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9] The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12] It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read: 29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice. 31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...] 32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons. [] 34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout. 35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.[13] The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders. OUR RULING We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance. The Petition for Certiorari We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15] from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court[16] (Certificate of Compliance) that in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitions Prayer patently shows.[17] Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION.[18] Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that: x x x (e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic); (f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied) (g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic). x x x The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that the CA did not act on the petition up to this date while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken. At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and

deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time. To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt. [20] Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public. In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accionreivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the firstlevel courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition. In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies. The Writ of Amparo To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[22] The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents: (a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006; (b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz; (c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemias affidavit; (d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed land; (e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards; (f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire. On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was accidental. As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made

under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner. We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot. Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate. Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ ofcertiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the situation obtaining in the present case. While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25] and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. The Writ of Habeas Data Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that 1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same; [] 66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP. These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitio ners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3 We begin with the petitioners allegations. Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7 In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9 After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11 Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13 Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17The van then sped away.
4 1 2

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22 What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25 Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28 Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30 On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an email address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.36 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39 The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40 In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.42 On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr . Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50 For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51 Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53 Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner: Police Action Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56 The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59 At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different p olice stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60 On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63 On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. 64 Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67 The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69 Military Action Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74 For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76 On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78 The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82 The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction. 85 The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPPNPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88 The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92 Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94 Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. AMPARO A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96 Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97 Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the highranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99 Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100 The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102 The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied) Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108 x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied) It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit: x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced

disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.112 Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113 We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings. In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 118 But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights. B. The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121 Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. HABEAS DATA As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant. For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision: Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information. Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises. Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP -NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP -NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existenc e of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.129 Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed

by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors. Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is ha rdly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wear ing any mask.1avvphi1 The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date. In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice. To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR. Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows 1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. 2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and tortur e, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. 3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. 4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for

final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision: 1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings; 2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision. 4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. 5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes: a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR; b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable. Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010 LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule. The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in substance, the following allegations: 1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued; 2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes daught er, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation even after Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him; 3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching them; 4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government agents in civilian clothes; and 5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF. The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National

Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4 Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her daughters: 1. Gen. Esperon attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action. Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look into the matter;5 2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of the petition is on-going vis--vis Lourdes abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga. Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmarias municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated with the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its orders.61avvphi1 3. P/Supt. Roquero stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes complaint, an investigation and submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with relevant information; 4. P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP; and 5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes kidnapping; that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed. Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them. The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.

The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition, petitioners motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8 After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation. SO ORDERED. In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. 9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10 x x x And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB. None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13 As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the CAs holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.

As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy. While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."14 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,15foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators 16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.18 While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.20 It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. 21 Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents crim inal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."23 Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings]. xxxx As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo. 25 Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset." Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established. Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical Sergeant John N. Romano,27 officer-incharge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes abduction. Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors to the milit ary or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent.29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection. Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxxx Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis added.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.32 Per the CAs evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security. Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with some definite findings and recommendation. As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them;

and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "[They] do not trust the government agencies to protect them." 34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is understandable, though. The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in theVelasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.) This brings us to Mary Joys charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joys bare allegations of harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision: In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None "36 Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of the designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-070602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review. Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or personal security. The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. 42 It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the

Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be sustained. Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution. As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razons imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the AFP and the PNP. At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case. First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-PC-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O70602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation. Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-

C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision: (1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo; (2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and (3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following: (a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court; (b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and (c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them. The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners. This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP. Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA. SO ORDERED.

RUBEN N. SALCEDO, Complainant,

A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ) Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,* and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.

versus -

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and Promulgated: JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Respondent. July 5, 2010 arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing self-help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x RESOLUTION BRION, J.:

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and how it We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo. came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as follows: 1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office regarding the procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the established procedure is to assign cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper motions. But since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for instruction and or appropriate action; 2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1 st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo; 3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC); 4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the petition; 5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped in the petition; 6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon; 7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the information that I was going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin. Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent judge]; 8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon to explain why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction from me; 9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed

if they still discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court; 10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo nor was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by Judge Lucagbo; 11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not motivated by any ill motive or malice.[2]

(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was immediately assigned to his sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec. 3 further states that it can be filed on any day and at any time; (d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the Agora Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly spend the night in jail; (e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of the SC Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found the petition sufficient in form and in substance; (f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioners representative and their counsel, thus, the following information were elicited: 1) That the property of petitioners family, which is under their possession and Tanmalack registered under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the area and put up improvements by constructing shanties thereon; That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated arguments and altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report the incident and be blottered; That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008 in order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of the property; That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and despite the protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave the police station; and, That petitioners counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his client from police custody but to no avail;

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008,directing the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku. The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

2)

3) In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity. 5) 4)

(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in the petition, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the same warranted the issuance of the writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in the area where the alleged incident happened, so that the statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be hearsay; (h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return pursuant to the rules; during the summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who appeared, the alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the following answers: 1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the complaint considering that the petitioner was already released; That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to complain, followed by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict between the petitioner and the other persons is on a property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in possession; and

The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged: (a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioners counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason); (b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of Amparo];

2)

3)

That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him but only he could not release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further evaluation. We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the

(i)

[H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily armed men with him when he allegedly harassed the complainant.

[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo have arrived into an agreement that the writ be considered permanent.]

THE REPORT OF THE OCA

The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8, 2010, signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva. The Report likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads: EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, as in the instant case, or of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty and security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights. Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was attended by irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Also, the petition was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court where the act or omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred. Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have complied with his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad faith, ignominy or ill will, thus, herein complainants allegation that respondent Judges act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves scant consideration. This Office agrees with respondent Judges observation that Rojos decla ration not anymore to contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened to deprive+ Jose *Dy Tanmalack+ of his liberty.

OUR RULING

administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalacks petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of extralegal killings and enforced

At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killing s and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.[3] The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held: To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

disappearances or the threats thereof. The petition merely states that he is under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely in custody.[6]

Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.[7]

In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. We laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,[9] viz: As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him undue injury. This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.[10]

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him.[12]

We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ ofAmparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.

More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainants allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Writ of Amparo. Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.[11] We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law requires. accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of Amparo. The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[13] In the present case, the complainant failed to

We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182498

December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. Theprivileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis. Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents. This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget. This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below. The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7 On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.9 More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state: xxxx 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong; 8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and his room was closed and locked; 9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room; 10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government; 12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; 13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband; 14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men; 15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; xxxx 17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondents] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results; 18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners] refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband; 19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties; 20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time; 21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the [respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands; 22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondents] request for help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of [respondents] husband, Engr. Tagitis; xxxx

25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied] On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.11 In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12 The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following summary: 13 xxxx 4. a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person. b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 oclock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions. 5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation

of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court. The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:14 xxxx That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis. That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around six oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six oclock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government. That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions. That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible therefore. Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas affidavit which alleged that:16 xxxx That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS. That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
15

That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance. That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED. That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report. That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar of justice. That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued. Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis disappearance, viz:17 xxxx 3) For the record: 1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident; xxxx 4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office; 5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila; 6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest; 7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 oclock p.m. and never returned back to his room; 8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to determine the whereabouts of

the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court; 9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have caused the following directives: a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter; b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive; c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality; d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance; e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction; f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis; 10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the following: a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007; b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis; c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO; 11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following: a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the disappearance and the action being taken by our office; b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;

c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM; 4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate solution of the case. Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18 Task Force Tagitis On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives.21 In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23 [Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his [personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the IDB Scholarship Fund. In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction. 25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo. 26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27 9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program. 20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them.

xxxx It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case. On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds: 28 (1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis claim that they already had an "all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated? (2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated post. Yet, P/Supt KASIMs subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioners unofficial source of the military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis. Testimonies for the Respondent On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This friend also told her that her husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis." 31 The respondent recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah." 32 On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second wife, and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34 The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time they

arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husbands disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phones battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phones battery.36 The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his medication.38 On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40 On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 oclock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM). On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit. While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007. When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused. While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days. I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so. The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: 41 On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of

Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for highranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis. On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he assured me that hell do the best he can to help me find my husband. After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal. On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam. It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us. He asked a favor to me that "Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw repo rt." He assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient. In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim. On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. 42 In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43 She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim. 44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. 54 On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of [its] contents."56

On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the res pondents testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the PNP. 57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. 59 He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity.60 On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others. 62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because "it was not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. 63He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his abduction.64 In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latters disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis. 70 THE CA RULING On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondents testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis abduction came from no less than the military an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the CIDGs involvement in Tagitis abducti on. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis. The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73 THE PETITION In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence. 74 THE COURTS RULING We do not find the petition meritorious. Sufficiency in Form and Substance In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to: 1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security; 2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his disappearance, and the respondents source of information; 3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their consent; 4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband; 5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations; 6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis disappearance; and 7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband. A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course s tate the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present. In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77 These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.

Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. 79 We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certai n that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondents personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition.80 These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents frustrations in securing an investigation with meani ngful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward. Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Courts intervention. We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it. Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondents petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition. xxxx 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong; xxxx 10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency; 11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; 13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband; xxxx 15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; xxxx 17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondents] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results xxxx 20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time; xxxx 25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case. The Desaparecidos The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would be very helpful. The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly

to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons. 83 In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments counter -insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases: 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again; 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and 3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.88 In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92 Enforced Disappearances Under Philippine Law The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94 JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So well have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and disappe arances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95 In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98 As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. 99 The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure. Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights. Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties. Enforced Disappearance Under International Law

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. 102 The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising from "reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations." 103 In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied] Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied] The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established. 111 Binding Effect of UN Action on the Philippines To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."112 Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: 114 Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied] As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."115 In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we held that: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either bytransformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied] We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117 [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original] The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the following in these respects: First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994. 122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees."123 One of the key provisions includes the States obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in

accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1 Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared persons mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13. 127 Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as follows: These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted] Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity.131 Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance.135 While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider

a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us. The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a disappearance:136 1) the right to recognition as a person before the law; 2) the right to liberty and security of the person; 3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed; 5) the right to an identity; 6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees; 7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation; 8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance. 9) the right to protection and assistance to the family; 10) the right to an adequate standard of living; 11) the right to health; and 12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied] Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides: Article 2 3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]

In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137 15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied] The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138 18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied] In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government, held that: The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz: (The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied] Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling: [A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to

safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied] These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance. Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus: The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.142 In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144 when we acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise." Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun.145 The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime. 147 Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150

These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of this case. Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows: Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. xxxx Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims bysubstantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability. Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied] These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied] In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recogni zed that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said: The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied] Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding. In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence that the government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It held: 130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts. 131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied] In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velsquez, the victims sister, who described Manfredos kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo. 156 Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only

compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness 157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the abovedescribed conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Assessment of the Evidence

We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial. In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance. The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondents testimony: Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those in charge of any records or investigation? A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir. Q: What is J.I.?

The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited? The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."159 Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: 160 (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir. Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp? A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir. Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy? A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report? A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied] She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination: Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?

We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.

A: Yes, maam. Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation? A: Yes, maam. Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?

A: Yes, maam. Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report? A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a military report, maam. Q: But you were able to read the contents?

Q: Who were they? A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir. Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time? A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir. Q: Were you able to talk to him?

A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam. A: Yes, sir. Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim? Q: The four of you? A: There were three of us, maam. A: Yes, sir. Q: Who were your companions? A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam. 162 xxxx Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do? A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, maam."163 xxxx Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information? A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that they would deny it, maam.164 On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz: Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when you went there? A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir. Q: Only the two of you? A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir. Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time? A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir. Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer or what? A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but Im certain that i t was typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir. Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form? A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165 xxxx Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time? A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir. Q: After that incident, what did you do if any? A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] 166

Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.167 To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I." The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military." Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story. 170 Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence." Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis custodian. Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant). 172 To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case. The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. Other than these pi eces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis. The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived in Jolo and was never seen again. The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance. Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case. More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis. The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated

during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirims replacement in the latters last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation even an internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims "asset" and what he indeed wrote. We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respon dent when she herself reported and inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself. As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,173 the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts. This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against

Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps enforced disappearance. Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance exclusively to the NBI. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms: a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court; e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNPCIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action; g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision; h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision; These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation. The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186640

February 11, 2010

GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A. VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Petitioners, vs. CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition docketed as G.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). On January 2, 2008, the Court1 resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A. Cleofas amended her petition2 on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-respondent Marciana Medina (Marciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers3 including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt. Gil Villalobos4 (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional respondents. In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas "wives" Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006 to the Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),5 they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71st Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail. Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006, whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006, 6 this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed7 the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action. Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps,8 the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 9

Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,10 verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as Commander of the Armys 7th Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Victor Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed with the appellate court on January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his return from an official trip abroad. In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the petitions ultimate objective was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel;11 that the petition failed to indicate the matters required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative; that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them; and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military officers with respect to their duties; or allege that respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify Josephines claim that she saw the victims on two different occasions inside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow up on the PNP Capas Stations further action on their complaint.12 Denying he violated the victims right to life, liberty and security, Gen. Esperon specifically asserted that, in compliance with the Defense Secretarys directive in relation to cases of Writ of Amparo against the AFP, he issued directives to the Nolcom Commander and the Armys Commanding General to investigate and establish t he circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units was concerned; and undertook to bring any military personnel involved, when warranted by the evidence, to the bar of justice.13 Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of the victims, stating that it was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility,14 and that he was away on official business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.15 Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on September 1, 2007 and thus had no personal knowledge about the victims alleged disappearance or abduction on Septemb er 18, 2006; that he was informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities; and that in compliance with Gen. Esperons directive, their command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.16 Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24, 2006, on which date civilians were not allowed to enter except on official missions or when duly authorized to conduct transactions inside the camp. He thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen the two victims inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on September 24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead recounted that on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself as "Antonina Galang," who informed him about the disappearance of the victims since September 18, 2006. Warning him that these men were members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any queries or complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.17 Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyone named Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered the camps kitchen to drink water. Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately inquired on the actions taken on the case. He averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly; or consented, permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He declared that it had always been his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who violated the law before the court of justice.

In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their issuance. They went on to argue that such request relied solely on bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in Josephines affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw Nicolas and Heherson on board an army truck near the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside the kitchen of the 71st Infantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while logging outside said camp, Josephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson.18 On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed Decision of September 17, 2008,19 Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows: All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any direct or indirect link between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson.Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of justice. The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the 7th Infantry Division, which had jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, should exert extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. The Philippine Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the State. RELIEFS While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing. Hence, We find it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and justice as follows: 1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, within reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alert status. 2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written report to this Court within three (3) months from notice. SO ORDERED.20 (underscoring supplied) The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.21 The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009.22 Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,23 Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,24 and Maj. Gen. Ralph Villanueva25 (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate courts assailed issuances, faulting it for

. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING PETITIONERS TO: (A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO, NORTH LUZON COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC CITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF THE 7th INFANTRY DIVISION LOCATED IN AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC CITY; AND. (B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES, FILE CHARGES AGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM NOTICE.26 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court finds merit in the petition. In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the following findings: To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson, petitioners presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner Cleofas Sanchez neighbor, who allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson inside Camp Servillano Aquino on September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major Henry Galang, who is allegedly living inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw Nicolas and Heherson at Aqua Farm at Hacienda Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Battalion is located and where Heherson was seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen cooking, having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot wound; that on November 1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil to give her a cellfone which Tech. Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas and Heherson will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and thereafter, she did not see the two anymore. While Josephine Galang Victorias story of how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents. 1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she knows a certain woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces herself as Antonina Galang, niece through the cousin of his wife and a long-time resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she lived with her partner Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or siblings house; that he knows the reputation of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness and integrity, known to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before God and the State. 2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II since birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang Victoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother; that she even took care of Antonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to fool others, a liar and invent [sic] stories for reason of money. 3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang is a niece and attested the same negative reputations against Antonina. It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victorias relatives were never successfully rebutted by her and the Court gives credence to them. No ill motive [sic] were established against the said witnesses to testify against Antonina Galang.

Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she first saw Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because she was visiting her uncle, Major Henry Galang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang was put to doubt. TSG Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Major Galang was no longer residing there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of TSG Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on Antonina Galangs penchant to invent stories or tell a lie. In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang that the two missing person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino and later, in Aqua Farm, were Nicolas and Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang never did see the faces of the two but were known to her through photographs. Certainly, there may be a difference between photographs and the faces in person. To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in the early morning of September 18, 2006.27 (underscoring supplied) NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courts September 17, 2008 Decision. The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo or raised in the appellants assignment of errors or arguments.28 This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. He may move for a correction or clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule and excuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties contentions that have remained disputed.29 What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the RELIEFS 30 by the appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper. Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to prove either partys claim, viz: SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claim by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the

writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review. Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every cit izens constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.31 The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, viz: SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs: (a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge. (b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons. (c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of theamparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the appellate courts judgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the production of logbooks and reports. 32 At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.33 If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading34 under the Amparo Rule, but they did not. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March 3, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 182165

November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents. The factual antecedents. Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan. By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory. The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos. The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them. By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is herebyGRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan. SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated. The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease. On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos. Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property. On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7 The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise: Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8 rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE. Without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12 In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied) The petition is impressed with merit. The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, libertyand security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof."Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or

abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted) To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and secur ity, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property. Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16 To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: xxxx The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. 17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted) Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held: On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)" 19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.20 Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz: xxxx 11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied) Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. As for respondents assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.22 Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008. More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo andhabeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping. It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1 It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute. At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189155

September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3 We begin with the petitioners allegations. Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7 In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9 After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 13 Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17The van then sped away. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22 What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25 Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28 Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30 On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. 31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an email address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.36 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39 The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents

any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40 In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.42 On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48 Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. 50 For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51 Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53 Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner: Police Action Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56 The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in

the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59 At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different pol ice stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60 On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63 On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. 64 Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67 The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69 Military Action Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.72 Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74 For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76 On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82 The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction. 85 The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPPNPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88 The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92 Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94 Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. AMPARO A. Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97 Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the highranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99 Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100 The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102 The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied) Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108 x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied) It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of

responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit: x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents

thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces. 112 Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113 We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings. In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 118 But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies wi th the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights. B. The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121 Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. HABEAS DATA As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant. For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision: Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governm ents Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information. Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises. Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP -NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied). The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP -NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan

and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129 Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1 The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date. In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice. To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR. Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows 1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. 2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. 3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision: 1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings; 2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision. 4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. 5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR; b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable. Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184769

October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim:

the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008. By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following: a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection; b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.1 Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. 2 By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise: xxxx I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector. By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for a TRO. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7 By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. 101avvphi1 Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her

place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employeremployee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction. Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and t hat OCA-Circular No. 79200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases. Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities. The petition is impressed with merit. Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13 Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is laborrelated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.