314

James Schmidt and Thomas E. \,\Iartenbcrg

13
93. Foucault Reader, 38. Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
94. Hacking, "Self_Improvement," 238. (Subjectivation)
95. Foucault Rpadcr, 48.
Gilles Deleuze
96. Ibid., 50.
tl "Critique of Impure Reason," 463.
97. M
1 CC ar lY, ,
. 1 N' tz· he Cruelty" Polit-
'1'11 . "C"al'nl\"lis of AtroCIty: FOllcau t, 1 le sc, '
98. See James tV 1 Cl, ,< ,

ical71/Cory 18 (1990): 478. .

. . . TI 'IS E. vVartcnberg, The Forms oj power: From Dmlll-
99. ,For a~ dlSc~r.SSlOn,'. sce(Ph~~~~iphia: Temple University Press), 1990.
na/IOIt fa Trall.'!J0nlla /Oil '

100. I-lacking, "Self-Improvement," 9°8

_~'J •
. "Critique as a Philosophic Ethos," 421 (italics in original). ,Vhat happened during the fairly long silence following The History
101. BernsteIn, .
. J G /" d' am der kloml da Lll- a/Sexuality? Perhaps Foucault fell slightly uneasy about the book: had
9 Cl . l'
10_. ,Ins tan , '.
t.:
Carve Versw:lw iiber verschw( enl~ ,esellS all : 1 1
179 9 ) re finted in Dlcter Henne 1, C(., he not trapped himself within the concept of power relations? He
cralur, und ficm gescUs~!wftITlr:WII.~~clWl~ i~ra~i: (Fr!kfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967), 134- himself put fonvard the following objection: "That's just like you,
Kalil, CClllz., Rchberg: Uber /Com 1L11( •
always with the same incajJacit,.)1 to cross the lhw, to pass over to the
138.
other side ... it is always the same choice, for the side of power, for
'· l "On the Common Saying: 'This May be Tnle in Theory,
1 O~ lmmanue1 I'\.illl, . . 67 what power says or of what it causes to be said."l And no doubt his
" I O N t Apply in Practice," in Poiiliw[ 1Vnlmgs, .
But toes 0 own reply was that "the most intense point of lives, the one where
104. Hacking, "Self_Improvement, " 9°9 _:J their energy is concentrated, is precisely where they clash with power,
. (C b' 1 . C'lmbridge University struggle with it, endeavor to utilize its forces or to escape iL"I traps."
a O'Neill Constructions oj Rl!aSOIl ,am rIC ge. -'< • 'h'"
I ~~. 1~)o8~)a) 58-59. 'For a discussion of the antifoundationalism ot Kant s et lCS, He might equally have added that the diHi.lse centers of power do
P less, . , ,
see pp. 18-19,56,64. not exist without points of resistance that are in smne way primary;
and that power does not take life as its objective without revealing or
106. Clifiql/.l! oJJudgmt:nl §40. giving rise to a life that resists power; and finally that the force of the
"The Return of Morality," in Foucault Live, 330. outside continues La disrupt the diagrams and turn them upside
107.
down.
But what happens, on the other hand, if the transversal relations
of resistance continue to become resu'atified, and to encounter or
even construct knots of power? Already the ultimate failure of the
prison movement, after 1970, had saddened Foucault, on top of
which other events, on a world scale, must have saddened him even
more. If power is constitutive of truth, how can we conceive of a
"power of truth" which would no longer be the truth of power, a
truth that would release transversal lines of resistance and not inle-
gral lines of power? How can we "cross the line"? A.nd, if we must
316
Gilles Deleuzc
attain a life that is the power of the outside, what tells us that this
outside is not a terrifying void and that this life, which seems to put
up a resistance, is not just the simple distribution within the void of
"slow, partial and progressive" deaths? We can no longer even say
that death transforms life into destiny, an "indivisible and decisive"
event, but rather that death becomes multiplied and differentiated
in order to bestow on life the particular features, and consequently
the truths, which life believes arise from resisting death. What re-
mains, then, if not to pass through all these deaths preceding the
great limit of death itself, deaths which even afterwards continue?
Life henceforth consists only of taking one's place, or every place, in
the cortege of a "One dies."
It is in this sense that Bichat broke with the classical conception of
death, as a decisive moment or indivisible event, and broke ,vith it
in two ways, simultaneously presenting death as being coextensive
with life and as something made up of a multiplicity of partial and
particular deaths. When Foucault analyzes Bichat's theories, his tone
demonstrates sufficientiy that he is concerned with something other
than an epistemological analysis::! he is concerned ,vith a conception
of death, and few IllCll more than Foucault died in a way comlnen-
surate with their conception of death. This force oflife that belonged
to Foucault was always thought through and lived out as a multiple
death in the manner of Bichat.
vVhat remains, then, except an anonymous life that shows up only
when it clashes with power, argues with it, exchanges "brief and
strident words," and then fades back into the night, what Foucault
called "the life of infamous men," whom he asked us to admire by
virtue of "their misfortune, rage or uncertain madness"?3 Strangely,
implausibly, it is this "infamy" which he claimed for himself: "My
point of departure was those sorts of particles endowed with an en-
ergy that is all the greater for their being small and difficult to spot."
This culminated in The Use of Pleasure's searing phrase: "to get free of
oneself. "'\
]fw History of Sexuality explicitly closes on a doubt. If at the end of
it Foucault finds hinlself in an impasse, this is not because of his
conception of pmver but rather because he found the impasse to be
where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as
we run up against it in our smallest truths. This could be resolved
317
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch
it away from tile void and pull it back from death. This would be like
a new axis, different from the axes of both Imowledge and power.
Could tillS axls.be the place where a sense of serenity would be finally
attamed and hfe truly affinned? In any case, it is not an axis tilat
annuls all others but one tilat was already working at the same time
as the otilers, and prevented tilem from closing on the impasse.
Perhaps this third axis was present from tile beginning in Foucault
Uust as power was present from tile beginning in knowledge). But it
could emerge only by assuming a certain distance, and so being able
to CIrcle back on the other two. Foucault felt it necessary to carry out
a general reshuffle in order to unravel this path which was so tangled
up in the others that it remained hidden: it is this recentering which
Foucault puts forward in the general introduction to The Use of
Pleasure.
But how was tilis new dimension present from the beginning? Up
untIl now, we have encountered three dimensions: the relations
which have been formed or formalized along certain strata (Knowl-
edge); the relations between forces to be found at the level of tile
diagram (Power); and the relation with the outside, that absolute
relation, as Blanchot says, which is also a nonrelation (Thought).
Does this mean that there is no inside? Foucault continually submits
interiority to a radical critique. But is there an inside that lies deeper
than any intem,al world, just as the outside is farther away than any
external world? The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter
animated by peristaltic movement, folds and foldings that together
make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside,
but precisely the inside of the outside. The Order of Things developed
this theme: if thought comes from outside, and remains attached to
the outside, how come the outside does not flood into the inside as
the elements that thought does not and cannot think of? The ~n­
thought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart,
as that impossibility of tilinking which doubles or hollows out the
outside,5
The classical age had already stated that tilere was an inside of
thought, the unthought, when it invoked the finite, the differeut
orders of infinity. And from the nineteenth century on it is more the
dimensions of finitude which fold the outside and constitute a
 319
318 Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuzc

statement repeated or doubled "something else" that was barely dis-

, 'tl d a"~ l'nto itself" an inside to life, labor and
"d 1'" "densIty WI 1 r~.u' 1 tinguishable from it (the transmission of letters on the keyboard,
ept 1, a , ' b . Id d if only to sleep, but converse Y
I guage in whlch man IS em ec e , 'k' AZERT), Equally, the books on power showed how the stratified
an, .' ' . ' _ bedded in man "as a living beIng, a wor Ing
wblch IS also llselt em I' t"6 Either it is the fold of the infinite, £or111s repeated relations between forces that were barely distinguish-
individual or a speaktn,~> S~s)J~~ finitude which curve the outside and able from one another, and how history was the doubling of an
or the cons~ant fol~S
constItute t 1e lnSl e.
l;f","
1irth oj the Clinic had already shown how
to the surface but equally how patho-
emergence, This permanent theme in Foucault had already been
analysed in depth in Raymond Roussel. For what Raymond Roussel
the clinic brought tile body up d d' t~ this body deep foldings had discovered was the phrase of the oUL'iide, its repetition in a
, l' ubsequently Intro uce In second phrase, the Ininuscule diflerence between the two (the "snag"
10gICa anatomy s , .1 Id tion of interiority but constituted
which did not reSUSCItate t le 0 n~ ~ [I 'accra,] ), and the twistiug and doubling from one to the other. The
, I th inside of this outsIde,' snag is no longer the accident of the tissue but the new rule on the
Insteac. ~ new ,f of the out"iide: in all his work Foucault
The mSlde as an opera IOn of an inside which is merely the fold of basis OfV·lhich the external tissue is twisted, invaginated and doubled.
seems haunted by tIllS theme f I lin of the sea, On the subject The "facultative" rule, or the transmission of chance, a dice-throw.
the outside, as if the ShIp were a .~ c ut~o sea in his boat, Foucault They are, says Foucault, games of repetition, of difference, and of
of the Renaissance madman w l10 IS P the doubling that "links them,"
wrote: This is not the only time Foucault presents in a literary and hu-
, . 1 exterior and inversely, ' , a prisoner in the morous way what could be demonstrated by epistemology or linguis-
he is put in the lD tenor of t 1e. t' f routes' bound last at the infinite tics, which are both serious disciplines. Raymond Roussel has knitted
'the freest the openes 0 .. [' I
midst 0 f W I1at 1S ' j ,. )' 'lhu;(" that is the prisoner 0 - t le
crossroad s, H e 1
's the P'lssenger '')(11 Lxa I. '"
"
, or sewn together all the lueanings of the word dOll-blufe, in order to
passagc,R show how the inside was always Il,e folding of a presupposed out-
I' th'm this madman himself. As Blanchot side,ll And Roussel's last method, the proliferation of parentheses
Thou gllt h~s nl~' ~,~~:re~:~~~es t;le outside, that is, constitutes it in an inside one another, multiplies the foldings within the sentence. This
says 0 f Foncau, . "'-I
-'-. is why Foucault's book on Roussel is ilnportant, and no doubt the
., f xpectation or exceptlOll. '
intenonty. o. e .
a rather the theme wI'llC I1has ,
always haunted Foucault is that
' ,
path it traces is itself double, This does not at all mean that the pri-

tl:~ doubl~, dOU~~rii~r7z:t~~,; ~;~~~;t~~~lS~~eth;t i;;t~':~r~

macy can be reversed: the inside will always be the doubling oj the
of But th,e outside, But it does mean that either, like Roussel recklessly searching
on the contrary, It IS an 1I d bi' f the Other It is not a re- for death, we want to undo the doubling anel pull away the folels
doubling of the One, but a re on mg 0 f the Diff~rent. It is not "with a studied gesture," in order to reach the outside and its "stifling
roduetion of the Same, but a repetItIon o . ". nee
P ' f . "I" but something that places In Immane hollowness"; or like Leiris, who is more wise and prudent but none
the emanatlOn 0 ,In , . It is never the other who is a double the less in another sense incredibly audacious, -we follow the folds,
an always other or a NOl;-sdf. self tInt lives me as the double of the reinforce the doublings frmTI snag to snag, and surround ourselves
, I d bl'111g process It IS a , ,
m t le o U , ' 1 t 'I I find the other m with foldings that form an "absolute memory," in order La make the
other: I do not encounter In~self on ~ le OU SIC e, Other the Distant,
outside into a vital, recurring elementY-'! As The ilislOl")' oj fHadl/l!ss
me ("it is always concerned wIth shOWIng how the _ '-I' '
, I tl S'lme") 10 It resembles exactly t le ll1vagma- put it: to be put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely. Perhaps
IS also the Near al1C le ~ , ' f 1 hi' ' 1 sewing' twist Foucault has always oscillated between the two forms of the double,
lion of a tissue in elnbryology, or the act 0 (OU mg 1 1 ' , ,
already characterized at this early stage as the choice betl-veen death
fold stop and so on, , I
" d I t ' 1 its Inost paradoxica pages, or IT1Cmory. Perhaps he chose death, like Roussel, but not without
The Archaeology oj [(noH/hI ge S 10wec , 11
'-. . .. f other and above all how one having passed through the detours or foldings of memory,
how one phrase was the repetItIOn 0 an ,
320 321
Gilles Delellzc Foldings, or the Inside of Thought

Perhaps he even had to go back to the Greeks. In this way even

This,. at lea~t, is Foucault's version of the novelty of the Greeks.
the most impassioned problem would be giveu a context that woul~
And tlus verSIOn appears very important in both its detail and iL'i
restore a sense of calm. If folding or doubling haunts all Foucault s
superficial mode~ty. "Vhat the Greeks did is not to reveal Being or
work but surfaces only at a late stage, this is because he gave the
unfold the Open m a world-historical gesture. According to Foucault
nam~ of "absolute memory" to a new dimension which had t~ be theY.dId a grea~ deal less, or more. 1G They bent the outside, through
distinguished both frmn relations between forces or po~er-re~atlOn~
~ senes of practICal exercises. The Greeks are the first doubling. Force
d from stratified forms of Imowledge. Greek educatIOn presents IS what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation between
an ld' . I
new power-relations which are very different fro~ the 0 Impena.
other forces: it is inseparable in iL<;elf from the power to affect other
forms of education and materialize in a Greek hght as a system of
forces (spontaneity) and to be affected by others (receptivity). But
visibility, and in a Greek logos as a syst~nl of statements. We can
\vhat com.es (~bout as a ~esult is a relation which Jorce has with itselj; a
therefore speak of a diagram of power whrch extends across ,all qual-
jJOwerto a/leciltselj, an affect ofsel[ on self Following the Greek diagram,
ified forms of knowledge: "governing oneself, managmg one s estate,
on~y.frec"men can dommale ~thers ("free agents" and the "agonistic
and participating in the administration of the city were thre~ prac-
rel,lllOns between them are dlagraxnmatic characteristics). [7 But how
tices of the same type," and Xenophon "shows the contmlllty and
could they dominate others if they could not dominate themselves?
isomorphis111 between the three 'arts,' ~s w~ll as th.c ch~on~lo~l~al The domination of others must be doubled by a domination of one-
sequence by which they were to be practlsed m the hfe of an mdmd-
self. The relation with others must be doubled by a relation with
ua.1 "13 Hmvever , not even this marks the great novelty of the Greeks.
. ~neself. The obligatory rules for power must be doubled by faculta-
Such novelty ultimately emerges thanks to a double unhookmg or
tIve rules for the free man who exercises power. As moral codes here
"differentiation" [deaoc1wgt!]: when the "exercIses that enabled ~ne
and there execute the diagram (in the city, the family, tribunals,
to govern oneself' brcome detached both from. power as a r~,latIO~,
games, etc.), a "subject" must be isolated which differentiates itself
bellveen forces, and from knowledge as a stratIfied fornl, or code
from the code and no longer has an internal dependence on it.
of virtue. On the one hand there is a "relation to oneself' that con-
This is what the Greeks did: they folded force, even though it still
sciously derives from one's relation wit~1 others; ~n the other the~e
~·emallled f?rce. They made it relate back to itself. Far from ignoring
is equally a "seH:'constitution" that conscIously denves from the moral
IntenOrIty, lI~dlv~duahty or subjectivity they invented the subject, but
code as a rule for knowledge. I •1
only as a derIvative or the product of a "subjectivation." They discov-
This derivative or differentiation must be understood in the sense
ered the "aesthetic existence" - the doubling or relation with one-
in which the relation to oneself aSSUIl1eS an independen t status. It is as
self: the facultative rule of free man.'" (If we do not regard this
if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow
derIVatIOn as beIng a new dilnension, then we must say that there is
a relation to oneself to elnerge, and constitute an inside which IS
no sense of subjectivity in the Greeks, especially if we look for it on
hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension: "enkrateia,"
the level of obligatory rules.) Foucault's fundamental idea is that of
the relation to oneself that is self-mastery, "is a power that one
a dimension of subjectivity derived from pov./er and knowledge with-
brought to bear on oneself in the power that o~e exercised over out being dependent on them.
others" (how could one claim to govern others If one could not
. In ano.ther way it is The Use ~f PleasUFl! which in several respects
govern oneself?) to the point where the rela~on to oneselfbe~omes
differentIates from the previous books. On the one hand it invokes
"a principle of internal regulation" in relatIOn to the constItuent
. - 15 a long period of time that begins -with the Greeks and continues up
powers of politics, the family, eloquence, games a~(I eve~, VIrtue:
to the present day by way of Christianity, while the previous books
This is the Greek version of the snag and the doubhng: a dIfferentia-
considered short periods, between the seventeenth and nineteenth
tion that leads to a folding, a reflection.
centuries. On the other it discovers the relation to oneself, as a new

322
Gilles De1cuze
dimension that cannot be reduced to the pmver-reIations and rela-
tions between forms of knowledge that were the object of previous
books: the whole system has to be reorganized, Finall):, there is a
break with The Histor)' of Sexualit)', which studied sexualIty from the
double viewpoint of power and knowledge; now.the relatl~n ~o one-
self is laid bare, but its links with sexuality remaIn uncertatn.-O Con-
sequently, the first step in a cOlnplete reorg.aniza.tio~ is a~ready the~e:
does the relation to oneself have an elective affinity wIth sexualIty,
to the point of renewing the project of a "histOl~y of sexuality"?
The reply is a vigorous one: just as pm,;er-relauons can b~ affirmed
only by being carried out, so the relatIon to onese~f, WhIC~l bends
these power relations, can be established only by bemg carned out.
And it is in sexuality that it is established or carn:cl O~lt. ,Pe~ha~s not
immediately; for the constitution of an inside ~r.mtenonty IS ahme,n-
tary before it is sexual.:!! But here again, what IS It that ~eads ~exuahty
to "differentiate" itself gradually fronl alimentary consideratIOns and
beC0111e the place in which the relation to oneself is e,nacted? Tl:e
reason is that sexuality, as it is lived out by the ,Greeks, Incarnates, In
the female the receptive element of force, and In the nlale the actIve
or spontaneous elenlent.::!::! From then on, the fr~e ~an's relation ~o
himself as self·detennination \\rill concern sexuahty In three ways: In
the simple form of a "Dietetics" of pleasures, one governs oneself in
order to be capable of actively governing one's body; in ~he composed
form of a domestic "Economics," one governs oneself In order to be
capable of governing one's wife, who in turn may attain a good
receptivity; in the doubled fOrIn of an "Erotics" of boys" one governs
oneself in order that the boy also learns to govern himself, to be
active and to resist the power of others,::!~\ The Greeks not only in-
vented the relation to oneself, they linked it to sexuality, composing
and doubling it within the latter's terms. In short, the Greeks laid
the foundation for an encounter between the relation to onese1fand
sexuality. , Itself dnd changIng ItS nature to the point where the Greek mode is
The redistribution or reorganization takes place all on Its own, or
at least over a long period. For the relation to oneself will n~t remain
the withdrawn and reserved zone of the fi"ee man, a zone ll1depen-
dent of any "institutional and social system." The relat~on to oneself
will be understood in terms of power-relations and relatIOns of know1-
edge. It will be reintegrated into these systems from which it was
323
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
originally derived. The individual is coded or recoded witl .
" I" kI lIn a
mora r lO\:led.ge, and ab,ove all he becomes the stake in a power
struggle and IS dlagrammatlzed.
The fold therefore seems unfolded, and the subjectivation of the
free man IS transformed into subjection: on the one hand it involves
being "subject to someone else by control and dependence," with all
the, processes of,ind.ividuation and modulation which power installs,
actIng on the daIly hfe and the interiority of those it calls its subjects;
on the other It makes the subject "tied to his own identity by a
consCIence or. self-knowledge," through all the techniques of moral
~d human sCIences that go to make up a knowledge of the subject."!
Sll~ultaneously, sexuahty becomes organized around certain focal
POll1ts of power, gives rise to a "scientia sexualis," and is integrated
Into an agency of "power-knowledge," namely Sex (here Foucault
returns to the analysis given in The Histar), of Sexuabty) ,
rvlust we conclude from this that the new dimension hollowed out
by the Greeks disappears, and falls back on the two a.,es of knowledge
and power? In that case we could go back to the Greeks and find a
re1ation to oneself ba~ed on free individuality, But this is obviously
not the case, There wIll always be a relation to oneself which resists
codes an~ powers; the relation to onself is even one of the origins of
these P~ll1ts of resistance which we have already discussed, For ex-
ample, It would be wrong to reduce Christian moralities to their
a:tempts at codi~cati~n, and the pastoral power which they invoke,
wlthout also taI(lng Into account the "spiritual and ascetic move-
ments," or suqjectivation that continued to develop before the Ref-
ormatIon (there are collective subjectivatjons),~5 It is not even
enough t~ sa7 that the latter resist the former; for there is a perpetual
commu~l~cauon bet1,veen them, whether in terms of struggle or of
cOm~OSltIOn. "\That must be stated, then, is that subjectivation, the
~'~lat~~n to one~elf" continues to create itself, but by transforming
a distant memory. Recuperated by power-relations and relations of
knowledge, the relation to oneself is continually reborn elsewhere
and otherwise, '
The most general formula of the relation to oneself is the affect
of self by self, or folded force. Subjectivation is created by folding.
Only, there are four foldlllgs, four folds of subjectivation, like the
 325
324
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuze

rivers of the inferno. The first concerns the material part of ourselves isolating
. "( a new p rocess a fsubJecllvation
" that leads to a "des' .
su b~ect and no Ion ger to a sub'~ect of pleasures)?" ' mng
which is to be surrounded and enfolded: for the Greeks this was the
body and its pleasures, the "aphrodisia"; but for Christians this will And what can we ultimate!, s· b
modes a d d .) ay a out our own contemporary
~ n our rno ern relatIO n t 1 ~
If it is true that power increasin 1°i~~~e:~~? l¥hal,are ,ourjourjolds?
be the flesh and its desires, desire itself, a completely different sub-
stantial modality. The second, properly speaking, is the fold of the
riority and our individuarty. 'f' glY our dally hves, our inte-
relation between forces; for it is always according to a particular rule I , I It las become individ r ' 'f"
true that knowledge itself 1 b . . ua mng; I' It IS
forming the hermeneutics aI~~s cO~~~:~i~::c:;~:m~y ,iI~dividu~ted,
that the relation between forces is bent back in order to become a
relation to oneself, though it certainly makes a difference whether
or not the rule in question is natural, divine, rational, or aesthetic,
wha. t remains for our suhiectivl'ty' Tl
f J '
~e es~nng sub.~ect,
lere never remaIn'" 1' g
and so on. The third is the fold of knowledge, or the fold of truth in o the subject, since he is to be created a h , s . anyt.un
. f . ' n eac occasIOn hke a D 1
pOlOt a reSIstance, on the basis of the folds which s 11' '.. 1 oca
u ~ecll\",e O1owl-
so far as it constitutes the relation of truth to our being. and of our
edge and bend each
being to truth, which will serve as the formal condition for any kind the body d' 1 power. Perhaps modern subjectivity rediscovers
of knowledge: a subjectivation of knowledge that is always different, an Its p easures as opposed t d' I
too subjugated by Law' Ye't tl' . a a eSlre t lat has become
whether in the Greeks and the Christians, or in Plato, Descartes, or , l1S IS not a return to the G k '
there never is a return.28 The struggI £. amo d ree s, sInce
Kant. The fourth is the fold of the outside itself, the ultimate fold: it
through a resistance to tIle hyO p e Olr ernsubje.ctivit).rpasses
resent Lorm f b' ,
I S O su ~ectJon, the one
is this that constitutes what Blanchot called an "interiority of expec- 1.-\

consisting of individualizing
tation" from which tl,e subject, in different ways, hopes for immor- £ ourse ves on the basis of '
power, the other of tt. -' " . constrall1ts of
tality. eternity. salvation, freedom or death or detachment. These ognized identity fi ad I actIng ejach Ind1VIdual to a known and rec-
, xe once am for ',11 Tl . . gg1 .
. I' .' le stru. e for sub.~ectivity
four folds are like the final or formal cause, the acting material cause
presents itself, therefore as tl
of subjectivity or interiority as a relation to oneselC:!G These folds are , . le ng It to dIfference ..
metamorphosis ~m (H ' , ' vanatIOn and
, ere we are multiplyu tl .
enlinently variable, and moreover have different rhythms whose var- are touching on the un bI' I d 1? le questIOns, since we
iations constitute irreducible modes of su~jectivation. They operate
, [tlle projected fourth v~~m: ~~ 7:";~:~11;~~~: Le'/~~etlx (iI la chaiT
e

IOta F~ucault's very last topics of research.)

"beneath the codes and rules" of knowledge and power and are apt
,,/lal y , anc beyond
to unfold and merge with them, but not without new foldings being
In l1w Usc of Pleasure, Foucault d .
created in the process. fact he had already defined it ~s ., does not dlscove~ the subject. In
On each occasion the relation to oneself is destined to encounter the statement But b r d ' ,£ envatlve, a functIon derived from
sexuality, according to a modality that corresponds to the mode of conditioned b~ tl,e f~ld e~~"~g It ~ow as a derivative of the outside,
Vs
subjectivation. This is because the spontaneity and receptivity of force ible dimension So ,ye 11" (h1mb 1~ out fully and gIVes it an irreduc-
will no longer be distributed on the basis of an active and a passive , ave t e aSIS for a' 1' 1
question: How can '''e 1. . lep ) to tle most general
role, as it was for the Greeks, but rather as in the completely different , l1aITIe t lIS new dimeI' 1.
oneself that is neither knowl d ISIOn, t lIS relation to
case of the Christians, on the basis of a bisexual structure. From the self pleasure or de '. ' 0 e ge nor power? Is the affect of self by
viewpoint of a general confrontation, what variations exist between ., Sll er reo l ,"e, c a 11 I't ".111 d'IVldual
. c 1 ." I
the Greek sense of the body and the pleasures, and the Christian conducl of pleasure or desire;J vVe sh 11 fi d 1 one HCt, t le
we note the lbnits which thi~ third:i 111. t le exact term only if
sense of flesh and desire? Can it be that Plato remains at the level of periods of time TI. . . lTIenSIOI1 assumes over long
the body and the pleasures to be found in the first folds, but is already . le "ppemance of a folding ftl 'd
unique to Western d ~, I a le Out.sl e can seem
beginning to raise himself to the level of Desire to be found in the e\e opment. Perhaps the Orient does not r
ent such a phenOInenon and tl r f _ . p es-
third fold, by folding truth back into the lover, and is consequently float across a stiflin h011 1~ Ine 0 the outside continues to
g OWl1ess: 111 that case asceticism would be a
 1

327
325 Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuzc

culture of annihilation or an effort to breathe in such a void, without
any particular production of subjectivity.3I)
The conditions for a bending of forces seem to arise with the
agonistic relationship between free men: that is, with the Greeks. It
is here that force folds back on itself in relation with the other force.
But even if we made the Greeks the origin of the process of subjec-
tivation, it still occupies a long period of time in the run-up to the
present day. This chronology is all the more remarkable given that
Foucault examined the diagrams of power as places of mutation, and
the archives oflul0wledge, over short periods oftime,31 Ifwe ask why
The Use oj Pleasure suddenly introduces a long period of time, perhaps
the simplest reason is that we have all too quickly forgotten the old
powers that arc no longer exercised, and the old sciences that: arc
no longer useful, but in llloral matters we arc still \veighecl down with
old beliefs which we no longer even believe, and we continue to
produce ourselves as a subject on the basis of old modes which do
not correspond to our problems. This is what led the film director
Antonioni to say that we are sick with Eros ... Everything takes place
as if the modes of subjectivation had a long life, and we continue to
play at being Greeks or Christians, and to indulge in a taste for trips
down memory lane.
But there is a deeper positive reason. The folding or doubling is
iL"Ielf a IvlelTIOry: the "absolute memory" or memory of the outside,
beyond the brief 111emory inscribed in strata and archives, beyond
the relics remaining in the diagrams. The aesthetic life of the Greeks
had already essentially prompted a memory of the future, and very
quickly the processes of subjectivation were accompanied by writings
that were real memories, "hypOlnnemata,"3~ Ivlemory is the real name
of the relation to oneself, or the affect on self by self. According to
Kant, tilne was the form in which the mind affected itself, just as
space was the fonn in which the mind was affected by sOlnething
else: time was therefore "auto-affection" and made up the essential
structure of subjectivity.:I:1 But time 'as subject, or rather subjectiva-
tion, is called memory, Not that brief menlory that COlnes afterwards
and is the opposite of forgetting, but the "absolute memory" which
doubles the present and the outside and is one with forgetting, since
it is itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted: its fold, in fact,
merges with the unfolding, because the latter remains present within
the f~rmer as the thing that is folded. Only forgetting (the unfolding)
recmers what IS folded II1 memory (and in the fold itself).
. There IS a final rediscovery of Heidegger by Foucault. Memory
IS contrasted .not WIth forgetting but with the forgetting of forget-
tmg, whIch chssolves us into the outside and constitutes death, On
t~le ot.her, hand, as long as the outside is folded an inside is coexten-
SIve :VIth It, as memory is coextensive with forgetting, It is this coex-
tenSIve
. nature 'which
, " is life a long pel'I'od of t'lme. T'Ime b ecomes . a
subject becaus~ It IS the folding of the outside and, as such, forces
e~er~' present. Into for~etti.ng, b:lt preserves the whole of the past
:vIthm mem~1 y: forgettIng IS the Impossibility of return, and nlcmory
IS th,e necessl.ty of renewal. For a long time Foucault thought of the
~uL'i~de as beIng an ultimate spatiality that was deeper thar: time; but
In hIS late ,~orks he ~ffe~'s the possibility once more of putting time
on the outs~~e and th111lung of the outside as being tinle, conditioned
by the fold.""
It is on ~his point that the necessary confi'ontation between Foucault
anel Heldegger takes place: the "folel" has continued to haunt the
work ofFo~lCault, but finds its true dimension in his last research. In
what ways IS he similar to and different from Heidegger? We can
evaluate. them only by taking as our point of departure Foucault's
?reak ,WIth .phenoinenology in the "vulgar" sense of the term: with
In~entIOnahty. The idea that consciousness is directed towards the
thIng ~uld gai,ns signi~ccu~ce in the world is precisely what Foucault
refuses to beh~ve, In fact mtentionality is created in order to surpass
~ny psychologlsm ~r naturalism, but it invents a new psychologisln
aI~d a, new naturahsm to the point where, as lvIerleau-Ponty himself
saId,
.
It can hardI}' be • distinO'uished
• ~ • D
f!'oln a "I"earnIng
£
. " process. It
~est~le~ ~he psy~l~ologlsm tl~,at synthesizes consciousness and signif-
IcatI~ns, a nat~lrahsm of the savage experience" and of the thing, of
the al1nless eXIstence of the thing in the world.
This g~ves rise to Foucault's double challenge, Certainly, as long as
we
. rema1110nthelevelof\vod.l
, . r sane p Ilrases we can belIeve
. in an
IIltentIOnah h , through whi I . . .
, "'J C 1 conSCIOusness IS dIrected towards some-
thmg• and D_aains significance ('\ <- S some tlllng
. SIgl1l
. 'filCant); as long as \ve
remam
" on the
" .level of things and .states of tllngs
l ' · we can b e I'Ieve 111
. a
savage expenence that lets tlle tIlIng
L • . wan d '
er aImlessly through
328 329
Gilles Deleuzc Foldings, or the Inside of Thought

consciousness. But If , p 1lenomeno 1ogy "places things in parenthesis,"

fold which it made with being; and that the unfolding of Being, as
as ,It Calms
l' t 0 d 0, thl's ought to push it beyond words .and phrases d' the inaugllral gesture of the Greeks, was not the opposite of the fold
towards statements, and beyond things and states of thIng.s tow~r s but the fold itself, the pivotal point of the Open, the unity of the
, '/'['t' . B t statements are not directed towards anytlung, SInce
tnSl Jl 1 lC.\. U b' t unveiling-veiling, It was still less obvious in what way this folding of
the are not related to a thing any nlore than they ~xpress a su ,~ec Being, Ule fold of Being and being, replaced intentionality, if only
bu:"efer only to a language, a langllage-being, that gIves them umque
to found it. It was Merleau-Ponty who showed us how a radical,
subjects and objects that satisfY particular .condltions as Imman~nt "vertical" visibility was folded into a Self-seeing, and from that point
, 11
vana)es.ru A'lcl vI'sl'bilities are not deployed 111 a savage . worldb already
., D on made possible tlle horizontal relation between a seeing and a
opene d up t 0 'a prl'ml'tive (pre-predicative) conSClOusness, _ . llt Ie er seen,
only to a light, a light-being, which gives them fon~s, \roport10~S An Outside, more distant than any exterior, is "twisted," "folded,"
and perspectives that are immanen t In the proper sens,e tl~at IS, and "doubled" by an Inside that is deeper than any interior, and
, f
free 0 - any Inten 0 , ' 11' nal gaze 'Ifi Neither languao-e
b
nor
_
hght
,._.
wIll be
alone creates the possibility of tlle derived relation between the in-
exanlined in the areas that relate them to one another (.deslgna.tIOn,
terior and the exterior. It is even this twisting 'which defines "Flesh,"
si nification, the signifying process of language; a. physIc.al envI~on-
beyond the body proper and its objects, In brief, the intentionality
g
ment, a tangl'bl'e or I'Iltelligible world) but rather 111 the IrredUCIble '. . ' of being is surpassed by the fold of Being, Being as fold (Sartre, on
'
d ImenSlOn , tllat ~
gl','es. both of them as separate and ,sel.f-suffiClent ' I' the other hand, remained at the level of intentionality, because he
. '
entItles: UtiIele ' I'S" II'gllt'-, and ~
"there is" language. All llltentlOna ity , was content to make "holes" in being, ,...,ithout reaching the fold of
co 11 apses 111 ' tlIe gap ~
tl,'lt
~
olJens up bet1veen these , two monads, or In
Being), Intentionality is still generated in a Euclidean space that
the "nonrelation" between seeing and speakIng. . prevents it from understanding itself, and must be surpassed by an-
This is Foucault's major achievement: the cOH:erslOn of phen~m-
other, "topological," space which establishes contact between the
eno 1ogy mto , epis , tem ology . ' For seein rr and speaking means know1I1g 1-
b '-- . Outside and the Inside, the most distant, the most deep.C}!;
'] I It ,ve- clo not see what we speak
[ SllVOlr,)l about, nor do we spea ...
. .. (' There is no doubt that Foucault found great tlleoretical inspiration
about what we see; and when we see a pIpe we shall ~lways .say .In in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for the theme that haunted him:
one way 01, ana th)' e r"till'S
. . is not a pipe" ' as
.though . 111tentlOnahty
the fold, or doubling, But he equally found a practical version of it
denied itself, and collapsed into itself. :verythlOg IS knowl:dge, an~
in Raymond Roussel, for the latter raised an ontological Visibility,
this is the first reason why there IS no savage expenel~c~ . ther~ IS forever twisting itself into a "self·seeing" entity, on to a different
nothing beneath or prior to knowledge, But knowledge IS Irredu~:1bly
dimension from that of the gaze or its objects," We could equally
double since it involves speaking and seeIng, language and lIght,
link Heidegger to Jarry, to the extent U1at j}(ltaj)"ys;cs presents itself
which j's the reason why there is no intentionality, . precisely as a surpassing of metaphysics that is explicitly founded on
But it is here that everything begins, because for Its part ~henom-
the Being of the phenomenon, But if we takeJarry or Roussel in this
eno 1ogy, 1Il ' 01'd el- to cast off the psychologism and naturahs111 that
L _ , '
way to be the realization of Heidegger's philosophy, does this not
conti~uecl to burden it, itself ~urpassed intentionality as t~le relatIon
mean that the fold is carried ofT and set up in a completely different
between consciousness and its object (being [['iitanl or Sande]), A11d
landscape, and so takes on a different meaning? vVe must not refuse
in Heidegger, and then in Merleau-Ponty, the surpassmg of mten-
to take Heidegger serionsly, but we Inust rediscover tlle imperturb-
tionality tended towards Being [L'Et11! or SCI'Il], the fold of Bemg,
ably serious side to Roussel (orJarry), The serious ontological aspect
,
From IntentlOnahty , ' .to lIe 1 10r 11 (, f rom b' eln g to Bemg , from phenom- needs a diabolical or phenomenological sense of humor.
enology to ontology, Heidegger's disciples taught us to what extent
In fact, we believe that the fold as doubling in Foucault will take
ontology , was ll1separa, bl e f rom tIe 1 f 0 1( I, 51"nee Being was preCIsely the
on a completely new appearance while retaining its ontological im-
 1

331
330
Gilles Dcleuze Foldings, or the Inside of Thought

d' to Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, has been a hallucinatory theme of Doubles and doubling that trans-
port. In the first place, accor 109 \'t, only to found the latter in
forms any ontology.
the fold of being surpasses mtelntIVonab1le)or the Open does not give
, " I " s why t le lSI , But this double capture, which is constitutive of knowledge-Being,
a new dImenSIon. t 115 1 'd' something to speak, SInce
. -, i thout also provl Ing ... could not be created behveen two irreducible forms if the interlock-
us somethIng to see w . I ment of sight only If It also
' tl Self-seemg e e ing of opponents did not flow from an element that was itself infor-
the fold will constItute ",e I t flanguage to the point where
, I S If. peakmg e emen 0 , , If' mal, a pure relation between forces that emerges in the irreducible
constitutes t lC e -5 , . If' language and sees Itse III
II tl at speaks 1tse 10 , separation of forms. This is the source of the battle or the condition
it is the same wor,( 1 I P ty Light opens up a spealung
I ' I and Mer eau- on , , h ' for its possible existence. This is the strategic domain of power, as
sight. In f elC egger . as " ' f i ,t' l11aunted
If signt ca 101
the visible Wh,C 10
, opposed to the stratic domain of knowledge, From epistemology to
no less than a seeIng. ' " t be so in Foucault, for whom
d 'n JHTlllscanno strategy. This is another reason why there is no "savage" experience,
turn murmure meant g. . 'I 'l't1'es and language-Being to statc-
. ' . ~ rs only to VISI )1 1 , < • • since battles imply a strategy and any experience is caught up in
the hght-Bemg Ie e bl' co1lnd an intentionahty, smce
I '11 t be a e to re,' , relations of power. This is the second figure of Being, the "Possest,"
ments: the fole WI n.o -I d' " tion between the l..vo parL.;; of a
the latter disappears In t lC l~unc power-Being, as opposed to knowledge-Being, It is the informal forces
'. ever intentIonal. . or power-relations that set up relations "between" the 1:\'1'0 forms of
knowledge tIlat 15 n· , d b rOl'ms how could a subject
. titnte y two L1 -. • formed knowledge, The two forms of knowledge-Being arc forms of
If knowledge IS cons I b'ect since each form has Its
. . lily lmvarc s one a ~ , . exteriority, since statements are dispersed in the one and visibilities
display any Intentl0na . tie ',ble to ascribe a relatlOll
. - l' ts~:m Yet It mus ) " in the other; but power-Being introduces us into a different element,
own oblects and su 'Jec , f tl 'r "ll0n-relation," Knowl-
- - 1. 1 erges Tom leI an unformable and unformed Outside which gives rise to forces and
to the two forms w l1C 1 em C f B ' g but Being lies between two
. h first figure 0 CII1, " their changing combinations. This shows that this second figure of
edge is BeIng, t e l . '- hat I-Ieidegger called the "between-two
forms. Is this not precIsely w '" I C1,c or chiaslluls"? In fact, they Being is stilI not the fold. It is, rather, a Ooating line 'with no contours
1 . ed the ill tef a ng . which is the only element that makes the two [arms in battle com-
or Ivlerleau-Ponty ~lm, _ . 1 . For Nlerleau-Pollty, the interlacll~g Of
are not at all the sam~ tim g f' Id B t not for Foucault. There 15 an
municate. The lferaclitean elelnent has always gone deeper in Fou-
rges WIth the 0 . u . . I cault than in Heidegger, for phenomenology is ultimately too
between-two me . , ," Ig of t IlC VISl "bl e anel the articulable: It 15 t le
paciJYing and has blessed too many things,
interlacing or Intertwll1.lI I 'Intentionality. But this inter-
I f ' ng that rep aces Foucault therefore discovers the e1ement that comes from outside:
Platonic mode a weall I ' b ttle between two implacable
, ' f ' 'tnngleho\c, 01 a a , force, Like B1anchot, Foucault will speak less of the Open than of
lacing IS In act a, s , I I Being' if)loU like it is an mtel1-
I f 'ms of'know e( g e - , , the Outside, For force is linked to force, but to the force of the
foes who are t le 0 1 , 'bl I multiplied in both directlOns,
tionalily. but one that IS r~verSl .e, :a~ . opk It is still not the fold olltside, such that it is the outside that "explains" the exteriority of
. fi . teslDlal 01 filel ase . forms, both for each one and for their mutual relation. This accounts
anel has become 111 111 . . . f 'ts two forms. It is still not a
, b " tl er the mterlacmg 0 1 , , for the import:'lnce of Foucault's declaration that l-Ieidegger always
of Bemg, ut 1a ' I ' t ' tegy of the interlacmg, Every-
topology of the fold, but r~t ~e1 U:,:,~~ were reproaching Heidegger fascinated him, but that he could understand him only by way of
thing takes place ,as thoug 1 0 " I I A 1(1 Ivll'lt he finds in Rous- Nietzsche and alongside Nietzsche (and not the other \vay round):!]
f ' g too qlUC {y, 1 , Heidegger is Nietzsche's potential, but not the other way round, and
and Merleau-Pon ty or gam ' d Ivllat he could have
. .. . 1 in Nlacrntte, an ~
sel, in a dIfferent way agau. r/:I is the audiovisual battle, the Nietzsche did not see his own potential fulfilled. It was necessary to
founel in yet another sense ,111 Ja y'l t 1lquered the visible, the recover force, in the Nietzschean sense, or power, in the very partic-
1 . ,~ of worcl s t 1a co ular sense of "will to power," to discover this outside as limit, the last
double capture, t 1e nOlse , . . I bl ·10 In Foucault there
fury of things that conquered the arncu a e. , point before Being folds, Heidegger rushed things and folded too
quickly, which was not desirable: this led to the deep ambiguity of
 333
332 Foldings. or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuzc

his technical and political ontology, a technique of knowledge and a claim and what resistances may I counter;J VVl t I
folds can I surround myself I . la can be, with what
politics of power. The fold of Being can come about only at the level or 10W can I produce myself as b'
O n t1,ese three questions th "I" d .' a su ~ect?
a set of particular positio~s o~cu . Odes .nho.t desIgnate a universal but
of the third figure: can Jorce fold so as to be self-action, the affect of
self by self, such that the outside in itself constitutes a coextensive pIe wit 111 a One speaks-O .
O ne confronts, One lives·1-1 N . I ' ne sees,
inside? What the Greeks did was not a miracle. Heidegger has a from one age to another' bu; ,:~ng e solutIOn can be transposed
Renan side to him, with his idea of the Greek light or miracle:" In certain proble _. '. can penetrate or encroach on
Foucault's opinion the Greeks did a lot less, or a lot more, depending matlC fields, wlllch means that the "g' ." f
problem are reactiva d. Ivens a an old
on your choice. They folded force, discovered it was something that somewhere in Fouca~~t ~: anlo~,~r. (Perhaps there still is a Greek
could be folded, and only by strategy, because they invented a rela- in a "problematizalI'o ,,' f vlea e 'y a certam fmth which he places
tion between forces based on the rivalry between free men (the F" . . " . n 0 p easures.)
government of others through self-government, and so on). But as lnally, It IS praxIs that constitutes the sale can· .
and present, or, conversely the ,\-va . , . unulty between past
1
a force among forces man does not fold the forces that compose him
without the outside folding itself, and creating a Self within man. It
the past. If Foucault's inte1Views jorm
Y
::1~:~:)lC~ the prese.n t expl~i~s
because they extend tIle I . t . I . .gml part oj 'IlS work, It IS
is this fold of Being which makes up the third figure when the forms lIS onca problem t·..· f
books into th _. a lZatIOn ° each of his
are already interlocked and battle has already been joined: from this e constructIon of the present II .
punishment or sexuality '1"- t. I' pro) em, be It madness,
point Being no longer forms a "Sci est" or a "Possest," but a "Se-est," , . v' 11a are t Ie new type' f . 1 .
are transversal and immediate .. tl 1 so. stlligg e, whIch
to the extent that the fold of the outside constitutes a Self, while the tized? VVllat are the "intellect 11, a" ler tlan ~entrahzed and media-
outside itself fonns a coextensive inside. Only through a stratico- or "particular" r tl. I u~ s new functIOns, which are specific
a ler t Ian unlversaP "VI
subjectivation, which tend to have n~ id~at. ar)e th~ ~ew modes of
strategic interlocking do we reach the ontological fold.

tri~:~er~;:n~~ ~~I~i~I~,~~~ounps: t:"'9"6t Scanwere

J do,. Y~~:~~·d~~;,~,~~o,t~h~t.r:~~I;~
These three dimensions - knowledge, power, and self - are ir-
reducible, yet constantly imply one another. They are three "ontol-
ogies." Why does Foucault add that they are historical?"" Because they lIke the "reh .. 1" f I
do not set universal conditions. Knowledge-Being is determined by ,IS OUI'1'Igh t and wlnt .
three questions .·J5 "\That' I ealSd 0 t lese
to say, our "truth" today' WI t <- IS our angu.age, that is
the two [or111s assumed at any moment by the visible and the articul- . . la powers must we cont· t d I
IS our capacity for resistanc' t O d 1 Ion ,an w lat
able, and light and language in turn cannot be separated from "the to say that the old struggl:~ a ~ ayw lIen we can no longer be content
unique and limited existence" which they have in a given stratlUTI. we not perhaps above all b~a~/eT' no onger worth anything? And do
Power-Being is determined withi11 relations between forces ,,,,hieh are "production of a new sub .ectiv;\l~;ess to and even participate in the
find an unexpected "enc~untel'~ .. Dtlo nlot the changes in capitalislll
themselves based on particular features that vary according to each
age. And the self, self-Being, is determined by the process of subjec- 111 Ie s ow emerge f .
as a center of resistanc e.'E ac II time
. there· , . 1nee I 0 a new . Self
tivation: by the places crossed by the fold (the Greeks have nothing £

not a movement of sub.ecL"' . IS SOCIa c lange, IS there

universal about them). In brief, the conditions are never luore gen- also its potential' TI ~ 1ve ~ eCOI1VerSIOll, with its ambiguities but
eral than the conditioned element, and gain their value [rom their . lese questIOns rna b ·d
tant than.- . D . Y e conSI ereel lllore impor-
particular historical status. The conditions are therefore not "apod- • aleelencetoluan'suniversalrightsinclud' . I I
ictic" but problematic. Given certain conditions, they do not vary
of pure law. In Foucault, ever rth' ., .' _ l~g 111 t Ie rea m
alion' the variabl fk } Ing IS subject to variables and vari-
historically; but they do vary with history. What in fact they present . ,es 0 nowledge (fo" I' .
as immanent variables of th r examp e, objects and subjects
is the way in which the problem appears in a particular historical relation between forms' I e ~tatement? and the variation in the
formation: what can I know or see and articulate in such and such a , t le vanable partIcularities of power and the
condition for light and language? What can I do, what power can I
 335
334
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Dcleuze

variations in the relations hetv.,reen forces; the variable subjectivities, learning process constituted in the external .
the innate and the acq1l' d 'I I WOl Id, Artaud contrasted
and the variation of the fold or of subjectivation. Ire Witl tle "ge 't'l" I "
But ifit is true that the conditions are no more general or constant thought as such a thougl1t I' I nl ,1, t1e genItalIty of
, w HC 1 comes fro n ' .I
than the conditioned elenlcnt, it is none the less the conditions that: farther away than any external world a l.:tn outsiC e that is
interest Foucault. This is \vhy he calls his work historical research internal world, Must this outside b II' dnCdl hence .closer than any
. e ca e lance;lJ, The d I
and not the work of a historian. He does not write a history of d oes In fact express the sim Ie t ' . Ice-t HOW
one established be h ve'el1 aPrtl' s IPOsslble p. oIVer·or·force-relation, the
luentalities but of the conditions governing everything that has a L~ p" cu ar j -eature 'd b
mental existence, namely statements and the system of language. He numbers on the different faces). sarnve at ychance (the
does not write a history of behavior but of the conditions governing The relations between fo F
cern not only men bllt tl fces , as ;oucaull understands them, con-
everything that has a visible existence, namely a system of light. He Ie e lements the I'll f I
which grouj) either at ral1d . '. e ers 0 t le alphabet,
does not 'write a history of institutions but of the conditions governing , < am 01 accordIng to 'l"' I
their integration of different relations between forces, at the limits han and frequency dictated b _' cel a1l1 aws of attrac-
only in Ule first case' whil tl ~ a partIcular language. Chance works
of a social field, He does not write a history of private life but of the . , ' e le second case perhap' ..
conditions governing the way in which the relation to oneself consti- conciItlons that are partiall d ~. s opel ates under
)' etermmed by the first ' "I
tutes a private life, He does not write a history of subjects but of chain, where we have ,a SLIC cessIOn .' o·f partIal ' ' . I' I'' as In a ,IV_ .arkov
outside: the line t l r l t ' . < < 1 e III ClllgS, ThIS IS the
processes of subjectivation, governed by the foldings operating in the " contInues to lInk up r' d .
of chance and depend en C "ill om events 111 a Inixture
ontological as much as the social field: w In truth, one thing haunts cy. onsequently, thin kin I , . I' ,
Foucault _ thought. The question: ''VI~1at does thinking signify? new figures: drawing 01 t ' . I g lere La ...es on
I parl1cu ar features' lin1-'
c,

What do we call thinking?" is the arrow first fired by Heidegger and each occasion inventl'l1g tlle senes ' . tIlat rno I 'f ung
-1
events;
'
and on
of one particular feature to tl 'TI \e rOln t le neIghborhood
then again by Foucault. He \vrites a history, but a history of thought le next. lere are all' -, [ .
features which have all f' ' sorts 0 parucular
as such. To think means to experinlent and to problematize. Knowl- " come 10m outsIde- .. ' I
power, caught up in the l'el' t' ,) ' pal tIC.ll ar features of
edge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of a Ions )etween forc 'D
tance, which pave the way Co I . es, eatures of resis-
thought. In the field of knowledge as problem thinking is first of all .11 r c lange' and even r
remain suspended outsid ' I ' . savage .1eatures which
seeing and speaking, but thinking is carried out in the space between , e, WIllOut enterIng int . I '
Ing themselves t 1 . . Ole atlOns or aIIow-
the two, in the interstice or disjunction between seeing and speaking. , 0 )e lIHegrated (only here does "S'1\" "
On each occasion it invents the interlocking, firing an arrow from meamng, not as an experience b t, I _ . ,age take on a
' u as t 1at whIch cannot t b b-
the one towards the target of the other, creating a flash of light in sor)eI d 111 to experience) ,.!R < ye e a
the midst of words, or unleashing a cry in the midst of visible things. All these determinations of thou ht ar I" ,"
the action of thought Al de, I g ,e a I eady ollgmal figures of
Thinking luakes both seeing and speaking attain their individual , 1 .01 a ong time F I d'd
limits, such that the two are the coml11on limit that both separates that thought coulcl be' a th' I '-. oucall t 1 not believe
, ny mg e se Ho II I
Illorality, since thought can C I 'I: ,w ,cou c t 1.oug ht invent a
and links them, < 11nc not ung In Its If· I '
from which it cOlnes a I I' I ' '-. e except t lat outSIde
On top of this, in the field of power as problem, thinking involves nc w lIC 1 resIdes' . - " I
L

Fiat! which destroys any in " In It as tle unthought"? That

the transmission of particular features: it is a dice-throw. vVhat the 19
speeds up the elnerg'el1C IPferal1ve 111 advance: However, Foucault
dice-throw represents is that thinking always comes [r0111 the outside e 0 one strange fin I fi 'f I .
(that outside which v./as already engulfed in the interstice or which farther away than any external world " a 19~1l'e: I t le ~utslde,
world is tl " _ ' ' IS also closeJ Ulan any 111ternal
constituted the common limit), Thinking is neither innate nor ac- , lIS not a SIgn that thou rl t aff; .
outside to be its 0 I g1 ects Itself, by revealing the
quired. It is not the innate exercise of a faculty, but neither is it a wn unt lought element?
 ""'I'
!

336 337
Gilles Deleuzc
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought

It cannot discover the unthought . . . without immediately bringing the

unthought nearer to itself - Of even, perhaps, without pushing it further of time) in ways that are n t i l '
away, and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a change it with a future that comes°fi.:l~aO cO~lt1I111OUS but h?stead confront
by that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between them."o it To thinl- m t b utslde, exchange It and re-create
. ,eans a e embedded' tl .
serves as a limit: what can 111 le present-LIme stratum that
This auto-affection, this conversion of far and near, will assume more . I '. I see and what can I say today' But tI ..
1nvo ves uunklng of the ast as i t ., ,. . . . . 118
and more illlportance by constructing an i'l1side-sjJace that will be P
relation to oneself (tller . C IS kcondensed m the lI1slde, 111 the
completely copresent with the outside-space on the line of the fold. e ]S a ree' In me CI··
on). We will then think the past against th' or a lnsUan, aJ~d so
The problematical unthought gives way to a thinking being who
latter, not in f~tvour of a return but "in fav:rP;e:l:nt and. re~lst the
problematizes himself, as an ethical subject (in Anaud this is the c01l1e" (Nietzs I ) I . ' pe, a f a tnne to
"innate genital"; in FOllcault it is the meeting bct:\veen self and sex- the outside Soct,le t' t lall S, ?y lllaking the past active and present to
uality). To think is to fold, to double the outside with a coextensive la sametIl111g new 'II C all
' k''mg always·
tl1111 I I "I,m y come about ' so tllat
inside. The general topology of thought, which had already begun Y
( the past') b 't' ' mdd reac 1 t lOught. Thought thinks its own history
"in the neighborhood" of the particular features, now ends up in the , u lI1 or er to free it Iffr I' .
and be able finally to "tl . I' I se . o,:n w lat It thl. nks (the present)
folding of the out'iide into the inside: "in the interior of the exterior .', un," at lenVlse (the future) 52
ThIS IS what BIanchot called " t l ' .
and inversely," as lvIaciuess and Civilization put it. We have shown how , le pa'SlOn of the " I " r
that tends towards the outsid, __ . OUt~l( e, a .lorcc
any organization (differentiation and integration) presupposed the become "intimacy" ". t . :_ only beCcluse lhe oltt'ilde ilself has
primary topological structure of an absolute outside and inside that < , 1I1 rUSlOn. ;)3 The three a enci -' f

encourages relative intennediary extcriorities and interiorities: every ~~l~n~t~:~~~~::~y :1~;l~;,~"c!ent

and constantly ~epla:~l~ ~~~7'~~~1~;~
inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside-space, inde- so tl . . of contmually produClng levels that force
me llng new to be seen or . 1 B
pendent of distance and on the lilnits of a "living"; and this carnal outside has t ' :,alc. ut equally the relation to the
or vital topology, far from showing up in space, frees a sense of time
that fits the past into the inside, brings about the future in the
of all, the rel!:~o:~:~ ::':~~l;;~l~;I;~et~~sl!~~~:I~:~;~~;I~~~~'pwh~e,
last
new modes o[subjectivation. Foucault's v _ . . ~ . 10. UClng
outside, and brings the two into confront.:ltion at the limit of the great works that t .I I \ ork lInks up agam WIth tile
living present. 51 or us laVe clanged what it means to think.
Foucault is not only an archivist in the manner of Gogol, or a
cartographer in the manner of Chekhov, but a topologist in the ()

manner of Bely in his great novel Pelm:'1burg, which uses this cortical •
folding in order to convert outside and inside: in a second space the '" '" "o,p'" ~

industry of the town and of the brain are 111erely the obverse of one "
another. It is in this way - which no longer owes anything to I-Iei-
degger - that Foucault understands the doubling or the fold. If the
inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, between them
there is a topological relation: the relation to oneself is homologous
to the relation with the outside and the two are in contact, through
3
the intermediary of the strata which are relatively external environ-
ments (and therefore relatively internal). 1. Una of the outside
2. Strategic zone
On the limit of the strata, the whole of the inside finds itself actively 3. Strata
present on the outside. The inside condenses the past (a long period 4. Fold (zone of subJectlvatlon)
 339
338 Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuz e

-' "But never has fiction the nonstratified substance's job to become stratified, To be realized
, ,thing but fi ctIOns". _'
"I have never wntten an) II ,ve n'lrrate Foucault s in this way means becoming both integrated and different. The
1" rty How coU c '
Produced" such ? TI
truth ane .lea 1 I"
rld IS mac e up
of superimposed surfaces, ar-
1
informal relations between forces differentiate from one another by
g reat fictIOn. 1e wo I I clge But strata are crossee creating two heterogeneous forms, that of the CUl\-'es which pass
1 I ld is thus ,-nowe ' L
chives or strata. T 1e \\or lone hand the visual scenes, through the neighborhood of particular features (statements) and
1 t "ep'lrates on t le
bJv a central fissure t 1a s , I "t'CIIlable and the visible on that of the scenes which distribute them into figures of light (visibil-
4 1 rYes' t 1e ar I " "
and on the other the soune cu 'bl ' forms of knowledge, Light and ities). And at the same time the relations between forces become
I
each stratlun, the'two .Irreduc e f t riority where VISI , 'b'I""
1 Illes an
d integrated, precisely in the formal relations between the two, from
r l'onments a ex e bl
Language, two vast en,1 't d 50 ,"e are caught in a dou e one side to the other of differentiation. This is because the relations
t' I depoSI e, ,
statements are respec Ive y I f In stratum to stratum, fr01n between forces ignored the fissure within the strata, which begins
' rse ourse ves ro L I
movenlent. We 1ll1me _ sand cun'es; we follow t le only below them, They are apt to hollow out tlle fissure by being
. the surfaces, scene
band to bane; 1 we cross , ' " f the world: as Melville says, we actualized in the strata, but also to hop over it in both senses of the
ach an IntenOl a h
d
fissure, in or er to re fraid that there ,vill be no one : ~l'e term by becoming differentiated even as they become integrated,
look for a central charnber, a I' blltan ilnmense and ternfylng Forces always conle from the outside, from an outside that is far-
, I viII reveal not u n g ' , B
and that man s sou, "r I'fe among the archIVes?), ut ther mvay than any form of exteriority, So there are not only partic-
I' I" o[\oolong ,or I I
void (who wouII C t lIn \. "b b the strata in order to reac 1 ular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular
, try to dun a ave " I
at the same tune we " onstrcltified substance t 1at features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these re-
, heric elelnen t, a n ,
an outsIde, an aunosp I tl t vo forms of knowledge can lations and to change the unstable diagram. And there are even
f 1-' 'ng lOW le:\
would be capable a exp amI , I tr'1tum from one edge of the savage particular features, not yet linked up, on the line of the outside
' -t ne on eac 1 S " , I
embrace an d Intel WI I ould the two halves of t le ilself, which fonn a teeming mass especially just above the fissure.
" If ot then lOW c
fissure to the atIleI" n, II t tements explain scenes, or This is a terrible line that shuffles all the diagrams, above the very
. 1 w cou C s a L
archive cOInmunlcate, 10 raging stornlS, It is like Ivlelville's line, whose two ends remain free,
scenes 1'IIus t ra te st'ttements? , -I lent stann)' zone wIlerc' ~ which envelops every boat in its complex twists and turns, goes into
, _ '·d-' 's a battle, a tUI)U, .
The Infonnal olltSI e 1 . f' f " between these pOInts are hon-ible contortions when that moment comes, and always nms the
. d th relatIOnS a orces .
particular pomts. an e II t d a'nd solidified the vISual dust risk of sweeping sonleone away wilh it~ or like 1vIichaux's line "of a
"t erely co ec e
tossed about. 5 tl a a m . "bove them But up above, thousand aberrations" with its growing molecular speed, which is the
, I r tl battle ragmg a ",
and the sonIC ec 10 a le r _ alld 'ue neither bodIes nor "whiplash of a furiolls charioteer." But however terrible this line may
, f ' - lrlVe no 1.01 nl " ,
the partIcular eatuIes , . _ I d 'n of uncertain doubles be, it is a line of life that can no longer be gauged by relations
. _ W'" enter Into t 1e omal _'
speakmg pel son.s, e I' t'lniially emerge and fade (Bl- between forces, one that carries man beyond terror. For at the place
, I I re t lIngs con
and partIal deat lS, W le I" H I"e s"ys Faulkner, ,ve no longer of the fissure the line forms a Law, the "center of the cyclone, where
.' . opo ItKS. e ,(
chat's zone), TIllS 15. a mlcr I " f atl,ers deaf and blind to one one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence," It is as if
l'k 1:1 mollS 01 e, c, f
act like people. btlt Ie. vo [ ' Id slowly dispersing dotlds a the accelerated speeds, which last only briefly, constituted "a slow
'" I ' d t f the unous at , 1
another, 111 t 1e JIll s a I ' g Death to the bastards! Kill, Being" over a longer period of time, It is like a pineal gland, con-
, - - lather s 10utlll
dust that we fhng at e(lc 1 . I' e corresponds to a diagranl stantly reconstituting itself by changing direction, tracing an inside
. t te In t lIS zan
Kill!" Each atmosp h er.IC s a I' I . taken up b)' relations: a space but coextensive with the whole line of the outside. The most
, I f tures w lIC 1 are " .
of forces or partlcu ar ea I ' 't tegy belongs to the all' distant point beCOllleS interior, by being converted into the nearest:
-" ' _ f tl e earth t len a s ra
strateg), If strata al e a 1 " , b t l)e ftllfilled in the stratum, life within tile folds, This is the central chamber, which one need no
" , tl strategy sJo 0 1
or the ocean. B t\llt IS lC,
>
f 't' n in the archive, anC longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes
, , . b to come to rUI 10
jusl as it is the dIagram s JO
p

341
340
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuze

fane's seed and, relatively speaking, a n:aster of one's OT The Order oJ Things, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock and New York:
~~::~l:;and particular features, in this zone of subJectlVatlOn: the Pantheon, 1970).
PDD 'La pensee du dehors', Critique, No. 229 (June 19(6): 523-546.
boat as interior of the exterior.
Qll 'Qu 'est-ce qu 'un auteur?', Bulletin de la Socii5t,! Jranfaisc de j)hilmojJhie, 63,
No.3 (1969),73-104,
Notes RR Raymond Roussel (Paris: Gallimard, 1963).
Abbreviations SP Suroeiller el jmnir. Naissancc dc fa prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
SS Lc sOl1a de soi (Histoire de la sexualitc III) (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).
AK The Archaeology oj Knowledge, trans. A . Sllen. d an (London: Tavistock and
TDL "The Discourse on Language," trans. R. Swyer, in The Ardweology oj Knowl-
New York: Pantheon, 1972). edge (New York, 1972),
AS L'arclu!oio!:,ric fiu s(1voir (Paris: Gal1imard, 1969).
. . trans.. A. SIlcn(
. 1an (London: Tavistock and New TNP This is lIot a /Jipe, trans. James Harkness (Berkeley: University of California
BG The Birth of the Chmc, Press, 1981).
York' Pantheon, 1973).
TUP The Useo/Plcasllre, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Random House, 1985 and
(,'l\Tp G"'" 'st pas 111J(! 1,ij)c (Montpcllier: Fat<t Morgana, 1973). Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986),
w r t . C R ' (New
DL Death and lhe Lab)'linlh: the 'World of Raymond Roussel, trans. .A. uas
UP L'usage des j)laisirs (Histoire de la sexualitc II) (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).
York: Doubleday, 1986 and London: Athlone, 1987).. .
l'HI 'La vie des hommes in fames', LI?s cahias dlt chemin 29 (1977), pp, 12-29.
. .' 1 P , .". Thl' Birth of the Prisoll, trans. A. SherIdan (London.
DP Dlsnplwl! am /llll.\ t. "iT 'k' p. thean 1977- reprinted Harmondsworth: 1'S La vo/mlte de sa1Joir (Histoire de la sexualite I) (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).
Allen Lane and New lor. an , ,
Peregrine, 1979). VI'll 'What is an Author', trans. D. Bouchard and S. Simon, in LGP, pp. 113-
138.
HF Hisioire dc fa folil~ rll'c'igi? dassiqllc (Paris: Gallimarcl, 1972).
The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: All IntroductIOIl,. ~ans.
. R" Hurley (New York: 1. VHf, p. 16 [LIM, p. SOJ.
HS
1978 'md I-hrmondsworth: Pengum, 198·1).
Pant1leon, < < 197' d 2. NG, pp. 142-148, 155-156 [BG, pp. 140-146, 152-153J,
IPH . . R'IVwm...
1, PWrYl' .. [r'ms
< •
F. Jellinek (New York: Pantheon, ' !J an
Hannondsworth: Peregrine 1978). 3. VHf, p. 16 [LIM, p. 80J. vVe note that Foucault differs from two other views
LCP Lallgllagt, Counter-AIclllory, Pradicr!, edited by D. Bouchard (Oxford: Black- of infamy. The first, akin to Bataille's position, deals with lives which pass into
legend or narrative by virtue of their very excess (for example the classic infamy
well, 1977). .
LIAI "TI rfc of infamous men," in Powcr, Tlllfh, Sfralcg)', edited by M. Morns of a Gilles de Rais, which through being "not.orious" is consequently hllse). In
an(~Cp.lp~llton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979) pp. 76-91. H the other view, which is closer to Borges, life passes into legend because its
complex procedures, detours, and discontinuities can be given intelligibility only
. R H \
,"BC .I.\1adlll!ss and Cillitizatwn, trans. . 0 \ 'ard (New York'
.
Random ouse,
by a narrative capable of exhausting all possible eventualities, including contra-
1965 and London: Tavistock, 19(7). dietary ones (for example, the "baroque" infamy of a Stavisky). But Foucault
MG Les 1II0tS el ICI choses (Paris: Gallimard, 19(6). . conceives of a third infamy, which is properly speaking an infamy of rareness,
. '. R' .. · (Paris' Gallimard:Julliard, o\1vrage collecttf, 197::\). that of insignificant, obscure, simple men, who are spotlighted only for a moment
.I.HPR .I.HOI, Pwnc lVIeI/!... " ,< <

. p . U iversit'lires de France, 1963; re- by police reports or complainL<;, This is a conception that comes close to Chekhov .
NC Naissance de fa diniqllc (Pans: resses n "
vised 1972). , '., 4. UP, p. 14 [TUP, p. 8J,
.
NGff 'Nletzsche l ' '1 ogle,
a genea . l'histoire'
" in HOllllllage rl .Jean HypjJobte
1-1"(Pans. 5. See AIG~ pp. 333-339 [01~ pp. 327-8J for "the Cogilo and the unthought."
l;ress~s Ul~iversitaires de France, 1971). 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, lstory, See also PDD.
trans. D. Bouchard and S, Simon, in LCP, pp. 139-16'~,
O[) L'ordre dll disnmrs (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 6. i'vlG, pp. 263, 32'1, 328, 335 [01; pp, 251, 313, 317, 324J.

7. NG, pp. 132-133, 138, 164 [BG, pp. 131-136, 161J.

342 343
Gilles Deleuze Foldings, or the Inside of Thought

8. HI·; p. 22 [MAC. p. 11]. ~x~stence, s:e UP, pp. 103-105 [TUP, pp. 89-91]. "Facultative rul ,".. . ~
taken nm from Foucault but from Labov which . es IS a phlase
9. M. Blanchot, L'ElIlrelicll ill:iilli (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 292. adequate on the level ofa statement t d.. . none .the les~ !;eems perfectly
that are no longer constants H .' ? .eSlg~clte functIOns ofmternal variation
10. lVIC, p. 350 lOT, p. 339] (and on Kantian man as being an "empirico- d. . . . . el e 1t ,1cqUlres a more general mCOl .
transcendental doublet," an "empirico-critical doubling"). eSlgnate I eguJatmg functlons as opposed to codes. ,mng, to

11. [Translator's Hofe: As well as meaning "double," "doubling," etc., La ])ouh[ure 19. UP, p. 73 [TUP, p. 62].
(Paris: Lemerre, 1897) is also the title of a novel wrillen in Alexandrines by
20. Foucault says that he had begun by writin Tab IT , .••
Roussel]. These arc the constant themes of HR, especially chapter 2, where all to HS, in the same series)' "'tl I I g 00," on sexu,lhty (the sequel
, 1en wrote a Jook on t1 . f
the meanings of dOllblure are recapitulated in a discussion of Roussel's Chiqllen- techniques of self in which sexualit ha ... ,. Ie notIOn 0 self and the
aud/!: "les vers de la doublure dans la piece de Forban talon rouge" (M p. 37) rewrite for the third time a book in ~rIic;I(~ ;!~sappe.lre~l, a.nd I was obliged to
("the verses of the understudy in the play of Red Claw the Pirate" [DL, p. 25]). the two." See Dre){us and Pal'
"-" )mow, p. 996
__ ). ed to maltltam a balance between
(This gradually becomes "les vers de la douhlure dans la piece du fort pantalon
rouge" (RR, p. 38) (''lhe mole holes in the lining of the material of the strong 21. UP, pp. 61-62 [TUP, PI" 50-52].
red panL,"' [DL, p. 26])]. 22. TTTl
UF, pp. 55-,07 [TUP, PI'. 46-47].
12. vVe must quote the whole text on Roussel and Lciris, because we feel it
involves something that concerns Foucault's whole life: "From so many things 23. See TUP, parL'i 2, 3 and 4. On the "
[TUP, p. 221]. antinomy of the boy," see UP, p. 243
without any social standing, from so many fantastic civic records, (Leiris] slowly
accumulates his own identity, as if within the folds of words there slept, with 24. See Dreyfus and Rabinow pp 911 91~ W
nightmares never completely extinguished, an absolute memory. These same pieces of information as fol1~ws: .(~) ~~r~iitY~I~~nt\restlrr~e FO~lcault's different
folds Roussel parts with a studied gesture to fmd the stifling hollowness, the mode of subjectivation, but the' arc in i ..' va po es, l Ie code and the
inexorable absence of being, which he disposes of imperiollsly 1.0 create forms the intensifl~ation of ~., I} 1 ~v~lse .proportlOn to one another, and
[r one llnoves LIe dimmutlOtl of the other (UP , ~:- ~7
without parentage or species" (DL, p. 19). TUP, pp. ~~-30]); (b) subjectivatiol1 tends to pass into a 1 . ':~. ~a-~
empty or fi?"'d to the profit of the code (this is a general ~~:I~~<:f f))~~om~s
13. UP, p. 8~ [TUP, p. 76]. new type 01 power ·lppea 1· I '''I, (c) ,1
14. See UP, p. 90 [TUP, p. 77] for the two aspects of "differentiation" after the etrating the interio~: this ~:' ~vr~~co~'~~~l:~les ~he task of individualizing and pen-
is then taken over by the power of tl S Ie p(lstoral power of the Church, which
215: this text bv FOllcaultlinh 11 Ie. tate s~e Dre}'~usal1(~ Rabinow, pp. 21"1-
classical era.
15. UP, pp. 93-94 [TUP, pp. 80-81]. modulating pO\\;er'). I,.; p wIlh DP s analysts of 'mdividualizing and

16. This accounts for a certain tone in Foucault, which distances him from
25. UI', p. 37 [TtIP, p. 30].
Heidegger (no, the Greeks are not "famous": see the interview with Barbedette
and Scala in Lt:s Noltvelh!s, 28June 1984). 26.
[TU? I am systematizing
9h 3 ] ..
the four as pects. outrmed by Foucault in UP, pp. 32-39
, pp. -~- -9 .. I ol1cault uses the word "subjection" to desigtnt t1· d
17. Foucault does not directly analyze the diagram of forces or power relations aspect of the subject's constitution. but tl· . .1 I e ' e le secon
unique to the Greeks. But he does appreciate what has been done in this area different t t 1 . , l i S WOl( t len takes on a meaning
by contemporary historians such as Detienne, Vernant, and Vidal-Naquet. Their relations. ;hel~h~~; :: l~~: ;~.ll~e: t~e .consti~llted subject is subjected to power-
originality lies precisely in the fact that they defined the Greek physical and to 01: which in fact sl~~wed l~ow lft:r~~~lh~r 1II~~~rtar~ce and al~O\vs us to return
mental space in tenns of t.he new type of power relations. From this point of an obiect of knowledg b' I : d ~I all( angu<1ge were hrst and foremost
c, elore Jelng folded t ·t·
su~jectivity.
:J
view, it is important to show t.hat the "agonistic" relation to which Foucault a cons Ilute a more profound
constantly alludes is an original function (which shows up especially in the
behavior of lovers). 27. See the chapter on Plato, part 5 of TUP.
!8. On the constitution ofa subject, or "subjectivation," as something irreduc- 28. HS had already shown that the b 1,· d·
uality without sex" was the 1
.
Q(} dn Its pleasures, that IS to say a "sex-
Ible 1.0 the code, see UP, pp. 33-37 [TUP, pp. 25-30}; on the sphere ofaest.hetic . -, . moe ern means of "resisting" the agency of "Sex,"
 1
345
344 Folc1ings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuze

it is through a glass lens or a vignette [ ... ] it's [ ... ] to place the act of seeing
. 1 (V5 90R[HS P 157]).But'L~areturnto[heGrccks
in parenthesis [ ... ] a plethora of beings serenely impose themselves."
:~~~~c:: l~:~~:~::;:ep~rt;~~;
anci ;~l)iguou:; [~r
the body an(~ iL~ p1casure~ ~n
the
Gr~ei( view was related to the agonistic relations between free l1l~n, an ~cncc 38. According to Heidegger, t.he Lichlilugis the Open not only for light and the
to a "virile society" thal was unisexual and excluded won~en; ,:lule we al~ ob- visible, but also for the voice and sound. 'Ve find the same point in Merleau-
viously looking here for a different t}'pc of relations that 15 umque to OUI own Panty, (1). cit., pp. 201-202. Foucault denies the set of these links.
social fIeld. 39. For example, there is no single "oqject" that would be madness, towards
29. See Dreyfus an d l"'-.£lb"lIlOW, pp. "J11
D.
~ 91 9
--_. which a "consciousness" would direct itself. But madness is seen in several dif·
ferent ways and arliculated in st.ill other ways, depending on the period in time
"I II' lsclfsufficiently competent to treat the subject
'10 FOlIC mIt never conSlC cree 1m. . " and even on the different stages of a period. vVe do not see the same madmen,
, f'O' ;'1 forms of development. He occasionally alludes to the Chll~esc ars nor speak of the same i1Jnesses. See AS, pp. 45-46 [AK, pp. 31-32].
o .ne,; db' different either from Qur "scicntia scxualis" (1-15) or irom the
erotica as emg . Id b " tl >. Self or a
"10. It is in Btisset that Foucault finds the bTfeatest development of the battle:
aesthettc lIfe 0 t le G ree k"s (]'UP) . The questIOn
" " " [ I . _ wou e: IS lei e a <

process of sul~jectivation in Orien Lal techlllquesr' "He undertakes to restore words to the noises that gave birth to words, and to
reanimate the gestures, assault':i, and violences of which words stand as the now
. d 1 ort durations in history and their relation to
31. On the problema [ Iong<ln S l . . . . ' (77 [0 H" "' silent blazon" (GL, xv).
" F B"" 1 1 j,'cn'l5 mr {,hislOire (Pans: Flammanon, 1J 11 15(01),
the senes, see . I ,me e ,~ .' " < \ S I~_
" S M' uhews Chicago: University 01 ChlCago Press, 1982]. In ~ , : pp. .1 41. "fvty whole philosophical evolution has been determined by my reading of
tI ans. . <l ., . I ' .. I )eriods of wne were Heidegger. But I I'Ccobrnize that it is Nietzsche who brought me 1.0 him" (Les
16 [.'1K, pp. 7-81 Foucault showed how eplsteI110 oglca J
NOllvelles, p. 40).
necessarily short.
42. 'Vhat is interesting about E. Renan is the way the Pril:m sltrf'Acro/Jole present':i
32. See SS, pp. 75-84.
the "Greek miracle" as being essentially linked to a memory, and memory linked
This is one of Heidegger's main theI11~s in h~s interpretat.~o~ of ~(..'t~t. O~ in turn to a no less fundamental forgetting within a temporal structure of bore-
;~~tcault's late declarations in which he Imks hImself to Heldegget, see hs dom (turning away). Zeus hirnselfis defined by the turning back [Ie repll] , giving
NOll1ldles, 28 June 198,L birth to Wisdom "having turned in on himself [n1)lilD, having breathed deeply."

1
'14 Itwast.hetlemeso f" tIC
1 0 tside 'md of exteriority which at first seemed to
u_ , [(T 340] 43. See t.he French edition of Dreyfus and Rabinow, MidwlFollC(luli, /t'lljmrcollrs
~lin.pose a p rinnc)'
<
of sp'1Ce
<
over time, as is borne out by MC, p. 351 J, p. . . '" /J/tilosojJ/tiqlll! (Palis: Gallimard, 191H), p. :1:'\2.

'35" lill, PI'" 136-140 [Dt, PI'" 105-108]" 44. On Foucault's three "problems," which obviously must. be contrasted with
'~6 a tl e Fold the interlocking or the chiasmus, the "tur~in~ b~ck on itself Kant's three questions, see UP, pp. 12-19 [TUP, pp. 6-13]. See also Dreyfus and
, "I ~. '~le" se~ M Merleau-Ponty, LelJisible elf'i'Hvisible (Pans: Galhmard, 197~, Rabinow, p. 216, where Foucault admires Kant. for having asked not only if there
ofl.le\lSI, .' .. . r·' E ,. n' Northwest.ern Unt- is a universal subject, but also the question: "vVhat are we? in a precise moment
1964 [TII(' Vi,'ible and lhl? lllll/Slblt!, trans. A. Lmgls, \<lnsto . . .
" p"" "1969]) And the "work-notes" insist. on the necessity 01 surpass1l1g of history."
verslt.y ress,. . . . I "" t - . t olom!
"II1tentlona
" I"tty. on tIe
I wa)"'"tl
'\1 1,'1 vertical
.
dnnenSlOn t Iat con. sum es ,lOP I "£1 I" 01
"15. To read some analyses, you would think that 19G8 took place in the heads
( ).263-264). In !v[erleau-Ponty, this topology implies t.he dl~cov~ry t 1~l.t es 1 ofa few Parisian intellectuals. We must. therefore remember that it is the product
.I'll I of such an act. of return (which we already find 111 Heldegger, of a long chain of world events, and of a series of currents of international
IS \.1e pace . I /' I [P' . Minuit
. . 'd' r to Didier Franck, i-iddegger d Ie IJrobieme (e eS)(lCC ans. .' thought, that already linked the I~II/l!rg{?nce C!/ new j017I1S C!/ stl1lgg1e fo fhe prodllction
<1CCOl mg ' . ' . 1' . , ducted by Foucault III
1986]) This is why we may beheve t.IMt the ,tn<l )SIS con (!t't1 Hew sllbjectivity, if only in it5 critique of centralism and its qualitative claims
tl~e ~1t11')ub1ished Les (lveux de fa chair in turn concerns t.he wh?l: of the prol;lem conceming the "qualitJ' of life." On the level of world evenL<; we can brieny quote
of the "fold" (incarnatton) . when "It stresses t1le CI,11. , ongms of t-les l 1 lrom
-isthn
the experiment with self-management in Yugoslavia, the Czech Spring and its
the viewpoint of the history of sexuality. subsequent repression, the Viet.nam War, the Algerian "Val' and the question of
~n. The text uflU{, pp. 136 and 140 [DL, pp. 105-106; 108] insists ~n th~s point, networks, but we can also point to t.he signs of a "new class" (the new working
. ~.m t11e p en-holder. "An mtenor cele- class), t.he emergence off~lrmers' or students' unions, the so-called institutional
when the gate passes through the Iens set
"
I)ratlOl1 of bemg ... a VIS1 )1 Ity sepa , fron) be"lng seen
" [ ] " "I "I" r"lte ' [although] access to
346
Gilles Dclcuzc

14
. 1 I fOn"II centers, an d so all. an the level o[ currents. of
psychiatnc all( cc uea I , L 1_'- 1 sc Histor)' and Class COJlSCIOIlS-
d ht go back to u ...<les, W 10 Foucault and Feminism: A Critical Reappraisal
thought we must no .. a lestlOl1S
i. I' I
to ( 0 WIt 1 a n . ~
cw subicctivihl'~J'
then the Frankfurt
1/I!SSWi.l" alrc<tc1y raIsmg qu • . I" "alltonOITll'" (Tronti); the rcOection
school, ItaI"mn '!~1>+,lrx-ism , 'mel
' the first SIgns. 0. f the new workmg . class (G)' orz, Jana Sawicki
I I d S'lrlre on the quesl10n 0 .
that rcvo vcc aroun '.. . 'b' ""SilU<ltionism," "the COn1tllumst
I "Socnhsrn at Bal ansm,
the groups sue 1 as , . d I " . (0 olitics of desire"). Certain cur-
. . II F'I' G . Uan an tIe n11C p .
Wal'" (cspcCla y ·c lX ~U<1 < , •• n f-ll After 1968 Fou-
' . led to make theIr 111 uenee c . ,
renL<; and events have con tIn\. . [ forms of struggle, with GIP
r overs the questIon 0 new
>

II d
cault persona .y fec lSC
, f
. I".
about nsons) an
,I the struggle for prison rights, an
1
I I
(Group for norma IOn , '"
c
DP He is then led to think throug 1
elaborates tIe 1 "011'crophl'slCs, of powerl'm , 'er)' .
ncw way, Then he turns to tIe
1
1 1 of the tntellectua tn.l \ .,(, d
and live out t lC 1'0 e 'transformed bctween h.) an
l' ctivity whose gIVens are , k
question of a new su )Je , 1" k I t AmericUl movemenL". On the lin'
. I 1" .s perhaps In e( 0 ' I'
TUP, WhlCl t lIS lime I. , II' [ .1 nd subJ'ectivity, see Foucau ts
l'rf t 'uggles the mte ec 1M a . '
between the e t erent s I . ' 'll! 91 9 Foucault's interest in new forms
analyses in Dreyfus and Rabmow, p~. - -- -, , Feminist appropriations of Foucault have resulted in path breaking
of subjectivity was also surely essenth11. .
and provocative social and cultural criticism. Original analyses of
~, 9] The most profound study on Foucault, hIstory
46, See UP, p. b [7 UP, p, " "F 'ault revolutionizes history," in Comment anorexia nen'osa, the social construction offemininity, female sexual
,' ,', by P'ml VeYlle, ouc, . ," . "
and coneI IUons, IS , C 'l ~'~ "111 t on the question oj- . Invanants. desire, sexual liberation, the politics of needs and the politics of
011 lh:rill'histoil'l.' (Pans: SCUll, 1971), eSptXh )
differences have changed the landscape of feminist theory. 1 vVhy has
47. The trinity of Nietzsche, Ma11 arme-.,111 d Artaud c
is• invoked above all at the
Foucault's poststructuralist discourse been of special interest to fem-
end of OT inists? Foucault's attention to the productive nature of power, and
~,.,.
·
1 re FoucauI t 111VO I'"e.5 a "s'lvage
., exteriority" and offers1 the
d his emphasis on the body as a target and vehicle of modern discipli-
48, See aD, p. ~ I, W le 1 b' I gictl objecL" concepL<;, and met 10 s
example of Mendel, who dreamee up bI~l °1 't' 11'5 d.'t)' This does not at all nary practices were compatible with already developing feminist in-
, '1 ted by the 10 ogy 0 1. "
that could not be aSSIn11 a , ... ~. ~ ience, It does not exist, hecause " sights about the politics ofpersonallifc, the ambiguous nature of the
. l I t there IS no Sa\i,lge exper ,
contradict t IIe Ie ea t 1a . J I' I powcr-relations, Thereforc for so-called "sexual revolution" in the sixties, the power of internalized
, I ~ 1)' supposes know ee ge ane , I
any expenence a reae " ,~ I themselves IJushcd out 01 know- oppression, and the seeming intractability of gender as a key to
. '" Infltcular features I I n c · ,
this very reason sa\ dge , . 1 . tl1a[ 'cicnce ClOnol recogmze personal identity. In addition, Foucaultwas one of the most politically
edge and power into tIe I "'marg ins"., .so nlue I so " ,
them, See aD, pp. 35-37. engaged of the poststructuralists. He did not confine his political
"~t" lil'e interventions to the experiments in playing lvith language character-
. 1[' . ked in thougIIt alIa .. the throw of dice .. or the
4~). Husser1 Imllse lI1VO "' Phiilwmmwlobrie ulld jJlulIIolllcl/oio- istic of the literary avant-garde. His books were intended to sen1e as
..
posltlOns 0 t' a p oint in his Idem Z.1l e/llcr rCIJ/en
gisdwll Philosophic (1913). interventions in contemporary practices that govern the lives of op-
pressed groups such as homosexuals, mental patients, and prisoners.
"0
:J .
'IC'J, p, ,~o8
J~ oJ
lOT, p. 327]. See also the commentary on Husserl'sphenomen-
1vloreover, his skeptical attitude toward Enlightenment humanism,
olo6'Y, Me, p. 336 [07; p. 325]. .
universalist histories, and traditional emancipatory theories coin-
" I" f . It' (Paris' Presses UIllV-
,.,1 See G. Simonden, L'indil1idu cf sa gelli:.I'I? j)hyslC()')1O otf1q r ."
, . 96' cided with feminist critiques of the linlits of liberalism and rvlarxism.2
crsitaires de France, 1964), pp. 258-_ :J,
Recently, however, some feminists have put the feminist collabo-
52. See UP, p. 15 [TUP, p. 9]. ration with Foucault into question. They argue that felninist appro-
53. tv!. Blanchot, L'enlrctien injini, pp, 64-66.
priations of Foucault's discourses on subjectivity, power, and
resistance threaten to undermine the emancipatory project of fem-
 Contents

© 1994 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sources and Acknowledgments vii

All rights resenred. No part of this book may be reproduccd in any form by 1 Introduction 1
any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or
Michael Kelly
information storage and rClricval) without permission in writing from the
publisher. Part I
This book was set in Baskerville by DEKR Corporation and printed and bound 2 Two Lectures 17
in the United States of America.
Michel Fouml.l!t
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
3 The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the
Critique and power: recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate / edited by
Hmnan Sciences: I'vIichc1 Foucault 47
Michael Kelly. .fiirglm Habenllos
p. CTTl. - (Studies in contemporary German social thought)
Includes bibliobrrapbical references and index. 4 Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Po\ver:
ISBN 0-262-11182-9. - ISBN 0-262-61093-0 (pbk.) Foucault Again 79
1. Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984. 2. Power (Social sciences)
Jllrgl?11 IJabrmJl{ls
3. Habermas,Jiirgen. '1. Critical theory. 1. Kelly, !vlichael, 19.1')4-
II. Foucault, ~rlichel. III. Habermas,Jiirgen. IV. Series. 5 Critical Theory/Intellectual History 109
B24'lO.F72'IC75 1994
194-dc20 93"16227 j\!Iichc! Foucault
CIP
6 The Art of Telling the Truth
JVlic/wl Fou(,({If/1

7 Taking Aim at the I-Icart of the Present: On

Foucault's Lecture on Kant's H'lwl h Enlightellment? 149
Jiirgen ]labenJl({s