North American Philosophical Publications

Socratic Definition Author(s): John Beversluis Reviewed work(s): Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 331-336 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009548 . Accessed: 01/11/2011 13:30
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American Volume

Philosophical ii, Number

Quarterly 4, October 1974

VIII.

SOGRATIC
JOHN

DEFINITION
this paper I wish to examine the traditional in? I terpretation of the Socratic Theory of Definition. wish, on the one hand, to render epistemologically the sense in which Socrates does, in intelligible
fact, dismiss the particular case, and thereby ex?

BEVERSLUIS

"VT O reader of Plato's early dialogues can fail to be -*-^ struck by the centrality and the philosophical importance ascribed to definition1. Socrates is con? stantly asking the What-is-X? question, constantly looking for that character or complex of relations
common to a number of instances whose presence

accounts for their being, and for our calling them, has called this tendency "the X's. Wittgenstein that its for and holds correla? craving generality"
"the tive, contemptuous ticular case," has attitude towards the par?

shackled ; for it has not investigation philosophical the philosopher but also made led to no results, only as irrelevant the concrete alone dismiss cases, which to understand of the the usage him could have helped general is knowledge?" liminary term. When he Socrates does not asks "what the question, even it as a pre? regard cases of knowledge.2

sources of the "craving for the philosophical to his methodology. On the generality" peculiar other hand, I wish to show that his appeal to par? ticular cases is radically inconsistent with his simultaneous dismissal of them as irrelevant for the What-is-Jf? On the hy? answering question. is a pothesis that the traditional interpretation reliable explication of the texts, I shall argue that the Socratic Theory of Definition does not admit of hibit
a coherent formulation.

answer

to enumerate

I. The What-is-X?
Logic and

Question:

such a there is one sense in which Plainly, of the Socratic attitude toward characterization the particular case cannot be faulted. For Socrates typically does reject out of hand every attempt to answer in terms of the What-is-X? question his "contempt" for examples, thereby manifesting them. But there is another, and no less typical, strategy which he is wont to employ in the early of its occurrence and the frequency dialogues;
renders Wittgenstein's characterization significantly

Metaphysics

a convenient Euthyphro provides point of de? Like interlocuters encountered parture. many by Socrates in the early dialogues, Euthyphro initially responds to theWhat-is-X? question by producing what he takes to be an example of an X. Having been asked what Piety is, he confidently declares: "Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prose? cuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege,
or of any similar crime . . ." (5e). As everyone

incomplete.
particular

That
cases as

strategy

consists

in an appeal
to a proffered of

to

counterexamples

definition,
an

and whose

function,

as such, is to provide
the

apparently

conclusive

demonstration

it. Such an necessity for amending or abandoning none the of which of contempt appeal betrays Wittgenstein speaks; on the contrary, insofar as it implies that a compatibility with "what we would say" is a necessary condition to be satisfied by any
adequate mative definition, status upon it the appears particular to confer a nor? case.

ambivalence This extraordinary Socrates cries out for clarification.

on the part of in Accordingly,

knows, Socrates is never pleased with such a reply. But what exactly is it that displeases him ? It needs to be noted that Socrates' displeasure or doubt on does not arise from any disagreement his part as to whether the alleged example of X is, in fact, an example of it. Indeed, he typically con? cedes this point at once. Rather his displeasure arises from his dissatisfaction the kind of with answer which his question has elicited: instead of of the having addressed himself to the discovery eidos of Piety, Euthyphro has simply made ostensive reference to a particular action which he believes is pious. That is, he has confused definition with
Association Nov. to ac? n, 1972. I wish of Tennessee, and to C. Grant Luckhardl

1This of a paper read to the Tennessee essay is a revised version Philosophical to my commentator, Martha of the University Osborne my indebtedness knowledge and Anthony Nemetz of Georgia of the University State University of Georgia. 2 The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, 1958), pp. 19-20. 331

332

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

enumeration, standing

thereby of Socrates'

evidencing question.

his

misunder?

of Definition
What-is-X?

is incoherent
question.5

on either account

of the

different radically to is be elucidated question

literature. Some

Two

accounts of how this co-exist uneasily in the

have supposed

II. The

Epistemological

Priority

Thesis

commentators3

that, in asking the What-is-Z? question, Socrates is interested in discovering the meaning of a word. to their view, the request for an eidos need According it any ontological not be taken as carrying with for the is Piety? is What commitment; question: to: What without remainder is the reducible of "piety" ? meaning bristle at this analysis. On Other commentators4 is to be con? their view, the What-is-Z? question
strued neither as primarily nor even as importantly

Given his wish to discover the X-ness common to are X, there is something those things which Socrates' about characteristic logically peculiar as of irrelevant for rejection particular examples this purpose. For if it is the common character that to discover, how can he systematically he wishes to disallow a concern with those very particulars which it is common ? Far from being irrelevant, is
not such a prior gathering of instances the necessary

of a mere word. For it concerned with the meaning a request, that is, is a request for a real definition, for the eidos of the thing (pragma) Piety. According? character of the question is to be ly, the ontological as central and irreducible. regarded in this paper It is sufficient for my purposes these two quite dissimilar simply to have mentioned accounts. For I have thereby rendered harmless in one particular advance objection which might
otherwise possess a certain cogency, namely, that

theWhat-is-Z? question is not analyzable solely in an objection terms of a request for a definition; some philosophers would want, and surely which to put forth against any thesis which depends ought,
upon so controversial an analysis. For My thesis, how?

ever,
existing

is such that it does not matter

accounts one accepts.

which
it applies

of these
to both

theWhat-is-Z? with equal force. However question as a logical claim about whether is elucidated,
meaning there or remains as a claim metaphysical a more fundamental about issue the eid?, involving

the relation knowledge

ability to

of epistemological priority between a of an eidos on the one hand and an

recognize its instances on the other.

of the inquiry ? starting-point that this pre? The awkward fact is, however, not self-evident claim does appear to have sumably as himself Socrates being self-evident at impressed of an all ; for his usual response to the production on some is that of the of interlocuter part example a rebuke followed by a restatement, and often of his original question. elaboration, painstaking cases and the recourse to particular But without of words, how is the inquiry ordinary meanings even to begin ?More pointedly, what sense are we to attach to a request for that which all X's have in common which includes as one of its procedural in answering it, we are not to that, stipulations account ? X's take into any The Socratic rejection of examples is, therefore, It can, however, be rendered more problematic. intelligible once it is grasped that what is at issue from is not simply the distinguishing of definitions the but relation of epistemological examples, to the traditional in? according priority which, to hold between Socrates believes terpretation, them. At Euthyphro 6d-e he declares :
Tell look shall that me the nature have a of the I shall standard and then idea of Piety (hina) to which I may (paradeigma) . . .Then I actions I may measure ... is and that such-and-such pious ... is not.

their disagreement the proper concerning Despite of the What-is-X? the two elucidation question, this epistemo? positions do not differ concerning logical issue; their respective accounts are, in fact, I shall argue that, owing to this identical. Hence common epistemological thesis, the Socratic Theory
3 See,

and

by which be able to say such-and-such

And
boys

at Lysis 223b he muses:

and how and Lysis, ridiculous be one I, an old boy, who would that of you, you two should

O Menexenus

R. G. Cross, "Logos for example, and Forms in Plato," ed. by R. E. ?Allen (London, in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, 1965)* PP- 27-29 4 See R. S. and Forms in Plato: A Reply to Professor Gross," in Allen, Bluck, "Logos op. cit., pp. 34 ff; Sir David Ross, Plato's The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards "Plato," 1967), (New York, 1951), p. 16; I. G. Kidd, Theory of Ideas (Oxford, Vol. VII, p. 484. 5 to speak of the What-is-Z? as a request for a definition, for two reasons to I shall continue ?Although it ismisleading question use that term: (i) the precedent of hitting upon for doing so provided (however misleading) by the literature; (ii) the difficulty the a linguistic is not equally misleading, even more which alternative tedious as well and stylistically obscure, (for example, . of. .). "apprehension"

socratic

definition

333 be to instances

... to be friends ourselves imagine a friend been to discover able what

as we is.

have

not

yet

someone

might

competent

recognize

of epistemological the relation Concerning in C. Guthrie W. K. writes : question, priority

Socrates like how whether decided said to that act you justly, cannot or discuss aesthetic moral questions like questions have previously

of X while
know,

it means) (and know, in that sense, what lacking a knowledge of its definition (and not
in that sense, what it means).

a thing is beautiful, unless you what and you mean by the concepts "justice" . . .Until are so we a these that have fixed, "beauty" to which standard in our minds the individual actions can be referred, objects . . .6 are talking about we shall not know what

It is no part of my purpose to determine which of these views is the more philosophically plausible. My purpose is simply, given the traditional interpre? to the fact of disagreement tation, to call attention and to explore some of its implications for the Socratic Theory of Definition.

and we

R. E. Allen thesis :
It should derived be

has

recently
that

championed
in the

the same

III. The

Philosophically
Corollary

Offensive

noted

neither

early

dialogues

nor in themiddle dialogues is our knowledge of Forms

from of similarities; for it is only recognition as a standard the use of the Form that we may through . . Without . be assured that similarity in fact obtains the life of moral becomes guess? [the eid?], knowledge work, and guess-work marred by mistake.7

That

is not tolerated is, a concern with examples by Socrates for the following reason. For him to allow that the investigation into what X is may a scrutiny of known means of begin inductively by tantamount to his holding X be of would examples them as that we have already correctly identified The view of epistemological examples. priority ascribed to him, however, is precisely the opposite. That is, the ability correctly to identify something as an instance itself presupposes that we know its
eidos.

If the Socrates of the early dialogues does hold that the eidi, present and perceived, are themselves their in? the sole standards by reference to which stances can be recognized, it should hardly come as a surprise to find him disallowing appeals to in? to the investigation stances as a preliminary into what X is. For it would, of course, be self-contra? such an appeal. dictory were he to countenance this account of epistemological Given priority, however, Allen's conclusion (that in the absence of a knowledge life becomes of the eid?, the moral too is weak. For marred by mistake") "guess-work one would be wholly lacking such knowledge, ignorant not only of what X is, but of what things are X as well. And if, as the early dialogues make clear beyond all doubt, no one has such definitions,
it follows as a necessary corollary that everyone is

If this interpretation is correct, it follows that Socrates must be taken as denying the apparent
truism asserted know of which we G. may in one E. Moore spoke when he that

while

a word sense, what means, not in another sense, we may time, . . . to the fact that] we know what it means [owing are quite unable to define it.8 well, quite at the same the contradictory of Moore's claim consists

ignorant in this twofold sense. commentators from The tradition of Platonic whose writings I have been constructing a Socratic has not taken the full measure Theory of Definition inference. For it incontro of this extraordinary them to the view commits that, for vertibly a is between there radical Socrates, dichotomy in the and That is, ignorance. knowledge pre~Meno
dialogues there neither is nor can be any state of

For

precisely

in the assertion

that it is not the case that

the later Plato called "true belief": mind which the state of mind which may justifiably be ascribed to anyone, who, though lacking a definition of X, is

6A clear and representative is itself an acceptably Ill, p. 352. This passage History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), Vol. to avoid the appearance of employing this descriptive statement I am calling "the traditional of what However, interpretation." consensus an allegedly I offer the additional of Platonic label too loosely, as denoting identified real but insufficiently scholarship, in Allen, of the Theory of Ideas," data: H. F. Cherniss, "The Philosophical corroborative Economy (by no means exhaustive) An Analysis "Plato's Euthyphro: Plato's Earlier Dialectic op. cit., pp. 2-3; Richard Robinson, (Oxford, 1953), p. 51 ;P. T. Geach, and Commentary," The Monist, vol. 50 (1966), p. 371; R. E. Allen, Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms (London, An Examination Plato of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1970), pp. 72, 116; A. E. Taylor, (New York, 1956), p. 47; I. M. Crombie, The Philosophy 1962), p. 57; Norman Gulley, 7 Plato's Euthyphro, op. cit., p. 48. 8 Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London, of Socrates 1953), (New York, 1968), p. 9.

p. 205.

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AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

a recognitional yet able to manifest ability of its instances. For it is precisely this phenomenon which their account of epistemological priority precludes. to The later Plato had, of course, attempted account for the occurrence of true belief, the state and ig? of mind between knowledge "midway" norance, by invoking the Theory of Recollection. " " It was by an appeal to the eidos as the dimly standard, which this theory introduced, perceived to and attempted that he both acknowledged account for such genuine perceptions of reality as men have. But the Theory of Recollection iswholly the fact absent from the pre-Meno dialogues. While is well-known, of its absence the epistemological to the traditional for those committed consequence to has not, my knowledge, been made interpretation to It needs be emphasized, therefore, fully explicit. account of epistemological that the foregoing priority, taken in conjunction with the fact that the is absent from the prt-Meno Theory of Recollection in those dialogues there entail that dialogues, jointly can be no consistent account of the state of mind known as "true belief." The Socratic dichotomy
between knowledge and ignorance must, conse?

implausible as itmay seem, the Socrates of the early dialogues must be interpreted as holding that, if you cannot define Friendship, you cannot know what a friend is.Nor whether you have any. Nor how to be one. The logic of the position admits of no other
alternative.

IV.

The

Contradictory and its Corollary

of

the

Thesis

from the view of quently, be sharply distinguished it is too often the later Plato, a view with which
confounded.

I mentioned earlier that Socrates' typical re? of examples on the part sponse to the production of some interlocuter is that of a rebuke followed by a restatement of his original question. Occasionally, this procedure is set aside in favor of a however, very different one. In Laches, for example, he de? viates from his customary policy by allowing the enumeration of particular instances of Courage, in war, amid perils of including those courageous the sea, pain, and in overcoming their own desires ; common and having done so, asks for "that same the which is in all these cases, and quality fi '" which is called Courage (191 d-e). It is passages such as this one which account for W. K. C. Guthrie's observation that
is to collect X] fellow-seekers for knowledge of quest [in the Socratic to which instances it is agreed by both can be applied. that the name ["X"] . . . are examined the collected Then to examples some common in them discover of quality by virtue the first stage which they bear that name.9

the intended state to which one is Accordingly, to be reduced by Socratic dialectic must be taken to be that of acknowledged ignorance, real and total. and true For in the absence of both knowledge to live the good life proves the attempt belief,
abortive locuter's at its very presumed, Hence inception. but premature, the inter confidence

this puzzling gloss is to be brought into har? with Guthrie's previously cited remarks is far mony How
from clear. For one cannot simultaneously affirm

must be undermined; everything must be thrown is not to be into question. the dialectic Indeed, run its full course until the regarded as having interlocuter has been brought to see that he "can?
not say a word" in reply to Socrates. On any other

(a) that known instances of X are to be scrutinized for the purpose of discovering the eidos common to one cannot and that them, (b) recognize something
as an instance of X unless one already knows that

its cutting edge is blunted, and the moral to its aporetic, and purportedly urgency attaching is trivialized beyond recog? character therapeutic, account
nition.

eidos. Indeed, strikingly traditional

eidos common

these contradictory claims exhibit in of the limpid form the incoherence to interpretation. According (a), the
to a number of instances is, in prin?

be read as then, must early dialogues, : is Charmides and this again again demonstrating con? Euthyphro ignorant concerning Temperance, Not Courage. concerning cerning Piety, Laches even Friendship emerges intact. As outrageous and The

Such a view pre? ciple, discoverable inductively. supposes, of course, that we are capable of gathering known instances of X while lacking a knowledge of their eidos. To grant this, however, is to deny the relation of epistemological affirmed priority by (b).

8 The Greek "Aristotelian" ". . . from ob? remark: similarly (New York, 1950), p. 77. See also F. M. Cornford's Philosophers latent in [particulars] the universal and disengages it in a generalization" of individual servation cases, an act of insight discerns his own earlier recognition of "Plato's break with all theories Plato's Theory of Knowledge 1950), p. 185. This despite (London, ..." no satisfactory from sensible that "... objects (p. 4), and his subsequent knowledge by abstraction warning deriving in terms of Aristotelian account Forms can be given of Platonic logic" (p. 268).

SOGRATIC

DEFINITION

335
by a few elementary ~(~D&I). logical moves, yields

But it is precisely that relation which is said to be of the philosophical constitutive methodology the What-is-X? underlying question. The question we need to ask, therefore, is not simply how it is that the interlocuter, while lacking a knowledge of the eidos, can be expected to gather a number of its known instances ; the real question in such a state, can he be is :how, while remaining expected to gather even one ? It will, be recalled that when nevertheless, to the is Euthyphro responded question: What an ? with him Socrates rebuked for Piety example, only an example of a pious action, having produced instead of a definition of Piety. But, given the fore? going analysis, this is surely a curious objection on Socrates' part. For if it is the case that (i) one's having a definition of X is epistemo logically prior to, and a necessary condition for, the ability to identify something as an
instance and of X.

which,

That
that it

is, the epistemological

is not the case that

priority
any one

thesis entails
can possess a

a definition. At the recognitional ability without same time, however, Socrates grants that Euthyphro has identified an instance of a pious action despite the fact that he has no definition of Piety. That is, Socrates grants the truth of ~D & I. But in simul? taneously affirming

(~D&I)

and

~(~D&I)

(ii) Euthyphro then

has not produced

a definition.

(iii) since there are two, and only two, states mind with respect to X, knowledge and to and his failure norance, since, owing state produce a definition, Euthyphro's mind cannot be that of knowledge, it follows that

of ig? to of

he contradicts himself. Socrates cannot, therefore, consistently hold that a knowledge of the eidos is epistemologically prior to a recognitional ability of its instances, and at the same time allow that Euthyphro, while lacking the the latter. The logic former, has somehow managed of his position entails that he simply acknowledge is in a position to that neither he nor Euthyphro the alleged instance is, or is not, a know whether genuine one. Yet, Socrates does not acknowledge this. Indeed, he allows that Euthyphro has identi? fied an instance of a pious action.11 His complaint that it is only an instance does not alter the fact it is one. Socrates that, by his own admission, or at he least that knows this. But, claims, implies, given the truth of his own theory, how can he know

it?

But

there

is a second,

and

far

stronger,

reason

for

(iv) no one, including Socrates himself, since he, such knowledge,10 too, disclaims having could possibly be in a position to determine has correctly identified whether Euthyphro
an instance of a pious action or not.

holding Socrates' procedure to be self-contradictory. This reason emerges most clearly once it is noticed that Socrates himself, while professing ignorance of some general term, is nevertheless able quite con? come to with forward examples of it. As a fidently to Cephalus' definition of Justice counterexample
"rendering the produces as to every celebrated man case his due," of returning Socrates a weapon is unjust.

agree that (i), the epistemological priority thesis, is the Socratic view. of the claim that one Their respective elucidations can recognize instances (I) only if one is in posses? sion of a definition (D), admit of a common formal
ization, namely,

Traditional

commentators

to its mad,
every one

though
present

rightful,
unhesitatingly

owner;

a case which

agrees

On

strength of this single counterexample is instantly rejected. But how Cephalus' definition do they know ?How, that is, can every one so con? is zwjust fidently agree that the action in question the

to Socratic maneuver overlooks the fact that the honorific term appeal irony here. But this diversionary the only possible description of the "he-knows-but-he's-not-telling" Other commentators phenomenon. so flattering. been nearly as involving as "insincere," Richard Robinson has appraised behavior Socrates' "persistent and as evidencing "a negative and destructive too, has raised searching Vlastos, hypocrisy," spirit" (op. cit., p. 22). Gregory about Socrates' care for the souls of his fellows. and conditional" "limited See his "The Paradox of Socrates," in questions Vlastos 16. Socrates, ed. by Gregory (New York, 1971), pp. 7-8, 11That to Euthyphro on the part of Socrates such a concession is not a mere inadvertance of which I am taking unfair ad? is borne out by the fact that he makes to others. See, for example, similar concessions vantage Laches, 191a, c-e, 193a, 196c; Charmides, i57d-e. "irony" have not readers may is by no means

10 Some

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PHILOSOPHICAL

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while Justice remains undefined ?There is a curious, and wholly unjustified, reversal of epistemological in evidence the here, a reversal which priority traditional does and cannot, not, interpretation
explain.

The Theory of Definition ascribed to Socrates by a knowledge of the that interpretation that requires to eidos is a necessary condition for the ability
instances recognize of the proceedings, of it. An attentive reveals examination that a com? however,

of the eidos is a necessary condition for knowledge the ability to recognize instances and that being is it? with instances already recognized compatible to be satisfied by any self a necessary condition to If Socrates is consistently adequate definition. hold the former, he must be fully prepared to ignore whether apparent or real, between discrepancies, what X is and those actions which are convention? then, does he so ally said to be instances of X. Why,
often appeal to these same conventional views as a

itself instances already recognized patibility with constitutes one of the criteria in terms of which the is to be assessed. adequacy of a proffered definition is that a proffered definition What is this means in? sometimes12 rejected by virtue of its being with those things already recognized compatible as genuine instances. But if the Socratic refutation of a proffered definition depends upon an appeal to its particular cases whose function is to demonstrate we the with "what would say," incompatibility indisputably normative character of such an appeal to is sufficient to contradict any view according which a knowledge of the eidos is itself prior. For that a surely it cannot be argued simultaneously Butler University

basis for rejecting a proffered definition? That is, of the elenchus to how can part of the application a definition consist in showing that it is at variance with conventionally held views about Piety and Justice, and hence unacceptable, if it is the very function of knowledge of the eidos as expressed by the definition to constitute the sole criterion by reference to which those same views can be truly assessed ? The following dilemma can, therefore, be con? structed. Either Euthyphro, without his definition, can identify instances of Piety or he cannot. If he that cannot, why does Socrates himself acknowledge he can ? If, on the other hand, he can, why does he need a definition? Received August 21, 1973

of words is not only inex? the criterion For occasionally but not always. Sometimes, by the ordinary meanings provided are really happy, that the guardians although rejected. At Republic 420 if we are briskly assured plicably ignored, but scornfully mass known as "the multitude") would undifferentiated the ordinary man referred to simply as part ofthat (here disparagingly nature of the how can so unproblematically be pronounced not say so. But if the ordinary man concerning happiness, ignorant is not definition to of at discredit can the mere to in be sufficient itself his Justice? Why Cephalus' 331c opinion Republic appeal with "what we would to discredit is incompatible which the same sort of appeal sufficient important, say" ?How any definition are we to determine when it is to be applied to what further criterion after all, is the compatibility ?And by appeal requirement? and when not ?

12