"We Shall Not Surrender": Kennedy, the Berlin Crisis, and the Effective Use of the Rhetorical Presidency

JESSICA A. SCHOENHERR Michigan State University

President John F. Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961 without a national mandate. Three months later, he lost international standing after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and received an ultimatum on Berlin from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev saw Kennedy as a weak leader and wanted to take advantage of the situation by threatening access to routes to West Berlin. When Kennedy attempted to show strength, his lack of power nationally and internationally prevented action. Wanting to protect American interests in Berlin and to show the international community that the United States was not weak on international matters, Kennedy went directly to the public to gain support for his plans. In an example of how to best deal with the contrasting jobs of leading public opinion and following it, President Kennedy did both, convincing the American public that if they supported him in a hard-line stance against the Soviet Premier, he would protect American interests from communism. With their support, Kennedy created a strong international persona for himself and eventually gained the respect of Khrushchev. The respect translated to a negotiating power Kennedy used to prevent nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

"We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire Free World," President Kennedy told the American people in July 1961 (Kennedy 1961, 25). He spoke to the country after a difficult beginning to his administration. Between November 1960 and July 1961, President Kennedy won an election with a slim margin of one hundred thousand votes (Miller 1996, 77), endured the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba (Benson 2004, 12), and left his first meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev with the possibility of war over Berlin (Catudal 1980, 122). Even in the face of two international conflicts, Americans were not concerned with foreign policy so much as they were concerned with unemployment, civil rights, and education (Catudal 1980, 121). Yet in the midst of their other concerns, President Kennedy spoke to the United States about the crisis in Berlin that day in July. He asserted that the country was committed to staying in West Berlin and he tied that commitment to the United States' commitment to preserving the world from communist oppression.

Why, with all the concerns Americans had about things other than the former capital of Germany, did the president choose to focus on Berlin? President Kennedy made Berlin the focal point of his administration out of necessity. On the one hand, Premier Khrushchev had forced Berlin to the front of Kennedy's agenda when the two leaders met in Vienna. Khrushchev promised he would sign a treaty with East Germany that would nullify the post-World War II treaty and prevent the French, British, and Americans from freely accessing West Berlin (Catudal 1980, 114). The Western countries could either sign a treaty with East Germany as well or they could refuse. Refusal, however, meant no allied access to West Berlin (Catudal 1980, 115). Khrushchev promised Kennedy that if the West tried to access the capital, he would see it as a threat to East Germany's sovereignty and the Soviets would protect the country (Catudal 1980, 115-116). When Kennedy promised to protect American interests in Berlin, he essentially promised that if Khrushchev attacked western interests, the west would fight back (Catudal 1980, 118). Both leaders knew that a war over Berlin meant nuclear war.1 Having realized that half of the population of the United States could die in a nuclear war (Dallek and Golway 2006, 132), a war with the Soviets threatened the well-being of the American public, and Kennedy had to make that threat very clear to an otherwise apathetic populace. On the other hand, however, President Kennedy also had an opportunity to use Berlin to present himself as a strong leader and create a popular mandate for himself. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy lost respect in the international community, especially with Khrushchev, who thought the new American president was weak.2 Kennedy told journalist James Reston that Khrushchev "'thinks because of the Bay of Pigs that I'm inexperienced. Probably thinks I'm stupid[he] thinks that I have no guts'" (Dallek and Golway 2006, 125). Khrushchev presented the ultimatum on Berlin because he thought Kennedy was a weak leader who had no support behind him (Halberstam 1972, 76). When Berlin came down to a battle of wills, the Soviets believed the West, led by the United States, would never fulfill their promises in the city (Catudal 1980, 199). President Kennedy was not only aware of Khrushchev's perceptions, but realized after Vienna that he needed to change them (Halberstam 1972, 76). Kennedy had to be a strong leader, and he had to force Khrushchev to take him seriously. The mere threat of nuclear war was no longer enough to deter the Soviet Premier from interfering in Berlin--the old Eisenhower doctrine of "massive retaliation" was no longer believable, as no one thought the United States would follow through on its threats (Sorensen 1965, 513). Nuclear war was a very real possibility after Berlin, however, and Kennedy needed to diplomatically extricate nuclear weapons from the crisis. To do so, however, Kennedy needed to show Khrushchev that he was serious about using nuclear
Kennedy told Khrushchev they both had the power to destroy each other (Catudal 1980, 116-117). Halberstam wrote in The Best and the Brightest that "If anything, the Bay of Pigs had made the Kennedy Administration acutely aware of its vulnerability and determined to show that it was worthy, that this was not a weak young President unable to cope with the Soviets, but that he was just as tough as they were, just as fast on the draw" (Halberstam 1972, 72).
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weapons to protect American interests and that he would stand behind his threats-something he could do only when he was considered a strong leader. In order to appear as strong opposition to Khrushchev, Kennedy needed the support of his own country. The post-World War II, Cold War environment encouraged the president to take control of foreign relations conflicts and solve them (Schlesinger 2004, 127-128). Even so, the people needed to trust the president if he were to continue controlling foreign affairs.3 Essentially, the president needed the trust of the country. If he had it, then he could act as he saw appropriate on foreign affairs. According to his speechwriter, Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy felt that as the president, he had the latitude to act without public support in foreign affairs (Sorensen 1965, 509). Even so, Kennedy knew the public could constrain his actions with their approval or disapproval--he realized he needed their trust (Sorensen 1965, 509). Having won the election by so slim a margin, Kennedy had no great majority of support. With the added public support that stemmed from a well-executed foreign relations plan, Kennedy could claim a public mandate and could show Khrushchev he had the force of the country behind him. Kennedy could and enforce whatever decisions he made. So long as the public was convinced, Kennedy could take the strong position and refuse to back down from his threats. Using the public support of the country, however, could constrain the president's ability to act without popular support. According to Jeffrey K. Tulis in his book The Rhetorical Presidency, what Kennedy tried to do with Berlin was nearly impossible. Claiming to listen to the people while simultaneously telling them the president was acting in their best interests creates a difficult situation for presidents. Tulis suggested that there were "limits to popular leadership" and that the presidency could not "function well under the auspices of a theory of popular leadership" (Tulis 1987, 146). When presidents moved from their job as leader of public opinion to their job as listener of public opinion, the change would create a contradiction and the two jobs would "frustrate or subvert each other" (Tulis 1987, 146). Essentially, Tulis said that by going to the public for a mandate, the president surrendered his ability to act outside public opinion--he chained himself to the public. What Kennedy did, however, was navigate the duel roles of the presidency correctly and efficiently. He did so by first convincing the people he was acting in the best interests of the country and then telling them they should support him so he could enforce those interests. Kennedy's actions raised important questions about Tulis's theory because rather than being weakened by his ties to the public, Kennedy used his public support to strengthen his international persona. By focusing on Berlin, Kennedy had a visible, immediate threat that he could present to the American public, and he did so using the news media. In acquainting the country with the issue through speeches and press conferences, Kennedy could also outline his plans to protect American interests in Berlin and explain his actions. The people, in return, saw their leader doing everything in his
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Schlesinger quotes Averell Harriman, who said "'No foreign policy will stick unless the American people are behind it'" (Schlesinger 2004, 325).

power to protect American interests from communism and gave him their approval, which then allowed Kennedy to continue his plans to deal with Khrushchev. Needing to threaten war to prevent war, Kennedy made Berlin a focus of his administration, hoping to create a starting point in the cycle of public approval and presidential power. In doing so, he successfully used rhetorical tools and the media to address the people and gain a public mandate, then used the power from the mandate to build a powerful international persona with which Khrushchev respected and cooperated. President Kennedy was the example of a president who could use public opinion to gain a mandate and act in the country's best interest. THE PRESIDENT AND THE PEOPLE The relationship between the president and the people became extremely complicated in the twentieth century because the presidents began claiming national mandates. The twentieth-century president found himself dealing with two presidencies: one, the constitutional presidency and the other the popular mandate presidency. Because the Constitution provided for a leader not directly elected by the people, the president was separated from the electorate and, as a result, was intended to guide the people rather than be influenced by them. At the same time, however, the presidency was not an isolated office--the president needed a connection to the people and he needed to understand their concerns. Without this understanding, he would never be able to appeal to the public and gain public support. Dealing with public support and doing what was best for the country created a set of important difficulties for the presidency in the twentieth century. The presidency, at its conception, was not a branch that answered directly to the people. In fact, according to the founders, the legislative branch, not the executive, was the branch closest to the people (Madison 2001c, 272). James Madison pointed out in Federalist 52 that "as it is essential to liberty, that the government in general should have a common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential, that the [legislative branch] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people" (Madison 2001c, 273). Speaking about the presidency, Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist 68 that while the president needed a "sense of the people" to properly do his job, he also needed "a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements that were proper to govern [the peoples'] choice" (Hamilton 2001, 352). To properly execute the laws, the president needed to understand the people's position, but also be able to see beyond their immediate desires to execute the laws according to their best interest. The president was not the legislative branch, which depended on the people--the people depended on the president to guide them, not the other way around. The Federalists feared the people having too much influence on the federal government. The people, they knew, were prone to passions rather than reason. James Madison said that by nature, men have their own opinions, ideas, and preferences for different leaders--essentially, their own passions--and they are "much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their

common good" (Madison 2001a, 43-44). People would rather follow their passions to a useless end than set them aside for the sake of a national good that benefited far more people. In realizing this, the founders feared giving the people total power of the government because passions could actually destroy the common good and created the presidency, hoping to temper that opinion The presidency, however, was not sacrosanct either. Fearing demagoguery, the Federalists also wanted to limit the president's power over the people. As Madison said, the leaders of a republic needed controls on their actions.4 Jeffrey K. Tulis, explaining the role of the president and the fear of demagoguery, pointed out that presidents, possessing the ability to influence the people, could abuse that power for personal gains (Tulis 1987, 28-29). Noting that the founders feared demagoguery, Tulis also pointed out the founders knew demagoguery could combine with majority tyranny to destroy the government (Tulis 1987, 28-29). By pretending to listen to the people, the demagogue would claim to be protecting their interests, while in truth he was protecting his own and gaining more power in the process5 Simultaneously, the president could successfully convince the people that he would use his extra power for the public good. Tulis explained, however, that at times, the president did need to convince the public that he was acting in its best interests by appealing to its desire for protection (Tulis 1987, 30). These times were special cases, like during wars, and were extremely rare (Tulis 1987, 30). Using demagoguery all the time, however, would lead to its abuse (Tulis 1987, 30). The abuse of public appeals and their power would create a tyrant, not a president upholding his executive duties. As a tyrant, the president would consider his interests first, not those of the people. Thus, the Constitution was also supposed to limit the possibilities of demagoguery, and it did this by checks and balances--the legislature against the president. The people ensured their leader was not abusing his power. In the twentieth century, however, the presidency became the arm of the people. President Woodrow Wilson reinterpreted the Constitution, saying that the independent executive described above was not the most useful to the government. Instead, he reinterpreted the meaning of independent executive to mean the executive alone had a national mandate (Tulis 1987, 128). Because the president was the only member of the national government elected by the entire populace, he was the person who represented the peoples' interests (Tulis 1987, 128). The job of the executive thus became finding the "'majority sentiment'" of the people (Tulis 1987, 129). According to Wilson, this public leader was not a demagogue, as the founders had feared, because the president appealed to "'the true' and durable majority sentiment" (Tulis 1987, 130). The people would recognize a demagogue if they saw one, Wilson claimed (Tulis 1987, 131). Essentially, because the job of the
Madison said in Federalist 51 that "If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary" (Madison 2001b, 269). 5 Tulis used the example of Senator Joseph McCarthy, saying that history has considered McCarthy's communist rhetoric during the 1950s the work of a demagogue, while President Dwight D. Eisenhower's more rational discussions with the public were not. (Tulis 1987, 28).
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president was to understand the sentiments of the people and act on them in the name of the people, the president could not be a demagogue. If he tried, the people would notice and demand his removal. In making this claim, Wilson created a president of the people, one who the country elected and trusted, to do what they wanted done. Tulis was quick to point out, however, that even with Wilson's new interpretation of the executive, the old executive had not disappeared. At times, the president still needed to act as a president removed from the people (Tulis 1987, 146). Thus, the president found himself balancing between two different positions: a leader removed from public opinion and a leader who was a part of it. Playing both roles, however, proved complicated, if not nearly impossible, as Tulis pointed out (Tulis 1987,146). The president could either claim a public mandate, as Woodrow Wilson explained, or he could say his actions were in the people's best interest, as the founders intended. In his analysis, Tulis concluded that bringing the two roles together was nearly impossible because the president would undermine his own authority if he did so, as previously stated. Thus, in the twentieth century, the problem became trying to maneuver between the two presidencies to create public policy. While Tulis stressed the impossibility of the situation, however, President Kennedy's actions would show that public support can, in fact, strengthen the president's ability to act in the best interest of the people. PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING Creating public policy thus became a complicated operation, with the president trying to present a solution and make it seem like the solution was the people's idea. Jeffrey Cohen suggested that presidential success depended on the president's ability to navigate between "responsiveness and leadership" (Cohen 1997, 8). He continued by saying that with the development of radio and television, the people began looking to the president to guide and lead the country in times of crisis (Cohen 1997, 12), and when the president did so, they offered him support, creating a national mandate, which translated to power in negotiations (Cohen 1997, 14). Power in negotiations led to the ability to create public policy that the people wanted and put pressure on the detractors to agree with the president's policy. At the same time, however, the presidents were not looking for short-term gratification and public support. They wanted their policies to create long-lasting public policies that the people supported long after the president himself was in office (Cohen 1997, 15). By looking past the short sightedness of public opinion and toward long-term results, presidents could create a successful policy6 that earned them the respect and support of the public. That respect and support translated to respect and support on future projects (Cohen 1997, 15). Cohen concluded that in the balance between responsiveness and responsibility, the
Cohen defined successful policy as something that improves the nation in a way that gains public support (Cohen 1997, 15).
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president had the most to gain by creating successful policy independently rather than following public opinion (Cohen 1997, 15). Even so, he had to appease the people and follow their opinions to gain the power necessary to negotiate on those long-term, legacy-creating policy initiatives (Cohen 1997, 20-21). Allowing the people to dictate any sort of policy, however, could result in the president losing public support if the policy failed.7 Thus, the president strived to control the policymaking process by allowing the people to dictate mandates on less substantial issues, while the president controlled the policy on major issues (Cohen 1997, 16). Such a process allowed the people to feel like the president was responding to their concerns and gave him support, and the president turned that support into the negotiating power necessary to create substantial, thoughtful, and successful policy. Adding to the need for public support were the oddities of creating foreign policy. Where foreign policy was concerned, the president had significantly more latitude to act. Robin Marla, Charles Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis Simon concluded, as Cohen had, that public opinion could extend the president's realm of influence (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 590-591). High public support translated to an increased use of presidential prerogative in foreign affairs, with Congress supporting the presidents' decisions (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 590). More importantly, literature on the subject showed that the post-World War II presidents increased their public standing when they acted on foreign matters (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 592). Through their study, Marla, Ostrom, and Simon concluded that presidents could rely on foreign policy to influence short-term public approval (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 619). In this case, rather than allowing the public opinion to dictate a policy initiative that led to support, the president could act on a foreign issue and receive the initial support boost they needed to create good public policy. Marla, Ostrom, and Simon also outlined the most important factors for gaining public approval. According to their research, presidents received higher approval ratings after addressing the nation in prime time foreign policy speeches (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 611). More importantly, initiating a foreign policy provided the latitude presidents needed to gain public support, and that public support allowed the president to act on other policies (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 620). The authors concluded that while the relationship between president and the public created problems in the policy-making process, the president could essentially act on foreign policy--the presidents' leadership area in the twentieth century (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 591)--and gain the support he needed to lead public opinion rather than follow it. Thus, the president could, in fact, gain support by using foreign policy and utilize that support to create longterm successful policy. While listening to public opinion was crucial in maintain the support levels, to gain the initial support, the president needed only to make a move in foreign policy. By their suggestions, there seemed to be a solution to the

Cohen pointed out that even with a public mandate, the public still holds the president responsible if the policy fails (Cohen 1997, 19).

problem between the president and public opinion: have the president convince the people that he was acting in their interests, then use their support to act as needed. THE PRESIDENT AND THE MEDIA One important fact stood out in the previous section, and that was the importance of presidential speeches. Speeches were crucial to gaining public support for an issue. According to Marla, Ostrom, and Simon, the key to leading public opinion was utilizing "political drama," like televised speeches and public statements (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 595). With them, the president could directly address the people without sharing the political stage and he could focus public attention on a particular issue (Marla, Ostrom, and Simon 1990, 595). Continuing to explain the importance of rhetorical devices, Theodore Windt said, "Presidential rhetoric is a study of how Presidents gain, maintain, or lose support of the publicIt is a study of power, of the fundamental power in a democracy: public opinion and public support" (Windt 1980, 2). Rhetoric--speeches, press conferences, and public remarks--controlled the public opinion, and public opinion translated to political power. Where the president could explain his situation and receive the approval and understanding of the country, he had the power to continue his policies. To do so, the president utilized the tools that he had, including the prime time speech and the public statement. The Kennedy administration was very aware of this connection and the mandate it could create. President John F. Kennedy knew he needed to use rhetorical devices and the media to reach the people. According to his speechwriter, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy "recognized his obligation to 'lead, inform, correct, and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion, if [presidents were] to exercise fully that judgment for which we were elected'" (Sorensen 1965, 310). The President realized that he needed to lead public opinion, not follow it. At the same time, however, he knew the public had to approve of his policies--Kennedy knew that he needed to use the media to promote those policies if he wanted to lead public opinion (Sorensen 1965, 312). Coinciding with this necessity was Kennedy's lack of a public mandate after his election. Without a mandate, Kennedy realized that he had to be selective about the issues he brought to the public. Sorensen said At a time when the international scene and the narrow Congressional margins required all the national unity possible, John Kennedy saw no sense insquandering his limited political capitalby making major appeals for public support on too many hopeless or meaningless causes (Sorensen 1965, 329). In the early 1960s, President Kennedy understood his political environment. He knew he needed to encourage national unity using what little political capital he had if he wanted to get anything accomplished, and he also knew he had to do it selectively--the issues he chose to emphasize had to be meaningful causes that the

public would rally around. By emphasizing one issue and directly addressing his concerns on it to the people, Kennedy could explain why his actions were in the public interest and, more importantly, why the public needed to support him. Without this ability, the President would be unable to navigate between being the two roles of the president because he could not directly plead his case. Thus, in order to create his mandate, Kennedy needed to use whatever arenas were available to address the public, namely the rhetorical devices the media allowed, like speeches and press conferences. GAINING A MANDATE: THE BAY OF PIGS AND BERLIN To gain his mandate, President Kennedy had to focus on foreign relations, not on domestic problems. Lewis L. Gould pointed out that because Kennedy's win over Nixon in 1960 was so narrow and "his working majority in Congress so tenuous" that Kennedy could not pass major domestic policy through the legislature immediately after his election (Gould 2003, 131). Thus, foreign policy, the arena where, as previously mentioned, the president was the national leader, was the only place in the government where he could act and not face harsh opposition. As Gould explained, "If Kennedy was to be a strong presidenthe would have to do so by presidential initiatives in foreign policy rather than as an architect of laws and programs" (Gould 2003, 131). When Kennedy took the oath of office on January 28th, 1961, he inherited two foreign policy problems from the Eisenhower administration: an invasion of Cuba and the crisis in Berlin. With strong action in either area, the president would control the stage, address the public, and earn popular support with his plans to solve the crises. As history showed, the Bay of Pigs invasion was not the solution to Kennedy's problems. Kennedy's first foreign policy action was a failure and an international embarrassment. In his speeches after the incident, Kennedy painted himself as a student, somebody who was learning about the Cold War rather than actively participating in it (Benson 2004, 36). Thomas W. Benson explained, however, that the press and consequently the people did not see Kennedy's education in foreign affairs as a negative--they saw it as something positive.8 Kennedy assumed responsibility for the invasion in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Benson 2004, 38). The newspaper and the people accepted his explanation (Benson 2004, 36). Kennedy seemingly did not lose or gain any domestic popular support after his explanation of the invasion. The American public remained reserved on judging their new president, listening to his explanation and accepting it. There, Kennedy gained no mandate, but he also did not lose any prestige. Internationally, however, Kennedy had taken a beating. The Bay of Pigs fiasco showed President Kennedy as weak and unlearned in Cold War politics to the international community, and it alarmed the European
Benson wrote that after Kennedy addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors a week after the invasion, two themes emerged from the speech--learning and responsibility--which became more important to the American people than the failed venture (Benson 2004, 36).
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allies. Dean Acheson, working in the Kennedy administration reviewing Berlin policy, said that, "'the Bay of Pigs really shattered the Europeans. They had tremendously high expectations of the new administration, and when this thing happened they just fell miles down with the crash'" (Catudal 1980, 66). The Europeans had allowed the United States to control their security after World War II because they needed protection, which the United States could provide through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.9 Europe depended on strong American leadership to protect western interests. The failure of the Bay of Pigs shook their confidence in American intervention. Simultaneously, the Soviets saw the failure of the Bay of Pigs as a sign of weakness, a black mark on the president and something they could exploit in an attempt to get international concessions, especially on Berlin. Abraham Chayes, a legal advisor to the State Department, explained that "'the Russians could not possibly understand why, having undertaken this and gone and done what we did, we didn't finish it off. That, I think, raised at least the possibility in the mind of many Russian leaders that there might be some failure here to be played upon'" (Catudal 1980, 67). While Kennedy explained the situation at home and kept the American public from deciding on his weakness or strength as president, the international community condemned the president almost immediately The failure of the Bay of Pigs marked the beginning of a major problem for the administration: they needed to show strength, or the international community believed Kennedy would get run over by the Soviets. In the atmosphere of weakened international faith, President Kennedy went to Vienna in early June, 1961, for a summit with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Analyzing the Vienna conference, Honor M. Catudal explained the discussion of Berlin, where Khrushchev presented Kennedy with his Berlin plan. As already described, Khrushchev gave President Kennedy two choices--sign a treaty with East Germany or go to war over West Berlin. Presumably, Khrushchev presented this ultimatum because he thought Kennedy was a weak leader who would never wage a nuclear war over a city on the other side of the ocean, as previously discussed. In forcing the issue, Khrushchev hoped to show that the United States would not uphold its promises and to discredit the young president (Dallek and Golway 2006, 125). What Khrushchev did more than anything, however, was force Kennedy to assert himself. During the conference, Khrushchev asked Kennedy what the United States' interests in Berlin were. Kennedy responded that the United States had made promises to the people of West Berlin, and that if the United States left the city, no country would ever take American promises seriously again (Catudal 1980, 114). Kennedy refused to let that happen. Because of his determination to uphold American promises and Khrushchev's ultimatum, Kennedy found himself in a forced situation. He would not go back on his promises to West Berlin by signing a peace treaty with the East, no matter the outcome. In his final ten-minute meeting with Khrushchev, Kennedy told the Soviet leader that because the United States had
Catudal discussed Kennedy'spre-Vienna meeting with French President Charles deGaulle, during which deGaulle outlined American involvement in Europe through NATO (Catudal 1980, 91).
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respected the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Kennedy expected the Soviets to do the same with the western sphere of influence, including Berlin (Catudal 1980, 118). If the Soviets were to interfere in West Berlin, the United States would have to react (Catudal 1980, 118). In his warning, Kennedy promised Khrushchev one thing: if anything in Berlin changed, the countries would go to war over Berlin. The President asserted the American position and his determination to uphold it--he only had to show Khrushchev that he was serious about protecting access to West Berlin and a strong enough leader to keep his promise of war. SHOWING STRENGTH WITH BERLIN Having taken a position, President Kennedy now had to maintain it. Immediately after Vienna, President Kennedy spoke to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and he told the Prime Minister that the West needed to review their military plans for Berlin (Catudal 1980, 119). Kennedy asked the State and Defense departments of the United States government to conduct a policy review (Catudal 1980, 137). As the two departments began their review, Dean Acheson finished his own review of Berlin policy, and he concluded that certain pieces of past Berlin policy made the United States look weak in the divided city. Catudal summarized Acheson's report as saying that the crisis over the divided city was precipitated by the Soviet leader not in order to rectify a local situation but to test the general American will to resist. [Khrushchev's] hope was that, by making the US back down from a sacred commitment, he would seriously undermine American power and influence throughout the world (Catudal 1980, 143-144). Acheson's report also said that the mere threat of nuclear war was no longer enough to deter the Soviets--they no longer believed the United States would actually use its nuclear weapons (Catudal 1980, 144). Acheson ultimately concluded that because the United States was engaged in a battle of wills, the United States needed to maintain an unrelenting position of keeping the status quo in Berlin or going to war over it (Catudal 1980, 147). Negotiating with the Soviets was not an option until Khrushchev took the Americans seriously (Catudal 1980, 147). To be taken seriously, Kennedy needed to be firm--he needed to assure the world that the United States would protect its Berlin interests, even if it ultimately meant nuclear warfare. To stand firm, however, Kennedy needed to convince the public that his policy on Berlin was the only possible solution to Soviet intervention in western affairs. Moreover, by convincing the public of this, his substantial public support could contribute to a perception of his strength to the rest of the world, especially Khrushchev. As already stated, the American public was less-than-concerned about a city over four thousand miles away, especially when there were problems at home that garnered their attention. Even so, caring about Berlin was crucial to Kennedy maintaining his position. The Soviets believed that the Americans and the other

Allies would never support going to war over Berlin (Catudal 1980, 199). Without the understanding of the public, Kennedy would not be able to do it--if the American people were unconcerned about losing the city, Kennedy could never explain to them why they should risk their lives to support the president's stance on Berlin. Kennedy had to convince the people that his plans were in their best interests. Kennedy thus painted a picture of dire problems in Berlin to impress on everyone the seriousness of the situation and the necessity of maintaining his hardline position. Immediately after the June summit, Kennedy gave his first White House speech, and he admitted that Vienna was not a success (Catudal 1980, 120). The Americans were not prepared for the assertion at the time because of their outside focuses, which, Catudal explained, "were hardly conducive to a sense of unity or to high national morale which JFK hoped to instill to meet Khrushchev's challenge" (Catudal 1980, 122). Even if the people were unprepared for such a message, however, Kennedy wanted them to understand the weight of his words. Theodore Sorensen explained, "[Kennedy] wanted no newsman or citizen to be under any impression that the complacency he had battled so long could be tolerated any longer, or that there were any easy, magic ways to deflect the Soviet drive" (Sorensen 1965, 550). The people had to listen to him. To ensure they understood the seriousness of the problem, Kennedy appeared grim on television and in briefings, and when compared to Khrushchev's smiling face, Americans assumed their president was bullied in Vienna and that he was "disheartened" by the unsuccessful meeting (Sorensen 1965, 550). Even so, his serious discussions did serve their purpose--Americans began looking at Berlin as a crucial piece of American foreign policy where the Soviets were threatening American interests. Kennedy's emphasis on Berlin in discussions, his grim demeanor during press briefings, and his discussion with the American public on television underlined his determination to stay the course, and the public responded. By early July, 1961, Gallup reported that the majority of Americans supported the president's hard-line Berlin policy (Catudal 1980, 169-170). Eighty-five percent of Americans said they would go to war to keep American troops in Berlin, and sixty-seven percent of those polled said that if the Soviets signed a peace treaty with East Germany, the allies should fight (Catudal 1980, 170). Americans were preparing to fight with the Soviets over Germany, and they knew that going to war with the Soviets meant nuclear war (Dallek and Golway 2006, 122). The people responded to Kennedy's call, saying that where the United States had a commitment and had made a promise, the people did not want their president to back down. Kennedy was gaining their attention and their support. To ensure he had the necessary support, however, Kennedy gave a full explanation of Berlin policy that further united the public behind the cause. Kennedy's speech to the nation on July 25, 1961 happened at the suggestion of his speechwriter. Theodore Sorensen suggested that Kennedy explain the crisis, "'our rights, obligations, and objectives,'" and emphasize the American "'intent to defend Berlin at all costs'" (Catudal 1980, 176-177). According to Kevin Dean,

Kennedy used this speech to magnify the role of Berlin's "significance in the general case against Communist expansion" (Dean 1991, 538). Kennedy painted Berlin in terms that the public understood: communism interfered with American interests in general, and it was interfering with American interests in Berlin specifically (Dean 1991, 538). The United States wanted to stop the communist interference; therefore they had to hold firm in Berlin (Dean 1991, 538). Dean concluded that because Kennedy gave the speech and made such powerful connections, "Kennedy's major goals of establishing unified support for his administration's Berlin policy, [and] reaffirming his leadership capabilitieswere all attained" (Dean 1991, 541). While Kennedy had already underlined the importance of Berlin, he had a nation united behind his policies after the speech. Now President Kennedy had support behind him, and he could act according to the nation's best interests. The people had been convinced that action in Berlin was necessary, and with that conviction, Kennedy continued to hold his hard line against Khrushchev. His mandate was emerging, and with it so was Khrushchev's respect. CONCLUSION The mandate President Kennedy received in July 1961 came to fruition in October 1962, when he and Soviet Premier Khrushchev negotiated their countries away from nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. After asserting his position in Berlin and holding that line for over a year, the real nuclear confrontation came not in Berlin, but in Cuba. There, however, a very different story took place. As Khrushchev explained in his memoirs, "'Kennedy wassomeone we could trustWe accepted the concession he was making and made a concession of our own by withdrawing our nuclear weapons from Cuba'" (Dallek and Golway 2006, 184). Khrushchev trusted Kennedy, accepted American concessions, and made a few of his own in order to avoid nuclear attack. This time, nobody doubted that either side was serious that nuclear war would be used, and this time, nobody took advantage of the other side. Kennedy in 1962 had considerably more respect from the international community than he had after the Bay of Pigs and Vienna in 1961. This Kennedy managed to negotiate with the leader of the Soviet Union--something Dean Acheson said would not happen unless President Kennedy convinced Khrushchev that his will was just as strong and his threats just as likely to happen if nobody paid attention to his demands. With the creation of his public mandate and the resultant ability to enforce his threats, Kennedy had convinced Khrushchev of his strength. To hold his hard-line stance on international affairs and earn that respect from Khrushchev, Kennedy had first made the case to the American public. With their support in his powers as Commander-in-Chief, Kennedy could do whatever he deemed necessary for success in Berlin, including threatening nuclear war. By outlining the problem, American interests, and the necessity of upholding international promises to the public, Kennedy convinced the nation that he needed the latitude to act in their best interest. With a nation united behind him, Kennedy

was the strong leader he needed to be. Because he did protect the United States and its interests so well in incidents like Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the people responded with more public support.10 Thus, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the president had established himself enough that he could push for legislation elsewhere, like with the passing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 (Halberstam 1972, 253). The Kennedy administration's actions in Berlin showed that a president can, in fact, successfully navigate the road between being the president of the people and the president for the people. As the leader of the country, the president needed the latitude to act in the people's best interests. At the same time, however, he could not do that if the public felt the president was ignoring their interests. Rather than allowing these two problems to contradict each other and prevent him from acting, as Jeffrey Tulis suggested, Kennedy took the problem to the people, outlined his plan of maintaining a hard-line, and asked the country to support him on it. When they did, Kennedy used that support as a show of force to Khrushchev--Kennedy now had the American public behind him and would not back down from his promises as Khrushchev had hoped. To gain that support, however, Kennedy had to use speeches and comments to convince Americans their best interests laid in the president standing strong in Berlin. As president, Kennedy had their attention and could direct it as he thought most necessary, and with Berlin, that was to convince the people the United States needed to uphold its international commitments, even if those commitments could lead to nuclear war. When Kennedy addressed the nation on July 25, 1961, he convinced the people to unite behind him, to see Berlin in the context of the battle against communism, and to support his positions. Simultaneously, Kennedy asked people to support him and told the people he was following their interests--because they feared communism, he would take care of their fears, and Berlin was the first place to do it. As the president of the people, he told his constituents he was listening to their fears of communism. As the president for the people, he told them to trust his judgment that he was doing what was right by threatening to go to war over Berlin. By creating his own mandate, Kennedy managed to usher in a new era of international politics. The Kennedy presidency, which came closer than any other to nuclear war, held a hard line until it was in a position to negotiate, then emphasized that negotiation was crucial to international relations. There would be no more test of wills, no more fear that threats would go unfulfilled--the will was there and the threats would happen if there was no negotiation. In managing public support and turning it into strength and ultimately into negotiating power, Kennedy showed that presidents can use rhetorical devices to work for the people and with the people to create a successful mandate and good policy at the same time.
10

Halberstam noted that Kennedy had two distinct periods during his presidency, divided by the missile crisis: the first, recovering from the Bay of Pigs and the lack of public mandate and the second Kennedy's more ambitious last year in office. During that last year, Kennedy used his mandate to "begin (slowly of course) to challenge some ideas and attitudes " (Halberstam 1972, 253).

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