Future of History 2010-2011

201 o-20 I I -VOLUME Stx
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION
OF LI NDEI1.GI1.r\DLIATF.
H ISTOIUCAL SCI IOLARSHIP
A "f' TilE U NI VEi t SITY OF TORONTO
20 I 0-20 I I - VOLUMF. SI X
The archetypical image of a historian or a history student in the popular con-
sciousness can be rather grim: one cannot help but imagine a lone (bespec-
tacled, frumpily-garbed) figure hunched among towering piles of books,
poring over tattered documents in a dimly-lit and dusty archive.
Although this forlorn image may not necessarily be true in all cases (I, for
one, spend much of my time hunched over books in an antiseptic, Ouores-
cent-lit library, not a dim and dusty archive), it docs hint at the problem of
a certain form of intellectual isolati on that is often found among undergrad-
uate history students. As such, it is my hope that The Future <?}. rlistory will
contribute towards making the study of history a more collective and shared
endeavour through fostering criti cal intellectual dialogue and recognizing
some of the best examples of undergraduate scholarship in history that can
be found at the University ofToronto.
To conclude, my sincerest thanks goes to those brave souls who submitted
their work to the scrutinizing eyes of The Future if History's editorial board,
as well as to the editors themselves for sacrificing the requisite blood, sweat
and reading weeks necessary to produce this journal. In addition, I would
also like to express my warm gratitude to the colleges and campus organiza-
tions for thei r generosity in contributing to our f undraising efforts.
Happy reading!
AILSA CJ-JAU
March 2011
SENIOR EDITORS:
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Copyright 2011
ISSN 1916-5765
It would not have been possible to publish this year's edition of The Future
cf History without the generous contributions of:
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Centrefor Riformation and Renaissance Studies
:: CERES
Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies
University ifTrinity Collene
Victoria University in the University ifToronto
New Colleae
University Colleae
University if St. Michael's Co Ilene
Tryin9 to Keep the Upstarts Down: Sumptuary Laws in Early Modern Italy
and Enaland
Gina Clark
Life on the Edoe: The Impact of Runaway Slave Communities on
Colonial Brazil
Kate Bruce-Lockhart
lnterrogatinB Apparitions: lrifluences on the Interpretations if Spirits
in Late Seventeenth Century London
Maximilian Smith
La Croix Grossiere:An Inquiry into Urban Middle Class Support for Army
Service in France
Alain Bartleman
Ethiopia Shall Soon Stretch Forth Her Hands Unto God: I!Jrican-American
Responses to the halo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935
Safia Aidid
The Anti-Social War: The American YJort in Vietnam, Errin9 in Values
and judoemenr
Ben Ainsworth
Snapshots of History: An Examination of Iconic Photoaraphs and Their
Construction cfJ'icarious Memory
Julianne Kelso
8
22
34
43
55
65
75
SuMPTUARY LAWS IN EARLY MoDERN I TALY AND ENGLAND
Gina Clark
TilE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 9
In the first act of Hamlet, Polonius provides this fatherly advice to his
son, Laertes, who is about to leave Denmark for France:
Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not express'd in fancy; rich, not gaudy,
For the apparel oft proclaims the man ...
1
When Shakespeare penned these words in the early 1600s, sumptuar y
clothing laws were in place with the intention to proclaim a man's rank
and status. However, in comparison "vith Italy and other European states,
England was slow off the mark in 1337 when it passed its first sumptuary
act which restricted imports of cloth and fur to royalty and certain elites.
Genoa, in comparison, passed a law code almost 200 years earlier banning
the use of sable costing more than 40 soldi.
2
Early in the thirteenth century,
Italy, Spain, and France began passing numerous sumptuary laws in an
attempt to restrict luxurious clothing and to limit extravagance in feasting,
funerals, weddings, and gift-giving.
3
Traditional studies of state laws
controlling dress in the early modern period have focused on fiscal motives,
such as protectionism, the balance of trade, and the supply of bullion. From
a social history perspective however, sumptuous clothing was a visual
symbol of one's wealth, power, profession, and gender. Italian and English
laws clearly differed concer ning the enactment, enforcement, and duration
of their sumptuary laws, and intriguingly, the target ofltalian legislation was
usually women while English laws focussed mainly on men. Nevertheless,
the ultimate goal of legislators in both j urisdictions was to control society
by establishing a hierarchy of dress in which rank and status could be visibly
distinguished. In the end, neither state succeeded in suppressing the supply
and demand for luxurious and ever-changing fashions.
It must first be acknowledged that English sumptuar y laws have
1 William Shakespeare, 1/amlet, (Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited, I 963) Act I, Scene
3, lines 70-72.
2 Catherine Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law in Jcaf.y 1200-1500 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002) 24.
3 Kim M. Phillips, "Masculinities and the Medieval English Sumptuary Laws,n Gender&..
History 19.1 (2007) 23.
I 0 - T i lE FUTURE or II ISTOIW
been much less studied than those ofltaly,
4
and that while Italian cities issued
several hundred laws during the early modern period, English legislators
enacted only nine major acts. > Unlike Italy, where most sumptuary legislation
was enacted locally or at the city level, almost all English laws originated at
the nationalle,el, either in the House of Commons or by royal proclamation.
Although England passed its last major clothjng legislation in 1554, there
were ninet een Elizabethan proclamations between 1559 and I 597 dealing
with the "excess of apparcl.'
16
All sumptuary legislation was repealed in
1604. Nevertheless, various legislators attempted to enact new sumptuary
laws into the mid- 1650s: however, the House of Commons, House of Lords,
and the Crown could not reach a consensus.
7
A study of Italian sumptuary
legislation by Catherine Kovcsi Ki llerby reveals that more than 300 laws
were enacted by republican, despotic, and royal regimes between 1200 and
1500.R Her examination of more than 40 Italian cities in that period
that Florence passed 6 1 known sumptuary prohibit ions, Venice 43, Bologna
21, and Siena 2 1 while the average Italian city passed about five. Itali an cities
did not abandon sumptuary legislation unti l the eighteenth century, more
than a century later than England.
9
Both English and Italian authorities invoked penalties to enforce
their laws. English legislato rs tried a variety of penalties from confiscation
of offending items in 1363 to a sliding scale of fines in 1463. The most
severe penalty was levied in 1554 whereby an employer was requjred to
4 Maria Giuseppina Munarelli, "Reconciling the Privilege of a Few with the Common
Good: Sumptuary Laws in Medieval and Early Modern Europe," j ournal ?[ Jl1edre1al and
Early Modern Srudic.r 39.3 (2009) 602. Most historians of Italian sumptuary laws have
focused their research on the North, so this paper follows suit.
5 N. 13. llartc, Control of Dress and Social Change in Pre-Industrial England," in
Trade Government., and rn Pre-lndu.mial Eneland: Essays Presented co F.J. Fisher, edited
by D. C. Coleman and A. H. John, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976) 132-165.
Harle states that the major English sumptuary acts were passed in I 337, 1 363, 1463,
1483, ISIO,twoin ISIS, 1533,and 1554.
6 Alan llunt, Governance I?}' the Consuming Passions: A Hiscory ?[Sumptuary Low (New York: S1.
Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 120.
7 Harte, "State Control of Dress," 149- I 5 I .
8 Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Low, 2, 34.
9 Muzzarelli , "Reconciling the Pri\ilege of a Few with the Common Good: umptuary
Laws in Medieval and Early Modern Europe," 601; Kovesi Kille rby, Sumptuary Law 132.
T111.: FunmE OF HISTORY - 1 l
pay a 1 00 fine if his servant was found wearing prohibited silk, while
the servant 's penalty was a daily fine of L I 0 and three months in prison.
10
The "bizarre minutiae" of the 1463 act affected people of every class and
made enforcement almost impossible.
11
Unlike some Italian cities, England
failed to create an administrative body to enforce its policies. In fact, the
1483 English act and subsequent legislation and proclamations typically
referred to non-compliance with previous statutes.
12
In any event , historians
have found few records of prosecutions in England.
13
Italian penalties and
methods of enfor cement varied in different cities across time. Although
some laws provided for confiscation of forhidden items, fines were the most
common penalty.
14
For wealthy Italian women whose husbands or fathers
paid the fines, it was a kind of luxury tax, and paoare le pompe became a
contemporary colloquialism.
15
Florentine enforcement records from
the fourteenth century show t he names of women from the wealthiest
of families, such as the Medici, Pazzi and Strozzi.
16
However, fines often
assisted charities , such as hospitals and workshops devoted to helping the
poor.
17
Some Itali an penalties could be quite severe compared to those in
England. In 1453, Bolognese women in all stations of life were threatened
with excommunication for disobeying the sumptuary law.
18
Florentine
prostitutes and servant girls who contravened dress regulations and failed
to pay their fines on time suffered corporal punishment. A prostitute could
I 0 Harte, "State Control of Dress," 144- 145.
II egley B. Harte, "Silk and Sumptuary Legislation in England," in La Seta in Europa
Sec. XIJJ XX: ott/ della "l'cntiquauresrma Setlimana J/ Swclr", 4-9 maggio 1992 (Firenze: La
Monnier, c.l993, lstituto lnternazionalc di Storia Economica "F. Datini," Prato) 807-808.
12 Hart e, "State Control of Dress," 14 7.
13 Ibid.
14 "Reconciling the Privilege of a Few with the Common Good: Sumptuary
Laws in Medieval and Early Modern L:urope," 6 1 0; Ronald Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation
in Renaissance Florence," diss., Columbia University, 1993, University Microfilms
lmemarronal 8604663, 623.
15 Jane Bridgeman, '"Pagare lc pompe': Why Quattroccnto Sumptuary Laws Did Not
Work," in Women in lcalian Renaissance Culture and SocieiJ, edited by Letizia Panizza
(Oxford: Lcgenda, 2000) 221. Paaare le pompc means paying the established fine to
contravene the law.
16 Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation," 624.
17 Muzzarelli, "Reconciling the Privilege of a Few with the Common Good: Sumptuary
Laws in Medieval and Early Modern Europe," 6 10-6 1 I.
18 Ko\'csi Killerby, Sumptuary Lou\ 124.
12 - THE FUTURE OF HISTORY
dress in fmery forbidden to respectable women, but if she failed to wear a
bell on her head and gloves on her hands to identify herself as a prostitute,
she was flogged "throughout the public and customary places."
19
Worse still
was the lot of a servant girl who was stripped naked, flogged publicly from
the jail to the marketplace and around the grain market, and then flogged
some more.
20
In contrast to England's relative lack of enforcement policies,
Florence appointed an official in 1330 knovvn as the Ujficiale delle donne and
Venice created the Provveditori sopra le Pompe later in the century. In each
republic, officials searched for people violating the sumptuary codes and
levied fines against them.
21
The logbook of a Florentine official reveals that
during six months in 1349, he charged eighteen women with infractions
and two men for interfering with his duties.
22
Another source states that in
1343, fifty-one women were caught by officials in just three days.
23
Some
Florentine women were both clever and creative in foiling the U.Jficiale delle
donne. For example, a woman caught wearing too many buttons on her dress
insisted they were studs since they had no buttonholes while others argued
that their necklaces were made of mother-of-pearl, and not the pearls
forbidden by law.
24
As a result, sumptuary legislation was frequently updated
to close loopholes and to capture new fashion trends.
Between 1200 and 1300, Italian laws focussed almost equally on
weddings, funerals, and women's clothes. However, between 1400 and
19 Ronald Rainey, "Dressing Down the Dressed-Up: Reproving Feminine Attire in
Renaissance Florence," in Renaissance Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Euoene F. Rice, Jr.,
edited by John Mofasini and Ronald G. Musto (New York: Italia Press, Inc. 1991) 228.ln
his disscrtion (p623), Rainey suggests that prostitutes were flogged fully dressed to avoid
"free advertising."
20Jbid.
21 Harte, "State Control of Dress," 144; Rainey, "Dressing Down the Dressed-Up" 221.
22 Rainey, "Dressing Down the Dressed-Up," 222-223.
23 Carole Collier Frick, Dress I no Renaissance Florence: Families, Fortunes, and Fine Cloth ina
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) 183.
24 Diane Owen Hughes, "Sumptuary Laws and Social Relations in Renaissance Italy,"
in Disputes and Settlemenrs: Law and Human Relations in the West, edited by John Bossy
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1983) 6970; Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation"
520.
THE f-UTURE OF HISTORY - 13
1500, three times as many regulations were enacted regarding women's
attire for weddings and funerals.
25
Sumptuous clothing worn by men was
acceptable, given their civil , professional, and military roles.
26
Until the
fifteenth century, women were usually viewed as a single group rather
than by their hierarchical status.
27
It appears that Italian legislators were
convinced that women's vanity and the unnecessary expense of their
ostentatious clothing contributed to economic problems, as well as the
decline in marriage and birth rates, and even the ruin of men.
28
On the
other hand, ecclesiastics insisted that sumptuous dress was not about vanity,
but about the mortal sin of luxuria or self-indulgence.
29
Some laws reflected
the belief that Eve's responsibility for the Original Sin bore a relationship
to clothing which therefore predisposed women to "an excess in apparel."
30
The preamble to a 1420 Florentine law declared that the "chief ornament of
women" was modesty which when "removed by unbridled excess in apparel"
exposed an immodest state of mind.
31
An Italian woman was expected to be
chaste, and modest clothing was seen as proclaiming her honour and, more
importantly, the honour and status of her husband or father.
32
In the early
fifteenth century, Giannozzo Alberti of Florence instructed his young wife
that to demonstrate her chastity, she must "[sJhun every sort of dishonour,"
which included being "aJI made up and plastered and painted and dressed
in lascivious and improper clothing."
33
To do otherwise was to offend
Giannozzo, their children, and even God.
25 Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Low, 38. This is based on Figure 2.1: The ranoe and number of
Italian sumptuary concerns in which the author uses a bar graph to examine II categories of
concerns. I estimated the number of sumptuary provisions for the three largest concerns
for I 200-1300 and then for 1400-1500 which led to the conclusion that laws for women's
clothing tripled over the period compared to laws for weddings and funerals.
26 Ibid.
27 Diane Owen Hughes, "Regulating Women's r:ashion," in A History ojWomen in the West,
Volume 2: Silences of the Middle Aoes. edited by Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992) 14 7.
28 Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law, 11 3.
29 Bridgeman, '"Pagare le pompe': Why Quattrocento Sumptuary Laws Did Not Work,"
213.
30 Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law, 118.
31 Ibid.
32Jbid., 117.
33 Leon Battista Alberti, "Book of the Family," in H/S357Y:A Social History of RenailSance
Europe, edited by Nicholas Terpstra (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2009) 127.
14 - T HE FuTUI\E 01' HISTOIW
Women's "lascivious" desire for sumptuous clothing affected
dowries which usually consisted of cash in Florence, less the value of the
bride's trousseau and any other wedding gifts from her family.
34
Bridegrooms
often counted on the cash to invest in business ventures, but in the fifteenth
century, the high cost of trousseaus reduced the money received by
grooms.
35
Florentine officials feared that the "immoderate and unbearable"
cost of women's extravagant and unnecessary apparel forced young men
to postpone or avoid marriage, which added to the city's demographic
crisis caused by plagues and famines.
36
As a result, officials noted that it was
necessary to:
restrain the barbarous and irrepressible bestiality of women
who, not mindful of the weakness of their nature, forgetting
that they arc subject to their husbands, and transforming their
perverse sense into a reprobate and diabolical nature, force
their husbands with their honeyed poison to submit to them .
. . . women were made to replenish this free city and to observe
chastity in marriage; they were not made to spend money on
silver, gold, clothing and gems.
37
In 1424, San Bernardino, the bishop of Siena, preached that women's wanton
extravagance caused immorality in young men since, unable to marry but
needing to relieve their sexual desires, they resorted to sodomy.
18
It should
be noted that although Diane Owen Hughes argues that, "(mJost fifteenth-
century preambles clearly state that women are the ruin of men," Kovesi
Killer by found only six "overtly misogynistic preambles" in the 300 laws she
examined.
39
Given the emphasis that Italian legislation placed on women's attire,
England provides an interesting contrast with its efforts to control men's
34 Rainey, "Dressing Down the Dressed-Up," 233.
35 Ibid., 233-234.
361bid., 478-480.
3 7 Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation," 4 79.
38 Rainey, "Dressing Down the Dressed-Up," 234.
39 Owen Hughes, "Sumptuary Laws," 84; Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law, I 19.
TilE FUTURE OF HiSTORY 1 5
clothing. Some English clergy were as vehement in their attacks on men's
extravagant dress as the Catholic ecclesiastics were on Italian women's
apparel. Ministers preached against clothing that was said to "puff up pride"
and serve as "allurements to sinfullust .'"'
0
In 15 88, an English bishop insisted
that:"( m Jan's apparel is the badge of a sinner, yea of a condemned and cursed
sinner.'"'
1
Moral issues seemed apparent in the 1463 legislation w,hich forbid
that no one under the degree of a lord was to wear "any gown, jacket or
coat, unless it be of such length that the same may cover his privy members
and buttocks.'"'
2
This legislation was aimed primarily at younger men who
wore fashionably short jackets which led to the invention of the codpiece to
please the clergy.
43
Almost a century earlier, Chaucer wrote:
Alas, some of them show the bulge of their shape, and the
horrible swollen members, that seem like the malady of hernia,
in the wrapping of their hose;and also the buttocks of them look
like the hind parts of a she-ape at the time of full moon.
44
When Chaucer composed that text, he was probably unaware that Florence
had passed a law in I 377 that required men's garments to reach at least the
middle of their thighs when standing up straight.
45
Moreover, the preamble
to that law targeted the habits of boys under the age of fourteen and viewed
their "lasciviousness" as equal to that of women.
46
Considering the focus
of Italian legislation on women's sumptuary excess, this concern for male
modesty seems unusual .
The focus of three centuries of English sumptuary laws was certainly
not the morality of men. Instead, legislators sought to maintain the "great
chain of being" in which every individual had a determined place and wore
40 l larte, "State Control of Dress," 142
41Ibid.
42 Harte, "Silk and Sumptuary Legislation," 808-809.
43 Phillips, "Masculinities and the Medieval English Sumptuary Laws," 26.
44 Phillips, "Masculinities and the Medieval English Sumptuary Laws," 26 quoting
Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Parson'sTale,"in The Canterbury Tales, in Larry D. Benson (cd.),
The Riverside Chaucer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), lines 421-3.
45 Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation," 214.
46 Ibid., 577.
clothing that reflected their link in that chain.
47
It can thus be argued that
patriarchal societies do not simply seek to control the "hierarchy between
genders, but hierar chy within each gender as well," and this fits the English
situation.
48
In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries new money from
the professions and urban occupations made it fairly easy to climb the social
ladder which posed a threat to those who had already done so, and one
of their responses was to pass clothing laws to keep the upstarts down.
49
Wealthy knights in the Commons wanted to be visually distinct from those
beneath them. For example, the 1463 act forbid esquires, gentlemen, and
anyone under the degree of knight, including their wives, from wearing"any
velvet, satin brocade or any counterfeit cloth of silk or corsets made like
velvet or stain brocade, or any ermine."
50
Between 1500 and 1600 "clothing
as an expression of power" reached its pinnacle in England.
51
Elizabeth I was
so exasperated with the failure of the sumptuary legislation that, in 1595 and
IS 96, she summoned her j ustices of the peace and instructed them to use
"Herculean courage" to enforce the Acts of Apparel to prevent "a pestilent
canker in a commonwealth, the confusion of all degrees."
52
Even though the
masses were "grindingly poor," the purpose of the acts was to force all men
to dress according to their degree.
53
As for Englishwomen, they were exempt from the statutes for
ninety years between 1483 and 1574, although the 1483 act was "prejudicial"
to the wives and servants of labourers.
54
Compared to their Italian peers,
the identity of high-ranking Englishwomen was not confined to their dress
and ornamentation. These women often managed their husbands' property
and households, arranged the marriages and careers of their children, and
4 7 Harte, "State Control or Dress" 139.
49 Claire Sponsler, "Narrating the Social Order: Medieval Clothing Laws," CLIO 21.3
(1992) 281.
51 Hunt, Governance 1 the Consumin9 Passlans: A History 1 Sumpwary Law, 307.
52 Harte, "State Control or Dress," 149.
53 Ibid., 139.
54 Harte, "Silk and Sumptuary Legislation," 808; Muzzarelli 606.
THE FUTURI! OF HISTORY - 17
supervised the distribution of property to the next generation.
55
Unlike
wealthy Italian women, they do not seem to have petitioned for clothing
exemptions. All the same, women in England were not always free to dress
as they wished. In the three English acts prior to 1483, even lower-class
women were subject to restrictions based on the rank or income of their
husbands or fathers. For example, the 1463 act proclaimed that: "No man
with income under 40s., or their wives, to wear fustian, bustian, fustian of
Naples or red scarlet cloth; no fur but black or white lamb."
56
Moreover,
in 1574, after women had enjoyed ninety years of relative freedom from
dress regulations, Queen Elizabeth issued the first English law with a section
devoted exclusively to women's apparel. Although the preamble to her
proclamation commanded that "all manner of persons in all places . . . reform
their apparel," Elizabeth was especially concerned with the likely "decay of
the whole real m" caused by the importation of rich cloth, and in particular:
the wasting and undoing of a great number of young gentlemen,
otherwise serviceable, and others seeking by show of apparel
to be esteemed as gentlemen, who, allured by the vain show of
those things, do not only consume themselves, their goods, and
lands which their parents left unto them, but also run into such
debts and shifts as they cannot live out of danger of laws without
attempting unlawful acts ...
57
Elizabeth herself was no slouch in the clothing department. No one was
allowed to imi tate her dress, and when she died, she left 6,000 magnificent
garments behind. 5
8
Italian laws seemed to target women's vanity, self-indulgence,
55 Phillips, Mascubnities and the Medieval English Sumptuary Laws," 31 quoting Barbara
Harris, Enol ish AristocraLic Women, 1450-1550: Marrtaoe and Family, Property and Careers
(Oxford: Oxrord University Press, 2002) 6.
56 Ibid., 35.
57 16 Elizabeth I, Royal Proclamation, 15 June 1574. Sec Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, Early
Modern Europe, 1450-1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) http://www.
cambridge.org/ resources/0521808944/3114_ Wiesner! lanks%20ch8%20Primary%20
sources. pdr.
58 Herman Freudenberger, "Fashion, Sumptuary Laws, and Business," Business History
RevitiV 37. 1 (1963)40.
18 . ~ Fur uRl: OF HISTORY
modesty, and the "unbearable cost" of their unnecessary apparel. As new
industri es and trading opportunities attracted people into urban centres,
there was more money available than ever before t o some classes.
59
In 1439,
a chronicler in Breslia blamed war and pestilence in his city on the luxury of
women's clothing, especially that of the lo-.ver classes:
builders, blacksmiths, pork-butchers, shoemaker, and weavers
dressed thei r wives in cri mson velvet, in silk, in damask and
finest scarlet; their sleeves, resembling widest banners, were
lined with sati n or with marten, fitting only for kings, on their
heads pearls and the richest crowns glittered, crammed with
gems; I myself saw wives of shoemakers wearing stockings of
cloth of gold and dresses embroidered with pearls, interwoven
with gold, silver, and silk with marvellous ski11.
60
Many of the laws passed by the republican, despotic, and royal governments
in Kovesi Killerby's study applied to all "great and small," but the majority
of laws contained some class distinctions.
61
However, unlike England
with its multitiered hi erarchical system, republican legislators repeatedly
exempted the same four groups from clothing laws and applied restrictions
across the board to everyone else, including their own families.
62
Doctors of
medi cine, doctors of canon and civil law, and judges were exempt because
their skills and knowledge brought honour to the city.
63
Knights also earned
exemptions t o appease them for losing the right to govern, and because they
often represented their cities as ambassadors it was essential for them to
dress magnificently. M The wives and daughters of these worthy men were
similarly rewarded.
In the fifteenth century, although dowries were becoming the most
important transfer of personal assets in Italy, laws prevented women from
59 Kovcsi Killerby, Sumptuary Law, 81 .
60 Ibid.
611bid., 83-84.
62 Ibid. , 89.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 89-90.
T11r PuTUf\F OF HISTORY 19
wearing their wealth.
65
Legislators were concerned that when women
dressed as they pleased, they were flaunting an individuality that betrayed
their allegiance t o their husband's authority and lincage.
66
One of these
women, the wealthy icolosa San uti of Bologna, was incensed that the 1453
sumptuary law issued by the Cardinal of Bologna favoured the wives and
daughters of knights and denied other women the right to wear clothing
that identified their personal dignity and worthinessY In her treatise to the
Cardinal, written on behalf of" ever y Bolognese woman of good name," San uti
argued that the accomplishments of women in ancient and contemporary
times were at least egual, if not surpassing that of men. Because they were
forbidden from rewards in the public sphere of government, church, and
war, sumptuous clothing was the only way for women to display their
identity and individual mer it. Thus, Sanuti demanded that: "ornaments and
decoration, the tokens of our virtue," be restored.
6
a A !though her plea failed
to gain even a temporary reprieve, she is renowned as being the first woman
responsible for the public defence of women.
69
The Medici dukes, who ruled Florence from the fall of the republic
m I 532 unti l the eighteenth century, became more concerned with the
passage of sumptuary laws that rewarded patronage and hi erarchy than with
women's sumptuous excesses.
70
Nevertheless, they enacted a new law in
1638 requiring wi,es to abandon colourful dresses for black robes after six
years of marriage, apparently because women no longer needed to appear
sexually attractive for their husbands.
7 1
By the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Italian legislators focused more on hierarchy than gender; perhaps
65 Owen Hughes, "Sumptuary Laws," 97.
66 Owt:n Hughes, "Regulating Women's Fashion, 140.
67 Catherine Kovesi Killerby, '"l leralds of a Well Instructed Mind: ' Nicolosa Sanuti's
Defence of Women and Their Clotht:s," Renaissance Studies 13.3 ( 1999) 259; Owen
Hughes, "Sumptuary Laws"93.
68 Nicolosa Sanuti, "Defence of Women and Their Clothes," in Cather ine Kovesi Killerby,
'"Heralds of a Well-Instructed Mind:' Nicolosa San uti 's Defence of Women and Their
Clothes," Renaissance Swdies 13.3 (1999) 272 273,282. In a private letter, Sanuti stated
that the opinions in the treatise were her own, but a man of"greal excel lence and virtue"
wrote it since she did not know Latin (p. 261)
69 Kovesi Killerby, Sumpwary Law, 132.
70 Rainey, "Sumptuary Legislation" 626, 629.
71 Owen Hughes, "Regulating Women's Fashion" I 5 I.
20 -T111:: FuTURE OF HISTORY
as dowries and marital gifts escalated, the power of wealthy women in Italian
households began to match that of wealthy women in England.
72
No doubt,
Italian legislators also realized that the local production and sale of luxurious
fabrics, clothing, and ornaments were important factors in the creation of
wealth that benefited not only artisans, but entire cities.
73
As Owen Hughes
suggests, the goal of Italian legislation in the late early modern period was"to
keep the economy up and upstarts down," and as such, it began to resemble
t he laws of northern monarchs.
74
Urbanization, lhring standards, and social mobility increased steadily
throughout western Europe, but particularly in pre-industrial England.
75
English attitudes towards controlling dress changed earliet than the rest of
Europe as "pri vate vices" were recognized as providing "public benefi ts."
76
The growth in the average real wage in early eighteenth-century England led
to the beginnings of a broad market in which workers could buy luxurious
goocls.
77
Negley Harte argues that if the attempt to control dress had been
effecti ve in England, it would have been impossible for the economy to move
forward into the industrial revolution.
78
There is no doubt that lawmakers in
both countries were driven by fiscal motives as men and women indulged in
an excess in apparel. It is also clear that both Protestant and Catholic clergy
waged a campaign against the sinfulness of self-indulgence and lasciviousness
of their flocks, especially women in Italy and men in England. However,
what was most disconcerting to legislators in Italy and England was their
fear of a world-turned-upside-down. Wealthy women in Italy, empowered
by large dowries, sought to declare their individuality. Boundaries in both
countries were being challenged and blurred as people "great and small"
dressed above their stations in life, creating "the confusion of all degrees"
which was so distressing to Elizabeth I. Owen Hughes reminds us that most
73 Muz7-arelli, "Reconciling the Privilege of a Few with the Common Good: Sumptuary
Laws in Medieval and Early Modern Europe," 599, 603.
74 Owen Hughes, "Sumptuary Laws," 98-99.
75 tate Control of Dress," 155.
76 1bid.
77 Harte, Control of Dress," 155- 156; Frcudcnberger, "Fashion, Sumptuary Laws,
and Business," 44.
78 Harte, "State Control of Dress," 156.
TtiG Fu or I hsroRv - 21
Italian laws were written by men who lived ofT women's dowries, bought
t hem forbidden clothing, and paid their flnes.
79
Thus, the attack on women
as the ruin of men tends to obscure the fact that secular legislators dressed
their wives and daughter s to refl ect their own wealth and status. Italian laws
were decidedly descriptive, as were those in England. Although English
legislators played their rank and status cards from their first act in 1337
limit ing fur and imported cloth to the royal family to the final statute in
I 554, which punished servants for wearing silk, the laws did not represent
reality on the ground. Despite differences in enforcement procedures,
legislative preambles in both Italy and England continually described non-
compliance with previous laws.
Fashion could not be stopped by legislation as people dropped old
styles and moved to new ones to avoid prosecut ion. Moreover, by forbidding
items, such as gold and silver cloth, purple silk, extra buttons, and pearls, the
laws actually increased the demand for them. The social order kept changing
throughout the early modern period, rendering ineffective legislation which
attempted to preser ve rank and control society by establishing a hi erarchy
of dress.
THE I MPACT OF RUNAWAY SLAVE COMMUNITIES
ON COLONIAL BRAZIL
Kate Bruce-Lockhart
T HE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 23
The history of Brazil is intimately intertwined with slavery. As one
Portuguese colonizer wrote in the early days of settlement, without African
slaves, "it is impossible to do anything in Brazil."
1
African slaves helped shape
the contours of colonial society, enabling the rise of Brazil as a center of
profit. The story of Brazilian slaves has largely been told within the borders
of oppression: on the sugar plantations, in the gold mine, and toiling in coffee
fields. The agency of slaves has thus been often overlooked. Slaves, driven
to act by the insufferable conditions of their existence, resisted colonial
subjugation on multiple levels. The most profound form of resistance to the
slave system was found on the edges of colonial society, as slaves rejected
oppression and fled to the forest s. Maroon communities, or "mocambos,"
undermined slavery, the mainstay of the colonial Brazilian economy. These
pockets of freedom dotted the colonial landscape, from the peripheries of
urban areas to the Amazon rainforest. While they varied considerably in size
and structure, their presence was destabilizing for the colonial apparatus.
Mocambos presented alternati ve social and economic systems, interacted
with free society in ways that were disconcerting to Crown authorities, and
contributed to the formation of new local identities that diverged from the
interests of the colonial officials. While it is unlikely these communities were
consciously orchestrated as instruments of malevolent revenge against the
colonial system, they nonetheless represented a complex and powerful form
of resistance, as slaves stepped out of the boundaries of control to acquire
their own political, social and economic space.
Of all the nations in colonial Latin America, Brazil was the most
enmeshed in the slave trade. Colonization in Brazil was unthinkable without
slavery. The desire for wealth underwrote Portuguese colonial intentions, and
such profit hinged upon the domination of African slaves. Slaves provided the
bedrock of Brazilian labor throughout the colonial period. Riches amassed
from industries such as gold, sugar, di amonds, cotton and coffee were all
fueled by African slave labor, allowing Brazil to emerge as the focal point of
Portugal 's overseas colonies. As new frontiers were explored and new lands
settled, slaves were an indispensable profit-making tool. The development
of Brazil was contingent on slave labor wherever it spread- from the great
1 R. K. Kent, "Palmares, An African State in Brazil", The j ournal if African 1-/iswry 6 (1965):
161.
24 - THE FUTURE OF H ISTORY
sugar captaincies of Pernamubco and Bahia in the seventeenth century, to
the gold and diamond mines of Minas Gerais in the eighteenth century, to
the opening up of the south for coffee and tobacco in the latter stages of
colonial r ule. The statistics on slaver y attest to it s tremendous role in the
colony. By the end of the eighteenth century, over one and a half million
slaves had been imported from Africa, making Brazil the largest and most
varied slave system in the NewWorld .
2
It was "unqualifiedly the primary
slave colony" in Latin America.
3
Given that slavery was so vital to Portuguese success in Brazil,
settlers had to ensure slaves would remain under the colonial yoke. Much
of the historiography surrounding Brazilian slavery has argued that it was a
rather benign operation relative to other slave societies in the Americas. The
groundbreaking work of Brazilian historian Gilberto Freyre - arguably "the
most influential intellectual of twentieth century Brazil"- portrayed master-
slave relations as paternalistic and humane.
4
Freyre sought to demonstrate
the "comparative mildness of slaver y" and the "harmoniousness of race
relations" in colonial Brazil.
5
Historian Frank Tannenbaum augmented
Freyre's argument, claiming that miscegenation and the protective role
of the Church made Brazilian race-relations relatively peaceable.
6
This
comparative framework has colored much of the study of slave histor y in
Brazil, positing it as a decidedly mild and tolerant alternative to the harsher
slave system of the United States.
In reali ty, slavery in Brazil was a brutal and dehumanizing enterprise,
characterized by incessant labor and harsh treatment. Much of the work of
Freyre and Tannenbaum has been dispelled as the oppressive conditi ons of
slave life in Brazil have come to light. Indeed, the very existence of mocambos
suggest mast er-slave relations were far from humane, as slaves were driven
2 Laird W. Bergad, The Comparatil'e Histories if Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States,
(NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61.
3 Kent, "Palmares, An African State in Brazil," 88.
4 Jeffery D. Needell, "Review: Gilberto Freye: Social Theory in thcTropics,"journa/1
Latin American Studies 41 ( 2009): 8 2 2.
5 David H.P. Maybury Lewis, "Introduction to the Paperback Edition," The masters and the
slaves, (Berkeley: University of California P r e ~ s 1986), lxxxvii.
6 Michael Phillipps, "Tannenbaum, Frank," in The Historical Encyclopedia if world slavery,"
Volume I, edited by Junius P. Rodriguez, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 628.
T HE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 25
to flee their bondage. Plantation work was arduous, with excessively long
hours and strict discipline. The prevailing theory of slave management was to
"extract as much labor at as little cost as possible."
7
Slaves worked in "hellish"
conditions, often getting no more than four hours of sleep.
8
Proper housing
and nutrition were lacking, to the point that the Crown would intervene
to force plantation owners to provide more food for slaves.
9
In addition to
terrible conditions, slaves were subject to a "planned policy of punishment
and terror as a means of control."
10
They were victims of beatings, rape,
torture and even death. Slave owners relied on institutionalized cruelty to
perpetuate domination and coerce their slaves into fueling t he relentless
profit machine of the colonial project.
The unbearable combination of grueling labor, dismal living
and working conditions, and ruthless discipline fomented a growing
desire amongst slaves to break free of the tethers of colonialism.
11
Slave
resistance can be conceived of on a continuum, ranging from small acts of
individual resistance to larger scale group actions. On an individual level,
slaves would refuse to work, commit suicide, and practice infanticide or
abortion.
12
Violence was at times part of resistance, as groups of slaves
would occasionally rise up and kill their masters. While large rebellions
occur red - mainly in the nineteenth century - they were not a prominent
feature of slave resistance in Brazil. As historian Stuart B. Schwartz argues
in his article ''The Mocambo: Slave Resistance in Colonial Bahia," the
most powerful form of slave resistance was the r unaway communities, or
mocambos. Wherever slavery proliferated, mocambos followed, not only in
Brazil but also throughout Latin America. Runaway communities challenged
colonial authorities in varying degrees in colonies such as Cuba, Jamaica,
Dominica, Hispaniola, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Surinam.
These maroon communities represented a profound threat to the colonial
system throughout the New World, eroding the boundaries of control and
7 Stuart B. Schwartz, "The Mocambo: Slave Resistance in Colonial Bahia",Journal if Social
Hiswry 4 (1970), 316.
8 Ibid, 316.
9Ibid, 317.
10 Ibid.
lllbid.
12 Ibid, 315.
26 - T ~ FuTURE Ol' I lis ro RY
creating new front iers for freedom.
Mocambos abounded in Brazil, in various forms and with multiple
impacts. They were a prevalent feature of the colonial landscape, from the
"reces es" of the Amazon forest to the outskirts of urban centers in Bahia.
11
While they differed throughout Brazil, mocambos offered slaves the chance
to carve out independent, free domains for themselves. Some were large,
self-sustaining communities wi th complex economic and social systems,
while other exist ed in small parasitic bands that lived by pillage. Despite
their pervasiveness, much of the history of mocambos is shrouded in
myster y and myth. The majority of evidence about them is derived from
colonial officials who orchestrated their destruction, thus presenting a rather
narrow perspective on their past.
14
A myriad of questions remain when it
comes to their internal workings. One major point of debate is the extent
of their return to African practi ces ver sus the degree of syncretism with
local indigenous and colonial cultures. Whatever the answers to lingering
questions about their structure may be, an exploration of prominent
mocamobs in Pernambuco, Bahia, the Amazon and Minas Gerais provides
valuable insight into the reality of maroon communities and their impact as
a form of slave resistance.
Pernambuco has commanded special attention in the study of slave
resistance, as it was home to the largest and most legendary mocambo of
all. A risi ng star in early colonial Brazil, this captaincy amassed large profits
built on the foundati on of African slave labor, thus the existence of large
mocambos is not surprising. In Pernambuco, the largest mocambo of all was
Palmares. It was a thriving runaway republic that presented a formidabl e
challenge to the colonial order. Persistent conflict between the Dutch and
the Portuguese in Pernambuco created a climate of chaos and disorder that
allowed slaves to escape.
15
As a result, the population of Pal mares surged
to around 20,000 in the seventeenth century.
16
Historians such as R.K.
13 Thomas Flory, "Fugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil ," The j ournal of
Nenro Hiswry 2 ( 1979), I 18.
14 JP Vajcllos," lave Control and Slave Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais:, 1700- 1750,"
journal of Latin llmerican Swdies I ( 1985), 21.
15 Kent, "Palmares, An African State in BraLil ," 162.
16 lbid, 173.
Kent have characterized Palmares as an "African state," arguing that it was
a recreati on of social and political institutions of West Africa.
17
Evidence
suggests that strong remnants ofWest African culture permeated Palmares,
such as public rituals, religious practices, defense mechanisms, and modes
of statecraft.
18
The residents called thei r community "Angola Janga" or "little
Angola," suggesting a strong tic to their African roots.
19
However, these
African features melded wi th both Portuguese and indigenous practices,
as Christian elements, colonial dress, and local Indians permeated the
mocambo. Palmares, like much of the New World, was a pastiche of di fferent
cultures, beliefs, and ethnicities.
Of all the Brazilian mocambos , Palmarcs was the most eminent.
In nearly all discussions of slave resistance in the New World, it occupies a
glori fi ed position. Its fame was apparent during the colonial period, and has
carried on to contemporary times, becoming a powerful symbol of black
consciousness in Brazil. Descriptions throughout the ages arc romantic
and filled with awe. One colonizer called it "a rustic republic, in its way,
well ordered."
20
Nineteenth century Portuguese author Joaquim Pedro de
Oliveria Martins extolled its virtues further : "of all the historical examples
of slave protest , Palmares is the most beautiful, the most heroic. It is a black
Troy and its story the Iliad."
21
R. K. Kent, who has devoted considerable
lime to the study of this mocambo, presented it as such: "This is the Pal mares
grandcs of which so much is heard in Brazil , with its well-kept lands, all
kinds of cereals, beautifully irrigated with streamlcts."
22
Zumbi, the most
famed king of Palmares, has enjoyed an "apotheosis as an ethnic hero."
23
He
has been elevated to an exalted symbol of resistance, celebrated each year
17 Robert N. Anderson, "The Quilombo of Pal mares: A New Q,erview of a Maroon
State in Seventeenth Century Brazil," j ournal of Lat. in American Studies 3 ( 1 996), 564.
18 Ibid, 564.
19 Ibid, 568.
20 Anderson , ''The Quilombo of Pal mares: A New Over view of a Maroon State in
Seventeenth Century Brazil," 549.
21 Ibid, 550.
22 Kent, "Pal mares, An African State in Brazil," 167.
23 Anderson, "The Quilombo of Pal mares: A New Ovcniew of a Maroon State in
28 -T IJE FUTURI2 OF HISTORY
on November 20th, Brazil's "day of black consciousness."
24
Commemorated
in myth and legend, Palmares symbolizes the palpable reality of runaway
communities as the form of slave resistance.
While Palmares was the most famous of the Brazilian mocamobs, it
was not the only significant one. Brazil was filled with runaway communit ies,
with a myriad of sizes, structures and systems. Mocambos in Minas Gerais
were the most organized after Palmares.
25
Ambrosio, one of the largest
in this region, had considerable economic capabilities and a division of
labour similar to free society.
26
Having appropriated machinery from the
plantations, the inhabitants of Ambrosio had sugar mills, as well as the ability
to ferment cane Hquor and produce manioc flourY In Bahia, the majority
of mocambos were found close to urban centers. Some had farms, but most
carried out a parasitic existence, raiding towns and attacking travelers.
28
Mocambo-dwellers in Bahia represented a constant threat to local security,
encroaching on farms, and even threatening to seize towns.
29
In the Amazon,
a contested and uncertain area of the frontier, mocambos added a layer
of disorder and equivocation. While the region had a relatively low slave
population, colonial structures were skeletal, allowing it to become "rife
with mocambos and fugitives."
30
In this ambiguous area of control, slave
communities were an "integral component" of the "hostile environment."
31
While their inter nal workings, proximity to free society, and day-to-day
impact on the colonists di!Tered, these maroon communities nonetheless
represented a destabilizing dynamic in the landscape of colonial Brazil.
Although it is clear mocambos altered the reality of many slaves
in Brazil, considerable debate remains as to their impact on the colonial
system. Historians have problematized these communities as a form of
24 "Brazil's quilombos: Affirmative anticipation," The Economis[, March II, 2010,
Americas section, Print edition, 42.
25 Roger Bastide, "The Other Quilombos," in Maroon Societies: rebel slave communities In the
Americas eel. Richard Price, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 1979), 194.
26 Flory, "Fugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil," 120.
27 Ibid., 121.
28 Schwartz, "The Mocambo: Slave Resistance in Colonial Bahia," 322.
29 Ibid, 32 1.
30 Flavio dos Santos Gomes, "A "Safe Haven": Runaway Slaves, Mocambos and Borders in
Colonial Amazonia, Brazil ," lllspamc American Hiswrical Review (3), 4 77.
31 Ibid, 482.
TJJ!! FUTURE OF HISTORY - 29
resistance, questioning slaves' reasons for fleeing. The motivations behind
the creation of mocambos were complex and layered. Clearly, slaves were
fleeing the brutal conditions of their existence. However, there were not
only "push factors" - cruel treatment and harsh working conditions - but
also "pull factors," namely the abiUty to exist on one's own terms. Running
away offered slaves the chance to create a life for themselves outside of the
colonial parameters, reclaim their humanity, and forge new identities. Slaves
could opt out of the dominant system and start a new existence.
While slaves clearly wanted to escape the brutal realities of forced
labor and begin anew, questions remain as to whether they were consciously
rebelling against the institutions of slavery and the perpetuation of colonial
control. Again, the answers arc multi-dimensional. As historian Thomas
Flory suggests, mocambo inhabitants were "complex both individually and
collectively; they were capable of calculation and settling for a variety of
goals."
32
For many, running away was not an act purposefully orchestrated
against "slavery as an abstraction:u
3
but rather a response to individual
desires to escape, combined 'vith favorable ci rcumstances in which to
do so.
34
These slaves were not t rying to over throw the colonial system,
but were instead focused on their own opportunit ies for freedom. ln this
sense, the mocambos represented a strategy of "renunciation rather than
confrontation" - slaves were opting out of the system rather than directly
attacking it.
35
However, Brazilian historian Oiliam Jose has suggested that
for some mocambo inhabitants, a desire to exact revenge upon their masters
dictated their actions.
36
He suggests that acts of stealing from free society
were not just a mechanism for survival, but also a means of vengeance
against the "master dass."
37
While debates continue about the intent behind
mocambos, it is clear that they were a major threat to the dominant system.
Mocambos represented a fundamental rupture in the colonial
32 rlory, "Fugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil," 118.
33 Jbid.
341bid.
35 Vajellos, "Slave Control and Sla\'C Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais:, 1700- 1750,"
28.
36 Flory, "Fugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil ," I 18.
37 Ibid.
30 - THE FUTURE OF H ISTORY
fabric. Labour, profit, and colonialism itself hinged on the dominance of
African slaves. In the words of Puerto Ri can historian, Jorge L. China,
mobcambos "denied slave owners the indispensable, tractable labour force
they desperately craved to run their mines, plantations, cattle ranches,
ships, shops and residences."
38
They undermined the slave system in
multiple ways. Many served as a magnet for captive slaves, noted by a r eport
from a Jesuit priest in 1692, declaring that "no settler wi ll have his slaves
secure" if mocambos persisted.
39
The effect of some was more tangible
and immediate; especially those that hovered near heavily populated areas
and came in regular contact with members of free society. Wherever there
were mocambos, "perpetual fear" amongst settlers followed, creating an
"atmosphere of alarm" throughout the colony.
40
This fear is captur ed in
a letter from the Brazilian Count of Assamar to the King of Portugal in
1719: "The runaway blacks arc so numerous that ever yday they show up in
a different place ... so boundless is their boldness, getting together in bands
of twenty, thirty, forty armed with weapons they take from their masters
when they nee.'"'' In the Count's mind, the fate of colonial Brazil woul d be
decided by the response to the mocambos: "this matter seems to me of such
importance as to decide whether this county will be preserved or ruined.'"'
2
The potency of mocambos as a form of resistance is evident through
the vigorous colonial response. For most colonial officials, accommodation
of mocambos was unthinkable. As a statement from a planter-dominated
town council in Salvador proclaimed in 1640, "under no circumstances is it
proper to attempt reconciliation nor to give way to the slaves ... that which
is proper is only to extinguish them and conquer them so that those who
arc still domesticated will not join them and those who arc in rebellion
will not aspire to greater mcthods.'
143
A range of strategies was employed
38 Jorge L. Chinea, "Diaspol'ic Marronage," in Encyclopedia !if the African diaspora: or! a ins,
experiences and culture, Volume I, edited by Carolyn Boyce Davies, (Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 2008), 384.
40 Bastide, "The Other Quilombos," 192.
41 Vajellos, "Slave Control and Slave Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais:, 1700-1750,"
21.
42Ibid.
TilE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 3 I
to stem the flow of runaways. Free blacks and Indians were used early on
as "bush captains" to seek out and capture mocambo slaves. H This method
proved largely ineffective, and as time wore on the expeditions became
larger and more centralized under Crown control. H These campaigns were
notoriously brutal, with troops instructed to harass the runaways until they
"perish or surrendcr."'
16
Often the colonists were unsuccessful, falling prey
to the impressive defense networks of mocambos such as Pal mares. There
were over twenty expeditions against Palmares from 1654 to 1678 alone,
all of which failed.
47
The formidable defense structures, such as mazes with
spikes or disguised pits
48
were disconcer ting for the authori t ies, as they
r epresented the determination of the inhabitants to "resist and survive.'
149
When the expeditions were successful, punishment was harsh, especially
for mocambo leaders. Colonial officials disparaged the body of Zumbi, the
most famed leader of Pal mares, after his death in battl e in 1695.
50
He was
castrated, mutilated and decapitated, and his head was displayed in public
as an ominous warning to potential runaways.
51
The vicious tone of these
efforts symbolized the officials' attitude towards the mocambos. >
2
They
wanted to emasculate the power of leaders such as Zumbi to nullify the
existence of alternative forms of authority.
While those in the upper echelons of power saw mocambos as an
unqualified danger, many locals cooperated and colluded with r unaway
slaves. Throughout colonial Brazil, people in free society maintained open
441bid., 319.
45 Vallejos, "Slave Control and Slave Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais: , 1700- 1750,"
21.
4 7 Anderson, "The Quilombo of Pal mares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in
Seventeenth Century 552.
49 Vajellos, "Slave Control and Slave Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais:, 1700-1750,"
21.
50 Mary Karasch, "Zumbi of Pal mares: Challenging the Portuguese Colonial Order," in
The Human Tradition m Colonial Latin America, edited by Kenneth J. Andrien, (Lanham: SR
Books, 2004), 118.
5 1 Ibid
52 Vallejos, "Slave Control and Slave Resistance in Colonial Minas Gerais:, 1700- 1750,"
21.
32 - THE FuTURE OF H ISTORY
lines of communication with mocambo inhabitants.
53
The relationship
between runaways and locals was one of varying degrees of mutual
dependence, rather than incessant attempts to destroy one another. Trade
brought these two groups together, as mutual economic needs forged close
ties.
54
Inhabitants of Palmares frequently traded foodstuffs and crafts with
settlers in exchange for salt, munitions and weapons.
55
Contact between
runaways and free blacks or mulattoes was especially common. In the city of
Salvador, local blacks were known to help mocambo dwellers enter the city
at night to steal weapons, an interaction that "colonists and officials were
anxious to eliminate."
16
Thus, while the mocambos were outside colonial
parameters, they managed to infiltrate free society to serve their needs.
The links between maroon communHies and settlers reveal a
paradox of the mocambo as a form of resistance: while they removed
themselves from the dominant system, they often reli ed on it in order to
survive. This helps to explain why surmounting a war against the colonial
authorities was not in their interests. Rather, they operated in a deli cate
balance between autonomy and dependence. While this may seem to diminish
their impact as a form of resistance, their ability to manipulate the system
to serve their own needs was yet another way of undermining the colonial
order. Runaways not only created alternative communities for themselves,
they were also able to destabilize and contaminate the prevailing system.
The interaction between mocambos and free society was
symptomatic of the growing bifurcation between the interests of locals
and the Crown, and the emergence of new "Brazilian" identities. Many
settlers were more concerned with their own immediate needs than those
of the Crown, and trade with mocambos often played an integral role
in supplying them with goods. In order to protect these trade relations,
locals would inform mocambos of upcoming expeditions to destroy them,
explicitly acting against the colonial authorities. The rise of relationships
between locals and mocambos demonstrat ed the materialization of distinct
53 Flory, "f-ugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil," 125.
54 Ibid.
55 Anderson, "The Quilombo of Pal mares: A ew Overview of a Maroon Stare in
THE FuTURE OF IIJSTORY - 33
local identities, amplifying the challenge to colonial rule.
57
Furthermore,
mocambos themselves represented the forging of new societies. They
were often multi-dimensional racial entities, populated by blacks from an
array of countries in Africa, indigenous peoples, and white outcasts. These
composite communities fused political, economic and religious practices of
their various inhabitants, resulting in fundamentally new cultural realities.
Mocambos were an important piece of an evolving Brazilian identity with
distinct interests and ideals from the colonial overseers.
In the annals of Brazilian history, mocambos represent a complex
and powerful form of slave resistance. Driven to flee by the brutal conditions
of their existence, runaway slaves sought to create their own space outside of
colonial oppression. Throughout colonial Brazil, mocambos were a palpable
threat to the prevailing order, undermining the crux of the Portuguese
profit machine. They challenged the colonial authorities on multiple levels:
as an outside alternati ve to oppression, as an internal source of corruption
of the colonial system, and as sites of growing local identities that stnyed
from official designs. Whether on the grand scale of Palmares, or the smaller
communities interspersed throughout the rainforest, mocambos were a
powerful form of resistance, offering slaves a chance to obviate colonial
hegemony and li ve wi thin the realm of freedom.
57 Flory, "Fugitive Slaves and Free Society: The Case of Brazil," 124.
I NFLUENCES ON THE I NTERPRETATIONS OF SPIRITS IN LATE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY L ONDON
Maximilian Smith
T1 1E FuruRE m H ISTORY - 35
England has a rich tradition of supernatural lore, with stories of
fairies, sprites, witches and spirits dating back many hundreds of years. In
the early modern period, the English took great pleasure from reading and
recounting stories of otherworldly events, with a par ticular interest centred
on the visitations of spirits and ghostly apparitions on the living. The idea that
the dead could counsel or even simply mingle with the li ving became the
centre of a storm of religious controversy in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Protestant theologians and scholars sought to discredit the idea
that the souls of the dead could return to interact with the li ving, deeming
it a ridiculous Catholic notion. Curiously, however, it would seem that the
combined efforts of the Protestant eli te to stamp out ghost belief, or at least
to replace it with a more palatable supernatural paradigm, largely failed.
Scholarly works from tl1e early sixteenth to late seventeenth centuries
would suggest a shift in beliefs concerning ghosts, but an investigation of less
professional accounts of ghostly happenings points to a relatively unaltered
popular belief in ghosts. Of course, certain features of the new Protestant
paradigm found their way into popular ghost belief. Nevertheless, clements
which Protestant scholars had deemed overtly Catholic, and thus attempted
to eliminate, also temained. Ghost belief proved resilient to a complete
paradigm shift, but remained capable of incorporating new clements
from disparate belief systems over time. As Owen Davies has suggested, it
appears that "people could cope easily with multiple realities when it came
to the existence of ghosts."
1
Pamphlets relating ghost tales and supernatural
visitations from late sevent eenth century London bear evidence of this
phenomenon, displaying the manner in which literature sampled from the
same period can contain traditional elements of what was deemed Catholic
ghost lore, as well as newer aspects of Protestant supernatural belief. At
the same time, these samples, in t heir inclusion of traditional elements
associated Vlrith Catholic belief, as well as newer Protestant elements,
indicate that ghost belief did not centre on any religious paradigm. Rather,
it exemplified a distinct set of cultural beliefs.
The three pamphlets studieJ arc representative of ghost literature
in late seventeenth London. They describe the appearance of a ghost in
I Owen Davies, The Haunted: a social history if olwsrs (New York: Palg ravc Macmillan,
2007), 240.
36 . THE FUTURE OF 1-IISTORY
Holbourn
1
, the haunt ing of the home of Mr. Edward Pitts in Puddle-Dock
3
,
and "the devils appearing to Thomas Cox a hackney-coachman.'>4 While these
three samples cannot possibly account for every nuance of ghost literature
in London during this period, they are representative of the varying nature
of ghost belief, and as such they are appropriate subject s for this study. The
first of the sources recounts the appearance of the ghost of the former Mrs.
Adkins to a serving maid in her familial house in Middle-Row, Holbourn
on the night of March 16, 1679. According to the pamphlet, the spectre
of Mrs. Adkins, charged the maid with telling Mary, the granddaughter of
Mrs. Adkins, to search under the hearth. Upon Mary's search, the bones of
two children ar e reported to have been unearthed. The bones were then
made available for viewing at the Cheshire Cheese pub down the road.
5
In
the second account, a devil, inst ead of a wandering soul, appeared to Mr.
Thomas Cox on an October night in 1684. The devil appeared first in the
form of a gentleman, who then transformed into a fiery bear. Finally, the
Puddle-Dock account recounts the visitation of an unknown spirit to the
home of Mr. Edward Pi tts in 1674. This spirit deli vered quite a conspicuous
religious message to Mr. Pitts. In each of these accounts there is a different
interpretation of otherworldly visitation. The purposeful ghost of Mrs.
Adkins is expressed by the pamphlet's author to be her guil ty soul, returned to
earth for repentance. Conversely, in the Prot estant t radition, the apparition
encountered by Mr. Cox is not felt to be a ghost-that is, the returned soul
of a mortal being but is rather described by the pamphleteer as a 'devil,' or
a malicious spirit. The visitor in Mr. Pitt's house is unidentified, suggesting
a lack of certainty as to whether the spirit was a returned soul, a devil, or
perhaps even an angel . It is clear that these accounts, whi ch occurred within
ten years of one another, display a lack of coherence in popular ghost belief
in the late seventeenth century. The accounts do not bear evidence of an
adherence to any specific religious paradigm. A further investigation of each
source in turn will demonstrate the manner in which ghost belief resisted
2 Anonymous, "Great news from Middle-Row in Holbournn (Early English Books
Online).
3 Anonymous," ews from Puddle-Dock in London" (Early English Books Online)
4 Anonymous, "A strange, true, and dreadful relation of the devils appearing to Thomas
Cox a hackney-coachman who lives in Cradle-All ey in Baldwins-Garclens" (Early English
Books Online).
5 "Great News from Middle-Row," 3.
THE FuTURE m HISTORY 37
manipulation by religious authorities, inst ead reflecting the individual
beliefs of the teller, indicating an unguided and serious speculation amongst
lay people as to the nature of apparitions.
Prior to the Reformation in England, scholarly studies of ghost
lore most often undertaken by Catholic clerics and scholars
6
- suggested
that ghosts were the souls of the dead, returned from Purgatory to fulfil
unfinished business in the earthly r ealm. Elements of this idea were generally
refl ected in public belief.
7
The Protestant line, the Reformation,
was that Purgator y did not exist, and therefore spirits (whi ch Protestants
did not deny existed), must be either angels or devils. Lewes Lavater's 1572
work, OJ Ghosts and Spirites Walking by Nyoht, perhaps best exemplifies the
Protestant mode of thought concerning spirits. Lavater claims "that the soules
of the faitl1ful are saved, and that the soules of t he unbeleevers ar e damned
immediately without delay, and therefor e there is no Purgatorie."
8
Lavater
follows this claim by stating that, since ghosts cannot be the souls of men-
"God hath deane shut up this dore of deceit, & not permitted any dead [manJ
to returne hither'
19
- ghosts must either be disguised angels or devils, but
most often devils.
10
Both professional and popular pre-Reformation ghost
lore, in line with the Catholi c assumption that ghosts wer e souls r eturned
from Purgator y, most often depicted ghosts as in some way preoccupied
with earthly affairs. A ghost mioht return to exact revenge, but most often
the ghost was driven by guil t.
11
Essent ially, Catholic-influenced ghost belief
\vas characterized by the purposeful nature of the ghost, which in most
cases was not to be feared. Protestant associations of ghosts with witchcraft
and devilry, on the other hand, left those who believed in Protestant 'devil
spirits' very fearful of the apparitions they encountered.
12
6 Davies, The Haunted: a social history ?fa hom, 14.
7 J. Dover Wilson, Introduction to OJGhostes and SpiriwsWalkina by 1Vyaht (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1929), xvi.
8 Lewes Lavater, OJGhostes and SpiritesWalkina by Nyaht (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1929), 156.
9Jbid., 122.
10 Ibid., 175.
11 Christina Hole, Haunted no/and: a survey of Enol ish ohost-lore (London: Batsford
Ltd. , 1940), 28.
12 Davies, The Haunted: a social h1story of ahosts, 43.
Based upon the above criteria, that ( 1) pre-Reformation ghost
belief was influenced in part by Catholic belief in Purgatory and (2) those
who believed Protestant teachings thought ghosts were most often devils
in disguise, and thus feared them, it is safe to say that the account of the
ghost at Middle-Row adheres mostly to a model of pre-Reformation
ghost interpretation. The anonymous author of the pamphlet concerning
Mrs. Adkins' ghost begins by noting the purposeful nature of the ghost
in question: "when Crimes that blush with cruel Murthers do pollute the
world, restless Ghosts and Airy forms from their dire Mansions, and compel'd
to rouse and discover their vile deeds their hands have done" (emphasis mine) .
13
Furthermore, the "immortal Spirit" of Mrs. Adkins purportedly bade the
serving maid "not to fear, for its Comission was not to injure her."
14
The
account from Middle-Row bears no marks of Protestant theology: the ghost
is purposeful, and the author stresses that it is in fact Mrs. Adkins, "returned
from the long incloasing grave,"
15
and not an imposter spirit. The author
also notes that the ghost was not to be feared, as a devil surely would be.
Thus, the Middle-Row account provides us with evidence that even after the
Reformation had eliminated most Catholic practice from England, elements
of Catholicism still influenced popular ghost belief.
While evidence of continued Catholic influence upon ghost belief
can be found in the 1679 account of the ghostly happenings at Middle-Row,
there is evidence to suggest that clements of the new Protestant ghost lore had
caught on in popular belief in the 1684 account offhomas Cox's supernatural
experience. In direct contrast t o the description of Mrs. Adkins' ghost, the
spirit, which appears to Cox, seems to lack any purpose at all. It simply
appears to Cox as a gentleman and then, without provocation, transforms
into a bear and explodes into flame.
16
The spirit does, however, cause Cox
to "lose all Sense in the Horror and Consternation he was in."
17
Clearly, this
purposeless spirit, referred to in the pamphlet not as a ghost but as "devils
appearing to Thomas Cox,"
18
has been interpreted by the pamphlet's author
13 "Great News from Middle-Row," 1-2.
14lbid.,3.
15 Ibid., 2.
16 "A strange, true, and dreadful relation," 6.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., I.
TrrE FuTURE OF H ISTORY - 39
with Protestant beliefs in mind. That the spirit is assumed to be a 'devil '
suggests a demonological interpretation on the part of the author, consistent
with contemporary Protestant belief.
19
That a Protestant paradigm was
adopted in the interpretation of this incident is further supported by the fear
apparently inspired in Mr. Cox by the apparition. In her essay on ghosts in
sixteenth and seventeenth century English folklore, Gillian Bennett describes
how, because apparitions were interpreted by Protestants as either angels or
demons, they would in Protestant accounts leave their earthly witnesses
terrified and confused.
20
Mr. Cox's "Horror and Consternation" perfectly fit
this description. Furthermore, it woul d appear that the pamphlet's author
was writing with the intent of spreading Protestant theology. There is an
obvious religiously didactic tone, and the assertion of the ghost's nature as
a devil is consistent with Protestant ghost lore. The author warns against
disbelieving his account: "I would advise those whom Atheism and lr!fJdelity
has so far prevailed upon to amend their own vicious Lives."
21
Those who
continue to disbelieve do so at the risk of "greater mischief. . . correct[ingJ
their insolence."
22
Perhaps this pamphlet carries an oblique warning not to
tr ust apparitions, lest they should be devils in disguise. At the very least, it
displays a very different sort of ghost belief than that found in the account of
Mrs. Adkins' ghost, proving that ghost lore in seventeenth century London
did not adhere to any distinct belief system.
The accounts of Mrs. Adkins' ghost and Thomas Cox's demonic
experience, each display distinct elements of either Catholic of Protestant
influence in their interpretations of supernatural occurrences. This was not
the case wi th all accounts of ghosts from this period, as is evidenced by the
1674 pamphl et detailing the haunting of Mr. Edward Pitts' home. According
to John Newton, a denizen of early modern England would apply one of
three interpretations in telling or listening to a ghost story. The first of these
int erpretations is that which identifies the ghost as a departed soul. This
interpretation is evident in the account of Mrs. Adkins' ghost . The second
interpretation identifies the ghost as either a good or evil spirit and is
19 Gillian Bennett, "Ghost and Witch in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" Folklore
97 (1986): 9.
20 Ibid., 8.
21 "A strange, true, and dreadful relation," 3.
22 Ibid.
40 - THE FulURE OF H ISTORY
evidenced by the account oiThomas Cox's encounter with a spirit identified
as a ' devil.' The third interpretation takes a sceptical stance.
23
This must
not he confused with disbelief- rather, those employing the third form of
interpretation would be willing to believe that their 'ghost' was a returned
soul, but were sceptical of the potential influence of the devil. H Newton holds
that the sceptical interpretat ion proves that the Protestant view of ghosts
was not monolithic and was open to interpretation.
25
One might extrapolate
Newton's claim t o suggest that a sceptical interpretation of ghosts would
suggest the presence of more than one religion's assumptions within ghost
belief. The account of Mr. Pitts' haunting exemplifies what Newton would
call the sceptical interpretation of a ghost story. The typical traits of haunting
arc observed and recorded- moving furniture, strange sounds and lights-
as is the ghost's strange religious message, consisting of various religious
texts fixed to an impromptu cross. Although the specific events recounted
in t his pamphlet are interesting enough, it is the interpretation that is most
relevant here.The author suggests, at the end of his account, that "[t]his night,
March 16 Mr. Pitts intends to have some people to sit up, that may speak to
anything that shall appear, and to demand in the name of the Father, what are
you?"
16
Clearly, the author remains undecided upon the nature of the spirit
visiting Mr. Pitts' residence: is it a purposeful soul, come t o deliver a message
to a loved one, or a spirit, either malevolent or good, come to lead Mr. Pitts
to salvation or damnation? The author invites scepticism, and in fact invites
the reader to join in the scepticism by announcing Pitts' intention to stage
a confrontation with the spirit. Obviously, the pamphlet adheres to neither
a Catholic nor a Protestant rather adopting scepticism and a
willi ngness to interpret the ghost in one of a variety of ways.
Each of the three pamphlets included in this study seems t o offer
a different interpretation of ghosts. There are elements of Catholic and
Protestant belief present, but equally interesting is the fact that all three
23 John Newton, "Reading ghosts: early modern interpretations of apparitions," in Early
Modern Ghosts: Proceedinas l?fche 'Early Modern Ghosr.s' coriference held at St.john's Colleae.
Durham on 2411> March 2001, ed. John Newton (Durham: Centre for Seventeenth Century
Studies, 2002), 59.
241bid., 60.
25 Ibid., 65.
26 "News from Puddle-Dock," 6.
TilE f-uTURE OF HISTORY - 41
pamphlets invite their readers to participate in the act of interpretation.
The account of Mrs. Adkins' ghost invites those readers who question the
veracity of the tale to witness the bones discovered underneath t he hearth
themselves by visiting the Cheshire Cheese pub. The author of the pamphlet
concerning Thomas Cox explicitly mentions that Cox "is ready to confirm it
to any person who is desirous of further satisfaction from his own mouth ."
27
Finally, the account of Mr. Pitts' haunting, as evidenced above, invites public
speculation as to the nature of the spirit. Evidently, popular ghost belief in late
seventeenth century London was a very interactive affair, open to a variety
of interpretations. The fact that laymen would feel the need to interpret
ghost encounters at all suggests the lack of a wider popular adherence to a
single religious paradigm explaining the ghostly phenomenon. Jo Bath notes,
in reference to the very same account of "Great News from Middle-Row"
investigated in this study, that while ghosts were hotly debated in scholarly
religious circles, they were a source of great entertainment for the masses.
28
One might go even further and say that ghost stories were not just a form
of entertainment, that they were in fact debat ed in the public sphere as
well as in scholastic circles. The language of the pamphlets certainly suggests
that this is the case. The author of the pamphlet concerning Thomas Cox's
encounter evidently felt that the nature of spirits was open to debate. Why
else would he implore people not only to believe in ghosts, but also t o be
wary of them, lest "greater mischief does correct their insolence"? Such an
imploration suggests that some interpreted ghosts as harmless spirits, and
that some did not believe in them at all. Similarly, the Puddle-Dock account
invites speculation, and the Middle-Row pamphlet invites those who might
otherwise not believe to witness the bones discovered at the whim of a ghost.
Al though these invitations cannot decisively prove that public debate about
the nature of ghosts occurred, they strongly suggest that it did. If debate did
take place, the evidence from the three pamphlets studied herein suggests
that it would encompass both Catholic and Protestant theology, unlike those
debates occurring in scholarly circles.
29
Much of the difficulty in studying English ghost lore comes from
27"A strange, true, and dreadful relation,"?.
28 Jo Bath and John Newton, "Sensible Proof of Spirits: Ghost Belief during the Later
Seventeenth Century" f"Olklore I 17 (2006): II .
29 Ibid. , 3.
42 - Tin- FuTURE OF HiSTORY
the anonymity of the authors of pamphlets such as those investigated
in this study. Should their identities be known, perhaps their purpose in
writing pamphlets about ghostly encounters would become clearer. It is
certainly possible that of these three pamphlets, members of the clergy
wrote one or alL It is equally possible, however, that laymen wrote all three
pamphlets. Perhaps they were written simply for financial gain. Whatever
the case, and disregarding the possible identities of the authors, one thing is
clear: pamphlets such as these offer valuable insight into the state of ghost
lore in seventeenth century England. The language of the pamphlets and
the manner in which they describe and interpret spiritual occurrences
indicate the varying nature of ghost belief in London, and probably all
of England, at this time. Apparently, popular ghost belief did not adhere
specificall y to any religious paradigm, which sought to describe the nature
of supernatural visitations. Rather, ghost belief consisted of a collection of
tenets from varying belief systems, all incorporated into public debate and
interpretation. Furthermore, such varied belief, coupled with language from
within the pamphlets suggesting the existence of public debate about ghosts,
indicate that the grand debate about the nature of spirits did not simply
run its course in scholarly circles. Given the nature of such pamphlets as
popular entertainment and education, one might suggest that Londoners,
far from reading tales of ghosts and spirits for a simple fright or a laugh,
were very much engaged in debating the nature of spirits and, as much as
men like Lewes Lavater, added to the pantheon of popular belief with their
own theories and interpretations.
A N I NQUIRY INTO URBAN MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT
Fo R ARMY SERVICE IN FRANCE
Alain Bartleman
44 - THE FuTuRE or HISTORY
Passant, sous cctte croix grossierc
Giscnt deux soldats, deux vaillants.
lis sont inconnus de Ia terre:
Jamais Ia fanfare guerriere
N'eut pour eux d'accords triomphants,
Mais Ia France peut peut erre fiere )) I
"Lord," intoned the National Assembly before its 14 May meeting,
"we are a guilty country."
2
Indeed, smashed by a victorious Prussia, and
wrecked by civil war, all France could do by 1871 was pray. Yet, one year
later, with German t roops still patrolling French territory and memories
of the Commune still fresh, the National Assembly voted on a piece of
legislation that would impress French unity and French republicanism upon
both itself and the rest of the world.The 1872 Law on Universal Recruitment,
opening with the heady remark that "tout Francais doit le service militaire
personnel [all Frenchmen must ser ve in the mihtary]," swept out the old
imperial army, and brought in a new, popular army founded on the basis of
mass conscription.
3
Consciously referring to the revolution's levee en masse
enacted 80 years before, the Act brought both relief and unease to French
conservatives! Would the new French army merely ' place a gun on the
shoulder of every socialist,' as Adolfe Thiers opined, or would it instead act as
a centerpiece for a regenerative, Catholic and conservative French republic?s
The perception of military service-whether in the form of conscription,
mandatory military service, or voluntary engagement through the officer
I Doggerel verse included as part of a compendium of ultramontane, nationalistic
poetry. Marc Bonnefoy, Dieu et pauie, poesies dediees a l'armeefrantaise (Paris: Librarie des
Bibliophiles, 1876), I.
2 Fredrick Brown, For the soul !if France: Culture Wars in the Aoe <]Dreyfus (London: Knopf,
2010), 34.
3 Lagrage de Lagre, Texte Diflnit!f de Ia nouvelle loi sur le recrutemem de l'armee, votee par
/'assemb/ee nacionale le 27 juillet 1872 avec notes explicatives (Paris: Moniteur Universe lie,
1872),5.
4lbid.
5 Karine Varley, "Contesting Concepts of the Nation in Arms," in European lllstary
Qyarterly, Vol. 36(4), 2006, 550.
THE FuTURE OF HISTORY - 45
corps
6
- relied on the perceptions of the army itself by the middle classes.
This essay seeks to determine how urban, bourgeois French Catholics
viewed military service from 1872 to 1891 . I argue that the majority of
bourgeois French Catholics, while generally supportive of military service
as a means of maintaining social order, were at the same time ambivalent
about its imposition. Mixing on one hand preference for the idea of enforced
hierarchy, and on the other, prospects for a militarily stronger France, as
well as the possibilities offered by specific forms of military service (such
as that offered to graduates of the ecole polytechnlque and the ecoles de nuerre),
bourgeois Catholics also expressed fear that conscription would endanger
t he church and radicalize the lower classes. "Bourgeois" in this case refers
to a broad social class comprising financiers and professionals, as well those
such as such as clerks and accountants. What defines such a group as a
cohesive social class, I argue, is less its economic position, which varied from
the wealthy rentiers of Paris to the shipping clerks of Marseilles, as much as
a regimented social position. In contrast to members of the rural peasantry,
(barely French, according to Eugen Weber)
7
the inner city proletariat, or
the nobility (whom they attempted to mimic in some regard), the bourgeois
were also urban and explicitly French in their moeurs.
8
This fact, coupled
with their high rate ofliteracy, and ever-increasing purchasing power, makes
a study of their views on military service both methodologically rich and
historically relevant.
9
That the Catholic bourgeoisie should have supported
military service-originating in 1872 and expanded again in 1889- speaks
not only to their support of France, but also to the ability of the French
6These terms, while seemingly redundant, are important. Conscription refers to
impressments in the ranks for general service. Mandatory service refers to the process-
sti ll in use today- by which French students of the 'grandes ecolcs' arc forced to
serve the state. For those in elite engineering schools, such as Ponts et Chausses, or
Polytechnique, the mandatory service is almost always within the military.
7 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (San Francisco: Stanford university press, 1976), 6.
8 Weber discusses this at length, contrasting rural 'peasants' who lived in Ia France prlifonde,
with bourgeois citizens who, whatever their actual location, were always assumed to live
in faraway towns that were uenvied and distrusted" as agents of the nationalizing force that
was the french republic. (Ibid., II)
9 Masterman's pithy phrase: uthe rich despise the working people; the middle classes fear
them," is all important in this context. Peter Gay, Pleasure U'ars (New York: Norton, 1998),
14.
46 -THE FuruttE OF HISTORY
regime to absorb vvithin it previously hostile elements.
The essay begins with a discussion on the historiography and the
context of the French army and conscription under the Third Republic. Using
three newspapers- /e Temps, le Fiaaro, and /' Univers- as well as secondary
sources, the body of this essay shows that the Catholic bourgeoisie supported
military service as a means of maintaining social order, guaranteeing the
role of Catholicism within the state, and increasing t he avenues to social
acceptance within society. Despite fears over increased radicalization of the
military- manifested in particul ar through the rise of General Boulanger
and increasingly universalistic and anti-Catholic legislation- bourgeois
Catholics were mostly in favor of military ser vice as a means of guaranteeing
a social contract between the army, the church, and the republic. The essay
concludes with a summary of the key points, and a bri ef discussion on the
consequences of the republic, church, and army compact.
The historiography of this subject relates to the larger debate as
to whether or not t he army under the Third Republic was loyal to the new
republican order, or \>vas a 'strong centre of reaction.' Such conceptions,
while broad and sweeping, nonetheless encapsulate the views of major
historical schools such as the Marxists and radical republicans on one hand,
and traditionalists in the other. The former is encapsulated by Arno Mayer's
Marxist critique. Arguing that an aristocratic army drew enlisted men from
"savage backwaters,"
10
in order to smash them against both the industrial
proletar iat and the central powers,
11
Mayer concludes by stating his view
that the French army was in fact a bastion of reaction instead a melting pot
of republican solidarity. In his framework- reflected by sources at the time,
such as the communard eaali te the purpose of the army was to 'transform
victims of capital into capital's defenders,
112
and to provide refuge for
reactionary elements that refused to adapt to the republic.
13
On the other
hand, t raditionalist and revisionist historians- both English and French- are
IOArno Mayer, The Persisrenu '![the Old Reaime (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 308.
!!Ibid.
12 Francie Magnard, Quoting 'egalite' in Le Fiaaro, 5 March 1878. series 3 64.
13That these elements should have reflected the views of the reactionary republic which
they lived under (notably under MacMahon) is sometl1ing which may have escaped
Mayer 's thesis. See Giradet, La Socwe JI,11Jztaire dans Ia France Comemporaine (Paris: Pion
1953), 229.
THE f UTURE OF H ISTORY- 47
considerably kinder to military's role within republican society. Noting,
that the was in fact, loyal to the French republic, even
Jf mistrusted it, 11 Horne argues that the army exerted
a mmrmal role wuhm the early political life of the Th
1
rd R bl
. . . cpu rc, even as
tt werghed heavrly upon French politics. Other 'republican' historians such
as Girardet, Chanet, or Weber, rs toe the republican line in arguing that
the. ar my molded the french peoples into a w1ifled and republican French
nat10n.
the context of France's explicitly republican conception
of conscn ptron provides the key to understanding military ser vice under
Third as the Army's popular perception as a ' strong
pomt of react10n oc.caswnally manifested itself (as in the Dreyfus affair),
at the expense of the hberal order, generally speaking this perception is not
Rather, the army's role derived from the presence of both external and
mte rn al foes. By 1872 France had experienced both of these. Signiflcantl
th fj .1. y,
e lrst mt Jtary action of the French republic was not the expulsion of
Prussian. (later German) troops from her territory. Rather it was t he
suppre.ssron of the May Commune in I 871, a fact not lost to either radical
republrcans, who nearly saw their republic swept away in an orgy of Parisian
excess, or to conser vatives. As a result of this Horne argues th
, , e army was
by deputies ' as ark of the covenant,' its legitimacy untouched
either by its defeat at the hands of the Prussians, or its ruthless suppression
of the commune.
17
That is not to say that debate did not exist over the form the
army .should tak.e. Even within the monarchist right, opinion was split as
late as 1872: Thrers wanted a professional army, IS whereas his monarchist
demanded a mass citizen 's army capable of addressing issues
?f soc1al degeneracy and revanche.
19
Only the skilful poli ticking of de Broglie
14Aiistair Horne, The French Army and Politics 1870- 1970 (London: MacmiiJan 198
4
) 3
15 See Jean-Franr;:ois Chanet Jl. /' ' 11 R' ' ' .
18 ' ers nou'e e: epublrque et riforme militaire
71- 1879 (Rennes: Presses univcrsitaircs de Rennes 2006) " ' b n .
. , , vvc er, reasams mto
Frenchmen; ?rardet, La Societe Militairc dans Ia France Contcmporainc.
16 Mayer, 1'he Persistence '![the Old Reaune, 308.
17 Horne, The French llrmy and Polrtics 1870- 1970 15.
18 Alan. Grubb, The Politrcs '![Pessimism (Newark: of Delaware Press 1996) 75
19 Dav1d Ralston, Ani!Y onJ The Jtepublic (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), 3S. ' ' .
r
48 -THE FmuHE Or HISTORY
saved the country from deadlock, and delivered France the army she would
keep until 1997: a short-term conscript force with a strong professional
cadre. Reflecting popular fears over the reliability of the army, I.:Univers
would write in 1872 "il me semble que Ia commission eut agi en adoptant
plus de sagesse en adoptant Ia loi du recruitement prussien (I think the
commission had acted by adopting more wisdom in adopting the law of
Prussian recruitmentJ."
20
The new conscription system- which mandated
five year-service for I 00,000 men, one-year service for another 40,000 and
no service at all for 60,000- played into fears of republican mob rule.
21
The key, therefore, towards convincing bourgeois Catholics as t o the
justification for losing a son for potentially five years, was the initial solidarity
between republican, Catholic, and soldier in maintaining a hierarchal social
order. Politically, French Catholics took heart from the conservative Due
d' Audiffrey-Pasquier's paean to the army's judgment. In allowing the
'moderate' revolution of 1848 to continue, while crushing the excesses
of the 1871 Commune, the army, he maintained, was a 'school of social
discipline.'
22
Indeed, the continual fear expressed by the right-wing press
during both the 1872 and 1888 debates on conscription was one of social
order: "On aura que les gardes nationales! [We wiJI have National Guards!J"
wrote the Fiaaro on 18 July 1889, even as it decried the impressments of
seminarians, " ... eJies sont impuissantes a proteger la France [ ... they (the
National Guards) are powerl ess to protect France) ."
23
While some ascribe
this fear of the masses to the fundamental tension existing between a socially
conservative republic, and the perception of a Jacobin mass ready to seize
power at a moment's notice, l + it is perhaps more important to note the
traumatic effect of the Commune and the very real threat of labour activism
during this time. So poisonous was the legacy of the Commune that twenty
20The Prussian model in this case was one in which conscripts served 5 years under
the colours, 3 in the reserves, and 4 in the Iandwehr. This guaranteed a highly trained
and politically loyal reserve force, as well as a large contingent of well-trained active
conscripts. L' univers 28 July 1872.
21 George Plynn, Conscription and democracT The Drc!ft In France, Great Bricain and the United
Swte5 (Westport: Greenwood, 2002), 18.
22 Girardet, La Societe Militairc dans Ia France Contemporaine, 163.
23 Le Ftsaro, 18 July 1889.
24 James Lehning, To Be a Cuiun, The Political Culture if the Early French Third Republic
(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2001), 12.
Tile FUTURE OF HISTORY - 49
years later, le Fiaaro could still tar radical conscription plans with the
communard brush. It feU to the church, acting in conjunction with the army
itself, to popularize military service among bourgeois Catholics.
Indeed church leaders reaffirmed the historic linkages between
the army and the republic, quelling fears of Jacobinism within the ranks.
A balm to uneasy bourgeois, the notion of a popular army had influential
Catholic backers dating from during the Franco-Prussian war. The bishops
of Nancy and Angers sent trainee priests to Gambetta's armies with the
expectation that they would 'fall as martyrs for the motherland,' along with
Breton volunteers fighting under the flag of the Sacred Heart.
25
Likewise,
the contemporaneous revival of popular cults, such as that of that of the
'warr ior saint,' St. Martin ofTours, whose shrine developed into a popular
pi lgrimage spot for young Catholics, deepened the linkages between the
army and the church.
26
So did the continuation of war chaplaincies by the
Archbishop of Paris, for example.
27
Likewise, the support of Pius IX, who,
in 1873, singled out France within his blessing for 'those struggling for God,
religion and country as part of Catholic civilization,' did much to soothe
tensions between the Catholic bourgeoisie and its republican government.
2
8
So explicit was the link between the upper church echelons and the army
that no less a figure than the Archbishop of Algiers would spell out that "les
homes de guerre soot ceux qui dieux assoscie ... le plus avec son action dans
le monde [men of war are those who God addresses ... the most with His
actions in the world)."
29
The role of the church therefore, in linking popular
Catholicism to the army, and by extension, into the republican civil state,
quelled initial bourgeois fears over the role of a Jacobin army. In turn, this
lent credence to the notion that the army would be able to provide a method
of restoring 'traditional' values to France.
25 BcrtrandTaithe, Citizenship and Wars (London: Routledge, 2001 ), I 01.
26 Brian Brennan, "The revival of the cult of St. Martin ofTours in the Third Republic," in
Church HiscatyVol. 66, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), 491.
2Tlaithc, op. cit., 98.
28 Pius would single France for praise as a result of German expulsion of the Jesuit order
in 1873. Allan Mitchell, V1ctors and Vanquished, (New York: Scholarly Book Services, 2002),
160.
29 Charles Lavigerie, L'armee et Ia mission de Ia france en cifnque. Discours dans Ia cachedrale
d'alner, 25 Avril, 1875 (Alger: Librairie Jourdan, 1875), 6.
50 - THE FLITURE I iiSTORY
Likewise, the burden of mandatory military service was eased by
the increased social status it offered. No longer the home for ne' er-do-wclls
and the poor, military service increasingly offered social returns to those
who volunteered. While Maxime Weygand could truthfully write in 1885
that the army was still perfect for ' nobles without a fortune,' the truth of
the matter is that the military was becoming increasingly meritocrati c and
middle class.
10
This fact is shown by the increasing number of bourgeois
students at both the Ecole Polytechnique, and the Military Academy of St-Cyr,
both of which required extensive military ser vice after graduation. Not only
did the military provide the glamour of a well-respected uniform, but also a
proper education through the establishment of military schools such as the
Ecole Superiere de Guerre ( 1876), and the establishment of CO [Non-
commissioned officers] conversion schools.
31
The growth of merit-based
soldiering, replete with prepas and arandes ecoles, enhanced the army's prestige
amongst the bourgeois.
32
Reflecting this, StCyr would see its percentage of
cadets with a particule decline by I 0% from 1868 to 1883, even as class sizes
rose from 284 to 454.
33
Mirroring the leveling of social status, it seems
that entering students were increasingly religious: from 1871 to 1880 near
1 ,800 students entered StCyr from religious schools, compared to only 700
in the period from 184 7 to 1871.
34
Even as the army became more popular
among the bourgeois, therefore, it retained, if not expanded, its reputation
for Catholicism.
onetheless, Catholic support for conscription waned as
conscription itself came to be seen as a means of attacking the church.
Whereas it was possible for Louis Veuillot, editor of the ultramontane
l'univers, to write "let us be Catholic and we will be republican," in "1873,
such a statement seemed impossible by the 1880s.
35
Taking their cue from
Gambetta's famous quotation ' le clericalisme? Voila I' ennemi, [Clericali sm?
30 Horne, The French t1rmy and Politics 1870-1970, 16.
31 Jean-Denis Bredin, L'Affaire (Paris: Fayard/julliard, 1994), 26; cited in DAvid Rimoch,
"The AlTair of the tate," Senior Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2008.
32 Girardet, La Societ.e Milicarie dans Ia France Contemporaine, 188.
33 The parLJcule refers to t11e presence of a nobiliary particle (de, des, etc) typically
associated with aristocratic families. Ibid., 186.
34 lbid.
35 BertrandTaithe, Citizensh1p andJ.tars, (London: Routledge, 2001), 99.
THE FUTURE OF H ISTORY - 51
There's the enemy!]' anti-clericals sought to purge the French state from its
. t 'th th l "36
assocra rons WJ e c ergy. Corresponding Catholic enthusiasm for the
republic and its institution waned. For example, the Catholic reaction to the
passing of the 1889 law on expanded conscription, which forced seminarians
go take up the colours, was vehement: Cardinal Ri chard of Paris, vvriting in
I'Univers, stated that the law was "une mesure legislative prise directement
contrcs les religieux, des seminaries [a legislati ve measure taken directly
against the religious, the seminarians]."
37
Le Fiaaro wrote that the 1889 law
constituted ' Ia guerre contre les seminaristes [the war against seminarians],'
and went out to describe its wholehearted opposition to the measure. 38 Le
Fiaaro, in particular, increasingly discussed the burden of conscripti on upon
the 'hardworking intelligent and learned' young Frenchmen, who would
suffer a delay of two years in their 'social growth.'
39
In an article published
in 1882, Le Fioaro described Gambetta's attempt to extend conscription
as: "linking the two ends of the civil-military noose around throats of
[Frenchmen] everywhere.'-. Conscription, and military service it seemed,
was only popular as long as it reinforced the compact between bourgeois
Catholics and the republic.
Yet, suppor t of the Catholic middle classes for conscription
survived in part because the middle classes conceived that a republic was
best able to guarantee its rights. This is arguably reflected in the failure of
the Catholic French middle class to support General Boulanger's attempt
at installing himself as a de-facto Napoleon IV While bourgeois Catholics
should have supported Boulanger- his hardline on worker's strikes, as
well as his apparent support for officers of non-noble origins, both lent
themselves to bourgeois support, as did his middle-class origins- they
generally did not.
41
Indeed, Le Fiaaro, recounting Boulanger's duel with
36' Girardct, La Soc1ete Militaire dans Ia France Contemporaine, 186.
37 Letter 26 June to Pres of Republic, published in L'umvers Thursday 18 j uly 1889.
38 Le Fiaaro 18 July 1889.
39 Anonymous, "Monsieur Gambetta, lcgislateur militaire,"Le Fiaaro, 9 April 1882.
40 Ibid.
41 As war minister, Boulanger actively supported means of social leveling that included
reforming St Cyr, the allowing of NCO's to wear beards, and the casing of social
between the ranks. The fact that he was born to a lawyer, and thus could lay claim
to bcmg part of the bourgeoisie, could not have hurt his chances either. eager, 6.
52 -THE FuTURE OF HISTORY
republican radical Charles Fouquet (Boulanger would lose badly), went so
far as to compliment Fouquet for his extraordinary courage and on
Boulanger attempting to cheat in the duel- a fact by
more liberal le Temps.42 J.:Univers, for its part, satisfied ttself wtth snarkHy
reporting Boulanger 's defeat at the hands of Floquet: "voila le General
Boulanger dcmisionnairc [General Boulanger has

The shared view of these two right-wing papers--one decidedly
Catholic,4 the other merely patriotic- about Boulanger 's defeat does
than merely show Boulanger 's lack of popularity Cathohc
bourgeoisie. They also show the extent to which its line (and by
extent, its reader ship) encouraged its readers to act wtthm the framework
of the French republic. Democracy, not authoritarianism, would be the
path chosen by the French Catholic middle classes, a fact by that
of the 6 mill ion francs raised by Boulanger in 1889, S 112 mtlhon came
from aristocratic sources.
45
In the elections of 1889, Boulanger's poorest
showings would be in Paris's stalwartly bourgeois 3rd and 1Oth
even as he swept working class neighborhoods!
6
Support for the .army 1t
seems, only went as far as support for the republic inasmuch as. 1t could
guarantee the rights of the Catholic bourgeoisie and keep the Jacobm masses
out of practical politics. When these rights were violat ed as in .the case of
Boulanger, the bourgeois- either through the press, campatgn.
or in the polls- turned on the offending institution and "':ere Wlllmg to
compromise with erstwhile hostile elements. Military was a part
of this compact that the bourgeoisie was willing to accept 1f tt meant the
survival of Catholicism within the republic.
Importantly, the Republic was able to frame the
argument in a manner that guaranteed nominal Catholic support for
goals even as the church itself resist ed it. Thus was the French bourgeoiS
42 Charles Chincholle, Le Duel de Hier, in Le Figaro, 14 July 1888. Compare with
Lc Duel Boulanger-Floquet, Le Temps, 14 July 1888.
43 Pierrc Vcuillot. "[nouvelles de] France," L'Unlvers, 14 July 1888.
44 Taithc, Citizenship and Wars, 99. .
45 Reinforcing once again the social and often political divisions amongst catholic
bourgeois and some of the nobility, the Comte de Paris would reject Boulanger. Seager
202.
46lbid.
THE FUTURE OF H ISTORY- 53
able to transcend clerical complaints and accept such changes as the price
for Catholicism's social acceptance as the primus inter pares of French state
religions. For example, while Cardinal Guibert called the 1889 Act the
forbearer of the "extinction of Catholicism in France,'"'
7
reactions on the
part of the French public and lay orders were muted. Indeed, despite official
clerical chagrin, the reaction shown by the head of the Sulpician order, Henri-
Joseph Icard, was to tell his congregations to: "become model soldiers, and
do not complain.'
148
In a show of muted solidarity with the clergy, L'Univers,
saw fit to reprint on its front page the entirety of the Archbishop of Paris's
letter to the French President- with further commentary conspicuous by
its

Read either way, the symbolic fusion of the warrior-priest,
begun in l 870 with the papal Zouaves camping at the Shrine ofTours, had
now become complete. The illustrated supplement of I'Univers, publ ished
two days later, did not show monks led off to barracks in chains by frothing
Jacobins. Rather, its opening piece was simply a parade of St Cyriens- most
of them likely bourgeois and Catholic-attired in their smartest dress blues,
on parade for the 14 July celebrations.
50
In conclusion, the experience of the French Catholic middle classes,
the so-called Catholic bourgeoisie, offers us a glimpse into the world of both
nationalism and religious sentiment. Occurring at a time of tremendous
religious and national upheaval, the evolution of this class to view its
obligations and rights within the framework of a national compact among
the Army, The Church, and the Republic, marks an important turn in the
acceptance of the French state. To the many bourgeois however, the choice
between serving an amoral republic or rejecting service and engendering
the survival of their faith in France must have seemed only too much like an
onerous cross. Nonetheless, their support for the politically vital institution
of conscription, as well as its rejection of anti-democratic forces in the form
47 Cardinal Cuibert, l.erter to rhe Senate, 6 June 188 I, published in (Annales Catholiques
1881/03/26), 694.
48 Joan Coffey, "For Cod and France The Military Law 1889 and the Soldiers of Sainte-
The Catholic Hworical Revien 88.4 (2002) 689.
49 Jostling with an ad for "Ia grammaire de Ia bourse" and "Ia vie ami rable du saint
mcdint, ' the piece is a trenchant reminder of the power of French Catholicism as much as
it is a piece in the pitfalls of French grammar. l.univers 11/usrre, 20 July 1889.
50 Ibid.
54 - T1 1E FuTUitE OF 1-l!STORY
of Boulanger, was vital for ensuring success of the republic in the early stages
of the Third Republic. Bourgeois fears of the Jacob in underclass, as well a::.
the ca.tholic tendency to explicitly frame French nationalism in militar) .
social and religious terms, would come to have disastrous repercussions in
the era to come. When the choice would later come between supporting
a defunct and anti-Catholic republic, and an explicitly pro-Catholk
authoritarian figure, the choice would not be nearly as stark as it was in thl
case of Boulanger. ,,
5 t Marc Baruch, "Charisma and Hybrid Legitimacy in Petain's Etat Francais," in
7otalitarlan Movements and Political Relloions 7,2, London 2006. 220
AHUCAN-AMERI CAN R ESPONSI::S TO THE
ITALO- ETHIOPIAN CRISIS, 1945
Safia Aidid
56 - THE FuTURE OF HISTORY
Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her
hands unto God.
Ethiopia's free
Be like me
All of Africa,
Arise and be free
All you black peoples
Be free! Be free!
- Psalms 68:31
- Langston Hughes (Opportunicy, 1935)
The nomenclature 'Ethiopia' has long figured in the Afri can
American collective consciousness, evoking Biblical imagery of an ancient
African civilization and a moder n black empire untouched by the stain of
European colonial rule enforced on the rest of continent.
1
Emperor Menelil<
11 's victory over Italian forces at Adwa in 1896 further solidified Ethiopia's
appeal as a symbol of black resistance and liberation, and seemed to confirm
Old Testament readings which emphasized God's redemption of Africa and
oppressed African peoples worldwide.
2
When Mussolini's Italy invaded
Ethiopia in October of 1935, the historical, cultural, political and ideological
meanings of Ethiopia already embedded in the African American imaginary
converged to ignite an emotional response which viewed the invasion as an
attack on blacks worldwide.
1
This paper will explore these sociocultural and
historical linkages between Ethiopia and the African diaspora in the United
States, and examine how these linkages came to produce reactions of racial
agitation and political mobilization as the distant Italo-Ethiopian Crisis
unfolded on Ameri can streets.
In August 1935, delegates of the umbrella organization the Negro
Fraternal Counci l of Churches met at St. Paul African Methodist Episcopal
1 Joseph E. Harris, African-American Reactions co War in Ethiopia, /936-1941, (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1994) 19.
2 Paulos Milkias, The Boule tif Adwo, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006) 193.
3 Cedric Robinson, "The African Oiaspora and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," Race &..Closs
XXVII (1985) 54.
Till! FuTURE OF HISTORY 57
Church i n Ohio for their annual convention to "ponder solutions to American
blacks' dire racial and economic plight."
4
In the opening ser mon, Bishop
James A. Bray described the unfolding situation in East Africa in apocalyptic
terms, warning that fascist Italy's imperial agenda against a free black empire
would inevitably result in the decline ofWestern civilization and the rise
of "the sleeping lion of potential unified consciousness of related groups,
representing more than one billion five hundred million colored people"
against white domination.
5
The Council unanimously endorsed his position,
and passed a series of resolutions condemning Italian aggression against
Ethiopia and the implications of such ambitions for race relations worldwide.
6
One such resolution read: "While by sympathy, principle, and ideals we arc
Americans to the core, wecannotbedeaftothecrythatcomcs from a menaced
nation in the land of our fathers' fathers.'
17
The sentiment implicit in the
Negro Fraternal Council of Churches' interpretation of the emerging Italo-
Ethiopian Crisis is one embedded in African American readings of Christian
scripture which emphasize black Uberation and redemption.
8
Such readings
often centre on Biblical references to Ethiopia which were understood to
refer to the Afri can continent as a whole, establishing a spiritual link and
religious affirmation of an ancestral homeland where black civilization
thrived.
9
Inspired by Psalms 68:31 which prophesied the rise of Ethiopia,
breakaway black churches often named themselves Ethiopian or Abyssinian,
thus adopting symbols of black freedom, power, and independence.
10
The
largest of these independent African American churches was the Abyssinian
Baptist Church, founded in New York in 1800.
11
The imagery and symbolism
of Ethiopia, Biblical in origin and popularized by the black Church, was
central to black liberation discourse and vernacular in the 19th century.
12
4 William R. Scott, The Sons if Sheba's Race, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993)
3.
'i Ibid, 3.
6 1bid:
7 Mary Sawyer, "The Fraternal Council of Negro Churches," American Society if Church
History 59 ( 1990) 57.
8 Harris, African-American Reactions 19.
9 Fikru Negash Gebrekidan, Bond Without Blood, (Trenton: Africa World Press Inc, 2005)
37.
10 Paulos Milkias, The Battle if Adwo, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006), 192.
II Ibid, 192.
12 Cebrckidan, Bond Without Blood, 37.
58 -Tm FuTURE or HISTORY
Ethiopianist themes were similarly used outside of the Church,
adopted as emancipator y rhetori c by abolitionists and early
leaders in Ameri ca.
11
For instance, abolitionist Frederick Douglass closes his
narrative with the following:
r ... 1 notwithstanding the blood-written history of Africa, and
her children, from whom we have descended , or the clouds and
darkness now overshadowing them - progress is yet possible, and
bright skies shall yet shine upon their pathway; and that "Ethiopia
shall yet reach forth her hand unto God."
14
While Douglass and others invoked the image of Ethiopia for racial uplift
at home, other African Americans saw migration "back" to Africa as a
practical realization of the transoceanic bond which linked the continent
to the diaspora spiritually, consciously and ancestrally through the symbol
of Ethiopia. s During the first half of the 19th century, thousands of African
th
C I . . S . t
16
Americans settled in West Africa via c Amencan o omzation oc1e y.
However, it was not until the United Negro Improvement Association was
founded in \ 917 by Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey that the back-to-Africa
vision gained widespread interest among African Americans.
17
While
had limited success in this venture, Gar vey did much to reshape percept1ons
of Africa and generate interest in the continent among diasporic blacks.
18
His
Declaration cf the Riohts cf the Neoro Peoples cf the World declared the "anthem of
the Negro race" to be ' Ethiopia, Thou Land of Our Father s.'
19
Though Ethiopianist symbols and readings of Christianity initially
infor med and shaped an African American consciousness of Africa and
13 !bid, 37.
14 Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and A1y Freedom, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003)
298.
15 S. K.B Asanle, "The Afro-American and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis, ! 934-1936," Race&..
Class XV ( 1973) 167.
16 Gebrekidan, BondWithouc Blood, 38.
17 Ibid, 38.
18 Ibid, 38.
!9 Barry Chevannes, Rasuifari: 1\oots and Idcolow . (Syracuse: Sytacuse University Press,
1994) 39.
fostered a nomenclatural spirit ual attachment, Ethiopia's significance was
not limited to the religious sphere. In addition to the embedded religious
meanings, Ethiopia's status as a sovereign black state was shared only with
Liberia and Haiti, two states whose full sovereignty was compromised by
external economic inte rests.
20
When a newly unified Italian Republic found
itself excluded from the Berlin Conference of 1884 and attempted to
colonize the only African territory left untouched by the European power s,
they were bitterly defeated by t he superior Ethiopian forces of Emperor
Menelik II in the Battle of Adwa in 1896.
21
The victory further solidified
Ethiopia's image among African Americans as the site ofblack independence
and freedom, marking a transition from 'Ethiopia' as a broad designation
for the continent to 'Ethiopia' as the specific geopolitical space it remains
today, and a matching shift as this contemporary space carne to encase
the historical and sociocultural meanings African Ameri cans held for the
continent as a wholeY To many, Ethiopia's success over European invaders,
and its continued political independence in a period of colonial subjugation
over the ,continent was simply proof of the truth of God's covenant with the
black race.
23
The pan-Africanist expressions of Marcus Garvey, W. E.B. Du
Bois and others in the early 20th century capitalized on and developed
already existing pan-Africanist currents inherent to Ethiopianism and
African American identity.
24
Indeed, the pan-Africanist thematic, though
popularized through Gar veyism, has always been a fundamental identity
marker among the African diasporic communities of what Paul Gilroy calls
the ' Black Atlanticc, a cultural formation and transatlantic historical and
cultural consciousness which transcends nation-state boundaries and is thus
"relevant to understanding political organizing and cultural criticism."
25
The symbolic and cultural leverage of Ethiopia, due in large part to the
black Church's scriptural emphasis on African references and redemption,
20 Asafa Jalata, "Being in and out of Africa," Journal cif Black Studies 40. 2 (2009) 192.
21 Cedric Robinson, "The African Diaspora and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," Race &_Class
XXV!I (1 985) 55.
22 Milkias, The Battle c?J"Adwa, 195.
23 Scou, The Sons cifSheba's Race, 7.
24 Gebrek.idan, Bond Without Blood, 39.
25 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, (Cambridge: Har vard Univer sity Press, 1993), 19.
60 TilL FUTURE OF IIISTORY
fosters a clear link between Africa and African Americans that predates later
articulations of pan-Africanism andmBiack Nationalism.
26
However, the
pan-Africanism which emerged after the Pan-African Congresses of the
191 Os and 1920s strengthened and politicized linkages between Africa and
its diaspora, as educated blacks from botl1 sides of the Atlantic converged to
discuss issues of common concern.
27
It was within this context of an emerging, internationalized
articulati on of pan-Africanist consciousness, shaped by a long-standing
tradition rooted in Biblical writings of Ethiopia as a symbolic figure of black
freedom and its reality as an independent state in colonized Africa, that the
ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis of 1935 unfolded, igniting black protest worldwide.
"Mass meetings and attempts to recr uit volw1teers have taken place in
Harlem," wrote WE. B. DuBois, "and in the West Indies and West Africa,
despite the efforts of both France and England, there is widespread and
increasing interest."
1
HTo African Americans, Fascist Italy's invasion was more
than a mer e violation of international law: the move ha, declar ed war against
the black world by invading "the sole r emnant of black greatness."
29
"Ethiopia
is our country," wrote one woman from New Mexico in the Chicano Difender,
"and as long as there is blood in our veins we should love and respect it as
such."
30
Italy had thus not simply attacked Ethiopia, but everything Ethiopia
represented and symbolized to the African diaspora in the United States,
which in turn generated the mass protest and mobilization by the African
Ameri can community to come to Ethiopia's defense.
The African American response to the outbreak of the crisis in 1935
was largely spontaneous, but swift and immediate nonetheless.
31
Much of
the initial organizing took place in Harlem.
32
An umbrella organization
representing over 20 groups and a membership of over I 5,000 African
Amer icans was founded in response, known as the Provisional Committee
26 Gebrekidan, Bond Without Blood, 46.
27 Harris, African-American Reawons, 19.
28 con, TheSonsi?[Sheba'sRace,6.
29 Asantc, "The Afro-American and tl1e Italo-Ethiopian Crisis" 168.
30 Robinson, "The African Diaspora and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 68.
31 Ibid, 68.
32 Robinson, "The African Diaspora and the ltalo Ethiopian Crisis," 61.
T HE fUTURE OF HISTORY 61
for the Defense of Ethiopia.
33
By July of 1935, the Committee for Ethiopia
was founded, and in September, a group of thirty black doctors, dentists,
pharmacists and nurses formed the Medical Committee for the Defense
of Ethiopia to ship over two tons of medical supplies to Ethiopia.
34
Over
20,000 people with Ethiopian flags \.vere reported to have demonst rated
against Italian aggression in Harlem the following August.
15
Additional mass
demonstrations were r eported in Chicago, New York, Miami, Fort Worth,
Washington and Mobile.
36
By December, The United Aiel for Ethiopag
collect ed funds from black Church congregations in New Yor k and Chicago
for the Ethiopian war efforr.
37
With localized gr assroots efforts underway, the International
Council of Friends of Ethiopia was the first to attempt to mobilize pro-
Ethiopian support among African Ameri cans on a national scale.
38
Founded
by Dr. Willis Huggins, a historian and friend of the Ethiopian royal fami ly,
the group traveled to Geneva in August 1935 to appeal to the League
of Nations to intervene in this crisis between two member states and
,
r eportedly gamerco positive reception.
39
A short-li ved interdenominational
and interracial organization known as the American Committee on the
Ethiopian Crisis was founded later that month to "aid Ethiopia by peaceful
means, to preserve its political and territorial sovereignty, and in the event
of war, send medical and non-military aid to the invaded country.'>40 Its
successor, American Aid for Ethiopia, sent almost a tonne in medical and
surgical suppl ies, as well as an ambulance, to the Ethiopian Red Cross before
merging with the Friends for Ethiopia organization.
41
Not surprisingly, African Amer ican Churches also took interest in
the events unfolding in East Africa and provided an additional avenue for
33 Asante, "The Afro-American and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," 171.
34 Robinson, ''The African Diaspora and the lta1o-Ethiopian Crisis," 6 1.
35 A sante, "The Afro-American and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 171.
36 Robinson, "The African Diaspora and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 62.
37 1bid, 62.
38 A sante, "The Afro-American and the ltalo-Ecl1iopian Crisis, " 172.
39 lbid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
62 -THE FuruHE ~ HJSTOJ\Y
community mobilization!
2
The National Baptist Convention, representing
over three million African American followers, sent a telegram from
their September 1935 meeting to U.S. Secretary of State Cor dell Hull,
demanding that "he insist upon the rights of all nations to self-determination
and self-development without war-like aggression from other nations.',.
3
As exemplified in Bishop Bray's sermon to the Fr aternal Council of Negro
Churches regarding the dangers of Italy's imper ialist agenda in Ethiopia,
the religious organizing most explicitly articulated the racial agitation
under pinning African American protest of the invasion, warning against its
negative consequences for race relations.
Other organizations and individuals took a more militant stance
against the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, advocating ar med defense of Ethiopia and
calling for and often recruiting African Amer icans to enlist for ser vice.
44
The most active of such organizations was the Pan African Reconstruction
Association (PARA), which organized mass drives for recruitment and
signed up a reported 30,000 members in 22 American cities.
45
"I don't see
why Ethiopia should just be another nation of slaves for the white man,"
remarked one youth at a PARA drive in Harlem, "and I'll fight for Ethiopia
and give my life and my blood.'"'
6
Another organization, the Black Legion,
boastef 3,000 members and created a training camp in up-state NewYork.
47
The enthusiasm and high turnout for enlistment eventually reached such
levels that an editorial by the black newspaper the Chicano Difender, addressed
the phenomenon directly:
Don't do it, young men and women. There is too much for you
to do at home! You in Dallas, Tcx., who are enlisting to fight for
Ethiopian independence ... do you think you have independence
at home? You in Miami, Fla., who in fiery words declare that
Ethiopia must be kept free ... do you think you are free? You,
in New York and in Chicago, who have worked yourselves
4 2 Scott, The Sons I?J' Sheba's Race, 4.
43 Asante, "The Afro-American and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 173.
44 Robinson, "The African Oiaspora and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," 68.
45 Asante, "The Afro- American and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 174.
46 Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race, 137.
4 7 Asante, "The Afro-American and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis" 74.
THE FuruHE OF HISTORY - 63
~ n t o a frenzy over the plight of Haile Selassie and his empire
tn Northern Africa ... do you suppose your conditions are any
better than those of the warriors of Ethiopia? If you think these
things, you think without reason.
Pressured by the U.S. State Department which remained suspicious of the
pro-Ethiopian organizing activities undervvay, discouraged from visiting the
country, as well as legally unable to fight for a foreign military against a
"fr iends of the United States" under U.S. law, the recruitment drives were
more romantic than practical in efTect.
48
However, several African American
volunteers did make it to Ethiopia, among them John C. Robinson known
h " '
as t e Brown Condor of Ethiopia, and Hubert Fauntl eroy Julian, known as
the "Black Eagle of Harl em," two aviators whose activities in Ethiopia were
closely foll owed back home.
49
African American newspapers, frustrated
with mainstream media's cover age of the war, took a pro-Ethiopian stance
and carried news daily
Ethiopia is on the spot. Three of the world's principal robber
nati ons have turned thumbs down on her. The League of Bandits
- misnamed the League of Nations - will do nothing to save her
just in the same way as it did not prevent the Japanese from
appropriating Chjnese real estate.
50
Publications like the Chicano Difender, the Pictsburnh Courier, the Amsterdam
News and the Baltimore Afro-American published letter s of anger and frustr ation
from African Americans around the country.
51
The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)'s publication about the Crisis
add ressed it ae "the rape of Ethiopia is the rape of the Negro race, and the
newly established Voice if Ethiopia publication carried slogans such as "No
a ~ Shall Shed His Blood For Europe Unt il Ethiopia Is Free.''
52
T he African American protests against Italy's 1935 invasion of
48 Harris, African-American Reactions, 158.
49 Robinson, "The African Oiaspora and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," 62.
50 Asante, "The Afro-American and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," 175.
5 1 Robinson, "The African Diaspora and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis," 68
52 Milkias, The Boule oJAdwa, 208.
64 - THF FUTURE OF HISTORY
Ethiopia, like similar protests among blacks in the Caribbean and other parts
of Africa, accomplished little to help Ethiopia, which remained under Italian
occupation until 1941 .
53
For African Americans, U.S. law limited their
ability t o directly participate in the struggle, and the pressures of the Great
Depression in the 1930s and a largely impoverished community further
limited their abilit)' t o fundraise and mobilize resources as effectively as
Italian-American communities.
54
Regardless, the African American response
to the distant Italo-Ethiopian Crisis is a remarkable instance of a pan-African
consciousness polit icized and mobilized in the United States, generated by
a historical and sociocultural symbolism which equated Ethiopia, confluent
with the African continent itself, with a significant sense of African American
racial identity, dignity and self-determination.
53 Asante, "The Arro-American and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis,"\ 79.
54 Gcbrekidan, BondWirhout Blood, 56.
T HE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM
'
ERH!NG IN VALUES AND jUDGEMENT
Ben Ainsworth
66 -TilE FUTURE OF HISTOHY
In March 1965 Lyndon Baines Johnson deployed the Third Marine
Regiment to defend the Da Nang Airstrip, signalling the first of many
commitments of combat troops to Vietnam, and the escalation of a struggle
whose ultimate failure is legend. One school of thought contends that the
war in Vietnam was lost because the United States military, paralysed by
liberal idealists holding seats in Congress or protesting at universities, was
denied the ability to operate fully and thereby defeat its communist enemy.
Proponents of this position argue that if America had been allowed to utilize
the full might of its armed forces with the intention of fully liquidating t he
enemy, victory would have been assured.
This claim is false, I will argue, because the abortive war in Vietnam
was the natural result of failed objectives driven by a regressive and rigid
capitalist paradigm. The White House administrations involved in managing
the war in Vietnam were not merely inspired by anti-communist Cold
Warrior politics, but by a vision of social progress and modernization that
formed the intellectual framework of post-Second World War capitalism.
The economist mindset that pervaded both military and government
bureaucracies confined them to a conventional form of war-fighting
whereby tangible figures and numbers were the main-if only- indicators
of progress, in a Vietnamese nationalist struggle that was not solely restricted
to military means.
Hindered by a capitalist and technocratic perspective, the American
attempt at nation-building and counterinsurgency (COIN) in Vietnam was
unfit for the political and military circumstances of Indochina. The United
States was not forced to "fight a ' limited war"' at the demand of the home
front but rather it was strategically conf}ned to waging one. And considering
that 'total war' operations, such as Rollins Thunder did occur during the
conflict to negative effect, 'limited war' alone is not an adequate explanation
for US shortcomings in Vietnam. The truth is that American objectives in
the war were confounded by its values: ultimately, and because of these
values, its military forces were unable to comprehend the nature of the war
in which they were engaged- hence, Michael Hunt's apt description of the
United States as a "disoriented giant" in Vietnam.'
I Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendency: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global
Dominance (Chapel Hill, N.C. :The Univer sity of North Carolina Press, 2007).
THE fUTURE OF HISTORY - 67
The Nature of the War
'The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman
the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on
whrch are neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into,
somethmg that IS ahen to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and
the most comprehensive."
2
-Carl von Clausewitz
If the Second World War was a conundrum the war v tn
, m 1e am was a
conundrum wrapped in an enigma- and it continues to be. American forces
faced both conventional and unconventional enemies: the North Vietnamese
(NVA). and the Liberation Front (NLF/VC), respectively.
Ultimately, g1ven the guernlla tactics employed by both the VC and later
American forces were mostly unable to locate and
Jdenttfy their enemy and .consequently their supreme military strength did
not equate to an easy victory. The American military establishment had
been shaken by the asymmetric wars that dominated the second half of
the twentieth century. Although there were many cases of insurgent wars
before the Second World War, rampant anti-colonial sentiment weakened
and the vast proliferation of weaponry had sparked a, sharp rise
m number and strength of insurgent movements in European spheres
of mAuence. in Vietnam and elsewhere made gains through
protracted conflicts agamst conventional armies trained to fight the previous
generation of warfare, whereby the enemy was another state and both it
and the battlefield were identifiable. The French dubbed this new way of
war guerre en suiface to denote "the total absence of fronts, or columns or
familiar military forms."
3
In guerre en swjace, the struggle is
pohtlcal and the people are the objective. In Vietnam, all parties were in
competition for the favour of the local population. The Nor th Vietnamese
the insurgents and the counterinsurgents all sought to win the "he ts d,
d , I ar an
mm s (as ogan attributed to both John Adams and Sir Gerald Templer) of
the South Vietnamese.
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(New York, N.Y.: AlfredA. Knopf, 1993), p. 100.
3 Etienne de Durand "F " U d J
, ranee , tn n erstan mg Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and
Challenges (NewYork, N.Y.: Routledge, 2009), p. 18.
68 - THE FUTURE OF l liSTOI\Y
laking over the war after a decade of openly supporting the French
tnJSSion civilisatrice (the occupation and political subversion of Vietnam),
America had a steep uphill battle. The French, shifting from a colonial style of
assimilation (direct rule) to association ("trois couleurs, un drapeau, un empire'),
had violently crushed hopes of Viet namese independence and allowed the
social and governmental structures o f South Vietnam to greatly degenerate,
along with the economy. As well, South Vietnam was "rent by a multitude
of conflicting ethnic, religious and political forces.'
04
As George Herring
writes, "Americans attempted a truly formidable undertaking on a very
weak foundation."
5
The Amer ican effort was not a great feat of benevolence
but rather began as a result of" America's failure to take Clausewitz's dictum
to heart, and to recognize the kind of war that it was fighting."
6
Why Limited War?
"The circumstances of the war thus posed a dilemma that Americans never really
understood, much less resolved. Success would probably have required the
physical annihi lation of North Vi etnam, but given the limited American goals this
would have been distasteful and excessively costly. It ran a serious r isk of Soviet
and Chinese intervention and would have been counterproductjve by creating a
vacuum into which China would flow."
7
-George C. Herring
Limited war in Vietnam was not forced upon the American military
by the antiwar movement or the liberal media or Washington officials;
indeed, it was quite the opposite. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara
once remarked that "!t]he greatest contribution Vietnam is making- right
or wrong is beside the point- is that it is developing an abil ity in the
United States to fight a limited war, to go to war without the necessity of
arousing public ire."
8
A limited 'vvar, that is, a "war whose obj ective is less
4 George C. Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending War", Foreion 1!ffairs 70, no. 5
(Winter, 1991): 113.
5 Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending War," 112.
6 Nadia Schadlow, "Governance", in UndemandinB Counterinsuroency: Doctrine, Operations,
and Challenoes (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2009), 175.
?Ibid., 114.
8 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Srrareoy: The Vietnam War in Context (Novato, C.A.: Presidio
Press, 1982), p. 18; Cited in James A. Nathan, "Force, Statecraft, and American Foreign
Policy", Polity 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1995): 242.
TilE f-UTURE OF HISTORY - 69
than the uncondi tional defeat of the enemy,'>9 was not only the strategic
corollary of guerre en swface (especially considering the long and porous
borders ofVietnam) but the only way South Vietnam could remain under
American auspices without direct Chi nese or Soviet intervention, which
many in Washington- including Johnson
10
- feared would spark another
World War. "The United States would have to avoid both defeating and
being defeated by the enemy. This was the kind of war of attrition, or
limited war," according to David Fromkin, "that McNamara advocated."
11
Desp ite this, Johnson never issued a coherent strategy for Vietnam; at times
the military was all owed to '"do its thing' .. .. The Vietnam War is often
described as the poster child for this pathology."
12
At other times, Johnson
would reject General Westmoreland's (and other expert) plans for more
limited, population-centric approaches
13
-despite Westmoreland's "utter
obl i viousness to the political nature of the war.'>l4 These contradictions
make studying the provenance of the li mited war doctrine in Vietnam very
complicated . Johnson was only sure-footed about continuing the war, not
about how it was fought.
The military was at times conflicted in its COIN approach but
also pleased with the results of its metrics. Johnson's cabinet, in the main,
preferred limited war. And, as Jonathan Caverley asser ts, Johnson was most
concerned about keeping the home front content with the economic costs
of the war.
15
As a consequence of this the military limited manpower and
incr eased the use of indirect firepower (also known as "force-multipliers"
like artillery support and tactical airpower) that was employed with little
discrimination to "counterproductive effects."
16
These methods were more
9 WordNet 3.0 is copyright Princeton University, 2006. Accessed November 6, 2010.
<http: //wordnctwcb. princeton.edu/perl/ webwn?s=limitcd%20war>
I 0 Ivan Arreguin-Toft , How the Weak Win Wars: A Thecry Cotiflict (New York,
N:Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 151.
11 David From kin, "Review: Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy: What the New Docu-
mcntsShow",fweisnAJfairs74,No.l (Jan.-Feb., 1995), 168.
12 Jonathan D. Caverley, "The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and
Vietnam", International Security 34, No. 3 (Winter, 2009-1 0): 127.
13 Ibid., 131.
141bid., 127.
I S Ibid., 132-139.
16lbid., 122.
suited to ''barbarism"
17
and total war objectives than limited war itself. In
light of this, the fi scally conser vative position was inherently in conflict with
limited war objectives. Indeed, Arreguin-Toft posits t hat only in the sense
that the US sought not t o overthrow the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRY) and instigate war with China were its interests "accurately described
as 'limited."'
18
The argument that America's democrat ic standards sowed
their own destruction in Vietnam and that the "United States and the ARVN
were not brutal enough"
19
is moot considering that the North Vietnamese
population dropped by almost three percent during the war.
20
A Question ofValues
"Building learning organizations entails profound cultural shifts."
21
-Peter M. Senge
Popularized after the Second World War, modernization theory is
founded on a dichotomy between traditional and modern states. Progressive
states work toward, in Walt Rostow's words, "The Age of High Mass-
Consumption."11 Essentially, modernization t heor y upheld a capitalistic
conception of progress exclusive to secular democracies that "underpinned
America's expanding aid programs" in the Third World.
11
Cold War historian
Christopher Fisher best explains the implications of modernization theory
during the Cold War Vietnam experience:
Moderni7..ation theory offered a blueprint for development that
17 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win H0rs:A TheO')' '!f Asymmetric Corif/icL, 152.
18 Ibid., 151.
19 1bid., 162.
20 Ibid.
21 Peter M. Senge, The F!fih Discipline: The Arc and Practice '!f the Learn inn Organi1.ation (New
York, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1990), p. xv; Cited in John A. Nag!, LearninB to Eat Soup with a
Kn!fe: Counterinsurgency Lessons from MalclJa and Vietnam (Chicago, I. L. : University or Chi-
cago Press, 2005), 220.
22 Walt W. Rostow, "W. W. RostowTheorizes The Five Stages to Modernization, 1960,"
in Major Problems 1n American Foreign Relotlons, Volume II: Since I 914, seventh eel., edited by
Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston, M.A.: Wadsworth, 201 0), 330.
2 3 Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, "Culture and U.S. -Third World Relations
During the Cold War", in Major Problems in American Foreinn Relations, Volume II: Since I 914,
seventh cd., edited by Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston, M.A.: Wads-
worth, 2010), 3 16.
TtrE FuTURE oF H r ~ r O R Y - 71
was consistent with America's most treasured values, conceived
in the progressive tradition, premised upon social universals, and
aggressive in rebuffing Soviet advances. Unlike containment or
rollback, modernization refashioned the Cold War into a contest
of competing ideologies of progress. It gained limited traction
in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, but it became a
staple of U.S. Foreign policy for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, when one of modernization theory's chief architects,
Walt Rostow, became a prominent voice for Presidents in the
!960s.
24
Rostow's capitalist conception of progress (or "take-o!f model")
was vehemently anti-communist, stating that "[Communism] is a kind of
disease which can befall a transitional society."ls In light of this, nation-
buiJdjng programs under the capitalist ideal of modernization fit perfectly
with containment policy. To Washington, assisting the Thi rd World toward
the American or Rost ovian-conception of modernity was to pre-emptively
stymie the communist 'disease' and strengthen the West's position in the
Cold War. It could be argued that modernization theory, contai nment policy
and the domino theory created a universaJ jus ad bellum for America in
the Third World. The Rostovian model attempted to universalize "nation-
building lessons based on selective readings of particular cases of nation-
state formation, crisis and/ or consolidation ."
26
The model was highly
technocratic and entirely ahistorical; however, its logic appealed to ardent
Cold Warriors in the White House and otJ1er technocrats like McNamara. As
Milne asserts: "Nationalism and human agency play litt le part in Rostow's
story of nations being driven through histor y by the unquenchable drive to
industrialize."
27
The linearity of modernization theory proved to be the folly of
24 ChristopherT. Fisher, "Nation Building and the Yietnarn War: A llistoriography", Pac!flc
Hiswrlcal Review 74, No. 3 (Aug., 2005): 446.
25 Rostow, "W. W. RostowTheorizesThe Five Stages to Modernization, 1960," 330.
26 Mark T. Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Buil ding: Political De-
velopment Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945- 1975 ,"journal
'!fSoutheastAsian Studies 34, No.3 (Oct., 2003): 444.
27 David Milne, "'Our Equivalent of GuerriUa Warfare': Walt Rostow and the Bombing of
North Vietnam, 1961- 1968," The Journal '!f1>1ilitary Hmory 7 1, o. I Uan., 2007): 171.
72 - TilE FUTURE Of IIISTOI\Y
the Vietnam endeavour. In the main, modernization theory immediately
put the entire underdeveloped world in a state of communist threat. In
Vietnam, it allowed US war planners to overlook the historical condition of
Vietnam, the on-going civil war and the nationalist struggle and to mistake
the Vietnamese ttdu tranh against foreign occupation for a 'communist
disease' exploiting a transitional state. Many Southerners who identified
with the pre-Diem Vietnamese nation went unnoticed.
28
And Washington
misunderstood that "the appeal of communism in South Vietnam stemmed
not from material poverty, but from 'political deprivation'; that is, the lack
of an 'effective structure of authority."'
19
And while the nation-builders
attempted to develop good governance as part of the COIN strategy, their
focus was ultimately directed toward more ' kinetic' approaches that heeded
the tangible resul ts on which technocrats and convent ional militaries
thrived.
30
The American military effort was radically determined by this
economic value system. Bombing strategy in Vietnam became one of the
most- if not the most- detrimental factors in the American effort to win
"hearts and minds" both in Vietnam and at home. Indeed, it was Rostow
who established the chosen graduated aerial bombardment campaign; he
promoted it so confident ly that McNamara and Bundy called the bombing
campaign the "Rostow Thesis."
11
Rostow's rationale assumed that the pnonoes of North
Vietnamese President llo Chi Minh were the same as his
own, namely that the pursuit of economic growth was the
overwhelming consideration in peace and war. Rostow believed
that the North Vietnamese leadershjp would cave in to American
military pressure in order to save its fledgling industrial base.
In ascribing such motives to North Vietnam, Rostow failed
to appreciate the longevity and obduracy of an ideology-
28 Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development
Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945-1975 ," 440.
29 Ibid., 443.
30 Kinetic: In military terminology, ' klnctic operations' are those that actively seek to
engage with the enemy in battle.
3 1 Milne, wour Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare': Walt Rostow and the Bombing of orth
Vietnam, 1961 -1968," 186.
TilE FUTURE OF IIISTORY - 73
nationalism-not beholden to the economic sources that
informed his own.
32
Me ' amara was one of Rollino Thunder's earliest detractors, and
with the benefit of hindsight it can be shown that "no one involved in the
campaign on the US side considers Rollino Thunder a success."
11
Indeed,
the operation significantly increased opposition to the war effort and the
ensuing infrastructural damage had little military Although the
orth Vietnamese feared bombing campaign, t hey were decidedly
resolute in their nationalist atiu tranh. Blinded by modernization theory and
technocratism, many in the American government and military establishment
were unable to empathize with their enemy. Westmoreland's letter "Tactical
Employment of US Forces and Defensive Action" dated December 10, 1965
contended that going "over to the offensive and destroy[ing] the VC"ls was
the utmost priority, Westmoreland's reasoning being that high enemy body
counts were indicative of significant progress in the war. Indeed, from an
engineer's perspective, dominating the tangibles of warfare (i. e. manpower
and machinery) would ensure victory. However, in auerre en suiface "[n]
either intensified bombing nor escalation of the ground war would have
solved what was always the central problem- the political viabili ty of South
Vietnam ."
16
Another failed initiative, the Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP)-
inspired by the British experience in Malaya- aimed to separate insurgents
from the people and subsequently control the dispersion of aid, did more
political damage to the war effort than proliferated American goods to the
VC ever could have. A briefing to McNamara by a Provincial Representative
for the SHP on December 12, 1964 reported that "the situation in fact has
been st eadily deteriorating" largely because of"confusing guidance received
3 2 lbicl. , 171 .
33 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory cf Asymmecric Coriflict, I 54.
34 1bid., 153.
35 Folder VA ( I) ( I) Guidance COMUSMACV, [part I of2J; MAC j03, Historians Back-
ground Material Files; RG 4 72, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, M.D; Cited in John M. Carland, "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmorcland'sAp-
proach in Two Documents", The journal cfMilitary History 68, No. 2 (Apr. 2004): 570-574.
36 Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending War," II 0.
74 - THE FuTURE oF H ISTORY
from higher echelons."
37
Overall , "the assumption that rural practices
and values could be eradicated, or at least revised, to fit anti-communist
modernising and nation-building goals remained entrenched as the war
deepened ."
38
Ideological progress did eventually arrive with General Creighton
Abrams after 1968, a change vividly illustrated by his disposal of
Westmoreland's objective statement: "The mission of US forces in Vietnam
is to search out and destroy the Vietcong," replacing it with: "The mission
of the US is to provide protection for the people of Vietnam ."
39
As John
Nag! points out, this marked the true beginning of a population-protection
strategy in Vietnam; however, it was too late.
4
From the outset , American
objectives in Vi etnam were confused, incongruent and sometimes non-
existent. An anti-empathetic ideology augmented America's disorientation
and made progressive transformation nearly impossible. After decades of
interaction with Vietnam, the military- in a fight or flight state- took steps
toward becoming a learning organization; however, global disapproval for
the US strategy of barbarism in Vietnam would ultimately end what many
have labelled the "anti-social war.""
37 Letter to Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Gentlemen - re: briefing of McNamara, 19
December 1963, Folder 12, Box 0 I , John 13. 0' Donnell Collection, The Vietnam Archive,
Tcxasl cch University.
38 Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development
Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945- 1975 ," 440.
39 John A. Nagl, speaking to Priztker Military Library, July 23, 2007.
40 Nagl, speaking to Priztkcr Military Library.
41 Arreguln-Toft, How rheiVeokiVin Theory of Asymmerric Coriflicr, 168; Michael Wal-
zer, just and Unjust Moral Aroument wirh Hirror ico/ lllustrotions, third cd., (New York,
N.Y.: Basic Books, 2000), 168.
A N EXAMINATION OF IcONIC PHOTOGRAPIIS AND TII EIR
CONSTRUCTION OFVICARIOUS M EMORY
Julianne Kelso
76 THI FUTURE OF HISTORY
Photographs exist in the powerful mediating position between the
occurrence of an event and its understanding in t he consciousness of others.
By transcribing an instant on film and preserving it in time, a photographer
has the ability to construct memories for viewers. Throughout the twentieth
century, iconic images of history have been used to create these memories
by condensing entire events into singular moments that come to symbolize
a nation, a struggle, or a concept. This paper will argue that an image's
spatial organization and assumed historical meaning contribute to the
construction of these memories and narratives, despite their isolation
from lived experience and their often purposeful composition. It will do
so by examining the construction of space in photography, the relationship
between transcribed time and duration, and the usc of iconic photography
in forming vicarious memories.
Transcribed images arc a critical tool in the recording of history. By
producing a mimetic record of the perspective of a photographer, they have
the power to authenticate events and attest to their occurrence. However,
photography's questionable objectivity is an often disputed issue that must
be considered when attempting to determine the role of photography in
the formation of history. Much debate regarding photography's paradoxical
relationship with reality has centred on what Tom Gunning has described
as its inherent "truth claim"- the assumption that photographs objectively
represent the world that they transcribe.
1
Kendall L. Walton has argued for
the validity of this supposed implicit truth by stating that "Photographs are
transparent. We see the world throuah them ."
2
If one accepts what Walton
believes to be the transparent nature of this technological mimesis, then, as
Andre Bazin has stated, "The photographic image is the object itself."
3
The
notion that photographs arc simply tangible records of emanations of Light
that arc produced without human influence leads them to be conseguently
1 Tom Gunning, "What's the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs," NORD/COM
Re1iew 5.1 (September 2004): 42.
2 Kendall L. Walton, "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism," in
Photooraphy and Philosophy, ed. Scott Walden (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008), 22.
{emphasis in original).
3 Andre Bazin, What is Cinema? trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California
Press), 1967 (qtd. in Mesk.in, Aaron and Jonathan Cohen, "Photographs as Evidence",
2008, 71).
THE fUTUHE OF HISTORY 77
construed as pure and unbiased representations of single moments of time
within specific spaces. Unlike drawings or paintings, photographs are often
understood to be impartial due to the nature of the photographic process,
in which the decisive role of the photographer is often disregarded. The
value of photographs is derived from their capacity to commit to film a
(purportedly) complete two-dimensional record of space at a certain
moment. Drawings and paintings, in comparison, are believed to be
subjective because the details included in their content rely upon decisions
made by an artist and that artist's perception of an event. Their dependence
upon human impressions and opinions therefore causes them to be seen
as less reliable than photographs.
4
In contrast, as Walter Benjamin asserts,
phoLographs transcends the domain of art by making a historical claim to
the verity of what it depicts. s They arc therefore often trusted as objective
evidence that authenticate events and provide the means for the construction
of historical understanding.
However, contrary to the widely held belief in the inherent truth
of photography, these snapshots of what is perceived to be reality exist as a
decidedly biased actor in the formation of memory. The presumption that, in
comparison to handmade records of events, photographs record the entirety
of a moment in an objective manner reguires a kind of"genesis amnesia'
16
of
the undeniable construction of space evident in photography. Photographs,
after all, cannot be unbiased recordings of events, as the spatial formation of
their production is largely influenced by what must be their unquestionably
biased human photographers. As the choices made by an artist, as well as
their skills and style, determine how events are represented in paintings,
so too does the photographer's composition, whether intentional or
accidental, dictat e the meaning inferred by viewers. The most obvious
objection to the assumption that photographs represent historical reality
i_s that a photograph can never be a complete recording of an event- after
all , the camera is able to act only as an extension of what a single witness
4 Scott Walden, "Truth in Photography," in Photoorophy and Philosophy, eel. Scott Walden
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008), 106.
5 Andrew Benjamin, H ~ r e r Benjamin and History (London: Continuum, 2005).
6 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theo'J ofPracrlce, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1977), 78-79 (qtd. in Keirstead, Thomas, "Gardens and Estates:
Medicvality and Space", 1993, 300)
78 -THE FuTURE oF HISTORY
(the photographer) can perceive. This means that the viewer can only see
the event from one angle, neglecting the way an event may look from the
mult it ude of other possible viewpoints. Whether the photographer is able
to choose a specific angle from which to shoot or is restricted by available
vantage points, the photograph cannot be trust ed to be objective as it shows
only one interpretation of events. Similarly, the cropping, framing, and post -
production of a photograph influences the way in which the image is deployed
and controls how a viewer comprehends its meaning. By determining an
image's composition, the photographer is able to create photographs that
include or exclude certain factors to form a desired interpretation of what
t ook place, or to invoke certain emotions. Changes to colour, brightness,
and contrast in post -production can also similarly manipulate the way in
which viewers comprehend images, and through them the object s they
depict . Coupled with the claim of an implicit objectivity and truth in its
creation, all these factors of subjective manipulation by the photographer
(whether intentional or accidental) give photography a unique power over
the formation of historical memory. Despite their biased construction,
they are able to produce meaning and understandings of events for viewer s
through their purported inherent truth.
Due t o this perceived role as an objective recorder of history,
photographs are frequently used by journalists, historians, and acti vists to
authenticate events and raise awareness of their occurrence. Photographers
are often tasked with infor ming the world of an event that a major
power would rather keep secret, such as the massacre of pro-democracy
demonstrators and civi lians in Beijing in June 1989 .The Chinese government
had announced that as the country had been placed under martial law, all
phot ography was strictly prohibited. Therefore, foreign journalists present at
the events often had their fil m and videocasset tes confiscated by the People's
Liberation Army.' Despite this, four for eign phot ographers in the Beijing
Hotel, about half a mile away from Tiananmen Square and in direct sight
of Changan Avenue where much of the bloodbath occurred, managed to
capture a single moment of what would come to be known as the Tiananmen
Square Massacre. Their images all depict a man in a white shirt with grocery
7 Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Trananmen Square (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre,
1989), 186.
THE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 79
bags in his hands as he stands defiantly in the middle of the road in front of
a row of approaching tanks. Along with the photographs, a video version
of the moment also spread more understanding of the events throughout
the world. The video has added to the iconic status of the image of the lone
man's demonstration by capturing the moments after the photographs
were taken, as the leading tank attempted to swerve around the man, and
he climbed on t op of it t o speak with the soldiers. After a few moments,
he came back down, and the tanks passed him. The video of these events
provides the story behind the event depicted in what would become iconic
photographs. As the photographs were protect ed and smuggled to safety-
one photographer hid his film in a toilet tank as police raided his room,
another concealed it in a packet of t ea, and the most widely circulated photo
of them all (taken by JefTWidener of the Associated Press) was smuggled out
in an aide's underwear
8
- t hey managed t o immortalize a moment in history
and create vicarious memories in the minds of countless viewers.
In t he days after the man's stand-off with the tanks, these images
were transmitted to the headquarter s of major news agencies, where the
striking nature of the photographs led them to appear on the front page
of newspapers all over the world. They were printed underneath such
attention-grabbing headlines as "One Man's Act of Defiance and Valor,"
"Crackdown in Beijing; One Man Can Make a Difference; This One Jousted
Briefly with Goliath," and "We Stand with Him.'
19
These images of one single
moment came to symbolize China's pro-democracy movement. To this day,
they create an understanding of the demonstrations for viewers who remain
distanced from the event in both space and time. The iconic status of the
photographs has simplified the demonstrations to the defiance of one man,
who is often considered to be a representative of all Chinese people at the
time.
Why was it that amongst all the photographs of protestors dur ing
the events, it is an image of one single man that has become a symbol of the
8 Patrick Witty, "Behind the Scenes: Tank Man ofTiananmen," NYTimes.com. NYTimcs,
last modified June 3, 2009, http://lens.blogs. nytimes.com/2009/06/03/ behind-the-
scencs-tank-man-of-tiananmen/
9 "Newspaper Headlines about the 'Tank Man'", PBS, accessed Januar y 10, 201 1, http:/ I
www. pbs.org/ wgbh/ pages/ frontline/ tank man/ cron I icon. html
80 - T HE FUTURE OF HISTORY
Chinese people's push for democracy? There are hundreds of photographs
cf crowds of protestors, soldiers facing off against dissidents, and bloody
rebellions throughout Beijing during the events of June 1989, and yet Jeff
Widener's photograph, often titled Tank Man (Figure 1 ), is undeniably the
most commonly used to represent the entire seven weeks of protests. While
the powerful nature of the subject itself should not be underestimated, the
composition of the photograph was a large part of its birth as an iconic
image that both recorded and afTected history. The perspective of the
photo was certainly not by choice-it was taken from the relative safety
ofWidener's balcony on the sixth floor of the Beijing hotel.
10
Th.is vantage
point causes the man to look smaller next to the tanks than he might seem
were the photo to have been taken from a closer distance. This, in turn,
makes the tanks appear larger and more oppressive, depicting the repressive
nature of the military and the fight of the everyman against an overpowering
totalitarian government in China. If the photo had been taken from behind
the man, from the vantage point of the tanks, or from directly above,
the differences in size of the lone man versus the oppressive tanks might
not appear so enormous, which is arguably the most critical factor in the
development of this photograph as an iconic and internationally famous
image. The looming nature of the large street lights in the foreground of
Widener 's photograph also make both the tanks and the man appear smaller
and farther away- alerting the viewer to the photographer's distance from
the event and therefore creating an understanding of the danger surrounding
its development.
The three other photographs taken by foreign journalists of this
moment were from similar vantage points, as they were all shot from
within the Beijing Hotel or on its roof. What, then, has made JefTWidener 's
photograph undoubtedly the most widely circulated and iconic of the four?
Certainly, the speed at which he transmitted his image to the Associated
Press was a factor; however it is also interesting to consider the power
of the photograph's composition when compared to the other three. The
image taken by Charlie Cole (Figure 2), also shooting from a balcony at
the hotel, presents the viewer with a tight, highly cropped version of the
event, as he composed the photograph through zooming in directly on the
I 0 Witty, Behind the Scenes.
THE FUTURE OF HISTORY - 81
Figure 1- Copyright JefTWidener, Associated Press.
Figure 2- Copyright Charlie Cole
82 - Tm Fu1 ~ or llisTORY
man and the tanks. While this allows the viewer a more detailed shot of
the man compared to the other three, it also means the photograph lacks
the resounding aesthetic power of the expansive emptiness of the street
surrounding the stand-off that is undeniably a factor in the popular ity of
Widener 's shot.
The photograph taken by Stuart Franklin (Figure 3) , who was
shooting alongside Charlie Cole at the time, has a contrary composition to
Cole's. Instead of focusing on the man and the tank, Franklin's photograph
is a wide shot that all ows for the capturing of the entirety of the street,
including a large, ominous dark shadow that creeps down towards the scene
from the top left of the frame. The effectiveness of the shot suffer s from this
method because the eye is direct ed towards a burned-out, abandoned bus
that sits in the top centre of the shot, and not the showdown between the
man and the t ank. Also, as in Arthur Tsang Hin Wah's ver sion (Figure 4),
the movement of the tanks into the lineup cr eates a feeling of acti on and
build up that is missing from Cole 's and vVidener's. In comparison, it is the
ver y presentati on of the tanks halted in their movement that created such
a resonati on amongst the international community, as it was not only the
man's defiance again. t the army but also the army's momentary hesitation
that made the moment seem so critical to not only viewer s of the photos,
but also onlooker s present at the event.
11
Clearly, since in Tsang Hin Wah's
photo the tanks arc still moving, the sense of the success of the man's lone
demonstration is lost.
Still , there is no doubt that all these images had the ability to
affect the way the history of this moment was understood, and this power
came from their ver y simplicity. It is the construction of space within their
depiction of a single man standing alone against a wave of dehumani zed
oppressive army machiner y that has come to symbolize the fight of the pro-
democracy movement at the time. For twenty years, these four photographs
and the video footage wer e the only images available to the public that
could create a visual under standing of this historical moment and ther efore
construct vicari ous memory. Despite some variations, they presented the
II Jan Wong, "Inter view: Jan Wong", Fronrline: che Tank Man, accessed November 12, 2010,
http:/ / "'" \\.pbs.org/ wgbh/ pages/frontline/tankman/ inter views/ wong. html
T t !E f-UTURE OF HISTORY 83
Figure 3-Copyright Stuart Franklin, Magnum Photos
Figure 4--Copyright Arthur Tsang Hin Wah, Reuters.
viewer with a simil ar version of events since they were all taken from the
same vantage point and provided a simple story of a single man versus the
oppression of his government's army. For this reason, the 2009 release of
another image of the same moment (Figure 5), taken by Terril Jones, has
stimulated new memory of the event. The photo was taken from eye level,
as Jones stood on the street behind a rack of bicycles which appear in the
foreground, capturing demonstrators as they appear to be fleeing from the
approaching tanks. These other actors were left out entirely from the other
photographs-as was the front loader which sits in the middle of the frame,
cleaning up the bloody residue of bodies and trash that have been left behind
from the massacre. When Jones was originally pouring through his negatives
after he left Beijing, it was easy for him to miss the scene unfolding in the
background of the shot, as it is for the viewer today. However, upon closer
inspection, one can see the "Tank Man" with his grocery bags, standing in
wait in the middle of the street. Nevertheless, his distance from the tanks
and the appearance of other actors and so many other objects in the shot
make the photograph lack the spatial qualities of the photographs analyzed
above that made them so striking.
The effect of iconic photographs on history is due not only to their
spatial configuration, but also their function as a preservation of a single
moment in time. The magic of a photograph is that it preserves time but
also allows it to stretch or condense, as the moment becomes cut from its
timeline and separated from its duration. An event that happens for only
an instant, whether it be a bullet rippling through the air, an expression
forming on a person's face, or a man standing in defiance against a wave of
tanks, takes on new meaning when it is preser ved in a photograph. When
viewing a photograph, what came before and what will come after are
undetermined. It is a visual "cutting" of an historical event, a way to employ
Foucault's genealogical historical form by isolating a critical moment from
all other actors and discursive influences. This effective form of studying
history "deals with events in t erms of their most unique characteristics, their
most acute manifcstations."
12
Using photography as a tool in effective history
12 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Lansuase, Counter-Memory, Practice:
Select Essays and Interviews, cd. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977),
154.
THI: f-UTURE OF HISTORY - 85
Figure 5-CopyrightTerrilJones, Associated Press
86 - THE FuTuRE OF HISTORY
therefore removes events from a linear line of development that runs up to
our present and then continues onwards towards the future. Like a handful
of mismatched photographs, history becomes a mass of singular moments,
mistakes, and chaotic events which can leave humanity without a clear
understanding of how they occurred or where they stand within what is
understood as time.
13
When considering iconic photographs and their role in the formation
of history, one may propose that iconic photographs cannot be isolated from
time in such a way, as without a knowledge of what was occurring while the
photographs were being taken (in this case, the tanks stopping for a single
demonstrat or), they would lack historical meaning. While an understanding
of the narrow context of the photo is certainly necessary in order for it to
achieve its dramatic effect, most viewers experience the photo outside of
its linear t imeline of the massacres that were occurring before and during
the moment depicted in the photographic image. In fact, the photograph's
separation from hist orical events has led to the "Tank Man" being construed
as a singular hero- the one man who stood up to an approaching army.
As Jan Wong, who was present at this event, has explained, it was actually
common for demonstrators during the protest to block the army from
moving. Protesters surrounded the tanks, and then fed the army, gave them
water, and lectured them extensively about how they should be behaving.
14
However, as the military crackdown deepened and became increasingly
bloody throughout the day of June the 4th, the citizens who attempted
to stop the tanks no longer became a barrier to the army. As Canadian
reporters Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon state in their journalistic account of
the events, tanks and armored personnel carriers frequently crushed people
in their paths- including young children and the elderly.
15
They note that
the corpses of those who had been pulverized by the tanks were left for
days afterwards, "as a reminder that the army was willing and able to crush
those who opposed it."
16
While the heroism of the man is not disputed, the
singularity of his actions can be put into question when considered within
the realm of this larger historical context.
13 Ibid, ISS.
14 Wong, Interview.
15 Simmie and Nixon, Twnanmen, 182.
161bid, 183.
THE FuTuRE OF HISTORY - 87
Similarly, one might also posit that it is the viewing of the video of
the event that made this moment memorable, and not only the photograph
(whichever one of the four is viewed). However, the iconic photograph
performs as a unique actor in the formation of memory in the minds of
the international community when this event is considered. It is the very
isolation from time and movement in the photographs that has made the
"Tank Man" an influential figure in the way we remember the events that
occurred in Beijing that spring in 1989. All four of the photographs depict
the man standing defiantly in front of the approaching tanks. Photographs
of him climbing up to the top of the tank, speaking with the driver, and
climbing down again also exist, and yet none of them have reached the iconic
stat us that Tank Man has achieved.
17
This is also due to the very nature of
what the photograph captured. Unlike any other photographs of those few
moments, including the newly released shot by Jones which was discussed
above, these four are famous because they depict the most critical point
of the event- the single moment when the first tank has just approached
the man and is close enough to do what most onlookers expected: run him
over.
18
It is this split second of decision, when the man holds his ground and
the driver chooses to halt, that has come to be immortalized in the minds
of millions who were never present at the event. The ability of the viewer
to stretch or condense this moment in time as mentioned above is what has
made the photographs so powerful. Stuart Franklin was recently asked why
he believes that the photographs of the event arc "more memorable" than
the video of the same moment. He stated in reply, "Still images always are.
There is time to reflect."
19
As the photographic camera enables the artist to freeze and
preserve a pivotal moment, thus allowing it to becoming an iconic image, it
17 In fact, Tsang Hin Wah has expressed regret that his photograph of the man climb-
ing up the tank was originally chosen by his agency to be circulated over his shot studied
above, which he believes meant his work was ignored by most of the press. See Witty,
Behind the Scenes.
18 Wong, Interview.
19 Stuart Franklin, Inter view with Nigel Warburton, "Magnum Photographer Stuart
Franklin Discusses His Photograph, Tiananmcn Square June 4th, 1989"Virtualphiloso-
phcr.com, last modified 2006, http: / / virtualphilosopher.com/ 2006/ 12/ magnum_link_
to_ .html
88 - THE FuTUI\E oF HISTORY
holds significantly more power than the medium of video in the creation of
symbolic capital. By creating a symbolic singular moment, an event then
becomes associated with a photogr aph, turning the image into a mnemonic
tool. This fuels vicarious memory of an event for a viewer, imbued with a
certain historical meaning that is deter mined by their spatial composition.
As photographs compress a larger event or idea into a singular photo,
the image a photograph depicts comes to represent something larger
than itself.
20
In doing so, Tank Man became a symbol of the entire pro-
democracy revolution in t he late 1980s in China and encouraged support
from Western countries for democratic activism in China. Eventually, its
iconic and symbolic nature has meant that it has transcended the time and
space in which it was taken, coming to represent not only China's fight for
democracy but any form of rebellion against authority. This paper does not
intend to claim that Widener or his colleagues set out to create a skewed
representation of the events of the massacres in Beijing by intentionally
composing photographs that would come to represent the enti rety of the
demonstrations of June 1989. Rather, the development of symbolic capital
in the photogr aphs of "Tank Man" simply shows that even photogr aphs
constructed in the most accidental of circumstances can become icons that
provide repr esentations of events to their viewers that cannot be seen as
objective.
The power of images thus lies in their role as silent actors in the
wr iting of history and its remembrance. By transcribing moments on film
through the eye of the camer a's lens, photography preserves events in
history, allowing them to take on new life and meaning as they are viewed
by new actors. Through the use of spatial composition and the cutting of
time, they ser ve as both evidence of pivotal events and the symbols of ideas
that have the power to change the way history is understood. Although the
pro-democracy movement that Tank Man symbolizes was not successful-
as the demonstrations were heavily suppressed by the government- the
image itself succeeded in informing millions of people throughout the
world about Chinese civil society's push for democr acy. This singl e cut in
ti me has constructed and fueled collective memory of the demonstrations
20 Rob Kroes, Phowaraphic Memories: Private Pictures, Public /manes, and American History
(Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Press, 2007), 71.
THE FUTURE OF H ISTORY - 89
in Beijing in 1989 for the past two decades, and thus the event has been
preserved in history through the material transcription of a single instant in
an iconic photograph.
I know no way ofjudging the future but by the past.
PATRICK H ENRY

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