The American Frontier as State of Nature

By Michael J. Faber, University of Southern Indiana and Darla Martin, Indiana University

Prepared for presentation at the 2009 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association

Abstract: John Locke claims that in the beginning, all the world was America. For Locke, America offered a glimpse into a world without government, a state of nature with no clear governmental power. Specifically, the western frontier of eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury America presents a place without institutionalized government in which individuals were essentially free to act independent of formal law and to form consensual societies. This paper examines how well the frontier fits Lockes understanding of the state of nature, concluding that, while it is not a good fit with Locke, the American frontier offers insights into the philosophical foundations of government in America. These insights enable us to better understand and defend both the liberal consensus theory of Louis Hartz and the frontier hypothesis of Frederick Jackson Turner. Lockes claim encourages us to examine the frontier as a state of nature; doing so should give us additional understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of American political thought.

In the beginning, asserts John Locke, all the world was America. Locke finds in North America (or at least in the myth of North America, circa 1689) the reality behind his hypothetical state of nature. Since Locke never visited America, it is difficult to give much credence to his image of it, but his ideas certainly had an influence on American political thought in the ensuing centuries. The frontier was in some respects a wild and uncivilized place. It was largely beyond the reach of government and laws, making it potentially a prime example of a state of nature within relatively recent history. Of course, the analogy is far from perfect; in a true state of nature, individuals have never known society, and do not begin with clothing, weapons, technical knowledge and skills, et cetera. Nonetheless, by examining the American frontier as a state of nature, we can explore American political development from another angle. Theorists who describe a state of nature invariably use that description to explain how government emerges out of anarchy. By treating the frontier as a state of nature, we can begin an exploration of the origins of American government, and explain why the institutions of government developed the way that they did. We can further examine American ideology, which was shaped at least in part by the frontier experience. We aim to begin this exploration, using Frederick Jackson Turners frontier thesis and John Lockes state of nature to examine the American frontier. If the frontier resembles a Lockean state of nature, as Locke himself seemed to believe, and Turners argument that the frontier is the most important factor in explaining American development, then we can expect the establishment of Lockean institutions and ideology. If it does not, we can explain the departures from Locke that are inherent in the American political system. This analysis, of course, must begin with Locke himself, and his articulation of the state of nature.

The State of Nature Locke describes his state of nature as a state of perfect freedom [for individuals] to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. (Locke 2003, 101) It is a state in which individuals are autonomous, but not one in which license prevails. Individuals, Locke claims, are bound by a law of nature, established by natural reason. This law of nature ensures personal security and property rights, and gives to each individual the right to punish any transgressions of the law of nature. Property rights, for Locke, are established by labor; an individual who puts labor into an object, even labor so simple as picking it up off of the ground, establishes a right to property, assuming no prior right exists. According to the law of nature, all others must respect these property rights; failure to do so is theft. Punishment of crimes against the law of nature may be carried out by any individual, for no one is superior or inferior in power in the absence of society and government. Further, punishment is at the discretion of the individual exercising this executive power. Any individual who violates the law of nature establishes a state of war between himself and all of mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security. (Locke 2003, 104) Because there will always be those who will initiate such a state of war, Lockes state of nature is not an entirely peaceful place. There is violence and conflict, always begun with a transgression of the laws of nature. Basically, this means that there is always a bad guy and a good guy, always a criminal and an enforcer of justice. There are not, or rather should not be, any gray areas. Of course, if the original criminal believes that he has been unduly punished, or that his punisher went too far, he can of course treat that as a new transgression, and use his own executive power to punish

crimes against the law of nature. The roles, then, would be reversed. Thus a simple act of theft, for example, could turn into a long-running feud between individuals, a constant state of war to be ultimately resolved only through the death of one of the parties. Since Locke assumes that individuals might recruit others to assist them in the administration of justice, and they might similarly recruit others to assist in their defense, this can easily turn into a rather extensive violent conflict. Lockes state of nature, then, is perhaps not truly a state of peace, but rather an intermittent and perilous peace punctuated by bloodshed and war. He insists that as soon as an immediate threat has passed, we leave the state of war and return to the peaceful state of nature, but persistent conflict and even misunderstanding can lead to frequent returns to the state of war. The issue at stake here is justice, and in a state of nature each individual is the enforcer of justice and there is no appeal but to Heaven. Between individuals, the enforcement of justice involves a state of war, although Locke emphasizes that it is not the enforcement of justice but the original transgression that initiates the war. If the American frontier approximates a Lockean state of nature, then, we might expect to see signs of natural law, broad agreements on what constitutes proper behavior and a broad respect for freedom and equality. Where this is absent, we should find that the absence is the exception, tied to violence and criminal behavior. If such behavior is rampant, then it becomes difficult to distinguish between those breaking the natural law and those merely enforcing it; in such a case, we might better conclude that Lockes state of nature does not fit, or at least that Locke was too sanguine in his assessment of human nature. Broadly speaking, we are looking for three things in assessing the fit of Lockes theory: attitudes towards property rights, the extent of mutual voluntary cooperation, and the presence and causes of violence. If property rights or cooperation are generally absent, or if violence is a regular part of life rather than an intermittent

state of war, then we should be inclined to reject Lockes picture in evaluating the American frontier. Lockes state of nature is of course not the only theory. I have begun with Locke because he is so often associated with the American founding. Whether his influence is in fact the primary influence on the founders ideology is not critical here 1 ; if the American frontier resembles a Lockean state of nature, it is immaterial whether his writings influenced American ideology because his theory of government should apply anyway in such a case. The founders, though, also drew quite consciously from Montesquieu, who is not generally considered a state of nature social contract theorist. Nonetheless, Montesquieu describes a pre-societal state of humanity. Men in nature, he claims, would assume themselves weak and impotent, and would fear all others. In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior. There would, therefore, be no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature. (Montesquieu 1949 v.1, 4) This first law, peace, is followed up with three other laws: the pursuit of nourishment, the attraction between men and women, and the tendency to form society. Thus humanity quickly leaves the state of nature for a state of society. Clearly there were associations and interactions on the American frontier, so it cannot fit Montesquieus vision of nature, but it may well resemble the kind of society which Montesquieu claims will first arise spontaneously from nature. It is interesting to note Montesquieus claim that Each particular society begins to feel its strength, whence arises a state of war between different nations. (Montesquieu 1949 v.1, 5) At first glance, the American frontier can be understood as warring societies of settlers and natives. Looking back, we see voluntary societies of settlers that are more or less spontaneous attempting to carve out a life for
1

See Bailyn 1992 for a discussion of other influences on the founders. Gordon Wood makes a similar argument in his Creation of the American Republic. The debate over the influence of liberal and republican ideals on the American founding is an extensive one, and only tangentially related to this paper.

themselves. We also see tribes and nations of natives essentially doing the same. Exploring the hostile relationship between the two might indeed suggest that this area and time period fits better with Montesquieus early society than Lockes state of nature. The key difference between Montesquieus early societies and Lockes state of nature is that in the former the individuals recognize the enduring presence of society, while in the later it is merely an arrangement of convenience. In a state of nature, individuals have no obligation to others, moral or legal. They are obliged to follow and uphold the law of nature, but that obligation does not specifically extend to other individuals. A mere awareness of societys existence carries with it at least a legal, if not moral, obligation to ones fellow men. Thus there is a distinction to be drawn here; in the context of this work, we must ask whether individuals on the frontier, whether settler or native, felt a clear obligation to their fellows, or whether interaction was a matter of convenience and mutual advantage only. Of course, this presupposes some element of cooperation and trust. We must remember not to make this assumption without careful consideration; Thomas Hobbes famously claimed that no such trust could possibly exist in the absence of society and civil laws. The influence of Hobbes on the founders is a matter of some dispute, but his state of nature is perhaps even more famous than that of Locke. His state of nature is simply a state of war; he sums it up rather succinctly, and my words cannot add much to his:
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 1996, 84)

This vision of the state of nature, if it applies here, would make the American frontier a violent, savage, and dangerous place; on the surface, it was clearly all of these. There is no confusion between Lockes relatively peaceful pre-societal cooperation and Hobbes constant war of all 6

against all. This is clearly a different vision, and given the brutality that occurred in the early American West, we must consider Hobbes in this context. If the frontier is truly a lawless place, with no clear reason and no stable peace, no societies and little to no cooperation, then we might conclude that it best approximates a Hobbesian state of nature. Locke, Montesquieu, and Hobbes give us a useful starting point for assessing the American frontier as a state of nature. The condition of the western frontier certainly has an impact on the formation of political societies in that region, and it may have a broader impact on the development of American political thought and American democracy. This is the argument made famous by Frederick Jackson Turner in the late nineteenth century, and it is an argument worth revisiting in the context of this analysis.

Turner and the American Frontier Turner famously argued that the American frontier is the most significant explanatory factor in American history and development. This claim rests on a particular vision of the frontier. A closer look at his thesis and his understanding of the frontier brings us a step closer to assessing whether the American frontier resembles a state of nature, and if so, which one. In the opening paragraph of his famous essay, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, Turner sums up his frontier thesis succinctly: The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development. (Turner 1966, 199) This is perhaps overstating his case, but a bit of exaggeration does not hurt the overall theory, which is an important one. The possibility for westward expansion in the United States was certainly a significant factor in American political

development; the notion of Manifest Destiny was a driving force in public policy for much of the nineteenth century. The frontier, as Turner envisions it, is not a particular geographic line at a particular point in time, but a region that moved over time. Essentially, the frontier is a moving target. As wilderness communities grew, they became more established and permanent, and began to resemble older societies further east. This does not mean that the frontier ceased to exist, only that it moved further west.
The wilderness disappears, the West proper passes on to a new frontier, and in the former area, a new society has emerged from its contact with the backwoods. Gradually this society loses its primitive conditions, and assimilates itself to the type of the older social conditions of the East; but it bears within it enduring and distinguishing survivals of its frontier experience. (Turner 1896, 289)

The frontier in the 1750s looks very different from that of the 1780s, the 1820s, or the 1850s. But throughout its early development, America always had a frontier, room for expansion and new settlement; this westward-moving region is the American frontier that Turner discusses, in the form of many successive frontiers over time. Each successive frontier involved similar problems with different details, and drew similar individuals with different occupations and aspirations. The exploitation of the beasts took hunter and trader to the west, the exploitation of the grasses took the rancher west, and the exploitation of the virgin soil of the river valleys and prairies attracted the farmer. (Turner 1966, 213) Each subsequent migration had different features, but, for Turner, all represented the frontier, and therefore the meaning of America. We are concerned here with the first wave of frontier settlers; by the time ranchers and farmers reached the frontier, there was some semblance of society in place, and thus clearly not a state of nature in the Lockean sense. Turner further describes this advance line of the frontier.
Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities,

its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wavethe meeting point between savagery and civilization. (Turner 1966, 200)

It is essentially Turners claim that the frontier involved a return to primitive conditions that we are examining in this paper. If the primitive conditions on the frontier resemble Lockes state of nature, then we might logically conclude that American social development has proceeded along more or less Lockean lines. The frontier, of course, was not merely a geographical location. It was part of the American mindset, deeply ingrained in our collective national psyche. The psychological frontier was in many ways an entirely separate matter from the geographic frontier. Billington explains the relationship between the two:
Certainly modern scholarship has proved that two frontiers have traditionally influenced American thought, and that they bore little relationship to each other. One was the actual frontier, where sweating pioneer farmers braved the greed of their fellow men and the savagery of nature to eke out an existence. The other was an imaginary frontier which persisted in the minds of Americans and some Europeans. From the eighteenth century on this image of the West influenced statesmen, fired the imagination of authors, and helped shape the attitude of the people toward their own land as well as toward other nations of the world. (Billington 1965, 3334)

In one sense, we are concerned here only with the actual historic frontier, and not this psychological one. In another sense, though, the psychological frontier is equally important, if not more so. If the westward pioneers saw themselves in an essentially Lockean state of nature, they would be likely to create limited institutions, with power kept firmly in the hands of the people. If they saw themselves in a Hobbesian wilderness, they likely would have submitted to whomever could promise their safety. Such institutions would likely develop regardless of the actual circumstances of the frontier. Further, for those Americans not pushing westward, perceptions of westward expansion may well influence visions of politics. Those who saw a savage frontier might be more inclined to call for strong government intervention, especially to pacify or defeat the natives. Those who had a more Lockean vision would be more inclined to

criticize harsh measures against the Indians as unwarranted and illegitimate. Clearly, both perceptions persisted at various times in and in various groups within society. For this analysis, we are more concerned with the frontier mentality, insofar as such a generalization exists. If Turners thesis is basically right, then studying the frontier is not merely helpful in understanding American history; it is essential. Here, we claim that the frontier offers us insights into the nature and theory of government in the United States. The ramifications of Turners frontier thesis are explained well by Billington:
If the United States is to endure in the shrinking world of the twentieth century it must recognize that its institutions have been shaped by a unique past and that its ideals have been tailored by traditions unknown among peoples of the newly emerged nations. (Billington 1965, 43-44)

The frontier is part of that unique past; it is not the only aspect, but it is perhaps the most important. This paper acknowledges the importance of the frontier in understanding American politics and history, and aims to better understand the ramifications of the frontier as both historical and theoretical place.

John Locke, Louis Hartz, and American Liberalism Turners argument gives us no reason to assume that John Locke is the most relevant state of nature theorist here, or even to apply social contract theory at all. Another area of American historical literature, headlined by Louis Hartz in his famous Liberal Tradition in America, suggests the importance of Locke. The argument of Hartz spawned a substantial reaction as well, resulting in extensive study of the republican aspects of the American founding by Bailyn, Wood, Pocock, and others. This paper can be viewed as essentially a test of Hartzs theory in one key aspect of American history, but this first requires another look at Hartzs theory.

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Hartz liberal tradition is a sort of Lockean liberalism, with a few variations on that central theme. This dominant liberalism results from the absence of feudal institutions in America; without feudalism to argue against, other traditions have been unable to take root. American liberalism, however, is a unique tradition, built on pragmatism more than theory. There has never been a liberal movement or a real liberal party in America: we have only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually does not know that Locke himself is involved. (Hartz 1955, 11) Locke is clearly the central figure here.
[T]he record of American political thought is a veritable jig-saw puzzle of theoretical confusion. But throughout it all the liberal temper of American theory is vividly apparent. Locke dominates American political thought, as no thinker anywhere dominates the political thought of a nation. He is a massive national clich. (Hartz 1955, 140)

American liberalism occurs on a subconscious level, but it is ever-present. This consensus presents a danger of unanimity which squelches that which would challenge it; this is the danger of public opinion against which Tocqueville warned. The American tradition stemmed from its unique situation and revolution. America did not join Europe in its intellectual or political traditions, but carved out its own way. It rejected the emphasis on community for a sort of individualistic uniformity which took its place. This unanimity is based on common assumptions about life and humanity which have never been adequately challenged in American life. It is not difficult to claim, with Hartz, that much if not all of American thought relies on some level on John Locke; he does not exaggerate in referring to Locke as a massive national clich. A close reading of the Declaration of Independence side by side with Lockes second treatise should leave little doubt on this score, unless one (foolishly, it would seem) denies the seminal importance of the Declaration in American thought. This is not the place for such an examination, but Hartz is clearly defensible here. Locke is of central importance in the ideas on which this nation was founded. But this does not tell us which parts of Locke we are using,

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beyond those which have been borrowed for the Declaration of Independence. Hartz gives us some indication of what was taken. He finds in Locke two main themes: an implicit defense of the state, and an explicit limitation on the state. Lockes concept of free individuals in nature forming a state by mutual consent is a remarkable defense of the state and its power to legitimately coerce individuals. This social norm of free individuals, because of the lack of feudal institutions in America, appeared less a norm to be adopted than a simple statement of fact, as Hartz explains in his usual lyrical prose.
History was on a lark, out to tease men, not by shattering their dreams, but by fulfilling them with a sort of satiric accuracy. In America one not only found a society sufficiently fluid to give a touch of meaning to the individualist norms of Locke, but one also found letter-prefect replicas of the very images he used. There was a frontier that was a veritable state of nature. There were agreements, such as the Mayflower Compact, that were veritable social contracts. There were new communities springing up in vacuis locis, clear evidence that men were using their Lockean right of emigration. (Hartz 1955, 60-61)

Hartz thus suggests that the early American frontier was in fact a Lockean state of nature. From this starting point, though, the Americans proceeded only to limit the state, without any sense of its proper power. Thus they missed half of Lockes argument; the state of early American society, Hartz claims, resulted in a partial reading of Locke, missing much of his intent. Hartz maintains that Locke can only be properly understood in terms of Filmer and feudalism; in their absence he is read in a way that he could neither have foreseen nor intended. It is interesting that Hartz himself offers no great summary or analysis of Lockes work; as he claims Americans tend to do, he appears to take Locke for granted.
Hartz never bothers with a full account of Lockes philosophy; he only stops to remind us briefly, from time to time, of some element, as if he merely needs to jog our memory on the subject. Hartz felt so comfortable that he already shared an account of Locke with his readers that he saw no need to repeat it. (Dienstag 1996, 498-499)

Thus Hartz presents a stylized and limited Locke, perhaps oversimplified. His reading of Locke is certainly a very basic one, ignoring many of the nuances present in the Two Treatises. Marvin

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Meyers makes this claim in critiquing Hartz; Locke, he says, serves as a convenient abstraction for Hartzs theory.
The liberal formula is largely independent of the complex structure of John Lockes reasoning. Locke connotes the ethos of a nation born equal: the spirit of atomistic social freedom, of bourgeois enterprise, and laissez faire. Professor Hartzs Locke, in brief, comes very close to expressing what Tocqueville called individualism: that mature and calm feeling, nurtured by equality of condition, leading each man to seek his own material well-being with slight regard for fellows or community, ancestors or posterity, tradition or authority. (Meyers 1963, 263)

This Locke which Hartz uses, Meyers claims, has little connection with John Locke, but is rather a homegrown ideology that is distinctively American, with little of the Old World in it. By using an American version of Locke, if this interpretation can be so called, Hartz denotes clearly the difference between America and Europe, which is a useful distinction in itself. By oversimplifying Locke, however, Hartz makes his philosophy less useful for saying anything meaningful about American politics. All of this implies that the American frontier may not in fact be a state of nature as Locke describes, but rather an Americanized version related to this simplified Lockean theory. This suggests three things. First, if, as Hartz claims, the frontier essentially follows Lockes state of nature, but the resulting society does not resemble that described by Locke, then either Lockes theory itself is flawed or American government is illegitimate by that theory. Either of these would, of course, be huge and controversial claims. Second, if the frontier departs from Lockes account in important ways, we may be able to better explain Hartzs contention that we have veered away from Lockes full theory. Third, if the frontier does not resemble Locke, then we must explain why American society still has Lockean elements, or we must diminish or dismiss the importance of Locke on American society. As we will see, the frontier does resemble Lockes, but not closely. This different version of a state of nature, if we can even properly call it that, leads to society strikingly different from that described by Locke.

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Turner would not necessarily disagree with Hartzs thesis, especially his claim that America must be understood in the context of Europe. Our destiny is interwoven with theirs, he observes, asking how shall we understand American history without understanding European history? (Turner 1994a, 27) American history and politics is perhaps best understood as an offshoot of European ideas, although these ideas have certainly been adapted to a different situation. This brings us, of course, back to Turners claim that the American frontier is a defining characteristic of American political development. What is different between America and Europe, for Hartz, is the absence of feudalism. What is different between the two for Turner is the presence of the frontier. The two are related. The early frontier provided ample space for expansion, and allowed for individuals to find their own place and purpose. They were not bound to land owned by others because there was land to be claimed for themselves. Feudalism relies on limited ownership of land and limited geographic mobility; neither was the case in early America. Thus Turners thesis is compatible with that of Hartz. Whether the two can be combined, though, requires a close look at the American frontier itself.

Life, Liberty, and Property on the American Frontier Turner himself makes a case for the frontier as a state of nature, perhaps of Hobbesian characteristics. Remote from the opportunity for systematic education, substituting a log hut in the forest-clearing for the social comforts of the town, he suffered hardships and privations, and reverted in many ways to primitive conditions of life. (Turner 1896, 291) He describes it as the meeting point between savagery and civilization, suggesting that society has basically been left behind. Patrick Griffin argues more directly for the frontier to be understood as a state of nature. He describes efforts by the British government to prevent settlers from moving west.

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Such efforts proved to be futile, as many British subjects in the New World set out to find new areas to settle.
When they headed west, illegal settlers entered a no-mans-land, a region that except for a few pockets could not by definition contain subjects. Subjects entering such lands surrendered their rights. Since they entered a region with no government, they were regressing to the state of nature. (Griffin 2007, 44)

After the revolution, the new American government made less effort to restrict westward migration, but the status of the frontier was otherwise unchanged. American settlers moving west did not forfeit their rights, but they basically left the privileges and protections of citizenship behind. This, of course, suggests that the settlers entered something akin to a state of nature, though the relatively nearby presence of society means that it is not a perfect state of nature as understood by the social contract theorists. Still, it may be close enough for the purposes of those theories. To assess whether the American frontier can be understood as a Lockian state of nature, as we noted above, we need to look for three things: attitudes towards property rights, the presence of voluntary cooperation, and the nature of violence. The West was a realm beyond law. There were no courts to evict, no laws to protect the interests of the wealthy, no speculative grants to safeguard. In short, the world beyond the line lay beyond regulation. (Griffin 2007, 60) As such, property rights were not safeguarded by any civil laws, nor were they protected by any formal authority. For Hobbes, this situation suggests that property rights do not exist, that such an idea is incoherent in the absence of government. It is clear, however, that the settlers on the frontier believed they had a right to the land on which they settled. In fact, the draw of the western frontier was the presence of essentially free land. Individuals who were not pleased with their fortunes in society often set out to lay claim to western land and make a living off of it. In the absence of the concept of

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property, this plan makes no sense. One might object, of course, that the frontiersmen were merely transplanting the idea of property from society into the wilderness, and that this property assumption does not support a Lockean interpretation of the frontier, or discredit a Hobbesian interpretation. We should note, however, that the settlers distinctly brought or developed the notion that property is established through labor; this idea contributed to conflicts with Indians, who did not take the same view towards property, or at least not towards land. The settlers cleared and developed land that the natives saw as essentially their territory. The justification here was that if the Indians were not doing anything with the land, meaning they had not improved it or labored on it in any way, then it was free land for the taking. This fits well with Lockes description of natural property rights; Locke in fact would likely endorse that rationale for Europeans settling on Indian lands. Once a settler could establish his property, he began to build a new life, which was often a solitary one. This does not, however, suggest an absence of cooperation and joint action on the frontier. The nature of the west clearly led to a certain amount of individualism, but frontiersmen were generally not hermits. Nonetheless, this situation led to a certain amount of discomfort and distrust with society, and especially government.
As has been indicated, the frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is antisocial. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression. (Turner 1966, 221)

This hostility to authority suggests the kind of individualism found in Locke, as well as an absence of the fear that Hobbes describes. If the frontiersmen were living in constant fear, they would have been less suspicious and more respectful of any governmental authority that could

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protect them. 2 Rather than turn to government for protection, settlers turned to government when it furthered their interests. Billington notes that frontier co-operation was entirely reconcilable with individualism. The pioneer was dependent on the social group and was not in the least reluctant to solicit aid from his government when his own betterment was involved. (Billington 1965, 28) This notion of government as a tool for furthering individual interests rather than primarily an instrument of protection, fits much better with Locke than Hobbes. Based on Turners reading of the frontier, then, it does not appear a truly Hobbesian state of nature. Griffin disagrees with this assessment, suggesting that the frontier does resemble the state of nature described by Hobbes (one need only read the title of his book, American Leviathan, to pick up the influence of Hobbes in his analysis), but his description of a state of nature belies the error in this claim. He argues that the European settlers on the frontier had a persistent us versus them mentality, leading to a sense of community with other whites and an ingrained hostility towards the natives. He claims that this twinned dynamic of the demonization of others and the valorization of the people epitomized relations on frontiers from time to time during periods of profound tension and violence. (Griffin 2007, 13) Certainly the violence Griffin describes fits into the theory of Hobbes, but the sense of being on the same team as others, which clearly existed among both settlers and natives, suggests that the situation was not a war of all against all, but a war of us against them. There was substantial cooperation on the American frontier. On the Indian side, extended families and tribes worked together for mutual benefit; in fact, it might be more reasonable to treat the natives as individuals in society rather than outside of it. As for the
2

Of course, one could argue that they lived in fear of both nature and authority. I do not engage that argument here, because in such a case Hobbes picture of a state of nature is inaccurate anyway since he claims that people in a state of nature will willingly submit to strong authority.

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European settlers, there is more isolation but the isolation is not total. Small communities sprang up throughout the frontier as settlers found life easier where they could share the labor with others. The cooperation of settlers looked much as Locke describes it theoretically; these were voluntary associations brought on by mutual benefit and compatible world view. Cooperation was far less common between the natives and the settlers, but the fact that anyone was working together implies that Hobbes was at least too extreme, if not outright wrong, when his theory is applied to the frontier. Because of the persistent image of frontier violence, though, it is hard to exorcise the specter of Hobbes from this discussion. The Hobbesian nature of the frontier, however, is probably overstated, perhaps to the point of being little more than mythology. Bellesiles critiques popular portrayals of the Old West, suggesting that they have influenced violence in modern society. Nonstop Indian warfare and gunfights in the streets of every western town inured Americans to the necessity of violence. From this Hobbesian heritage of each against all emerged the modern American acceptance of widespread personal brutality. (Bellesiles 2000, 285) Of course, he argues, this warfare did not really happen, at least not as often as most people believe. We tend to see the frontier as a place right out of Leviathan, but that does not square with reality. Then again, perhaps this Hobbesian vision has an impact on how American politics develops; the image may have had more influence than the reality. As Bellesiles himself laments, In this contest between the postmodern dialectic of image versus reality, image usually wins. It is difficult for the serious scholar to compete with the media's power to form popular views of reality through visual impact. (Bellesiles 2000, 284) This perception of violence was a significant part of the psychological frontier, and as such it likely had an impact on American

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political development. But it does not square with the level of cooperation and development on the physical frontier. The level of violence on the frontier is certainly far beyond the peace that Montesquieu anticipates, but it is not necessarily beyond Lockes notion of a state of war. Clearly, where there was no influence of civil law, peaceful desires did not generally prevail, but it does not appear that there was truly a Hobbesian war of all against all, either. To argue that the violence that did exist on the frontier follows Lockes concept of natural law, though we need to look beyond the level of violence and consider motives. Unfortunately for a Lockean analysis, much of the frontier violence of settlers against Indians, or Indians against settlers, was essentially senseless violence. It is difficult to assess how much, if any, of the warfare can be attributed to one side redressing grievances; since the grievances were real and imagined, general and specific, we cannot fairly conclude that either settlers or natives were merely enforcing the law of nature. It seems unlikely that they even agreed on what that law of nature contained, especially given their possibly irreconcilable differences concerning property rights. Griffin offers us some insights into the motives on both sides of the conflict. In both cases, we can see some Lockean motives (though certainly not attributable to Lockean influence, at least not on the native side) and hints of a law of nature. But rather than a clear picture of what constitutes a violation of natural law, we instead see a jumbled cycle of escalating violence and unjustified mayhem rather than just recompense and fair punishment.
Although settlers crossing the line were heading into land that belonged to Indians, few had moral reservations about doing so. In fact, many harbored or condoned a violent hatred of Indians. Frontier people condoned Indian slaughter because of what Indians had done. Settlers conceded that they were partly demented by their own surmisesthat is, their perceptions of reality in a brutal worldbut asserted that Indian hatred stemmed from their late sufferings under Savage Cruelty. Settlers moving west of the line, in the words of Thomas Cresap, despaired of being Massicread by a Barberous and Inhuman Enemy and being Butchered without Immediate Relief and Assistance. (Griffin 2007, 62)

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From the native point of view, the picture was similar; they, too, believed they had been wronged, and were entitled to take action, even violent action, in response.
In such circumstances, Indians had little choice but to defend their lives, liberty, and property. In particular, younger men who saw their hunting ground taken over, their relations slaughtered, and posts and settlements arising in their lands would not be restrained. They attacked traders, killed what they called Virginiansthe catch-all term for land-hungry whites entering the country that belonged to themwho made their way down the Ohio River, and savaged white hunters. (Griffin 2007, 69)

Thus what we see is a cycle of violence based on perceived general wrongs, but not specific acts. Individuals were not being punished for their own actions, as Locke expects in a state of nature; instead, entire groups, tribes, settlements were being attacked for a general history of violence not necessarily attributed to the particular victims of vengeance. Even among whites, the notion of revenge was often more prominent than any more abstract idea of justice, as Turner explains.
The Westerner defended himself and resented governmental restrictions. The duel and the blood-feud found congenial soil in Kentucky and Tennessee. The idea of the personality of law was often dominant over the organized machinery of justice. That method was best which was most direct and effective. The backwoodsman was intolerant of men who split hairs, or scrupled over the method of reaching the right. In a word, the unchecked development of the individual was the significant product of this frontier democracy. (Turner 1994b, 86-87)

Thus vigilante justice and feuds took precedence over any law, civil or natural. Individuals did not so much take the law into their own hands as decide who deserved punishment for perceived insults and injuries. This is at best a perversion of Lockes theory; at worst it is virtually a refutation. At least under these circumstances, a Lockean view of justice did not prevail on the American frontier.

Conclusion If the frontier ever did resemble a state of nature, it certainly did not stay as such. Pioneers and frontiersmen formed small communities, and eventually societies and even what we might call states. These small fledgling states often had fully functional economies and political institutions to watch over economic and social matters. The economies and governments were 20

adapted to the conditions of the frontier. Not only was the economy of every frontier village shaped to supply the needs of the rural area surrounding it, but in each the welfare of the community was protected by tight controls over such public businesses as grist-milling or retail selling. (Billington 1965, 18-19) Such societies were highly democratic, relying on participation and popular input and electing officials, often for very short terms of office. As Turner puts it, From the beginning of the settlement of America, the frontier regions have exercised a steady influence toward democracy. (Turner 1994b, 81) Local institutions were established, relying on representation, and closely and jealously guarded by the people. These participatory institutions were made necessary because a vast flow of problems forced a high degree of participation in the making of decisions, an acute pitch of political awareness among the settlers. (Elkins and McKitrick 1954, 339) Thus democratic institutions were a response to practical problems facing the community; to solve these problems communities would join together in a democratic fashion, creating democracy as it was needed. Turners frequent claim that American democracy was born on the frontier has been assailed by critics claiming that the settlers brought democracy with them from the East and from Europe; they did not create it. But this involves a misunderstanding of Turner. Billington notes that Turner never makes the claim that democracy was born on the American frontier. Only American democracy was born there, a version of democracy different from that which existed in the Old World. (Billington 1965, 21) It is this democracy and its origins with which we are concerned. We do not aim to offer an extensive analysis of democracy as it is practiced everywhere, but only that version that was essentially homegrown. And American democracy was something unique to the New World; Tocqueville, Bryce, and others have articulated the uniqueness of this particular brand of popular

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rule. A special kind of democracy developed in the United States, and its development, as Turner understood, relied heavily on the role of the American frontier in political and social life. Understanding this particular version of American democracy requires understanding its origins in the American frontier. This necessitates an exploration of frontier conditions in theoretical perspective, and this paper is only the beginning of that task. From our analysis, the American frontier does not appear to be a Lockean or Hobbesian state of nature, but something else entirely. Understanding the state of nature as it existed along the frontier, though, is essential to understanding the development of frontier democracy. In concluding that the American frontier was not a Lockean state of nature, we do not aim to deny the importance of the frontier or of Locke in American political development. We are sympathetic to both Turners frontier thesis and Hartzs liberal consensus. But understanding American history and development requires more nuance. The frontier was not entirely a lawless place, nor was it governed by a consensual law of nature. It was violent but not without cooperation and friendliness. It lacked the structure of European or coastal American society, but it was not without some civic and legal arrangements that shaped the development of frontier societies. Such societies were not spontaneous as we might see from a state of nature, Lockean or otherwise; they were offshoots of existing arrangements. Western settlers had placed some distance between themselves and centers of political power, but they did not leave society and civilization entirely behind. The concept of the frontier is still an important one in American life. Geographical expansion seems to have come to a halt, but the idea still resonates. We can see the frontier notion in the push for human space travel. McLure (2000) finds the frontier ethos in the

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expansion of technology. Similar arguments can be made for most innovations; the frontier is thoroughly ingrained in the American psyche.

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References Bailyn, Bernard. 1992. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bellesiles, Michael A. 2000. Guns Dont Kill, Movies Kill: The Medias Promotion of Frontier Violence. The Western Historical Quarterly 31(3): 284-. Billington, Ray Allen. 1965. The American Frontier. Washington, D.C.: The American Historical Association. Bryce, James. 1995. The American Commonwealth, two volumes. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Dienstag, Joshua. 1996. Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought. American Political Science Review 90(3): 497-511. Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick. 1954. A Meaning for Turners Frontier: Part I: Democracy in the Old Northwest. Political Science Quarterly 69(3): 321-353. Faragher, John Mack. 1994. Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Griffin, Patrick. 2007. American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier. New York: Hill and Wang. Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Hobbes, Thomas. 1996. Leviathan. Edited by J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Locke, John. 2003. Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. Edited by Ian Shapiro. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McLure, Helen. 2000. The Wild, Wild Web: The Mythic American West and the Electronic Frontier. The Western Historical Quarterly 31(4): 457-476. Meyers, Marvin. 1963. Louis Hartz, the Liberal Tradition in America: An Appraisal. Comparative Studies in Society and History 5(3): 261-268. Montesquieu, Charles Secondat Baron de. 1949. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated by Thomas Nugent. New York: Hafner Press. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000. Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1896. The Problem of the West. Atlantic Monthly 77: 289-297.

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Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1966 (1893). The Significance of the Frontier in American History. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms. Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1994a (1891). The Significance of History. In John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1994b (1903). Contributions of the West to American Democracy. In John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Wood, Gordon. 1972. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

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