Leaving It up to the Imagination: POV Shots and Imagining from the inside Author(s): Jinhee Choi Reviewed work(s):

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 17-25 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559136 . Accessed: 28/02/2013 10:54
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JINHEECHOI

POV Shots and Leaving It Up to the Imagination: Imaginingfrom the Inside

developed in her book Reading with Feeling, that our aesthetic appreciation of fiction contains a temporaldimension, which is in fact constrained by the trajectory of the narration process.5 Similarly, for Smith, POV shotsalthoughhe carefully avoids linking POV shots directly to characteridentification-are one of Letter Woman the importantdevices that align the viewer to a froman Unknown by providing access to character (Max Ohuls,1948) (MaxOphuls, 1948) character subjectivity.6 In this essay, I will focus on Smith's claim Recent literaturein the philosophy of film not that POV shots tend to activate centralimaginonly attemptsto explain the cognitive processes ing. I attempt to show that such a tendency involved in engaging with fiction film, but also claim about the function of film technique is addresses the textual cues that contribute to ratherdubious. In my view, POV shots rarely provide an occasion to employ central imaginevoking an emotionalresponsefrom the viewer, ing. Even if POV shots can prompt central For instance,CarlPlantingaemphasizestherole of facial expression in inducing affective imagining, with the aid of othertechniquessuch mimicry in the viewer.1 Susan Feagin shows as reaction shots or devices to evoke startle how timing-via shot length and the interval response, the tendency relationship between between shots-has a bearing on bringing out POV shots and the activationof centralimaginemotional responses from the viewer.2 Murray ing becomes so tenuous that it is quite uninSmith focuses on point of view (POV) shots as formative. It does not provide us with a one of the importantfeaturesthat encouragethe systematic way to detect the function of such a viewer to imagine the character's experience filmic technique. A stronger and systematic from the inside.3 None of these scholars claims relation, I suggest, can be found between the that the parametersthey foregroundnecessarily extent of viewers' knowledge and an activation of certaintypes of imagining.I will proposethat result in a certaintype of emotion in the viewer. Their claims are rather weak: these paralimited information on the character's experimeters-facial expression, narration process, ence or behaviorplays a more significantrole in and POV shots-are "elicitors," following eliciting centralaimagining. Feagin's terminology, in the sense that they are textual cues that contribute to the spectator's engagement. I. THEROLE OFPOVSHOTS These elicitors are identified within their larger theories of film emotion. For instance, The POV shot has taken a special place in film timing nicely illustrates Feagin's claim, theories as a device that leads the viewer to
The Journal of AestheticsandArtCriticism 63:1Winter2005

in a desolateamusement [Strolling parkon a winter evening] I alwayslikedtheplace[theamusement Brand: park] at thistimeof year. Lisa:Perhaps to imagine whatit will be in youprefer the spring.Becauseif it is alreadyspring,thereis to imagine. nothing

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18 identify with a character,by making the viewer replicatethe perceptualstate of the character.In his book Engaging Characters, Smith successfully argues against such a claim by delineating different levels at which the text guides and relates to the spectator.Smith claims that there are three levels in which the film text engages the viewer: recognition, alignment, and allegiance.7Recognition refers to the viewer's constructionof a characteras a unified person from the cues available in the text; alignment refers to the distributionof knowledge and information aboutthe story world. A POV shot is one of the devices that align the viewer to a certain characterby guiding the viewer's attention to what is significant in the narrative. We as spectators are cued to attributecertain beliefs and desires to characters-by witnessing what those characters see, want, and intend to do. Throughoutthis process, we are also informed about the story world. The last level that Smith describes is allegiance: the level at which the spectatormorally and emotionallyengages with character. However, we should note that engagement with charactersat the level of allegiance does not necessarily depend on perceptualalignment with charactersvia POV shots. As Smith and others point out, characteridentification at the level of allegiance can be achieved through various means other than POV shots. For instance,in Gold Is Not All (1910), we emotionally identify with a poor couple, even though this is done by manipulating the ranges of knowledge between the viewer and the character, without recourse to POV shots.8 We see a shot of both a poor couple and a rich couple walking along the street,divided by a wall. The message that the poor couple, although they envy the rich couple, is happier than the rich couple is narratively communicated by other means-that is, the viewer has more knowledge than both couples-rather than througha POV shot of the poor couple. Furthermore, the POV structure does not guarantee allegiancewith characters. Noel Carroll provides us with an interesting example.9 He argues thatin Empireof the Ants (1977) there is a shot of people seen from a giant ant's perspective. We see the people multiplied by the ant's many irises. However, such a structurewould not emotionally ally us with the giant ant. What

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism these two examples-Gold Is Not All and Empire of the Ants-illustrate is that although POV shots can contribute to an emotional engagementwith characters,they do not ensure it. Emotional with characters engagement requires more thanmere perceptualalignmentwith them and it is achieved in conjunction with other factors within the narrative,such as the character type and the importanceof the character. Aside from the three levels at which a film guides the viewer, Smithpostulatesthreedifferent types of mental process employed during the spectator's engagement with the narrative: acentralimagining, centralimagining, and noncognitive responses such as affective mimicry and reflex responses.10Smith adoptsthe distinction between acentral and central imagining from Richard Wollheim.11Similar distinctions can be found in othermodels: KendallWalton's imagining from the outside versus imagining from the inside and Currie's primary versus secondary simulation (or impersonal versus personal imagining).12 A main difference between these two types of imagining is that in the case of the former in each pair, one merely imagines that such and such is true in the fictional world; whereas in the latter case, one projects oneself into the fictional situation, takes on the beliefs and desires of a character, and imagines what it would be like to be in the situationin which thatcharacter is placed. There is disagreementamong these scholars regardingexactly what promptscentralimagining or to what extent central imagining is employed during the film-viewing process. Some (such as Walton) argue that the film mediumin generalpromptscentralimaginingespecially imagining seeing-while others (including Smith and Currie)argue that central imagining is prompted only locally within specific narrativecircumstances.Neither view, seems to provide us with sufficient reasons to think that film as a whole or certain filmic techniques reliably prompt central imagining. I will returnto this point shortly. As a rule of engagement,Smith proposesthat certain textual cues may foster imagining or predispose us to imagine in a certain way.13 Smith does not argue that certain textual cues are either necessary or sufficient to activate the spectator's mental faculty in an automatic manner. Certain textual cues are elicitors or

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Choi POV Shots and Imaginingfrom the Inside catalysts that tend to trigger certain cognitive mechanisms. Moreover, Smith finds a closer link between POV shots and central imagining than any other cueing structure.He argues with caution that POV shots are able to trigger the viewer's perceptual imagination because they depict the perceptual states of charactersthat are then supposedlyrenderedin the spectator.14 In other words, when we as viewers see optical POV shots, we imagine ourselves seeing the object of the character'sgaze. For example, in Dead Calm (1989), the example Smith relies on to illustrate his point, John Ingram (played by Sam Neill) inspects a deserted ship. A pulley suddenly flies in his direction. We as viewers see a POV shot of Ingramin which the pulley swings towardthe camera.Yet, we imagine seeing the pulley fly toward us! However, we should note that Smith's rule of engagement is applicable only to perceptual imaginationwhich is a subcategoryof central imaginingnot to central imagining in general. For, a' la Smith, POV shots render the perceptual states of a charactereffectively, but not the emotional states.15 To test whether optical POV shots indeed tend to trigger central imagining, we first need to ask under what circumstances we employ centralimagination.Smith and others appeal to the notion of "simulation" in explainingthe process of centralimagining.Imagininga character from the inside amountsto simulatingthe character's situation oneself and projecting one's own subsequentemotional outputs to the character.16 However, it is important to note that centralimagining,understoodas an exemplarof simulation,does not need to be activatedunless there exists an epistemic gap for the viewer to fill in. In the philosophy of mind, the simulation theory is proposed as an alternative to the theory-theoryto explain how we attributemental states to others. The theory-theory, proposed by philosopherssuch as JerryFodor and others, claims that we deploy a theory of folk psychology in order to explain and predict others' intentions, desires, and behaviors.17 According to the theory-theory,we possess a tacit theory of the human mind, which consists of a set of beliefs about causal relations that link beliefdesire inputs, internal states, and behavior outputs. When faced with a situation where we

19 need to anticipatehow otherpeople will behave, we apply such a folk psychological theory. Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols propose a weakenedversion of the theory-theory,suggesting that we do not necessarilymake recourseto law-like generalizations in attributingmental states to others, but do so based on a body of knowledge governinga certaindomain.18 On the otherhand, proponentsof the simulation theory-such as Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, and Gregory Currie-deny that we possess a complex theory of humanbehavior.'9 Rather, we simulate the situation in which others find themselves.20We imagine being in the other's shoes and run our own inference or decision-making mechanism "off-line" to generateoutputs.Drawingon our own response,we further ascribe our imagined response to the target person. One of the assumptions behind using our own cognitive or emotive mechanisms to understandor to predict the mental/ affective states of others is that we and the target person possess similar decision-making mechanisms,and when personaldispositionsor predilectionsare bracketed,we can reach a successful predictionaboutthe psychological states of others. The success of such a predictioncan be measured against the external behavioral cues availableto the attributor. I will not try to determine which theory is more plausible in explaining mental attributions. For the purpose of this essay, it is sufficient to point out that the occasion for employing either a folk psychological theory or the simulation method involves rather limited knowledge on the viewer's part: when the viewer does not have full access to the mental states or the behavioraloutcomes of the target subject. The film-viewing process places us within a kind of epistemic situationwhereeither method can be employed. Films not only provide, but also withhold, informationrelevant to understandinga character'spsychology and to predicting a character'sbehavior. Understanding a character'spsychology is a crucial step for understanding the narrative, given that Hollywood narratives are often driven by goal-oriented protagonists and that character psychology provides for a specific narrative development. As a film unfolds, the narrative constantly poses questions to the viewer: What will the protagonistdo next? What will

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20 an antiprotagonist do next to preventthe protagonist from achieving his or her goals? We need to fill in the informationgap that the narrative leaves open by making inferences from cues availableto us. The film-viewing process does provide occasions for employing either folk psychology or a simulation, especially when the viewer has limited access to a character's psychology. However, I doubt whether POV shots provide occasions for either. When POV shots are used, the viewer's rangeof knowledge aboutwhat the characterperceives is no less than that of the character.The structureof a POV shot is often composed of two steps: (1) the characterlooks off screen (a point/glance shot) and (2) the object is seen (a point/object shot). By following the glance of the character,we attributea perceptualbelief to the character that thereis an object. In my view, such a situation does not require any type of central imagination. POV shots provide, not withhold, informationabout the character's perceptual state. We are informed about the object of the character's gaze, and thus we do not need to imagine the character's perceptual experience ourselves in orderto infer that the charactersees an object.2' Let us examine closely the scene in Dead Calm that Smith describesto illustratehis point. As the boat that carries Ingramapproachesthe ship, we are aligned with Ingram via POV shots. Shortly after he ascends the ship and startsto investigate,he hears a loud bang. As he turnsaroundto find the source of the sound, the cameracuts to show a closeup of a pulley flying in his direction, and then cuts back to Ingram who avoids the pulley. Smith argues that the POV shot of the pulley flying toward the camera, combined with other textual cues, invites the viewer to imagine Ingram' s experiencefrom the inside: we imagine the pulley swinging toward us. However, there seem to be a couple of problems with using this kind of example to support Smith's claim that POV shots trigger perceptualcentralimagining. First, despite the insertionof the POV shot of the pulley, the camera positions in this scene situate the viewer as an observer:the viewer's knowledge slightly exceeds that of Ingram.As Ingram walks toward the middle of the ship with his back to the camera, the camerazooms in to show his back in medium closeup. The

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism gradually tightened framing signals a looming danger and evokes suspense in the viewer, although the source of the danger is yet to be revealed. When the pulley swings directly towardthe camera, the viewer is startledat the suddenappearance of the pulley. However, as if in answer to our primaryquestion of whether Ingramwill be able to escape the pulley, in the next shot we see Ingramdodge the pulley. It is interesting to note that the camera, instead of showing us a reaction shot of Ingramimmediately, cuts away to an overhead shot of Ingram in extreme long shot. The shot shows where the pulley was coming from and assures the viewer that Ingramis safe. It is not until the next shot that the viewer is able to see Ingram's facial expression-which is surprisinglycalm-when he stops the swinging pulley. Furthermore, the alleged employment of central imagination while watching the scene seems to be redundantat least and indeterminate at most. On the one hand, the effect of the scene, "a visceral flinching," as Smith puts it, does not seem to be the result of centralimagining.22 This more or less startle response is a product of neither acentralnor central imagining. A startleresponse occurs independentlyof any cognitively mediated response, and in this case, independentlyof the viewer's concern for Ingram'ssafety. On the otherhand, if, as Smith suggests, POV shots prompt central imagining along with the assistance of other techniques such as reaction shots or startleresponses, it is hard to pinpoint the exact causal connection between POV shots and central imagining employed by the viewer, if it were indeed employed. Despite Smith's cautionaryattemptto revive an intuitionthatPOV structure is closely linked with character identification, I find such a claim-that is, POV shots tend to triggercentral imagining as a part of what Smith calls the "multifacetedalignment"-rather too weak for delineating the process of central imagining. Although it is true that POV structure is a reliable-but not the only-device to align the viewer to a character,such an alignment does not necessarily demandthat the viewer imagine from the inside. It is often the case that the disparitybetween the viewer and the character in terms of their ranges of knowledge inhibits the former from simulating the latter's exact

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Choi POV Shots and Imaginingfrom the Inside experience even with the assistance of POV shots. Consider, for example, the scene in which Ingram finds out that Hughie Warriner (Billy Zane) lied to him and his wife Rae (Nicole Kidman) about what happened on the ship. Ingramhurriesto returnto his own boat to warn his wife about Hughie. As Ingram nears the boat, he jumps off to get onto the rearof the boat but he misses by an inch. Instead,he is hit by the boat's propeller. Shortly after, we see Ingram's POV shot of the boat moving away from him and toward the far background, followed by a reaction shot of him looking off screen in despair. It is interesting to note how the film orchestratesthe scene in such a way thatour concernfor Ingramdiscouragesus from completely identifying with him. Before we are shown his point of view, we see him bleeding in an underwater shot. We as viewers imagine both his pain and despair, while Ingram seems for the moment to be oblivious to his own pain. He is preoccupiedwith his concernfor his wife, until he swims back to his boat and discovers the severe wound on his arm.In my view, there is a strongerand more informativerelationship between the extent of the viewer's knowledge and the employmentof centralimagining.In the next section, I will explore this thesis further. Before I discuss my own model, I first need to addresssome possible objections. One might point out thatI reducethe function of POV shots solely to their representational roles, that is, that they deliver to the viewer informationabout what a charactersees, while neglecting their additional functions, such as performingan expressive role, that is, to underscore what a characterfeels or experiences.23 One might further argue that subjective POV shots occupy a special place by engaging the spectator's imagination more directly. For, unlike optical POV shots, most of which depict the object of the character's vision more or less objectively, subjective POV shots imitate or emulate the subjective experience of the character. I will examine Currie's claim that subjective shots have privileged access to a character'sperceptualsubjectivity. Currie claims that subjective POV shots may encouragethe viewer to imagine what it is like to have the experience of the character.24 Like Smith, Currie distinguishes between two types of imagining-primary (impersonal)and

21 secondary (personal) imagination-in order to show the differentlevels of imagining involved in watchingfilms. One of the similarities between central imagining and secondary imagining is that both are examples of self-imagining. That is, the object of imagining is yourself: "you" figure in the contentof your imagination.In the case of centralimagining, you imagine yourself seeing the characters inside the fictional world and observe the events as they unfold. Similarly, in the case of secondary imagining, you imagine what you would do or feel in the situationthat the charactersare facing. POV shots, however, do not occupy a special position within Currie'stheory. Currieis reluctant to privilege POV shots in terms of their power to trigger the secondary imagination, but argues that subjective shots may trigger secondaryimagining. For instance, in North by Northwest (1959), Thornhill (played by Cary Grant), is mistaken for Kaplan by Vandamn's henchmen. He is forced by Vandamn's henchmen to drink and then to drive drunk. As Thornhillrealizes thathe is in danger,he tries to escape by pushing Vandamn's men out of the car. When he drives ratherrecklessly down the hill, we see a series of subjective POV shots intercutwith reactionshots of Thornhill;we see a subjective shot of Thornhill onto which the images of the road are superimposed. Currie would argue that in such a case the content of the subjective POV shot is "a rough guide to what we should imagine his experience is like."25 It is truethatsubjectivePOV shots mark the subjective states of charactersmore explicitly than do optical POV shots. However, do subjective POV shots more easily lead the spectatorto imagine the character'sconditions from the inside? I do not believe so. Why does a subjective POV shot put us in a betterposition thanan optical POV shot to initiate centralimagining?In fact, such a shot seems to relieve the viewer from the burdenof imagining from the inside: the shot mimics, but does not exactly replicate, the perceptual state of the character.Why should the viewer need to imagine anything when the character's perceptual state is directly available to him or her? It might be possible that subjective shots trigger a viewer's own personal memory similar to the experience portrayed. For instance, when one sees a portrayalof a character'spounding

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22 headache from a hangover via a swirling camera movement or shaking image, it might bring back the viewer's own personal memory from past experience. But such a case does not make the viewer project himself or herself imaginativelyinto the fictional situation.Rather, it enables the viewer to retrieve,by association, his or her actualmemory. Currieand Smith might still ask: What, then, is the experience that we have while watching more drasticallymarkedsubjective POV shots, such as the dolly-zoom shots thatmimic the dizziness of Scottie (played by Jimmy Stewart)in Vertigo(Hitchcock, 1958) when he looks down a long, winding staircase?26 Smith and Currie might attemptto explain the effect renderedin the viewer by recourse to the way a shot is presented: that is, it is presented as a subjective POV shot. However, it does not seem convincing to argue that that is the main source of our experience. Suppose we see two images shot from a moving rollercoaster:one is framedas a subjective shot while the other is not. In both cases, the images give rise to dizziness in most viewers. Although it has yet to be determined empirically, my prediction,in the former case, where the shot is framedas a subjective shot, is that the viewer's response does not result from centrally imagining having such an experience or from simulating the character'sexperience, but rather that it is directly caused by seeing such an image. To give rise to such an effect, it does not have to be framedas a subjectivePOV shot or as an optical POV shot. If my hypothesis is correct,we do not need to appeal to the notion of central imagining or to secondary imagining to explain the effects of watching the subjective shots of Scottie in Vertigo. The viewer does not experience feelings similar to those of Scottie because he or she simulates Scottie's perceptual experience. The viewer has such an experience because the dolly-zoom affects his or her vision directly with its swift shift of objects in focus. The main reason for having such an experience has to do with the fact that this affective mechanism is modular;it is built in such a way thatwe cannot help but feel dizziness when there is swift change in the visual field or when it is unstable. If so, unlike what Smith and Currie would argue, the subjective POV shot should not be considered a special device that leads the

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism spectator to imagine a character's experience from the inside.

II. WHAT IS IT, REALLY?THE EXTENTOF THEVIEWER'S KNOWLEDGE

What,then, contributesto engagingthe viewer's central imagination? Smith's and Currie's solutions rely on the intuition that the depth of narration-especially subjective narration-has to do with promptingcentral imagining. Both optical POV shots and subjectivePOV shots are often considered to be the devices that cue the viewer to the character'sperceptualor mental subjectivity,which then presumablytriggersthe viewer to imagine the character's experience from the inside. However, as I hope I have shown in the previous section, the fact thatPOV shots inform us about character psychology undercutsthe possibility that central imagining is needed: when we are given information aboutcharacters,there is no need to imagine it ourselves. There appears to be an inverse relationship between the extent of the viewer's background knowledge and the viewer's need to employ folk psychology or a simulation:the more the viewer's knowledge is restricted,the greaterthe need for the viewer to engage in one or the other process. That is, when we lack psychological informationabout characters,we then need to engage in some process-whether theorizing, simulating, or imagining-to obtain it. Certainly, we should add a few constraintsto this general thesis. First, we as viewers do not generally employ folk psychology or a simulation to understandthe psychological states of all charactersin a film, but only of those who are pertinentto the narrative.27 If this is the case, the need for engaging either process-theorizing or simulating-to understanda character's psychology will be bounded by the narrative saliency of that character.Second, the viewer's knowledge of generic norms sometimes obviates the viewer's need to rely on folk psychology or simulationin orderto predictthe character's future behaviors. For example, while watching a generic Hollywood ending where the protagonist runs to the heroine to confess his love for her-for example, When Harry Met Sally (1989), Reality Bites (1994),

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Choi POV Shots and Imaginingfrom the Inside and There's Something About Mary (1998)there is no need for the viewer to employ folk psychology or a simulation to predict whether the heroine will accept the protagonist's love for her. We know that she will! However, films governed less by generic formulas invite the viewer to imagine the character'ssituations. An example will illustrate my point. In the last scene of Vertigo,Scottie takes Judy (played by Kim Novak) to the top of a bell tower to confront her with the fact that she helped Scottie's friend murderhis wife. As Scottie walks up the stairs,he stops to look down twice. Both times, we see the stairs shot with a dolly-zoom, which emulates the subjective state of Scottie. However, when Scottie is near the top of the tower, he looks down the stairs one more time. It seems that if we are to employ central imagining, it occurs when Hitchcock does not cut to the shot of the stairs.That is, only then does the centralimagining come into play; for that is the only time that Scottie's perceptual state is not available to the viewer. Looking at Scottie's ambivalentfacial expressions, the viewer imagines what Scottie's experience would be like, and at the same time attemptsto predictwhether Scottie will be able to continue to follow Judy. Shortlyafter,we see a shot of stairsusing a normal lens, which indicates that Scottie finally overcame his fear of heights. Given his current perceptual state, we can furtheranticipate that he will go up the stairsto confrontJudy. Currie seems to believe that there is a connection between secondaryimaginationand the extent of a viewer's knowledge, although he does not fully explore the idea. He argues that secondary imagining is needed when we lack information about the character's experience; we need to imaginatively experience it in order to fill in the gap. Although the authoror filmmaker guides us and provides us information about the charactersand what they feel, it is impossible for a fiction or a film to portray every minute detail aboutcharacter psychology. Moreover, if a character'spsychology is completely laid out for the viewer, then it leaves "nothingto the imagination."28 This, according to Currie,should be considered a stylistic vice. To make the viewer simulate a character's situationor mental process, the extent to which the narrativeprovides informationabout character psychology should be between complete

23 which makes simulationunnecestransparency, sary, and absolute opacity, which makes simulation nearly impossible. This requirement,as Currie calls it, can be named "psychological naturalism."29 I wonder, however, whether so-called psychological naturalismis a useful constraintfor the viewer to simulate the character'sexperience. The requirementis so broad that the vast will fulfill it. Even experimajorityof narratives mental films such as ChantalAkerman'savantgarde film, Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce,1080 Bruxelles (1975), which relies on neitherPOV shots nor reaction shots, is able to communicate the character'spsychology in such a way that the viewer registersthe character's psychological disturbances. In the remainderof this essay, I will examine Akerman's Jeanne Dielman to show that what facilitates the viewer's central imagination is primarilythe viewer's limited access to character psychology. By examining this example, I wish to show that neither the presence of a certain type of filmic device nor explicit cues to character psychology is necessary for the viewer to exercise central imagination. It has been alleged that Akerman's minimal and hyperrealiststyle blocks the viewer from identifying with a character.However, in my view, POV shots are only one of many devices that align the viewer with the character.It is true that Jeanne Deilman is not as expressive as protagonists in Hollywood movies; she rarely communicates her emotions verbally. But this means only that more attentionand imagination is requiredof the viewer. Jeanne Dielman is a middle-aged housewife and a part-timeprostitute.She is visually dominant throughout the film; indeed, excessively so. The story takes place in three days and we observe Jeanne's everyday routine. Each scene in Jeanne Dielman is differentiated by a type of action within a specific space. Together they function as narrative building blocks: potato peeling in the kitchen, coffee brewing in the kitchen, taking a bath in the bathroom, shoe shining in the kitchen, and dining in the living room. We become used to Jeanne's patternsof action duringthe first day in the film. That first day, Jeanne establishes a rhythm that will be disturbedafterthe visit of her second customer. We centrally imagine what she feels by paying

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24 attentionto her behavioralcues: she is indifferent, meticulous, compulsive, and self-content. However, the film withholds narratively importantinformationfrom the viewer. We do not see what happens in the bedroom between Jeanne and her first two customers. We only see the effects of the encounterwith the second customer on the second day. After the second her meticulouscustomer leaves her apartment, ness is replaced by sloppiness, and her efficiency with delay. For instance,Jeanne's hair is all tussled when she sees her second customer out. She puts the money that she earned from the second customerin the tureen,but forgets to replace the top. Jeanne remembers that she forgot to put the top back only after her son, Sylvain, arrives home from school. We also learn that she overcooked the potatoes and that she is perplexedby how to dispose of them. We see that she leaves the light on in her room and turns it off only after she throws away the potatoes. Since Jeanne's gestures and behavior are so meticulous in the first half of the film, the mistakes she makes in the latter half stand out. Jeanne drops the brush when she shines Sylvain's shoes. She drops a spoon and has to wash it again. All the objects that seem so deliberatelymanipulatedin the first half of the film slip throughher fingers in the second part. Her swift movement in the first half is delayed or slowed in the second half. When Jeanne peels the potatoes, she stops every so often as if she is distracted.Dinner is late because Jeanne had to go out and buy more potatoes after she overcooked the first batch. All these excessive behavioral cues indicate that Jeanne's life is disturbed. They lead the viewer to centrally imagine what might have happened in the bedroom with the second customer. What is it that Jeanneis tryingto cope with? Contrary to dominant analyses of the film that claim that Jeanne Dielman blocks the engagement with Jeanne, the film seems to provide the viewer with behavioralcues to the protagonist'spsychology. Akermanpresentsthe character'spsychology only indirectly, that is, via visual disturbancesand the pace of movements, ratherthan throughthe cause and effect linear logic often found in Hollywood narratives. The formal patternthat is set up through the repetition of similar types of activities

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism enables the viewer to detect visual disruption and to anticipatesome of the dramaticchanges in Jeanne's life. When the viewer begins to notice the changes in Jeanne's life, the viewer first tries to figure out what is causing all the changes. When Jeanne is shown, for the first time, with her customer in the bedroom, the viewer centrallyimagines what Jeanneis going to do or what exactly Jeanne is experiencing. Jeanne's facial expression does not provide a clear cue to her psychological state. The murder of Jeanne's last customermight come as a surprise to the viewer if the viewer had not detected the changes in Jeanne's life, or as a suspensefulresolutionif the viewer had noticed slight changes in Jeanne's behavior. Akerman consciously refrains from using POV shots or closeups of the character's facial expressions. Such a strategy in fact mandatesthe viewer to imagine Jeanne'sexperiencefrom the inside. As the Jeanne Dielman example illustrates, the resort to simulation or central imagining is more likely to occur in situations where the spectatordoes not have direct access to character psychology or futurebehavior,ratherthanin cases where certain filmic devices are used. If this is the case, the rules of engagementcannot be derived from the structureof filmic devices such as POV shots or subjective shots, but are ratherto be found in the ways the narrativeand the narrative processes of the film withhold informationaboutthe character'spsychology or behavior. In this essay, I began by examining Smith's claim that POV shots tend to trigger central imagining.However, as Smith admits,the structure of POV shots does not necessarily prompt central imagining. In my view, POV structures are,in fact, frequently unnecessary for the viewer to exercise his or her own central imagination, since the viewer is already informed about the character's perceptual experience. Next I shifted the focus to subjective shots, which, accordingto Currie,tend to engage the viewer more directly by giving rise to certain perceptual or visceral effects in the viewer. I argued that the effects in question should rather be ascribed to the particularperceptual capacity that makes us susceptible to certain types of visual stimuli, ratherthanto centralimagining. Instead of looking for a cause that triggers central imagining in the depth of narration,

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Choi POV Shots and Imaginingfrom the Inside I proposed to examine the cases in question in the light of the range of the viewer's knowledge about characters.That is, what triggers central imagining or simulation is the lack of the viewer's knowledge regarding character psychology or his or her future behavior, which mandates the viewer to employ central
imagining. 30 JINHEE CHOI of Film Studies Department CarletonUniversity Ottawa,Ontario KIS 5B6, Canada
INTERNET:jinheechoi@carleton.ca

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17. JerryFodor, The Language of Thought(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975); Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (MIT Press, 1987). 18. StephenStich and ShaunNichols, "FolkPsychology: Simulationor Tacit Theory?"Mind and Language7 (1992): 35-71. 19. Robert Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Simulation," Mind and Language 1 1986: 158-171; Alvin Goldman, "Empathy,Mind, and Morals" in Mental Simulation, ed. MartinDavies and Tony Stone (Oxford:Blackwell, 1995), pp. 185-208; GregoryCurrie,"Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science" in Mental Simulation, pp. 151-169. 20. Goldman,"Empathy, MindandMorals," pp. 188-189. 21. Carrollmakes a similar claim when he questions the necessity of the secondarysimulation(personalimagining) in orderto understand the narrative.That is, POV shots do not necessarilylead us to infer the mental states of the characters. For instance, in the example Carroll uses, when a character sees lava approaching him, we know without inference that he will think that the lava is dangerous.That is, there is no need to simulate the character'smental state in orderto think that a characterwill view the lava as dangerous.My point is concernedwith an earlierstep; a perceptual belief ascribed to the character-that is, the lava is coming in his direction-does not need to be simulatedby the viewer. See Noel Carroll, "Towarda Theory of Film Editing" in Theorizing the Moving Image (New York: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996), p. 407. 22. Smith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 412. 23. An anonymousreferee broughtsuch an objection to my attention. 24. Currie,Image and the Mind, p. 180. In his criticism of Currie'sclaim that POV shots seldom engage the central imagining but that subjective shots do, Smith argues that both subjectiveshots and objective optical point of view are likely to foster centralimagining.Accordingto Smith, there is no principled way of privileging subjective shots over POV shot in terms of giving rise to central imagining. MurraySmith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 422. 25. Ibid. 26. Smith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 422. 27. Noel Carroll brought this counterexample to my attention. 28. Currie,Image and Mind, p. 153. 29. Currie,Image and Mind, p. 155. 30. An earlierversion of this essay was presentedduring the panel entitled "PhilosophicalStudies of Contemporary Visual Arts"of the Pacific APA, 2003. I would like to thank the audience there for comments. I would also like to thank Noel Carroll,Susan Feagin, Carl Plantinga,and an anonymous referee of JAAC for their insightful comments. Rebecca Swender and StephanJohnsonhelped me tremendously in improvingthe writingof this essay.

1. Carl Plantinga, "Scene of Empathy and the Human Face" in Passionate Views, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (JohnsHopkins University, 1999), pp. 239-255. 2. Susan Feagin, "Time and Timing" in Passionate Views,pp. 168-179. 3. Murray Smith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside" in Film Theory and Philosophy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 412-430. 4. Feagin, "Timeand Timing,"pp. 171-172. 5. Ibid. 6. Smith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"pp. 416-417. 7. Murray Smith, Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 82-86. 8. I owe this example to Ben Brewster,"TheScene at the Movies" in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. ThomasElasesser (London:BFI, 1990), p. 323. 9. Noel Carroll, "Towarda Theory of Film Editing"in Theorizing the Moving Image (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 407. 10. Smith, "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 416. 11. Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 74-75. 12. Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 28-35; Gregory Currie,Image and Mind (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995), pp. 152-155. 13. Smith "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 416. 14. Smith "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 417. 15. Smith "Imaginingfrom the Inside,"p. 418. 16. Smith,Engaging Characters,pp. 95-98.

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