1) MATABUENA vs.

CERVANTES (38 SCRA 284)

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant's brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six
years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix
died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the
estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation
was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common law relationship.

HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.

2) PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA vs MARY ANN P. VILLA

ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
INGREMARK DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, G.R. No. 160708 October
16, 2009
Ravina v. Villa Abrille G.R. No. 160708
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They
have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their
mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in
Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said
lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is
registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro's lot. The house was finished in
the early 1980's but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and
an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro

nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann's consent, as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
and acting in connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the
house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from
the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
children, so much so that one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same
being contrary to law and evidence.[10]

RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her
children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners[21]
surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then
were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with
such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damages caused.[23] It is patent in this case that petitioners' alleged acts fall short
of these established civil law standards.

3) MARIA CHING vs JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006

MARIA B. CHING v. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., et al.

506 SCRA 735 (2006)

In line with the policy of the State, the law emphatically prohibits the sale of properties
between spouses.
Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint
for recovery of property and damages against Maria Ching, praying for the nullification of the
deed of sale and of transfer certificate and the issuance of a new one. Goyanko et al. aver that
they are the real owners of the property involved. They further contend that it was after their
father's death that they found out that a contract of sale involving the same property has been
executed by their father and common-law wife Ching. However, Ching claimed that she is the
actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed
the complaint against Ching, declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the
sale as null and void, fictitious and simulated.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null and
void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. 138405, in favor of the Maria Ching, was null
and void for being contrary to morals and public policy
HELD:
The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriage between
Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Moreover, while this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, the court find no evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record
shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband
and wife, there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage to
Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that the property located at
Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the subject property was not
conjugal, still the court cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on records that they
have been living together as common-law husband and wife.
The court therefore finds the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching
null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The purported sale, having been
made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine, undermines the stability of the family, a basic
social institution which public policy vigilantly protects.

4) SPS. RAMON LEQUIN and VIRGINIA LEQUIN vs SPS. RAYMUNDO

VIZCONDE and SALOME LEQUIN VIZCONDE, G.R. No. 177710, October 12,
2009
A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service.[12] For a contract to be valid, it must have three essential
elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of
the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.

The requisites of consent are (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
explained that intelligence in consent is vitiated by error, freedom by violence, intimidation or
undue influence, and spontaneity by fraud
Deceit is also present when one party, by means of concealing or omitting to state material
facts, with intent to deceive, obtains consent of the other party without which, consent
could not have been given. Art. 1339 of the Civil Code is explicit that failure to disclose facts
when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations,
constitutes fraud
. Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a party's
consent to a contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price,
the contract is null and void ab initio.
There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element
of consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price
has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of
consideration.[18] Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that "if the price is
simulated, the sale is void," also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as
indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually
made.[19]
Anent the second issue, the PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as consideration
for the transfer of the 500-square meter lot to petitioners must be restored to the latter. Otherwise, an
unjust enrichment situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the 500- square meter lot is legally
owned by petitioners as shown by the testimony of de Leon; therefore, they have no legal obligation to
pay PhP 50,000 therefor. Art. 22 of the Civil Code provides that "every person who through an act or
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." Considering that the
512 square-meter lot on which respondents' house is located is clearly owned by petitioners, then the
Court declares petitioners' legal ownership over said 512 square-meter lot. The amount of PhP
50,000 should only earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of complaint
up to finality of judgment and not 12% since such payment is neither a loan nor a forbearance of
credit.[20] After finality of decision, the amount of PhP 50,000 shall earn interest of 12% per annum

until fully paid.

5) FABILLO vs. IAC (195 SCRA 28)

Facts:
- Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother Florencio a house and lot in San Salvador, Palo,
Leyte, and to her husband a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte. After Justina's death,
Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. The court approved the project of
partition but said that the ownership of the land of Florencio be litigated and determined in
separate proceedings. So two years later, Florencio asked Atty. Murillo to assist him in
recovering the San Salvador property. Murillo asked him for 40% of the money value of the
house and lot as a contingent fee in case of success. Murillo and Florencio then entered
into a contract: Florencio agreed to pay Murillo, in case of success, the sum equivalent to
40% of whatever benefit Florencio may derive from such cases. Also, if the house and lot or
a portion thereof is just occupied by Florencio or his heirs, Murillo shall have the option of
either occupying or leasing to any interested party 40% of the house and lot.
- Murillo, pursuant to the contract, filed a case against Justina's husband to recover the San
Salvador property. The case was terminated when the court, upon the parties' compromise
agreement, declared Florencio the lawful owner of the San Salvador and Pugahanay property.
So Murillo then proceeded to exercise ownership over 40% of said properties and installed a
tenant in the Pugahanay property.
- Eventually, Florencio claimed exclusive rights over the properties and refused to give Murillo
the share of the produce of the properties. Murillo then filed a complaint, asking that he be
declared owner of 40% of the two properties. Florencio asked that the contract be declared null
and void, plus that they had vitiated consent.
- The lower court: There was insufficient evidence to prove that the consent was vitiated.
Ordered Florencio to pay 40% of the net produce of the property. Declared Murillo as owner of
40% of both the properties. IAC affirmed.
- Note: The case is being carried on by Florencio and Murillo's heirs.

Issue: Stipulation valid?

Held: YES. A contingent fee does not fall under prohibition in Art 1491 par 5. While Art 1491 par
5 prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase the properties and rights which are the objects
of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession, this prohibition applies
only if the sale of the assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the client's property. A contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a

contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition. The payment of such fee is not made during
the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled
by the lawyer. As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence and no fraud is committed,
a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
However, a careful look at the contract shows that the parties intended 40% of the value of the
properties as Murillo's contingent fee. Plus, the stipulation on Murillo having the option to
occupy or lease to any interested party 40% of the house and lot is declared vague. The
ambiguity should be resolved against Murillo because it was he who drafted the contract.
IAC decision reversed. Florencio's heirs ordered to pay Murillo's heirs the amount of P3k as his
contingent fee.

6) CONCEPCION R. AINZA vs. SPOUSES PADUA, G.R. No. 165420, June 30, 2005
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category? The
answer: it is a voidable contract.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of
the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case Gimena had
no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even
to the husband alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by the legal
provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code).
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all the essential elements are untainted
but Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable
because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the
contract cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the
Civil Code. By process of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable contract

The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the
action to annul t[h]5e same must be commenced within six years from the time the right of
action accrued. 1 Eugenia sold the property in April 1987 hence Antonio should have
asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action was commenced by
Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by
prescription.
Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Art. 173 should
apply, Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the sale because since April
1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such action being filed.
In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of her

husband is voidable. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask
for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning
the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.
Ainza vs padua
June 30, 2005, 462 scra 614
Meeting of the Minds in a Contract of Sale
This is a case involving family members. In April 1987, Ainza and her daughter Eugenia
orally agreed that Ainza pay P100k in exchange for half of the portion of Eugenia's
undivided conjugal property (a lot located in QC). No Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed. There was physical delivery of the land through Concepcion's other daughter
(Natividad) acting as atty-in-fact. Concepcion thereafter allowed Natividad and her
husband occupy the purchased portion of the land.
In 1994, Antonio caused the division of the lot into three (two were occupied by the
spouses), necessarily displacing Natividad. He also had each subdivision titled. Antonio
requested Natividad to vacate the premises. Antonio averred that his wife only admitted
of selling 1/3 of the property to Concepcion for which a receipt was issued signed by
Concepcion. The RTC ruled in favor of Concepcion. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
CA explained that the property is conjugal hence the sale should have been with
Antonio's consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of sale between Ainza and Eugenia is valid.
HELD: Yes it is valid until annulled (voidable). There was a perfected contract of sale
between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a
portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay
P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when both
parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to
Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of P100,000.00, as evidenced by the
receipt. Since the land was undivided when it was sold, Concepcion is entitled to have half
of it.
Antonio cannot, however, attack the validity of the sale b/n his wife and his mom-in-law,
either under the Family Code or the Old Civil Code due to prescription. The sale came
to his knowledge in 1987. He only filed the case in 1999. His right prescribed in 1993
(under the FC [5 years]) and 1997 (under OCC [10 years]).

7) GAN TINGCO vs. PABINGUIT (35 PHIL 81)

One of the bodies of law which conastitute the legislation now in force in
the Novisima Recopilacion. In Law 4, Title 14, Book 5 of the same is found
the following provision: "We order that in public auctions held by direction of
our alcaldes, neither the latter nor any person whomsoever in their name
shall bid in anything sold at such public auctions." The
word alcaldes means judges. The caption of Title 14 is " Alcaldes or
Provincial Judges," and the entire title deals with the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, the Penal Code was
also in force. Article 400 of the latter prohinits, under penalty, any judge
from taking part, either directly, or indirectly, in any operation of exchange,

trade or porfit with respect to things not the product of his own property,
within the territory over which he exercises jurisdiction. Judging from the
legal oprecedents on which the Civil Code is based, it would not seem too
much to conclude that the said article of the Civil Code does not make any
distinction between property in litigation. In effect, it appears to be as
delicate a matter for a judge to take part in the sale of property that had
been the subject of ligitgation in his court, as to intervene in auction of
property which, though not directly litigated in his court, is nevertheless
levied upon and sold as the result of a writ of execution issued by him. What
the law intends to avoid is the improper interference with an interest of a
judge in a thing levied upon and sold by his
order.
If under the law Gardner was prohibited from acquiring the ownership of
Acabo's lands, then he could not have transmitted to Faustino Abad the right
of ownership that he did not possess; nor could Abad, to whom this alleged
ownership had not been transmitte, have conveyed the same to Pabinguit.
What Gardner should have done in view of the fact that the sale, as he
finally acknowledged, was void, was to claim the price that had been
deposited in court, and the justice of the peace of Guijulngan should have
declared the auction void and have ordered a new sale to be held, besides
correcting the errors that had been committed in the proceedings. To the
reasons already stated, there is to be added the additional one, with respect
to the sale made by Faustino Abad to Silvino Pabinguit, that Abad was a
minor at the time - a circumstance that deprived him of capacity to sell (Civil
Code, art. 1263). Abad had no ownership to transmit to anyone and,
besides, he had no personality to enable him to contract by himself, on
account of his lack of legal age
Sanchez, the sheriff, the sole notary who certified all these deeds of
conveyance in order that Pabinguit might become owner of those coconut
lands with which his own lands adjoined, was in such a hurry that, as he
testified at the trial, on the very same day of the auction he had already
executed in behalf of Henry Gardner the final deed of sale of the said lands,
without allowing time for their possible redemption. Section 466 of Act No.
190 prescribes that if redemption has not been requested, this deed is to be
executed within the twelve months subsequent to the
sale

8) MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION (114 SCRA 77)

MACARIOLA vs.
ASUNCION
A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982, 114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent JudgeAsuncion in Civil Case

3010 which became final for lack of an appeal. One of the parties in that case was
Macariola. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November
11, 1963.
Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots involved in the partition, was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon. On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a
portion of the said lot to JudgeAsuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte with "acts
unbecoming a judge." The complainant alleged that that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010 decided by him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said provision.
HELD:
The Court finds that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment
of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For
the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
When the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of
the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the
amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of
partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there
was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondentJudge did not buy the lot in
question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from
Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
Therefore, the respondent Associate Justice of the Court of Appealsis hereby reminded
to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

9) CALIMLIM-CANULLAS vs. FORTUN, G.R. No. L-57499. June 22, 1984

MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner,vs. HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First
instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December
19, 1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in
question with an area of approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon
DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a
judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch II, which judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES
for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also
inherited by me from my deceased parents."
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19,
1980 for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the
house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land,
were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land
together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because
they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale,
In its original judgment, respondent Court principally declared DAGUINES "as the lawful owner
of the land in question as well as the one-half of the house erected on said land." Upon
reconsideration prayed for by MERCEDES, however, respondent Court resolved:

WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court, promulgated on October 6,
1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut
trees;
Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A)
including the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between
Fernando Canullas (vendor) and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes CalimlimCanullas;

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the
husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property;
(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid
under the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

HELD: The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the
second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging
to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the
conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of
the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the
value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, relied upon by respondent Judge, it was held
that the land belonging to one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a house,

becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid
to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691 (1961), where the following was explained:
As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be
deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the
very latest, to the time immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the
conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the
time their values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that
time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said
properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943 decision,
subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition
should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil
Code) ...

The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the house
and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to
morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had
abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from
whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from
the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy."

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other
subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were
allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil
law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over
the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family
law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage,
otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be
imposed upon the wig of the parties. That was the ruling in Buenaventura vs. Bautista, also
penned by Justice JBL Reyes (CA) 50 O.G. 3679, and cited in Matabuena vs. Cervantes. We
quote hereunder the pertinent dissertation on this point:

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as
when the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common- law
relationship.

As announced in the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura vs.
Bautista, 50 OG 3679, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally.
If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court,
'to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear
of undue influence and improper pressure upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law, ..., then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased'.
Moreover, as pointed out by Ulpian "It would not be just that such donations should subsist,
lest the conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better." So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage (Emphasis supplied)

10) DIONISIO FIESTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990
Fiestan vs CA
G.R. No. 81552 May 28, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada were the owners of a parcel of land

wituated in Ilocos Sur which they mortgaged to the DBP as security for their P22,400.00 loan. For
failure of petitioners to pay their mortgage indebtedness, the lot was acquired by the DBP
as the highest bidder at a public auction sale after it was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP. A
certificate of sale was subsequently issued by the Provincial Sheriff on the same day and the
same was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Earlier, petitioners executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered. Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property
within the one-year period, petitioners' TCT lot was cancelled by the Register of Deeds
and in lieu thereof, it was issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of
consolidation of ownership. The DBP sold the lot to Francisco and the same was registered in

the Office of the Register of Deeds. Subsequently, the DBP's title over the lot was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, the TCT was issued to Francisco Peria.
Francisco Peria secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due
thereon. He thereafter mortgaged to the PNB as security for his loan of P15,000.00 as required by
the bank to increase his original loan since petitioners were still in possession of the lot, the
Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises. On the other hand, petitioners filed on
August 23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer
certificates of title against the DBP, PNB, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is null and void by virtue of lack of a valid levy.
HELD:
No. The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15
of Rule 39 and a valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic
requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property be sold at public auction. The case at
bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be
identified or set apart by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of the mortgagor for the
purpose of satisfying the mortgage indebtedness. For, the essence of a contract of mortgage
indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the
debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment or fulfillment of the obligation to answer
the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of payment. By virtue of the special power
inserted or attached to the mortgage contract, the mortgagor has authorized the mortgageecreditor or any other person authorized to act for him to sell said property in accordance with the
formalities required under Act No. 3135, as amended.
The Court finds that the formalities prescribed under Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, were substantially complied with in the instant case.

11) FEDERICO N. RAMOS vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO A.C. No. 6210,
December 9, 2004
12) MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES REYES, ET AL., G.R. No. 154645, July
13, 2004
13) BIENVENIDO R. MEDRANO, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R.
No. 150678, February 18, 2005

14) Fortune Tobacco Corp. versus NLRC (200 SCRA 766)

15) Balantakbo s. CA, G.R. No. 108515, October 6, 1995
16) Phil. Suburban Dev. Corp. versus Auditor General 63 SCRA 397)
17) Froilan versus Pan Oriental Shipping Co. 12 SCRA 276
18) P.T. Cerna Corp. versus CA 221 SCRA 19
19) Leonardo versus Maravilla, 393 SCRA 156, November 27, 2002
20) Dy, Jr. versus CA 198 SCRA 826
21) Danguilan versus IAC 168 SCRA 22
22) Pasagui versus Villablanca 68 SCRA 18
23)Manuel Dulay Ent. Versus CA 225 SCRA 68
24) Addison versus Felix 38 Phil 404
25) Municipality of Victorias versus CA 149 SCRA 31
Moreover, it is expressly provided by law that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered,
when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. (Civil Code Art. 1497). Where
there is no express provision that title shall not pass until payment of the price, and the thing
gold has been delivered, title passes from the moment the thing sold is placed in the possession
and control of the buyer. (Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Watson & Co., 13 PhiL 26 [1909]). Delivery
produces its natural effects in law, the principal and most important of which being the
conveyance of ownership, without prejudice to the right of the vendor to payment of the price.