1 A Bridge Between Two Worlds: The Tao of Immanuel Kant

Can Eastern philosophy be examined on the same terms as Western philosophy? Philosophers who work in comparative philosophy are, for the most part, divided on the issue. Some Orientalists believe that Eastern philosophies, in general, are too distinct from Western philosophies to be fairly compared and contrasted. Similarly, many Western scholars believe that Eastern philosophies are too abstruse or esoteric to be compared to the clear and explicit philosophies of the West1. These models are both caricatures to some extent, but they are useful caricatures at demonstrating a point, namely that there is a falsely perceived division between Eastern and Western philosophical thought. This paper seeks to determine whether it is possible to compare "abstruse" Eastern philosophy and "explicit" Western philosophy on equal terms. The value of this project lies in that, if it is possible to do so, many new avenues of philosophical inquiry open up, and freer, more heterogeneous dialogue becomes possible between scholars of Eastern and Western philosophy. In order for this project to succeed though, it must be shown that both the Eastern and Western philosophies can be examined on their own terms, rather than making the Eastern appear more Western or vice versa. As a result, I will select two philosophers, one commonly taken to be an opaque Eastern philosopher, the other, a Western philosopher whose writing is clear and well-defined, and attempt to examine them both charitably, free from stereotypes. The philosophers chosen must also be influential, enough to be a convincing case that Eastern philosophy can be reasonably compared to Western philosophy. From there, I will attempt to
1

Or, as Brian Van Norden puts it, "I've given presentations on Chinese thought in which people have talked about Chinese philosophy as if it were a joke, and laughed off Chinese philosophers as if they were Winnie-the-Pooh." (Romano 9)

2 draw a strong connection between the two. It is my hope that a careful examination of these two philosophers, commonly taken to be unresolvable, will become the beginnings of a strong foundation, upon which a bridge can be built between Eastern and Western philosophy. Few philosophers in the East are as influential as Laozi, and so, why not start with his work, The Daodejing? There are, of course, more easily defensible choices. One could pick Confucius for instance, but such comparisons have been done time and again2. Besides, Laozi is commonly accepted by many to be one of the more esoteric philosophers, and as such, his work is appropriate for this task. But to whom should one compare Laozi's philosophy? Obviously, it must be a philosopher who is equally, if not more, influential in Western philosophy, a philosopher who is just as widely studied, otherwise, the comparison would be inappropriate. The philosopher must also write explicitly and clearly, otherwise the comparison fails. A strong choice would be Immanuel Kant. His work is perhaps some of the most widely studied and his philosophy is foundational for most modern and contemporary philosophical thought, whether it be ethical, metaphysical, epistemological, aesthetic, or political3. This paper examines a portion of Immanuel Kant's ethical philosophy, specifically his ideas about respect as formulated in, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and, The Metaphysics of Morals, and attempts to find parallels with ideas from philosophical Taoism, specifically, The Daodejing. Some of the most apparent commonalities between Kant and Laozi occur in their respective works on ethics. At face value, this might seem a difficult, if not impossible, task. But the goal is to establish grounds for comparison which can neither be

See Sandra A. Wawrytko's, "Confucius and Kant: The Ethics of Respect", published in Philosophy East and West, or more recently, Katrin Froese's, "The Art of Becoming Human: Morality in Kant and Confucius" published in Dao. 3 I am sure he has proved even more influential, but the point has been made.

3 described as Eastern or Western, grounds where the two philosophies may be examined equally, on their own terms, and comparisons may be drawn. The foundation of the bridge, one might say, is built on respect. What does Kant say about respect? Respect4denotes a special kind of duty to recognize the dignity and self-respect of other rational agents. The second formulation of the Categorical ImperativeSo act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (Kant, G, 4:429is interpreted as saying that rational agents have a duty to respect other persons, and as such, can be understood as the foundation upon which our duty of respect is built. The second formulation is therefore the duty of rational agents to have a "practical respect", which is to say, respect which is put into practice after the acknowledgment of the equal dignity of another person. Going beyond the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant says on 6:462 of the Metaphysics of Morals, ...But, just as he cannot give himself away for any price (for this would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being. (Kant, MM, 6:462) The respect for another rational agent is much like the respect that we owe ourselves. And once one recognizes that another human being has dignity, the moral law unavoidably forces from us a

Achtung or reverentia. It is the respect for the moral law, but also the respect for persons as ends in themselves. See CPraR 5:76 and Dillon 2.2

4 feeling of respect for the other rational agent, much like it forces from us a respect for our own dignity.5 The respect that one feels for another rational agent is a practical one. As Kant says, It is not a feeling to be understood as the mere feeling that comes from comparing our own worth with another's...It is rather to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense. (Kant, MM, 6:449) Kant argues that the feeling that is forced from us by the recognition of another's dignity is not the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that one feels when comparing one's own worth with that of another. Rather, it is the feeling that one must limit one's own self-esteem when encountered with the dignity of humanity in another person. In this sense, it is the active giving of respect when encountered with dignity in another, not just the feeling of respect. Clearly, respect is the proper response to dignity, both in ourselves and in other persons. But what is dignity? Dignity, according to Kant, is, ...that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity. (Kant, G, 4:435) Dignity is therefore a worth that is above any other price6. Beyond that, it is that which can be considered to be an end in itself, which means that only rational agents have dignity, as they are the only beings to be treated as ends in themselves.

It is important to note that Kant is not talking about the feeling of respect as a duty. One cannot be obligated to feel something or not, as feelings are not chosen. However, in order for practical respect to be sincere, it must accompany the feeling of respect for another. 6 Which is not to say that it is priceless. That would mean something different.

5 Dignity is not, however, the ultimate ground of respect. Respect is owed to anything that has dignity, on account of that dignity. But what is it that gives a being dignity? It is the possession of autonomy. Kant explains the grounding of dignity as, the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. (Kant, G, 4:436) Autonomy is the capability of rational agents to freely create the moral law for themselves. Thus, autonomy indicates that a rational agent is fully in control of one's ethical law-giving. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the agent that creates the law have dignity, which is to say, an inner worth above all price and a respect for that agent's law-giving authority. So, when one is obligated to act respectfully towards another person, it is the respect for the autonomy of the rational agent that one is forced to recognize. But why is respect morally important? Why is it so necessary to address? It is important to address, because respect is the only fitting acknowledgement of the status and worth that all, and only, rational beings possess. This would be true even if there were only one rational agent left in the entire universe. It is also important to understand why we as humans are obligated to act respectfully. The moral law unavoidably forces from us a feeling of respect, not only for our personal dignity, but for the dignity of others. This feeling of respect creates the basis for certain kinds of duties. Because the moral law forces us to respect our own rational selves, it does so for all other rational agents, meaning that the self-esteem of other rational agents is equally necessary to our own. The moral law, therefore, demands us to recognize the dignity of others.

6 This is the grounding of the duties to others. If we take respect as the only fitting response to dignity, then all duties to oneself and to others are duties of respect. As such, it can be considered that duties of love are actually a small subset of our duties of respect to others. The special duties which we have towards others are called duties of love, but will from here on be referred to as duties of respect, in light of the requisite duty of moderation, which will be explained later. In order, they are beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy, and are duties of respect which we owe to all other rational agents. Kant describes each of the duties of love in great detail, beginning first with beneficence. As Kant describes it, Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others; but beneficence is the maxim of making others' happiness one's end, and the duty to it consists in the subject's being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law. (Kant, MM, 6:452) Since benevolence is a feeling, and there can be no duties to have feelings, there can be no duty to feel benevolence. But there is a duty to treat others the way one would treat them if one did feel benevolently toward them. That practical duty is the duty of beneficence, beneficence meaning, "not taking another rational agent as a means to an end." The duty to make the happiness of others one's end is an unconditional (categorical) duty, but the particular ends of others that one has a duty to promote are limited to those the promotion of which do not violate the moral law. When another individual works for one's own benefit, one becomes the recipient of beneficence. When one is receiving the benefit of another's beneficence, one has a duty to show gratitude, but only to one's benefactor(s). Gratitude is, ...honoring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The feeling

7 connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient... (Kant, MM, 6:455) When one is put under obligation to be grateful, one honors ones benefactor by giving them respect. We (the benefactor and the one receiving the benefit) begin on equal footing. However, when one gives us benefit, a situation is created where the benefactor and the beneficiary are no longer on equal grounds. Gratitude is the attempt to return to the even ground which both persons were on before. Sympathy as a duty is a bit more complicated than beneficence or gratitude. Whereas beneficence and gratitude are direct duties to act in one way or another, sympathy is an indirect duty to "cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them" (Kant, MM, 6:457). This passage illustrates thatfirst, we have a duty to actively will to share in the feelings of others, and second, if we lack the necessary conditions to share in the feelings of others, we have a duty to cultivate this sympathetic feeling by not avoiding, ...the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtor's prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist. (Kant, MM, 6:457) By being sympathetic and receptive towards the suffering and joy of other rational agents, we respect them, in that we share in their pain and suffering, and thus, limit our self-esteem in light of their dignity.

8 Each of these duties is actually a duty of respect, specifically duties of moderation; which is to say, duties to limit one's self-love in light of the dignity of others. Beneficence is a limitation of one's own self-love, in that, when one makes the ends of others one's own end, one suppresses one's own ends and one's natural tendency to view oneself as the arbiter of action in order to further the ends of another. Likewise, gratitude can be viewed as a limitation of selflove, in that one's actions become focused on returning to equal footing with one's benefactor, instead of acting from inclination. Sympathy also can be considered a form of moderation, as one restricts one's own inclinations in light of the inclinations of others, say, the desire of a poor person for food. One could say that the duty of moderation is in fact a prerequisite to one's duties of love. As such, all three duties of love can be seen as a subcategory of our duty of moderation, which is to say, as a duty of respect. Now that Kant's concept of respect has been fleshed out, there must be an explication of respect in terms of Laozi's Daodejing. After all, it is absolutely necessary to fully understand the terms that each philosophy uses before beginning to talk about the parallels between the two. What follows is Laozi's conception of respect. Before analyzing Laozi's work, one thing must be made absolutely clear. The way that Laozi discusses philosophy is drastically different from the methods which Immanuel Kant uses in his ethical works. Unlike Kant's clear and precise explanation of terms and their meanings, Laozi uses vague, abstract language to discuss ideas. This is not to say that I am strengthening the caricature, but rather, during Laozi's time, there was no equivalent value placed upon, "clear and distinct ideas". As such, it is critical to analyze Laozi's writing beyond its face value. For Laozi, respect is a reverence for the Tao. But what is the Tao? What is the object of respect? The answer is not clear. The first chapter of the Daodejing attempts to provide an

9 answer: A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way. A name that can be named is not a constant name. Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and Earth7. Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures. And so, Always eliminate desires in order to observe its mysteries; Always have desire in order to observe its manifestations. These two come forth in unity but diverge in name. Their unity is known as an enigma. Within this enigma is yet a deeper enigma. The gate of all mysteries! (Laozi, TTC, Chap.1) The nature of the Tao is unclear to us. What we do know is that it created the universe and the myriad creatures8. We also know that it is possible to observe both its mysteries9 and its manifestations. So the enigmatic nature of the Tao is not totally opaque to us, as we have a means by which we can observe its mysteries. Furthermore, we can respect the Tao in two different ways. First, we can respect that which flows from the Tao, which we already know means the universe and living creatures. In Chapter 21, Laozi also mentions that virtue flows from the Tao, saying, "The outward appearance of great Virtue comes forth from the Way alone" (Laozi, TTC, Chap 21). Virtue, or d, is a wide term which has a similar connotation to the English meaning of the word virtue, meaning moral goodness. As such, we can respect the universe, all living beings, and moral goodness. The second way that we can respect the Tao is by respecting the Tao itself. Laozi says in Chapter 51:

7 8

Heaven and Earth should be taken to mean the universe in a more contemporary sense. Myriad creatures is Taoist technical terminology for all living beings. 9 The Tao's mysteries probably means the higher truths of the universe not available to those who separate themselves from the Tao.

10 The Way produces them; Virtue rears them; Things shape them; Circumstances perfect them. This is why the myriad creatures all revere the Way and honor Virtue. The Way is revered and Virtue honored not because this is decreed, but because it is natural. And so the Way produces them and Virtue rears them; Raises and nurtures them; Settles and confirms them; Nourishes and shelter them. To produce without possessing; To act with no expectation of reward; To lead without lording over; Such is Enigmatic Virtue! (TTC, Chap 51) We respect the Tao because it is natural to do so. And so, we can give respect to the Tao, because it created us and because it is virtuous, for which we, as creatures created by the Tao, naturally have respect. These two forms of respect are intrinsically connected. By respecting that which flows from the Tao, one respects the Tao itself, as it is the source of all that which has flowed from it. Conversely, by respecting the Tao itself, one respects all that it has created, as all things that the Tao has created are intrinsically a part of the Tao itself. Since we know what respect is and where it comes from, we must know what respect is given to. Humans are the only things capable of being cognizant of the feeling of respect, but all things respect the Tao. Moreover, respect applies to all things, as extensions of the Tao, and to the Tao itself. But humans, being creatures capable of cognizing the feeling of respect, are also capable of refusing to respect the Tao. And, according to Laozi, that is exactly what humans have done. We stopped living naturally, and so, have drifted from the Way. And since humans are no longer in sync with the Tao, we are not naturally virtuous, and so, must work to be closer to the Way. Respect is important, because it brings us closer to the Way. It matters because human beings are also a part of the Tao, despite our retreat from it. But by not respecting the Tao, we

11 separate ourselves from it. This separation from the Tao, according to Laozi, is the source of all of society's woes. He elaborates in chapter 53, saying: If I know anything at all, it is that in following the great Way, there is but one concern: The great Way is smooth and easy; Yet people love to take shortcuts! The court is resplendent; Yet the fields are overgrown. The granaries are empty; Yet some wear elegant clothes; Fine swords dangle at their sides; They are stuffed with food and drink; And possess wealth in gross abundance. This is known as taking pride in robbery. Far is this from the Way! (Laozi, TTC, Chap 53) Because these robbers10 have no respect for the Way and its creations, they cause unimaginable pain to others. Laozi implies that if these individuals would respect the Way and the myriad creatures, such robbery and the pain caused by it would not exist. So respect in the Taoist sense is simpler than Kant's conception of respect. One ought to feel reverence for the Tao, and by extension, all that comes from the Tao. This means having reverence for all living beings and the goodness that manifests itself as a result of the Tao. The Virtue that Laozi speaks about is often discussed in different terms, and so, is difficult to accurately identify. The best exposition that Laozi gives for Virtue is at the end of Chapter 51, when he says, "To produce without possessing; To act with no expectation of reward; To lead without lording over; Such is Enigmatic Virtue!" (Laozi, TTC, Chapter 51). Enigmatic Virtue seems to refer to the Virtue of the Tao, which is to say, the goodness of the Tao. As such, a human should emulate these virtues in order to be closer to the Tao. By giving without

10

Those who have done what Laozi laments in the above passage.

12 possessing, acting without expectation of reward, and leading without being tyrannical, one becomes a virtuous person, and, one could reasonably say, a beneficent person.11 Kant's views on respect and Laozi's views on respect, at face value, seem different to the point that one becomes unsure of whether a synthesis between the two is even possible. Looking beyond the surface, however, one sees threads that connect the two together. There are at least three ways in which the Kantian concept of respect can be connected with the Taoist view of respect. First, the duties of love asserted in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals correlate with certain ideas of working for the benefit of others in Taoism. Looking further, one can see that Kant's ideas about limiting our own self esteem in light of the dignity of other rational agents looks a lot like humble action and limiting our self-appreciation of virtue12 in the Daodejing. Beyond that, the respect for the autonomy of rational agents in Kant's ethics is quite similar to the actions of a good ruler in Laozi's works. But what does a drawing of parallels between these seemingly antithetical works look like? As discussed earlier, Kant believes that all human beings have what he calls duties of love, which are, in this case, duties of respect. To quickly recap, these duties are the duties of beneficence, or making the ends of other rational agents one's own ends, gratitude, or honoring those who give one benefit, and sympathy, the will to share in the joy and suffering of others, or, should that be impossible, the cultivation of receptivity to the joy and suffering of others. And in Laozi's philosophy, there are representations of each of these duties of respect. In other words, there are representations of what we could call "Kantian respect" in Laozi's philosophy.

11

It is important to note that in other sections of, The Daodejing, Laozi discusses other virtues, but it seems that these virtues are the core virtues of the Tao, and so, are the basic virtues of a good person. 12 See Chap 72 of TTC

13 As noted earlier, one of the key virtues in Laozi's philosophy is acting without expectation of reward. If we reformulate this to say, "In one's interactions with other manifestations of the Tao, take their ends as one's own ends and do so without expectation of benefitting from the interaction", then one can see the clear connection between acting without expectation of reward and the duty of beneficence. Because one respects the manifestations of the Tao, one acts for the sake of others without expecting any sort of recompense, just as one respects the dignity of others, and so, makes the ends of others one's own ends without expecting rewards for doing so. As Kant says, "To be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one's means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return, is everyone's duty." (Kant, MM, 6:453). In chapter 2 of, the Daodejing, Laozi says something similar, claiming that, "They [sages] act with no expectation of reward" (Laozi, TTC, Chap 2). Since a sage is one who naturally acts in accordance with the Tao, it is to be assumed that it is the duty of all humans to act without expectation of reward, as it is the natural13 state of humanity to act in accordance with the Tao. And so, we can see beneficence in the Daodejing. The Taoist connection with Kantian gratitude is less visible, but one can see traces of it towards the end of chapter 2 in the Daodejing. In the last two lines of the second chapter of the Daodejing, Laozi mentions the merit of the sage14. He says, "When their work is done, they do not linger. And, by not lingering, merit never deserts them." (Laozi, TTC, Chap 2). In other words, a sage acts beneficently, as was established in the previous paragraph, and, because he/she does not linger and is not attached to the inevitable rewards of his/her beneficent action, merit, is always given to them. It can therefore be assumed that one is expected to give merit to

13 14

And therefore best in the case of Taoism. Again, an individual who acts in accordance with the Tao, which means that the sage is virtuous.

14 one who acts beneficently, out of respect for their beneficence, which is to say, out of respect for their action's accordance with the Tao. Finally, there is a connection between the duty of sympathy and the Taoist conception of respect. The Kantian duty of sympathy is one where a rational agent ought to willingly empathize with the joy and suffering of others. If the agent cannot, then they are obligated to cultivate this feeling of suffering within the bounds of reason15. One can see a corollary in chapter 16 of the Daodejing, in which Laozi discusses constancy. Laozi says, ...And returning to one's destiny16 is known as constancy. To know constancy is called 'enlightenment.' Those who do not know constancy wantonly produce misfortune. To know constancy is to be accommodating. To be accommodating is to work for the good of all. To work for the good of all is to be a true king17. To be a true king is to be Heavenly. To be Heavenly is to embody the Way... (Laozi, TTC, Chap 16) By not knowing constancy, one produces misfortune. But, by knowing constancy, one works for the good of all and embodies the Way. If one assumes that constancy, in this instance, is a synonym for sympathy, then the passage begins to fall into place. We should read constancy as sympathy because in Kantian sympathy we accommodate, the misfortune of others when we limit our self-love in light of their suffering. To know sympathy is to be accommodating, just like Laozi tells us that, "To know constancy is to be accommodating" (Laozi, TTC, Chap 16). If constancy is sympathy, then not knowing sympathy produces suffering, a view which is consistent with the rest of Laozi's writing. More than that, knowing sympathy leads one to work

15 16

In a reasonable manner, not in ways that would violate their duties to themselves or the moral law. Taken to mean returning to the Tao. In this chapter, returning to the Tao means acting in accordance with the Tao, not dying, as it would appear to mean at face value. 17 Not in the sense of real, monarchal king. Rather, to be virtuous, or have "noble" qualities.

15 for the good of all, a view which is consistent with both the Daodejing and the Metaphysics of Morals. And so, constancy, understood to mean sympathy, is compatible with Kant's duty of sympathy. One can also see in the Daodejing elements of self-limitation in light of another's dignity. In Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says, "It [respect] is rather to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense..." (Kant, MM, 6:449). As such, respect in the Kantian sense involves limiting one's own self-esteem because one recognizes and respects the dignity of another rational agent. Laozi has a similar idea, in that; he claims that sages put themselves last out of respect for the inherent nature of other beings. Laozi says that sages, "put themselves last and yet come first; Treat themselves as unimportant and are yet preserved." (Laozi, TTC, Chap 7). A sage recognizes that all creatures are a part of the Tao, and so, acts humbly, placing himself last in terms of importance out of respect for the virtue in other people. This makes the sage virtuous, hence the indication that by doing so, they actually come first. This is not to be misunderstood as means-end reasoning. Laozi simply means that it is a fact that, by placing oneself last, the consequence is that one comes first. What that means is that one makes the goals of others most important (first) and as a consequence, the sage's goals are accomplished. If one seeks to be first, one inherently is not, because they will not place themselves behind others, and hence, not respect the virtue of others, in any true sense. Finally, one can see the correlation between Kant's idea of respect for human autonomy and Laozi's idea of the good ruler. As described earlier, Kant believes that autonomy, or the ability for a rational agent to freely create the moral law, is the ground of human dignity. And respect comes from the recognition of that dignity. So, respect is the proper recognition of the

16 autonomy of other rational agents. In chapter 17, Laozi discusses what makes a great ruler and what makes a poor ruler. He says, The greatest of rulers is but a shadowy presence; Next is the ruler who is loved and praised; Next is the one who is feared; Next is the one who is reviled. Those lacking in trust are not trusted. However, [the greatest rules] are cautious and honor words. When their task is done and work complete, Their people all say, 'This is just how we are.' (Laozi, TTC, Chap 17) It is clear to Laozi that the worst rulers are the ones who are reviled. What is it that causes a ruler to be reviled? Generally, but even more so in Laozi's historical context, a ruler that is reviled is a ruler who is tyrannical; an individual who rules his people with an iron fist, and makes it clear that the laws are determined by him and him alone. Laozi makes the argument that the very best ruler is one that barely acts. And when he does so, he acts subtly so as to respect the people. The very best ruler is one that, when his work is complete, the people will believe that it was because of them that the law is so. And, if one pushes on it a bit more, one can reasonably make the claim that Laozi is saying that the very best ruler is one that respects voice of the people. It is not a stretch to believe that Laozi would see all people, being equal manifestations of the Tao, as capable of being authors of the law. So one can reasonably see elements of respect for the autonomy of rational agents in Laozi's political and moral philosophy. There are, naturally, some criticisms of this attempt at drawing parallels between the two moral philosophies. The most obvious of such criticisms would be claims made by Laozi elsewhere in the Daodejing. In terms of claims that Laozi makes elsewhere in the Daodejing that might invalidate the claims made in this paper, it's necessary to select the strongest, most obvious contradictions in order to satisfy these objections. To begin, let us examine a claim made at the

17 beginning of chapter 2, where Laozi says, "Everyone knows that when the good strives to be good, it is no good." (Laozi, TTC, Chap 2). This would seem to be indicating that, were an individual to strive to be virtuous, they would become unethical. However, that is exactly what Laozi is arguing against. Laozi emphasizes a return to the natural state of humanity, which is to be more like the Tao. As such, one does not actually strive for virtue, but rather, acts in such a way that they achieve virtue without expecting it. For when one acts without expectation, it is reasonable to say that they act without overtly striving to be that which they're acting towards. In other words, by respecting the Tao in others without expecting whatever comes from that, one does not strive towards being virtuous. Instead, they do what they're obligated to do as a part of the myriad creatures, and by doing so, virtue comes to them. Laozi also discusses respect in terms of "the myriad creatures," which is to say, all living beings. This is strikingly different from Kant, in that Kant claims that respect and dignity only apply to rational agents, which are the only beings who ought to be treated as ends in themselves. Does this not invalidate the connection between the two? To put it simply, no, it does not. First, when one respects the myriad creatures, it is not directly respect of the creatures themselves, but rather, a respect for the Tao, which is what all the myriad creatures share in. Now, the Tao is not the same as autonomy, in that autonomy is the freedom to create the moral law, which only a rational agent can do. However, it is only from the Tao that the idea of freedom can come from, as all things, including virtues, flow from the Tao. By respecting the Tao, one respects both the myriad creatures, and the virtue which comes from the Tao, but one also respects the total autonomy of the Tao which all creatures share in. That being said, it is not absolutely necessary that the metaphysical outlook of these philosophies directly correlate with one another in order for there to be elements of one in the other.

18 Finally, Laozi says in chapter 19, "Cut off benevolence, abandon righteousness, and the people will return to being filial and kind." (Laozi, TTC, Chap 19). This would seem to be an indication that Laozi is contradicting himself, as abandoning benevolence would indicate that one abandons the virtuous treatment of others. However, if one takes Kant's definition of benevolence to be accurate, that, as he writes, "Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others" (Kant, MM, 6:452), one can see why Laozi would advocate the elimination of benevolence. Laozi, much like Kant, believed that acting for the satisfaction in the happiness of others was not virtuous. Rather, one ought to act for the benefit of others out of the respect one has for others, which means doing something because one is obligated to do so, not because it feels good. And so, much like Kant, Laozi advocates treating others as ends, not as means to an end. At face value, it would seem that between the Kantian philosophy and Taoist philosophy, there is a gap which is simply too vast to bridge. Once one digs below the surface however, one begins to see elements of Taoist philosophy in Kant's duties of love, which is to say, duties of respect for other rational agents. And while these do not constitute absolute duties to other human beings in the grand scheme of Kant's moral philosophy, the duties of love to other human beings are incredibly important in terms of how we can act practically in a society which requires us to interact with other people. Bridging the gap between the two philosophies plays an important role in opening Eastern philosophical concepts to Western scholars. By putting Taoism in terms which can be understood by Western philosophers, one begins to lessen the perceived mystique that seems to obfuscate Eastern philosophy to those not familiar with it. While the similarities between the two are far from perfect, it is a start, the beginnings of a foundation. And a start is enough for now.

19 Works Cited Dillon, Robin S. "Respect." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 Sept. 2003. Web. Autumn 2012. Froese, Katrin. "The Art of Becoming Human: Morality in Kant and Confucius." Dao 7.3 (2008): 257-68. Print. Kant, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. Laozi. The Daodejing of Laozi. Trans. P. J. Ivanhoe. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 2002. Print. Romano, Carlin. "The Chronicle Review." The Chronicle of Higher Education. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 23 Sept. 2013. Web. 23 Sept. 2013. Wawrytko, Sandra A. "Confucius and Kant: The Ethics of Respect." Philosophy East and West 32.3 (1982): 237-57. Print.