A mention of gender-based violence in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was conspicuous

by its absence. It was a glaring gap that has since been filled by the Committees General Recommendations 3, 19 and 24. It has been made clear through these successive recommendations that rape, sexual violence and other violence put womens health at risk and impair their ability to participate in family life and public life on a basis of equality and thus fall within the remit of CEDAW provisions. It is further made clear that rape is considered by the Committee to be a form of gender-based violence. The Vertido v Philippines decision represents the only views centred on rape to have come out of the individual complaints process of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol). This post focuses on the suggestion made in Vertido of two alternative models of rape law. The Committee states that an acceptable form of rape law (para 8.9(b)(ii)); - requires the existence of unequivocal and voluntary agreement and requiring proof by the accused of steps taken to ascertain whether the complainant/survivor was consenting; or - requires that the act take place in coercive circumstances and includes a broad range of coercive circumstances. With so many countries taking the former approach (the consent-based model), the Committees presentation of the two models on an apparently equal basis may prompt reconsideration in some quarters. Below will be given a synopsis of the Committees analysis of some of the problems and key points in rape legislation, followed by additional considerations of the non-coercion and non-consent approaches. Vertido on approaches to rape law Despite the lack of specific provision on rape and sexual violence in CEDAW, the Committee has no difficulty in finding that poor treatment of rape complainants is a breach of CEDAW under articles article 2(c) and 2(f), and article 5(a) read in conjunction with article 1. Namely the obligations to establish legal protection of women on an equal basis with men, to take all appropriate measures to modify and abolish existing laws which constitute discrimination against women, to modify social and cultural practices predicated on stereotypes or the inferiority/superiority of the sexes, and the duty of non- discrimination. The view is characteristic of the Committees open-textured approach, not prescribing a onesize-fits-all solution, but rather sketching a number of the elements that must, in their view, be present in CEDAW-compliant rape law. Amongst these elements, and in response to the specific facts of the Vertido communication, the Committee mentions that laws dealing with rape and sexual assault must: encourage cases to proceed without undue delay; should be impartial and fair; should not be affected by prejudices or stereotypical gender notions; should avoid revictimisation; and should not have any statutory requirement of violence in rape. Further they note that the law should have the notion of lack of consent at its centre. Finally the Committee

suggests that non-consent and non-coercion are both appropriate formats for legislative provisions. It is interesting to note that the Committee implies that consent can remain at the core of a rape law that does not specifically have lack of consent as an element of the crime. Despite recognising the importance of the concept of consent in their brief views (at paras 8.4, 8.7, 8.9), the non-coercion approach which they suggest (at para 8.9(b)(ii)) does not contain reference to the complaint or their (lack of) consent but only to circumstances. It is presumed that a nonconsensual circumstance would be a coercive one but the Committees comments surely would have benefited from the clarity of some suggested coercive circumstances. Consent-based rape law Given the seemingly open choice as between consent and coercion that Vertido offers, it is worth considering some of the strengths and weaknesses of the two models. The brief consideration here will start with the consent model, before assessing the non-coercion approach. The model of consent (or more correctly; non-consent) requires legal consent to sexual penetration and is borne out of autonomy theory and the liberal belief that the harm of rape is the acting without consent. The consent model is to be applauded for treating women as autonomous beings, for affording them the incredibly important decision-making power to make choices about their body and allowing them to police the boundaries of their own sexual activity. The proposer of sexual activity must satisfy the woman that they are worthy (in one way or another) of consent. Consent as a legal and philosophical model usually allows the woman (almost) absolute discretion (with the exception of when she is deceived). This strong grounding in choice and autonomy means the endorsement of the consent model by Vertido and by many of the worlds legal systems is unsurprising. The individual discretion to choose is only meaningful, however, when it is exercised in an environment free from pressures, influences and coercion. Despite the well-intentioned philosophy upon which the consent model claims to be based, it is often argued that the foundations of autonomy and empowerment are far from visible in practice. Munro writes that consent models often fail to adequately interrogate the concepts of freedom, capacity and choice (in C. McGlynn and V.E. Munro, Rethinking Rape Law, International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2010), 22). Additionally, Hunter points to two practical approaches that come out of the consent approach; the treating of the wronged woman as a helpless victim, or, as an autonomous (and therefore blameworthy) choice-maker (in R. Hunter and S. Cowan, Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (New York, Routledge Cavendish 2007), 92). Furthermore, by focussing on the physical act of penetration, the consent approach ignores the mental trauma of sexual violence, significant, writes Cowan as rape offends the self and sense of self (Hunter and Cowan (2007), 2). The non-coercion approach While consent-based law enquires whether the woman allowed sex, coercion-based approaches ask if the woman wanted sex. Du Toit writes that consent law has not in the past asked whether

the woman unambiguously intended, wanted or desired the sexual actions under consideration, but rather whether she allowed them to take place (in McGlynn and Munro (2010), 27). The coercive approach aims to address this by examining more closely and effectively the circumstances surrounding the sexual activity. The approach examines the pressures surrounding the sexual penetration and allows for factors such as intoxication, violence, blackmail, and potentially even the strongest of social influences. The South African Law Commission puts it thus, coercion constitutes more than physical force or threat thereof, but may also include various other forms of exercise of power over another person: emotional, psychological, economical, social or organizational power (in Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Violence: Human Rights Law and Standards in the International Criminal Court (2011), 19). At the heart of the approach is an enquiry into equality and whether decisions and choices were made on the basis of equality or on the basis of some other power dynamic. It aims to offer a real choice to the victim and not a choice based on the poor options she had available to her, and in his sense it is clearly in compliance with CEDAW. This compliance is confirmed in Vertido (para 8.9(b)(ii)) and the approach has been used by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in their Akayesu judgement (Prosecutor v Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) 1998, 598). The future The Vertido decision must at the very least prompt a reconsideration of the appropriateness and effectiveness of national rape laws. States that are struggling to adequately address the scourge of rape and sexual violence might benefit from a fresh look at the alternative approaches that the Committee offers. It is clear from the summary above that there are merits to both approaches and this affords states a range of options and some discretion. One thing is clear from the emphatic way in which Vertido is written states that do not use either of the models will leave themselves open to serious condemnation by the Committee. There is no room left in the view for those approaches that do not fit within one of the rubrics that the Committee advocates. Further, choosing and implementing one of these approaches is not sufficient to fulfil the duties imposed under CEDAW. States must also practically apply the law in a manner that addresses delays, bias, stereotypes and re-victimisation. It would be surprising if the issues addressed in Vertido were not taken forward in future communications. In that regard, there is cause to look forward to more detailed and nuanced examination of rape law by the Committee precipitated by the Optional Protocol. Ben Warwick graduated from Durham University (UK) in 2012 and is currently studying Human Rights Law at Nottingham University (UK). He can be contacted at btcw@me.com or on twitter at @btcwarwick. 14 December 2012
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In 1996, Karen Tayag Vertido worked as Executive Director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines. She filed a complaint against the then President of the Chamber, Jose B. Custodio, accusing him of raping her. She alleged that the accused offered her a lift home following a business meeting one evening and that, instead, raped her in a nearby hotel. In April 2005, after the case had languished in the trial court for eight years, Judge Virginia Hofilea-Europa acquitted the accused of raping Ms Vertido, citing insufficient evidence to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged. Her Honour based her decision to acquit on a number of guiding principles from other rape cases and her unfavourable assessment of the Ms Vertidos testimony based, among other things, on her failure to take advantage of perceived opportunities to escape from the accused. Ms Vertido subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee). She alleged that the acquittal of Mr Custodio breached the right to non-discrimination, the right to an effective remedy, and the freedom from wrongful gender stereotyping, in violation of articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In her communication, Ms Vertido claimed that the trial judges decision had no basis in law or fact, but was grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about rape and rape victims without which the accused would have been convicted. She further claimed that a decision grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions or one rendered in bad faith can hardly be considered as one rendered by a fair, impartial and competent tribunal, and that the Philippines had failed in its obligation to ensure that women are protected against discrimination by public authorities, including the judiciary. The Philippines observations on admissibility The Philippines contested the admissibility of the communication on the basis that Ms Vertido had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol). It claimed that Ms Vertido had failed to avail herself of the special remedy of certiorari. Ms Vertidos comments on the Philippines observations Ms Vertido countered that she was not required to exhaust the remedy of certiorari, as it could only be sought by the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. In addition, she submitted that, even if the remedy were available to her, it would have been ineffective in redressing her particular complaint of discrimination. CEDAW Committees admissibility decision

The CEDAW Committee declared the communication admissible, dismissing the suggestion made by the Philippines that Ms Vertido was required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to exhaust the remedy of certiorari. Views The CEDAW Committee concluded that, in failing to end discriminatory gender stereotyping in the legal process, the Philippines had violated articles (2)(c) and 2(f) of CEDAW, and article 5(a) read in conjunction with article 1 and General Recommendation No. 19 (violence against women). The Committee declined to consider whether or not article 2(d) had been violated, finding that it was less relevant to the case than the other articles alleged to have been violated. Committee member Ms Yoko Hayashi issued a separate, concurring opinion. Right to an effective remedy (art. 2(c)) The CEDAW Committee affirmed that implicit in CEDAW and, in particular article 2(c), is the right to an effective remedy. It explained that for a remedy to be effective, adjudication of a case involving rape and sexual offenses claims should be dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely and expeditious manner. The Committee determined that the Philippines had failed to comply with its obligation to ensure Ms Vertidos right to an effective remedy. It noted that her case had languished in the trial court for approximately eight years before a decision was made to acquit the accused and that, consequently, it could not be said that Ms Vertidos allegation of rape had been dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely and expeditious manner. Freedom from Wrongful Gender Stereotyping (arts. 2(f) and 5(a)) In finding violations of articles 2(f) and 5(a), the Committee affirmed that CEDAW requires States Parties to take appropriate measures to modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. It also stressed that stereotyping affects womens right to a fair and just trial and that the judiciary must take caution not to create inflexible standards of what women or girls should be or . . . have done when confronted with a situation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape victim. The majority determined that the trial judge had expected a certain stereotypical behaviour from the author and formed a negative view of her creditability because she had not behaved accordingly. It went on to say that the trial judges decision contained several references to stereotypes about male and female sexuality being more supportive for the credibility of the alleged perpetrator than for the creditability of the victim. Recommendations

Having found violations of articles (2)(c), 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee called on the Philippines to provide appropriate compensation to Ms Vertido. It also made a number of general recommendations aimed at redressing the systemic nature of many of the violations. These included taking effective steps to ensure that decisions in sexual assault cases are impartial and fair and not affected by prejudices or stereotypes. Communication No. 18/2008, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 September 2010) Decision
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Article 5(a) of CEDAW and the aspiration of equality as transformation On 16 July 2010, the CEDAW Committee held in Karen Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines that evidence of wrongful gender stereotyping in a Filipino rape trial amounted to a violation of articles 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The case of Vertido was the first communication before the CEDAW Committee to principally focus on wrongful gender stereotyping. Before then, the precise scope of state obligations stemming from article 5(a) of CEDAW had been left unexplained. The text of article 5(a) requires State Parties [t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. This provision is regarded as the pillar under the third objective of CEDAW as set out in the Committees General Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures. This reaffirms the obligation of State Parties [t]o address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and institutions. Prior to the decision of Vertido, Professor Rikki Holtmaat had written that article 5(a) has two limbs: 1. To ban gender stereotypes from mass media and advertising and school teaching materials, and;

2. To revise existing legislation and public policies which reinforce existing cultural and social exclusion of women. Article 5(a) is both reactive and proactive in its efforts to address systemic discrimination. Professor Holtmaat argues that it creates concrete obligations for states to put an end to laws and policies based upon gender stereotypes which are detrimental to women. This makes it an extremely significant provision in the move towards a different law and public policy; it provides a legal basis for social and cultural change. Professor Sandra Fredman has labelled this aspiration as equality as transformation; a restructuring of society so that it is no longer maledefined. The role of the CEDAW Committee in interpreting and applying article 5(a) is therefore crucial. A close analysis of the CEDAW Committees approach in Vertido will reveal whether the transformative potential of the provision is beginning to be realised. The strengths and weaknesses of the Vertido decision The case of Vertido makes several significant contributions towards the elimination of wrongful gender stereotyping in society but nonetheless suffers from various shortcomings. Primarily, the CEDAW Committee adopted a clear methodological approach to identifying wrongful gender stereotypes. This three-step process provides useful guidance for both victims and states to pinpoint the harmful stereotype effectively. 1. Identify the gender stereotype (those attributes, characteristics or roles ascribed to an individual by reason of his/her sex/gender). For example, women must physically resist sexual advances in order to express non-consent. 2. Explain the meaning and significance of this stereotype. For example, the aforementioned stereotype leads to the conclusion that those victims who do not physically resist sexual advances cannot be a victim of rape. 3. Identify the social harm arising from the stereotype. For example, rape victims in general and women rape victims in particular are denied enjoyment of their right to physical integrity and society develops inappropriate ideas that resistance is necessary to establish rape. A framework similar to this is a crucial precondition to the justiciability of wrongful gender stereotypes. It allows the specific harmful stereotype to be targeted and eradicated from the legal systems of State Parties. It is hoped that other human rights institutions and courts follow the lead of the CEDAW Committee in this respect. Secondly, the CEDAW Committee embraced a broad teleological interpretation of equality beyond its previous jurisprudence. The Filipino criminal justice system had in place clear precedents which prohibited the use of wrongful gender stereotypes in rape trials. On a formal level there was a legal prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex. In Vertido, the CEDAW Committee looked beyond the law on the books to examine the attitude of Judge Hofilena-Europa in handling the case and identified her disregard for these precedents. In doing so, the CEDAW Committee reaffirmed that formal equality is not enough; equality must be

practised as well as preached. This demonstrates a progressive attitude towards the realisation of equality as transformation. Thirdly, the CEDAW Committee treads new ground beyond the tentative steps of other human rights jurisprudence by issuing recommendations that directly target systemic discrimination. For example, in a factually similar case (M.C. v. Bulgaria), the European Court of Human Rights identified the use of wrongful gender stereotypes in rape trials in Bulgaria and emphasised that physical resistance is not necessary to establish rape. However, in articulating state obligations, the Court merely reiterated that Member States have a positive obligation to effectively investigate, punish and prosecute rape and sexual abuse. It made no express ruling aimed at eliminating the wrongful gender stereotypes from the criminal justice system. In contrast, the CEDAW Committee in Vertido went further and recommended the training of Filipino judges, lawyers and law enforcement personnel on CEDAW and its General Recommendations and recommended that gender-sensitive training be implemented in the judicial process. Similarly, in ahide Goecke v. Austria, the CEDAW Committee recommended gender sensitive training for Austrian police on domestic violence. The CEDAW Committee is consistently demonstrating a proactive approach to address the underlying causes of discrimination. This has the potential to engender a new public policy towards equality as transformation. Fourthly, the CEDAW Committee seemingly extends the obligation of due diligence beyond the field of violence against women. The concept of due diligence traditionally applies in order to impute the action of a non-state actor to a state. When rights are guaranteed under a treaty, the state is obligated to exercise due diligence to ensure their fulfilment, that is to prevent, investigate, punish and remedy the human rights violation in question. Failure to adequately do so will result in state liability for the human rights violation. The CEDAW Committee in Vertido held that State Parties have a due diligence obligation to banish wrongful gender stereotypes under articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW. This is the first case decided under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol) to extend the due diligence obligation to gender stereotyping. However, as identified by Cusack and Timmer, the discussion of due diligence appears to be borne out of confused reasoning by the Committee. The case of Vertido concerned the behaviour of a national judge acting on behalf of the state and not as a private individual, therefore the language of due diligence was unnecessary. The reference made to the judicial handling of the case suggests that the Committee did not intend to create a due diligence obligation with regard to the actions of private individuals but intended to uphold the state obligation to banish wrongful gender stereotypes in the judicial machinery. However, clarification is needed. In addition, the CEDAW Committee does not fully articulate state obligations under article 5(a) of CEDAW. Cusack and Timmer have suggested that the Committee could have adopted the tripartite framework of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The obligation to banish wrongful gender stereotypes is regrettably ambiguous. Moreover, it remains unclear whether article 5(a) has direct effect, that is, whether an individual can submit a communication to the CEDAW Committee purely on the basis of a violation of

article 5(a). In Vertido, the author alleged violations of both articles 2(f) and 5(a) and so the CEDAW Committee addressed these provisions contemporaneously. Consequently, this has failed to resolve earlier academic confusion as to whether article 5(a) is a hat-peg provision used to bring other issues under the scope of CEDAW and/or whether it is a mere amplification of article 2(f). Given the interdependent nature of CEDAW provisions, this may not prove to be overly problematic in practice but clarity ought to be achieved for the benefit of future individuals submitting a communication under the Optional Protocol. Finally, the decision remains limited to the context of rape trials. Specific sexual stereotypes were identified in the communication and the resulting recommendations aim to eliminate the existence of these stereotypes among Filipino lawyers, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Clearly, wrongful gender stereotypes are prevalent in all spheres of life. However, it was not the place for the CEDAW Committee in Vertido to broadly articulate state obligations to tackle wrongful gender stereotyping. This would be a formidable task stretching beyond the acceptable remit of the case. It is hoped that the CEDAW Committee can analogically extend the fundamental reasoning in Vertido to other spheres in future. Despite the identified shortcomings of the Committees decision in Vertido, it nonetheless represents a significant step forward. The eradication of wrongful gender stereotypes from society is a protracted process, not least because stereotypes play a crucial cognitive role in human thought and action. Progressive steps towards transformative equality ought to be matched with some degree of humility about the limits of one case, or even the actions of the CEDAW Committee. The Vertido decision provides a robust catalyst for societal change by directly identifying and addressing wrongful gender stereotypes, upholding a teleological interpretation of equality and boldly moving beyond other human rights jurisprudence. T o borrow the words of Professor Holtmaat, this begins to lay the groundwork for structural solutions to structural problems. The approach of the Committee in Vertido therefore signifies one tentative step towards equality as transformation. Kelly Reeve is an LL.B. (hons) Graduate and Legal Research Assistant at the University of Warwick in the U.K. 10 October 2012 This guest blog post further develops many of the points raised in Kelly Reeves article entitled Beyond Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result: Does the CEDAW Committee in Karen Tayag Vertido v The Philippines Embrace Equality as Transformation? (2012) 2(1) Warwick Student Law Review 72
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Karen Tayag Vertido discusses her recent experiences using the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. This post is a copy of the presentation Ms Vertido delivered at the CEDAW Committees General Day of Discussion on Access to Justice in February 2013 and is reproduced with her permission. It is an honor to be with you today. I mean that sincerely. But having said that, I realize I have mixed feelings about my qualification that brought me here. I would have preferred to have been invited because I am the worlds greatest expert at something. But I am not that, sorry. I am here though to tell you about my encounter with rape up close and personal and seeking justice afterwards. I was raped on March 29, 1997 in Davao City in the Philippines. As horrendous as that experience was, it was nothing compared to the next decade which was characterized with unspeakable pain. Mine is what therapists consider a text book rape. I knew the man who raped me. He was a former president of the organization of which I was executive director. It was done in a work situation. Extensive media coverage I guess was inevitable just based on the personalities of the protagonists. It was a double edged sword. The widespread interest in the case aggravated the stigmatization for me. But on the other hand, I exposed him for who he really was: a criminal, a rapist, not the respectable man he projected himself to be. To say that the trial lasted 9 years also meant 9 years of having wounds opened and re-opened just as they are about to heal. It also meant not being able to devote the required time and energy required of a new job. You see I was fired from the one I had. Too divisive, the board said. But a new job was not in the stars for me because by the time I was liberated from the rigors of the trial, I had hit 50 and new employment issues applied. I lost one of things I valued most: economic independence. Obstacles to Justice in the Philippines In the years that followed between hearings at court, I educated myself on the situation I was in. I plowed through legal and psychological books, I met with womens rights advocates, I worked with the therapists, and I met with women who were in like situations as mine. But unlike them, I was different in one way: I spoke against rape and all forms of violence in whatever forum or occasion open to me. The culture of silence is very strong in the Philippines. Women who have been raped do not talk about it; much less report the crime to authorities. What for? Doing so would just aggravate the shame inflicted on them by making it a very public issue. Then there is the fact that records show that Philippine courts are notoriously famous for acquitting men accused of rape. Poverty is the primary obstacle to justice. If only for the lack of money, not too many women dare to go so public as I did. You might ask how was I able to sustain 9 years of litigation. There were many donations that came, some with notes encouraging me to fight on. They came from people who invariably said they were fighting their own violations through me. It also helped that my lawyer, a staunch womens rights activist, gave her services pro bono.

Victim blaming is another downer to justice. A strong take-charge woman most oftentimes is considered arrogant while her male counterpart is admired for being resolute. Rape was considered my comeuppance for perhaps just having the job and the position I had. Besides many people in Davao City believed I had no business attending a business meeting in the evening. Lack of education has always been cited as basis for the generally accepted myths and misguided opinions surrounding womens issues. At this day and age, some Filipinos still believe that wearing shorts is a call to being raped. Embarrassed with their lack of education, many women are deterred from going to the authorities for assistance. Even judges are not exempt from a lack of education in womens realities. Many court decisions are premised on sexist myths. The man who raped me was acquitted of his crime because the judge believed a woman such I who was relatively highly educated cannot have been so stupid as to have been raped. Therefore, I could only have consented to be raped. She did not see the oxymoron in that. I am extremely embarrassed and ashamed every time my country appears on the list of the most corrupt countries. Corruption does bear heavily upon the judiciary as well as in all branches of government and the private sector. The impeachment of the Supreme Court Chief Justice last year and the trial of the former president give me hope that we may eventually clean up the country. But for now, we just have to contend with corruption which has become so pervasive. I fear we need more time and a stronger political will to get the level of corruption down even a few notches. There is no dearth of laws that are supposed to be for the promotion and for the protection of women in the Philippines. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 redefined rape as a public offense. The Anti-Human Trafficking of Persons law penalizes trafficking with or without the consent of victims. In 2004, the law against Violence Against Women and their Children was passed. Finally, the Magna Carta for Women passed into law on August 2009 is now the cover-all law that protects women. So why then do Filipino women continue to be objects of sexual discrimination, violation, and violence? It can only be the still widespread deficiency in gender sensitivity and strong of political will to enforce the law. Pursuing Justice through the Optional Protocol of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Take for example the communication I sent under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. I died in court that day the rapist was acquitted. But the knowledge that there that there was recourse to justice outside of Philippine courts brought me back to life. In November 2007 we sent off the communication to CEDAW. In July 2010, the views came from the Committee. It upheld my contention that indeed my rights were violated in the courts of the Philippines yet again after the original assault to my honor and to my body by a depraved man.

In subsequent years there was a series of exchange between my lawyers and representatives of the government of the Philippines coursed through the Committee. The official stand of the Philippine government was that it was not obligated by the views of CEDAW for basically two reasons: firstly I had not exhausted all means recourse to justice, meaning I did not go to the Supreme Court for a certiorari; and secondly, that the views impinged on my countrys sovereignty. My lawyer responded by reiterating the conditions extant in Philippine legislature that made going to the Supreme another exercise in futility. In response to sovereignty issue, we contend that the Philippines ratified CEDAW and therefore voluntarily agreed to its conditions. Now we are at an impasse. I am bewildered as to how this business is going to end. Or if this is indeed the end. I earnestly hope not. Not like this. In my perhaps simplistic thinking, I keep wondering why my government refuses to comply with the Convention which it ratified. My bemusement runs deep when I keep wondering why cant everyone see the wonderful benefits of not having any sector of society relegated to a subservient and exploited position? What is so objectionable about doing more for women starting with honouring its commitment to an agreement by complying with the views on my case? And if the Philippine government will not honor the views, will an external urging from UN CEDAW help? Is the Committee willing or able to give a gentle nudge? Is that even appropriate? What does that make of the Convention if governments refuse to honor it? Obviously I am not privy to many information the powers that be have. This may have to end hanging with more questions than answers. But I remain optimistic. The questions are reflections of dreams a world that is gentler and kinder to women; a better for everyone. And today I am so happy because I am with people who dream the same dream. With so many of us, how can we fail to eventually make the dream come true? Karen Tayag Vertido was the author of Karen Tayag Vertido v The Philippines. For previous posts related to this decision, see here (Reeve) and here (Warwick). See also Simone Cusack & Alexandra Timmer, Gender Stereotyping in Rape Cases: The CEDAW Committees Decision inVertido v. The Philippines (2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law Review 329-342
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