Pereboom Content Individuation PDF

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Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content Author(s): Derk Pereboom Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology (1995), pp. 401-428 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214228 . Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:04
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and 9, Al, Connectionism, Perspectives, Philosophical 1995 Philosophical Psychology,
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE AND THE INDIVIDUATION OF CONTENT DerkPereboom of Vermont University content divideintotwofamipsychological to understand attempts Current byTyler suchas thoseadvanced accounts to externalist lies of views.According on the does not supervene content Burge and RuthMillikan,psychological of by thenature partially butis fixed subject, of theindividual features physical byNed developed roletheories to her.'In therivalfunctional theworldexternal of the on thephysicalfeatures does supervene Block and BrianLoar, content solelybytheroleitplaysinthecausal determined andis, in addition, individual, Overthepast states.2 andmental behavior, sensations, network ofan individual's on their focussed of thesetwo typesof viewshas often criticism fifteen years, in an acceptableway, and both seem to be content capacityto individuate in thisrespect. deficient the at a levelthatcaptures content mustindividuate A satisfactory theory role we wantto make.Functional in psychological explanation generalizations sinceany of content, specification fine-grained allows foran extremely theory in content. However, in associated beliefcan make fora difference difference forindividuating criteria seems to provideno principled this typeof theory thesame howitmight remain in a waycoarse-grained to explain enough content by in associated beliefs,and thus contentdetermined despite differences theright psychological of sustaining rolewouldseemto be incapable functional forcontent anchors furnish by Externalist theories, by contrast, generalizations.3 entities in theexternal world, to entities thecognitive value of concepts linking have Butcritics inassociated beliefs. variation their retain which through identity too finely, cutcontent nevertheless theories in somecasesextemalist that argued is too coarse.4 individuation on other occasionsextemalist that and furthermore, in needto function theories distinguish thatextemalist In some cases, contents whereasin other and behavior, inference the same typeof role forexplaining mustaccountforsignificantly thattheyrender contents equivalent situations and behavior. of inference different patterns to despiteattempts persists, I believe thatthe forceof thesecriticisms that content is a for there that but individuating their strategy impact, mitigate of grain.This or coarseness in fineness deficiencies from well notsuffer might kinds in sciencessuch of natural individuation the takesits cue from approach
402 / Derk Pereboom playa structural features of entities as chemistry and biology.In thesesciences, arememof thenatural kindsofwhich they prominent role in characterizations content psychology suggest that psychological bers.Recentstudies in cognitive I shallargue that these features canbe approalso has various structural features. andfurthermore, that suchindividuation priated for theindividuation ofcontent, psychological fundamental intuitions about has a reasonable prospect ofcapturing and principled criteria for identity of content explanation, and of providing concept. I In psychological of inference and behavior,propositional explanation andwishes havea keyrole.Partoftheexplanaattitudes suchas beliefs, desires, attitude is attributable to its beingthe kindof torypowerof a propositional attitude it is, forexample, thana desireor a wish.The itsbeinga beliefrather by one taxonomy, is playedby its remaining explanatory role of an attitude, for thatis itraining, rather thanthatit is not example, itsbeinga belief content, theory, In David Kaplan's semantic raining. But thistaxonomy is notuniversal. forexample,'content' expressed by the 'that'clause, refers to theproposition wheretheproposition as he is wise, Socratesis wise is the same proposition In histaxonomy, besidescontent giventhat 'Socrates'and 'he' arecoreferential.5 attitude includes character, whichincludes andtypeof attitude, a propositional of how a subjectrepresents In Jerry a proposition. Fodor's system, features besidestypeof attitude in Kaplan's sense,propositional attitudes and content are represented, includevehicle, thesymbol by meansof whichone's contents of inference andfunctional role, the causal role a vehicleplays in a system A of that one set out thedefinitherefore, requires patterns.' discussion content, in a way closely tionof thenotion one is using.HereI shallbe using'content' of an attitude related to thefirst sense discussed, as the features and broadest that the kind But the distinctions other of attitude it is. as we shall see, than Kaplan and Fodormakeare important. mustsustainthe capacityof individuation Any view about the content in the psychological of individualsubjects' content to function explanation of content mustbe fine-grained enough and behavior. inferences Individuation butit mustalso be coarsein inference to account fordifferences and behavior, of inference and in theproduction similarities to capture salient grained enough behavior from to subject, and fora singlesubjectacrosstime.7 Frege's subject case.8 test is strongly evidentialfor finenessof grain in the intrapersonal statement butiftheidentity tothesameentity, refer 'Hesperus'and'Phosphorus' fora subject, thenan acceptable wouldbe informative Hesperus= Phosphorus theconcepts between mustmakea distinction 'Hesperus' psychological theory whichis to shehas bothconcepts), for that and 'Phosphorus' (supposing subject the contributions to between say thatin her case it mustmake a distinction if a subject has In general, content value) of theseconcepts. (i.e. thecognitive
Structure and theIndividuation of Content / 403 Conceptual for her,then'A' theconcepts 'A' and 'B,' and if 'A = B' wouldbe informative in and thusforhertheydiffer concepts forthatsubject, and 'B' are different cognitive value. in strong evidencefordifferences Let us recallwhyFrege'stestprovides playsthepivotalrole case. Content to content in theintrapersonal contribution IfHesperus= Phosandbehavior. in thepsychological explanation ofinference fora subject,thenforthatsubject identity phorus would be an informative the concept'Hesperus' can make significantly beliefsand desiresinvolving those of inference and behaviorfrom different contributions to explanations = Phosphorus, If Arianedoes notknowthatHesperus involving 'Phosphorus.' thesame concannot be regarded as having Hesperus is a planet herbeliefthat infer that Hesbecauseshe might tentas thebeliefthat Phosphorus is a planet, is a planet, and yet a starfrom herbeliefthatHesperus perusrevolvesaround around a star.And failto infer from thissamebeliefthatPhosphorus revolves thesame as herdesire be counted herdesireto visitHesperus just once cannot to visitHesperus just herdesire to visitPhosphorus just once,becausesupposing thiswouldnot once has causedherto makearrangements to landon Hesperus, Thusa psychomaking further plansto landon Phosphorus. preclude herfrom to explanadifferent contributions aimsto track significantly logicaltheory that Ariane'sconcept'Hesperus' and behavior mustdistinguish tionsof inference from her concept 'Phosphorus,'despite the fact that these concepts are coreferential. because it threatens to One mightworry thatFrege's testis inadequate in functional role, value wherever there is anydifference distinguish cognitive we generalizations thepsychological and that thusthistestwill also undermine forexample,the can be set aside. Although, wantto make. But this worry are different, functional roles of my concepts'fourteen days' and 'fortnight' are them.My thoughts involving 'fortnight,' Frege's testdoes not distinguish and to call to mind more likelyto make me think'what a quaintthought!' 'fourteen than aremythoughts involving "BeliefandSynonymy" Burge'sarticle = fourteen forme. a fortnight daysis notinformative days.' But nevertheless, in functional role whereFrege's test will not Hence, thereare differences value. distinguish cognitive theoriesof content. -forsome extemalist Frege's test poses a problem of discussed the Millian account names for by Saul proper Consider, example, in namesare intersubstitutable to whichcoreferential proper according Kripke, to semantic contribution the same and make belief contexts salve veritate, of inference view to theexplanation In an extension of thissemantic content.9 contribution to make the same would names coreferential and behavior, proper a belief about content. provides persistent Kripke's puzzle psychological of belief forsuch an account,and also, he argues,forany theory difficulty as "Londres est he a belief which Pierre comesto have attribution.10 expresses attribute we English-speakers anddisquotation, jolie." By therulesoftranslation landsup in London,in a bad ButPierre Londonis pretty. that to himthebelief
404 / DerkPereboom as "Londonis notpretty," he expresses that a belief andhe acquires oftown, part idiolect) from Pierre's translation (andperhaps bytheruleofdisquotation which, He all the while to him as the beliefthatLondon is not pretty. we attribute to attribute thebelief'Londresestjolie,' andthuswe wouldcontinue maintains contradictory we attribute Accordingly, Londonis pretty. to himthebeliefthat point The anti-Millian a mistake. to him,butthiswouldseemto involve beliefs seemsunavoidin beliefto Pierre a contradiction attributing of thiscase is that But to content. namesmakethesame contribution proper able if coreferential notjust fora Millianview,but thepuzzleraisesa problem Kripkearguesthat therulesof all wouldendorse becausethey of beliefattribution, forall theories and it is not obviousthatany otherconceivably and disquotation, translation thepuzzle. to construct arerequired elements controversial point of Kripke's puzzle can be As Loar has shown,the anti-Millian Even if we conceiveof usingthe notionof contradiction. without expressed thebeliefthathe up in an upscalepartof London,and forming Pierrelanding we could not countthisnew beliefto be the as "Londonis pretty," expresses same as the belief he acquired in France,since theyare not inferentially namesmustsometimes proper It seems to followthatcoreferential identical. Loar's argues, And as AkeelBilgrami to content." contributions makedifferent pointof Kripke'scase can be allows us to see thattheanti-Millian argument expressedby a Fregeanpuzzle. For PierreLondres = London would be value.'2 in cognitive namesdiffer and thusforhim,theseproper informative, Hence, Frege's test providesstrongevidencethatfor Pierre'Londres' and to content. contributions 'London' makedistinct can be identity exampleof Kripke'srevealsthatan informative Another namesare thesame (whenthe proper even whenthecoreferential constructed vehicles,in Fodor's sense, are the same). A subjectmay not realize that the andtherefore thepianist, to Paderewski is identical thestatesman Paderewski = Paderewksi when her.In addition, for maybe informative Paderewski identity demonstrative coreferential the Millian view is applied to demonstratives, out,however, to content. Burgepoints makethesame contribution expressions and identical notonlyforcoreferential thatFregean puzzlescan be constructed expressions.13 demonstrative and identical for coreferential also but names, proper by a demon'this' is accompanied if thefirst This = thiscan be informative thesecond and in The Lady Shanghai Welles from Orson of thesvelte stration Evil. in Touch Welles of of a morecorpulent by a demonstration thetwo that evidence in each of thesecases,we have strong Accordingly, content. to contributions different indicate theidentity sign flanking expressions valuebetween in cognitive thedivergence exampleshows, As the"Paderewski" in vehicles. a difference be by cannotalways explained the two expressions distinction the that dubious it is even whenvehiclesare distinct, Moreover, in cognitive fordifferences accounts vehiclesalwaysor eventypically between is sometimes by the beliefs provided contribution a further value. Plausibly, Pierre in Kripke's case,thebeliefs Forexample, theexpressions. with associated
/405 of Content Structure and theIndividuation Conceptual he associates thebeliefs from well be different with'Londres'might associates with'London.' But even if we makethismove,Kripkewould arguethatthe remains unsolved.We can imaginethatmany problemforbeliefattribution aboutLondonthatPierreacquiredin people havejust the information French Yet we predicament. they wouldbe in Pierre's counterfactually, andthat France, like 'Madeleinebelievesthat attributions, would wantto makeunembellished forbelief to them.So if we were to apply our standards London is pretty,' thebeliefthat to Pierre we wouldstillwantto attribute consistently, attribution Kripke'spuzzle. Londonis pretty, and thisis whatgenerates it is that individuation A common objection to Burge'sviewaboutcontent when theymustexplainsignificantly contents equivalent renders sometimes and at othertimesdistinguishes and behavior, of inference patterns different To and behavior. of inference patterns thatmustexplainverysimilar contents let us examinea case Burgehas used to argueforhis view.'4Alfred illustrate, and he and social community, linguistic is a member of the English-speaking But he has recently in manysituations. applies the term'arthritis' correctly in my a painin histhigh, andhe has cometo believe"I havearthritis developed as a by theexperts is classified in his community arthritis eventhough thigh," who is to Alfred, disease solely of the joints. Now imaginea counterpart but in his feature, individualistic identicalto him in everynon-intentional ailments, including theword'arthritis' rheumatoid refers to certain community and in of themusclesand tendons, ailments butalso including certain arthritis, in my in his language)"I have arthritis his belief(expressed thiscommunity a belief involvingour would attribute thigh"is true. We English-speakers but in obliqueposition) to Alfred, of arthritis (withourword'arthritis' concept individualistic there are no non-intentional notto his counterpart, eventhough a belief in our language to the between them. To attribute differences forhis suchas 'tharthritis,' we wouldhave to devisea translation, counterpart, his andmorespecifically, ofAlfred's attitude, term 'arthritis.' Hence,thecontent individualistic not simply on non-intentional of arthritis, is dependent concept abouthis social environment. factsabouthim,butalso on facts to be plausible to support Burge'sview,itmust Forthethought-experiment to Alfred, theconcept 'arthritis' just as to an expert attribute contents including But many of Alfred'scounterpart. on earth, and to denytheconcept'arthritis' and of Alfred and inferences thebehavior intuition that theindividualist report states.Furthermore, are explainedby the same psychological his counterpart someAlfred andtheexpert inbehavior between might thedifferences although beliefstheyhold, a significant 'arthritis' timesbe explainedby the different in such beliefs could conceivablyforceus to attribute enough divergence in when attributed to different concepts them.For the view thatconcepts, is of beliefs are independent surrounding explanations, completely psychological implausible.'5 thatdisavowsuch individualist theories have developed Burgeand others while theseintuitions that preserves intuitions. My aim is to develop a view
406 / DerkPereboom and in addition direction, that pull in theopposite explaining theconsiderations ofcontent individa method puzzle,andprovides a solution to Kripke's supplies we wantto make.Such generalizations can sustain thepsychological uationthat that Burge position ofthesort an externalist undermine a viewwillnotobviously and its to such a position, has advocated.But it will providean alternative andfrom the intuitions, oftheindividualist willderive from theforce plausibility of content. desiderata of a theory attractive waysin whichit can meettheother II on crucially depend BothKripke'spuzzleandBurge'sthought-experiments of indicative, ifnotdefinitive, to be strongly ordinary attribution practice taking an alternative to Hence,in developing thenature of thecontent of an attitude. in to undermine this confidence theories, one mightattempt theirexternalist twoperspectives bydifferentiating Onemight begin attribution practice. ordinary in a discussionof can be evaluated.Burge himself, fromwhichattributions proper namesand indexicals, Frege's views on the sense of beliefsinvolving Whatis functions of attribution. the psychological the publicfrom distinguishes throughordinarylanguage when propernames, or other "communicated of "to solvetheproblems from whatis required indexicals are used" is distinct John DonaldDavidson,and Perry, valueandobliquebelief contexts."'6 cognitive andDavidsonand of thissort, MichaelDevitthave also suggested a distinction to bear on Burge's thoughtDevitt have argued that it can be brought the purposeof psychological Devittarguesthatin attribution, experiments.17 abouttheworld: can be distinguished from theaim of learning explanation butalso to learn Folkascribe notonly forpsychological purposes thoughts thefolk do not thepossibility that about theworld. raises Thisdualpurpose ofbehavior.'8 tothe all the ascribe as relevant explanation they content regard in greater detail. I shall attempt to developthistypeof suggestion is One goal of beliefattribution have variouspurposes. Beliefattributions oftheworldrepresented evidence aboutfeatures by a to communicate to others is clear.People's of beliefattribution function belief.Thatthisis an important andpublic aboutwhat source ofevidence area significant beliefs they represent, thisevidence. meansfor ofbeliefs is an important If, attribution communicating abouttheworldis one's aim in attributing communication ofevidence however, thatevidencemight theexactway thesubjectrepresents a beliefto a subject, elms For example, even if a subjectcannotdistinguish well not be pertinent. elmsandbeeches andevenifshebelievesthat deciduous from mostother trees, elms ofherbeliefas "She believesthat theattribution arethesametypeof tree, about elms. evidence still communicate can to aresubject epidemics" Despitethe contextual have certain if her beliefs subject's meager conceptualability, beliefs as of her attributions a causal to elms,perhaps chain, relations involving
of Content /407 and theIndividuation Structure Conceptual aboutelmsto an audience. evidence beingaboutelms can stillprovide thepartit playsin the purpose, fundamental has another Beliefattribution Andwhenthisis themain andbehavior. of inference explanation psychological thanit does whentheaim emphases will tendto havedifferent goal, attribution Whencommunication dominates. abouttheworld ofevidence ofcommunication of all aspects delineating aim,carefully abouttheworldis thechief of evidence of a subject's thenature But specifying maybe irrelevant. a subject'sattitudes becausethe explanation, for psychological maybe critical attitudes very precisely and for her inferences can make a difference exact natureof the attitude behavior. of evidenceabout the world is at issue, belief When communication are can prescindfromthe detailsof the ways in which entities attribution WhenI makethe fitthisdescription. often De re beliefattributions represented. believesitnotto Pierre 'Londonis suchthat belief, of Pierre's de re attribution be ofno concern Londonmight represents themodebywhichPierre be pretty,' in communicating mainly I am interested thisbelief to me becausein attributing London represents themodeby whichPierre aboutLondon.And that evidence by the factthatin my attribution to me may be indicated is of no concern Moreover, for'London'salva veritate. substitutable coreferential expressions-are modeofrepresentation thesubject's inde dictoattributions delineating although as function might abouttheworld ofevidence is alwaysan aim,communication on thecharacter of havean effect there as well,andmight an additional purpose 'Pierrebelievesthatthe capitalof Englandis the attribution. My attribution of Pierre'sactualmode of representation maycome close to specifying pretty' doesnot, is pretty' inEngland city that thelargest believes while'Pierre London, in my salva veritate of coreferential expressions substitution and,accordingly, the precedencetaken by the goal of attribution fails. But nevertheless of render my specification of evidenceabouttheworldmight communication Londonunnecessary. detailsabouttheway Pierre represents further in mind.The Kripke'spuzzlewiththesereflections Let us now reexamine evidence cancommunicate that Londonis pretty ofthebelief to Pierre attribution to him of the beliefthat the attribution And further, thatLondon is pretty. But thatLondonis notpretty. evidence can communicate Londonis notpretty thus and evidence, communicate conflicting theseattributions might although we have yetno reasonto statesof affairs, provideevidenceforincompatible London.For if in Pierre the represents a contradiction way there is believethat more were more accurately specified-described states Pierre'spsychological the about of evidence aim of communication for the thanis required precisely well disappear. might world-any suchcontradiction tasks in psychological may demand distinct explanation Furthermore, states.If we of psychological in thespecification levels of precision different while stillin France,says to thetravelagent"Je wantto explainwhyPierre, to himthebelief we cando so partly byattributing a' Londres," voudrais vogayer chooses nowin England, to explain Ifwe want whyPierre, that Londonis pretty.
408 / DerkPereboom a walk,we than by taking to musicrather to getoverhis bad moodby listening or in Londonis notpretty, to himthebeliefthat by attributing can do so partly in interests explanatory French, que Londresn'estpas jolie. Givenour typical 'London' or of oftheconcept ourattribution suchcontexts, we neednotqualify thecaseand indeedso far-and thisis often theconcept'Londres'to Pierre, precision inthespecification greater does notdemand explanation psychological abouttheworld.But whenwe of evidence of content thandoes communication mustexplainhow he can believeboth 'Londresestjolie' and 'London is not and detailed must becomemore attitudes ofPierre's ourcharacterizations pretty,' moremustbe said abouttheway in whichhe is thinking precise.In particular, this ofLondon.One wayto accomplish aboutLondon-his modeofpresentation that he has not 'London' by specifying oftheconcept is to hedgeourattribution = London,andtherefore involving his use beliefs Pierre's Londres realizedthat thoseinvolving hisuse of 'London.' from of 'Londres'areinferentially isolated his article,Kripke stressesthe point that there is some Throughout however, that He argues, to explainPierre'ssituation. that suffices terminology thisdoes notsolve his puzzle. that toobserve initself Itisnosolution ofconfusion. Butbeware ofonesource thequestion whether Pierre believes someother which evades terminology, facts... . Butnone all the relevant tostate maybe sufficient London is pretty, that believe ordoeshenot, DoesPierre, ofthis theoriginal question. answers satisfactory.'9 question that seems I know tothis ofnoanswer London ispretty? evidence can communicate to Pierre of beliefs As we have seen,ourattribution We canlegitimately that Londonis notpretty. andevidence that Londonis pretty nottheprecise they reflect that giventheunderstanding makesuchattributions, his abouttheworldthat buttheevidence states, nature ofPierre's psychological of manycases of psychological as well as therequirements beliefscan provide, a more But in Kripke'scase, psychological requires explanation explanation. London,and thuswe wouldnot of how Pierre represents precisespecification believesthatLondon is pretty." attribute his Frenchbeliefsimplyas "Pierre any by hedging thedetailsof his mode of presentation we wouldstress Rather, therewill not be an unqualified yes/no As a result, less preciseattributions. forbelief problem answerto Kripke'squestion.But thisraisesno intractable for the as foranswers to "Was French attribution. Just foreign policyresponsible and "Is the ocean declineof Spain in the seventeenth century?" geopolitical is too complex to Kripke'squestion must be qualified. Reality blue?"an answer The content of to be satisfactory. to suchquestions forsimpleyes/no responses and indexical both in its conceptual is too intricate, perhaps Pierre'sattitude answer.20 to have an unqualified forKripke'squestion yes/no features, an alternative of the to explore We can also use theseobservations analysis good reasonto believethat issues raisedby Burge's example.Burgeprovides in the sense thatour is oftennon-individualistic belief attribution ordinary
/409 Structure and theIndividuation of Content Conceptual on facts abouta subject'sphysical of content aredependent ordinary attributions attributions he concludes Fromthisfactaboutordinary and social environment. Let us, individuation-conditions. haveextemalist that beliefcontents themselves the thattakes seriously however,attempt to develop an accountof content couldrequire thecognitive that psychological explanation individualist intuitions tobe thesame,andthecognitive concepts valueofAlfred's andhiscounterpart's to differ. Rather thanconcedean value of Alfred'sand the expert'sconcepts we might regard theninstead externalist individuation, positionaboutcontent as attribution evidenceagainsttakingordinary these intuitions as providing his writings, Burgeassumesthat determinative of cognitive value. Throughout adequate for psychological yieldsa notion ofcontent ordinary attribution practice practicemay be adequate to attribution explanation.2' But while ordinary be thatin morechallenging in typical cases, itmight psychological explanation contents, of attitude disclosethereal nature cases, thosethatmoreaccurately is inadequate. ordinary practice to see whether theintuitions Burge'sthought-experiment Let us reexamine while keeping in mind the that oppose his view can be accommodated, distinction between attribution aimedat communication of evidenceaboutthe world and attribution explanation. Alfredand his geared to psychological are identicalwith respectto all non-intentional, individualistic counterpart to a characteristics. to refer Alfred'sEnglish-speaking societyuses 'arthritis' is society thisterm rheumatoid ailment of thejoints,whilein thecounterpart's of the used to refer not onlyto thisailment of thejoints,butalso to ailments that we would ordinarily muscles and tendons.Burge argues convincingly tothe beliefs qualification-not only 'arthritis'-without attribute usingourterm in butto Alfred as well. But thisfact be explained by ourinterest might expert, evidence about thefeatures ofthe attribution, communicating, bymeansofbelief ofpsychological explanaworld andbytherequirements represented bya belief, of evidence tion in manyordinary thegoal of communication contexts. First, have public that we use terms that attribution abouttheworldthrough requires in accordance withtheir andthat we use theseterms public linguistic meanings, of And thusthisgoal givesus reasonto makeattributions linguistic meanings. andnot withitspubliclinguistic Alfred theterm 'arthritis' meaning, employing thanthepublicone, other a linguistic whileintending meaning using'arthritis' 'arthritis' or usinga made-up term notin thepubliclanguage-eveniftheterm even though fails to capturethe natureof his conceptaccurately. Further, to preclude evenfairly Alfred's of arthritis is too limited elementary knowledge of the standard errors-measuredagainst public linguisticmeaning-the wellbe relations to arthritis and contextual ofhis conceptual combination might about arthritis to communicate as of his beliefs being forattribution sufficient ofthejoints.GivenAlfred's ailment therheumatoid evidence concepregarding attributions to arthritis, relations tual and contextual therefore, usingthe term well be sufficient withitspubliclinguistic meaning, might 'arthritis,' unhedged, the of evidenceabout the aim of communication to satisfy world,even if
410 / Derk Pereboom to himthe same thatwe not attribute could require explanation psychological 'arthritis,' usingourterm to Alfred attribution Moreover, concept as theexpert. explanaformanycases of psychological would likelybe sufficient unhedged, moreprecisely-and of his concept thenature tion.But if we wantto specify the between to explainsomeof thedifferences we mustdo so in order perhaps of our concept and theexpert-attributions of Alfred and behavior inferences well have to be qualified. might 'arthritis' to Alfred to Alfred's of ourconcept 'arthritis' to denyattribution Ourpredisposition of evidence by theaim of communication also be explained might counterpart thatthe public Burge specifies about the world. In his thought-experiment, is notthesame community in thecounterpart's of 'arthritis' meaning linguistic a Hence,to attribute in our community. of 'arthritis' meaning as the linguistic to wouldbe to attribute counterpart to Alfred's 'arthritis' beliefusingourterm Mostoften to hiscommunity. foreign meaning a linguistic hima term intending the towards is directed byattribution about theworld ofevidence communication usingthelinguistic attribution therefore, Typically, subject'sown community. about ofevidence communication facilitates community ofthesubject's meanings usinglinguistic byattribution is frustrated whilesuchcommunication theworld, our attribution Consequently, to the subject'scommunity. meaningsforeign linguistic intending terms to a subject to attribute disinclined is strongly practice averseto using and we are accordingly meaningsalien to his community, to Alfred's 'arthritis' with our linguisticmeaningin makingattributions our attribuexplanation, if our aim is psychological Nevertheless, counterpart. to exhibit mayyetbe forced andqualifications, withourhedgings together tions, of theconcepts of Alfred and his counterpart. a convergence such as Loar, Block, and Fodor,have arguedthat Many philosophers, indicatethat thereare two types of of attribution variationin standards content,and the narrow contentrequired for content-wide, externalist In theviewI amdeveloping ofinference andbehavior. explanation psychological is mostaccurately character anditstrue is unitary, content here, as inBilgrami's, of The arguments in the context of psychological explanation. approximated qualifies showthat"widecontent" do not,all by themselves, Burgeand others itwouldseem, "Widecontent," content. kindofrealpsychological as a separate of communication thatin partaim to facilitate is derivedfromattributions a tendency be viewedas having theworld. Butthispurpose might evidence about of of thesubjectin the interest aboutthe attitudes to deflect the aim at truth of the world that the attitude evidence about the features communicating of evidenceaboutthe is in communication Thus whenour interest represents. the thebeliefthatLondonis pretty, to Pierre disregarding world,we attribute of London. In this case, we, as more complexnatureof his representation whatis in as notengaged ourselves solelyin specifying regard attributors, might also by the of his attitudes-but thereal nature Pierre'smind-in describing aboutthe evidence andpotentially goal ofcommunicating conflicting additional our are about. beliefs that Pierre's When,by contrast, features of the world
of Content and theIndividuation / 41 1 Structure Conceptual psychology, ourfocusis solelyon Pierre's explanation, interest is psychological as theparticular oras accurately attitudes accurately, Pierre's andon representing attribution therefore, In thispicture, requires. taskin psychological explanation thecontent of a subject's to represent a tendency incorporates of "widecontent" explanation, is psychological whereaswhenour interest attitudes imprecisely, as it reallyis. content is seen as approaching attribution types aretwodifferent inthisviewitis notthecase that there Correlatively, of Whenone aimsat communication attribution. of truth-conditions forcontent a "content" forattributing there maybe good reasons evidence abouttheworld, may have from Such divergence of the attitude. thatdiverges thereal nature of aboutthecontent value,butitdoes notaim solelyat truth genuine pragmatic about ofevidence ofcommunication Andthussuccessinthepursuit theattitude. ofthetruth-conditions thesatisfaction conflict with theworld might quitereadily of evidence of thegoal of communication of content attribution. Since pursuit ofthe characterization an imprecise to motivate abouttheworldhas a tendency sort it wouldbe a mistake to positan additional contents of subjects'attitudes, one's of truth-condition thatcorresponds to thispurpose.When,by contrast, andless is psychological one aimsmoredirectly explanation, questin attribution also at the and therefore about subject's attitudes, equivocallyat the truth of attribution. of thetruth-conditions satisfaction partially to communicate serves content attribution ifordinary Furthermore, withrepresenting tendsto conflict evidenceabouttheworld,and thispurpose content in ordinary content as it reallyis, thenconcepts as theyare employed of thesortwe have attribution do nothave externalist individuation-conditions in thought-experiments thatgenerate externalist examined.For if the factors of of the goal of communication conclusions can be explainedas a function the aim at truth about evidenceaboutthe world,and if thispurposedeflects partofwhosepurpose attitude then we shouldnotlookto attributions contents, is communication abouttheworldfortheindividuation-conditions of evidence of arenotbestrevealed byinstances ofconcepts. Theseindividuation-conditions false togenerate which has a tendency practice valuableattribution pragmatically contents. aboutattitude thataim at truth attributions, butrather by attributions In summary, our objectivewas to develop a view thatsolves Kripke's whilepreserving theresults ofBurge'sthought-experiments puzzleandexplains attitude we have constructed, In the picture intuitions. the key individualist abouttheworld ofevidence have(at least)twoaims,communication attributions combinesboth attribution and psychological typically Ordinary explanation. as unequivocally attribution neednotbe regarded tending Butordinary purposes. For whilethegoal of psychological to accuracy aboutthenature of attitudes. ofcommunicainattribution, thepurpose truth inclines tosubserving explanation about theaim at truth to deflect has a tendency abouttheworld tionof evidence maxidoesnotrequire In addition, typically attitudes. explanation psychological of Thus the ordinary attributions of attitudes. mal precisionin specification as be viewed not need and repreBurge'sthought-experiments Kripke'spuzzle
412 / Derk Pereboom well be room forthe Consequently, theremight accurately. senting attitudes also forthe beingthesame,andperhaps andhis counterpart concepts of Alfred and Pierre'sbeliefsmight beingdifferent, conceptsof Alfredand the expert all. reallynotbe puzzlingafter III that can forcontent individuation Our account now provide a method must consider we wantto make.Let us first generalizations support thepsychological a and Fodor,whichsupply by Dretske, Millikan, thecausal theories, developed years.22 in recent thathas becomeprominent method forcontent individuation value or is thatthe cognitive in thesecausal theories The commonelement that byentities orproperties is provided meaning ofrepresentations psychological their intheir whatis perhaps waysofhandling causethem. Causal theories differ thedisjunction which byFodor.23 hasbeenoutlined problem, difficultly, deepest are caused not onlyby cows but also by 'cow' representations To illustrate, wouldhave 'cow' mean andthusa simplecausaltheory busheson darknights, problem The disjunction cow or bush-or-a-dark-night. notjust cow butrather theright all the causesfrom forces causal theories to provide a wayof selecting causes are theright In Millikan'stheory, possible causes of a representation. ofthis In one statement biologicalfunction. ofproper singled outby thenotion of a beliefis C just in case therole thatbeliefsof thistype view,thecontent their proper thatproducethisbeliefare fulfilling play,whenthemechanisms involves beingcausedbyC's.24 functions as determined biology, byevolutionary 'cow' meanscow and notcow or In Fodor's asymmetrical theory, dependence in virtue of because 'cow' tokensare caused by things bush-on-a-dark-night in virtue oftheir causedbythings of 'cow' tokens beingcows,andtheexistence causedby of 'cow' tokens depends on theexistence nights beingbusheson dark there in virtue Fodor'sidea is that oftheir beingcows,andnotvice-versa. things is a hierarchy of causal dependence among causes of tokensof a mental or thepsychological meaning that specifies andtheproperty representation-type, is causallymostfundamental. value of that representation cognitive A problem have beenraisedforeach of thesetheories.25 Manydifficulties is that causal intuitions swayed byindividualist theperspective ofsomeone from ofhisthought-experiments. wouldseemto acquiescetoBurge'sanalysis theories the 'arthritis' conceptsof Alfredand his For example,by a causal theory, causes differ-the external-world since their would have to differ, counterpart is not the same disease as thediseasecalled on earth disease called "arthritis" of Alfred and the In the 'arthritis' twin earth. "arthritis" on concepts addition, the associated beliefs different matter how no wouldseemto be identical, expert Causal the same disease. werecausedby theories, as longas these concepts were, intuitions. theindividualist seemunableto preserve therefore, ornot whether wouldconcern for causaltheories A further anyone, problem forcausal viewsis One of themajordifficulties herintuitions are individualist.
/ 413 of Content and theIndividuation Structure Conceptual version Loar's revised tests. ofFregean theresults failto accommodate that they the acquires here.Pierre illustrative of Kripke'spuzzleaboutbeliefis especially ofLondon, part landsup in a pretty andthen belief'Londresestjolie' in France, that Londres realizing without wherehe acquiresthebelief'London is pretty,' = London. By Frege'stest,his concept'Londres' is distinct his concept form playsignificantly becausethey mustholdthemdistinct, 'London.' Psychology But of his behavior. and in theproduction different rolesin Pierre'sinferences the same-indeed, the views of London that theircauses mightbe precisely be theverysame as thosethatcausedthe might caused the 'Londres' concept 'London' concept.26 thebelief thatalthough by saying to handlethisobjection Fodorproposes are the contents of Pierre'sbeliefs'Londresestjolie' and 'London is pretty' a causaltheory HenceFodorhopestoretain differ.27 thebeliefs same,nonetheless As we haveseen,Fodor's a causaltheory of belief. of content, whileeschewing content, typeof attitude, of fourfactors, view is thata belief is a function to his analysisof Kripke'spuzzle,the role. According vehicle,and functional their arethesame,whereas twobeliefs and typeof attitude of Pierre's contents differ. vehicles, rolesof their vehicles, or thefunctional if, among otherthings,Fodor Such a solutionwould be satisfactory, functional andtheir ofvehicles oftheindividuation us withan account provided explanation. in psychological plausiblegeneralizations rolesthatwould sustain with can dispense explanation that psychological Fodorargues But surprisingly, in his own sense and, vehicleand functional role, and embraceonlycontent Fodorhopesto excludevehiclesand functional typeof attitude.28 presumably, in orderto avoid theirmessy precisely explanation roles frompsychological andtype content individuated causally whilehe retains individuation-conditions, Limited are less problematic. individuation-conditions of attitude becausetheir in Fodor's sense,however, and content of typeof attitude by the resources in inference and behavior will be unableto explainthedifferences psychology Londonand Londres.By Fodor's Pierre'sfailure to identify from thatemerge 'Londres beliefs estjolie' and thecontents ofPierre's ofcontent, characterization role in the therefore same and the play is are they 'London pretty' same, in his that could have elements Fodor does theory explanation. psychological from failure Pierre's and behavior in inference resulting explainthedifferences whenthese But sincehe lacksa wayto specify LondonandLondres. to identify fails to solve one his are arethesameand whenthey different, theory elements foraccounts of psychological explanation. of thefundamental problems have been drawnto causal views One of themain reasonswhytheorists of naturalism, that meetstherequirements is to providea theory aboutcontent of their naturalistic in virtue as sufficiently are regarded and causal theories I But naturalist reductionism. believe,can to incorporate requirements, capacity reductionist In myview,furthermore, be metwithout anytypeof reductionism. individuate cannot that forthereason shouldbe rejected ofcontent they theories WhileI will forpsychological withtheaccuracy explanation. content required
414 / DerkPereboom not argueforthisgeneral claim here,it is well-illustrated by one of Fodor's counterexamples to Millikan'sbiologicaltheory of thecontent of desires. According to Millikan'sview,the content of a desireis provided by its proper biologicalfunction. In one formulation of heraccount, thecontent of a desire is C just in case the role that desiresof this type play, when the mechanisms thatproducethis desireare fulfilling theirproperfunctions as determined by evolutionary biology,is to cause theorganism to secureC's.29 Fodor's counterargument examinesour desire for sweets. By evolutionary biology's accountof theproper function of themechanisms thatproducethe desireforsweets, theroleof thisdesireis to gettheorganism to ingest sugars. on Millikan'stheory, Consequently, thedesireforsweetsis correctly described as a desireforsugars.But thedesireforsweetsis satisfied by saccharine and Nutra-Sweet, and thus, thecontent of thedesireforsweetsis just whatit seems to be, for sweets,and notfor sugars. The content of the desireforsweets, therefore, cannot be derived from itsproper biologicalfunction.30 Millikan might respond that thedesire forsweets might really be thedesire forsugars despite Fodor'scounterexample, becausethepossibility of a desire for A beingsatisfied by something that onlyappears to be A provides no reason to believethatthedesireis reallyforsomething thatappears to be A. The desire forsomething sweetbeingsatisfied byDiet Coke (whichcontains Nutra-Sweet) is muchlike a desirefora Vermeer painting beingsatisfied by a van Meegeren The desire for theVermeer does notmean forgery. beingsatisfied bytheforgery that thedesirefora Vermeer is really just a desirefora painting thatlookslike a Vermeer. of oursystem's Hence,thepossibility beingfooledby Nutra-Sweet is notadequatereasonto reject thebiologicalaccount of desirecontent. One odd consequence ofthisresponse is that Diet Coke despite appearances, the desireforsweets, reallyfailsto satisfy just as the forgery reallydoesn't thedesirefora Vermeer. This is counterintuitive, becauseifone satisfy perhaps it was pointed wereaskedif one's desireforsweets was satisfied after outthat contained no sugars, one might well say"yes," theDiet Coke onejust consumed itwas ifone wereaskedifone's desire fora Vermeer was satisfied after whereas is a forgery, onejust acquired one wouldsay "no." outthat thepainting pointed case is notone reasonto believethat Fodor's"desireforsweets" This provides of beingfooledby appearances. more Buta further counterexample might prove convincing. Byevolutionary that the mechanisms the functions of account of biology's proper producethe Thuson is the to for the of this desire to role desire sex, get subject reproduce. be thedesireforreproduction. desireforsex mustactually Millikan'saccount, of thisview is thatdesireforsex wouldnotreally An unintuitive consequence One might holdoutfortheclaim wereattained. unlessreproduction be satisfied is notachieved, when satisfied sex is that desire for onlyapparently reproduction butthisview is farfrom plausible. desireforsex plays forMillikan'sviewis that At therootof thedifficulty different from therole thatis systematically a role in psychological explanation
of Content / 415 and theIndividuation Structure Conceptual purpose that theevolutionary thefact despite playedby desireforreproduction, one This problem, to reproduce. of the desireforsex is to get the organism a or supposing intentionality, intrinsic notby assuming note,is generated might be cannot that causalpowers ofview,or assuming point introspective privileged on the actual practiceof but solely by reflection relationally individuated, biology between evolutionary And thustherelation explanation. psychological is not as close as Millikanmakesit out to be. Evolutioncan and psychology of beliefsand desires-a psychology. us a system achieveits aimsby granting forthe theory of evolutionary independent is significantly But thispsychology notfor a desire we form of itskinds.In thecase of sexualdesire, individuation with sex.This associated pleasures andsensory theintimacy butfor reproduction, thanby to securereproduction is perhaps a better way forevolution strategy environgivenournatural perse. Similarly, toreproduce us form a desire having maywell be a provided by sweettastes pleasure a desireforthesensory ment, per thanwoulda desireforsugars sugars wayto makeus ingest moreefficient their strucchemical representing ifthisalternative wouldinvolve se, especially In bothcases,psychological cannot be determined by evolutionary content ture. alone. biologicalconsiderations of individuation to regard Thesereflections that it is advantageous suggest considerabiological ofevolutionary independent content as largely psychological seemsunableto individuate biologicaltheory tions.A reductionist evolutionary explanation. forpsychological required stateswiththe accuracy psychological to which content I favorthe nonreductive view according More generally, In theories.3' of all morebasic scientific is largely independent individuation that the convincingly StichandMichaelTyehaveargued Stephen recent papers, Theymaintain, can be appliedto a theory of content.32 nonreductive strategy to it neednotbe reduced I believe,that to be naturalistic, forcontent correctly, of a truescientiain its meetsthecriteria thenon-intentional, forif psychology itpositsareconstituted overwhich physics andtheentities byentities ownright, can be laid to rest. credentials aboutitsnaturalistic worries quantifies,
IV
such as the externalisms, If one wishesto rejectthevariouswell-known foundations to provide and ifone wants adequate viewsof BurgeandMillikan, a satisfying alternative reasonto believethat one mustprovide forpsychology, theories is in the Externalist individuation content offing. of theory psychological of content individuation, theory a imperfect perhaps workable, although provide it wouldbe bestto appropriate of a better and if one has no indication option, is very features. its counterintuitive of externalism Psychology someform despite to it have and of content method might individuation, some likelyto require is there that I shall available argue forthebestone imperfections. despite settle this and that foremost externalist the to alternative theories, a promising role facedby thefunctional from thedifficulties thatdoes notsuffer alternative
416 / Derk Pereboom theories thathave been advanced. the content of a mentalstateis a role theories, According to functional mental states outputs, andtheother function oftheperceptual inputs, behavioral forthistypeof view is The mainproblem to whichthestateis causallyrelated. classifying tokenmethod for andsatisfying that itappears to lackanyprincipled My beliefthatit is statesas havingthe same content. distinct psychological causal role thanyourbeliefthatit is different raining likelyhas a somewhat as beingbeliefsof might well class them roletheory raining, and so functional precludesthe kinds of different types. But this methodof individuation that we wantto make. in psychological explanation generalizations that rejects certain within a framework A strategy individuation forcontent According to byBilgrami. hasrecently beendeveloped well-known externalisms solelyby is individuated value of a subject'sconcept hisproposal, thecognitive points out, His strategy, as he himself thebeliefs withthat concept.33 associated musthave theresources to solve three The first of thesewe have problems.34 alreadyexplored:A theoryin which the cognitivevalue of a conceptis (at a time)will cut with theconcept associated individuated solelybythebeliefs in thisway value is determined sincewhencognitive cognitive valuetoo finely, Second,if all of a generalizations. it will not sustainplausiblepsychological valueof to individuating thecognitive beliefs wererelevant subject'sassociated inthecognitive value a concept, in belief to a change wouldamount anychange in cognitive of a concept. in belief wouldamount to a change And ifanychange couldnotdeepenor broaden hergraspof anyone concept. value,thena subject beliefs, weredetermined byassociated ifthecognitive valueof a concept Third, the psychological then conceptsthatthese beliefsinvolvewould constitute and meaning)of thatconcept, perhapsnot the linguistic meaning(although A theory of this sense).35 of it (in one traditional hence,they wouldbe analytic would seem to reintroduce a versionof the analytic/synthetic sort,therefore, forQuineanreasons, be unappealing. might which, distinction, Onlyin byan appealto context. to solvetheseproblems Bilgrami proposes individuated value forsome term some abstract senseis thecognitive by all of will thecontext withit.In anyspecific thesubject'sbeliefs associated situation, value fortheterm. the cognitive selecta subsetof thosebeliefsto determine in mother has arthritis Alfred's Alfred and theexpert maysharethebeliefthat relevant all ofthebeliefs of attribution in part becausein thecontext herfingers, arepossessed valuefor'arthritis' thecognitive to individuating bybothsubjects. value In addition, changeof cognitive changeof belief is possiblewithout the as relevant to individuating because the beliefsthata context designates since value fora term Finally, maynot includethosethatchange.36 cognitive value or psychological distinct beliefsare selectedto providethe cognitive be thatno particular well in it could different a term for contexts, meaning for a term in all contexts, andthus the meaning concepts provide psychological of a would be term.37 no particular concepts analytic howcontext doesnottellus in anydetail, might playthe however, Bilgrami
of Content Structure and theIndividuation / 417 Conceptual and beliefs ofAlfred indicates which howcontext for example, rolehe envisions, value fortheterm thecognitive to individuating would be relevant the doctor would becausethey areimportant, 'arthritis.' The details theory ofhiscontextual inpsychology areto that determine howgeneralizations constitute theprinciples be made, and how cognitivevalue can remainstable despitevariationin becomesclearwhenwe bring oftheproblem The seriousness associated beliefs. of attribution, mustmeettworequirements. at minimum, to mindthata theory about rather thanmerelyreduceto, our intuitions First,it must illuminate, mustbe testable such against in particular cases. Second,thetheory attribution Bilgramifails to provide If, however, intuitions about attribution. particular thetheory contexts andattributions, between specify therelations principles that cases. If he to reduceto our intuitions aboutparticular does indeedthreaten do, but does moreworkthansuchintuitions nevertheless thetheory insists that he supplies no principles that specifythe relationsbetweencontextsand between the deliverwe will have no clearway of distinguishing attributions, makethesedistinctions, andourintuitions. Andifwe cannot ancesofthetheory is true. whether thetheory we will have no way of testing his Bilgrami needsto supplement It is doubtful, that theprinciples however, and can be provided. therelations between contexts contextual Perhaps theory in a useful way.One might attributions aremuchtoo complex to be formulated a contextual forindividuation general principles thusarguethat account without of content be thebesttheory available.But one shouldagreethatifthere might to then there wouldbe somereason werea theory thatsupplied suchprinciples, favor such a view. V for Practices in other sciences suggest a more promisingstrategy of the same or entities as members content. Whenwe classify individuating of we often lookto structural features different kindsin chemistry and biology, in oceans is of thesame type in streams and thestuff theseentities. The stuff human We consider different structure. beings becauseithas thesamechemical structure. becauseof similar of the same speciespartly genetic to be members also have thatmanyconcepts indicates Recentworkin cognitive psychology to be a basis, similar there and consequently structure of varioussorts, might and difference aboutsameness forevaluating thosein other questions sciences, of these concepts,and also of the contentof which these conceptsare structure intoconceptual In thelasttwodecades, insight significant components. what to be done,and accordingly, has been achieved.But muchmoreremains but of content an actualtheory to constitute individuation, followsis notmeant take. sucha theory might a suggestion forthedirection rather andcontent for willbe valuable structure concepts individuating Conceptual it a with associated if fromamong the beliefs concept providesa way of Since conceptsare essentially than others. selectingsome as more weighty
418 / Derk Pereboom classification, identification, of abilities that includes connected witha complex aim to isolatethe associated beliefsthatare most and recognition, one might salient fortheseabilities. have recently arguedforwhat has come to be Cognitivepsychologists have essentialism.38 This is not the view thatthings knownas psychological of thingsof some kinds are that our representations essences,but rather these According to thistheory, of them as having essences. structured by beliefs part thanothers beliefs playa muchmoreimportant experimentally identifiable manynatural kindand some For example, in our classification of suchthings. of the thatinternal properties artifact are structured by an assumption concepts fortheirsurface are causallyresponsible thingsfallingunderthoseconcepts than their surface internal properties aremoreimportant properties, andthat these such beingwhattheyare. Hence,whenwe classify properties forthe things incarrying function their internal havea much moreinfluential things, properties ofthe actualconcepts tasksthan surface properties. Sometimes outthese do their oftheconcept, butoften partin thestructure internal properties playthecrucial a placeholder conception, like 'whatever the expertsbelieve to cause the really ofthediseasecalled"arthritis"' or 'whatever internal properties symptoms has thedecisiverole.39 cause thesymptoms of thediseasecalled"arthritis"' it One of themostsignificant essentialism is that features of psychological way to determine whichbeliefs and empirically testable provides a principled certainconcepts.Let us considertwo play the centralrole in structuring In one experiment Wellman, performed by SusanGelmanandHenry examples. fourtheir and five-year olds wereaskedforitemslike dogs and carswhether forbeing whattheyare. For insidesor theiroutsideswere more important wereaskedto consider situations: "Whatifyoutake thefollowing example, they likethatand gotrid out thestuff insidea dog,theblood and bonesand things of it and all you have leftare the outsides?" and "Whatif you take the stuff are outside of thedog,you know,thefur and gotridof it and all youhave left aboutthetransformed the insides?"Theywere asked two kindsof questions such like"Is it stilla dog?" and a function question an identity entity, question 72% of the as "Can it stillbarkand eat dog food?"For theidentity question, are was when the insides is what it the no indicated that entity longer responses was when the outsides what it that it is no while 35% indicated longer removed, are lost whenthe insidesare are removed.92% indicated thatthe functions ofthissort 29% when the are removed.40 Experiments provide outsides removed, of dogs and internal of evidencethatyoungchildren's properties conceptions a more oftheseproperties-play lackof detailed knowledge cars-despitetheir of surface in such than do crucial role classifying things conceptions properties. olds aboutan animal toldfour-year In another Gelman andWellman study, suited to a different that was brought species, and up in an environment theanimal believed whether in order to determine thechildren they questioned theproperties associated with orinstead innate displayed developed potentialities, of upbringing. For example, theenvironment theyaskedabouta cow who was
/419 Structure and theIndividuation Conceptual ofContent would be like, forexample physicalfeatures raisedby pigs whathermature hermature behavior would or curly, andwhat whether hertailwouldbe straight whether she wouldsay "moo" or "oink."Overall,children be like,forinstance likethis potential 85% ofthetime.Experiments answered on thebasis of innate of of internal properties conceptions provideevidencethatyoungchildren's category membership-how ininferences about more prominently animals figure and nurture.41 of environment do conceptions it is to be classified-than themany then from among canbe established, Ifpsychological essentialism isolatea of entities, we can experimentally withcertain types beliefs associated One should note that for classification. core group thatis most significant atthecoreofthe that theonlybeliefs essentialism doesnotspecify psychological are aboutessences.Psykindconcepts, evenfornatural structure of a concept, forone type important especially essentialism marks onlythebeliefs chological out for might be carried Similarresearch of conceptual ability, classification. and recognition, other such as identification withconcepts, abilitiesassociated connected withtheseabilities revealspecific typesof corebeliefs and it might as well. has thesortof psychological In addition, concept noteveryclassificatory example, are concepts, for essentialist structure we haveencountered. Functional essence that is causally not likely to involve suppositionof an internal of such But at the core of the structure for surfaceproperties. responsible or abouta definition we might well finda beliefabouta functional concepts we 'carburetor' Atthecoreoftheconcept placeholder conception. corresponding is a device thatmixes air with mightdiscoverthe beliefthata carburetor and forthose who cannotproducesuch a combustion, gasoline for internal fora there is a definition we might findthebeliefthatnevertheless definition, carburetor and thatmechanics knowwhatit is. have that andWellman essences ofthesort Gelman But still, psychological valueofconcepts thecognitive for individuating a paradigm investigated provide in the core to similarities and differences features. By appealing by structural we can judge the cognitive concepts groupof beliefsassociatedwithcertain The to be thesameor different. oftheseconcepts value ofvariousinstantiations have developedcan be used to kinds of testsGelman,Wellmanand others bothwithin structure in conceptual aboutsimilarity persons confirm hypotheses over timeand across different essentialism, therefore, persons. Psychological a concept mayhave, us witha good exampleof thetypeof structure provides and thecognitive valueofconcepts a modelforindividuating by suchstructure, intraandinterpersonal structural for similarity. determining empirical procedures value of of the cognitive reflection indicates how individuation Further difficulties three the illuminate their structural features might conceptsby beliefs:first, content thatindividuate raisesfortheories by associated Bilgrami content that is too of individuation for method offinding a theproblem avoiding content for method a of finding individuating and,morebroadly, fine-grained, between thedistinction oflosing thespecter injusttheright change way;second,
420 / Derk Pereboom analyticity. ofreintroducing andthird, thethreat inmeaning; inbelief andchange remedies functional structure byconceptual On thefirst issue,individuation tokenmethod forclassifying and satisfying lack of a principled role theory's for endorse, We might as having thesamecontent. states distinct psychological properties carry moreweight beliefs aboutessential that example, theprinciple as well as similar properties, aboutaccidental thando beliefs forindividuation Suppose, then, andrecognition. of identification from a study principles derived but yet the about arthritis, knowledgeable thattwo scientists are thoroughly We cannevertheless somewhat. concepts differ rolesoftheir 'arthritis' functional attribute the same conceptto themat least in partbecausetheyagreeon the and theyuse a similarset of core beliefsto of arthritis, defining properties arthritis. identify and recognize for theintuition structure canalso helpaccount byconceptual Individuation that Alfred andthe inBurge'scase,psychological couldrequire explanation that, has some SupposethatAlfred be attributed distinct 'arthritis' concepts. expert He also has a properties. beliefsaboutarthritis, butdoes notknowits defining is a disease by the belief that arthritis constituted placeholderconception of what explainthe symptoms characterized internal properties by whatever about he has somefalsebeliefs call "arthritis". In addition, peoplein his society wouldenablehim ofthebeliefs that measure arthritis, andhe lacksa significant the and recognizearthritis at the expertlevel. In this situation, to identify in Alfred's andtheexpert's difference between thecorestructures thatfunction a enough to constitute mightwell be significant conceptionsof arthritis by conceptual distinction in theirconcepts' cognitivevalue. Individuation contributions to content concepts' distinguish between might, therefore, structure And thus from sucha difference. wheresome externalist viewswouldprescind about a better of certain keyintuitions account thismethod potentially provides explanation. thekindsof generalizations we needto makein psychological forthe structure can also account In addition, by conceptual individuation that Alfred couldrequire that inBurge'scase,psychological explanation intuition thesame'arthritis' be attributed andhiscounterpart Supposeagainthat concepts. to any non-intentional withrespect Alfredand his counterpart do not differ refers to certain individualistic feature. Both believethatthe word 'arthritis' ailments notonlyof thejointsbutalso of themusclesand tendons. rheumatoid in their that wouldenablethem, ofthebeliefs Bothlacka significant proportion arthritis andrecognize toclassify, andenvironments, identify, societies respective that he wouldexpress level.Andeachhas a placeholder at theexpert conception thesymptoms whatever internal as "a diseasecharacterized explain properties by Underthese circumstances, of what people in my societycall "arthritis"." ofthe attribution wouldauthorize ofconcepts features individuation bystructural standards of the that the fact 'arthritis' to ordinary same concepts each,despite us from wouldprevent doingso. attribution practice in their belief indicate thesimilarity But how could an attribution practice the to each to do so by attributing It wouldbe misleading unqualified contents?
of Content /421 Structure and theIndividuation Conceptual in his thigh.For as we have argued,although belief thathe has arthritis in his thighwould be to Alfredthe beliefthathe has arthritis attributing to take it as an it mightwell be mistaken practice, warranted by ordinary we might concept precisely, To capture Alfred's of his attitude. accurate report Alfred thatalthough as we just did,by specifying needto hedgeourattribution measure ofthe conception, he lacksa significant has suchandsucha placeholder in their concept.'And thusthe similarity beliefsat the core of the 'arthritis' to each the by attributing accurately would not be captured attitude-contents in his thigh. beliefthathe has arthritis unqualified in a singlelan'arthritis' concept, attributing to eacha qualified Butperhaps ofcomenough. Forthepurposes accurately indicate thesimilarity guage,might valuable of evidence abouttheworldit wouldnotbe pragmatically munication a conceptin a languagethatthe to attribute to Alfredor to his counterpart not speak.But if we prescind his own community-does audience-typically For thepurposeof psychological vanishes. thatpurpose, thepeculiarity from we may need to attribute the same conceptto Alfredand his explanation, to characterize languages bywhich andthere couldwellbe different counterpart, thatconcept. of beliefs. In for the truth-conditions These claims have implications express one might ordinarily belief, which ofAlfred's Burge'sview,thecontent in his thigh,' to a truth-condition makesa contribution by 'thathe has arthritis by'he' and components specified is context-dependent theindexical onlyfor that have the and his counterpart thebeliefs of Alfred 'his.' But if we supposethat and that thecounterpart's is true, same content, Alfred's beliefis falsewhereas be context-dependent onlyto thenthetruth-condition of Alfred's beliefcannot element of thetruth thisdegree.For nothing else besidesa context-dependent in their truth-values, and couldmakethedifference conditions ofthetwobeliefs ofthecontribution what makesthedifference inthese truth valuesis independent to 'he' and 'his.' It clearly wouldhave to be thecontribution of theindexicals wordsor phrases occupytheposition of 'arthritis,' or whatever truth conditions contextthatmakesforthe additional of thistermin an accurate attribution, in thetruth conditions. dependence in Alfred's'arthritis' A good candidate fora context-sensitive component 'a disease In theplaceholder is theplaceholder conception conception. concept of what internal characterized explainthe symptoms properties by whatever element. is indeeda context-sensitive call "arthritis"' there peoplein mysociety will refer call "arthritis"' 'whatpeoplein mysociety ForAlfred, thedescription this in English,whereasforthe counterpart to the disease called "arthritis" Or if the in twin-English. to thediseasecalled"arthritis" will refer description in Alfred's to experts, makesexplicit reference concepconception placeholder in the whereas on the will refer to term 'the the experts earth, tion experts' on the refer will to term 'the the experts twin experts' conception counterpart's do not introduce in scheme that Burge's earth. context-depenHence,concepts intheviewwe suchcontext-dependence conditions do introduce denceintotruth
422 / Derk Pereboom are considering. is to raises.If a concept Bilgrami to theseconddifficulty Let us now turn must someanchor beliefs, changein associated valuedespite itscognitive retain value whensuchchangeoccurs. forcognitive be availableto providestability is that suchanchors to supply havefailed roletheories that functional The reason witha concept-distincassociated amongthebeliefs distinctions therequired rolethan to playa moreprominent wouldallow someofthesebeliefs tionsthat value of a concept-havenotbeenmadein thecognitive in determining others ofclassification, illumination essentialism's way.Butpsychological a principled principled wouldallow for andrecognition, foridentification results and similar value thecognitive If we individuate structure. basedon conceptual distinctions changein the thesame despite thenit can remain by corebeliefs, of a concept valuewouldoccuronly thanthoseat thecore.Changeofcognitive beliefs other at thecoreof theconcept'sstructure. whenchangeoccursin thebeliefs thecognitive pointsout is thatindividuating Bilgrami problem The third concepts certain value of a conceptby thebeliefsof the subjectrisksmaking in accordwithstructural of thatconcept.And indeed,individuation analytic for entailsthisresult, essentialism like thosepositedby psychological features its wouldconstitute in beliefsfound at thecoreof a concept involved concepts of it.Butas Hilary andwould,in one sense,be analytic meaning, psychological theQuineanopposition does notcontravene out,thisadmission Kornblith points between analyticon theconnection focusses Quine's opposition to analyticity.42 core of a into the structural but the typeof investigation ity and apriority, In theview we have been is decidedly empirical. we have considered concept butit does and fruitful project, is a significant analysis conceptual developing, byQuine'sarguments. features that arechallenged theobjectionable notmanifest solve the might structure Thus we can see how an appeal to conceptual by in whichindividuation of content thatarisefora theory kindsof problems criteria of thiskindprovides role.An account associated beliefs playsa central between change allows us to distinguish and difference, identity forconceptual of and changeof belief,and shows how a theory meaning of psychological A rejection ofrecent ofanalyticity. notion a plausible can accommodate content witha mightwell be compatible therefore, views about content, externalist and empirical. thatis plausible, principled, psychology to theviewwe have beendeveloping. two objections Let us now consider made in the psychological First,one mightarguethatthe beliefattributions both explanahaveas purposes psychological themselves essentialist experiments attributions these Andthus abouttheworld. ofevidence tionandcommunication Muchthat content unequivocally. be assumedto indicate psychological cannot the in theseattributions maysubserve interest mayseemto be of psychological not of and the about evidence psychological of world, communication of goal theaim at truth andhence, maydeflect they bymyownconjecture, explanation, of a theory that I have not shown content. Consequently, aboutpsychological structure about claims the itself of avail conceptual can content psychological
/423 of Content and theIndividuation Conceptual Structure like Gelmanand Wellman. madeby theorists As became clear in our discussionof But this objectionis mistaken. thanthe at one goal rather might aim (mainly) Kripke'spuzzle,ourattributions Since in attribution. will result in differences and differences in purpose other, experiments is to provide essentialist purpose ofthepsychological thedominant and not to communicate and behavior, instruments forexplaining inference to an audience,we have evidenceabout the objectsused in the experiments areaimedat specifying in theexperiments theattributions reason to believethat features of it is difficult to see howthecrucial content. Moreover, psychological of the view that to the children forexample, the attribution the experiments, for thansurface properties internal of animalsare moreimportant properties as a function of the aim to being what they are, mightbe understood of The implausibility to an audience. evidence abouttheseanimals communicate in the reasonto take the crucialattributions this conjecture providesfurther content. realpsychological to illuminate essentialist experiments psychological ananti-individualist for prototype A further derives from argument objection psycholoutthat, ingeneral, Kobespoints byBernard Kobes.43 theory developed sucbut also a subject'sclassificatory ogy aims to explainnot onlybehavior, cannot be facilitated this normative dimension cessesandfailures. But,he argues, of the if a concept'srangeof correct application is explainedsolelyin terms A subject'sarticulations and individual and dispositions. subject'sarticulations application of correct areoften forspecifying therange insufficient dispositions to there beingsucha range of theconcepts she has,whileshe is yetcommitted then, shouldlead us to fix of correct commitment, This background application. in part "itis fixed therange of herconcept's non-individualistically: application and social environment."" by thesubject'snatural viewwe have essentialist Thisobjection transfers easilytothepsychological inthe ofthesubjects beenconsidering: thearticulations anddispositions although the rangeof essentialist are insufficient to specify experiments psychological are yetcommitted to there thesesubjects correct of their concepts, application nonthesubjects'concepts individuate beingsucha range.We musttherefore ofthesort account andwe arethusled backto an externalist individualistically, is an account of therangeof correct there But, in reply, Burgehas advocated. and dispositions forwhich thearticulations concepts of therelevant application of the subjectsto a rangeof For the commitment of the subjectdo suffice. and the deference to expertsand to the world thatthis correct application, and dispositions. in such articulations will be reflected commitment involves, we have canbe explained ofplaceholder Thiscommitment conception bythesort therangeof correct does notspecify A placeholder beendiscussing. conception with theaid of a completed science in thewaythat would,butrather application of the the cause believe to like 'whatever the symptoms experts conceptions cause the or 'whateverinternal disease called "arthritis"' properties really a of extension the discover "arthritis."' To disease called of the symptoms the the world examine beyond placeholderconceptionwe must certainly
424 / Derk Pereboom individual, just as is thecase forconceptions like 'the first person bornin the twentieth century' and 'that manoverthere.' Butwe haveencountered no reason to think a placeholder that conception is to be individuated withreference itself to factors beyond theindividual subject'sarticulations and dispositions. Let me makethree pointsof clarification abouttheaccount as it has been so far. developed First, individuation ofcontent by structural features mayserve as a welcomesupplement to functional roletheory. Sucha viewaboutindividuation mightwell supplythe principled criteria for samenessof content that functional role theories require. But one mightalso accept individuation by structural features and rejectfunctional role theory if one were to denythat content is solelya function of relations to perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs, and other states.45 Second,it is consistent withthisaccount, whichfocusses on the psychological explanation of inference and behavior, thatthereare other branches ofpsychology for which attributions ofcontent shouldbe externalist in one or more of the senses we have discussed.Perhapsthe psychology of perception is one of thosebranches, but I shall not takea standon thisissue here.46 Third,forall I have arguedso far,theremay be externalist factors relevant to content attribution evenwhenpsychological explanation of inference andbehavior is at issue.I haveargued that thepsychological for explanation of suchphenomena, certain prominent externalisms maywell be inappropriate, and thatin orderto specify samenessand difference of content, one mightturn instead to structural features of concepts. This leavesroomfortheappropriateness of othersortsof externalist characterizations of content forthistypeof psychology. But I shallnotpursue thisissue anyfurther here. VI In summary, several prominent externalist with theories of content conflict some of our intuitions about psychological And thus,although explanation. individuation ofcontent in accord with these externalisms for most couldsuffice andpsychological views well be when such epistemic purposes, might inadequate certain recalcitrant cases of psychological areat issue.Furthermore, explanation and satisfying method of functional role theories seem to lack any principled of states the same content. token-distinct as having classifying psychological type Recentexploration of the structural features of concepts, however, potentially ofresources content in a waythat thekinds needed to individuate supplies yields thegeneralizations we wantto make.At thisstage in psychological explanation a theory of content individuation alongtheselinescan be neither fully spelled an ongoingempirical out nor confirmed. But such a theory does underwrite will ultimately itsprospects.47 research that determine program
Notes 1. papers, Putnam, Philosophical inHilary of'meaning'," "Themeaning Hilary Putnam,
Conceptual Structure and theIndividuation of Content /425

v. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 215-271;Saul A. Kripke, Naming andNecessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1980);"A PuzzleAbout Belief,"in Meaningand Use, ed. A. Margalit (Dordrecht, D. Reidel,1979); Tyler Burge, "Individualism andtheMental," inMidwest Studies inPhilosophy v. VI, eds. P. French, T. Uehling, H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), pp. 73-121; see also, his "OtherBodies," in Though and Content, ed. A. Woodfield (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1979), pp. 97-120; "Two Thought Experiments Reviewed," Notre Dame Journal ofFormalLogic,23 (1982), pp. 284293; "Individualism and Psychology," Philosophical Review95 (1986), pp. 3-45; "Individuation and Causationin Psychology," Pacifc Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989), pp. 303-322;Lynne R. Baker, SavingBelief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); RuthMillikan, Language,Thought, and OtherBiologicalCategories MIT Press,1984),"Thoughts (Cambridge: Without Laws: Cognitive ScienceWithout Content," Philosophical Review95 (1986), pp. 47-80; Daniel Dennett, "Evolution, in TheIntentional Error, and Intentionality," Stance(Cambridge: MIT Press,1987), pp. 287-321. Ned Block,"An Advertisement inMidwest fora Semantics forPsychology," Studies inPhilosophy, v. X, ed. P. French, T. Uehling, H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 615-678;BrianLoar, "Conceptual Role and Truth Notre Dame Journal Conditions," ofFormalLogic 23 (1982), pp. 272-283,"Social Content andPsychological in Contents Content," of Thoughts, ed. R. H. Grimm and D. D. Merill(Tucson:The University of Arizona Press,1985),pp. 99-110.In some functional roletheories content does not supervene on thephysical features of the individual; see, forexample, Gilbert Harman, "Functional Role Semantics," Notre Dame Journal ofFormalLogic 23 (1982), pp. 242-256,and"WideFunctionalism," in The Representation of Knowledge and Belief,eds. R. Harnish and M. Brand (Tucson:University of Arizona Press,1986). Ned Block,"AnAdvertisement for a Semantics for "Banish Psychology;" Jerry Fodor, inLanguage, DisContent," Mind, andLogic,ed. J.Butterfield (Cambridge: Cambridge in Mind and Cognition, ed. WilliamG. Lycan University Press, 1986), reprinted (Oxford:Blackwell,1990), pp. 420-438,"MeaningHolism,"in Psychosemantics of MIT Press, 1987), "Substitution and the Individuation (Cambridge Arguments inA Theory andOther MIT Press,1990),pp. Beliefs," ofContent Essays(Cambridge: at pp. 161-2. 161-176, Akeel and Psychological BrianLoar, "Social Content See, forexample, Content;" and Meaning Bilgrami, Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992),pp. 1-63. Salmon in Propositions andAttitudes, eds. Nathan David Kaplan,"Demonstratives," and ScottSoames(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1979). of Beliefs,"167-8. andtheIndividuation Jerry Fodor,"Substitution Arguments andBilgrami, andMeaning, "Banish DisContent" See, for example, Fodor, Belief pp. 30-1. in Translations GottlobFrege,"On Sense and Reference," of the Philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege,eds. P. GeachandM. Black(Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). at pp. 241-2. "A PuzzleAbout Saul A. Kripke, and Necessity; Naming Belief," Ibid. pp. 241-2. Content." andPsychological BrianLoar,"Social Content 16-19. and Meaning, Bilgrami, Belief Review TylerBurge, "Sinning Against Frege," Philosophical (1979), pp. 398-432.
2.
3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
426 / Derk Pereboom

andtheMental." "Individualism 14. TylerBurge, Loar arguesthata Fregeanpuzzle Content" and Psychological 15. In "Social Content of cognitive theory forBurge'santi-individualist thesesortsof problems reinforces Alfred is French, that Suppose Loar's contention. case illustrates value.The following to himthe attribute a' ma cuisse,'andwe therefore 'J'ai de l'arthrite andhe believes which concept ofarthritis-a using ourconcept inhisthigh, that he has arthritis belief wherehe to England, On one occasionhe travels to theexperts. we also attribute that including of 'arthritis,' conception oftheexperts' themeaning in English, learns, that andthefact on thepainin histhigh, Reflecting joints. to a diseaseof the itrefers 'I do not have the thigh is not a joint,he comesto believethe Englishsentence a' ma cuisse' for 'J'ai de l'arthrite thebelief Buthe maintains arthritis in mythigh.' = arthritis. But thenone day he makesthe arthrite that notrealizing manymonths, forhim.This beliefhas = arthritis, whichis informative thatarthrite connection ofthebelief is theabandonment of which thefirst on hisinferences, effects profound valueof thecognitive to showthat a' ma cuisse.' This is intended 'J'ai de l'arthrite One concept. 'arthritis' original that of Alfred's from is distinct concept theexpert's Alfred in whichfora timeafter all in English, example, a similar imagine might that there he believes is a diseaseof thejoints, that arthritis theexperts from learns a is like'fruit,' that'arthritis' he believes (Perhaps are twodiseasescalledarthritis. overlap.By bothdefinitions whose extensions definitions word withtwo distinct butpeas are so by onlyone.) But thenhe comesto believethat applesare fruits, = arthritis, time, is informative. which forhim,at that arthritis thecognitive helpto showthat puzzledoes not,however, This typeof Fregean that itdeparts note One should aredistinct. concepts andtheexpert's valueofAlfred's an interpersonal sinceitaimstodemonstrate puzzle, theform ofFrege'soriginal from in cognitive value-a difference in cognitive difference rather thanan intrapersonal of Butsuchextension Alfred. within rather than andtheexpert Alfred valuebetween in cognitive value wheretheydo not exist. Frege's testwould draw distinctions the has precisely counterpart French SupposeAlfred's Consider thiscounterexample. thecounterpart wouldexpress Alfred that has,except aboutarthritis that samebeliefs with these'arthritis' associated and behavior in French, theinference and that them We languages. as they can be forpeoplewhospeakdifferent are as similar concepts as having these concepts that regard generalizations wouldwant tomakepsychological to France, Alfred learning travelling value.Butwe couldimagine thesamecognitive thathe has two different fora time, believing, beliefs, 'arthrite' his counterpart's = that arthritis realization and later to theinformative in his thigh, coming ailments the testwouldillegitimately distinguish Fregean arthrite. Hence,thisinterpersonal andhiscounterpart. of Alfred concepts and againstFrege,"at p. 419; see also his "Individualism 16. TylerBurge,"Sinning 56 (1978), pp.338-362. ofPhilosophy De Re,"Journal p. 7, and"Belief Psychology," V (Minneapolis: inPhilosophy Studies Midwest "BeliefandAcceptance," 17. John Perry, of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 533-542;Donald Davidson,"Knowing University of theAmerican PacificDivisionMeeting Address, One's Own Mind,"Presidential PhilosophoftheAmerican March28, 1986,Proceedings Association, Philosophical "A Narrow Representational at p. 449; Michael Devitt, ical Association, pp. 441-458, ed. WilliamG. Lycan (Oxford: Theoryof the Mind" in Mind and Cognition, 1990),pp. 371-398. Blackwell, p. 389. 18. Devitt, p. 259. Belief," 19. "A Puzzle About
of Content /427 and theIndividuation Structure Conceptual

("The Perry and John of MarkCrimmons account constituent" 20. In the"unarticulated ofPhilosophy TheJournal Beliefs," Puzzling Reporting andthePhoneBooth: Prince Schiffer of Stephen theory indexical" 86 (1989), pp. 685-711) and in the"hidden 89 (1992), pp. 499-521),ordinary of Philosophy TheJournal ("BeliefAscription," to modesof reference implicit as alwaysmaking are construed beliefattributions a twonotsimply specifies Londonis pretty' that believes Thus'Pierre presentation. buta threeLondonis pretty, that and theproposition Pierre between place relation modeofpresentation andanunarticulated theproposition, Pierre, among placerelation modesofpresentation If theunarticulated theproposition. believes Pierre which under to Kripke'spuzzle. thenwe have a solution forPierre'stwo beliefsare different, examination buta thorough with myviews, arecompatible accounts Thesesemantical thescopeof thisarticle. issuesis beyond semantical of essentially p. 7. andPsychology," "Individualism 21. See, forexample, MIT Press,1981); (Cambridge: FlowofInformation and the Knowledge 22. FredDretske, MIT (Cambridge: Categories Biological andOther Thought, Language, Ruth Millikan, Content," Laws: CognitiveScience Without Press, 1984), "ThoughtsWithout and of Content Fodor,A Theory Review95 (1986), pp. 47-80; Jerry Philosophical MIT Press,1990),pp. 51-136;see also MohanMatthen, Essays (Cambridge, Other 85 (1988), pp. ofPhilosophy Journal Content," andPerceptual Functions "Biological 5-27. Essays,pp. 59-61. and Other ofContent A Theory Fodor, 23. Jerry pp. 67Content," ScienceWithout Laws,Cognitive Without "Thoughts Millikan, 24. Ruth 71. and ofContent inhisA Theory problems ofthese catalogue a splendid 25. Fodorprovides of Content," Other Essays,pp. 51-136.See also WilliamSeager,"Fodor'sTheory ofScience60 (1993), pp. 262-277. Philosophy pp. 58-60. and Meaning, Belief 26. Bilgrami, of Beliefs." andtheIndividuation Arguments Fodor,"Substitution 27. Jerry 28. Ibid,pp. 168, 174-5. pp.63Content," ScienceWithout Laws,Cognitive Without "Thoughts Millikan, 29. Ruth of Millikan'sidea in A to Fodor's refinement 67. The view citedhereis similar "...so evolution Millikan citing remarks, (pp. 69-70).DanielDennett ofContent Theory And itas a lung. blood,can establish to oxygenate an organfor itscapacity can select purposes-raisons orevolution-"endorsed" "choices" to suchdesign itis onlyrelative or anyoftheother beliefs, actions, perceptions, behaviors, we can identify d'etrethat in The Error,and Intentionality," ("Evolution, of folk psychology" categories at p. 300). MIT Press,1987),pp. 287-321, Intentional Stance(Cambridge: content avail itself of psychological account that a biological One might suggest Normalexplanation (Ruth Millikan, of Millikan'sdevice of a mostproximate 6, at p. 100). Butit is Chapter and Other Categories, Biological Language,Thought, that puzzlesraisefor Fregean to see howthisdevicecan solvetheproblems difficult in a satisfactory it wouldseemunableto differentiate For example, causaltheories. sinceeven theverysame Pierre's'London' and 'Londres'concepts, way between cause of each of them(whilethe be the mostproximate views of Londonmight function their are fulfilling in proper the attitude question that mechanisms produce biology). as determined byevolutionary and Other A Theory Essays,p. 77. ofContent 30. Jerry Fodor, Does Not WhatPhysicalism Reductionism: Without 31. RichardBoyd, "Materialism
428 / Derk Pereboom

v. 1, ed. Ned Block of Psychology, Entail," in Readings in the Philosophy Fodor,"Special Press, 1980), pp. 67-106; Jerry University Harvard (Cambridge: v. 1, pp. 120-133;Hilary of Psychology, in thePhilosophy Sciences,"in Readings ofPsychology, inthePhilosophy inReadings States," of Mental "TheNature Putnam, in thePhilosophy Life"' in Readings andOurMental "Philosophy v. 1, pp. 223-231, "The v. 1, pp. 134-143;Derk Pereboomand HilaryKomblith, of Psychology, 63 (1991), pp. 125-145. Studies Philosophical of Irreducibility," Metaphysics Mind 101 (1992), pp. Representation?" of Mental "Whatis a Theory Stich, Stephen Mind101 (1992), pp. 421-441. andtheMental," 243-261;MichaelTye,"Naturalism pp. 10-13. and Meaning, Belief Bilgrami, Ibid,pp. 10-13,83-129. cf. of concept-containment; in virtue is analytic sense,a judgment In one Kantian ofPure Reason,A6/B10-A103/B14. Critique pp. 122-9. Belief and Meaning, Bilgrami, Ibid,pp. 83-113. and in Similarity "Psychological Essentialism," Ortony, DouglasMedinandAndrew Cambridge (Cambridge: eds. S. Vosniadouand A. Ortony analogical reasoning, and Conceptual Press, 1989) pp. 179-195;Douglas Medin,"Concepts University v. 44, n. 12,pp. 1469-1481. American Psychologist, Structure," and Rey's "Concepts see Georges conception, to theplaceholder similar For a notion 19 (1985), pp. 197-303. andRips,"Cognition Medin, A Reply to Smith, Stereotypes: understandings Early andessences: "Insides M. Wellman, andHenry SusanA. Gelman at pp. 223-229. 38 (1991), pp. 213-244, Cognition of thenon-obvious," Ibid,pp. 229-234. MIT Press, Ground (Cambridge: andItsNatural Inference Inductive Komblith, Hilary 1993),p. 80. Prototypes," andPsychological W. Kobes,"Semantics Bernard PacificPhilosophical 70 (1989), pp. 1-18. Quarterly andan antiKobesdiscusses, that ofthesort andarticulations Ibid,p. 10. Dispositions based on them,are examinedin depthin Tyler Burge's argument individualist in theRole of Content Attitudes: "Wherein is LanguageSocial," in Propositional Owens(Stanford: andJoseph Anderson andMind,eds. C. Anthony Logic,Language, esp. 122-130. andInformation, 1990),pp. 113-130, ofLanguage for theStudy Center Be 88, Synthese a Functionalist," Cannot Realist Scientific "Why a DerkPereboom, (1991), pp. 341-358. W. Kobes,"Individualism andPsychology;" Bernard "Individualism See Tyler Burge, and in Philosophical 4, ActionTheory Perspectives, and Artificial Intelligence" CA: Ridgeview (Atascadero, of Mind, 1990, ed. JamesTomberlin Philosophy in of Perception," andtheObjectivity Error 1990); "Cartesian Company, Publishing andD. D. Merrill ed. R. H. Grimm (Tucson:The University Contents of Thoughts, of Arizona Press, 1985); Gabriel Segal, "Seeing What is Not There," The Be Egan,"MustPsychology 98 (1989), pp. 189-214;Frances Review Philosophical Review100 (1991), pp. 179-203. ThePhilosophical Individualistic?" and HilaryKomblith, I wantto thankLynneRudderBaker,David Christensen, discussion. and for commentary Kobes Bernard enlightening
32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.
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