Power Quality Impacts DG

Grid Reliability and Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Resources
1004473
Grid Reliability and Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Resources
1004473 Technical Update, March 2003
EPRI Project Manager W. Steely
EPRI 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304 PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303 USA 800.313.3774 650.855.2121 askepri@epri.com www.epri.com
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

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This is an EPRI Technical Update report. A Technical Update report is intended as an informal report of continuing research, a meeting, or a topical study. It is not a final EPRI technical report.
ORDERING INFORMATION
Requests for copies of this report should be directed to EPRI Orders and Conferences, 1355 Willow Way, Suite 278, Concord, CA 94520. Toll-free number: 800.313.3774, press 2, or internally x5379; voice: 925.609.9169; fax: 925.609.1310. Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. EPRI. ELECTRIFY THE WORLD is a service mark of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. Copyright 2003 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
CITATIONS
This document was prepared by EPRI PEAC Corporation 942 Corridor Park Blvd Knoxville, TN 37932 Principal Investigator D. Dorr T. Key This document describes research sponsored by EPRI. The publication is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner: Grid Reliability and Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Resources, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, 2003.1004473.
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PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
Results & Findings This research addresses the potential for distributed resources (DR) to improve power quality (PQ) and reliability of electric power to end-user equipment. Information and guidelines on how DR impacts key measures of PQ and reliability enables the user to quickly identify and compare options for DR. In particular, for installations where PQ and reliability are part of the expected value for the DR installation, this report will help in assessing that value. To facilitate this value assessment, findings are provided both in terms of improved power delivery and in terms of expected impact on end-use equipment. A procedure and case examples are provided where significant positive or negative impacts are anticipated. Challenges & Objectives As DR equipment begins to appear on the customer-side of the meter its impact on other nearby end-user equipment will grow in importance. Usually the specific impacts on local grid reliability and PQ will be site and system dependant. To answer the question of how DR will either improve or degrade the local PQ performance requires a defining of the system, as well as the relative sizes and characteristics of the involved loads and DRs. In applications where PQ and reliability are a premium, such as high-tech industrial processes or sensitive electronic equipment, this may be the main question to be answered regarding the value of the DR installation. Consequently there is a need for an effective assessment tool that predicts these impacts for different installation and system scenarios, and various DR options. The objective of this project is to develop a simple pre-installation application guide that identifies relevant concerns, as well as significant positive and negative local system impacts of DR. Applications, Values & Use Reliability and PQ are keys and, perhaps, essential market drivers for adoption of DR-capable technologies. As the costs of process interruptions increases (with advancing, modern industry and electronic commerce) and as the costs of DR-capable technologies declines, it is likely that more and more DR-capable technologies will be employed for mitigation of PQ and reliability problems. Whether these equipment are also employed to actually provide DR benefits back to the grid (voltage stability, load shedding, etc.) is less certain. EPRI Perspective The role of distributed resources in delivering PQ and reliability to the grid and for individual end users is an important area of research. On the one hand improving end-user PQ and reliability can be a significant value adder for DR applications. On the other, if DR detracts from PQ or reliability, it is likely to create a significant barrier to deployment. By building on results from prior EPRI work in both the DR and PQ areas, this project takes a step forward in identifying the full potential value of distributed generation and energy storage. With some additional future work to automate assessment procedures we expect to provide another webi
based tool brings in the form of a DR Application Guide on Power Quality and Reliability. This work compliments some of the other integration and troubleshooting tools previously developed such as the EPRI DR engineering guide, the DRIA Integration Assistant software, and the new economic screening methodology for utility applications of DR in T&D. Approach This project employs prior EPRI research related to integration of distributed resources, PQ, power service reliability and susceptibility on end use equipment. The approach was to build on this work to assure a complete system view in evaluating the impacts of DR on electrical reliability and PQ. It required identifying the key measures of electrical performance and describing the expected role of DR from enhancing power delivery to end use equipment. Examples of related EPRI DR documents and tools are the DR engineering guide, 1000419, the DRIA Integration Assistant software, 1004472, and the new economic screening methodology for utility applications of DR in T&D, 1004475. Keywords Distributed energy resources Distributed generation Premium power Power quality Reliability
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ABSTRACT
Improved power quality (PQ) and reliability for end-user equipment can be a significant value adder for distributed resources (DR). At the same time if DR detracts from PQ or reliability, it is likely to create a significant barrier to deployment. This research report addresses the potential for DR to enhance the local power. In particular, for installations where PQ and reliability are part of the expected value for the DR installation, this report will help in assessing that value. To facilitate this value assessment, findings are provided both in terms of improved power delivery and in terms of expected impact on end-use equipment. Information and guidelines on how DR impacts key measures of PQ and reliability enables the user of this document to quickly identify and compare options for DR installations near end-use equipment. A procedure and case examples are provided where significant positive or negative impacts are anticipated. The report is an example of EPRIs ongoing work to evaluate issues and opportunities related to integrating distributed resources into utility distribution systems and into local end-user power systems.
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CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1-2 Background ...........................................................................................................................1-2 Reliability Vs Power Quality ..................................................................................................1-3 Grid-Parallel or Standalone Operating Modes ......................................................................1-4 Characteristics of Utility Supply Compared With DR.............................................................1-5 How to Use This Report ........................................................................................................1-8 2 OVERVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................2-1 Electric Power System Reliability ..........................................................................................2-1 Conventional Measures of Reliability ...............................................................................2-1 Availability as a Measure of Reliability .............................................................................2-3 Reliability of Utility Electric Service .......................................................................................2-4 Frequency and Duration of Interruptions ..........................................................................2-6 Utility System Reliability Indices .......................................................................................2-7 Reliability of Facility Power Distribution...............................................................................2-11 Availability of Local Generation ......................................................................................2-12 Using Multiple Generators to Enhance Reliability......................................................2-12 Backup Generation ....................................................................................................2-15 Transition From Grid-Parallel to Standalone Mode....................................................2-17 Grid-Connected Generation.......................................................................................2-18 Parallel Utility Connection in Lieu of Redundant Generators.....................................2-21 Reliability Issues Related to DR ..........................................................................................2-22 Impact of DR Out-of-Phase Reclosure on Rotating Machines .......................................2-22 Impact of DR Fault Current on Sympathetic Tripping of Circuit Breakers ......................2-24 Impact of DR Fault Current on Utility Fuse/Breaker Coordination ..................................2-25 Reliability Summary.............................................................................................................2-27 Utility Vs On-Site Generation..........................................................................................2-27
Service Entrance- Vs Equipment-Level Solutions ..........................................................2-27 3 OVERVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER QUALITY AND DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES...........3-1 Power Quality Attributes........................................................................................................3-1 Power Quality in the Presence of DR....................................................................................3-2 Transients (Voltages and Currents)..................................................................................3-2 Short-Duration Variations .................................................................................................3-3 Long-Duration Variations..................................................................................................3-5 Voltage Unbalance ...........................................................................................................3-6 Waveform Distortion .........................................................................................................3-7 Voltage Fluctuations (Flicker) ...........................................................................................3-8 Frequency Variations........................................................................................................3-9 Summary of Power Quality Issues Related to Distributed Generation..................................3-9 4 END-USE EQUIPMENT SUSCEPTIBILITY TO POWER QUALITY VARIATIONS...............4-1 Equipment Susceptibility Test Results ..................................................................................4-5 Positive and Negative PQ Impacts of Installed DR ...............................................................4-7 End-User Power Conditioning Solutions ...............................................................................4-8 Uninterruptible Power Supplies ........................................................................................4-8 Improving Load Ride-Through........................................................................................4-11 Power Conditioning Performance and Costs..................................................................4-13 5 GUIDELINES FOR POWER QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT ........................5-1 Reliability Assessment Procedure.........................................................................................5-1 Background ......................................................................................................................5-1 Data Needed for Assessment ......................................................................................5-2 Procedure .........................................................................................................................5-2 Step 1. Define a Service Interruption ...........................................................................5-3 Step 2. Conduct a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)..................................5-3 Step 3. Calculate the Overall Service Availability ........................................................5-4 Accounting for Dependency Factors............................................................................5-6 Examples..........................................................................................................................5-7 Case 1: Long- and Short-Duration Events Calcuation .................................................5-7 Voltage Regulation Assessment Procedure........................................................................5-10 Background ....................................................................................................................5-10
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Procedure .......................................................................................................................5-11 Example..........................................................................................................................5-13 Case 1: Food Processing Plant .................................................................................5-13 Sag Assessment Procedure................................................................................................5-14 Background ....................................................................................................................5-14 Procedure .......................................................................................................................5-16 Examples........................................................................................................................5-17 Case 1: Calculation Without Distributed Generation..................................................5-18 Case 2: Calculation With Distributed Generation.......................................................5-19 Swell Assessment Procedure..............................................................................................5-20 Background ....................................................................................................................5-20 Procedure .......................................................................................................................5-21 Examples........................................................................................................................5-21 Case 1: Paper Mill A ..................................................................................................5-21 Case 2: Paper Mill B ..................................................................................................5-23 6 APPLYING DR TO ENHANCE EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE ...........................................6-1
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1 Two Types of DR: (a) Standalone and (b) Grid-Parallel ...........................................1-5 Figure 2-1 Percentage of Companies Using Indices Reporting in 1995 Out of 78 Utilities......2-10 Figure 2-2 Results of Survey of MAIFI Index for Reliability .....................................................2-11 Figure 2-3 The More Generator Units are in Parallel, the Smaller the Amount of Surplus Capacity Needed for a Fixed Level of Contingency Design (in This Example, N-1) ........2-13 Figure 2-4 Starting Reliability for Backup Generators. ............................................................2-16 Figure 2-5 Grid-Parallel Connection Scheme to Allow Local Island During Utility Interruptions and Isolation of DR Plant During DR Failures .............................................2-17 Figure 2-6 Availability of Generators Found in Various Studies .............................................2-19 Figure 2-7 Parallel Generator Configuration Supplying Protection Against Short-Duration as Well as Long-Duration Interruptions ............................................................................2-20 Figure 2-8 Series Generator Configuration Supplying Protection Against Short-Duration as Well as Long-Duration Interruptions ............................................................................2-21 Figure 2-9 Sample Reclosing Sequence for Line Reclosers and Substation Breakers ...........2-23 Figure 2-10 Sympathetic Tripping Caused by a Large DR Unit Feeding Fault Current into an Adjacent Feeder (REF: Integration of Distributed Resources in Electric Utility Systems: Current Interconnection Practice and Unified Approach, EPRI TR111489) .....2-25 Figure 2-11 Fault Contributions Due to DR Units 1, 2 and 3 May Increase the Short Circuit Levels to the Point Where Fuse-Breaker Coordination is no Longer Achieved ....2-26 Figure 3-1 Waveform and RMS Voltage During Voltage Sag ....................................................3-4 Figure 4-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply Configurations...........................................................4-9 Figure 5-1 Example System for Reliability Calculations ............................................................5-8 Figure 5-2 Screening Module and Tests for DR Impact on Voltage Regulation ......................5-12 Figure 5-3 Detailed One-Line Diagram of Feeder Serving Food-Processing Plant .................5-13 Figure 5-4 Impedance Model for an Example Substation........................................................5-14 Figure 5-5 One Line Diagram and Impedance Model for Substation With Customer DR........5-15 Figure 5-6 Sample One-Line Diagram With Varying Fault (Fx) Locations ...............................5-17 Figure 5-7 Calculation of the Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 Where the Distance From the Distribution Bus to FA Varies (No Generation) ..................................5-18 Figure 5-8 Calculation of the Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 Where the Distance From the Distribution Bus to FA Varies. There is a Small Generator at T1......5-20 Figure 5-9 Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 With and Without Generator for Faults as FA Distance Varies ...........................................................................................5-20 Figure 5-10 Overvoltage Screening Tool for DR Installations..................................................5-22
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Figure 5-11 Overvoltage Screening for Paper Mill Example 1 Failing Conditions ..............5-23 Figure 5-12 Overvoltage Screening for Paper Mill Example 2 Passing Conditions............5-24
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1-1 Performance Characteristics of a Standalone DR and a Utility Service Connection .........................................................................................................................1-6 Table 2-1 Relationship Between Number of Nines and Minutes Off Supply ...........................2-4 Table 2-2 Interruption Frequency (per Year) From EPRI DPQ and NPL Surveys .....................2-7 Table 2-3 Interruption Frequency (Per Year) from CEA Survey in Canada ...............................2-7 Table 2-4 Interruption Frequency (Per Year) for Distribution and Low-Voltage Systems in Norway ...............................................................................................................................2-7 Table 2-5 Reliability of Common Low-Voltage (<600 V) Equipment........................................2-12 Table 2-6 Surplus Generating Capacity Needed for an N-1 Design Decreases as the Number of Generators Increases.....................................................................................2-13 Table 2-7 Surplus Generation Capacity Needed With Parallel Generators Sized So That Any Two Can Fail and the Load Can Still Be Served (Data for N-2 Design)....................2-14 Table 2-8 Probability Calculation for Generator being Out of Service .....................................2-19 Table 2-9 Typical Fault Current Levels of DRs ........................................................................2-24 Table 3-1 IEEE Std. 1159-1995 Categories and Typical Characteristics of Power Quality Attributes (Electromagnetic Phenomena in Power Systems).............................................3-1 Table 3-2 Impact of Distributed Generation on Voltage Sags and Momentary Interruptions .......................................................................................................................3-4 Table 3-3 Impact of Distributed Generation on Voltage Swells or Temporary Overvoltages ......................................................................................................................3-5 Table 3-4 Impact of Distributed Generation on Steady State and Long Duration Voltage Regulation ..........................................................................................................................3-6 Table 3-5 Impact of Distributed Generation on Unbalance........................................................3-7 Table 3-6 Impact of Distributed Generation on Waveform Distortion ........................................3-8 Table 3-7 Impact of Distributed Generation on Flicker ..............................................................3-9 Table 3-8 Variations and Potential Impacts With Installed DR ................................................3-10 Table 4-1 Typical Equipment and Indication of Sensitivity to Various Disturbance Types.........4-6 Table 4-2 Reliability of Uninterruptible Power Supplies ...........................................................4-11 Table 4-3 Reliability of Static Switches ..................................................................................4-11 Table 4-4 Various Load Ride-Through Devices.......................................................................4-12 Table 4-5 Default Facility Performance and Costs for Reliability and Availability Analysis......4-13 Table 6-1 Impact of Power Quality and Reliability Events With Installed DR.............................6-2
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1
INTRODUCTION
As distributed generation begins to appear on the customer-side of the meter its impact on other nearby end-user equipment will grow proportionally. Usually the specific impacts on local grid reliability and power quality (PQ) will be site and system dependent. To answer the question of how distributed resources (DR) will either improve or degrade the local power system performance requires system details such as the relative sizes and characteristics of the involved loads and the size and types of installed DR. In applications where power quality and reliability are given premium value, such as high-tech industrial processes or sensitive electronic equipment, this may be the main question to show value in a DR installation. Consequently there is a need for an effective assessment guideline that predicts these impacts for different installation and system scenarios, and various generation options.
Background
The role of DR in delivering quality and reliability to the grid and for individual end users is an important area of research. On the one hand improving end-user power quality and reliability can be a significant value adder for DR applications. On the other, if DR detracts from power quality or reliability, it is likely to create a significant barrier to deployment. As distributed generation begins to appear on the customer-side of the meter its impact on other nearby end-user equipment will grow proportionally. Usually the specific impacts on local reliability and power quality will be site and system dependent. To answer the question of how DR will either improve or degrade the local power system performance requires defining the system, the relative sizes and characteristics of the involved loads, as well as the size and types of installed DR. In applications where PQ and reliability are a premium, such as high-tech industrial processes or sensitive electronic equipment for data processing, impacts on quality and reliability may be the main question to be answered regarding the value of the DR installation. Consequently there is a need for an effective assessment procedure that predicts these impacts for different installation and system scenarios, as well as various power distribution and generation options. This project continues EPRIs ongoing work to evaluate DR integration and provide tools for successful application of distributed resources into utility distribution systems and into local enduser power systems. The work builds on both PQ and DR studies and makes specific use of EPRI system compatibility evaluations and test results for many types of end-use equipment. This effort compliments some of the other integration and troubleshooting tools previously developed such as the EPRI DR engineering guide, the DRIA Integration Assistant software, and the economic screening methodology for utility applications of DR in T&D.
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Introduction
The subject of power quality impacts of distributed generation has been addressed in several recent EPRI reports including: EPRI Technical Report 1000405: Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Generation, 2000. EPRI Technical Report 1005917: Distributed Generation Relay Impacts on Power Quality, 2001.
These studies detail a number of the concerns of electric distribution engineers and make recommendations to avoid problems when DR is added to the power system. They address the question, when DR is interconnected with the power grid in relatively large quantities, how will they affect the PQ? Will it improve it or make it worse, or have no effect at all? The results clearly show that there are areas where DR characteristics and PQ requirements may be in conflict. This report focuses on the potential to not only avoid PQ and reliability related problems but to actually gain a performance advantage from DR. The report addresses the critical question of how a decentralized electric power system can perform better than the current vertically integrated centralized generation and control. It offers analysis procedure and techniques to assess quality and reliability factors for DR installations. A future standalone software or webbased tool is envisioned and would be expected to simplify making assessment for specific applications once these methods are applied and verified.
Reliability Vs Power Quality

A key concept in this report is connection between PQ and reliability from an end-user viewpoint. The electric utility transmission and distribution system is a complex network intended to deliver the most reliable power to the majority of customers. Because of the way the system is protected, momentary disturbances are common characteristic. Every time a thunderstorm occurs, a tree or animal comes in contact with the power conductors, or some other abnormal fault event occurs, a certain number of electricity customers will experience a momentary interruption in power while many other customers will experience a momentary voltage reduction called a voltage sag. This is simply a reduction in the voltage available on from the power source while the fault current is flowing. As soon as the fault is cleared, the power goes back to normal. In the majority of cases, the entire event lasts less than a half second. Unfortunately for most customer process equipment, it doesnt matter because production has already stopped and a costly reset and or cleanup effort is underway. In terms of utility power-system performance, everything has worked as intended and hopefully power is now back for all customers. Therefore, from a reliability standpoint (that is, long-term interruption), no one was interrupted. This is good for the reliability indices that the electric utility reports annually, but is terrible from a customer standpoint because there may be literally millions of dollars in losses if this event upsets process operations for a group of manufacturing or production facilities. Typically, the motors, pumps, compressors, and other mission-critical process equipment are not sensitive to the momentary voltage sags, but the control circuitry is extremely sensitive and causes the production equipment to trip offline. Even if the power-system fault is many miles 1-3
Introduction
away, a few of the more sensitive process controls will trip and while other may be unaffected. If the fault is within a few miles of the substation bus, the resulting sag will be more severe and everything in the plant is likely to trip offline. The bad news is that each event can cause costly process downtime. One of the methods of improving PQ performance and even longer-term reliability that is as of yet relatively unproven is the strategic application of distributed generation. Much of the prior research into DR and PQ impacts has been from the standpoint of negative interactions, but there are potential positive interactions that need to be evaluated. For example, properly installed and applied DR can minimize the impact of voltage sags at the facility bus, can provide inherent surge and lightning protection for downstream loads, can help regulate facility voltages at levels very close to the nameplate ratings of the sensitive equipment and can potentially improve three phase voltage unbalance. These positive PQ aspects of DR are detailed in the following chapters along with some useful information on equipment sensitivity levels, detailed power system reliability assessments, and PQ screenings for DR installations.
Grid-Parallel or Standalone Operating Modes

Two types of DR operating modes were considered to evaluate PQ and reliability impacts. These were standalone and grid-parallel DR. A standalone operating mode is an independent island and as such must provide voltage and frequency regulation within the island (see Figure 1-1a). Stand-alone DR must be able to follow and support various loading conditions while maintaining acceptable PQ. Loading conditions may include load steps, motor starts, inrush current, load nonlinearity, reactive power needs, unbalances, and periodic load fluctuations. The standalone generator must be reliable because it is the only source of power available. The standalone application is usually more demanding and costly than grid-parallel because it is designed with greater redundancy and imposes more requirements on the generator. This usually means that it is difficult to optimally size, from a capital investment perspective, and to optimally operate, from an efficiency perspective. The other type of operating configuration is the grid-parallel system (see Figure 1-1b). DR connected in parallel with the utility system operates as an additional source of energy, feeding the grid. It is usually very small with respect to the total power system and has no significant impact on power system frequency. It may supply most or all of the energy to the local customer load, but the customer site can rely upon the utility system source should the DR fail. This means that reliability of the DR is not so crucial as it would be for a standalone system. Grid-parallel DR is normally operated in a voltage-following mode, which means the machine operates at close to unity power factor and does not attempt to directly regulate voltage with reactive power.
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Introduction
(a) Stand-alone DG
Facility Bus
Facility Load
DG
(b) DG in Parallel with Utility

Facility Bus
Facility Load
Utility Source
480 V
DG
Figure 1-1 Two Types of DR: (a) Standalone and (b) Grid-Parallel
The grid parallel system has the advantage that the utility system can provide the reactive power for the load, handle load-step transitions and motor starts, and deal with nonlinear load currents. This may allow downsizing of the plant capacity somewhat compared to standalone approaches. Grid-parallel DR does not usually load-follow but instead is operated at constant full load to provide the best efficiency and maximum return on capital investment. In general, a generator designed for grid-parallel operation can forego redundancy and capacity and will operate in a more economical fashion even when standby charges are factored in. Most of the installed generators are provided as back up power systems, and are designed to operate standalone with a specified load. Most currently operating commercial and industrial systems classified as DR are operating as grid-parallel, to achieve better performance. This work assumes that the DR systems can be designed to operate in both configurations and it addresses the PQ and reliability implications. It does not address the economic implications of designing a DR system to operate in both modes with smooth transitions between the two.
Characteristics of Utility Supply Compared With DR

The utility system is a strong source, which will typically have less than 5% impedance (at the point of common coupling on the kVA base of the DR) and will be very stable from a frequency perspective. It represents a vast interconnected network of thousands of megawatts of generation capacity, and any single distribution feeder load is tiny in comparison and has no significant 1-5
Introduction
impact on the bulk generation dispatch needs or operating efficiency. By comparison, the DR impedance is high (20%), and the starting of large motors and other loads can create severe PQ problems. Typically, reliability of utility system power is in the range of 99% to 99.999% (national average is about 99.97%). This compares to a single DR that is on the order of 94 to 97% available. DR reliability is improved by employing multiple units so that if one is down, the others can pick up the load. An N-1 design, where one unit can be down and there is still sufficient capacity to serve the load, can be almost as reliable as a typical utility service. Table 1-1 compares a 150-kVA transformer-fed utility service to a standalone synchronous generator type DR, with a similar kVA rating.
Table 1-1 Performance Characteristics of a Standalone DR and a Utility Service Connection Standalone Generator Characteristic (150-kVA, ThreePhase Unit) 150 kVA 100 kVA 20% Utility System Service (150-kVA, Three-Phase Transformer and Service Drop) 150 kVA 100 kVA 4% (includes service drop)
Source capacity Site peak load Impedance (percent of source capacity rating, 150 kVA) Fault level (per unit of site peak load current, 100 kVA) Frequency dip during 100% step-load Voltage drop due to 20-HP motor start (locked-rotor current = 5 per unit) Exposure to fault-related voltage sags coming from utility system Impact of load variation on generation efficiency and economic dispatch
7.5 Can be more than 10%. 1520%
37.5 No change 4% 1 moderate to severe event per week No impact 9999.999% (average US value is 99.97% and range represents different T&D system types and conditions) 3555% (Depends on mix of utility generation resources; range includes T&D losses)
None
Strong impact
Reliability (annual availability in percent)
97% or less (assumes a single DR with no redundancy) 2040% (without cogeneration) 5585% (with cogeneration)
Typical effective power generation efficiency
Table 1-1 shows that the utility service is stiffer, more reliable, and better regulated for loadsteps than a typical distributed generator operating as a standalone entity. In fact, Table 1-1 is conservative in that it compares a 150-kVA generator to a 150-kVA utility service transformer. In many cases, the service transformer is greatly oversized relative to site load, so the utility system is even stiffer than indicated in Table 1-1. The only performance areas where the utility service has a performance disadvantage are with incoming deep voltage sags (due to the 1-6
Introduction
exposure of the power system) and in the efficiency of the generator if the DR is a co-generation unit (waste heat is recovered). When DR is combined in parallel with the utility system, the attributes of both approaches are emphasized. A properly interfaced grid-parallel DR can offer better PQ, reliability, and efficiency to the customer site than the standalone generator or the utility service alone. The key benefits are as follows: Voltage regulation: The low impedance of the utility service (typically less than 5%) in combination with the DR means that load steps and motor starts have a far less perturbing impact on the facility voltage level than they would for a standalone generator with 20% impedance. Furthermore, the combined impedance of the DR and utility system is slightly lower than the utility system alone, enabling better voltage regulation response during loadsteps than with the utility system alone. Harmonic distortion: The lower impedance of the utility system with respect to harmonics in combination with the DR means that nonlinear loads result in far less voltage distortion than if a standalone generator had to drive them. The utility system combined with the DR may also result in less distortion than the utility system alone if the DR is not a significant source of harmonics Frequency regulation: The parallel utility connection should hold frequency to within 0.5 Hz of 60 Hz in all but the most unusual utility system conditions, whereas the standalone generator will be momentarily well outside 2 Hz of 60 Hz during large load fluctuations. Efficiency: Operation of the DR in parallel with the utility system will enable heat engine devices (internal combustion engines [ICEs] and combustion turbines) to operate at a point on their loading curve that saves 10 to 20% in fuel per kilowatt-hour produced compared to the standalone application. In cogeneration applications, the DR can also be sized and operated to more appropriately match the site heat needs, which will significantly improve efficiency. Reactive power: Operation of the DR in parallel with the utility system may allow the DR to focus purely on the site real power consumption and not provide reactive support, depending on the interconnection requirements and agreement with local utility. Depending on the generator design, type, and loads at the site, this can lead to significant capacity cost savings for the DR. Reliability: A typical parallel utility connection can eliminate more than 99% of the potential power interruptions that an N-0 designed standalone DR installation would experience. Alternatively, it avoids the need to design for N-1 or N-2 and saves at least several hundred dollars per kilowatt in marginal standby capacity costs. Optimal sizing cost savings: The parallel connection with the utility system allows the DR integrator to design less capacity margin into the DR plant, thereby saving significantly on DR capacity costs.
Most or all of the above benefits apply to any type of distributed generation, including internal combustion engines and combustion turbine installations. This project focused on internal combustion engines and combustion turbine prime movers with synchronous generators because 1-7
Introduction
these are the most common form of DR at industrial and commercial facilities that may be paying standby charges and/or considering the pros and cons of standalone operation.
How to Use This Report

The report identifies and defines the specific areas where DR poses either a positive or a negative impact on end-use equipment. It then set out to develop guidelines for the assessment and if required, resolution of these impacts. This is accomplished by first defining different measures of electric reliability and PQ for conventional power systems. Then the likely reliability and quality impacts of adding a DR are also defined. By reviewing the typical susceptibility of enduse equipment the most important impact areas are determined. For these areas, an assessment procedure is proposed to insure the best application of DR at or close to industrial and commercial facilities. The chapter organization is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 cover the different electric reliability and quality measures that can be positively or negatively impacted. In Chapter 4 an overview of commercial and industrial equipment sensitivity to power variations is provided. Chapter 5 follows up by describing four engineering assessment procedures that address the main PQ and reliability impacts of DR. Then in Chapter 6 these impacts with installed DR are described in terms of their effects on the performance end-user equipment. .
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OVERVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES
This chapter details power system reliability including definitions, design considerations, measurement, and the likely impacts, both positive and negative, related specifically to the application of DR. Necessarily, distinctions are made between point of service reliability and the internal facility power distribution reliability, where on-site generation plays a significant role. Some aspects of reliability prediction and related probability methods used in reliability analysis are referenced. Finally, the role of end-use equipment susceptibility in determining overall system reliability is discussed.
Electric Power System Reliability

Planning for reliable power requires a total system viewpoint including consideration of the service reliability, the local electrical distribution design, and the requirements of end-use loads. A prediction of reliability involves the individual reliability of all components required to deliver power. Therefore reliability is reduced by distance and number of components between the main power source and the equipment to be served. Conversely, reliability is more likely increased by providing alternate delivery paths and additional sources of generation or by simply placing the generator closer to the point of use. This is where DR can play a significant role in adding reliability to an electric power system. Fortunately a number of methods have been developed, and are generally accepted in the electric industry, for measuring and predicting reliability. Reliability assessment and evaluation methods based on probability theory that allow the reliability of a proposed system to be predicted quantitatively are finding wide application today. Such methods permit consistent, defensible, and unbiased assessments of system reliability that are not otherwise possible. Fundamentals necessary for a quantitative reliability evaluation of electric power systems include definition of basic terms, practical measures of system performance, and the component reliability data. Conventional Measures of Reliability The term reliability in the context of electric power systems is generally used to indicate the ability of a system to continue to perform its intended function. In its simplest form we consider that power is either available or not. And the measurement indexes that have proven to be most 1 2 useful and meaningful in power distribution system design from , are:
1 Billinton, R., and Allan, R. N., Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, Plenum Publishing Corp., 1983.
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Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources
Load interruption frequency (number/unit time) Expected duration of load interruption events (time)
These indexes can be computed and then used to compute other indexes that are useful: Total expected (average) interruption time per year (or other time period) System availability or unavailability as measured at the load supply point in question Expected demanded, but unsupplied, energy per year
These measures become more complicated when different degrees of performance and failure are considered. The disruptive effect of power interruptions is often non-linearly related to number of phases effected and duration of the interruption. Thus, it is often desirable to compute not only an overall interruption frequency but also frequencies of interruptions categorized by the appropriate durations. This is particularly important in cases where no interruption occurs and the issue is voltage quality, the varying degrees and the different effects of unbalance, sags or swells, to be discussed later. From these fundamental concepts several measures of reliability have evolved in common use and are described in technical literature and standards. The following reliability measures, defined in the IEEE Gold Book3, are most commonly used for power distribution and other industrial and commercial electrical systems: Availability As applied either to the performance of individual components or to that of a system, it is the long-term average fraction of time that a component or system is in service and satisfactorily performing its intended function. An alternative and equivalent definition for availability is the steady-state probability that a component or system is in service. (IEEE Std 493, 1997) Unavailability The long-term average time, as a fraction of total time, that a component or system is out of service due to failures or scheduled outages. An alternative definition is the steady-state probability that a component or system is out of service due to failures or scheduled outages. Mathematically, unavailability = 1availability (IEEE Std 493, 1997) Interruption The loss of electric power supply to one or more loads. (IEEE Std 493, 1997) Interruption frequency The expected (average) number of power interruptions to a load per unit time, usually expressed as interruptions per year. (IEEE Std 493, 1997) Mean time between failures (MTBF) The mean exposure time between consecutive failures of a component. It can be estimated by dividing the exposure time by the number of failures in that
Ayoub, A. K., and Patton, A. D., A frequency and duration method for generating system reliability evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Nov. Dec. 1976, pp. 19291933.
3 2
IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Gold Book, IEEE Standard 493, 1997.
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period, provided that a sufficient number of failures have occurred in that period. (IEEE Std 493, 1997) Mean time to repair (MTTR) The mean time to repair or replace a failed component. It can be estimated by dividing the summation of repair times by the number of repairs, and, therefore, it is practically the average repair time (IEEE Std 493, 1997). Also it might be referred to as expected failure duration referring to expected or long-term average duration of a single failure event. Frequency of system failure is an index of the mean number of system failures per unit time, and is also given as the reciprocal MTBF. Availability as a Measure of Reliability Availability is one measure of power system reliability that has gained popularity lately as the economy moves from the industrial age to the high-tech digital age. This index of nines has been used to measure the uptime of a process and has been a commonly used metric to define the availability requirement for mission-critical facilities. And it has been used for quite some time in MIL Standards and other component or system reliability standards to describe the probability that a system or component will be available. In this case availability (or up time) of a component or system is based on its mean time between failure (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR). For example, if the MTBF of a 480-V metalclad switchgear is 0.0012 failures per year () and if the MTTR is 0.0108 hours per year (r), then the total downtime you would expect from the component is a product of and r, or 0.0012 X 0.0108 = 0.00001296 hours, an unavailability of 0.046656 seconds per year. The total uptime or the availability of the component can now be described as a string of Nines as follows: (10.00001296/8760) = 0.9999999985 or 99.99999985%. Since it is awkward to read such a long number, it has become commonplace to count the number of nines, such as six nines for 99.9999% or nine nines for 99.9999999% availability. In the power-conditioning industry, this method of calculating availability has been used for years to describe how reliable the different premium power systems such as UPS. The concept that was conveyed to the buyers was the more nines, the more reliable the UPS system. Even in the digital world of server manufacturers, the metric of Nines was used to tout one product against another. From Compaq to IBM to Hewlett Packard, the number of nines was used as a simple way to convey the reliability of their systems to the user. For example, Hewlett Packard N-Class servers were promoted this way, e.g., The N-Class offers excellent high availability (99.99% hardware availability, 99.95% across the entire solution stack) as HP moves towards its 5 nines: 5 minutes vision (99.999% data availability with only 5 minutes unplanned downtime per year). Recently there has been a trend of using the Nines as a metric for electric power system availability. Simply stated, the number of nines can be easily explained in terms of the percent of time in a year that power is expected to be available, where the 9s are calculated by setting total time as 1 and therefore availability is 1 the time unavailable. Table 2-1 shows availability, and 2-3
number of nines for different the average minutes off supply. While the technical accuracy of using such an index is subject to interpretation, it may be used to convey, in an order of magnitude, a sense of how much reliability is required by the different customer categories. For example a typical commercial or industrial customer may expect 4 nines, a hospital 6 nines (including its on-site generation), and a data center with elaborate redundant on-site generation and storage systems may be designed for 9 nines.
Table 2-1 Relationship Between Number of Nines and Minutes Off Supply
The Standard of Nines 0.99 0.999 0.9999 0.99999 0.999999 0.9999999 0.99999999 0.999999999
The Number of Nines 2 Nines 3 Nines 4 Nines 5 Nines 6 Nines 7 Nines 8 Nines 9 Nines
Minutes Off Supply 5256 525.6 52.56 5.256 0.5256 0.05256 0.005256 0.000526
The difference between the desired power availability for a particular site and the available power service at that site is one way to define opportunities for DR. For example if the desired power availability is 5 nines and the typical service availability is 3 nines, then on-site generation or energy storage is expected to have reliability value.
Reliability of Utility Electric Service

The availability of electricity from U.S. utilities varies significantly from region to region. It is also different in urban, suburban, and rural areas. The number of outages depends upon the length of the distribution circuit, whether it is underground or overhead, its voltage class, and so on. In an area served by an underground low-voltage distribution network, electric customers may experience less than one interruption every 10 years. And, in some rural areas served by long overhead distribution circuits of radial design, the cumulative outage time may be counted in days per year. Still the vast majority of utility customers have come to expect an electrical outage rate that is well below 10 hours per yearthe availability normally exceeds 99.9% and often approaches 99.99%. Compared to most local generation options, the utility electric service reliability is excellent. A rough estimate of expected utility electric availability can be obtained by looking at the way the service is provided. Average electric service reliability is well known as a function of feeder 2-4
type. Based on the Nines method and using approximate values (because the difference in availability demarcated between any two consecutive Nines can be large), the availability of electric supply for the different categories of feeders is typically: Commercial Business District: 99.999% Urban: 4 Nines or 99.99% Rural: 3 to 4 Nines or 99.9% to 99.99% Remote: 3 Nines or 99.9%
Note that these are average numbers for a large number of feeders. Any particular customer on any given circuit may experience reliability that is higher or lower than the numbers shown above. It is always best to look at feeder specific data when the location is known. Also it is important to note that availability is only one measure of reliability. In some practical cases a very high availability is not considered to be reliable service because the frequency of occurrence of events is relatively high. In this case availability can remain high if all events are of short duration, e.g. momentary. The unreliability comes in situations where brief power interruptions translate into longer down time of end use process or equipment. To better communicate these differences in interruption duration several classifications have been established in power system standards. Depending on which standard is followed, power failures or interruptions have been classified as long-term, short-term, momentary, temporary or sustained. Although impacts on the end user may vary, depending on the nature of the load equipment, and critically of its function, the times associated with these terms are becoming more standardized, especially in the utility industry. These standard terms can be a big help in communicating power-related problems with end users. The following overview shows IEEE and European power system standard terms for various interruption or power failure times as well as the methods of restoration. Note that these standards cover generation to end-use and are arranged by publication date with the most recent reflecting latest practices: IEEE Std. 1366-1998, Trial-Use Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices. Interruption, momentary. Single operation of an interrupting device, which results in a voltage zero. For example, two breaker or recloser operations equals two momentary interruptions Interruption, sustained. Any interruption not classified as a momentary event. Any interruption longer than 5 minutes IEEE Std. 1250-1995, IEEE Guide for Service to Equipment Sensitive to Momentary Voltage Disturbances. Instantaneous interruption: between 0.5 cycles and 30 cycles Momentary interruption: between 30 cycles and 2 seconds Temporary interruption: between 2 seconds to 2 minutes Sustained interruption: longer than 2 minutes 2-5
IEEE Std. 1159-1995, IEEE Recommended Practice for Monitoring Electric Power Quality (note this standard touches on reliability by defining interruptions of power and also defines other parameters for measuring quality of power) Momentary interruption: between 0.5 cycles and 3 seconds Temporary interruption: between 3 seconds and 1 minute Sustained interruption: longer than one minute
IEEE Std. 859-1987, IEEE Standard Terms for Reporting and Analyzing Outage Occurrences and Outage States of Electrical Transmission Facilities (withdrawn by IEEE but still in the vocabulary of may utility power system engineers). Transient outages are restored automatically Temporary outages are restored by manual switching Permanent outages are restored through repair or replacement.
European Norm EN 50160 (also being consider as an IEC standard) Voltage characteristics of electricity supplied by public distribution systems. Short interruptions: up to three minutes Long interruption: longer than three minutes
Frequency and Duration of Interruptions The frequency of short-duration interruptions has been quantified by various PQ surveys, including the EPRI Distribution Power Quality Project. These surveys, taken at different points in the distribution and end use systems, provide a good comparison on how events propagate through the power system. Such a comparison is made in Table 2-2 for two large North American surveys, the EPRI Distribution Power Quality (DPQ) survey and the National Power Lab (NPL) survey. The EPRI survey monitored both distribution substations and distribution feeders. The NPL survey monitored power receptacles inside an end user facility. This data shows that the overall trend is for the number of short interruptions to increase when moving from the power source to the load.
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Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources Table 2-2 Interruption Frequency (per Year) From EPRI DPQ and NPL Surveys Number of Events by Duration Range Point of Survey Substations (EPRI) Dist. Feeders (EPRI) Premises LV (NPL) 1-6 cycles 0.2 1.6 0.2 6-10 cycles 0.1 0.1 0.3 10-20 cycles 0.4 0.2 0.7 20-30 cycles 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.5-1 sec 0.5 0.5 1.2 1-2 sec 0.9 1.1 1.5 2-10 sec 1.1 2.3 3.3 > 10 sec 1.3 1.7 4.2 Total all Durations 5.3 8.8 12.2
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Canadian Electric Association (CEA) service entrance survey and from the Norwegian research lab (EFI) distribution primary and secondary voltage survey. These results are shown in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4.
Table 2-3 Interruption Frequency (Per Year) from CEA Survey in Canada Number of Events by Duration Range Point of Survey (CEA) Service Primary Service Secondary 1-6 cycles 1.9 3.7 6-10 cycles 0.0 0.0 10-20 cycles 0.1 0.0 20-30 cycles 0.0 0.0 0.5-1 sec 0.4 0.2 1-2 sec 0.0 0.5 2-10 sec 0.0 0.5 > 10 sec 0.7 2.1 Total all Durations 3.1 7.0
Table 2-4 Interruption Frequency (Per Year) for Distribution and Low-Voltage Systems in Norway Number of Events by Duration Range Point of Survey (EFI) Service Primary Service Secondary 0.01-0.1 sec 1.5 1.1 0.1-0.5 sec 0.0 0.7 0.5-1.0 sec 0.0 0.0 1-3 sec 0.0 0.7 3-20 sec 0.5 0.9 > 20 sec 5.2 5.9 Total all Durations 7.2 9.3
Utility System Reliability Indices System reliability indices have been defined and reported for at least the last 20 years by many US utilities. These indices had their origins in the 70s from reliability engineers work published by IEEE. However, without any formal standards a lot of variety has been observed in both the indices used, and methods of calculation, among different utility reports. Recently the IEEE Standard 1366, 2001, IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices, has 2-7
gone a long way toward consistent definition of for these system indices and the methods for calculating them. Even with the new standard there are some aspects of reporting where more work is needed in defining and establishing consensus. For example there is not agreement on the definition of major events and on a single way to calculate outage indices when major events occur. Consequently the IEEE working group on outage reporting practices continues its standardization activity in this area. In IEEE 1366 nine indices are defined, however based on a survey of US utilities, only 4 are in common use. The two most commonly used indices based on sustained interruptions are the Service Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and Service Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). Also popular for sustained interruptions are indices on Customer Average Interruption Duration (CAIDI) and Average Service Availability (ASAI) in For momentary interruptions the most commonly used index is Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI). The following are the definitions of these indices from IEEE 1366. SAIFI System average interruption frequency index (sustained interruptions). This index is designed to give information about the average frequency of sustained interruptions per customer over a predefined area. In words the definition is: SAIFI = Total number of customer interruptions Total number of customers served
Eq. 2-1
To calculate the index use the following equation:
SAIFI =
Ni NT
Eq. 2-2
SAIDI System average interruption duration index. This index is commonly referred to as customer minutes of interruption or customer hours, and is designed to provide information about the average time the customers are interrupted. In words, the definition is:
SAIDI =
Customer interruption durations Total number of customers served
Eq. 2-3
To calculate the index, use the following equation:
SAIDI =
ri N i NT
Eq. 2-4
CAIDI Customer average interruption duration index. CAIDI represents the average time required to restore service to the average customer per sustained interruption. In words, the definition is:
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CAIDI =
Customer interruption durations Total number of customer interruptions
Eq. 2-5
CAIDI =
riNi SAIDI = NT SAIFI
Eq. 2-6
ASAI Average service availability index. This index represents the fraction of time (often in percentage) that a customer has power provided during one year or the defined reporting period. In words, the definition is:
ASAI =
Customer hours service availability Customer hours service demand
Eq. 2-7
ASAI =
NT X (No. of hours/year) - riNi NT X (No. of hours/year
Eq. 2-8
System indices for reporting momentary outages were also introduced in the IEEE Std 1366. In the past many short-term outage were not reported. These are of particular consequence when determining service reliability for digital or highly automated process industries, where a very short interruption has about the same impact on the process as a sustained outage. The most used of the momentary outage indices is MAIFI. MAIFI Momentary average interruption frequency index. This index is very similar to SAIFI, but it tracks the average frequency of momentary interruptions. In words, the definition is:
MAIFI =
Total number of customer momentary interruptions Total number of customers served
Eq. 2-9
To calculate the index, use the following equation:
MAIFI =
IDiNi NT
Eq. 2-10
A survey by Edison Electric Institute (EEI), in 1995 has been useful in showing how utilities are using indices. In this survey 160 utilities were survey and 78 responded. These results are shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1 Percentage of Companies Using Indices Reporting in 19954 Out of 78 Utilities
The most used index is SAIDI, followed by SAIDI and CAIDI. Many utilities also measure ASAI, which represents the fraction of time (often in percentage) that an end-user has power available during one year or other defined reporting period. For example, if an end-user does not have power for a total of 2 hours in a given year (8,760 hours), the ASAI index for that customer is calculated as ASAI =(8760-2)/8760 = 0.99977. So ASAI can be described as the number of nines or a percentage representing actual availability. In the 1995 EIA survey, with 78 utilities reporting, the average feeder availability reported was to be .9994 and the mean was .9998. Some exceptional feeders reported 5 and 6 nines availability. This was also true in an earlier survey in 1990 with 60 utilities responding. For some transmission-connected customers availability is reported at 100%, which means that the power is available for all 8,760 hours a year. However availability one, the number of 9s, is not always the best measure of perceived reliability. This is the reason for the new momentary measures of reliability. It is certainly possible to have many momentary interruptions and a 3 or 4 nines of availability. Figure 2-2 shows the survey result for the momentary, MAIFI, index. It should be noted that a severe voltage sag, which may result in a end-user equipment interruption, is not counted in the MAIFI index.
A Nationwide Survey of Distribution Reliability Measurement Practices" By IEEE/PES Working Group on System Design, Paper No.98 WM 218
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Figure 2-2 Results of Survey of MAIFI Index for Reliability
Reliability of Facility Power Distribution

Reliability of the local power distribution system depends on the electrical components that are critical to power delivery such as service the transformer, circuit breakers, cable, bus duct, and etc. Each component of the power distribution has an expected failure rate and repair time. The IEEE Gold Book is one of the most authoritative resources on reliability of electrical equipment and electric power systems in commercial and industrial facilities. Table 2-5 shows a summary of the failure rates of common equipment as cited in the Gold Book. This reliability data can be used in an analysis to predict local power distribution reliability based on different series and parallel circuit configurations. This procedure is described in Chapter 5 of this report.
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Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources Table 2-5 Reliability of Common Low-Voltage (<600 V) Equipment5 Failure Rate Mean Time Between Failures (Events Per Year) (Years) 0.00141 0.000125 0.0062 0.0042 0.0027 0.0061 709 8000 161 238 370 164
Equipment Cable [per 1000 circuit feet] Bus duct [per 1 circuit foot] Transformers Fixed circuit breakers Metalclad drawout circuit breakers Enclosed disconnect switches
Availability of Local Generation As discussed in the previous section the availability of the electric grid is typically 99.9 or 99.99. By comparison, ICE generators and gas turbine driven generators in continuous operation are available approximately 95 to 97% of the time. At 97% availability this means that the local generator is expected to be out of service 263 hours a year, which is about 11 days. Most generator equipment manufactures cannot guarantee this level of availability. Some downtime is for planned outages to perform maintenance; these outages may not impact PQ if they can be scheduled at non-critical times. However, ICE generators and gas turbine generators (taken on an individual basis) are also out of service because of unplanned events about 1 to 2% of the time, or 88 hours per year, a little over three and a half days. Since this level of reliability is less than that of typical utility-supplied power transfer or paralleling scheme are the preferred approach. Of course, the reliability figures discussed are for a single local generator and can be improved with multiple units and redundant capacity. Using Multiple Generators to Enhance Reliability When planners develop designs for distributed generation power plants, these designs typically employ multiple small generators with a combined capacity that is sufficient to satisfy the load and reserve requirements. For a specified reliability goal (3 nines, 4 nines, and so on) the designer must take into account both forced outage rates and scheduled outage rates of the generators selected for the project. Depending on this desired reliability level and characteristics of the generator, an N-1, N-2, or N-3 design may be necessary. This refers to the level of redundancy, where 1 or 2 indicated the number of generators that can be down and the load is still served. An N-1 design can still serve the load if any single generator fails. An N-2 design can serve the load if any two generators fail, an N-3 if three units fail, and so on. Rarely would greater than N-2 be needed.
5
IEEE 493-1997 (Gold Book), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems
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Because of economy of scale a design with a few large generators will cost less per kilowatt of capacity, and require less redundant switchgear, than one employing a large number of small generators. On the other hand, smaller generators, though they cost more per kilowatt, ultimately require less surplus capacity to achieve a specific level of reliability performance. Figure 2-3 shows how the surplus generation capacity required for an N-1 design decreases as the number of generation units increases. Table 2-6 and Table 2-7 show this effect for N-1 and N-2 designs.
Load (1 MW)
Load (1 MW)
Load (1 MW)
Load (1 MW)
Gen
1 MW
1 MW
Gen
Gen
1 MW
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
Gen
0.334 MW
0.334 MW
0.334 MW
0.334 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
0.167 MW
Option A. One Generator Offers No Contingency for Failure
Option B. Two Generators Offer Contingency One Unit Failure But Need 1 MW of Overcapacity
Option C. Four Generators Offer Contingency For One Unit Failure When Sized for 0.33 MW of Overcapacity
Option D. Seven Generators Offer Contingency For One Unit Failure When Sized for 0.167 MW of Overcapacity
Figure 2-3 The More Generator Units are in Parallel, the Smaller the Amount of Surplus Capacity Needed for a Fixed Level of Contingency Design (in This Example, N-1) Table 2-6 Surplus Generating Capacity Needed for an N-1 Design Decreases as the Number of Generators Increases Number of Generators (N) 2 3 4 5 6
Contingency Design N-1 N-1 N-1 N-1 N-1
Surplus Capacity Needed 100% 50% 33% 25% 20%
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Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources Table 2-7 Surplus Generation Capacity Needed With Parallel Generators Sized So That Any Two Can Fail and the Load Can Still Be Served (Data for N-2 Design) Number of Generators (N) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Contingency Design N-2 N-2 N-2 N-2 N-2 N-2 N-2 N-2
Surplus Capacity Needed 200% 100% 66% 50% 40% 33% 29% 25%
As an example of an N-1 design, if there are two generators and each can cover the load by itself, then 100% surplus capacity is available and overall reliability is improved dramatically. The probability that both units will be out of service at the same time is small but not infinitesimal. Each can be forced out of service 1% of the time while the other is being maintained (2% of the time). Forced outages during maintenance will therefore occur 0.04% of the time. The two units can also both be forced out of service at the same time. This will happen 1% of 1% of the time, or 0.01% of the time. Therefore, both units will be unavailable 0.05% of the time, which is 4.38 hours per year. Overall, it will be possible to supply the load 99.95% of the time. As an example of another N-1 design approach, with three generators sized so any two can cover the load (each generator rated at 50% of the load), it will be possible to supply the load 99.85 % of the time. Two of the three units are estimated to be unavailable a total of 13 hours per year. The analysis above assumes that there are no periods of light load. With a varying load, it is often possible to schedule maintenance when fewer generators are needed. The risk of not being able to satisfy the load because a generator is out for maintenance will then be minimal. If maintenance is scheduled when only one of three generators is needed, then the load will only be lost when two of the three units are forced out of service at the same time, about 2.6 hours/year. Sufficient generation will be available 99.97% of the time. The availability could be higher if the load is light for long periods of time, so that two units are needed only occasionally. This is comparable to the unavailability experienced by a typical utility. For N-2 designs, the reliability improves even more. Any two units can fail and the load can still be served. For a three-unit system, with each unit sized at 100% of load, there is 200% surplus capacity available. One of three units will be available 99.999993% of the time. All three will be
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out an average of 0.06 hours/year. This level of reliability is far better than the average radial power distribution system and equivalent to the best network systems. Backup Generation Backup generators have long been used to supplement the utility power system. Generators are available for roughly $300 to $900/kVA depending on the size, manufacturer, and other factors. The key performance indicators that we need for a reliability analysis are the starting reliability and the availability. Figure 2-4 shows starting reliability from several sources, with most results being between 98% and 99.5%. Note that many of the diesel-starting percentages were obtained from nuclear plant records. One expects that these numbers are the best that can be done because nuclear plants follow strict testing, maintenance, and inspection standards. Applications where testing and maintenance is not rigorously performed may not have nearly the same level of performance. The availability of backup generators also factors into an analysis. The availability of backup generators exceeds 99% as cited in the IEEE Gold Book and is higher than the availability of grid-connected generation (standby diesel packages had 99.77% availability, standby auxiliary diesels had 99.84% availability, and standby gas turbine units had 99.48% availability).
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Gas turbines [IEEE 493:1997] [ARINC:1988] [Booz, et al.:1970] [Kongsberg Dresser Power:1984] [AT&T:1980] Diesels [IEEE 493:1997] [ARINC:1988] Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at US Nuclear Plants [EPRI:1986] Consumers Power, Big Rock Point [US NRC:1988] Northeast Utilities, Millstone [US NRC:1988] Northeast Utilities, Connecticut Yankee [US NRC:1988] ComEd, Zion [US NRC:1988] ConEd, Indian Point [US NRC:1988] [Institute of Nuclear Power Operations:1983] [Bodi:1993] Telecommunications backup generators
90 92 94 96 98 100
Generator starting reliability, percent
Figure 2-4 Starting Reliability for Backup Generators.6,7
IEEE 493-1997 (Gold Book), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, and the following references sited in the Gold Book: ARINC Research Corporation, Final ReportRAM Study of Diesel and Gas-Turbine Generator Sets, Publication 4219-03-01-4803. Booz, Allen Applied Research, Small Gas Turbine Start Investigation, April 1970. Kongsberg Dresser Power, Internal Study Comparing Diesels with Gas Turbine Engines (unpublished), 1984. AT&T, Internal Study for Gas-Turbine Reliability (unpublished), 1980. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, NSAC 108, Sept. 1986. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR), NUREG/CR-4639 EGG-2458, vol. 5, RX, June 1988. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System, 1982 Annual Report, 1983. F. Bodi, Practical Reliability Modeling of Complex Telecommunications Services, 15th International Telecommunications Energy Conference, September 1993.
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Transition From Grid-Parallel to Standalone Mode If a grid-connected DR system is to achieve improved reliability, the utility interconnection interface and control system should be able to detect failure of either the local generation or the utility system supply and perform the appropriate switching to isolate the affected device. In the case of a utility system supply failure, the voltage will either sag deeply or disappear entirely. A grid-connected generation plant has the responsibility to quickly sense this condition (with appropriate protective relay functions) and create a standalone island composed of the DR and local site load. Once the island is formed, it will be maintained until the utility service voltage is restored, at which time the DR can resynchronize and reconnect to the utility system. In the case of a DR failure, the DR is quickly tripped off-line, and the load is served by the utility system. Figure 2-5 shows the basic layout for such an interface.
Islanding Detection and Power System Interface Protection Package
Proper Grounding and transformer configuration
Generator Protection and Control
Note: generator controls must allow for operation in two modes: grid-parallel and islanded mode
Utility 13.2 kV System
480 V Isolating Device
Gen
This element closed during parallel operation with utility system. Open during stand alone mode
480 V
Area of Island During Stand-alone Mode
Facility Loads
Figure 2-5 Grid-Parallel Connection Scheme to Allow Local Island During Utility Interruptions and Isolation of DR Plant During DR Failures
DR in a grid-parallel system will need to have all of the usual required utility system interface equipment and protection and will need to be applied with suitable grounding, acceptable PQ, and safety considerations for the utility system. In the transition from a grid-parallel state to a standalone state, the DR must change its operating mode from a voltage-following and utility-synchronized state to a voltage- and frequencyregulating state that can load-follow. The transition from one state to another is usually not 2-17
seamless. A short PQ disturbance or interruption might be acceptable depending on the site. However, a long interruption during the transition would be considered a reliability failure. Whether or not a seamless transition is required depends on the PQ design objectives of the facility. Using mechanical switchgear and traditional control-sensing methods, a very fast seamless transition is not possible. Nevertheless, it is possible to transition using conventional switchgear methods if a few cycles of disturbance are allowed to reach the load. For a seamless transition (within cycle) with no disturbance reaching the load, a static switch is the only real option. The control scheme to transition the DR to/from the islanded state needs to have the proper sensitivity to avoid false triggers during minor voltage anomalies that repeatedly send the DR site and customer load into an islanded state. On the other hand, it needs to be sensitive and fast enough to successfully transition the site to the islanded state whenever a real interruption or deep voltage sag on the utility system occurs. Improper execution in either direction could degrade the reliability performance. The control scheme must handle load/generation unbalances at the instant the system transitions to an islanded state. It is easiest to handle the situation when the load exactly balances the output of the generator before separation. If the generator is producing too much power (exporting to the utility system), the imbalance can cause the generator to accelerate (over-frequency) and can cause overvoltages. If the generator is producing too little power, then the frequency declines and an undervoltage may occur. Imbalances between local load and generation at the moment of separation must not be so large that the DR and load at the site cannot ride through the transition. High-speed load shedding and dynamic breaking load resistances can be used to deal with large unbalances. Grid-Connected Generation Facilities can also employ grid-connected generation to meet local needs for power along with supplying reliability enhancement. The installation costs are similar to backup generation, but the economics are much different as fuel costs and possible cogeneration benefit are factored in. For grid-connected generation, the availability is the key performance indicator as it affects the reliability to the load. Figure 2-6 shows that availabilities range from 90% to 97%. This is much lower than the availability of typical electric utility supplies. Given this level of reliability, it is difficult to supply highly reliable power solely with local generation (without the utility). Assuming that an individual generator has 97% availability the number of generators needed to achieve a specified system reliability can be calculated.
2-18
[Gas Research Institute, 1993] Reciprocating engines < 60 kW Reciprocating engines, 80-800 kW Reciprocating engines, > 800 kW Gas turbines, 1-5 MW Gas turbines, 5-25 MW Gas turbines, >25 MW Gold Book [IEEE 493:1997] Diesel auxiliary Diesel package Gas turbine Fuel cell [International Fuel Cells:2001] Configured with the utility Standalone
85 90 95 100
Generator availability, percent
Figure 2-6 Availability of Generators Found in Various Studies 8,9,10
For the case of three generators, where each generator has a 97% probably of operating, the probability of these generators being out of service is calculated in Table 2-8:
Table 2-8 Probability Calculation for Generator being Out of Service
Units Out of Service 0 1 (r=2, n=3) 2 (r=1, n=3) 3 0.973
Probability = 0.912673 = 0.084681 = 0.002619 = 0.000027 = 1.0
3 (0.97)2 (1-0.97) 3 (0.97) (1-0.97)2 (1-0.97)3 Sum
This table comes from the probability calculation where the number of generators running, given by r, out of a total number of generators, n, is found using the binomial distribution. This
10
Gas Research Institute (GRI) White Paper, Reliability of Natural Gas Power Generation Systems, citing results from: Brown, H. W. and Stuber, F.S., Reliability of Natural Gas Cogeneration Systems, Final Report, GRI93/0020, Sept. 1993. IEEE 493-1997 (Gold Book), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems. International Fuel Cells, Fuel Cell Reliability for the 12-Month Period Ending Nov. 1, 2001 as cited at http://www.ifc.com.
2-19
distribution yields the probability of exactly r successes in n trials with a probability of success p:11
Pr = n C r p r (1 p ) n r =
n! p r (1 p ) n r r!( n r )!
Eq. 2-11
It should be noted that these calculations are theoretical and dont include overlapping or common-mode failures. For generators, several factors contribute to common-mode failures:
Fuel supply Continuously run generators likely have a common supply of natural gas. Backup generators are more likely to have independent tanks for supply. Common controls Generators may have common controls for starting.
Most configurations of generators only help with long-duration interruptions and not with voltage sags or momentary interruptions. There are some configurations that use continuously running generators to supply critical loads with higher-quality power. The basic idea is to use a static switch to make the generator act as a UPS, with the generator taking the position of the batteries. The basic configurations are:
Static transfer switch configuration: The generator supplies some or all of the load. If a sag or interruption hits the utility supply, the static switch opens up, and the generator supplies all of the load, see Figure 2-7. Static transfer switch: The load normally runs off the generator. If the generator fails, the static transfer switch operates and switches the load to the utility input, see Figure 2-8.
Figure 2-7 Parallel Generator Configuration Supplying Protection Against Short-Duration as Well as Long-Duration Interruptions
In both of these cases, the generator must be able to match the load quickly. This is difficult, as many generation technologies have limited load-following capability. Some of the ways of matching generation to the load are:

11
Shed load by tripping load breakers to match the load to the generator. Use some sort of power electronics with short-term energy storage to dynamically correct for mismatches to give the generator time to match the load.
R. Billinton, Power System Reliability Evaluation, Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., New York, 1970.
2-20
Oversize the generator to supply motor-starting current if the critical load has motors.
Figure 2-8 Series Generator Configuration Supplying Protection Against Short-Duration as Well as Long-Duration Interruptions
Parallel Utility Connection in Lieu of Redundant Generators By operating DR in parallel with the utility system, high levels of reliability are readily achieved without the need for surplus DR capacity. In addition, the utility connection alleviates much of the need to have surplus capacity for the PQ and reactive power reasons discussed in preceding sections. As an example, if the generation in the facility is out of service 3% of the time, there are no spare generators in the facility, and the utility is 99.95% available (0.05% unavailable), then electrical power will be unavailable only 0.13 hours of the year. Even better availability can be achieved if the plant capacity is made of several small units and maintenance of units can be scheduled during periods of light load. This is one reason why even grid-parallel DR designs may employ multiple generator units. Excess generation capacity can marginally cost as little as $200 per kilowatt but is more likely to be in the range of $500 per kilowatt owing to the use of smaller generators (which have higher cost per kW) and additional switchgear/controls. The parallel utility connection can help avoid this expense. A word of caution regarding the ability of a parallel utility connection to avoid the need for surplus generation capacity; PQ considerations may still create a need for some redundancy. When the utility system is off-line, the grid-parallel DR plant temporarily becomes a standalone entity. It must have adequate capacity during this mode of operation to power the loads and maintain adequate PQ. If there are large motors, then DR overcapacity is still likely needed for PQ. Of course, due to the short duration of most power outages on the utility system (a few hours per year or less), the DR will not be operating in standalone mode very long, so somewhat reduced PQ might be acceptable. Nonetheless, the PQ conditions that occur during short transitions to standalone mode still need to be carefully considered to determine if surplus generation capacity can be avoided. The PQ sensitivity of loads, the types of loads (large motors or large step-loads), and generator characteristics will determine whether a parallel utility system connection can avoid the need for surplus generation capacity. In most cases, at least some significant surplus capacity can be avoided. 2-21
Reliability Issues Related to DR

The most prominent short-duration interruptions impacted by distributed generation are momentary interruptions (0.5 cycles to 30 cycles), primarily involving DR technologies that use rotating machines. The main issues related to momentary interruptions and DRs with rotating machines are:
Impact of out-of-phase reclose on rotating machines: Most likely will result in an increase in duration of the momentary interruption Impact of DR contributing fault current on sympathetic tripping of circuit breakers: Most likely will result in an increase in the number of momentary interruptions because of nuisance tripping Impact of fault current on utility fuse/breaker coordination: Most likely will reduce the number of momentary interruptions at the expense of sustained interruptions for a smaller group of customers
Impact of DR Out-of-Phase Reclosure on Rotating Machines Because of the transient nature of faults on overhead distribution lines, many utilities often use high-speed (30 cycles or less) reclosing of their substation breakers and in-line reclosers to rapidly restore service after temporary feeder faults. Reclosing is quite prevalent in North American utility systems. Utilities in regions of low lightning incidence may reclose only once, under the assumption that most of the faults are permanent. Within lightning-prone regions, it is common to attempt to clear faults as many as four times. Figure 2-9 shows the two most common sequences in four-shot reclosers:
One fast operation, three time delayed Two fast, two delayed
2-22
Figure 2-9 Sample Reclosing Sequence for Line Reclosers and Substation Breakers
The impact of instantaneous trip or fast reclose on DRs using rotating machines is similar to the issue of a motor reclosing out of phase, an issue which has been thoroughly explored in the past. The main concern for motors is that indiscriminate reclosing can produce inrush currents in excess of normal locked rotor current and may also result in damaging torque transients that in extreme cases can exceed the mechanical design limit of the machine and cause severe mechanical damage. The same concern exists for DRs using synchronous or induction generators that are downstream of a recloser or a breaker with instantaneous trip enabled. When the power is restored after a successful fault clearing with the instantaneous trip, the utility system voltage and the generator voltage maybe out of phase, resulting in transient forces and torques which may be well beyond the mechanical capabilities of the rotating machine. The generator shaft and stator end-turns are typically the most vulnerable to damage due to the excessive torques and magnetic forces that can occur during an out-of-phase switching. Although experience shows that catastrophic damage is not very common, nevertheless, it is essential for designers and operators of DR to know the risks involved in fast reclosing. In order to minimize the chances of this potentially damaging consequence, some utilities increase the time delay to as much as 5 seconds on feeders with DR. The PQ impact of this will obviously be detrimental, resulting, for example, in clocks that have to be reset. Other end-use loads that could ride through an instantaneous operation could also be affected by such an increase in time delay on feeders. Generally, at least a 1- to 2-second delay is recommended in the absence of any specific information regarding the characteristic of the DR. Another solution
2-23
is for utilities to disconnect the reclosing devices on all feeders to which DRs are connected. This, however, will result in a deterioration of service for other customers on the feeder. A second alternative is to continue high-speed reclosing and require DRs as part of the interconnection requirement to disconnect before reclosing can happen. A third alternative is to have the utility send a transfer trip signal to all DRs before reclosing occurs. This will be quite an expensive proposition, and the DR customers will have to bear the cost for the utility to implement such an option. Another alternative is for the utility is to block reclosing until all DRs are removed and voltage-supervising relays indicate that the line or feeder is dead. This reclosing supervision must be provided not only for the substation breaker but also for all the inline reclosers between the source and the DR interface. Impact of DR Fault Current on Sympathetic Tripping of Circuit Breakers The fault current contribution from a single small DR unit is not large. However, the aggregate contributions of many small units or a few large units can alter the short-circuit levels enough to cause sympathetic tripping resulting in an increase in the number of momentary interruptions that a customer would otherwise experience. Typical short-circuit levels of DR power converters are characterized in Table 2-9. For inverters, fault contributions will depend on the maximum current level and duration for which the inverter manufacturers current limiter is set to respond. On some inverters, fault contributions may last for less than a cycle, in other cases it can be much longer. For synchronous generators, the current contribution depends on the prefault voltage, subtransient and transient reactances of the machine, and exciter characteristics. Induction generators can also contribute to faults as long as they remain excited by any residual voltage on the feeder. For most induction generators, the significant current would only last a few cycles and would be determined by dividing the prefault voltage by the transient reactance of the machine.
Table 2-9 Typical Fault Current Levels of DRs Type of Generator Fault current into shorted bus terminals as percent of rated output current 100-400% (duration will depend on controller settings, and current may even be less than 100% for some inverters) Starting at 500-1000% for the first few cycles and decaying to 200-400% 500-1000% for first few cycles and decaying to a negligible amount within 10 cycles
Inverter
Separately Excited Synchronous Generator Induction Generator or Self Excited Synchronous Generator
Sympathetic tripping will be the most likely scenario for large generators near the substation that could cause sympathetic tripping of the feeder or line reclosers on the circuits they are applied to if faults occur on the adjacent feeders serviced by the same substation (see Figure 2-10). This 2-24
would occur because the generator would feed the adjacent feeder fault, resulting in high current levels on the unfaulted feeder. This can be prevented but requires additional equipment such as directional overcurrent relays at the substation and/or adjustments to standard overcurrent relays at the substation. The interaction will result in customers in Feeder A experiencing an increase in the number of momentary interruptions than they would have otherwise noticed.
Substation Transformer 115 kV
Circuit Breaker A Circuit Breaker B FEEDER B Fault Contribution of Distributed Generator
Fault
13.2 kV
FEEDER A
Feeder breaker A may nuisance trip during feeder B faults - relay modifications and/or careful coordination adjustments could solve the problem
3000 kVA Distributed Generator
Figure 2-10 Sympathetic Tripping Caused by a Large DR Unit Feeding Fault Current into an Adjacent Feeder (REF: Integration of Distributed Resources in Electric Utility Systems: Current Interconnection Practice and Unified Approach, EPRI TR111489)
Impact of DR Fault Current on Utility Fuse/Breaker Coordination Fault current contribution from DRs may also impact the fuse-saving practice that is used by some utilities. Under this practice, fuses for overhead laterals are usually coordinated with the feeder breaker so that they do not operate during temporary faults but will operate during any sustained fault. Fuses on underground laterals are normally coordinated to clear the fault without tripping the feeder breaker. For overhead laterals, fuse coordination is accomplished by using an instantaneous setting for the first breaker trip and time delay for later trips following reclose operations. The fuse size is selected such that it will operate on the time-delay trip but not during the instantaneous trip, giving the temporary fault a chance to clear during the first breaker operation. Fuse-breaker coordination for faults downstream of a fuse can be affected if the fault current passing through the fuse is changed significantly by the addition of DR units on the distribution system (see Figure 2-11). This occurs if fuses are coordinated with an upstream circuit breaker device in a fuse-saving practice. In this situation, the objective is for the upstream breaker to clear the fault prior to damage to or melting of the fuse. Normally it will take 5 to 6 cycles for the upstream breaker using an instantaneous trip setting to clear the fault. Hence the fuse needs to be sized so that its minimum melt time is longer than the total breaker fault-clearing time (at least 6 cycles plus some margin time). If the fault current increases, its minimum melt time may be significantly shorter than 6 cycles and it will no longer coordinate with the circuit breaker.
2-25
G2
SUBSTATION FEEDER
Fuse
G1
Breaker
G3
Lateral
Fault
Figure 2-11 Fault Contributions Due to DR Units 1, 2 and 3 May Increase the Short Circuit Levels to the Point Where Fuse-Breaker Coordination is no Longer Achieved
Using Table 2-9, a 1000-kW synchronous generator would contribute a peak fault current on a 13.2 kV primary feeder of about 218 to 437 Amps to a fault for the first few cycles. This compares with typical distribution circuits, which have primary fault currents ranging from about 100 amperes (at remote fringe areas) to more than 10,000 amperes near the substation. Thus, the current contribution from DR units is enough to impact fuse coordination in some cases, especially in weaker parts of the system. Table 2-9 represents the worst-case fault contributions and is only meant as an illustrative guide. For accurate analysis, the generator data should always be obtained from the manufacturer and in this case the faults are assumed at the generator terminals. The contributions will decrease the farther the generator is from the fault. The configuration and impedance of the DR site step-up transformer will also play a role. For example, a DR interface configuration that does not provide a zero-sequence path to the utility system will not contribute to ground faults on the primary side. When a single generator is added to the system, a manual calculation of the peak fault currents based on manufacturer data can be performed to screen for a serious impact on the existing shortcircuit levels. For multiple generation devices scattered throughout the system or for large generators, the only accurate approach is to perform software-based short-circuit analysis which correctly models the short-circuit behavior of the generators. In many cases, the DR units wont pose a threat to existing coordination; only a relatively few cases may require changes in protection settings. If a utility has to eliminate fuse-saving practices because of application of DRs in a feeder, the impact on customers can in fact be positive. In some cases, utilities disable fast tripping or fuse saving on substation breakers or reclosers in response to customer complaints regarding momentary interruptions. Disabling fast tripping minimizes the number of customers experiencing momentary interruptions at the expense of a smaller segment of customers on the affected fuse tap who suffer sustained interruptions. It may also reduce the additional costs to the utility of responding to service calls associated with momentary interruptions and ameliorate the adverse impact of momentary interruptions on the reliability indices of the utility.
2-26
Reliability Summary
Utility Vs On-Site Generation To obtain the level of reliability enjoyed by the average utility customer using standalone generation, the standalone facility must have at least enough surplus capacity at peak load to replace the largest generator. Two redundant generators may be needed to match the availability of the best utility systems. In a standalone facility, it is normally more economical to have a small redundant unit with several small units instead of a large redundant unit to back up a single large unit. This approach, however, cannot be taken to extremes because small units cost more per kilowatt of capacity and require additional switchgear. An installation with five generators, four plus a spare, is typical. If the facility is connected to the utility, then better reliability can be obtained without the spare generator. The installation cost without a utility connection (five generators) will therefore be approximately 25% more than the installation cost with a utility connection (four generators). It is possible to have the best of both worlds by connecting a facility with its own generation to the utility system. The utility system will then act as a highly reliable redundant generator. During normal operation, local distributed generators can supply the facilitys load. If one of these units is out of service for any reason, however, the utility will make up for any power deficit. If the utility experiences an outage, the distributed generation and load can temporarily separate and continue normal operation. This of course assumes that the interface between the facility and utility is designed to permit suitable disconnection and reconnection for utility disturbances. Service Entrance- Vs Equipment-Level Solutions Both utility-side and customer-side solutions are possible for many end users; each approach has advantages. Utility-side solutions tend to have the following characteristics:
Take advantage of the economy of larger scale Cover the whole facility without need to fully understand and segregate loads. Do not take up space within the facility.
Customer-side solutions tend to have different characteristics:
Pinpoint only devices that are sensitive (and important) require protection. Are scalable from individual devices (watts) to megawatts. Require knowledge of the specific process and local expertise for success. Can be applied right at the load and thereby address disturbances caused within the facility.
It should be noted here that, even if a utility supplies perfect power (100% availability); local protection right at the load may be needed. The most common internal problem is voltage sags 2-27
caused by faults in the facility, but other PQ disturbances such as motor-starting voltage sags, harmonics, or noise could necessitate local power-conditioning and ride-through. Another customer-side solution that is often overlooked is changes or add-ons to devices to give them more ride-through capability.
2-28
3
OVERVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER QUALITY AND DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES
This chapter describes the various PQ attributes that are important to performance of end-use equipment or systems. These are described in terms of voltage and frequency variations. The variations may be either event phenomena, with a defined duration, or continuous phenomena, designated at steady state. Installing DR in a power system has three possible outcomes with respect to power-quality attributes, that is, to either improve, detract, or not effect. For each of the PQ attributes the positive and negative aspects of adding DR will be considered.
Power Quality Attributes

The Recommended Practice on Monitoring Electric Power Quality, IEEE Std. 1159-1995 is the standard that defines PQ attributes. The purpose of this standard has been to define the attributes with enough detail so that categories and terms are meaningful, and facilitate better communications and understanding between customers, manufacturers, and utilities. Table 3-1 summarizes these PQ attributes of voltage and frequency. These are divided into seven main categories of electromagnetic phenomena that occur in power systems and given descriptive names such as impulsive transient or momentary sag. For each phenomena the typical spectral content, duration and magnitude are provided.
Table 3-1 IEEE Std. 1159-1995 Categories and Typical Characteristics of Power Quality Attributes (Electromagnetic Phenomena in Power Systems) Categories 1. Transients Impulsive Nanosecond Microsecond Millisecond Oscillatory Low frequency Medium frequency High frequency 2. Short Duration Variations Instantaneous Sag Swell Momentary Typical Spectral Content Typical Duration Typical Voltage Magnitude
5 ns rise 1 s rise 0.1 ms rise < 5 kHz 5 500 kHz 0.5 5 MHz
< 50 ns 50 ns 1 ms > 1 ms 0.3 50 ms 20 s 5 s 0 4 pu 0 8 pu 0 4 pu
0.5 30 cycles 0.5 30 cycles
0.1 0.9 pu 1.1 1.8 pu
3-1
Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources Interruption Sag Swell Temporary Interruption Sag Swell 3. Long Duration Variations Interruption, sustained Undervoltages Overvoltages 4. Voltage Unbalance 5.Waveform Distortion DC offset Harmonics 0 100th H Interharmonics 0 6 kHz Notching Noise Broad-band < 25 Hz 6.Voltage Fluctuations 7. Power Frequency Variations 0.5 cycles 3 s 30 cycles 3 s 30 cycles 3 s 3 s 1 min 3 s 1 min 3 s 1 min > 1 min > 1 min > 1 min Steady state Steady state Steady state Steady state Steady state Steady state intermittent < 10 s < 0.1 pu 0.1 0.9 pu 1.1 1.4 pu < 0.1 pu 0.1 0.9 pu 1.1 1.2 pu 0.0 pu 0.8 0.9 pu 1.1 1.2 pu 0.5 2% 0 0.1% 0 20 % 0 2% 0 1% 0.1 7%
Each of the seven primary categories of PQ attributes detailed in Table 3-1 have additional subcategories. So the phenomena are best described using these main and sub- category names that defined in the 1159 standard. For example, harmonic waveform distortion, temporary sag, or long duration undervoltage are all well-defined descriptions of phenomena with specified characteristics.
Power Quality in the Presence of DR

Some of the phenomena defined in Table 3-1 are more affected by the addition of DR than others. In this chapter only the PQ attributes that are likely affected in a DR application are discussed. Transients (Voltages and Currents) Transient voltages and currents are very short duration events, < 50 mS. They are usually a result of sudden changes in power systems and they shaped by the systems response to the change. The two main sources of these transient events are switching and lightning, where the sudden change is a connection, disconnection, or injection of voltage or current. 1. Connection or disconnection of elements on the power system. Capacitor switching, line switching and load turn on or turn off are examples of these types of events. 2. Injection of energy into the power system. A lightning strike or electrostatic discharges are examples of this type of event. The energy in these transients can contribute to the breakdown of components and/or insulation in residential electrical equipment such as appliance power supplies, compressor motors, and personal computing equipment. For the 120-Vrms system, the normal mode (line to line and line 3-2
Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources
to neutral) magnitude of concern begins at about 500 volts peak or above. For other base voltage levels a similar peak ratio of four times the RMS value provides a good rule of thumb for approximating the level of concern. For DR applications, the important question is what does the DR installation do either positively or negatively to impact the transient levels that the connected equipment experiences. DR impact on power system transients is primarily related to the connection and disconnection of DR power conversion equipment, i.e., synchronous and induction generators, and inverters. Switching transients are possible depending on the interconnection procedure and controls. Interconnection standards, such as IEEE 1547, limit some types of transients such as out of sync connections, but allow fast disconnects. When the DR is small compared to rest of the utility system at the PCC, transients should not exceed those expected from normal load switching. While on line the DR is likely to improve the system response to transients by slightly lowering the system impedance near the point of end use. Many DR, particularly inverter type systems will have onboard transient and surge protection. These protective devices add to existing system protection in a parallel connection and will tend to help control transients. The details of this added transient protection are discussed in sections four and five. Short-Duration Variations Short-duration voltage variations include measurable RMS deviations such as voltage interruptions, sags, and swells that last between one-half cycle and one minute. The most common of these variations last less than a few seconds and are often the result of three conditions:
A fault on the power system Loose connections in wiring The energizing of large loads such as large induction motors
Of the three conditions listed above, a fault on the power system and loose wiring connections are the most common conditions that result in a short duration voltage variations. Short-duration variations are generally defined by the number of electrical cycles that they last, and in the percent deviation from the nominal system voltage. These variations can cause electronic equipment and process equipment to shut down or to malfunction and section four details some of the positive impacts DR will have on minimizing the impact of short duration variations and in particular voltage sag events. Figure 3-1 shows the voltage waveform typically associated with a voltage sag (or dip) disturbance. Typically for transmission faults, these voltage disturbances last fractions of a second ( 1/10 second), which represents the total fault-clearing time for transmission faults. However, these momentary events can cause a complete shutdown of plant-wide processes, which may take hours to return to normal operation.
3-3

Model 7100 21.5KV Waveshape Disturbance Three Phase Wye 70.0A
1V
Model 7100 17.0KV
RMS Sag Disturbance
Three Phase Wye 50.0A

1V
0.0V
0.0A
8.5KV
25.0A
-21.5KV 0sec
-70.0A 6.67 ms/div 133.33ms 09/10/97 18:31:16.22
0.0V 0sec
0.0A 12.50 ms/div 250.00ms 09/10/97 18:31:16.22
Figure 3-1 Waveform and RMS Voltage During Voltage Sag
Clearly, while the availability of power may have been 100% during a given period, the lack of quality due to sags during that period may result in significant unreliability and losses to some end-user processes. By installing DR near end use equipment it may be possible to mitigate sag events. This is most likely the case for DR with overload capability. On the other hand, in the case were DR is also sensitive to the voltage sag event, and trips offline, this sudden loss of generation is likely to worsen quality by increasing the depth of the sag. Table 3-2 provides a rundown of different cases where DR impacts short-term voltage variations either positively or negatively.
Table 3-2 Impact of Distributed Generation on Voltage Sags and Momentary Interruptions PQ Category Voltage Sag Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - Starting of induction generators directly from the line will cause voltage drop similar to induction motor starting Negative - DR will reduce the fault current contribution from the utility source and may increase the duration of the fault clearing and therefore increase the sag duration Positive - Properly applied DR can provide voltage support and reduce the magnitude of voltage sags as seen by the load. Typically energy storage is required. Power Conversion Systems Induction Generator
Voltage Sag
Synchronous Generator or Induction Generator
Voltage Sag
All, and protective relays need to be set to allow voltage sag ride through
3-4
Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources Table 3-2 (cont.) Impact of Distributed Generation on Voltage Sags and Momentary Interruptions PQ Category Momentary Interruption Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - Out of phase reclosing can damage the shaft of rotating machines; Utilities may have to increase their reclosing time to accommodate for downstream DRs which will result in an increased duration of momentary interruption Negative DR fault contribution can cause nuisance operation of upstream sectionalizers, breakers, or reclosers. This will increase the number of momentary interruptions. Power Conversion Systems Synchronous Generator or Induction Generator
Momentary Interruption
IG, SG, and especially all with grounded-wye delta transformer connections
Temporary overvoltage is another phenomena that can be caused by the presence of DR. In Table 3-3 three scenarios are described where the presence of DR combined with system faults or the possibility to operate as an island may lead to voltage swells or temporary overvoltages.
Table 3-3 Impact of Distributed Generation on Voltage Swells or Temporary Overvoltages PQ Category Voltage Swell Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - Certain transformer connections for DR can cause voltage swells on healthy phases during line-toground faults during islanding. Power Conversion Systems Wye/ungrounded wye, delta/ wye, delta/delta, wye/wye with an ungrounded generator All
Voltage Swell
Negative - Voltage swells and ferroresonant overvoltages can occur due to resonance between the DR impedance and distribution capacitors during islanding. Negative - Out-of-phase reclosing between the utility system and an islanded DR may cause transient overvoltages.
Voltage Swell
All
Long-Duration Variations Long duration variations can be classified as RMS events that last longer than one minute. There are two standards that address these events, The American National Standard for Electric Power Systems and Equipment Voltage Ratings (ANSI C84.1), and IEEE Std. 1159-1995. The IEEE 1159 has three subcategories for long-duration variations: overvoltages, undervoltages, and sustained interruptions. In contrast to sags and swells, long-duration voltage variations typically are not caused by system faults. The most common causes of long-duration variations are switching operations, 3-5
large load variations, power system voltage regulation problems, and improper transformer tap settings. Depending on the design criteria for the equipment and its tolerances, a ten percent reduction in voltage may be sufficient to cause end use equipment to shut down. This is especially true if the equipment already is being supplied at a lower than rated voltage due to the wrong transformer taps or voltage drop due to a long cable run. Section five includes a discussion of the evaluation procedures and consideration for insuring a stable voltage to reduce possible impacts of long-duration variations. Table 3-4 describes both positive and negative impacts of DR on voltage regulation.
Table 3-4 Impact of Distributed Generation on Steady State and Long Duration Voltage Regulation PQ Category Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - A DR located just downstream of a voltage regulator can interfere with the line-drop compensation in the regulator and cause low voltages downstream of the generator. Negative - A DR can cause a steady state increased voltage because the reverse power flow decreases voltage drop on the circuit. Negative - Improper coordination between a utility voltage regulator and a voltage regulating DR can cause both regulators to hunt. Power Conversion Systems All
Steady State Voltage Regulation
Long-duration voltage variations
All
Synchronous Generator or SelfCommutated Inverter All
Positive - Properly applied distributed generators can improve the voltage profile along a circuit because of the voltage boost caused by the injection of real power. Positive - Properly applied distributed generators can improve regulation if they are operated in a voltageregulating mode (by varying reactive power).
Synchronous Generator or SelfCommutated Inverter
Voltage Unbalance Voltage unbalance is defined as the percent deviation in the RMS value of the highest or lowest phase measured relative to the average RMS of the three-phase voltage. The calculation of voltage unbalance uses: (Maximum RMS voltage deviation from the average/average RMS voltage) * 100. In general, utility supply voltage is maintained at a relatively low level of phase unbalance since even a low level of unbalance can cause a significant power supply ripple and heating effects on the generation, transmission, and distribution system equipment. Utility supply voltages are typically maintained at less than two percent, and one percent is not uncommon. Voltage unbalance more commonly emerges in individual customer loads due to phase load unbalances, especially where large, single-phase power loads are used, such as single-phase arc furnaces. Voltage unbalance of greater than two percent should be reduced, where possible, by 3-6
balancing single-phase loads as phase current unbalance is usually the cause. A voltage unbalance can magnify the current unbalance in the stator windings of a motor by as much as 20 times, thereby causing substantial heating. Voltage unbalance is treated separately from unusually low or high voltage conditions that may occur during faults. Sections 4 and 5 of this document provide more information on the sensitivity of end-use equipment to voltage unbalance and a procedure for assessment of possible unbalance problems related to DR. Table 3-5 describes typical scenarios where DR may result in negative or positive impacts.
Table 3-5 Impact of Distributed Generation on Unbalance PQ Category Voltage Unbalance Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - Existing feeder voltage unbalance can cause machine connected DR to trip on current unbalance or cause rotor heating due to high negative-sequence currents. Negative - Depending on the winding arrangement of the DR interconnection transformer, feeder current unbalance will be reflected in the interconnection transformer causing overload and possibly damage if the transformer is not protected. Power Conversion Systems Synchronous Generator or Induction Generator grounded-wye/delta and groundedwye/grounded-wye transformer (with the generator grounded). Synchronous Generator or SelfCommutated Inverter
Current Unbalance
Voltage Unbalance
Positive - In cases where the DR feeds a constant power into utility distribution feeders, the lower phase voltage will see a relatively higher current and a consequently a tendency to raise the voltage.
Waveform Distortion Waveform distortion is defined as a steady-state deviation from an ideal sine wave at the power frequency. IEEE Std. 1159-1995 defines five subsets of waveform distortion:
DC offset Harmonics Interharmonics Notching Noise
Of these five distortions, the primary concern related to DR installations is harmonic distortion of the voltage or current. Harmonics are sinusoidal voltages or currents that are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency of the power system. When harmonic currents flow through the impedance of the power system, voltage distortion results. Likewise a distorted distribution feeder voltage will usually cause current distortion in the DR output. Table 3-6 lists the cases where DR is likely to cause negative or positive impacts on distortion.
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Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources Table 3-6 Impact of Distributed Generation on Waveform Distortion PQ Category Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Power Conversion Systems Induction Generator
Waveform Distortion
Negative - Possibility of harmonic resonance at light load due to the interaction of system reactance with the capacitor required for reactive support for induction generator. Negative - Harmonic current injected by the DR inverter can increase voltage distortion and cause resonance with utility power factor correction capacitors. Negative - High switching frequency of PQM type inverters can cause resonance (2-3 kHz) with cable fed-system.
Waveform Distortion
LineCommutated Inverter SelfCommutated Inverter Induction or Synchronous Synchronous or Induction Generators
Waveform Distortion
Waveform Distortion Waveform Distortion
Negative - Voltage distortion from rotating generators can cause resonance with utility power factor correction capacitors Negative - When disconnected from the grid and supporting an island with nonlinear loads the higher impedance of the DR source will likely increase voltage distortion compared to grid connected. Positive - Properly applied Inverters connected DR can inject currents that tend to reduce harmonic voltage distortions.
Waveform Distortion
SelfCommutated Inverter
Voltage Fluctuations (Flicker) Voltage fluctuations can cause lamps to flicker. Even a one percent voltage variation is capable of producing flicker that is perceptible to the human eye. The sensitivity of humans varies with the frequency of the fluctuations. Time varying loads such as arc furnaces and welders can cause slow (sub 60Hz) voltage variations. In turn, these fluctuations can cause incandescent lamps to flicker or change in their intensity with time. Although these fluctuations typically do not cause any disturbance on the power system, the flickering lamps become quite a nuisance. Sudden variations of voltage, which are caused by the starting or stopping a DR can also cause light flicker. IC engine generators misfiring or fluttering wind generators will sometimes cause flicker. This flicker will generally be worse near the fluctuating generator or when the generator is relatively large compared to the electric power system at the point of common coupling. DR related flicker will be more pronounced when the fluctuating On distribution systems, long rural feeders with a large fluctuating generator near the end would be the most susceptible to flickering lights. Table 3-7 lists some cases where DR will impact voltage fluctuations and flicker.
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Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources Table 3-7 Impact of Distributed Generation on Flicker PQ Category Flicker Description of PQ Issue and Likely Positive or Negative Impacts of DR Negative - Low RPM, low number of cylinder machines applications or misfiring engines can cause voltage fluctuation. Negative - Cloud caused irradiance changes could produce flicker. Negative - Fluctuations in the wind speed, pitching/yaw error in blades, wind shear, and tower shading can produce flicker. Energy Source/ Prime Mover Reciprocating Engine
Flicker
Photovoltaic
Flicker
Wind Turbine/Generator
Frequency Variations Frequency variations are variations from the base 60-Hz power frequency. Frequency variations of the electric power system are extremely rare. Even slight variations could cause damage to electric power generators and turbine shafts. Frequency variations are more common on customer-owned generation running off grid. In the case of off grid generator operation, load turn on (or step loads) can cause frequency variations while the generator governor attempts to bring the machine back on the speed setting. When utility frequency variation occurs the connected DR can provide a positive benefit by momentarily increasing the real power output for a decreasing frequency and decreasing real power output for an increasing frequency. On the other hand if a decreasing frequency variation cause the DR to drop off line it will have a negative impact.
Summary of Power Quality Issues Related to Distributed Generation

The previous discussion of PQ attributes and how DR may contribute in either a positive or a negative way is summarized in Table 3-8. This table will be supplemented with the discussion in chapter four regarding the sensitivity of equipment commonly found in commercial and industrial facilities.
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Overview of Electric Power Quality and Distributed Resources Table 3-8 Variations and Potential Impacts With Installed DR Event Category Sub Categories of interest at DR installations Lightning related Switching related Short Duration Variation Sag Swell Long Duration Variation High RMS Voltage Low RMS Voltage Voltage Unbalance Waveform Distortion Voltage Fluctuations Frequency Variations N/A Harmonic Voltage and Current Flicker Decreasing or Increasing Potential for Positive Impact, Negative Impact, or Both Positive Impact Negative Impact Both Positive and Negative Negative Impact Both Positive and Negative Positive Impact Both Positive and Negative Both Positive and Negative Negative Impact Both Positive and Negative
Transients
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4
END-USE EQUIPMENT SUSCEPTIBILITY TO POWER QUALITY VARIATIONS
To better understand the value of applying DR in ways that will have positive impact on electric customer equipment and processes, it is important to understand the existing levels of susceptibility of the equipment commonly found in industrial and commercial facilities. This chapter details the various sensitivity levels of electronic equipment from a PQ perspective. Categories include industrial and commercial power electronics, process control devices, lighting and motor driven loads. The first step in determining how DR may impact customer loads is to assess the power conversion and power use requirements of the equipment. For example, a power supply for a programmable controller, a motor, and a start/stop relay are examples of three electrically powered devices that have distinct differences in the way they utilize the voltage and current supplied by the power system. Each of these devices can have distinct differences in their respective sensitivity to electric power variations. The following paragraphs describe the most prevalent equipment types found in commercial and industrial facilities and overview the PQ sensitivity of these equipment types. Relays, Starters and Contactors These devices are typically found in the on/off control circuitry for most industrial processes as well as in the controls for HVAC systems, pumps, blowers and emergency stop circuits. The basic design concept is to energize a wire coil to magnetically change the state of (open or close) a set of contacts. The contacts act as the switch that turns off or on the device being controlled. The applied input voltage determines whether or not the coil will maintain enough magnetizing current to keep the contacts from changing state. Most coils can withstand steady state and momentary input voltage variations of plus/minus 20% of nominal. Depending on the design, these devices can withstand complete interruption in power for only one or two electrical cycles. For momentary voltage sags, the sensitivity of these devices can be distinctly different. Testing at the EPRI Power Quality test facility shows that the sag sensitivity of relays and contactors can range from units that are susceptible if the voltage sags to 85% of the system nominal to units that are only susceptible if the voltage sags below 40% of the system nominal. Information Technology Equipment (ITE) IT equipment includes personal computers, servers, routers, fax and copy machines, telephone switching equipment, and printers. These devices are prevalent in both industrial and commercial office space. All of the mentioned devices utilize some variation of the single-phase switch mode power supply SMPS for input power. The SMPS input has a bridge rectifier and capacitor as the primary power converter to convert the AC line voltage to DC for power distribution at lower or higher DC levels as required. IT equipment is generally will be relatively immune to any line to neutral and line to 4-1
End-Use Equipment susceptibility to Power Quality Variations
line transients up to about 1000 volts peak, but may suffer from lockup or trip outs if a peak detection circuit is used to sense input voltage. SMPS testing performed at the EPRI PEAC test facility indicates that these power supplies can withstand steady state input voltage variations of plus/minus 20% of nominal, can with stand variations of plus/minus 30% of nominal for a few seconds and can withstand complete interruption in power for one to thirty electrical cycles (depending on the loading condition and the size of the bulk storage capacitors used in the design. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) Programmable controllers are found in commercial and industrial process control settings ranging from elevators, to wastewater treatment, to automobile final assembly. The PLC is an industrial computer with capabilities to read input signals, make decisions based on a stored program and send corresponding signals to output devices. The power supply for the PLC is identical to that found in a computer (switch mode power supply), thus the electrical performance or susceptibility is similar. The PLC power supply will be relatively immune to any line to neutral and line to line transients up to about 1000 volts peak, but may suffer from lockup or trip outs if a peak detection circuit is used to sense input voltage. PLC testing performed at the EPRI PEAC test facility indicates that these power supplies can withstand steady state input voltage variations of plus/minus 20% of nominal, can withstand variations of plus/minus 30% of nominal for a few seconds and can withstand complete interruption in power for five to thirty electrical cycles. When evaluating PLC sag performance, it is important to look at more than just the power supply. Many PLC's monitor input voltage and will shut down if the voltage peak is reduced more that 20 percent below the nameplate specification. All of the devices controlled by the PLC input and output cards are potentially susceptible to voltage variations and most of them are at least as sensitive or more sensitive than the PLC power supply. Lighting Keeping the lights on is a personnel safety objective as well as a required PQ performance objective. It does no good to improve the PQ immunity of a process if the lights dont stay on. Therefore lighting and other process support aspects such as compressed air, heating, cooling, steam etc. are the primary objectives. The susceptibility of the lights to power variations is very different depending on the type of lighting used. The following discussion categorizes the lighting by the four most common lighting types and describes the PQ susceptibility of each type of light.
Incandescent Lighting: These are the most common of all lighting technologies. The bulb filament heats up and glows to illuminate the immediate area surrounding the bulb. The luminance of the filament is directly proportional to the voltage applied and even a 2 percent change in voltage is perceptible. This makes the incandescent lamp extremely sensitive to voltage flicker. In addition, these lights will prematurely fail if the steady state voltage exceeds 110 percent of the voltage rating of the bulb. Sensitivity to PQ variations are primarily flicker and overvoltage related. High Intensity Discharge (HID) Lighting: HID lighting includes both metal halide, as well as high and low pressure sodium lamps. The HID light is an arc discharge technology where a current arc is discharged across a gas filled tube very close to the peak voltage of every half cycle of the AC sinewave. A magnetic ballast controls the current discharge and the arc extinguishes close to the zero crossing of each half cycle. Once the tube is heated up, the arc will provide full light output but even a one half cycle drop in voltage to less than about 80 percent of the system nominal will cause the lamp to extinguish and a period of three to eight
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minutes of no light output will follow until the temperature and the pressure of the gas tube gets to a point where the arc discharge can resume. Sensitivity to PQ variations is primarily related to voltage sags and momentary interruptions where a nuisance dropout of the lights is the result.
Magnetic Ballasted Fluorescent: This type of lamp is the common four or eight foot fluorescent type where current is passed through a gas tube, rendering a luminance to the area surrounding the tube. These lamps will re-strike immediately following a sag or momentary interruption, thus the primary PQ concern with this light type is related to voltage flicker Electronic Ballasted Fluorescent: These lamps are identical to the magnetic ballasted fluorescents with the exception of the ballast type. The electronic ballast used in this type of lighting is very similar to a switch mode power supply and will restart immediately after a voltage sag or a momentary voltage interruption and can withstand steady state variations of plus/minus 15 or 20 percent. The primary PQ concern with this light type is related to voltage flicker and to transients above 5 or 6 hundred volts peak that can damage the ballast.
HVAC Equipment Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning equipment includes both single and three-phase products. Overall, the HVAC system is a process that includes a number of the elements described in this section such as relays, contactors, compressor motors, blower motors and so on. The primary PQ concerns can be correlated to the specific items described under each component description. Overall, the primary PQ concerns for HVAC systems are sensitivity to voltage sags, momentary voltage interruptions and voltage unbalance. Air Compressors Almost every industrial plant, from machine shops to pulp and paper mills have some type of compressed air system. Plant air compressor systems can vary in size from a small unit of 5 horsepower (hp) to systems with over 50,000 hp. Similar to keeping the lights on, compressed air is many times one of the critical support aspects required to keep process operations running, thus priority should be placed on immunizing the compressors to better withstand PQ variations. The compressor itself will be sensitive to voltage (and corresponding current unbalance) and will usually have a programmable trip setting that may be adjusted somewhat to improve PQ performance. In addition a processor or a control board (similar to a PLC) is used to monitor a number of inputs and make decisions based on the states of the various inputs. The PQ concerns for air compressors are sensitivity to voltage sags, momentary voltage interruptions and voltage unbalance Chillers Cooling water is another one of the critical support processes for many applications. A number of sub-components such as relay contactors, compressors, blower and so on will be integrated into the chiller system. This makes the chiller very susceptible to PQ variations. Similar to the air compressor, the PQ concerns for chillers are sensitivity to voltage sags, momentary voltage interruptions and voltage unbalance AC induction motors AC induction motors find uses in nearly every industrial and commercial facility and are said to be part of over 50% of the electric power utilization across throughout the world. The induction motor has no power supply, but uses an insulated wire wound around a steel core to magnetically induce rotation in the motor shaft. Overall, the induction motors PQ concern are primarily steady state related issues such as voltage unbalance, single-phasing, and steady state voltage requirements within plus/minus ten percent of the equipment nameplate. For voltage sags and momentary voltage interruptions, it is usually the 4-3
motor control circuit and the associated relays and contactors that cause any nuisance tripping problems. In fact, holding induction motors in for ten to twenty electrical cycles during voltage sags and even during momentary interruptions is a process design objective for many petrochemical facilities. To summarize the PQ concerns for induction motors, the AC induction motors are sensitive to voltage unbalance, single-phasing, and steady state over or undervoltage. PWM Variable Frequency Drives Pulse width modulated variable frequency drives comprise the majority of motor control applications. The basic PWM drive utilizes a three-phase bridge rectifier and capacitor to convert the input AC to a DC value equal to the peak voltage of the AC power source. The DC is then switched (or pulsed) to control the speed of an AC induction motor. Any time precision process control, variable motor speed or increased process efficiency is desirable, the PWM drive is likely to be found. The power supply for a PWM drive is essentially a three-phase switch mode power supply. There are a number of PQ concerns with PWM drives from both an emissions and an immunity standpoint,. Regarding emissions, the PWM drives generate harmonic currents and high frequency switching transients that in turn, propagate back into the electric power system. Regarding PQ immunity, EPRI PQ test facility results indicate that the PWM drive is sensitive to, over and undervoltages as well as to short duration sags, swells and momentary interruptions. Another common problem for these drives is that utility capacitor switching can cause nuisance tripping of the drive due to DC bus overvoltage conditions. There are differences in sensitivity levels dependent upon the manufacturer and the programmed setting of the drive. In addition the drive control circuit can sometimes be the weak link that causes process stoppage. To summarize the PQ concerns for AC variable frequency drives, they are sensitive to virtually all PQ variation when the voltage goes outside a plus/minus twenty percent window outside the drives nominal nameplate voltage rating. In addition, AC drives can generate transient noise and harmonic currents that propagate back into the power system. DC drives DC motor drives are used in a variety of commercial and industrial applications ranging from rolling mills to printing presses to elevators. The primary considerations for using DC drives center around those applications where there is a need for either high torque or precision speed control. In addition, with many mature processes, the designers and system integrators are much more comfortable and familiar with the use of DC motors and their attractive first costs of implementation. In terms of PQ performance, the DC drive presents a unique set of challenges that makes the technology one of the most difficult to protect against electrical variations. The most common version of the DC drive uses a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) converter type input power supply and a DC field winding power supply. Both of these sources must be able to ride-through electrical disturbances during normal operation as well as during regenerative operation. In addition, many DC drives use a second SCR package to dump energy back into the power system in order to quickly slow down, or perform what is commonly referred to as regenerative braking. Overall, each of the PQ concerns described for the AC variable frequency drive are also the same for the DC drive. The notable difference would be that the DC drive is usually a little more sensitive than a similarly sized AC drive. To summarize the PQ concerns for DC drives, they are sensitive to virtually all PQ variations when the voltage goes outside a plus/minus ten percent window outside the drives nominal nameplate voltage rating. In addition, DC drives can generate transient noise and harmonic currents that propagate back into the power system.
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Sensor Control Units Sensor control units are the power sources and watchdog or monitoring circuits for various process parameters such as gas flow sensors, flame detectors, pressure transducers, optical sensors and so on. The control unit usually supplies the power to the sensors, thus the PQ concerns are usually related to the control unit susceptibility to voltage variations. Most of these control units are immune to steady state PQ variations of plus/minus 20 percent and are immune to voltage sags and swells of plus/minus 30 percent of the nominal nameplate voltage. Some units can withstand greater variations, but EPRI PQ test facility characterizations indicate that the sensitivity thresholds vary with different manufacturers. Resistance Heating and Drying Many processes contain resistance heaters or dryers as a component of the process. Examples include laser printers, copiers, aluminum melting and so on. There are usually not to many immunity PQ concerns with the resistance process, but the control circuitry may contain relays and contactors that have extreme sensitivity to sags and momentary interruptions. Overall the resistance elements are not in need of power conditioning thus the major challenge is separating this typically large portion of the electrical load from the more sensitive portions of the process. Occasionally when more precise temperature control is required, the heating components will be controlled by silicon controlled rectifiers or other semi conductor control devices. When these control devices are used, harmonic emissions back into the power system can become a concern.
Equipment Susceptibility Test Results

The previous section provided a brief summary of EPRI sponsored equipment testing accomplished over the past ten years. These test projects are commonly referred to as System Compatibility Research Testing and EPRI has a substantial database of information on how differing types of equipment is affected by voltage variations. There are well over 500 individual device test results in more than twenty different equipment categories. The results of these tests provide a useful means of comparing the different devices and their sensitivities to PQ variations and enable a ranking that can be used as a checklist to determine how sensitive a given facility will be to PQ variations based on the types of equipment and processes found in the facility. The following table summarizes the results of the equipment testing performed at the EPRI PEAC PQ test facility or by EPRI PEAC staff in some facility PQ site audits.
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End-Use Equipment susceptibility to Power Quality Variations Table 4-1 Typical Equipment and Indication of Sensitivity to Various Disturbance Types
Equipment Category
AC PWM Adjustable Speed Drive DC Adjustable Speed Drive CNC Machine Personal Computers PC's Programmable Logic Controllers AC Relays (ice cube) AC Contactors (master control) Motor Starters (NEMA size 00 to 5) DC Contactors Fax Machine Metal Halide Lighting High Pressure Sodium Lighting Telecom Switching Equipment Electronic Ballast Fluorescent Lamp Magnetic Ballast Fluorescent Lamp AC Induction Motor Air Compressors Chillers HVAC Systems Resistance Heating and Drying Sensor Controllers Incandescent Lighting
Sags Swells Sags and Swells and Interruption Votlage or Transients Transients Transients Interruption Duration Duration Undervoltage 0vervoltage Voltage Voltage Duration < 3 Duration >3 Current Capacitor Lightning Load Duration > 3 Duration >3 Imbalance Notching <3 <3 Seconds seconds Harmonics Switching Related Switching Seconds seconds Seconds Seconds 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 - Indicates little or no sensitivity 1 - Indicates that some models will be sensitive 2 - Indicates majority of models will be sensitive 3 - Indicates the device generates the event
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Positive and Negative PQ Impacts of Installed DR

Installation of distributed generation has the potential to impact the sensitivity of customer load equipment in both positive and negative ways. Previous EPRI reports have discussed primarily the negative impacts of DR when proper considerations are not made prior to and during the DR installation. In this section we overview the both the positive and the negative impacts. To follow this up, section five of this report will describe procedures and methodologies that can be used during the application of DR to improve overall equipment performance in the presence of PQ variations. Transients Based on the information shown in Table 4-1, it is clear that transients and in particular lightning related surge events are a concern for nearly every category of commercial and industrial equipment. In fact, the DR device itself should be concerned about possible damage due to lightning related surge events. The installation of DR will not do anything to increase the likelihood of these events occurring at a facility, however since the interconnection hardware is typically designed with some type of transient mitigation or surge protection built in, the connected loads will benefit from this inherent surge protection as well. In the case of lightning related transients propagating into the facility on the power conductors, installation of DR can have a positive impact on the load equipment. For capacitor switching and load switching transients, the installed DR will not have either a positive or a negative impact Short Duration Variations Table 4-1 indicates that short duration variations such as voltage sags and momentary interruptions are detrimental to the performance of most customer load equipment. Overall, the installation of DR is not expected to resolve problems with short duration PQ events, however there could be a 10 to 20 percent improvement in voltage sag mitigation if a properly sized DR device is installed. More detail on how this improvement may be accomplished is supplied in Chapter 5. As far as voltage swells and momentary interruptions, if the DR is installed properly with attention to proper grounding methods, the DR will have minimal impact either positively or negatively on these variations. Long Duration Variations For long duration variations such as steady state low and high voltage, installed DR can potentially have positive or negative impacts depending upon the specific feeder type, the electrical installation configuration and whether or not steady state voltage regulation was an objective of the engineering analysis for the installation. The prior discussions on equipment susceptibility clearly indicate that equipment operated at a level very close to the nominal nameplate rating is less susceptible to PQ variations. In fact, installing DR in a manner that provides the facility with steady state voltage at or close to the equipment nameplate voltage is an excellent way to gain added PQ value from a DR installation project. More detail on how this improvement may be accomplished is supplied in Chapter 5. Voltage Unbalance Table 4-1 indicates that most three-phase motor controlled devices are highly sensitive to voltage unbalance, in fact more than a one percent unbalance on a three phase system warrants de-rating of any type of motor driven system and a five percent unbalance requires some type of remedial action before the motor can be operated. Installed DR may be able to remedy some load induced voltage unbalance and there are some unique configuration options to support critical load with DR that could be beneficial. Any unbalance of the utility 4-7
source is likely to make the DR more prone to tripping off line during single-phase PQ variations, therefore the engineering analysis for the DR installation should take voltage unbalance into consideration. Waveform Distortion Table 4-1 indicates that the majority of load equipment is not overly sensitive to harmonic voltage distortion, and in many cases, the rectifier power supply based load equipment is actually a harmonic current generation source. While harmonic distortion of the voltage and current is not a major performance factor for most facility loads, it is generally understood that minimizing voltage distortion of the facility bus is a good design objective and will reduce the possibilities of heating related problems for the electric power system components. Reducing distortion levels will also minimize the potential for fuse blowing and nuisance trip related problems with facility loads. Installed DR can increase the level of voltage distortion of a facility if a low quality inverter is used to support the equipment in an isolated mode, or is used to grid connect. Alternatively if the DR is configured to provide harmonic current for some of the facilities harmonic generating loads, the voltage distortion on the facility bus can be decreased. Voltage Fluctuations Table 4-1 indicates that many of the lighting technologies used in industrial and commercial facilities can produce light flicker in the presence of voltage fluctuations. While flicker has been a documented concern with some early installations of DR it is unlikely that applications close to facilities and facility loads will results in notable flicker problems. Frequency Variations Variations in the 60Hz power frequency are not common, however, there is a requirement that installed DR devices have the ability to synchronize with and follow the grid frequency during transitions from non-grid tie to grid tie mode. Unsynchronized transfers can result in nuisance tripping of controlled rectifier power supplies and may even result in fuse blowing or rectifier power supply damage. Beyond the grid synchronization requirement, it is unlikely that frequency variation problems will result through the application of DR devices.
End-User Power Conditioning Solutions

Facilities with a need for high reliability and PQ usually have a back up generator. In addition they may also apply one or both of the following:
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) Improving load ride-through
Various options for redundancy are available for each of these. Well discuss each of these in addition to other local options for increasing the availability of end-use equipment. Uninterruptible Power Supplies The UPS provides short-duration energy storage to enable equipment to ride through shortduration disturbances such as voltage sags and momentary interruptions (and also voltage swells 4-8
and switching surges). UPSs may also clean up the voltage waveform, provide isolation from voltage flicker, and supply more tightly regulated voltage. UPS systems cost on the order of $300 to $600 per kVA (systems smaller than 100 kW or complicated redundant systems can go much higher). Figure 4-1 shows several configurations of UPS, including various redundancy options. The double-conversion UPS provides the best quality voltage to the critical load. During normal operation, all power to the load goes through the rectifier to the DC bus then is converted back to AC. In the line-interactive UPS, the input goes directly to the critical load, but when the input has a disturbance, a static switch opens, and the batteries provide power to the load. In addition to the configurations shown in , several other UPS options are available. Instead of batteries, ultracapacitors or superconducting coils can supply the stored energy. Rotating UPSs, another possibility, have long provided isolation and ride-through for critical loads. Redundancy provides better overall reliability to the load, accounting for normal maintenance on the UPS and failures of the UPS system. The simplest form of redundancy on a doubleconversion UPS is a static bypass: when the UPS fails, a static switch quickly closes to supply the load from the power system. Although not shown on the diagram, often a separate manual or mechanical bypass is supplied in all of the configurations in Table 4-1 to allow maintenance.
Figure 4-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply Configurations
In many configurations, UPSs are the final defense against disturbances, so their reliability is important, but limited independent data is available. Table 4-2 shows data from manufacturers and one independent source on the failure rates of UPSs. Care must be taken when evaluating vendor claims of reliability. Many vendors site the MTBF as the failure to the critical loadon systems with a static bypass, this is not necessarily a reflection of the UPS module performancethe static bypass used the power system to provide power when the UPS was unavailable. Maintenance is not included in the availability numbers. Normal maintenance requires something like 8 hours of downtime per year. This significantly reduces the availability numbers8 hours of downtime translates to 99.91% availability just for maintenance. The repair time following a 4-9
failure varies widely, depending on the type of failure, how quickly the failure is identified, how available are spare parts, and what type of service arrangements are available. Individual hardware failures are not the only concern. With reliable hardware, and especially in redundant configurations, other failure modes not included in these numbers are important to consider:
Human error: Loss of critical loads from human error is a significant portion of failures in redundant configurations. Switching mistakes, incorrect installation, poor choice of settings, failure to perform maintenance, and failure to test systems properly can all lead to outright failure or introduction of hidden failure modes that show up later. Common-mode failures: If redundant UPSs share common designs or controls or batteries or even if they are physically very close, simultaneous failures can wipe out much of the theoretical reliability improvement that redundancy provides. We can take some steps to avoid common-mode failuresmake sure redundant UPSs are independent (possibly even using different manufacturers), dont perform maintenance during stormy weather (we are much more likely to get utility system disturbances during storms), keep adequate physical separation between systems, and test systems periodically. Interaction with other equipment: Batteries are a major source of trouble with UPSs. If batteries are not maintained and replaced as appropriate, they may not have enough reserve to allow the UPS to ride through interruptions as designed. Another common failure mode for critical load is that the UPS excessively switches to batteries. Excessive switching can prematurely wear batteries, so they dont work when really needed. A UPS may use the batteries excessively because of excess harmonics or noise on the input supply.
Accounting for these types of failures is very difficult in a reliability analysis. There is little data to quantify these effects.
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End-Use Equipment susceptibility to Power Quality Variations Table 4-2 Reliability of Uninterruptible Power Supplies1216 MTBF (Years) 84.44 3.13 5.71 11 5 Hours out per 10 years 103.79 19.16
Source Briggs, 1998 MGE, 1999 Liebert (wed site info) Solidstate Controls (web site info) Exide Electronics, 1997
Availability 99.8815% 99.9781%
In redundant UPS configurations, the static switch plays a prominent role. Table 4-3 shows some data on the reliability of static switches. Fortunately, they appear to be quite reliable, with mean time between failures of several times that of a UPS system.
Table 4-3 Reliability of Static Switches16 Failure Rate (Events Per Year) 0.00206 0.00769 0.00368 Mean Time Between Failures (Years) 485.8 130.0 271.7
Rating 600A 600-1000A >1000A
Improving Load Ride-Through One option that is often viable for improving the quality is improving the ride-through of sensitive equipment. The equipment costs are often lowestthe trick is finding the sensitive equipment. Three main techniques improve load ride-through:
Add a local ride-through deviceUse anything from a full-blown UPS to less expensive compensation devices.
12 S. J. Briggs, M. J. Bartos, and R. G. Arno, Reliability and Availability Assessment of Electrical and Mechanical Systems, in IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 138796, Nov./Dec. 1998. 13 MGE UPS Systems, UPS Topologies and Standards, available at http://www.mgeups.com/techinfo/ techpap/articles/0248-e.pdf. 14 Liebert, The Advantages of 6-Step Inverters for Large UPS Systems, white paper, available at http://www.liebert.com/support/whitepapers/documents/sl_24240.asp. 15 Solid State Controls, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Data Analysis of UPS, white paper, available at http://www.solidstatecontrolsinc.com/techhpapers/papers/mtbf.html. 16 Exide Electronics, Powerware Plus Parallel Redundant System, white paper, April 1997, available at http://www.powerware.com/pdf/9315/tech_papers/pr-paper.pdf.
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Change settings/programmingSome devices have settings that can be changed, which will improve their ride-through. Specify ride-through during equipment purchaseThis is the approach semiconductor 17 manufacturers have pushed with the development of the SEMI F47 standard, which specifies a test that semiconductor tools must pass.
Table 4-4 provides information on load ride-through devices. Load ride through is a very good solution for many facilities. Some of the devices are specific (such as the contactor hold-in devices for use with relays and contactors); others are more general. In an existing process in a facility, identifying the weak links is tricky. Testing with a voltage sag generator can identify the performance of individual devices and help locate ride-through equipment. Utilities and end-use facilities should push to improving the ride-through of equipment. Standards such as SEMI F47 are a move in the right direction. Establishing testable quality levels (either those defined in this report or other definitions) helps push manufacturers in the direction of providing more built in ride-through (with proper design, manufacturers can design extra ridethrough will little extra cost in many cases).
Table 4-4 Various Load Ride-Through Devices Typical Mitigation Level Low Voltage/ Panel/Branch Circuit Level Typical Cost (U.S. $) Typical Size
Generic Name
Device Model Names
LV Static Series Compensation
-Dynamic Sag Corrector (Dysc) -Sag Ride Through Device (SRT) -Reactivar Electronic Sag Protector (ESP)
$150-$300/kVA
20 kVA to 500 kVA
http://www.softswitch.com/ http://www.ch.cutler-hammer.com/surge/products/srt.html Battery-Less RideThrough Device -Constant Voltage Transformer -Dip Proofing Inverter -Mini Dynamic Sag Corrector http://www.sola-hevi-duty.com/ http://www.dipproof.com/ Contactor Hold-In Circuit -Coil Lock -KnowTrip Contactors $50-$100 per unit Contactor Coil Low Voltage Equipment Control Level $200-$600/kVA 75 VA to 3 KVA
http://www.scrcontrols.com/Knowtrip/ http://pqsi.com
17 SEMI F47-0200, Specification for Semiconductor Processing Equipment Voltage Sag Immunity, Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, 2000.
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Power Conditioning Performance and Costs Table 4-5 summarizes some of the data for power conditioning equipment described in this chapter for use in a reliability and availability analysis. Where possible, use site-specific information instead of the general information in the table.
Table 4-5 Default Facility Performance and Costs for Reliability and Availability Analysis Cost Year 2000 (US Dollars) $700 per kVA $100 per kVA $800 per kVA $800 per kVA plus fuel costs
Power Conditioning Equipment Uninterruptible power supply Static switch Backup generators Online generators
Performance MTBF=5 years Availability=99.8% MTBF=100 years Starting reliability=99% Availability=99% Availability=95%
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5
GUIDELINES FOR POWER QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
The previous chapters provide a background on likely PQ and reliability impacts of DR, both positive and negative. This chapter will provide assessment procedures for the areas where DR potential impacts are expected to be significant. Four assessment procedures are provided including:
Reliability/Availability Assessment Procedure Long Duration Variation (Voltage Regulation) Assessment Procedure Short Duration Variations (Sag) Assessment Procedure Short Duration Variations (Swell) Assessment Procedure
Each procedure contains a section providing background on the topic, with an assessment methodology and procedure, followed by illustrative examples. In some cases step by step screening methods are provided. These will enable utility personnel and system integrators to assess potential impacts of DR on local power systems and the connected end-use equipment before it is installed.
Reliability Assessment Procedure

Background This procedure is based on the IEEE Gold Book, which has been accepted as a recommend practice for industrial and commercial power systems by IEEE. The methodology has been modified to include both PQ-related equipment failures and outage-related failures. Therefore the varying susceptibility of different end-use equipment is considered in the analysis. Unavailability is calculated using a network reduction method, which is analysis of series/parallel combinations of elements, rather than the more academic minimum cut-set theory described in the IEEE Gold Book. The method assumes series and parallel structures can be reduced to equivalent components with predicted failure rates and average repair times. In this method the equivalent component failure rates and repair times are calculated for various power sources and are then combined with the interconnecting circuit elements. This is a somewhat more intuitive approach than the cut-set theory and requires a good understanding of the electrical oneline diagram and of how the power system is operated. It allows for reliability estimates where no failure data is available. The goal is to provide a method that incorporates the most important aspects of redundant systems, while at the same time keeping is simple and 5-1
Guidelines for Power Quality and Reliability Assessment
not defeated by minor missing data. The basic approach is to reduce complex systems using series and parallel combinations of elements. Data Needed for Assessment Data needed for quantitative evaluations of system reliability depend to some extent on the nature of the system being studied and the detail of the study. In general, however, data on the performance of individual components, times to repair together with the times required to perform various switching operations, are required. System component data are:
Failure rates (forced outage rates) associated with different modes of component failure Expected (average) time to repair or replace failed component Scheduled (maintenance) outage rate of component Expected (average) duration of a scheduled outage event
If possible, component data should be based on historical performance of components in the same environment as those in the proposed system being studied. For example the reliability surveys conducted by the IEEE provide an excellent source of component data when such specific data is not available. Some of this data may be obtained from Chapter 3 of IEEE Std 493-1997. For feeder performance it is always better to use actual data rather than average, e.g. use local utility statistics on a feeder rather an average for similar feeders from the EPRI DPQ study. Also, switching times should be estimated for the system being studied based on experience, engineering judgment, and anticipated operating practices. Switching time data generally required includes the following:
Expected times to open and close a circuit breaker Expected times to open and close a disconnect or throw-over switch Expected time to replace a fuse link Expected times to perform such emergency operations as cutting in clear, installing jumpers, etc. Expected times to transition a DR from one operating mode to another.
Procedure The network reduction method is believed to be particularly well suited for electric power distribution systems as found in industrial plants and commercial buildings. The method is systematic and straightforward and lends itself to either manual or computer computation. An important feature of the method is that system weak points can be readily identified, both numerically and non-numerically, thereby focusing design attention on those sections of the system that contribute most to service unreliability.
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The procedure for system reliability evaluation is outlined as follows: 1. Assess the service reliability requirements of the loads and processes that are to be supplied and determine appropriate service interruption definition or definitions. 2. Perform a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which consists of identifying and listing those component failures and combinations of component failures that result in service interruptions and that constitute minimal cut-sets of the system. 3. Compute interruption frequency contributions and expected interruption durations, for combinations of series and parallel elements to the system availability. Combine the results for different power sources with local bus work, cables, transformers, and other equipment to find the overall reliability to the critical load. Step 1. Define a Service Interruption The first step in any electric power system reliability study should be a careful assessment of the power supply quality (e.g., sags, surges, harmonics, etc.) and power continuity (momentary interruptions and outages). A further key step is to relate the quality and reliability to requirements of the loads that are to be served. This assessment should be summarized and expressed in a definition of equipment interruption that can be used in the succeeding steps of the reliability evaluation procedure. This equipment interruption definition specifies, in general, the reduced voltage level (voltage sag) together with the minimum duration of such reduced voltage period that results in substantial degradation or complete loss of function of the load or process being served. This definition will depend on the susceptibility of equipment and the type of process that requires reliability Frequently, reliability studies are conducted on a continuity basis, in which case, interruption definitions reduce to a minimum duration specification with voltage assumed to be zero during the interruption. Step 2. Conduct a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) The FMEA for power distribution systems amounts to determining and listing those component outage events, or combinations of component outages, that result in reduced quality or interruption of power service at the load point being studied, and according to the equipment interruption definition that has been adopted in step 1. This analysis must be made in consideration of the different types and modes of outages that components may exhibit and the reaction of the systems protection scheme to these events. Component outages are categorized as follows:
Forced outages or failures Scheduled or maintenance outages Overload outages
5-3
Forced outages or failures are either permanent forced outages or transient forced outages. Permanent forced outages require repair or replacement of the failed component before it can be restored to service; transient forced outages imply no permanent damage to the component, thus permitting its restoration to service by a simple reclosing or refusing operation. Additionally, component failures can be categorized by physical mode or type of failure. Each will produce a varying impact on system performance. This type of failure categorization is important for series connected circuit breakers, other switching devices or for back up generation, where many failure modes are possible, such as:
Fails to trip when required Trips falsely Fails to reclose when required Fails to start Fails to sync and transition
The primary result of the FMEA, as far as quantitative reliability evaluation is concerned, is the list of critical series and parallel combination of elements that will serve the load. This is the set of elements that define a service point. These can usually be determined by inspection of a oneline electrical diagram that has been updated to reflect as build conditions. For series elements any single element can cause a failure and for parallel elements only the overlapping failure result in loss of service, according to the interruption definition adopted. Series components can be dependent or independent and do not necessarily have to be connected as long as a failure of the series component constitutes a system failure. More details on this method are provided in chapter 8 of the IEEE Gold Book. An important non-quantitative benefit of FMEA is the thorough and systematic thought process and investigation it requires. Often weak points in system design will be identified before any quantitative reliability calculations. Thus, the FMEA is a useful reliability design tool even in the absence of the data needed for quantitative evaluation. Step 3. Calculate the Overall Service Availability Using the results of the FEMA in step 2, series and parallel combinations of components need to be reduced to an equivalent. Series elements can be combined as:
S = 1 + 2 + L + n
U S = U1 + U 2 + L + U n = 1r1 + 2 r2 + L + n rn
rS = US
Eq. 5-1 Eq. 5-2
Eq. 5-3
Where,
5-4
: failure rate, normally in interruptions per year

U : unavailability (total interruption time), normally in per unit, percent, or hours or minutes per year r : average repair time per failure normally in per unit per year, percent per year, or hours or minutes The subscript S is the total of the series combination and the subscripts 1, 2, n indicate the parameters of the individual elements. Parallel elements can be combined with:
P =
UP rp
Eq. 5-4
U P = U1 U 2 L U n = 1 2 L n r1 r2 L rn rP = 1 1 / r1 + 1 / r2 + L + 1 / rn
Eq. 5-5
Eq. 5-6
for n=2,
P =
UP = 1U 2 + 2U1 = 12 ( r1 + r2 ) rp
Eq. 5-7
The subscript P is the total of the parallel combination. Note that the units must be kept the same: has units of 1/years, so the repair time, r, must be in units of years. Normally, this means dividing r by 8760 if r is in hours. Also note that the above equations are approximations that are valid only if the unavailability time is much less than the time of interest. IEEE recommends a criterion that component unavailability of all series and parallel is less than 1% of the per-unit time, e.g. the annual time unavailable/8760 is less than .01. This is criterion is generally true in distribution reliability applications, and more so for high-reliability applications. A more likely source of error is the assumption of independent sources used in the equations representing parallel combination of elements. In real-life electric supplies multiple feeders are very seldom totally independent sources. A good illustration of this problem can be seen in the reliability data for utility supply found in from survey results and published in the IEEE Gold Book. The average reliability of single-circuit supplies in the Gold Book has the following failure rate and repair time:
= 1.956 failures/year
r = 79 minutes
5-5
If a system were supplied with two parallel sources with the above failure-rate characteristics, one would expect the following failure rates according to the ideal equations:
P = (1.956)(1.956)(79+79)/525600 = 0.00115 failures/year

r = 1/(1/79 + 1/79) = 39.5 minutes The actual surveyed reliability of circuits with multiple supplies is:
= 0.538 failures/year
r = 22 minutes The failure rates when using multiple circuits or feeders are reduced, but they are typically several orders of magnitude lower than the predicted value. The reason the calculations are wrong is that the equations assume that the failures are totally independent. In reality, many failures have some dependencies. The major factors are:
Facilities share common space (utilities run two circuits on one structure). Separate supplies contain a common point upstream. Failures bunch together or overlap during storms. Maintenance must be considered. Hidden failures can be present.
Also, parallel supplies in many cases contain endpoint equipment that is not paralleled, which can include transformers, bus work, breakers, and cables. It is possible to analytically model each of these effects. The problem is that much of the necessary input data is unknown, so educated guesses are needed. For example, to analytically handle storm failures, one needs to find a storm failure rate and the duration of storms (both of these numbers are hard to come by). Accounting for Dependency Factors Two of the major error factors, common-mode and hidden failures, can be accounted for by including a correction factor in the reliability calculation. This factor, m, includes utility experience and intends to account for the common-mode failures, hidden failures, and the overlapping failures due to storms. More comprehensive methods are available, however this simplified approach is warranted because increased accuracy requires better input data, that is usually not available. The m factor is applied as follows:
P =
UP = 1U 2 + 2U1 = 1 (2 r2 + m21 ) + 2 ( 1r1 + m12 ) # rp
Eq. 5-8
The term with m2-1 should really be
just be assumed as part of m2-1
1[2 r2 + (1 2 r2 )m21 ] . The term (1 2 r2 ) is very close to one and can , which makes it reduce to 1 ( 2 r2 + m21 ) . The same is true of the m term.
2-1
5-6
m1-2 is the percentage of time that component 2 fails when component 1 fails. If m=0, then the equation becomes the theoretical equations, which assume that the failures are independent. The repair time rP is estimated as the minimum r1 and r2. Maintenance is included with the individual failure rates and repair times. This is a conservative approach because failure rates can also be reduced by preventative maintenance. The procedure for this calculation is: 1. Find an equivalent of the utility system using parallel and series combinations. 2. Find an equivalent of local sources. 3. Find an equivalent of utility and local sources together. 4. Merge the equivalent source with local bus work, cables, transformers, and other equipment to find the overall reliability to the critical load. Within the utility system (item 1) and within the local system (item 2) there may be interdependencies (accounted for by the m factor), but the utility and local system should not have many interdependencies between them. Make sure to account for loading when combining sources in step 3. For example, if a system has three utility feeds each with unavailability U1, U2, and U3, and two of them must be in service to supply the load, the overall unavailability is U1U2+U2U3+U1U3. The total would be U1U2U3 if each supply could handle the entire load. If each of the three supplies has an unavailability of 0.01, then with two required to support the load, the overall unavailability, is 310-4, whereas if -6 one supply can support the load, the unavailability is 10 . This approach can be used to analyze the reliability, availability, and quality to most customers. The customer-side sources can also be handled with this approach. Most utility feeders can be modeled in this fashionutility distribution feeders are generally radial or fairly simple looped systems that can be handled with this approach. An exception might be grid network systems where there are many redundant paths, and the interdependencies might be complicated. Largerscale transmission systems would also be difficult to model with this approach for the same reason. Specific systems might warrant a more detailed model than is provided by this approach (for example to optimize out certain interdependencies), but for the purposes of this report, it is sufficient. Examples Case 1: Long- and Short-Duration Events Calcuation Consider the example in Figure 5-1 with two primary utility feeds, a backup generator, and a UPS. Each of the power sources is assumed able to power the entire load. The first calculation only evaluates the reliability for long-term interruptions, of five minutes or longer. In this case 5-7
Utility with primary
a = 2/year
b = 1/year
the contribution of the UPS is not included. Also, for now, the local transformer, bus work, and cables will be ignored.
Figure 5-1 Example System for Reliability Calculations
To use equation 5-8 some educated guesses are required for the m factor. For the two utility feeds, it is likely that there will be a fairly significant portion of events that affect both circuits, so we will take m1-2 = m2-1 = 0.05. This factor mainly includes the possibility of upstream failures (probably on the sub-transmission), simultaneous faults due to overlapping equipment, and failures bunched together during storms. Hidden failures are not expected. And there shouldnt be much correlation between the utility feeders and the local generation, so we will take all m factors between the generator and the utility to be zero. The reliability of the utility portion can be found with:
12 = 1 ( 2 r2 + m2 1 ) + 2 (1 r1 + m1 2 )
4 hours 4 hours = (2 / year )1 / year + 0.05 + (1 / year ) 2 / year + 0.05 8760 8760 = 0.1518 / year
Eq. 5-9
Note that the m factor dominates the equation (even if m=0.005). For simplification, we will assume that r12= 4 hours. The generator requires a different calculation because the backup generator is not operated very much. The factor m will primarily be hidden failures (what percentage of the time will the generator fail to start properly when the utility fails?). We will assume m=0.1. To find the overall failure rate with the generator, we multiply the failure rate of the utility system by the unavailability time of the generator. The unavailability time of the generator includes the time out for maintenance and the hidden failures (m). Also note that the failure rate and repair time for the backup generator (g and rg) are actually its maintenance frequency and duration. It doesnt 5-8
make sense to use the second term, which would be g(12r12+m12-g), because the generator is not continuously running, therefore the calculation is:
12 g = 12 ( g rg + mg 12 )
6 hours = (0.1518 / year ) 2 / year + 0.1 8760 = 0.01539 / year
Eq. 5-10
This yields a MTBF of almost 65 years, and five nines of availability (making the simplified assumption that r12g=4 hours). This result is good reliability, but it is nowhere near the MTBF that would be calculated using ideal equations assuming independence. A second reliability calculation now includes the shorter-duration events. If the previous example is extended to analyze short duration events (including sags and momentary interruptions), some modifications to the analysis will be needed. The following assumptions will be used:
All short duration disturbances originate on the utility system. The repair times for all such disturbances are zero (ignore overlapping events). The generator can be ignored, because it wont start immediately.
1 = 20 events/year, 2 = 10 events/year.
The UPS is repaired 4 times per year 3 hours each time. The UPS has a failure rate of 0.5% annually.
The primary-selective scheme is a mechanical scheme that will transfer only for long-duration interruptions. Therefore, the PQ events that get through will be those on the currently connected feeder. Because we may not know, which that is, we will take the average of the two feeder failure rates. Without the UPS, this would be the failure rate: 12 = (1 + 2)/2 = 15/year. The UPS requires special handling. The UPS is in series, so if a UPS failure occurs, the load will have a failure (this was not included in the previous example because it was assumed that the failed UPS could be bypassed). The m mainly reflects the possibility of hidden failures. An offline UPS could have hidden failures. The mu-12 is assumed to be 0.001. The overall failure rate is:
12u = u + 12 (u:m ru:m + mu 12 )

3 hours = 0.005 / year + (15 / year) 4 / year + 0.001 8760 = 0.0405 / year
Eq. 5-11
Roughly half of these are due to maintenance, and half are due to hidden failures, e.g. failure of the UPS to properly correct the disturbance. The frequency and repair time of the UPS indicated by u:m and ru:m are UPS maintenance (load interruptions may occur if the utility PQ disturbances
5-9
happen when the UPS is bypassed for maintenance). This failure rate for short duration disturbances is added to the failure rate long duration events, calculated previously to get:
u L1 = 12u + 12u L 4 = 0.0405 / year + 0.01539 / year = 0.0559 / year

This is a MTBF of almost 18 years.
Eq. 5-12
Voltage Regulation Assessment Procedure

Distributed resources can influence the voltage regulation of electric power systems. This influence will occur whether or not a DR is regulating voltage or whether it is operating in a voltage following mode. This is because any device that influences the flow of power on the distribution system will have an impact on voltage drops occurring across impedances in the system, and this will result in changes in voltage at various points on the system. These changes may be significant if the generator relatively large compared to the power system at the point of application. Effect also depends on the way in which the generator is operated/controlled, and the nature of the upstream voltage-regulation equipment (such as load tap changer [LTC] transformers, line voltage regulators, and switched capacitors). DR can provide support of voltage. It can also lead to high or low voltages that are outside the required normal operating range. Background Power distribution systems are mainly limited in their capacity to serve a given load by, either thermal limits or voltage-drop limits. When a system is said to be thermally limited, it means that as loading on the system increases, the lines and equipment (such as transformers) will reach their maximum allowable temperature before the voltage drop on the system causes the voltage to deviate outside the acceptable operating range. Thermal limits are determined by factors such as annealing temperature or sag clearance limit for overhead conductors or the temperature rise limits of insulation in cables and transformers where significant loss of life or damage may occur. Most urban distribution circuits or shorter suburban circuits are thermal rather than voltage limited due to the relatively short feeder lengths and correspondingly smaller voltage drops on such systems. When a system is voltage-drop limited, it means that as loading increases, the voltage eventually deviates outside of the normal range before the thermal limits of the conductors or other equipment are reached. Voltage limits are defined as the loading level at which the voltage deviates outside the ANSI C84.1 Range A limits. In contrast, many rural distribution circuits are voltage-drop limited because they have long feeders with considerable voltage drop. Several screening modules were presented in EPRIs Engineering Guide for Integration of Distributed Generation and Storage Into Power Distribution Systems (1000419). These describe basic checks to determine whether either a thermal or voltage limit is likely to be exceeded in any DR application. This is done through various aggregate capacity checks, stiffness ratio tests, comparison of DR output to existing load on the system, and other tests. A DR application that 5-10
passes the screening should generally not cause a problem with either a voltage or a thermal limit. It should be noted that, unlike the typical case of loads on a distribution system, which lead to line-voltage drop, DR has the potential to raise voltage by injecting power back into the system. So the screening tests must address high-voltage concerns (voltage-rise limits) as well as low-voltage concerns (voltage-drop limits) caused by DR. Procedure This screening provides a tool to check distributed generation (DR) installations for characteristics that are known to impact voltage regulation or interact with voltage-regulating equipment. It should not be considered foolproof and is most certainly not a substitute for a load flow study. To determine whether distributed generation-caused voltage-regulation problems may result from the installation under consideration, navigate the flowchart in Figure 5-2. A result of Pass indicates that the installation does not possess any typical characteristics that can lead to voltage-regulation problems. However, it is possible that regulation problems may still occur. The decision to conduct a further system study is based on the presence of one or more system characteristics that suggest voltage-regulation problems may result if the proposed generations system is placed into operation. In preparation for using the flowchart, the following steps should be taken:
Sketch a one-line diagram of the distribution feeder where the DR is to be placed. Note on the one-line diagram:
Location of all regulating devices and of the DR Location of the PCC for the DR as defined by IEEE 519
At the PCC, determine:
Available fault current Typical per-unit voltage levels

Determine rated output current of the DR. Determine peak load current at nearest source-side regulating device.
5-11
Figure 5-2 Screening Module and Tests for DR Impact on Voltage Regulation
5-12
Example Case 1: Food Processing Plant A food-processing plant wishes to install a gas turbine synchronous generator to provide process heat for its facility. Because the electric demand of the plant is small with respect to the process heat requirements, the plant plans to sell excess electrical energy back to the power provider. The generator is capable of producing 1 MW of power at 0.95 power factor. Following the preparation steps outlined above for using the flowchart, a one-line diagram is developed and detailed as shown in Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-3 Detailed One-Line Diagram of Feeder Serving Food-Processing Plant
In the diagram, note that there are two regulating devices, the load tap changer (LTC) associated with the substation transformer and the line-voltage regulator (VR) on Feeder B. Because the VR is obviously the closest regulating device, peak load current for the device was determined and placed on the diagram. The three-phase short-circuit current (I SC_PCC) at the point of common coupling was determined from computer modeling or manual calculation based on line impedance and available fault MVA at the substation. The DR rated output current (I DR) must be determined based on the distribution system line voltage VLL_DIST, which may be determined based on generator nameplate data and then scaled based on the secondary (Vs) to primary (Vp) voltage ratings of the DR transformer, as shown in the following equation.
Vs I DG = I DG _ Rated Vp
Eq. 5-13
For this example, I DR was determined based on the rated power and power factor information given using the following equation.
I DG =
Generator Power Generator Power Factor 3 VLL _ DIST
1,000,000 0.95 3 12,470
= 48.7 Amps
Eq. 5-14
5-13
Referring back to Table 5-2, in the first decision after Start, the I SC_PCC/ I DR ratio is 64.8, which fails the first test but passes the following test. Because the generator will be providing power to the system, the positive response to block 3 leads the engineer to block 6, requiring a determination of typical voltage levels at the PCC. Ideally, this data should come from monitoring. However, in the absence of monitored data, field measurements and load-flow analysis should provide a good estimate of typical voltage levels at the PCC. Assuming that the typical PCC voltage levels are less than 1.04 per unit, the next test (block 7) asks whether the generator is between the regulator and the line drop compensator load center point. This is the point on the distribution system on the load side of the regulator at which the compensator settings are calculated to deliver a specified voltage for a specified load current (typically peak load current) at the regulator. Because the generator is located between the regulator and the load center, there is a chance that low voltage could occur as a result of the generator interacting with regulator compensation settings. To test for this possibility, in block 8 a comparison is made between the DR output (I DR = 48.7 A.) and 5% of the peak current at the regulator (5% I VR_Peak = 0.05189 A = 9.45 A). Because I DR exceeds 5% I VR_Peak, the DR application fails the screening, requiring additional studies to determine the operational impacts of DR on the existing power distribution system.
Sag Assessment Procedure

Background To understand the impact of distributed generation on voltage sags, it is helpful to evaluate the basic voltage divider model for a radial circuit that explains the impact of available fault current and distance to the fault on voltage sag. Figure 5-4 shows the simple voltage divider model where Zs is the source impedance at the point-of-common coupling (PCC), and Zf is the impedance between the PCC and the fault. In this context PCC refers to the point where the load current branches off from the fault current.
Vsag ZF E ZS Fault
Load
pcc
Figure 5-4 Impedance Model for an Example Substation
5-14
Assuming that the pre-fault voltage is 1.0 per unit, and neglecting the effect of load current, the voltage during the fault at the PCC can be given by the following expression:
Vsag =
Zf Z f + Zs
Eq. 5-15
Any fault impedance should be included with the feeder impedance to calculate Zf. The voltage divider model shows that as the fault is electrically closer to the bus (smaller Zf ) the sag will be deeper. Also, as the available fault current decreases (larger Zs) the sag becomes deeper. The connection of a distributed generator to a distribution network mitigates voltage sags in two different ways: 1. The generator increases the fault level at the distribution bus, which mitigates voltage sags due to faults on the distribution feeder as shown in Figure 5-5. This especially holds true for a weak system. For a strong system, the fault level cannot be increased much more without the risk of exceeding the maximum allowable short-circuit current of the switchgear and the protection circuit. 2. Distributed generation can mitigate sags due to faults in the rest of the system. During such a fault the generator keeps up the voltage at its local bus by feeding into the fault. This concept can be illustrated using the one-line diagrams and the equivalent circuit diagrams shown in Figure 5-5. Z1 = Source Impedance Z2 = Impedance of Feeder # 2 and Fault Impedance Z3 = Impedance of DR transformer and Feeder # 1 Z4 = Impedance of the Distributed Generator (typically the transient impedance) VPCC = Voltage during the fault at the point-of-common coupling Vsag = Voltage at the generator bus during the fault
Figure 5-5 One Line Diagram and Impedance Model for Substation With Customer DR
5-15
Without the distributed generator, the voltage at the generator bus during the fault will be equal to the voltage at the PCC. When the distributed generator is present, the voltage at the generator bus during the sag is related to the voltage at the PCC according to the following equation:
(1 Vsag ) = Z4 (1 V pcc ) Z3 + Z4
Eq. 5-16
Z4 times the voltage drop at the PCC. This voltage Z3 + Z4 drop becomes smaller for larger impedance to the PCC (weak connection) and for smaller generator impedance (larger generator). The following examples show the impact of distributed generation on voltage sags for faults at different location with respect to the location of the DR and the point of interest where the voltage sag is measured.
The voltage drop at the generator bus is
Procedure 1. Draw one-line and impedance diagrams similar to those shown in Figure x. 2. Gather the following information: Zsource ZT0. Where: Zsource ZT0 Zsystem = = = (Distribution Bus Voltage)2/Short ckt MVA feeding substation (high side) Substation xformer Z * (Distribution Bus V)2/ Substation xformer MVA Zsource + ZT0 = =
3. Look up the conductor reactance Zfeeder /unit length which is typically given in ohms per thousand feet of conductor. Zfeeder / unit length = 4. Calculate Zsystem which is the impedance between the point of common coupling and the utility source. Zsystem = Zsource + ZT0. = 5. Calculate the voltage at the point VPCC, which is electrically equivalent to Vsag, neglecting load current using the equation:
5-16
V pcc =
Z feeder / unitlength * length Z system + Z feeder / unitlength * length
Eq. 5-17
Vpcc = _________________
Where length is the distance in thousands of feet to the applied fault point. Examples
Eq. 5-18
For the example case, the impedance will be assumed to be all reactive. It should be noted that for underground cable the resistance is much higher in comparison to the reactance. In those cases, it is best to use complex impedance throughout. The electrical system that the cases will be based on is shown in Figure 5-6. The transmission supply system is 138 kV. The short-circuit level on the transmission side at the transmission/ distribution interface is 200 MVA. Transformer T0 (10/12/15 MVA) steps the voltage down to 12,470 volts, and its impedance is 7%. There are two distribution feeders whose circuit breakers are labeled CB1 and CB2. Additionally, CB1 has a 2 MVA step-down transformer to 480 volt where all of the measurements will be made. The impedance of the transformer T1 is 7.5%, and it is connected delta/grounded-wye.
138 kV 200 MVA S.C. 12.47 kV
CB2 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM T0
X FA
10 MVA 138/12.47 kV Z=7%
CB1 Vpcc
X 2 MVA FB12.47/0.48 kV
Z=7.5% Vsag
T1
X FC
DG
Figure 5-6 Sample One-Line Diagram With Varying Fault (Fx) Locations
The conductors on the tap and on the load-side of transformer T1 can be ignored. Both feeders use 397.5-kcmil ACSR conductors. All faults in these cases will be three-phase faults. Assume the fault will be applied a point FA in Figure 5-7, and pre-fault voltage is 100% of nominal (1 per-unit).
5-17
Case 1: Calculation Without Distributed Generation In this case the fault is assumed to be at FA and varies in distance from the substation. Referring to Figure 5-7, we will calculate the voltage at the point VPCC, which is electrically equivalent to Vsag, neglecting load current. First, we will find the voltage at the point of common coupling which is the distribution bus:
V pcc =
Z feeder / unitlength * length Z system + Z feeder / unitlength * length

Eq. 5-19
Zsystem is the impedance between the point of common coupling and the utility source. It is Zsource + ZT0.
Z source (12470) =
12470volts 2 = 0.778 200MVA
Eq. 5-20
12470volts 2 = 1.09 Z T 0 (12470) = 0.07 * 10MVA

Z system = Z source + Z T 0 = 0.778 + 1.09 = 1.868
Eq. 5-21 Eq. 5-22
Zfeeder is the impedance between the point of common coupling and the fault. Since it varies, we will multiply the reactance of the conductor (397.5-kcmil ACSR), which is .1101 ohms/1000 feet times the distance from the point of common coupling to the variable point of application of the fault. For example at a distance of 5 miles:
V pcc =
.1101 * 26.4 = .609 = Vsag 1.868 + .1101 * 26.4

0.7
Eq. 5-23
0.6
Sag Magnitude in per-unit
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Distance to the fault in miles
Figure 5-7 Calculation of the Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 Where the Distance From the Distribution Bus to FA Varies (No Generation)
5-18
Case 2: Calculation With Distributed Generation In this case the fault is at point FA. The voltage at the point of common coupling has already been calculated in Case A1 for the varying distances. Now, a 125 kW, 156 kVA, 480-volt distributed generator is placed at the secondary of T1. The equation for determining the voltage at the secondary of T1 is:
(1 Vsag ) =
Z gen Z genpcc + Z gen
* (1 V pcc )
Eq. 5-24
where Vsag is the voltage as a percent of nominal on the secondary of T1
Zgen is the transient reactance of the generator. Its transient reactance is 0.347 per-unit on the base of the generator ZgenPCC is the impedance between the generator and the point of common coupling. This will be 5 miles of the same 397.5-kcmil ACSR conductor.
Z gen (12470) = 13.31 Z genpcc (12470) = .1101 * 26.4 + .075 * (

12470 2 ) = 5.83 2 MVA
Eq. 5-25
Eq. 5-26
We will show one example calculation based on the example in Case A1. At a distance of 5 miles (from the fault to the point of common coupling):
(1 Vsag ) =
13.31 * (1 0.609) 5.83 + 13.31
Eq. 5-27
Vsag equals .728 per-unit or 72.8% of nominal. Without the generator the voltage was on 0.609 per-unit. As you can see with such a small generator not much improvement is seen at the secondary of T1. Figure 5-8 shows the voltage at T1 with the generator in operation. To compare the voltage at T1 with and without generator, we can look at Figure 5-9.
5-19

0.8 0.7
Voltage in per-unit of nominal
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Distance (miles)
Figure 5-8 Calculation of the Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 Where the Distance From the Distribution Bus to FA Varies. There is a Small Generator at T1
0.8 0.7
Voltage in per-unit of nominal
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 with generator without generator
Distance (miles)
Figure 5-9 Voltage at the Secondary of Transformer T1 With and Without Generator for Faults as FA Distance Varies
Swell Assessment Procedure

Background In the case of DR-caused temporary overvoltage or voltage swell conditions, some basic information about the type of distribution system, type of DR, the interconnection transformer, and the available protection schemes can help determine the likelihood of future problems.
5-20
Therefore, navigating a flowchart with a few simple questions about the DR installation can help screen out configurations that may exhibit excessive voltage swell conditions. Procedure This screening provides a tool to check distributed generation installations for characteristics that are known to cause transient overvoltages. It is should not be considered foolproof and is most certainly not a substitute for an interconnection study. To determine if a distributed generation-caused overvoltage problems may result from the installation under consideration, navigate the flowchart in Figure 5-10. A result of Pass indicates that the installation does not possess any typical characteristics that can lead to overvoltages. However, it is possible that overvoltages will still occur. The conclusion for further system study is based on the presence of one or more system characteristics that suggest transient overvoltages may be a problem at the installation. Distributed generation-related overvoltage considerations are directly related to the various grounding details of the installation. To that end, much of the information needed to navigate the following flow chart involves the interconnection components that also affect the installations grounding. Examples Case 1: Paper Mill A A paper mill company decides to install a 4-MW gas-fired turbine to supply facility electrical power and process steam. The installation will be connected in parallel with the utility grid in order to sell excess capacity back to the grid. The utility circuit is a three-phase, four-wire multigrounded neutral system. The interconnection transformer is a delta high side to delta low side configuration, and there is not a 59G relay function or transfer trip protection scheme planned. The flowchart for this configuration is shown in Figure 5-11. This example fails the screening, indicating that further study is needed. The primary reason why the system failed the screening is that the system in not effectively grounded (the delta on the high side of the transformer is the giveaway). More information on effective grounding can be found in EPRI report 1000419.
5-21
Start
Four wire multigrounded system
What type of distribution system is present ?
Four wire ungrounded, three wire ungrounded, or high impedance grounded
Is the DG three phase ?

Yes No
Is the DG three phase ?

No Yes
Does the transformer arrangement provide effective grounding ?
Is the transformer connected phase-to-neutral ?

Yes
Is the transformer high side impedance grounded or ungrounded ?
No
1
Yes No No Yes
Is an alternative 59G overvoltage protection scheme allowed by the utility and present ?
Yes
No
Pass
Further study is required to asses special equipment needs.
Figure 5-10 Overvoltage Screening Tool for DR Installations
5-22
Start
Is the DR three phase ?

Yes No

No Yes

Yes
No
1
Yes No No Yes
Yes
No
Pass
Figure 5-11 Overvoltage Screening for Paper Mill Example 1 Failing Conditions
Case 2: Paper Mill B Reconsider the circuit in Example 1 but change the interconnection transformer to a groundedwye high side/delta low side configuration. The information in Islanding Voltage in this chapter indicates that this configuration does provide effective grounding. This alters the path as shown in Figure 5-12, and the result becomes a Pass. 5-23
Start

Yes No

Yes No

Yes
No
1
Yes No No Yes
No Yes
No
Pass
Figure 5-12 Overvoltage Screening for Paper Mill Example 2 Passing Conditions
5-24
6
APPLYING DR TO ENHANCE EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE
The previous sections overview measures of electric reliability and quality that can either positively or negatively influenced by distributed generation and storage. Also covered are the expected impacts of reduced PQ on end-use equipment, and procedures to assess quality and reliability when adding DR. In this section we will summarize the important aspects of each section and provide some conclusions ways to insure that a thoughtful engineering study (accomplished prior to the installation of a distributed generator), can result in an application that actually improves the available uptime of the on site electrical equipment from a PQ and reliability standpoint. In Chapters 2 and 3, the different electric reliability and quality measures that can be positively or negatively impacted by DR were described. The summaries of the PQ variations and reliability aspects that can be positively or negatively impacted are as follows:
Positive Impacts of DR - Transients (Lightning Related) - Momentary Voltage Sags (if DR has energy storage and trip time delay) - Power Service Availability
Negative Impacts of DR - Momentary Voltage Swells - Voltage Fluctuations (Flicker) - Frequency Variations
Possible Positive or Negative Impacts of DR - Long Duration Variation (High and Low RMS) - Voltage Unbalance - Waveform Distortion (Harmonic Voltage and Current)
In Chapter 4 an overview of commercial and industrial equipment design and its sensitivity to power variations was detailed, while Chapter 5 followed with some engineering analysis procedures to insure the best application of DR at or close to industrial and commercial facilities. The key tie in with respect to distributed generation is how the equipment performance may be either improved or degraded by the installed DR. Table 6-1 was developed to summarize this tie in. The table lists quality and reliability measures, typical DR impacts, and the expected performance response of end-user equipment with DR installed.
6-1
Applying DR To Enhance Equipment Performance Table 6-1 Impact of Power Quality and Reliability Events With Installed DR Event Type Transient DR Impact Positive End use equipment response and the role of installed DR Lightning related transients and possible damage are a concern for nearly every category of commercial and industrial equipment and this includes the DR device, which may have increased exposure. Consequently DR is typically designed with some type of transient mitigation or surge protection, the connected loads will benefit from this inherent surge protection as well. In the case of lightning related transients propagating into the facility on the power conductors, installation of DR can have a positive impact on the load equipment. For capacitor switching and load switching transients, the installed DR will not have either a positive or a negative impact Voltage sags and momentary interruptions are detrimental to the performance of most customer load equipment. Overall, the installation of DR is not expected to resolve problems with short duration PQ events, however there could be a 10 to 20 percent improvement in voltage sag mitigation if a properly sized DR device is installed.. For voltage swells, if the DR is installed properly with attention to proper grounding methods, the DR will have minimal impact either positively or negatively on these variations. If the grounding is not correctly done, voltage swells can be expected and the impact could be damage to equipment Installed DR can potentially have positive or negative impacts on steady state low voltage, depending upon the specific feeder type, the electrical installation configuration and whether or not steady state voltage regulation was an objective of the engineering analysis for the installation. Equipment operated at a level very close to the nominal nameplate rating is less susceptible to PQ variations. In fact, installing DR in a manner that provides the facility with steady state voltage at or close to the equipment nameplate voltage is an excellent way to gain added PQ value from a DR installation project. High RMS voltage can occur with installed DR, depending upon the specific feeder type, the electrical installation configuration and whether or not steady state voltage regulation was an objective of the engineering analysis for the installation. Installing DR in a manner that provides the facility with steady state voltage at or close to the equipment nameplate voltage is an excellent way to gain added PQ value from a DR installation project Most three-phase motor controlled devices are highly sensitive to voltage unbalance. More than a one percent unbalance on a three phase system warrants de-rating of any type of motor driven system and a five percent unbalance requires some type of remedial action before the motor can be operated. Installed DR may remedy load induced voltage unbalance. Any unbalance of the utility source is likely to make the DR more prone to tripping off line during single-phase PQ variations, therefore the engineering analysis for the DR installation should take voltage unbalance into consideration.
Voltage Sag
Positive / Negative
Voltage Swell
Negative
Low RMS voltage
Positive
High RMS voltage
Negative
Voltage Unbalance
Positive / Negative
6-2
Applying DR To Enhance Equipment Performance Table 6-1 (cont.) Impact of Power Quality and Reliability Events With Installed DR Event Type Waveform Distortion DR Impact End use equipment response and the role of installed DR
Positive / Negative
The majority of load equipment is not overly sensitive to harmonic voltage distortion, and in many cases, the rectifier power supply based load equipment is actually a harmonic current generation source. Installed DR can increase the level of voltage distortion of a facility if a low quality inverter is used to support the equipment in an isolated mode, or is used to grid connect. Alternatively if the DR is configured to provide harmonic current for some of the facilities harmonic generating loads, the voltage distortion on the facility bus can be decreased Many of the lighting technologies used in industrial and commercial facilities can produce light flicker in the presence of voltage fluctuations. While flicker has been a documented concern with some early installations of DR it is unlikely that applications close to facilities and facility loads will results in notable flicker problems. Variations in the 60Hz power frequency are not common, however, there is a requirement that installed DR devices have the ability to synchronize with and follow the grid frequency during transitions from non-grid tie to grid tie mode. Unsynchronized transfers can result in nuisance tripping of controlled rectifier power supplies and may even result in fuse blowing or rectifier power supply damage. Beyond the grid synchronization requirement, it is unlikely that frequency variation problems will result through the application of DR devices. Installed DR will always improve power system reliability indices for the local facility where it has been installed provided a comprehensive engineering analysis has been accomplished to insure distribution feeder and facility protective device coordination.
Flicker
Negative
Frequency Variation
Negative
Reliability
Positive
6-3
About EPRI
EPRI creates science and technology solutions for the global energy and energy services industry. U.S. electric utilities established the Electric Power Research Institute in 1973 as a nonprofit research consortium for the benefit of utility members, their customers, and society. Now known simply as EPRI, the company provides a wide range of innovative products and services to more than 1000 energy-related organizations in 40 countries. EPRIs multidisciplinary team of scientists and engineers draws on a worldwide network of technical and business expertise to help solve todays toughest energy and environmental problems. EPRI. Electrify the World
2003 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Inc. All rights reserved. Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. EPRI. ELECTRIFY THE WORLD is a service mark of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. 1004473 Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America EPRI 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304 PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303 USA 800.313.3774 650.855.2121 askepri@epri.com www.epri.com

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Grid Reliability and Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Resources

Grid Reliability and Power Quality Impacts of Distributed Resources

1004473 Technical Update, March 2003

EPRI Project Manager W. Steely

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

Reliability Vs Power Quality

Grid-Parallel or Standalone Operating Modes

(b) DG in Parallel with Utility

Characteristics of Utility Supply Compared With DR

7.5 Can be more than 10%. 1520%

Reliability (annual availability in percent)

Typical effective power generation efficiency

How to Use This Report

Electric Power System Reliability

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Reliability of Utility Electric Service

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

To calculate the index use the following equation:

Customer interruption durations Total number of customers served

To calculate the index, use the following equation:

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Customer interruption durations Total number of customer interruptions

To calculate the index use the following equation:

riNi SAIDI = NT SAIFI

Customer hours service availability Customer hours service demand

To calculate the index use the following equation:

NT X (No. of hours/year) - riNi NT X (No. of hours/year

Total number of customer momentary interruptions Total number of customers served

To calculate the index, use the following equation:

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Figure 2-2 Results of Survey of MAIFI Index for Reliability

Reliability of Facility Power Distribution

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Option A. One Generator Offers No Contingency for Failure

Contingency Design N-1 N-1 N-1 N-1 N-1

Surplus Capacity Needed 100% 50% 33% 25% 20%

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Generator starting reliability, percent

Figure 2-4 Starting Reliability for Backup Generators.6,7

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Proper Grounding and transformer configuration

Generator Protection and Control

Utility 13.2 kV System

480 V Isolating Device

Area of Island During Stand-alone Mode

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Generator availability, percent

Figure 2-6 Availability of Generators Found in Various Studies 8,9,10

Units Out of Service 0 1 (r=2, n=3) 2 (r=1, n=3) 3 0.973

Probability = 0.912673 = 0.084681 = 0.002619 = 0.000027 = 1.0

3 (0.97)2 (1-0.97) 3 (0.97) (1-0.97)2 (1-0.97)3 Sum

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Reliability Issues Related to DR

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources

Overview of Electric Power System Reliability and Distributed Resources