Double Knowledge According to Gregory Palamas

: . . , , . 3 ( ), 1977.

1. Philosophy and Theology

2. The Two Ways of Knowing God

3. Theology and Vision of God

4.

The Teaching of Gregory Palamas on Man

During his sojourn in Byzantium Barlaam of Calabria, a distinguished theologian and philosopher of the 14th century, took an active part in the discussions corcerning two great problems, namely those of the procession of the Holy Spirit and of the monastic hesychia. As regards the former he opposed the Roman Catholic view and as regards the latter opposed the Hesychasts. Since in both cases he employed gnostic criteria, equating philosophy with theology, he provoked strong oposition from Gregory Palamas. Palamas argumentation in this controversy included a series of dual distinctions, among which theory of double knowledge holds a notable place. In this theory we may note three aspects: the distinction between philisophy and theology; the distinction within theology of two ways of knowing God; and finally the distinction between theology and the vision of God or theoptia.

1. Philosophy and Theology The first distinction is a result of the conflict between Christianity and Greek philosophy, of which the beginnings go back to apostolic times. This conflict reappaers from time to time and during the years of the Renaissance dominated the entire intellectual field. The further humanistic studies advanced, the greater was the importance given to the human factor for the knowledge divine; consequently philosophy was appreciated the more. Barlaam, one of the pioneers of the Renaissance, reached the point of identifying the objects, the method and the achievements of

philosophy and theology, supporting his endavour with arguments to the effect that every human good is a gift of God and therefore all are of high quality. [i] Just as, he used to say, there are not two kinds of health-the one provided by God and the other secured by physicians, -in the same way, there are not two kinds of knowledge-the human and the divine-but only one. Philisophy and theology, as gifts of God, are of equal worth. On this analogy, the Greek philosophers were raised to the same level as Moses and the prophets; and this tendency was later extended to the point of introducing such persons as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and other sages to the iconographical cicle of Greek Orthodox Churches. Barlaam maintained that Both the sayings of the divine men with the wisdom that is within them and profane philosophy aim at a unique object and therefore have a common purpose, the finding of truth; for truth existing in all these is but one. This truth was given to the apostles at the beginning by God; by ourselves, however, it is found through diligence and purity. Philosophical studies naturally contribute to the truth given to the apostles by God and assist greatly in reaching out to the first immaterial principles[ii] In maintaining ths argument Barlaam should not be considered as a rationalistic philosopher; on the contrary, by futher elaboration of this thoughts he reaches conclusions that approach agnosticism. Indeed, he points out the complete inability of man in his natural state to understand the divine and, like Plato and Dionysios the Areopagite, seeks for purification and escape from the material body in other to achieve the vision of God in a condition of ecstasy. In complete constrast to these, Palamas draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. Certainly this division is not a unique phenomenon during those times. The Averroists of the West were accused and condamned in 1277 because among other teachings they maintained that things may be true according to philosophy and erroneous according to catholic faith, as if there were two contradictory truths. [iii] It is a matter of controversy nowadays what position was reached by the Averroists, and especially by Siger of Brabant, in the distinction they made between the two wisdoms and truths. But it is obvious that they at last had a definite predeliction for such a distinction which appears again in Ockhams philosophy. [iv]

It is extremely unlikely that Palamas had any knowledge of the views of these western theologians. His presuppositions and purposes were entirely different from theirs. When he was obliged to undertake work on this subject, he had recourse to Greek theology before his time and found satisfactory support for his position. St. Paul, addressing himself primarily to the intellectuals of Athens and Corinth-the sages, the scribes and the debaters of the agemarked the chasm between the two philosophies, the wisdom of the world which as foolishness was abolished and that wisdom of God which is eternal and brings salvation. [v] Similarly, James described worldly wisdom as sensual and Satanic, and that coming from above he calls full of virtue and pure. [vi] The attitude of these two apostles, dictated by missionary needs of the time, did not allow a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, because it entirely rejected the value of worldly wisdom. Naturally this manner of dealing with the matter had serious consequences for the evolution of theological thought up to the end of the second century and also influenced it in some degree in later times. For about a century no attention whatever was paid to the foolish wisdom of the world. Some of the apologists, who came from a different background and acted under different circumstances, adopted a different attitude. Our attention is especially called to the position which Clement of Alexandria took towards the problem. He perceived that the initial truth was one, but later dismebered by philosophical schools as that unfortunate Pentheus was dismembered by Bacchae. Although several schools maintain that they posses the whole truth, in reality they posess only a part of it. From this last observation it already appears that philosophy is not entirely valueless, but that the difference between it and theology is fundamental because philosophy has to do with names, i. e. the outward cover, while theology has to do with things, i. e. with essentials. Thus, since there are two kinds of truth, he says, -one of names and the other of things, -some people prefer the names, viz. Those that are engaged in the beauty of speech, i. e. the Greek philosophers, while the things are investigated by us, the barbarians. [vii] Nevertheless knowledge constitutes a chain in which the elementary lessons serve philosophy as their mistress, while philosophy itself serves theology as its mistress. [viii] Borrowing from Philo, [ix]he employs as representative types Agar the slave and Sarah her mistress, both of whom in turn gave Abraham lovable children but of unequal worth. [x] To Sarah burning with jealousy Abraham says, although I

embrace the worldly paideia both as younger and as your handmaid on one hand, on the other hand I honour and respect your science as a perfect lady[xi]. It is obvious that, according to Clement, whereas the philosophical systems possess a part of the truth, theology possesses the whole of it. Diadochos of Photie, examining this dismemberment from a different point of view, attributes it to the fall of man and considers it as a division between truth and error. By his fall man was divided in the doubleness of knowledge[xii] Basil the Great links the two kinds of knowledge with the conditions of life which they serve. Worldly wisdom provides understanding of the present transitory life and facilitates a successful passage through it. Divine wisdom provides the weapons for the attainment of the blessed life of the future. [xiii] Not being contradictory to each other, they form, as it were, a tree in which the one provides the leaves and the other the fruits. [xiv] Coming back to Gregory Palamas, we observe that he does not disagree with Barlaams contention that everything that is good is a gift of God and every gift of His is perfect, but he also remarks that every gift is not necessarily completely perfect. [xv] So long as the gifts of God are divided into natural and spiritual, philosophy is a natural gift[xvi] and as such under the influance of evil it has gone astray and changed and in some cases turned to foolishness. [xvii] Of course, under certain conditions philosophy adds to the knowledge of beings. But, since this knowledge cannot be indentified with or accounted equal to the divine wisdom, [xviii]it becomes obvions that neither is ignorance always something bad, nor knowledge always good. [xix] For the same reason devotion to philosophy should not be hindered, though its abuse should be strongly critized. [xx] The objects of the two disciplines are clearly distinguished. Philosophy aims on the one hand at the exploration of the nature and movement of beings, and on the other hand at the definition of principles of social life. If it moves within these boundaries, it is a dissertation of truth;if it looks for something beyond them, it becomes an absurd, useless and dangerous occupation; because it belongs to theology, or philosophy according to Christ, to aim at the invisible and the eternal. [xxi] Now, since the objects of the two disciplines are distinct, the conclusions of both may be true. This examination shows that according to Palamas teaching worldly knowledge and theological knowledge are clearly distinguished and

proceed on parallel paths. The destination of each determines its value. The one intended for this transient life is a useful handmaid, but is not indispensable for salvation; the other intended for the eternal life is more precious and is absolutely indispensable for spiritual perfection and salvation. [xxii] This is the only distinction for which Palamas firmy uses the term double knowledge, or .

[i] Defensio Hesychastarum 2,1,4. . [ii] Op. cit. 2,1,5. [iii] P. MANDONNET, Siger de Brabant et l averoisme latin au XIIIe s. ,2me d. ,Louvain 1911,V. II, 175. [iv] Sent. I, prol. ed. P. Bohner, . 13-15. [v] I Cor. 1,18-31; 2, 6-10;II Cor. 1,12. [vi] Jac. 3, 13-17. [vii] Stromata 6,17. [viii] Op. Cit. 1,5. [ix] De congr. 14,71ff. [x] Stromata 1,5. [xi] Ibid. [xii] Capita 88, E. DES PLACES, p. 148,17. [xiii] In Psalmos, 14, PG 29,256. [xiv] Ad juniores, 2. [xv] Defensio hesychastarum, 2,2,11. [xvi] Op. cit. 2,1,28.

[xvii] Op. cit. 1,1,19. [xviii] Op. Cit. 2,1,7. [xix] Op. Cit. 1,3,14. [xx] Op. Cit. 2,1,2. [xxi] Contra Acindynum, 6,1, Cod. Coisl. Gr. 98,149/149v. [xxii] Defensio Hesychastarum, 2,1,5.

2. The Two Ways of Knowing God When we abandon the philosophy of this world and follow Christian truth, we find another distinction. but as in this case the object of the search remains one and the same, the point in question concerns two ways of knowledge rather than the double knowledge. Barlaam, as an adherent of the unity of the knowledge of God and of the way of knowledge, denied that syllogism could prove the common notions, the first principles and God [xxiii]. He considered that illumination which was granted to all perfect men of ancient times prophets or apostles or even philosophers, was the only means of knowing God. It was given to them after they were cleansed of all impurity by intensive spiritual effort. Illumination made all of them God-seers ()[xxiv]. Barlaam held that demonstration was applicable only to what was perishable, i. e. to what was liable to change. Palamas, on the other hand, denied to these very things any possibility of demonstration, quoting the Aristotelian dictum: "for the perishable demonstration does not exist" [xxv]. Barlaam took faith, with its very wide connotation, as the basis for knowledge through illumination. Palamas also put it as the basis, but gave it two meanings, viz. wide meaning for what could not be demonstrated and narrow one for faith amenable to demonstration. The theory of double way of knowledge goes back to Plato and Aristotle. In dividing the four forces of knowing, i. e. sensation, science, intellect and opinion, into two groups, Aristotle maintained that the forces of the first group provide demonstrable knowledge, sensation through sensible objects, science through primary premises; while those of the second group provide knowledge which

is doubtful and cannot be demonstrated [xxvi]. In essence the four forces may be narrowed to two: that, of science and that of opinion. In both these forces confirmatory function is involved, the faith, which according to Aristotle is consciousness of certainty about the truth of knowledge [xxvii]. Clement of Alexandria reproduces the theory of double knowledge and double faith. "So long as faith is double, he says, the one applying to science and the other applying to opinion, it does not matter if demonstration is also characterised as double, one as scientific and the other as opinionative; for knowledge and foreknowledge are also characterised as being double, one of an exact nature and the other of a deficient nature"[xxviii]. Clement explains that opinionative demonstration is human, while scientific demonstration gets support by quoting the Scriptures; but in many cases he makes it clear that positive demonstration may be effected even independently of the Scriptures. As we see, a power dominates in both cases, and this is faith which according to the wellknown passage is defined as follows: "Faith is a concise knowledge of what is indispensable, while knowledge itself is a strong and certain demonstration of what has been received through faith" [xxix]. What Clement formulates according to the methods of the schools, other Fathers repeat in a simpler form. Theodore Sabaites calls the two ways of knowledge natural and supernatural[xxx], while Maximus the Confessor gives them various names according to circumstances: reason and spiritual sensation [xxxi], habitual and operative knowledge [xxxii], relative and true knowledge [xxxiii]. The first, of them is intellectual and helps in arranging things in the present, life; the second is active and scientific and ensures deification in the future [xxxiv]. In this way Maximus uses within theology that distinction which Basil made between theology and philosophy. The teaching of Dionysios. about the positive and negative ways of approaching God is not very different from this theory. When Palamas confronted Barlaam's argument, he had no difficulty in resorting to this tradition about the two ways of knowing God, of . On this point also it is unlikely that he had any immediate acquaintance with the teaching of the scholastics of the West, though he may have had some indirect information about them.

On the problem of the theognosia there are apparent contradictions on both sides. Barlaam, though he overestimates the value of Greek philosophy, finally denies both philosophical and theological knowledge. Palamas, though he underrates the value of Greek philosophy, accepts the value of natural theognosia. Barlaam's contradiction is removed by his taking refuge from bodily ties in the immediate vision of God in a state of ecstasy; while that of Palamas is removed by limitations of application. Palamas' position is summarised in one of his letters [xxxv]. The divine lies above dialectics and demonstrations; it is not subject to sensation nor is it subject to syllogism. But the Fathers have bidden us reason about the divine, and the syllogism concerning it they described as demonstrable, giving it this characteristic with the meaning of universal authority. The question here is of a kind of syllogism different from that of dialectics. As it has been said, Palamas maintains that there are natural and spiritual gifts of God. The natural gifts are not contemptible, for they can lead to a faint knowledge of God. This happens because God is not an abstract substance, but a personality that has manifold manifestations. Clement of Alexandria expressed a similar thought. "The event about God is not one but infinite; there is a difference between seeking for God and demanding information concerning God. In general, accidentals in every thing should be discriminated from their essence" [xxxvi]. Thus also Palamas discerns the essence of God, His uncreated operation and His creatures. on this basis he could say that "some things of God become known, others are searched for some can still be demonstrated, while others are entirely inconceivable and unexplorable" [xxxvii]. What then is known about God? First His creatures and the presence of His power in them. The knowledge of them restored the human race to the knowledge of God even before the law and the prophets; and it leads it there even today [xxxviii], for those who examine the causes of things, acknowledge the power, the wisdom and the presence of God [xxxix]. This is the knowledge which is obtained through the natural intellectual functions of man. It is an undemonstrable and limited knowledge which can be acquired even by men who are imperfect in character and in spiritual experience. Beyond it there is the demonstrable knowledge. In problems concerning the divine it is not the dialectical syllogism, which merely leads to simple probabilities, that can be used, but the demonstrable

syllogism which deals with everlasting and permanent and true things [xl]. The use of demonstrable syllogism is effective, because, as we have seen, there are aspects of the theological problem that admit of demonstration. The demonstration is based on the one hand on common notions and principles and on the other on revealed selfdemonstrated premises. Thus we find here a combination of natural and spiritual gifts, of which the joining elements are faith and love. According to Palamas, faith is not double as it is in Aristotle and Clement, but one and it joins together the two ways. Transformed through it, man's capacity for knowing becomes godlike [xli] and may come to a position to understand sufficiently what is beyond creatures, i. e. the uncreated operations of God. This second way of theognosia is pre-eminently called "theology".

[xxiii] Epistola I ad Palaman, ed. SCHIRO 243. [xxiv] Epistola I at Barlaam, 22. [xxv] Anal. Poster. 1, 8. [xxvi] De anima, ed. Of Oxford , 3, 427b/428b. [xxvii] Op. Cit. ,3,428a,sof. Elenchi4,165b,Physica 8,262 [xxviii] Stomata 2,17. [xxix] Op. Cit 7,10. [xxx] Theoreticum,, ed. 1960, 1, 326. [xxxi] Capita varia,4, 31 [xxxii] Op. cit. 4,29. [xxxiii] Capita theologica, 1,22. [xxxiv] Capita varia, 4, 29. [xxxv] Epistola I ad Barlaam, 33
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[xxxvi] Stomata 6,17 [xxxvii] Epistola I ad Acindinum, 8. [xxxviii] Defensio Hesychastarum, 2, 3, 44 [xxxix] Op. cit. , 2, 3, 15/16 [xl] Epistola I ad Acindinum, 13. [xli] Defensio Hesychastarum 1, 1, 9

3. Theology and Vision of God If we put aside the first way of theognosia, the natural way, and follow now the demonstrable and theological way, we find ourselves faced with a new ramification. The new distinction appears in the field of man's struggle to find God. Ancient ascetic writes distinguished three conditions in the progress of approaching God, viz. the practical, the natural and the theological. These were derived from Origen who held that the believer "through the practical way possesses Christ as his Lord, through the natural theory possesses Him as a King and again through theology as God" [xlii]. Evagrios preserves both the names and the meaning of these terms [xliii], while Diadochos of Photice modifies in some degree the terminology by using the words knowledge; wisdom and theology [xliv]. Palamas, after he had reflected much on natural and theological theognosia, came to the conclusion that the achievements realised in the second way are far more notable than those realised in the first. But in the end he sees that another way opens up, a way that leads to immensely more precious benefits: the way to the vision of God, to . Theology is a discourse about God, while theoptia is in some way conversation with God. There is a great difference between the two, as there is between knowledge of a thing and possession of it [xlv]. Isaac Syrus, speaking about two psychical eyes, the one for seeing the wisdom of God and the other for seeing the glory of his nature [xlvi], expresses with an image what Palamas describes analytically. According to Palamas, "God is not substance so that we may only speak about Him, for He did not say, I am the

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substance, but He said, I am that I am [xlvii]. The being does not spring from substance, but substance results from the being [xlviii]. Therefore, God is a personality that invites us; the personality whose presence we feel and to meet whom we press forward. If the substance of God remains inaccessible, His operations become accessible to us. The purified can by virtue of an excellent spiritual gift see the light of God just as the disciples had done in Thabor. And though this light is called a symbol, it is a natural one and does not exist apart from God; in other words, it is an uncreated operation of His [xlix]. This vision constitutes the beginning of a meeting which ends in the participation in the operations of God. Thus through his vision of God man rises without a bodily ecstasy to a personality that can speak with God and is able to become an associate f God.

[xlii] In psalmos 126 [xliii] Practicus, prol. and c. 1 [xliv] Capita, 9, 66, 67 [xlv] Defensio Hesychastarum, 3, 2, 12. [xlvi] Sermo 72, ed. SPETSIERIS, 281. [xlvii] Ex. 3,14 [xlviii] Defensium Hesychasterum 1,3,42. [xlix] Op. cit. 3,1,14.

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The anthropology of Saint Gregory Palamas is the nerve centre of his theology. His entire system aims at nothing else than the description and definition of the relations among men and of each individual mans relation with God. He follows man in his striving between the worldly and the divine, the created and the uncreated, and shows the way by which he may reach the state of the uncreated. And it is just this state that becomes man since he is not only a recapitulation and an ornament of the whole creation [i]; but also image of the Triune God for whom the uncreated kingdom was prepared since the foundation of the world [ii]. All physical life and existence is a created result of the divine energy. But the fact that even man is likewise such a created result does not equate him with the other animals. In man, elements of the ultramundane were added and finally the divine uncreated breath [iii] was given. The human body, consisting of matter, belongs to the category of material creatures. The human soul, consisting of ultramundane elements, differs from the soul of animals in that it is firstly essence and then energy; whereas the soul of animals is a simple operation which does not exist in itself but dies together with the body.[iv] As an independent essence the human soul is not dissolved with the body, but lives by itself after the separation; as a spiritual ,essence even though created, it is immortal.[v] A variety of opinions is found among the fathers as to the manner in which the soul is linked to the body. Gregory, in spite of his repeated reference to the Macarian opinion that it seats in the heart, seems to prefer the opinion of ,Gregory of Nyssa, according to which the soul is dispersed throughout the whole body as a dynamic element which holds the body together, contains its providential powers and vivifies it [vi]. The main powers of the soul: nous, logos. and pneuma (intellect, reason, and spirit) are simple functions, expressing it as a unique whole.[vii] They are not essences. Whenever Gregory speaks of the intellect as an essence,[viii] he evidently means the soul itself. His use of Macarian terms seems to influence some of his anthropological formulations and such an influence [ix]a may explain his insistence
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on the opinion that the main fleshly organ of the intellect is the heart. But of course this formulation also served other aims. It emphasises the close connection between the two elements of the human organism since the bodily element is biologically nourished by the heart. Such an emphasis serves to avoiding the predomination of scholastic intellectualism in theology. In any case, Gregory's occasional use of the word 'heart' in a broader sense must not be overlooked. In interpreting Psalm 32, 15, he says, "let us take here the expression 'heart created by Him' as meaning the inner man.[x] Reason is closely connected with the intellect, from which it is derived, and is sometimes identified with it [xi]; so that to distinguish one from the other, as Gregory does, seems some kind of technical enterprise. Lastly, the spirit comes forth from both intellect and the reason, and exists within both. It is the eros of the intellect towards the reason which vivifies the body[xii]. Gregory gives a broad and dynamic character to the much discussed expression "according to the image". He finds image in the whole existence of man and refers it to the Trinity. Man is a creature according to the image not vaguely of God, but concretely of the Triune God, since he has been created by the energy of the whole Trinity and may receive the divine light emitted from the whole Trinity, His intellect, reason and spirit constitute an inherent unity, corresponding to the unity of the persons of the divine Trinity, i.e. Nous, Logos, and pneuma (Intellect, Reason, and Spirit). As within divinity the Nous begets the Logos, and the Pneuma precedes as the eros of the Nous towards the Logos, so within man, ` the intellect bears the reason, and the spirit is projected as the eros of the intellect towards the reason. And as the Holy Spirit vivifies the world; so the human spirit vivifies the body[xiii]. Thus the image is extended to the whole man, including the body. The real meaning of Gregorys teaching on this point is: the capability of man to be elevated into a genuine spiritual personality, as an image and symbol of the personality of God. One could call this image microtheos rather than microcosmos. This is the natural state of man. Moreover the first man had received another gift: the divine spirit which is not a created thing, as are the rest of mans elements, but an ineffable uncreated divine energy. The final destination of man is to be assimilated with the divine archetype[xiv] and united with God in one substance,[xv] so that he may be called "another God"[xvi] Now this destination could be achieved only through that infusion of the

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divine spirit, by which man was clothed with the divine glory and became a participant of the divine splendour. This is the supernatural state of man. Whether man abides near or far from God depends, as it does for the rest of the reasonable beings, in his will, which means that it is a voluntary, not a natural condition [xvii] He is receptive of contrary spiritual qualities, goodness and evil, and may turn towards either[xviii]. Abiding in goodness means preservation of the divine spirit and of participation in God. Turning towards evil means moving away from God, and such a movement is equal to the death of the soul [xix] God neither created nor caused the death of the soul and of the body[xx] Death is the fruit of sin which was produced by the will of man.[xxi] Man received from the beginning the gift and the duty to live eternally in both soul and body. But life is worthless leas, except when it springs from participation in the life of God .[xxii] Life to the body is granted by the human spirit and real life to the soul is granted by the divine spirit. That is why the abandonment of the soul by the vivifying divine spirit causes its spiritual death, just as the abandonment of the body by the vivifying human spirit causes its physical death.[xxiii] The soul, when removed from God, only technically preserves its immortality[xxiv]' The devil, having first, moved away from God, was also the first to be subjected to spiritual death. And he succeded in seducing man to disobedience therefore to spiritual death.[xxv] The death of the body is an inevitable consequence of the spiritual death of the soul, which is extended to the human spirit: the power which vivifies the body. But while this death seems natural under these conditions it is at the same time a beneficial concession of God to man, which aims at cancelling the perpetuation of evil and sin.[xxvi] All descendants of Adam are subject to death, because the whole of mankind submitted itself to sin. We must not read into the fall as formation of inheritable guilt, or collective responsibility. The fact of the fall has effected the whole structure and state of man, the natural as well as the supernatural. And this is the reason why the fall of first man becomes the fall of all men. The fall withdrew from man the divine spirit which was infused in him and consequently his likeness to God. It ended his participation in the glory of the life of God. But the image of God remained untouched[xxvii] .The fact that it, appears now somewhat dim is due
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to that loss of likeness, which once rendered it completely clear and gave to it its full meaning. This is the non-natural state of man. Gregory, without being pessimistic about the abilities of the fallen man, considers them as limited. Man can serve himself in respect to his worldly needs, but cannot serve himself spiritually. He has the will to perform the commandments of God and can know Him partially through the observation of creation through his intellectual reflection. But, he is unable to know God completely and to meet Him, which is the final object of his life. This good is granted only by the uncreated light [xxviii]which is unapproachable to the fallen man. The untreated light is divine grace. Meyendorff [xxix]connects the teaching of Gregory on the operation of grace with the incarnation of the Logos. Romanides[xxx] refutes this thesis and maintains that grace operated even in Old Testament times, as the classical example of Moses proves Certainly, grace, which proceeds not from Christ alone but from the whole Trinity, existed and operated at all times. It did not however become a possession of fallen man until after the incarnation of Logos. In Old Testament times grace, operated incidentally and apocalyptically. Fallen man having already lost the divine spirit, could not participate in it permanently. Since the incarnation grace operates permanently and becomes subject to participation by man, if he receives the divine spirit anew. Only a renovation and a restoration of human nature according to its archetype [xxxi] could bring the necessary radical change in the course of mankind. And this change was realised through an unprecedented event : the incarnation of God. "The most excellent of all, Gregory says, or rather the incomparably excellent event is the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, and especially its last episodes: the salutary passion and the resurrection"[xxxii]. The nature which was assumed by Christ is not that of the species, i.e. the entire human nature, but that of an individual which did not exist by itself previously, but took existence in the hypostasis of the Logos and was united to Him in one hypostasis,[xxxiii] It was only this individual nature which contained the fullness of divinity [xxxiv]. And it was transubstantiated and deified as a first fruit of our kind [xxxv]. So a new root was created, capable of imparting life to its offshoots. The transubstantiation of the human nature of Christ is
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physical. The change brought about in man by the renovation is also physical; but the connection of men to that root is not physical as is the connection with the old root of Adam. The connection to the new root is secured by willing participation in the renovation.[xxxvi] Thus we find ourselves before a new state of man, a state which supersedes the simple restoration to the conditions before the fall, for it constitutes a transference to heaven [xxxvii]. Man before the fall certainly possessed the enlightenment of the divine light; but now the human nature assumed by Christ was seated on the throne of God and thence attracts men to Itself. The archetype of males is now John the Forerunner, and that of females, the Virgin Mary[xxxviii]. If physical life is a result of the divine energy according to Gregory, then the god-like life of man is a participation in the divine energy itself[xxxix] a participation which leads to theosis, deification. The first of the basic factors which determine the course of theosis is the concentration of the intellect. Here lies one of the main points around which the acute polemics between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam Calabros was concentrated. The latter, though not a thoroughgoing platonist in all his anthropology, put forth a strictly neoplatinic thesis concerning prayer. -He called for removal of the intellect from the body and mortification of the passive part of the soul, so that the intellect could be devoted to ecstatic prayer and communion with God. This was the only way to attain the true light; since the attachment of the intellect to the common operation of the body and the passive part of the soul fills it with darkness instead of light[xl]. Barlaam considers such an ecstatic condition as well as the grace of deification as thoroughly natural[xli] Gregory, on the contrary, caracterizes this opinion as the source of all error, both philosophical and theological [xlii].He calls for concentration of the operation of the intellect inside the body[xliii];or rather inside man as a whole.The body is not something worthless. Why that which may becomes a dwelling ; place of God, should not be worthy of having the intellect, as dweller? Such are the presuppositions with which the Hesychasts cast out the law of sin and introduced the power of the intellect into man. They gave to each function whatever is proper to it: to the sensitive, temperance; to the passive, love; and to the reasonable, sobriety.[xliv]

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The concentration of the aims neither at acquisition of learning nor at mere theologizing. To Gregory, theology is an insufficient means for approaching God, because it is "word" or "reason" about. God, while he himself seeks for contemplation of God above "word" and "reason". Theology in its positive and scholastic form, as knowledge and understanding of God, cannot be the goal of the movement of the intellect towards God. Nor in its apophatic form as submersion in the divine darkens should it be the only path for a Christian to pursue. In either form it must be superseded. A man may think of a city as much as he likes, but he will never acquire an exact picture of its structure, unless he visits it. A man may think of gold all the time but he will never possess gold, unless he takes it in his hands. Likewise, no matter how much one reflects on God, one can not acquire the divine treasures. One can acquire these only by experiencing the divine realities[xlv] by reaching the vision of Godthe theoptia-which surpasses theology just as the possession of an object surpasses the mere knowledge [xlvi]of it. Here a second factor is introduced: unceasing mental prayer. Gregory does not altogether reject ecstasy but gives to it its appropriate content. Since he considers even material things as gifts of God, he cannot refuse to give to the body a place in the spiritual experience. This is a thesis of eastern spirituality which may be traced back to Diadochos and Macarios. Gregory sees the exaltation of man to be brought about by an intense effort of the intellect, while the whole man participates in the divine gifts. The peak of this exaltation is communion with God, during which the human powers continue to function. In this sense, ecstasy is an operation by wich the h powers are elevated above their standard and which proceeds to the divine condescension. Indeed just as God condescends to man, so man ascends to God, in order that their meeting might be achieved[xlvii]. Prayer is the condition of ecstasy. It possesses the power to elevate man from earth to heaven and to bring him before God[xlviii]. The question is here not one of mere emotion. The whole man is seized by abundant light, the uncreated light of the divine glory which is eternally emitted from the Trinity. The light of mount Tabor, the light which is seen now by the Hesychasts, and the substance of the blessings of the life to come are three phases of one and the same spiritual event composed in a timeless reality [xlix].

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The uncreated light is not an object which can be sensually perceived. It exceeds both sense and understanding. But in spite of this, both soul and body participate in its vision. How does this become possible? Gregory, following of Photius [l], expounds a theory according to which the intellect in its elevation acquires a new spiritual sense; and this sense is the light itself. The intellect, when it is seized by the divine light and enters into it, becomes itself light. Therefore in reality it is the light that sees the light [li]. 'Thus man surpasses the state of ecstasy and reaches union with God and theosis. In this new condition there is beginning and progress but no end. Progress is endless[lii]. Although the element of the endless includes in itself the notion of imperfection, just and pure men may be called "gods", since they participate in God. They are, however, imperfect gods, and ones not identified or assimilated with the one God in essence [liii] That which is participated in is not His essence. Any thing which is participated in is divided, while the divine essence as a simple entity is indivisible; therefore, that which is here participated in is God's divisible energy [liv]. In order to understand Gregorys thought correctly, we may use a comparison. Man has the soul as an essence, whose functions are, as we said before, the intellect, the reason and the spirit.. If we now posit that a man participates in the intellect, the reason and the spirit of another man, then the functions of these two men are identified; but this does not bring about as well an identification of the essence of the souls of the two men. Such a thing is impossible. Thus on a higher level the spiritual man attains to the energies of God, but remains alienated from his unapproachable essence. Whenever man does not participate actively in uncreated divinizing grace, he remains a created result of the creative energy of God. His sole relation with God is that of a creature to the creator. But whenever he participates in divinizing grace, he acquires supernatural qualities and, without ceasing to be a created being by nature, he is transferred from the category of creatures to another position. God and man have then life as a common uncreated energy, the former as the natural source, the latter as a vessel of grace .So each man becomes a being without beginning and, end; anarchos and ateleutetos, in the words of Gregory [lv],which go back to Maximos the Homologetes, he enters into the untreated kingdom which is the glory of God [lvi]

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The establishment of the kingdom has already begun in this world. The soul of man, having been raised by the acquisition of the divine spirit anew, tastes the experience of participation in the divine light and glory. This is an actual experience which makes man a member of the kingdom of God. However, this participation will be completed only after the second coming,[lvii] which will abolish the death of the body. The connection of the new man with God remains indissoluble even after the separation of the soul from the body, as the divinity of Christ remained inseparable from his humanity even in his death. Whatever happened to God-Man may be repeated in man. The body will be raised in order that man might be renovated wholly[lviii] and assumed into heaven.[lix] It is the assumption and not the resurrection that is the divinizing gift par excellence to the just. The resurrection of the sinners consequently has a different meaning. 1t. is also a part of the restoration of the creation but from an opposite point of view. Physical death was for the human race a beneficial concession of God which aimed at cancelling the perpetuation of the evil. Now this gift is taken away, and the resurrection of the sinners becomes their torment.

[i] Hom. 26,1, 10,152. [ii] Cap. 24,Chrestou ,V 48. [iii] Op. Cit. [iv] Cap. 31,Chrestou V, 51f. [v] Cap. 45, Chrestou V61. [vi] Cap. 61, Defense of Hesychasts, 3, 2, 22, Chrestou I ,P. 673. This is the view of Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius Areopagita. [vii] Apodicticos 2, 9, Chrestou I, p. 397. [viii] Defense of Hesychasts 1, 2, 5, Chrestou I,p. 85.

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[ix] Cf. MAKARIUS, Hom. 15,20, PG 29, 589 B. [x] Defense of Hesychasts 2, 3, 62, Chrestou I, p. 595. [xi] Cf. Cap. 33, Chrestou, V 52: the reasonable and intellectual soul has life as essence. Also Defense of Hesychasts 1, 2, 3, CHRESTOU I p.396. [xii] Cap. 38, Chrestou,V 56. [xiii] Cap. 35-39, Chrestou V 53-57. [xiv] Defense of Hesychasts 1, 1, 22, Chrestou I,p.386. [xv] Cap. 24,Chrestou,V 48. [xvi] Apodicticos 2, 9, CHRESTOU I p. 85. [xvii] Cap. 51, Chrestou,V 65. [xviii] Cap. 33, Chrestou, V52. [xix] On Divine Participation 8, Chrestou II, p.144. [xx] Cap. 47, Chrestou, V 62. [xxi] Cap. 51, Chrestou,V65. [xxii] Antirreticos against Acindynos 2,7,18, Chrestou III,18. [xxiii] Hom. 16, 7, 9,432. [xxiv] To Xene, 9, Chrestou V,197. [xxv] Hom. 16, 7 9, 432. [xxvi] On Divine Participation 8, Chrestou II, p. 144. [xxvii] Cap. 39, Chrestou,V 56f. [xxviii] Defence of Hesychasts 2, 3, 66, Chrestou I ,p.598. [xxix] J. MEYENDORFF, Introduction l tude de Grgoire Palamas, Patristica Sorbonensia 3,Paris 1959,p.213 ff.

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[xxx] J. ROMANIDES, Notes on Palamite Controversly Greek Orthodox Theological Review 9 (1963-1964) 236 ff. [xxxi] Defensw of Hesychasts 1, 1, 5, Chrestou I, p.365. [xxxii] Hom. 41,II, 10,57. [xxxiii] Hom. 5,2, .9, 144. [xxxiv] Defense of Hesychasts 3, 1, 15, Crestou I, p.646. [xxxv] Op. Cit. 3, 1, 15, Chrestou I, p. 629. [xxxvi] Hom. 16, 9,422-481. [xxxvii] Cap. 54, Chrestou, V67. [xxxviii] Defense of Hesychasts, 1, 1, 4, Crestou I, 364.Hom. 53, OECONOMOS P.170. [xxxix] On Divine Participation 19, Chrestou II,p. 154. [xl] Defense of Hesychasts 2, 2, 17, Chrestou I, p. 524-525. [xli] Op. Cit. 3, 1, 26, Chrestou I, p.638. [xlii] Op. Cit. 1, 2, 4, Chrestou I,p.397. [xliii] Cf.Basil the Great, Epist. 2, PG. 32,228A. [xliv] Defense of Hesychasts 1, 2, 2, Chrestou I, p. 394. [xlv] Op. Cit. 1, 3, 15, Chrestou I, p.445. [xlvi] Op. Cit. 1, 3, 42, Chrestou I, p. 453. [xlvii] Op. Cit. 1, 3, 47, Chrestou I, p. 458. [xlviii] Hom. 2, 3, 9,49. [xlix] Defense of Hesychasts 1, 3, 43, Chrestou I, p. 455. [l] Cap. Gnostica 40. Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, De Nom. 4, 9, PG 3, 705. [li] Defense of Hesychasts 1, 3, 9, Chrestou I, p. 419
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[lii] Op. Cit. 2, 3, 35, Chrestou I, p.596. [liii] Theophanes 16, Chrestou II, p. 241. [liv] Op. Cit. 21, Chrestou II, p. 247. [lv] Defense of Hesychsts 3, 3, 8, Chrestou I, p. 686.MAXIMOS, Capita de charitate 3, 25, PG 90, 1024 C. [lvi] On Divine Participation 20, Chrestou II, p. 154. [lvii] Hom. 26, 12, 10, 166. [lviii] To Xene 14, Chrestou V 199. [lix] Hom. 22, 15-16, 10-16.

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