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Williams Peculiar Assertion

Roly Reyes 2/21/14 Ethics Paper 2 PHH 3638

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In a chapter called "Morality, the Peculiar Institution" of his book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams explores and rejects the consolidation of ethical theories as essential to philosophical thinking about ethics. Briefly, ethics is a prescriptive enterprise concerning what ought to be. He argues that ethical life is too messy and unpredictable to be captured and cataloged systematically. Not only does Williams seems to hold a general distaste for the discourse of ethical theory with a hint of general boredom to boot. He exemplifies his disposition of these efforts at the beginning of the chapter by stating that his objective is to explain "why we would be better off without it (Williams, p. 175). It's important to note that what Williams is railing against isn't the idea of ethical or moral codes to stand by to live an ethical life. To that effect, Williams emphasizes that the most crucial parts of ethics are it's "underlying aims, and the general picture of ethical life it implies" (Williams, p. 175). Going forward I will make an attempt to create a reasonable response that emphasizes some of the weaknesses of Williams' assertions. Williams has some interesting ideas and goes in some laudable directions on his assault against philosophers problematizing the systemization of ethics. He takes specific umbrage with Kant and Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism being an ethical system that says that the good thing to do would be that which produces the greatest amount of happiness among the greatest amount of people. However, in doing so he not only goes off the rails, he removes the rails outright -motioning that we would be better off without them. To suggest that we disregard the enterprise of determining exactly how we intuit and subsequently decide what is the 'good' or 'right' thing to do, would be tantamount to disregard something so engrained into the fabric of our lives, like the sun rising in the east. What Williams argues against is the idea of philosophers spending their

time concerning themselves with investigation and categorization of ethical systems through the myriad of theories that have been presented throughout the years, because it doesnt seem like anyone has gotten it right thus far. Its been a very two-step forwards, one-step back kind of model. When presented with options, and further, what is the 'good' or 'right' thing to do in any given situation, as compared to the 'bad' or 'wrong' thing to do and what makes it so is worthy of inquiry and investigation. Moreover, just because we've struggled with a question and didn't (and don't) have a clear answer doesn't necessarily mean that it should be abandoned and that time spent. A mathematician doesn't give up on a formula because it proves difficult. The same goes for a physicist, biologist, astronomer, psychologist, etc. in their respective fields. This may be due to the fact that the subject matters are inclined to be more intangible and more available for theorizing than in the aforementioned fields. This is a primary reason why I believe Williams argument falls in on itself. While there are certainly problems with any number of philosophical theories, particularly those concerning ethics that have been proposed by various philosophers. Instead of presenting another plausible solution to unraveling the complex and slippery nature of the way we decide what is ethical and what it means to lead an ethical life, Williams asserts that we should just cut our losses and not bother further with this line of inquiry. This intimation strikes me as the wrong approach and more than anything it seems like a disservice to the philosophical pursuits of those that came before him and those that followed. These reasons, among others, are why I think Williams' assertions are ultimately misguided.

Works Cited Williams, B. A. (1985). Morality, the Peculiar Institution. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.