Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vol 2, No 2
EDITORIAL
The protection of our sovereignty and territorial integrity for the continued
enjoyment of our cherished ideals of freedom and democracy is the reason for being
of the Philippine Air Force. The PAF is ready and willing to defend these ideals and
improve the quality of life of every Filipino. Along with freedom is our responsibility
to see to it that our people are secure from both internal and external threats. These
responsibilities ultimately rest upon the political will and the combines effort of all
concerned instrumentalities of government to enable the Air Force to mount a
credible defense.
The rejection of the military bases agreement by the Philippine Senate led to the
eventual closure of the US military base and downgraded the external defense
capability of the country. This political decision brought the responsibility to protect
the from external aggression squarely upon the government. Unfortunately, there
has been an external defense vacuum since the departure of the Americans that has
yet to be fully and properly addressed by the government. This vacuum can be most
easily filled with a fully modernized Air Force.
Close to a decade after the passage of the AFP Modernization Law in 1995, not a
single aircraft was purchased to realize the purpose of providing the Air Force with
the capability to perform its mandate.
Meanwhile, the repository of doctrine, flying skills and experience of our pilots
and controllers is in danger of extinction if no aircraft is to defend our skies. There is
no way out of our primordial responsibility to defend our sovereignty, the only way is
for the political leadership to guarantee our people's freedom and their way of life.
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The 55 year of the Philippine Air Force’s existence as an Independent Major
Service is a great time to be a part of this proud organization. It is a time to take
stock of what we have done, celebrating our achievements and learning from our
shortcomings to avoid future mistakes and further improve ourselves as an
institution. After all, Anniversaries are not mere parades and ceremonies. They are
also a time to remember blessings and all of the significant events that added even
more color to the Air Force Story.
In the past year, we were in the forefront of the renewed drive of our
Government to eradicate the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group by bringing air power to bear
upon our enemies. We continue to take the lead in realizing the Government’s
initiatives in long-term sustainable development primarily through our long-range
and medium-range air transport assets and our Technical Service personnel. We
relentlessly pursue our own development through our evolving modernization
program. We are distinguishing ourselves in the Balikatan 02-2 joint military
exercises with the flying skill and professionalism that has earned the admiration of
our American allies. We even successfully defended our overall title in the AFP – PNP
Olympics, harvesting a record number of medals. Coming in first has become our
new trademark. This is the new Air Force we are creating for the future.
The past year has not been without our own share of setbacks, but as ever, we
bounced back strong and made certain that the lessons learned formed part of our
renewed drive towards constant improvement. Learning from these lessons have
allowed us to stay ahead and further sharpen our spurs as the First Force. For we
intend to move forward and upward always. Every step we take, we become
stronger, we become better.
This year, in view of our declining air assets are new, and promising
developments in our capability development efforts. Alongside fresh initiatives to
acquire new systems, Our Commander-in-Chief gave us a job to fast-track the
development of our basic doctrines in support of the employment of new weapons
systems and equipment. We are not merely acquiring material assets, we are also
developing new ways and means to better utilize those assets, maximize them and
innovate in our primary mission to fly and fight.
I am thankful to be blessed with Commanders, men and women who made the
Air Force faster, stronger and better. In particular, I am pleased with the efforts of
our staff to develop the study of Revolutions in Military Affairs, or RMA. RMA is the
new and emerging trend of future warfare. Primarily, it is the development of a new
and revolutionary way of fighting through the employment of new and old
capabilities. Given our mix of old and new equipment, I am certain that the PAF’s
wealth of intelligence and insight will allow us to develop our own capabilities to
allow us to be in step with our neighbors.
We will always improve. For at the end of each performance, the question will
not be how much we have achieved, but how much we have given. Not how many
victories we have won, but how much we have done. Not how much we were
honored, but how much we have served. The ideal of success is not enough if it does
not carry the ideal of service. This is the ideal of the First Force.
This is your PAF today, ever more ready, willing and able to be the first to
deliver, the first to respond and proud to serve. This is the foundation we have built
for the future. And the future, as I have always maintained, is in the skies.
Clark Air Base lives two lives. It is an historical landmark and a major
Philippine military facility. Clark Air Base was born during that tumultuous period in
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Philippine History known as the Filipino – American War at the turn of the 20
Century.
Fort Stotsenburg
It began as Fort Stotsenburg, laid out in 1902 – 1903. Most of the American forces
sent to put down the Philippine insurrection were cavalry units -- horse-mounted
troops – and were not used to fighting small bands of enemies on foot. Adding
further aggravation to their already dire straights, their horses were soon dying out
from eating local saw grass, thereby immobilizing the cavalry. Importing grass just to
feed the horses was not only costly but time-consuming.
Thus when the US 5th Cavalry came across fields near the village of Angeles in
Pampanga in the Central Luzon plain, where good grass grew, the American military
commanders decided to turn the entire area into a permanent bivouac. Late in 1902
US Army Engineers laid out a military reservation encompassing some 7, 700 acres.
The camp was named Fort Stotsenburg, in honor of Col. John M. Stotsenburg, who
had been killed in April 1899 while leading an attack in Quingua in the province of
Bulacan.
It was still roughly over 150, 000 acres wide for over 70 years until it was
modified by the Military Bases Agreement of 1979; its overall size was reduced to
131, 000 acres. The Agreement of 1979 effectively returned sovereignty over the
bases to the Government of the Philippines. In February of 1979, then Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Espino raised the Philippine Flag over Clark Air Base,
signaling yet another new era for Clark under Philippine sovereignty.
The idea of American military bases on foreign shores was brought about by
the tensions of the Cold War. America was alarmed by a potential “domino effect” in
the developing world as the Communist wave spearheaded by the Soviet Union and
the People’s Republic of China were gaining footholds in various smaller countries in
the former Indo-Chinese territories of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. As part of the
American-led strategy of Containment, it established military installations in its ally
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territories. The US 13 Air Force also had stations in Okinawa and Guadalcanal, apart
from Clark Air Base. Clark Air Base was the largest American military installation
outside of the Continental United States.
The Philippines was of key strategic importance during the height of the Cold
War since it was located practically in the midst of the Southeast Asian region. Its
sea-lanes and airspace remain vital routes in the event of any great geopolitical
developments that could escalate into open hostilities. It remains just as vital to
maintaining the balance in international politics to this very day. Keeping open the
busy sea-lanes that lead to the Far East and traverse the South China Sea remain key
to maintaining any kind of balance in the Asian region.
Clark Air Base is the linchpin that held this arrangement together and
maintained the balance in the Cold War Era here in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Fortunately, the great thermo-nuclear war everybody feared never came to pass. The
Cold War ended with a whimper as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990. America then
decided to downsize or clear out altogether many of its overseas military facilities.
Pinatubo’s Fury
It seemed foreboding that the PAF took over Clark Air Base when Mt.
Pinatubo, after centuries of dormancy, erupted in a fury that lowered the overall
temperature of the entire planet. So devastating was the eruption that it was a full
two years from 1991 – 1993 that the volcano remained a very real threat. Long after
the eruption, lahar flows and intermittent ash fall continued to plague the province of
Pampanga as well as the neighboring provinces of Zambales and Tarlac.
The first great task of the PAF was to clean up Clark Air Base. Although the
Americans did a great deal of cleaning up on their way out, the ash fall and the lahar
caused by Pinatubo continued well after the Americans left. The 600th Air Base Wing
under Gen. Diamos practically spent its first year of existence cleaning up after the
devastation of the volcano. Slowly but steadily, Clark Air Base began regaining its old
form. Still, the after-effects of Pinatubo’s eruption lingered long after the volcano
had once again settled down, and PAF personnel were not too keen about staying in
Clark Air Base.
There are now six tenant units calling the Air Force City home including two of
the five major PAF Commands, the Air Logistics and Support Command (ALSC) and
the Air Reserve Command (ARC). Under the ALSC are the 410th Maintenance Wing
and the 420th Supply Wing. With them are the 672nd Finance Service Unit and the
PAF’s own special operations unit, the 710th Special Operations Wing. The latest
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addition to the growing list of PAF Units at the Air Force City is the 1 Tactical
Operations Wing, which oversees all PAF operations in the entire Luzon Region.
Clark Air Base is no longer just a purely military facility, which gives further
credence to the reality that is now the Air Force City. With the creation of the Clark
Development Corporation in 1993 and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) the
base is now a multi-purpose area that is geared towards not merely military purposes
but more importantly towards being an engine for sustainable long-term economic
development for the entire country.
In fact, the 600th ABW is tasked with the security, preservation and
maintenance of the expansive 4, 400 hectares making up the entirety of the CSEZ and
not just the PAF Facilities therein. Among the non-military facilities under the mantle
of the 600th ABW are the Diosdado Macapagal International Airport, the Duty Free
shops, the Mimosa and Fontana Leisure Estates and the Centennial Expo Site. In line
with the renewed Command vision of establishing and developing close ties with the
host communities, the 600th ABW also works closely with Local Government Units in
Angeles and Mabalacat in livelihood programs and other Civil-Military Operations.
With more private companies expected to settle in the CSEZ over the next few years,
the Air Force City is expected to continue to grow and expand as the PAF itself takes
on even greater responsibilities at Clark Air Base.
Republic Act No. 7227 created the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA). This statute accelerated the conversion of vast tracts of military
reservations and former US Military Facilities into other productive uses under the
auspices of the BCDA. Its policy statement declared “the government will accelerate
the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and extensions… “
Funds to be used will come from the sale in part or in whole of Metro Manila
military camps and bases. It was also the declared policy of the government to
enhance the benefits to be derived from the sale of these military properties to
promote the economic development of Central Luzon in particular and ultimately the
entire country in general.
As beneficial as the reasons for enacting this law may be, the BCDA has not
really lived up to its intended role of being the lead agency to ensure that the
government will gain maximum benefits from the sale of military real estate. Acting
in the capacity of a private real estate broker more than a government
instrumentality, the BCDA has made some questionable moves.
For instance, among its many functions, the BCDA is tasked with replicating
military facilities once they are moved to a new location after said facilities are
removed from their former locations in the aftermath of a sale of military real estate.
This means that if a unit used to occupy a single-story structure with a total floor
area measuring 100 square-meters, in the event it is transferred after a sale, the
BCDA must be able to provide for say a two-story structure with the same total floor
area for the unit upon its relocation. Otherwise, the BCDA cannot facilitate the sale
of that particular property.
Unfortunately, the BCDA has gone ahead and done precisely that, with AFP Units
winding up as victims because of this negligence. Some of the PAF Units and
facilities that transferred to Clark Air Base from Villamor Air Base are among the
BCDA victims, having to settle for smaller workplaces and shortchanged facilities. It
is often a misconception that newer facilities are better facilities, such as in this case.
The BCDA even wanted to build a new runway right through the PAF runway and
relocate the PAF yet again to an even worse corner of the reservation, after the PAF
had done the hard work of rehabilitating and improving the runway.
While the template for mixed-use military and civilian facilities has found
success in other parts of the world, the same cannot be said for the Philippines. And
the most immediate loser in this scheme is the PAF. The greater injustice is that it
was the Air Force that took the lead in cleaning up and starting the rebirth of Clark
Air Base after the Pinatubo eruption and the departure of the Americans when
everybody else was dallying and could not even see much hope for the base.
It was the Air Force that secured the entire facility, imposing law and order in
the tumult after the departure of the Americans and the eruption. It was the Air
Force that got the facilities up and running less than a year after the devastation
wrought when Pinatubo erupted. In fact, a PAF C-130 was the first aircraft to land at
Clark Air Base after the eruption and departure of the Americans in 1992. When Clark
was formally turned over to the PAF, it was given the worst corner of the reservation,
having been overgrown with vegetation and practically cemented in by lahar and ash.
Yet in only a year, the Air Force City was born and PAF Units began relocating soon
thereafter.
Now, even though the Air Force is legally mandated to secure Clark Air Base, it
seems as if the BCDA is having a far greater say than the PAF about the future of
Clark Air Base. Of the 4, 400 hectares making up the CSEZ, the PAF was given only
350 hectares for its exclusive use. All of the air service facilities being used by both
military and civilian air transport were all rehabilitated under the auspices of the PAF,
not the least of which is the fully refurbished Haribon facility and the new C-130
hangar. In short, after the Americans left and even before the BCDA, the CDC and the
CSEZ were created, when nobody else saw much hope for Clark, the PAF had already
claimed Clark Air Base and brought it back to life.
The PAF fully supports the development initiatives of the government. It has
even taken the lead in these initiatives through its own operations using its own
initiatives. That is precisely why the Air Force City was created. It was meant to be a
modern metropolitan multi-use complex that enhances the fulfillment of the mission
of the PAF. But because of some questionable undertakings of the BCDA, the PAF is
finding that instead of being a partner, its role and its voice in Clark Air Base is slowly
diminishing.
There is still hope to turn this unfortunate trend around, through dialogue and
more genuine empowerment for the PAF. The law itself mandates not merely a PAF
presence at Clark, but an empowered PAF that is a partner in its development. A
diminished PAF presence in Clark means a diminished capacity for development for
the CSEZ and the country as a whole.
The Air Force City is but a glimpse of what the PAF can accomplish when it is
fully empowered. The PAF already has the institutional capabilities to be an effective
partner, not merely an effective security force. All that is needed is to make certain
that as a real stakeholder, the PAF is not overruled or bypassed by those who do not
have the sympathy to see what Clark is all about. As stated earlier, it leads two lives,
as an historical landmark and as a major Philippine military facility. Now it is about
to have a third life: as a major engine for national development. No less than the
President herself concurs that the future is in the skies. Who but the PAF could
better take the lead in building and securing that future? But for now, the query
remains: Quo Vadis, for the PAF, for Clark Air Base, and for the National Government.
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References
2. Republic Act Number 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1991.
4. Executive Order Number 80 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in April of 1993. This
established the CDC, the BCDA and the CSEZ.
5. Republic Act Number 7898, an Act Providing for the Modernization of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and Other Purposes, 1995. (The PAF Modernization Program
was the template for the AFP Modernization Program)
6. PAF Memorandum of Agreement with the BCDA, signed during the term of Lt. Gen.
Nicasio Rodriguez as CG, PAF.
3RD TOW “THE FIRST FORCE IN MINDANAO”
By: 2LT RODOLFO N MANGAYA PAF
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The Third Tactical Operations Wing (3 TOW) is the First Force in Mindanao
that provides Tactical Air Power all over its area of responsibility. Its mission is to
conduct sustained air operations in coordination with the ground and naval forces of
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the Southern Command. In order for the 3 TOW to perform its mission, it performs
the following functions: close air support and interdiction, air mobile operations, air
assault and air logistic operations, tactical airlift operations, resupply air operations,
insertion and extrication, combat search and rescue, casualty air evacuations, air
reconnaissance and surveillance operations, forward air control operations, maritime
air patrol in support to socio-economic and national development. Lastly, it
organizes, trains and develops its personnel and other personnel of the Army, Navy,
PNP, reservists, and civilian auxiliaries to enhance unit operations, civil defense and
disaster preparedness. In short, 3rd TOW caters all air operation requirements of
Southern Command, other government agencies, and some legitimate non-
government organizations (NGOs) of the whole Southern Philippines.
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3 TOW is the only wing that is situated in the long war-torn Mindanao. The presence
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of the 3 TOW, the bedrock of Tactical Air Power in Southern Philippines, is a force
multiplier to the ground and naval forces of Southern Command. During the All Out
War against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abusayyaf Group (ASG), 3rd
TOW performed exceptionally well in providing simultaneous sustained air operations
against the lawless groups. The virtually non-stop pressures coming from the air
were just too much for the enemies thus they were forced to give up their
strongholds and surrender themselves to the government troops.
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Just recently, 3 TOW again has proven itself by successfully defending Edwin
Andrews Air Base and Tactical Operations Group (TOG) 9 from the massive attack of
the Misuari Renegade Group (MRG). It effectively and efficiently employed all its air
assets like the OV-10s, SF-260s, MG-520s and UH-1Hs against the MRGs during the
siege of Jolo and Cabatangan last 19 November 2001 and 27 November 2001,
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respectively. Without the close air support provided by the 3 TOW in those
incidents, the AFP ground troops might have encountered strong resistance of MRGs
from Cabatangan Complex and have found it impossible to neutralize them in a short
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period of time. In the operations against the ASG, the 3 TOW was again very
instrumental in the successful rescue of the Sipadan and Dos Palmas hostages and
the members of Miracle Crusade who were held captives by the Abusayyaf. Likewise,
the Wing contributed a lot in the killing of hundreds of Abusayyaf members by
providing close air support, air interdiction, casualty air evacuation of friendly troops
and resupply missions that brought the fighting government troops in a state of high
morale.
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Nowadays, 3 TOW is still and will
remain to be a vital factor for the total
annihilation of ASG and for the
successful rescue of the remaining
hostages. In the ongoing Balikatan 02-
1, the presence of the US troops in
Zamboanga City and Basilan Island
greatly enhanced the operational
capability of the government troops
operating in the area. The high-
tech air assets like the MH-47
“Chinook”, HH-60 “Pavehawk” /
“Blackhawk”, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) “Predator”, P-3 “Orion” and other
modern equipment like the satellite
Basilan and Jolo Islands are only small islands but have the most difficult
terrain to operate. Located both in the southern part of Mindanao, these two forested
islands have been a constant haven of Muslim terrorists and rebels. Because of the
unforgiving terrain, the five-grid square on the map will take the army troops five (5)
to six (6) days to travel by foot. Considering that the enemies in the said areas are
composed of only ten (10) to fifteen (15) armed individuals and splintered into
several groups, they are very mobile and unpredictable. They also don’t stay in
permanent camps and only harbor in different places at very short period of time.
Likewise, the enemies have the knowledge of the local terrain thus making them
move freely and swiftly mostly during nighttime. Given these situations, a company
or a battalion ground movement that will take five (5) to six (6) days to reach a
certain objective with the enemy group composed only of ten (10) to twenty (20)
individuals that are very mobile is inappropriate. The enemy concept of operations
makes the bandits and terrorists a very difficult target of the government troops.
Given these conditions, the only way to counter the enemy’s concept of operations
is to have sustained airmobile operations that will quickly insert and extricate the
ground troops in and out of the battle zone. In this kind of concept, it requires only
several well-equipped and highly-trained Light Reaction Force (LRF) composed of
seven (7) to twelve (12) soldiers who are capable of fast roping or rappelling from a
chopper and be deployed very quickly. With this, the five-grid square that will take
the army guys five (5) to six (6) days to walk will only be traveled in less that seven
(7) minutes by LRF in air mobile operations using UH-1Hs. This will also fully exploit
the capability of the UH-1Hs in bringing the timely employment of force to block and
strike into the battle zone and go away with the practice of using them like taxi to
ferry VIPs. The concept of using UH-1Hs for insertion and extrication missions have
the advantage of speed and accuracy over the enemy, thus, attaining the element of
surprise - a very important element in the operations in Basilan and Jolo. On the
other hand, the extensive use of air platform in Jolo and Basilan Islands has great
psychological impact both to friendly and enemy troops. The psychological impact of
this to friendly troops is that it gives assurance to the fighting troops on the ground
that they can be evacuated easily and be transported to the nearest hospital if they
get wounded in action. It also gives the ground troops easy time to get into and out
of the target objective without hassle and danger of ambush form the ground. For the
enemies, hearing the roaring engine of the aircraft and the thunder-sounding guns,
seeing the rockets and bombs drop from the sky make them worry a lot. Aside from
fire coming form the ground troops, the projection of force from the air gives the
enemies small and limited space to go and hide thus making them vulnerable and
easy targets.
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The aging fleet of air assets of the Philippine Air Force stationed at 3 TOW is
far beyond compare from the high tech avionics and navigational equipment of the
US aircraft. The capabilities between the PAF and US aircraft may differ a lot but the
caliber of PAF pilots in terms of flying skills is unprecedented. However, it is still a
must for the Philippine Air Force to be modernized. The PAF must have the advanced
technology of weaponry, aircraft, communications, and information and targeting
system in order to have efficient and enhanced capabilities in day and night air
operations. Without these, the lawless groups will keep on exploiting the present
limitations of the PAF aircraft to operate at night.
For a very technical branch of service like the
Philippine Air Force, fighting at the different fronts
of war requires reliable advanced air platform that
can meet the present internal and external security
concerns and other requirements of the Philippine
government. The horizon seen by the naked eye
from the ground and from the air differs a lot.
As the only unit in the area that has the capability to project the lethality of
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Tactical Air Power, 3 TOW will remain to be the edge force of Southern Command
against the MILF, CPP-NPA, ASG MBG, and other lawless elements in Mindanao.
Therefore, ground commanders who orchestrate the battle plan in Mindanao must
seriously consider Douhet when he pointed out that “Anyone considering the ground
and naval operations must of necessity remember that above land and sea is the air.”
EFFICIENCY OF WOMEN IN COMBAT
By 1LT WILLIAM RACAL PAF
Today, the modern society has started to take cognizance of the emerging role
of women in a more complex world of male oriented professions. Changes in views
have become more apparent although some still expect a few of them to make it. But
those who are categorically fated to succeed have ascended at par with their male
counterparts. Women are now seen to proliferate even the world of men in uniform.
Suffice it to stay that they have invaded almost every place in this society.
They undergo the same flight training with disregard to their inherent
physiological limitations. They are subjected to the same rewards for their well-
done accomplishments they will even serve the same set of punishments for their
misdemeanors.
It seems that nothing really separates or
differentiates women from the rest. Yet some
say women still cannot outlive the stringency
of life in this field. Their efficiency in combat
is still a discussion on the table. It has been
the recurrent theme in the society ever since
they were given the chance to prove
themselves.
In the Philippine Air Force, it has only been four years since lady pilots were
involved in combat operations. Not much can be concluded in this short period of
time, and with a few number of lady combat pilots as guinea pigs, the study is
somehow limited. There maybe observations on the presence of women in the field,
but these could not make a general conclusion as to whether women are really
efficient in combat.
Problems regarding female combatants in the Air Force are not much different
from those in the Army and the Navy. The Philippine Army have tried putting their
women in the front line as company commanders and platoon leaders, and the same
problem billeting is true. Likewise, in the Navy, midship women are not only allowed
to assignments in the ships, which have provisions for women.
Not all people have the same view on the efficiency of female combatants.
Perhaps there are still some who prefer women to stay home and watch their own
families. But times change. Unlike before, where battles are fought physically, today,
our battles are greatly influenced by technology. Time will come when battles will be
fought from the neck up and probably, by that time, more women will be involved.
Unlike men, who are generally war-freak, most women still prefer to be the
caring and loving mothers at home.
Those who chose to risk their lives, definitely, are very efficient in their own
fields because they have placed their hearts and minds on it. Maybe, you cannot put
all the women the world in combat, but only select a few who are determined and
willing to face the challenge.
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY
AFFAIRS
A Visionary Strategy for the Future of the Philippine Air Force
INTRODUCTION
The RMA issues emerged out of the post-Cold War era during the late 80’s
when debate about star wars and its implications to military strategy was
conceptualized. Moreover, military theorists and historians have long noted the
existence of historical revolutions. They believed that these historical revolutions
were caused by the introduction of new technological breakthroughs including
weapon systems. In contrast, the Soviets called these series of events as Military
Technical Revolutions (MTRs). Their theory was founded on the concept that the
incorporation of radically sophisticated capabilities into existing military forces would
provide them an advantage in the conduct of decisive military operations in the
European theater against NATO. Thus, following the introduction of MTR came the
introduction of the term RMA by analysts in the United States whose definition is
more technologically oriented.
In 1995, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7879, otherwise known as the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Law. The law declares a state policy
“to modernize the AFP to a level where it can fully and effectively perform its
constitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of
the Republic of the Philippines”. It is under this premise that the PAF had its own
paradigm shift towards achieving RMA. The PAF as the primary defender of the
country’s skies will develop its capability based on intrasystematic advantage.
Intrasystematic advantage as a means to exploit RMA is what the nation’s economic
condition dictates. This RMA strategy is defined as exploiting Information Technology
(IT) to enable one’s own military system to operate more efficiently and effectively
than it did before, own-system features are the targets for change, and the criteria
for improvement are based on own- system performance. Through this undertaking,
the PAF will exploit RMA to empower the five pillars of the Air Force Modernization
Program with emphasis on Capability, Materiel and Technology. Moreover, aerial
assets will be strategically revolutionized through the acquisition of aircraft capable
of gathering massive amounts of information, greater range of striking power, higher
accuracy and equipped with integrated weapons systems. Likewise, aircraft with
C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance) equipped with satellite video, gyro-stabilized cameras, side and
forward looking radars and data communication links form part of the PAF inventory
to be purchased. As such, future military operations will reduce civilian casualties
and compression of time on the battlefield. Significantly, through these highly
advanced air assets, integration and coordination with naval and ground forces will
facilitate the overall conduct of military operations.
As the PAF moves forward with its response to RMA, it may want to view the
phenomenon both as an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity because it
will empower military air power, and at the same time a challenge because of the
rapidly expanding role of the Air Force in the future. With RMA, the PAF is ready to
take-off to soar the infinite skies equipped with a strategic vision to revolutionize the
future of military operations.
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Endnotes:
1 Dr. Elinor Sloan, Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 2000, p.1
3 Ibid., p. 9
4 Ibid., p. 9
5 Ibid., p. 9
INTRODUCTION
The AFP Modernization Program began with only four components, that is,
without the doctrine development component. The four components were
Organizational Development, Materiel and Technology Development, Bases
Development, and Human Resources Development. In the Philippine Air Force
(PAFP), the premise for all these components was based on the perceived best way to
organize, equip, base and train to attain the level of the modern Air Force. It should
be noted, however, that the PAFM 0-1 is outdated and does not include the whole
spectrum of the current PAF missions and functions. During the deliberation of the
AFP Modernization Program, some lawmakers queried on the basis for the
modernization plan, hence, the inclusion of doctrine as a component of
modernization.
In 1995, Republic Act 7898, otherwise known as the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Modernization Law was enacted essentially with five-component areas.
Among the five areas, doctrines development is considered as a fundamental basis
for other component areas. It is significant to note that it was during the
Congressional inquiries regarding the rationale of other components that doctrine
became a tacit requirement.
The success of the PAF depends more on mental than physical capabilities.
People with greater mental acuity can outsmart even the most sophisticated military
establishment. As a major component of the PAF Modernization, doctrines
development will be a dynamic force multiplier. As mentioned earlier, the PAF
doctrine represents the apex of PAF thinking about the best ways to use air power
and how to effectively contribute to the attainment of national goals and objectives
and thus deserves utmost attention.
Process
5 4 3 2 1
F fw F Fw F Fw F Fw F Fw Total WM Interpretation
PAF 7 35 19 76 33 99 6 12 0 0 222 3.42 FAIRLY
Doctrine EFFECTIVE
Process
Developm SLIGHT
ent
8 4 3 4 6 2.44
Process 4 1 9 4 8 6 159
0 6 8
The OSS as the doctrine center of the PAF must be reviewed in the context on
the importance of doctrines development as an indispensable pillar in the
modernization program and as a major concern of the Command considering its
impact to the efficiency and effectiveness of the PAF. In the Unit Manning Document
(UMD) dated 30 March 2001, the OSS serves as a Personal Staff of the Commanding
General, PAF that assists and advises him on the formulation of PAF doctrines and
conduct of studies on air power and strategic and special projects of the Command.
Likewise, the UMD prescribes the authorized number of personnel wherein the
present manpower fill-up of OSS is only 40% manned based on the current UMD.
CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. OSS, HPAF to initiate a review of the HPAF SOP Nr 03, Subject: PAF Doctrine
Process, with objective of revising the current approach to doctrine development. The
review should focus on mechanisms to improve the process such as incorporating
provisions on educating the force on doctrines and ensuring that these doctrines are
being applied. The process should not end with the publication of the doctrine. The
end state should be a dynamic, coherent and systematized intellectual process and
not just a bureaucratic compliance. A doctrine development strategy should be
formulated along with the revision of the SOP.
4. A-8 in coordination with A-1 to program masteral and other advance learning
on the broad and specific streams to a core of personnel projected to be assigned
with the proposed Doctrine Center or to be designated as Doctrine Officer. Broad
doctrine education and training could include one or combination of the following:
a. Strategic Planning Course
c. Military History
Among others, the specialist stream for doctrine development may include
Human Resource Development, Logistics Management, Military Technology, Project
Management and Technology Management. These personnel shall be primarily
responsible for doctrine development of the Philippine Air Force.
6. A-1 in coordination with OSS to spot, recruit and develop qualified civilian
researchers and writers. Networking with educational institutions and research
centers would facilitate this effort. There are nine available slots for civilian
employees at OSS, HPAF
Reassessing the Philippine Air Force:
A Doctrinal Perspective
By Major Noel L. Patajo PAF
Since it became an independent Major Service, the formative years of the PAF
began as the whole world also began to realign into bi-polar community. Within the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the PAF represents the revolutionized science of
war-military air power. For a developing country, the Philippines adopted the
conventional air force organization patterned after the modification of the American
lessons learned during the war. For half a century, the PAF existed in a paradigm of a
conventional air force yet utilized as a support unit to a constabulary force, that is the
AFP. The AFP, the PAF in particular, are essentially defense essentials of a
democratic country against the communists. Currently, the AFP is still mandated by
law to defend the national territory against foreign invaders and the PAF as the
primary air defense unit tasked to meet the enemy as far as possible away from the
Philippine territory.
Air Corps
The first Filipino military pilot, LT Leoncio Malinao, flew the JN-4 over the
fields of Pasay and Cavite in 1920 thus heralding the birth of the Filipino airman.1 By
the end of that year, another 25 military pilots led by Lt Porfirio E. Zablan will
graduate from the Philippines first aviation school-Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor
Corporation. On January 1, 1935 the Philippine Legislature passed Act 4194 formally
creating an aviation unit for the Philippine Constabulary that was tasked to assist the
Philippine Constabulary in maintaining peace and order and the government in
performing such civilian work as customs duty and aerial pest control.
Later in 1935, the Philippine Constabulary Air Corps (PCAC) with its two
wings-tactical and service was placed under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Army
Air Corp (PAAC). During the World War II, General Douglas McArthur inducted the
PAAC into the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and turned over
fourteen P-26 Peashooters and three B-10 bombers.2 The Japanese began its attack
of the Philippines with planes and the PAAC proved its mettle against odds. The air
action over Batangas proved to be the only recorded air-to-air combat experience of
the Filipino airman. The defeat of the Filipino airmen and the destruction of the
USAFFE air corps paved the way for the wholesale defeat of the ground defenders.
The Second World War proved that the Air Force is capable of completely
independent action in its own element and far beyond the range of land and sea
forces.3 Consequently, the military thought after the world war favored the strategic
strike option that an air force offered. Corollary, the early air power theorist idea
that control of the air is a requirement to be achieved before any further operation in
all mediums can start created an air force organization that favors the fighter unit-
pursuit unit according to Gen Billy Mitchell, over other air force elements.
th
For the PAF, the 5 Fighter Wing became the lead unit of the PAF. Since then,
th
the quality of the air assets in the 5 Fighter Wing became the barometer of the
th
quality of the whole PAF. The air defense mission of the 5 Fighter Wing along with
the radar and warning control became the vital cogs of the Philippine Air Defense
Systems. In turn, the quality of the air defense system determines the ability of the
AFP to conduct a respectable defense of the national territory if the proposition that
whoever controls the air controls the surface will be true.
Since the end of the cold war between the United States and the former Soviet
Union and their respective satellite states, more ethnic conflicts have erupted and
engulfed countries than ever before the Philippines has been no exception to ethnic
strife. The Christians and Moros in Mindanao have been at odds, sometimes at each
other’s throats, for centuries.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines considers the Mindanao conflict as a low
level conflict – hostile acts that are deliberately limited in scale or confined
geographically. Specifically, in accordance with modern lexicon of warfare, it is low
intensify conflict and sometimes called revolutionary or guerilla warfare. It is unique
that it directly targets the political – social structure of the country rather than its
Armed Forces.
“Close Air Support Air Force” is about air power employment in low intensity
conflict. Broadly, it may be viewed as air power application by a small air force in
support of the surface forces against insurgents and or conventional formations of
forces.
Aerial fire support for friendly surface forces has always been well understood
in the AFP, with Army and Navy commanders recognizing the significance of such air
support. The broad AFP concept for internal security operations is known as "Lambat
Bitag" operations series - Filipino words literally meaning Net and Snare involve the
prominent role of air elements as well as surface forces.
In the land environment, the air roles are Close Air Support (CAS) and
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). CAS involves air attacks against the rebels in
contact with AFP forces. BAI involves air action against rebel forces (including supply
lines) which are in a position to directly affect the outcome of the land battle but
which are not in contact with friendly land forces. BAI aims to isolate the rebels in
the battlefield.
The conventional air force advocated so far adheres to the air power structure
recommended in the PAF Air Power Manual. Despite claims that the PAF lacks the
doctrinal depth, the existing PAF organization, structure, doctrine and thoughts point
to a balance Air Force. For brevity, the air power structure contains the air strategy –
overall employment plan for air forces in war. The final air strategy product is the
combination of technology, manpower and doctrine.
The PAF also uses the concurrent campaigns such as air strike (strategic air
force), control of the air (air defense air force), and air support (close air support air
force). All three campaigns interlock to form the platform on which the Air Force (air
power) is based. Air operations, on the other hand, are integrated employment of air
power to achieve a specific campaign objective. There are many related air roles or
capabilities that an air force requires to exercise fully the potential of air power. A
small air force like the PAF will generally not have the capability to exercise all the
roles. It is strongly advocated that despite some of the non-mandatory air roles
stated in the generic air power structure, the PAF should strive to have the capacity
to perform such air roles when needed and part of ensuring it can is by having a
comprehensive basic air doctrine.
As stated earlier, the Philippine Constabulary Air Corps (PCAC) was intended
to perform support roles for peace and order operations. If we examine the PAF
history, since 1947, the PAF has been performing air support roles to the
constabulary role of the AFP. The threat of invasion, according to present planners,
will be very remote and that internal security operations will be the focus for the
years to come. As such, the “constabulary air force” will be revisited rather than the
“conventional air force”. With such assessment, the PAF through LtGen Defensor
correctly adopted the “First Force” Strategy: Force Projection, Information
Advantage, Rapid Response and Mobility, Strategic Impact, Tactical Synergy, Force
Generation and support, Organizational brilliance, Research and applied innovation,
Control of stations and Empowered quality workforce.
The AFP is currently reviewing its basic doctrine-with it, the Major Services
are also reviewing their basic doctrine. For a long time, the AFP has been organized
as a conventional force mandated by law for territorial defense. The concerns of the
AFP for several decades concern the communist movement and secessionism and
lately organized crime groups like the Pentagon and Abu Sayyaf. The President had
tasked the AFP to look into its doctrine and perhaps the AFP by accepting the fact
that the bulk of its concern is constabulary in character, the proper doctrine should
be semi-conventional AFP that can shift its organization and force structure to
conventional nature while continuously performing “constabulary” role.
The Air Force, on the other hand, should seek to achieve the ability to win
wars by air power alone – more relevant in the current nexus of security and law
enforcement will be to achieve “constabulary” effectiveness through its air power.
The small air force, to be relevant, should be able to strike when needed with
lethality and precision if the information it relayed became essential knowledge for
the decision makers.
THE AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
MAJOR GENERAL NEMESIO M SIGAYA O-5658 is a
distinguished graduate of the Aviation Cadet Program Class 1970A
from the Philippine Air Force Flying School. An energetic “fighter
jock”, he flew the jets of Basa Air Base as a pilot trainee, element
leader, flight instructor and flight commander, among others,
aside from also flying the Hueys of the Philippine Air Force.
GEN SIGAYA has held various key positions. What paved his way to his
present designation as the Commander, Air Defense Command was his previous
assignment as the 530th CTW Commander during the campaign against the MILF and
the ABUSAYYAF in 2000 where the role of the Air Force during this campaign was
pivotal in the victory of the AFP.
Q As the Commander of the Air Defense Command, what do you think is the role
of your unit at the present time?
A As the “Defenders of the Philippine Skies” and our nation’s first line of
defense, the mission of the Air Defense Command is to defend, secure and protect the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines. Our mission and functions are specific,
whether it is today or tomorrow. We are mandated to provide active air defense;
conduct strategic strikes against enemy forces and installations; conduct combat air
patrol over Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Kalayaan Island Group (KIG); provide
air surveillance, air warning, aircraft control, communications network in support of
PAF Air Defense System; strategically deploy ground base air defense against enemy
air attack; provide air support to combat forces in maritime environment; monitor air
and surface traffic on territorial airspace, EEZ & KIG; and perform other functions as
directed by higher headquarters. Unless these mission and functions are changed, our
role will still be the same.
Q Can you share with us your vision of your unit or the Air Force as a major
branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines?
The first and most important role for an air force is control of the air. With
control of the air, all other combat tasks whether on the ground or in the air, can be
expected to go much smoother. I foresee important transformation in our Air Force
Organization depending on what is required by our national interest and national
priority.
The overall organization development of the Philippine Air Force will put more
particular emphasis on key principles of joint operations and interoperability
along this line- Command and Control have to be well defined at GHQ down to the
lower units. We should continue to seek new and innovative application to
increase our defense capability in the context of constraint of resource outlook.
We will rely more on high level of competence and professionalism of the men
and women of the PAF. I foresee a PAF that is able to respond quickly to short-
notice tasks because of its preparedness. Our levels of readiness for key response
forces- like Air Defense, Intelligence, Maritime Surveillance, Maritime Patrol, and
ready- reactions ground forces should be increased as we continue to understand
better the demands of the defense of the country in a short- warning conflict.
Q What can you say about the present capabilities of the Air Force in terms of
preparedness in dealing with both external and internal threats of the country?
A Providing for the defense of the Philippines is no easy task. We have a very
small and antiquated air defense forces. All of us know how many antiquated air
assets we have at present. We should learn from our past and the lessons of war
where Air Power plays an urban role in this defense.
The ability of the PAF to respond quickly to short-notice tasks rely much on its
preparedness. Our level of preparedness in external threats on some key response
forces like intelligence, air surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense and ready
reaction ground forces needs to be properly addressed and defined.
A PAF with very few antiquated air defense assets and radars, dealing with
external threats is a nightmare. Our preparedness in internal threats is adequate and
is a force to reckon with. Our equipment is older that the pilots flying them but are
still reliable and could still be depended upon. However, the urgency to upgrade our
capabilities is very relevant.
Q What is your concept of an ideal Air Defense System for the Philippines?
A An ideal Air Defense System for our country should be able to apply a strategy
of defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth requires coordinated, flexible and measured
application of defense capabilities. In conflict, our air defense system would be able
to terminate the conflict or threat promptly and prevent its escalation. Defense-in-
depth exploits our geography by aiming to keep an adversary at arms length and
make any operations inside our PADIZ more difficult for an aggressor. The ability to
defend our territory will greatly reduce the prospect of a successful attack in the
Republic of the Philippines.
This strategy of defense-in-depth will require an Air Force structure that can:
The Air Defense System should be able to integrate civil and military
surveillance and intelligence sources, including combat aircraft, mobile surface to air
missile systems with major surface combatant. Airborne Early Warning and Control
(AEW & C) aircraft would considerably enhance our Air Defense.
Q With the passage of the AFP Modernization Law in 1996, what is the prospect
improving the capability development of the Philippine Air Force?
Q How do you see your role, your unit and the Philippine Air Force in the future?
A The PAF should be modernized, highly competent and professional, able to
respond to the new and more complex environment of the future. I see an Air
Force more involved in the promotion of regional peace and stability. Along this
line, the Air Defense Command will play a vital role in the defense of our country.
Q Sir, can you relate to us your personal and professional circumstances, before
achieving this rank and position? Your philosophy in life?
A If you do your job well, if you live a simple and honest life, if you do your job
professionally you will achieve what you want, cause in this world “nothing is
impossible” we can do it.
Ever since I took command of my first wing, I laid down my guiding principles,
which I wanted my men to follow. I coined the acronym “UNITY” which means:
N – networking
In support of the force ahead of its time, OSS has initiated the formulation of
the PAF Doctrines Development Matrix and has implemented the Presidential Policy
Guidance of creating the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Office in the Philippine
Air Force. These, among other accomplishments, have enhanced PAF’s vision of the
future by drawing out the doctrines that will decide the outcome of future conflicts
and by determining factors that will give the PAF the winning edge in fighting these
conflicts.
With the unfolding of the future warfare, the OSS has initiated the clearing of
the skies of the future Philippine Air Force.
The PAF has never taken this undertaking lightly. In its intention to maintain
its efficiency in rendering service to the people, one of its concerns is to have sound
doctrines guiding its personnel. Prior to its publication, a doctrine has to undergo
several phases of research and formulation, test and evaluation, and validation and
revision before it is submitted for CG, PAF’s approval. The process must be
continuous due to the changing technology, policies, organizational set-up, and other
aspects affecting its effectiveness and efficiency. The bodies concerned in
deliberating PAF doctrines are the PAF Doctrines Study Group (PDSG) headed by the
Director, OSS and PAF Doctrines Board (PDB) headed by the PAF Vice Commander.
Just recently, OSS sponsored the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and Workshop
CY- 2002, which was participated by the Director for Operations of the Functional
Commands, the Commanding Officer of Air Power Institute, Doctrine Officers of
different PAF units, and representatives from GHQ and other branches of service.
It was purposely held to layout a solid foundation of the PAF doctrines
development program consistent with the PAF Modernization Program for the
effective and efficient development of the respective doctrines of the PAF
Functional Commands. The objectives of the said conference and workshop are to
revitalize networking among doctrine officers, to layout plans for a strategic
doctrine development program for PAF, and to enhance the awareness and
update on doctrine development in the AFP. The key inputs of the workshops are
the AFP Modernization Program, Existing AFP Defense Policies, CG, PAF First
Force Strategy and SOP #03.
One significant output of the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and Workshop
is the PAF Doctrine Development Matrix, which aims to encourage the maximum
participation of different PAF units in the formulation of different operational and
tactical doctrines. The matrix is based on the AFP Modernization Program, of which
Doctrine Development is one of its pillars. Presently, it serves as the basis for the
doctrine development and programming of the staff concerned together with the
other requirements in the PAF.
As has been always said, change is the only thing constant in this world; what
is essential today may not matter tomorrow. Even in the conduct of warfare, changes
are inevitable when new executions of military operations are introduced due to new
technologies, doctrines, and concepts. This is termed as Revolution in Military Affairs,
which according to Andrew Marshall, is a major change in the nature of warfare
brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which when
combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and
organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military
operations.
The recent change in the organizational set-up of the OSS is not the first time.
The advent of developments in the military environment and the demand for a
responding PAF supported by sound doctrines triggered these changes, changes that
will keep the PAF at par with the other Air Forces in spite of our technological set
back.
REFERENCES:
After Activity Report on the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and Workshop CY 2002,
OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City
Master Plan CY 2002, OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City
UMD CY 2002, OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City