NOTES ON COMMUNITARIANISM Phil. 213 R. N. Johnson I.

THE COMMON GOOD

Communitarians argue that we should prefer a politics of the common good to liberalisms neutrality with respect to any conceptions of the good. The "common good" for liberals is an optimal combination of preferences, each of which is given equal consideration, within the limits of respecting each person's rights. But liberalism does not judge the value of any preference. Professional wrestling is not ranked below or above theatre. Communitarians think that we can and must make such a judgment; a society can survive only if it promotes values which each recognizes as objective. What is the communitarian argument for this? Kymlicka claims it is, roughly, this: The possibility that the state might remain "neutral" with respect to values requires that each person's "self" is "unencumbered" by its social roles. But the self is essentially encumbered by its social roles. So liberal neutrality should be rejected. What does it mean to say that the "self" is "encumbered" by its "social roles"? Actually, the idea is quite intuitive on its own, but is difficult to make entirely clear. Basically, communitarians think this way: Suppose I ask you "Who are you?" Most likely, in telling me who you--your "self"--is, you will describe a set of social roles, say, "US citizen, from Missouri, Muslim, student, middleclass, daughter of so and so, sister of so and so" and so on."You" will be that unique nexus amongst these social roles. On this picture, "encumbed" is just a fancy word for "defined by" or "made up of", and thus communitarians assert, and liberals deny, that the self is essentially "defined by" or "made up of" these roles. That is how I will be understanding the idea, anyway, and if communitarians have something else in mind, it is perfectly obscure to me what that might be. Why does liberal neutrality imply a self which is not "defined by" its social roles? Because liberal neutrality is justified on the grounds that it respects self-determination. For a state to favor one set of values over another set, according liberalism, would be for it to take a stand against that other set of values, and to make it difficult, if not impossible, for those whose values are disfavored to pursue and realize those values in their lives. They would not, that is, be able to make of themselves what they choose. But respecting a person's capacity to make of herself what she chooses is, for liberals, a basic requirement of any political system. So a state must be "neutral" with regard to values. But supposedly liberals must conceive of this in such a way that it implies respect for the choices of a self which is not determined and defined by its social roles. So in objecting to an unencumbered self, communitarians are objecting to the idea that we should respect self-determination, so conceived. And in objecting to respect for self-determination so conceived, communitarians are objecting to liberal neutrality.

II. THE ENCUMBERED SELF

According to liberalism, "who I am" is not defined by my class, ethnicity, religion or membership in any tradition or community. I am not defined by these because I am free to reject or accept the values of associated with any of these roles. It is that freedom that liberalism seeks to preserve and respect.

Communitarians think this is wrong, and is anyway based on a mistaken or unrealistic picture of ourselves. Who I am is defined by my class, ethnicity, religion and membership in a tradition and community. Hence, my good is what is good for the roles I inhabit. What is good for me is what is good for a, for example, white, working-class, anglo, protestant professor of philosophy. If "who I am" is defined by my social roles, then the choices I (my encumbered self) make are determined by the values associated with those roles. Hence, "self-determination", when the "self" is "encumbered", is "choosing on the basis of the roles one inhabits". But are we "encumbered" or "unencumbered" by our social identities or roles??

III. THREE ARGUMENTS

Communitarians argue that we are encumbered by them on the grounds that the alternative supposition, that we are unencumbered by our roles, leaves us with a self which is (1) "empty", (2) violates our self-perceptions, and (3) ignores our embeddedness in communal practices. THE EMPTINESS ARGUMENT 1. If the self is unencumbered by its social roles, then we can question the value of all of our social roles at once. 2. If can question their value all at once, then no value associated with any role can give us guidance in evaluating them. 3. But if no value associated with a social role can give guidance here, then either there is no value at all to be used, or simply the value of the freedom we exercise in questioning the value of these roles. 4. If there is no value, then we cannot evaluate anything, and so a fortiori, cannot evaluate all of our social roles at once. 5. If freedom is the only value, then what makes any of these roles valuable must be the freedom they bring. 6. But then, either we must conclude that the more free choices we make, the more valuable our life, or that we should not pursue activities for their own sakes but for the sake of the freedom they bring, neither of which is defensible. 7. So, the self is encumbered.

If freedom of choice is the only value, then the more we exercise it, the more value is created. The more we exercise it, the more valuable our lives. But that implies that it is better if each and every day we question all of our committments and endorse them anew. But committments can't be questioned every day. A life with more choices is not better than other lives. If freedom of choise is the only value, then everything we do we do for the sake of exercising free choice, not for the values internal to those activities. But telling people to make free choices doesn't tell them which choices to make. It doesn't tell us what is worth choosing. But this is a false picture of our motivations. I write papers in order to say something, not in order to exercise free choice. If writing papers is intrinsically valuable, then it is worth doing for its own sake, hence,

1. If the self is unencumbered, then we cannot teat communal values as authoritative. 2. If we cannot teat communal values as authoritative, then we cannot value any projects for their own sakes. 3. If we cannot value any projects for their own sakes, then we cannot acquire any projects. Liberals claim that we do not need a "fixed" given set of values in order to question our projects and roles. But that does not imply that they think that there is no given set of values at all. Indeed, every choice may require a given set of values, but a liberal thinks that these values themselves can be questioned over time, perhaps from the perspective of new values. Perhaps we should treat communal ends as authoritative anyway, however. THE SELF-PERCEPTION ARGUMENT 1. We are unencumbered by our social roles only if this corresponds to our "deepest self-understanding". 2. But our deepest self-reflection reveals a self encumbered by its aims, purposes or "ends". 3. So the self is not unencumbered. Problem: That the self is unencumbered does not imply that we can imagine ourselves with no aims. The capacity for the self to question any aim only requires that I be able to imagine myself with other aims. And this, in turn, implies that no particular aim is constitutive of me. The unencumbered self implies, not that we can perceive a self with no aims, but that we can perceive ourselves with different aims. Can we perceive ourselves with different aims? THE EMBEDDED SELF ARGUMENT 1. We are unencumbered by our social roles only if our reasoning consists of decisions of who to become. 2.But our reasoning consists of discoveries of who we are, not decisions about who to become. 3. So the self is not unencumbered. Problem: What is the argument for 2? Apparently, the idea is this: I am a philosopher, teacher, husband, brother, US citizen, etc. That is, who I am is comprised of various roles. When I engage in practical reasoning, I try to determine what it would be best for me to do. But if "me" is simply the occupier of these roles, then in practical reasoning, I am trying to determine what is best for one who occupies the roles which I occupy. That requires discovering what it means to be a philosopher, teacher, husband, brother, US citizen, etc. Importantly, for each role, what defines it is a good one of its kind. Hence, the answer to the question "what is a philosopher" is cast in terms of doing certain things well--arguing, thinking, reasoning, and so on. So in deciding what it would be best to do, I am deciding what it would be best for a philosopher, etc. to do, and that requires discovery of what a philosopher is, that is, one who does certain things well. It is supposed to follow from this that practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for me to do, is a process of discovering who I am, not a process of deciding who I am

to become. This is how communal values define our identity, and so why we discover who we are rather than decide who to become. But even if we do engage in self-discovery, having done so, we surely think we can question the values we discover. Suppose I am a lawyer. I try to decide what it would be best for me to do, and in so doing I am discovering what a lawyer is. In my community, a lawyer, I find, is someone who litigates well. But upon finding out that these values--the values of litigation--define myself, I can surely question them. And questioning these values is a rational, deliberative process of deciding whether these values really are valuable. But since this sort of deliberation is no longer a process of discovery, it looks as if practical deliberation is surely more than what the communitarian thinks that it is. Suppose, then, we adopt a weaker view, one that allows adoption and questioning of ends for reasons. This would not mark any difference with the liberal theory. Communitarians may respond that the roles and associated values cannot be rejected by us, but they can be reinterpreted. (Christian housewife example). Implausible, since we can makes sense of rejecting values and roles. People do do it. So must be a normative claim. People shouldn't do it. But that is equally implausible.

IV. THE SOCIAL THESIS:

The development and exercise one's capacity for self-determination requires a certain kind of society with a certain kind of social environment. (i) A state which is neutral on values is not this kind of society or social environment. (ii). A state which encourages valuable and discourages valuless ways of life is this kind of society or environment. a. Requires sustaining cultural structures provides people with meaningful options. b. Requires a shared forum in which to evaluate these options c. Requires a political structure which citizens see as having legitimacy. Liberals think that the state should be neutral and so not promote or sustain certain ways of life over others, certain cultural traditions over others. Rather, ways of life and traditions will be sustained, if they are of value, by the free choices of people in society. BACK