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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Thomas Pickering

Type of Event: Interview
Date: December 22 2003

IPrepared by: Danie; Byman

Reviewed by: Chris Kojm
Team Numbers: Front Office, Three (Counterterrorism Policy) and Four (Financing)
Location: 2100 K Street
Participants - Commission: Philip Zelikow, Chris Kojm, Daniel Byman, Len Hawley,
and Serena Wille

Career History
Highlights of Ambassador Pickering's long and illustrious career include serving as
Ambassador to Israel (1987-1988), UN Ambassador (1988-May 1992), Ambassador to
India (August 1992-March 1993), and Ambassador to Russia (May 1993-November
1996). In 1996, Pickering briefly retired and became President of the Eurasia
Foundation. In April 1997, he came back as a career officer to serve as Undersecretary
for Political Affairs, leaving that position at the end of December 2000. On January 2,
2001, Pickering became a Senior Vice President for International Affairs at Boeing. (U)

Duties as Undersecretary
Pickering described the duties of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs ("P") as varying
according to who is the Secretary. As the number three, P plays a crucial role when the
Deputy and Secretary are away. P also serves as the Department's crisis manager and as
the position with which various regional assistant secretaries work most closely. P is also
traditionally the top career officer, acting as a voice and an ear for the Foreign Service in
particular but also for the civil service. Pickering also was a voice and an ear for INR
and for SteT. In general, Pickering tried to focus on issues where Deputy Secretary
Talbot or Albright were not directly involved, and he acted as a decision maker on them.
He was often the Department's Principal in Deputies' meetings and attended many
"Small Group" meetings, either acting as the Principal or backing up Albright. (U)

When Pickering became P, he and the Secretary agreed that the Department was
excessively stovepiped. Undersecretaries often did not include the relevant bureaus in
their meetings. Gaps resulted, and too many things were pushed to the top for resolution.
To counter this, Pickering worked closely with the other five undersecretaries and made it
a point to invite other bureaus to various meetings. ~

Terrorism before the Africa Bombings

Pickering's past work in the Middle East, South Asia, and El Salvador made him very
.concerned about terrorism even before the 1998 Embassy bombings, though he noted
there was "more frustration than celerity on what to do." He spent a lot of time on

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Embassy security and was concerned about the lack of Congressional support regarding
Inman standards and personnel security. ~

The post-Khobar investigatiorj 9/11 Classified Information Iwas very closely

held. State was trying to assist the FBI in determining responsibility and helped prepare
military contingencied 9/11 Classified Information I
Before the bombings, counterterrorism was one of many important priorities and was not
a preeminent issue. Bin Ladin was a top concern, but he was seen as comparable to
Hizballah or to concern about Palestinian groups in the past. Collection limits made it
hard to assess the threat - intelligence was not giving the Department a sense of urgency.
Bin Ladin's links to past attacks were not known to him until much later. Pickering saw
terrorism as part of the problem for his own building and people and one that was
concentrated overseas, not as a national problem. ~

Response to the Embassy Bombings

The primary objective of the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan was to kill Bin Ladin
and other senior leaders he was meeting with, as well as fighters who might be involved
in future attacks. The objectives were "totally frustrated." Albright and Pickering were
on board with the strikes on Afghanistan. He noted that the President personally asked
the opinion of every person in the room, including Pickering. However, Pickering had
doubts that the training camps were a good target, particularly if U.S. personnel had to be
evacuated, as this would tip Bin Ladin off. There were also concerns regarding two of
the three targets in Sudan, though not al-Shifa (though, in retrospect, perhaps there should
have been.) There was no discussion of Presidential politics or of "wagging the dog."
~

The strikes were seen and prosecuted as a "one off," not as a campaign from the start.
Neither the Principals nor the President seemed to want more, and once the assessment
came in it further decreased the appetite for a campaign. The public criticism reinforced
what people already thought on the value of more strikes. For the August 20 strikes, we
ha~ lnformation that Bin Ladin and others might be in a meeting -
subsequent attacks on empty camps would be "seen as an exercise in fecklessness" and
lead to criticism abroad and at home. ~

;there were an infinite number of bad targets. Afghanistan (unlike Iraq) had no real
/infrastructureto hit. Moreover, the Taliban, in contrast to the Serbs and the Iraqis, were

/i/ used to roughing it and would not be influenced by infrastructure strikes, though he noted
they might be influenced if you hit their militaryforces, ~

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Until September II, there was no sense that the United States could mobilize national
support to press Afghanistan and Pakistan. The TLAM strikes were about at the level the
President thought he could muster under the circumstances, especially as it was an
overseas attack, not one on the U.S. homeland. In late 1998, the United States was
involved in conflicts in Iraq and the Balkans, and there was little appetite for more wars.
'(&)

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Pickering did' not believe the President would pull his punches on Bin Ladin or would
otherwise be reluctant to employ force. Rather, there were not plausible targets to strike
and considerable risks to using military force. In general, he noted that the Clinton
administration was constantly using force, and he was persuaded that the President would
have used force again if there had been good intelligence. ~

The Cole
Pickering received reports on the responsibility for the Cole attack very late, as
investigators wanted to wait until they received more data. There was tremendous
infighting between State and the Bureau over access to Yemen, and he managed that
problem rather than responded to the results of the investigation. ~

In general, there was little desire to respond despite an earlier threat to hold the Taliban
accountable. The disputed election initially delayed consideration. After the Democrats
had lost the election, the Clinton administration was not planning to go out on a limb but
would leave this to the next administration. In general, the lack of a target set also
discouraged a response. ~

Pakistan
With regard to Pakistan, there was constant conce
Prime Minister Sharif was trying to work with the mte tates to improve IS position
at home. Pickering was involved in various efforts to manage the F-16 issue and arrange
for Pakistan to receive compensation for the money it lost in trying to purchase these
fighters. ~ ..

Pickering does not remember the 1998 attempt to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of
terrorism. He guesses that overwhelming U.S. interests in other areas overrode the single
focus on the rise of state sponsorship. Pickering also doubted that the designation of
Pakistan would have produced a positive result, believing it would instead lead to a crisis
that would result in a loss of traction on other issues. ~

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Today, Pakistan knows that the United States needs its help in Afghanistan. As in the
past, it is using this dependence to avoid full cooperation. ts)

Saudi Arabia
Pickering was aware of Saudi approaches to the Taliban with regard to Bin Ladin, though
often after the fact. Even at the time, the Saudi option was seen as a "forlorn hope."
Others, he noted, were more hopeful on this. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were seen
as dragging their feet, and it was hard to get them to cut economic and travel ties. He
does not remember a Principals' discussion of this. tq.

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Pickering watched efforts to get information on Madani al-Tayyib and others from Saudi
Arabia. The U.S. had few options with Tayyib, as the Saudis did not want to let him out
of their control, and we lacked sufficient influence with the Saudis to force this issue...._ ...
The Saudis were wiling to work with the United States to meet their own obiectivesl

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IIn general, cooperation

got better. Sending Khobar suspect
Hani al-Sayegh back Improved U.S. credibility. ~,

In general, the assumption was that Bin Ladin was financing al-Qa'ida from his own
pocket and getting money from abroad. There was some sense that Saudi Arabia had
stopped official support for al-Qa'ida but had not gone after wealthy Saudi individuals.
In hindsight, the U.S. was too optimistic that shuttine down Bin Ladin's personal
accounts would solve this problem. I
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Bin Ladin was located.several times, but he was near women and children so a decision
was made not to strike: Pickering was skeptical at the time that the United States would
be able to kill Bin Ladin, and in general his skepticism grew. ~

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Intelligence
Pickering was an avid consumer of intelligence and feels that he knows and appreciates
various intelligence difficulties. Intelligence was often limited on al-Qa'ida. The
Embassy bombings, for example, were "a surprise." He constant asked the Intelligence
Community to get more, and in general he noted that they tried hard and were responsive.
Later on, he felt he had a sense of the gravity of the threat but very little sense of the risk
to the homeland or the potential catastrophic scale of a strike. There was never an
aggressive "Team B" put together on counterterrorism. ~ ..

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more intelli ence was ver

.... ...He stressed the importance of HUMfNT. To improve HUMfNT, a five

year program - not an annual one - is necessary. ~

Doing an "Estimative Product" would be valuable for the intelligence community. It

would bring consumers up to date and pulse the community. People like Pickering who
cover the whole world "need to be hit on the head with a 2 by 4." It is wrong to assume
that he or others would pick up a pattern from a steady stream of small reports on a
problem over six months. ~

Overall Response to Terrorism

U.S. officials had a "virtual frame" for the problem of al-Qa'ida. In general, there were
limits to what would be considered. This was broken with the 1998 attacks, but the
response to the strikes in the end reinforced the frame. To shatter the frame before
September 11, the President would have had to be prepared to go to war and confront
Pakistan, something that was only possible if the danger to the lives of thousands was
recognized and understood. ~

Pickering noted that in general officials thought they were doing what they could given
the limits they .faced, These limits involved intelligence and the funding and financing of
both anti-terrorism and. counterterrorism. Limits on intelligence made it particularly hard
to weight the equities and risks with other problems. (U)

With regard to terrorism, the U.S. has a tendency to prepare to meet the last attack.
Moreover, when it happens overseas it is seen as a State Department problem, not a
national one. The solution is not always hardening an Embassy or going home. (U)

Pickering noted that he was a believer in diplomacy. Long shots to gain cooperation need
to be taken, if only to show that we tried peaceful options before we escalate. (U)

Miscellany

• In general, Pickering felt that aviation sanctions on the T~iliban had a little value,
but that in general sanctions against the Taliban offered little traction. There was
no concerted effort to cut off the Taliban's oil, as it could have otten the oil from
Pakist
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• The eSG offered advantages for counterterrorism, but it often produced a

backlash, as it involved counterterrorism officials talking among themselves and
did not bring in the regional offices. Even after September 11, Pickering noted
that other issues must be recognized. Pickering did little with the eSG - this was
mainly done by S/CT. (U)

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• Pickering did learn of the Bin Ladin indictment regarding Somalia in the Southern
District of New York. (U)

• Pickering did talk to the Crowe Board and learn of its findings but was not
personally briefed. His sense of the Crowe Board's headline was "badly
prepared, badly informed." (U)

• Pickering is concerned that today the U.S. is turning the war on terror into a war
on Islam. The international community should have been courted more in the war
with Iraq to reduce this. We still have "no idea" on public diplomacy and are
"fooling around" with the Middle East Peace Process. (U)