TAURUS TAXI CO v.

CAPITAL INSURANCE
FACTS: On December 6, 1962, Alfredo Monje, a taxi driver of Taurus Taxi Co., Inc. while driving, collided with a Transport Taxicab at the intersection of Old Sta. Mesa and V. Mapa Streets, Manila, resulting in his death. At the time of the accident, there was subsisting and in force Commercial Vehicle Comprehensive Policy No. 101, 737 which insured each passenger with P5,000.00. After the issuance of policy No. 101, 737, the defendant issued the Taurus Taxi Co., Inc. Indorsement No. 1 which eventually refuses to pay the family of the deceased Alfredo Monje. Defendant-appellant Capital Insurance & Surety Co. Inc. alleged as the first error of the lower court its failure to hold "that in view of the fact that the deceased Alfredo Monje was entitled to indemnity under another insurance policy issued by Ed. A. Keller Co., Ltd., the heirs of the said deceased are not entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy issued by appellant for the reason that the latter policy contains a stipulation not to indemnify those already indemnified in another policy. They argued that what was paid therefore was not indemnity but compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not the insurance prohibition of the company is applicable provided that there has been a prior claim in another insurance policy. HELD: Yes, the insurance is still applicable. Since what is prohibited by the insurance policy in question is that any "authorized driver of plaintiff Taurus Taxi Co., Inc." should not be "entitled to any indemnity under any policy", it would appear indisputable that the obligation of defendant-appellant under the policy had not in any wise been extinguished. It is too well-settled to need the citation of authorities that what the law requires enters into and forms part of every contract. The Workmen's Compensation Act, explicitly requires that an employee suffering any injury or death arising out of or in the course of employment be compensated. The fulfillment of such statutory obligation cannot be the basis for evading the clear, explicit and mandatory terms of a policy. Assuming however that there is a doubt concerning the liability of defendant-appellant insurance firm, nonetheless, it should be resolved against its pretense and in favor of the insured. It was the holding in Eagle Star Insurance, Ltd. v. Chia Yu 6 that courts are to regard "with extreme jealousy" limitations of liability found in insurance policies and to construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. In other words, to quote a noted authority on the subject, "a contract of insurance couched in language chosen by the insurer is, if open to the construction contended for by the insured, to be construed most strongly, or strictly, against the insurer and liberally in favor of the contention of the insured, which means in accordance with the rule contra proferentem." 7 Enough has been said therefore to dispose of the first assigned error. Decision is affirmed.

Insurance Case Digest: Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co. V. Woodworks Inc
(1979) G.R. No. L-25317 August 6, 1979

FACTS In July 21, 1960, Woodworks, Inc. was issued a fire policy for its building machinery and equipment by Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co. for P500K covering July 21, 1960 to July 21, 1961. Woodworks did not pay the premium totalling to P10,593.36. Woodworks in April 19, 1961 allegedly notified Philippine Phoenix the cancellation of the Policy so Philippine Phoenix credited P3,110.25 for the unexpired period of 94 days and demanded in writing the payment of P7,483.11. Woodworks refused stating that it need not pay premium "because the Insurer did not stand liable for any indemnity during the period the premiums were not paid." Philippine Phoenix filed with the CFI to recover its earned premium of P7,483.11. Woodworks was asked to pay the premium after the issuance of the policy put an end to the insurance contract and rendered the policy unenforceable. The Court of First Instance favored Philippine Phoenix. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid insurance contract despite no premium payment was paid HELD: No. There was no valid insurance contract. Policy provides for pre-payment of premium. To constitute an extension of credit there must be a clear and express agreement therefor and there nust be acceptance of the extension - none here Since the premium had not been paid, the policy must be deemed to have lapsed. Failure to make a payment of a premium or assessment at the time provided for, the policy shall become void or forfeited, or the obligation of the insurer shall cease, or words to like effect, because the contract so prescribes and because such a stipulation is a material and essential part of the contract. This is true, for instance, in the case of life, health and accident, fire and hail insurance policies. Explicit in the Policy itself is plaintiff's agreement to indemnify defendant for loss by fire only "after payment of premium" Compliance by the insured with the terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of recovery. The burden is on an insured to keep a policy in force by the payment of premiums, rather than on the insurer to exert every effort to prevent the insured from allowing a policy to elapse through a failure to make premium payments.

PHILAMLIFE V. ANSALDO - JURISDICTION OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER

234 SCRA 509

Facts: Ramon M. Paterno sent a letter-complaint to the Insurance Commissioner alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of the Philamlife as a result of certain practices by said company. Commissioner requested petitioner Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as Philamlife's president, to comment on respondent Paterno's letter. The complaint prays that provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract of Agency executed between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions as published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared as null and void. He also asked that the amounts of such charges and fees already deducted and collected by Philamlife in connection therewith be reimbursed to the agents, with interest at the prevailing rate reckoned from the date when they were deducted Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant to the President, asked that the Commissioner first rule on the questions of the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner over the subject matter of the letters-complaint and the legal standing of Paterno. Insurance Commissioner set the case for hearing and sent subpoena to the officers of Philamlife. Ortega filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the Insurance company has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that there is no complaint sufficient in form and contents has been filed. The motion to quash was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the insurance commissioner had jurisdiction over the legality of the Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents.

Held: No, it does not have jurisdiction.

The general regulatory authority of the Insurance Commissioner is described in Section 414 of the Insurance Code, to wit: "The Insurance Commissioner shall have the duty to see that all laws relating to insurance, insurance companies and other insurance matters, mutual benefit associations and trusts for charitable uses are faithfully executed and to perform the duties imposed upon him by this Code, . . . ." On the other hand, Section 415 provides: "In addition to the administrative sanctions provided elsewhere in this Code, the Insurance Commissioner is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon insurance companies, their directors and/or officers and/or agents, for any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of any provision of this Code, or any order, instruction, regulation or ruling of the Insurance Commissioner, or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Insurance Commissioner, the following: a) fines not in excess of five hundred pesos a day; and b) suspension, or after due hearing, removal of directors and/or officers and/or agents." A plain reading of the above-quoted provisions show that the Insurance Commissioner has the authority to regulate the business of insurance, which is defined as follows: "(2) The term 'doing an insurance business' or 'transacting an insurance business,' within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2 [2]) Since the contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not included within the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.