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SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MR X

I, the undersigned, MR X do hereby make oath and state that: 1. I have already made a statement the contents of which must be read together with this statement. During the consultation I had with the legal team of SAPS I realized the necessity of making a supplementary statement. The supplementary statement addresses some of the issues germane to the workings of the Commission.

2.

On either the 5th or 6th of August 2012, I together with approximately 700 RDOs attended a meeting at a sporting ground situated at Mooinooi. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the RDOs long outstanding grievance of underpayment by LONMIN.

. 3. Bhele was nominated as the Chairperson of the meeting. It was agreed that the demand of a minimum salary of R12, 500.00 per month was not negotiable. Our view was that because NUM previously failed to ensure that our salary is increased to R12, 500.00 per month it failed to carry out the mandate of the RDOs and should be excluded from negotiating on behalf of the RDOs. I cant remember when the proposal was put to NUM.

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4.

The RDOs did not accept the reason advanced by NUM that it could not negotiate a salary increase because of the two year agreement that had been concluded with LONMIN Management. The perception was that NUM was in cahoots with LONMIN Management. During the meeting that was held either on the 5th or the 6th, it was decided that the RDOs should meet on the 9th of August 2012 to enable other absent RDOs to be present when it was expected that a decision would be taken as to how the salary increase demand would be pursued.

5.

On the 8th of August 2012 whilst on duty the RDOs were approached by Mr Boyise (Boyise) in the employment of Lonmin who indicated that LONMIN Management unilaterally decided to increase the salary of the RDOs with the following amounts: 5.1. 5.2. R750.00 per month for RDOs without an assistant; and R500.00 per month for RDOs with an assistant and the assistant to receive R250.00 per month.

6.

Boyise was asked whether NUMs representatives were advised of the unilateral decision made by Management. Boyise responded that a NUM

representative was expected to have been present during the discussion. Whilst the discussions took place, Mr Shiba (Shiba) the co-ordinator of NUM appeared. The RDOs present decided not to sign any documents accepting

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the proposed unilateral increase. Both Boyise and Shiba were told that the RDOs would be having a meeting at Wonderkop on the 9 th of August 2012 to discuss the issue of the salary increase to be presented to LONMIN Management without involving the Unions. Boyise stated that the increase was offered because Management recognised that the RDOs are underpaid, whilst working under strenuous and dangerous conditions underground. Shiba was told in no uncertain terms that NUM should not involve itself in this issue as it had failed to carry out the mandate of the RDOs.

7.

On the 10th of August 2012 a meeting was held at Wonderkop Stadium during which the proposal that was put forward by Boyise was discussed and ultimately rejected. It was reiterated that the amount of R12 500.00 per month was not negotiable. A decision to march and present the RDOs demand to the Time Management Office (office) was adopted. Despite some of the Whilst

strikers carrying sticks and knobkerries the march was peaceful.

marching to the office, the police stopped the strikers from proceeding forward. After some discussions the strikers were allowed to proceed. The police used a crime -scene tape to cordon off the office allowing only our representatives to go inside the office. The police instructed the strikers not to enter the cordon-off area.

8.

Noting that our representatives were not returning, the strikers became impatient and wanted to go inside the Office to establish what was happening. A representative of Management came out of the office and told the strikers

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that disciplinary steps would be taken against those who absented themselves from work without any lawful reason. The strikers were not happy with the

response. Bhele responded and told the representative of Management that the RDOs will not report for night shift and that the RDOs have decided not to involve NUM in this matter as we are capable of resolving it ourselves. Bayi said we should return to the stadium to decide the way forward.

9.

At Wonderkop Stadium it was agreed that the RDOs should mobilise, intensify and ensure that all the RDOs took part in the unprotected strike without any exception. It was further agreed that force should be used to enforce the strike in ensuring that none of the RDOs reported for duty as from the 10th of August 2012 until our demand is met. We were aware that we may lose our jobs for taking part in the unprotected strike. However we were not bothered. It was decided that the RDOs should again congregate at the stadium the following day.

10.

On the 11th of August 2012, on my way to the stadium I personally noticed persons wearing red t-shirts and caps embroidered with the name NUM inside two Quantum mini-busses belonging to LONMIN using loud hailers encouraging RDOs to report for duty. Those who reported for duty were

assured that the necessary steps would be taken to ensure their safety. I saw some people reporting for duty on the 11th .The aforesaid conduct on the part of NUMs members or officials in encouraging the RDOs to report for duty was discussed at the meeting and it was clear that there was anger as it was

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felt that the conduct of NUMs members or officials was undermining the RDOs cause. It was agreed that violence should be used to close down NUMs offices and attack any person who was found inside the office. It was decided that we should go to our various places in order to arm ourselves with an assortment of dangerous weapons which were to be used in attacking NUMs office and its officials. I went to Nkaneng Settlement where I bought a knobkerrie and a spear with which I armed myself and joined the strikers along the route to NUMs office. I am aware that some of the strikers bought dangerous weapons from a gentleman known to me as Ntshebe who resides in Nkaneng.

11.

On the way to NUMs office we sang the song how we are going to kill NUM and
Mr Zokwana(Zokwana) as a demonstration of an intention on our part to

indeed close down NUMs offices, injure or kill any of NUMs officials or members. As the strikers ran away because of the shooting that was done by LONMINs security personnel, I went through the hostel and saw two people lying on the ground with blood on their clothes. I did not see any NUM officials shooting at the strikers using firearms.

12.

At the koppie Bhele further said we should take off the dresses and put on trousers meaning that we should intensify our action in order to achieve our goal. Bhele reported that two of the strikers were shot dead as a result of the attack that was launched from inside NUMs offices by persons who were dressed in clothes embroidered with the name NUM. It was suggested and

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agreed upon that a cleansing ritual should be held for the strikers that may have had contact or walked next to the two strikers that we believed to have been killed. A mixture of intelezi and water was prepared for the cleansing ritual. The strikers that took part in the cleansing ritual stood in a row and were sprinkled with the mixture.

13.

The hill now known as the Koppie was strategically chosen for the following reasons:

13.1.

it is secluded and located away from the public for the performance of rituals;

13.2. 13.3.

the trees and the boulders gave us privacy; strangers could be seen approaching from far away because of its vantage position and the Apollo lights;

13.4.

it would be difficult for a stranger to specifically pinpoint the precise location of where we were camped;

13.5.

access to the koppie using a motor vehicle was not easy because of the rugged terrain;

13.6.

if the need arose, it was easy for us to escape from the koppie.

14.

It was the responsibility of the Committee of 15 to co-ordinate the unprotected strike and any related matters. On certain occasions Makarapas who were not

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part of the Committee of 15 were allowed to take part in the deliberations and decision making process.

15.

I have been taking part in muti and ritual practises since childhood which includes the usage of intelezi, making cuttings on certain parts of the body and putting muti on those parts of the body. I believe that muti if properly used and instructions followed, the purpose and objectives for which the muti and ritual practises are used, can be achieved. I have successfully used muti to prevent being bewitched. In 1999 I was involved in faction fighting and the group that I was part of used muti to protect ourselves against the rival group and we believed that the muti worked.

16.

I contributed R20.00 that was utilised for the payment of transport that fetched the two Inyangas. The Inyangas, who were in possession of suitcases, were introduced to us as good Inyangas just like their father. An amount of

R1000.00 was required for the performance of the rituals with a deposit of R500.00 payable immediately and the balance to be paid later. I contributed towards the payment of the required deposit of R500.00. We were advised that the rituals can only be performed and be effective if we were prepared to carry out the Inyangas instructions. Xolani and Kaizer are the ones who spoke to the Inyangas after which the instructions were communicated to us. The further instructions communicated to us were as follows :

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16.1. 16.2. 16.3. 16.4. 16.5.

not to look back once we decided to launch an attack; to remove bracelets and watches; not to carry cellular phones; not to carry coin money; to wait for the police to first fire at us before launching an attack against the police, and if possible, to conduct ourselves in a manner that will provoke the police, resulting in the police firing first at us;

16.6. 16.7.

to appoint a person who was going to be our leader; to sit or stand separately from the people who did not take part in the performance of the rituals;

16.8.

not to step on a spot where there is an indication that someone might have urinated on;

16.9.

to sleep at the Koppie until such a time that our demand is met;

16.10. to approach the police in a crouching manner which would make the bullets, if fired by the police, to miss us, as we would be invisible to the police. 16.11. to defy any orders or instructions given by the police; 16.12. if the need arose, weapons in our possession should be put down in a flat manner; 16.13. to make clicking sounds with weapons to get encouragement.

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17.

After agreeing to observe the instructions of the Inyangas referred to above, the Inyangas opened their suitcases took out three multi-coloured sheets, similar to the ones that are used by Inyangas and Sangomas were fastened to trees to make a screen. Bottles that contained muti were fastened to trees using multi-coloured ropes. During the performance of the rituals, spoons were used for placing the muti on the incisions. A three legged pot that contained a mixture of intelezi and water was placed on the fire. After the mixture was boiled, it was used as part of the rituals.

18.

A person whose particulars I cannot remember was sent to buy razor blades which were used for the cuttings that were made on the various parts of our bodies. Only people, who contributed the R500.00 deposit on the 11th of August 2012, took part in the rituals inclusive of myself. The two sheep were taken behind the screen by the Inyangas. Two of the sheets that were

loosened from the trees were used to wrap the two sheep before they were placed on the burning fire alive. The ashes, the fat and the blood that dripped from the two sheep were placed on a lid of a pot, mixed with the muti taken from the bottles and used as part of the rituals. Those who took part in the rituals were ordered to fully undress, stand in two rows and the muti mixture that was made was put on the incisions that were made on the various parts of the bodies, set out below: 18.1. 18.2. The wrist; The toes;

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18.3. 18.4. 18.5. 18.6. 18.7. 18.8. 18.9.

Front and back portion of the knee; The ankles; On top of the head; Upper part of the chest; On the cheeks; The eye lids; The lower part of the back;

18.10. The sides of the hips; 18.11. The thighs; 18.12. Below and above the belly button; 18.13. Above and at the back of the knees; 18.14. Between the shoulder blades; 18.15. On the forehead; 18.16. On the inside and the side of the elbow joints; 18.17. At the back of the ears.

19.

The Inyangas instructed us to appoint a stubborn, fearless and brave person to lead us, on whom further rituals had to be performed. Mambush was appointed to lead the group. We were further instructed by the Inyangas

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to dig a hole wherein the remains of the two sheep should be buried. The Inyangas made available a pick and a spade which were used to dig a hole in which the remains of the two sheep were placed. Mambush was instructed by the Inyangas to stand on top of the remains inside the hole, further rituals were performed on Mambush after which the hole was filled and covered with soil. The Inyangas further advised us that human blood, tongue and chin were required to further strengthen us.

20.

No one was allowed to go home without the permission of Xolani who was the only person permitted by the Inyangas to have a cell phone.

21.

The strikers that took part in the rituals were known as Makarapas. Strikers that did not take part in the rituals, were not allowed to be part of the Makarapas. It was the responsibility of Makarapas to ensure that the

decisions taken by the Committee of 15 were implemented. Some of the people who did not take part in the rituals on the 11th of August 2012 were allowed to remain separately from the Makarapas at the Koppie. Each time the larger group of the Makarapas left the Koppie for a mission a group of about 50 Makarapas remained behind with the Inyangas to protect and preserve the Koppie. The Makarapas and the two Inyangas permanently

stayed and slept at the koppie from the 11 th of August 2012 until the morning of the 16th of August 2012. It was Xolanis responsibility to buy food and whatever supplies that was required for that period.

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22.

On the 12th of August 2012, the singing of slogans, the displaying, brandishing and brushing of dangerous weapons was intended to provoke the Security Officers to start firing at us so that we could attack them. I have identified the Security Officers that were attacked and killed as 22.1 Mr Fundi, whose body is depicted in Slides 29 and 30 of Exhibit L and whose blood and body parts were removed for muti purposes, 22.2 Mr Frans Mabelani, who was attacked, killed and set alight inside a car whose body is depicted in slides 31 and 32 of Exhibit L.

23.

The property of LONMIN that was damaged and set alight is depicted in slide 38 of Exhibit L.

24.

During the report back session at the Koppie, it was established that none of the Makarapas were killed or sustained any injuries during the incident referred to above. This fortified our belief that the muti is effective and

encouraged us to persist in our attitude of using violence, if need be, to achieve our objective. The Inyangas cut the body parts of Fundi into smaller pieces, mixed it with the blood, placed it on top of a lid which was placed on the fire until the body parts and the blood were burnt to ashes. We were instructed by the Inyangas to stand in a line and the ashes were put inside our mouth using a spoon which we licked and swallowed. After this, the Inyangas told us that they had accomplished their mission in protecting us from police bullets, made us fearless, strong and invisible to the police.

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25.

The strike gained momentum, more people supported our cause and joined the Makarapas. This is as a result of the killing of both Fundi and Mabelani, the destruction of property, the robbing of cell phones and firearms. On the 12th of August 2012, rituals were performed on the strikers that joined the Makarapas. Arising from the incident that led to the death of both Fundi and Mabelani, damage to property and the theft of the weapons, it was expected that the police would raid the Koppie with the intention of arresting the Makarapas, recovering robbed items and confiscating dangerous weapons. It was decided that if the police were to approach the Koppie, they would be met with resistance and violence as we were heavily armed with dangerous weapons and firearms. We would not have allowed ourselves to be arrested by the police without mounting resistance. Had the Police approached the Koppie, we would have noticed them from a distance be it during the day or night.

26.

I have identified Julius Langa as the person who was attacked in the early hours of the 13th of August 2012 because of the colour of the clothes that he was wearing, and the scene where his body was found. I am advised that the photos I used to identify Julius Langa were taken by the police on the day and at the scene where he was killed. Some of the Makarapas left the scene in three vans whilst others walked to the Koppie. On the way to the Koppie we met security personnel in the employment of Lonmin although there was a discussion between the security personnel and some of the leaders of the Makarapas, I did not hear what was discussed.

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27.

As we proceeded along the railway line Mambush brought to our attention the presence of a number of police officers whom we regarded as a stumbling block in the achievement of our objective. We knew that the police would not allow us to publicly carry and display dangerous weapons. The message relayed to the police that we were not fighting them, was not said in good faith. We would not allow the police to confiscate the dangerous weapons in our possession. We agreed that only Mambush, Xolani and Mosotho should talk to the police and the group was reminded of waiting first for the police to shoot before we could attack them. Mambush advised us that we should defy any instructions given by the police and do whatever we can to provoke the police to first shoot at us.

28.

Mambush and Mosotho could be seen talking to the police whilst making gestures with clenched fists, as instructed by the Inyangas. In the video

Xolani is clearly depicted with his hands open whilst addressing the police and was shouted at for not complying with the instructions of the Inyanga. Mambush instructed us to calm down, which we did. The undertaking that the weapons will be surrendered at the Koppie would not have occurred as it was a ploy used to let the police allow us to proceed to the Koppie. Despite having agreed that only three persons would address the police, the video clearly show that more than three persons spoke to the police.

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29.

It is clear from the video that Mambush was taking a leading role.

The

crouching position was in line with the instructions given by the Inyangas. Both the singing and the clicking of the weapons was meant to give us courage and at the same time to provoke the police into first firing at us. During the discussions that transpired with the police, we were singing a song; Xinisa masende umfana o ngege u lunge. It simply meant that we had to be strong, bold and make sacrifices if we had to achieve what we set out to do. General Mpembe (Mpembe) told us that he was going to count up to 10, during which period we should leave our weapons on the ground. Whilst Mpembe was counting, Mambush instructed us to defy him and proceed further which we did. One police officer, who was pointing a firearm next to a boulder, retreated as we approached him. We rushed forward making noise and singing songs that any person seen wearing a NUM t-shirt should be killed and that the lion that ate people is at Bizana. By the lion we were referring to the father of the two Inyangas as we were made to eat the ashes of Fundi.

30.

Whilst proceeding in the field, we decided to move towards the informal settlement with the intention of attacking or killing any male person found. This is so because all the male persons were expected to be supportive of our cause and be at the Koppie. As we approached the informal settlement the police started firing teargas which was an act that we were waiting for to trigger an attack on the police. The firing of teargas by the police caused us to attack them.

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31.

It appears that the police officer that I attacked and injured with a spear was trying to run for safety inside the Nyala. At one stage I heard Mambush

shouting and giving instructions that we should leave the place and return to the Koppie which we did. Some of the strikers that sustained injuries as a result of the attack on the police were lifted and carried to the Koppie from where they were transported to the hospital. During the report back session at the Koppie, in an endeavour to establish why other people other than the police sustained injuries or were killed, the view was that either some of them were not Makarapas and just joined us along the way or those who were Makarapas, did not carry out the Inyangas instructions. The fact that three police officers were severely attacked and robbed of their fire arms made us belief that the muti was effective. It was discussed that because of the attack on the police, the robbing of fire arms and cell phones, there was a strong possibility that the police will search and raid the Koppie with the view to arresting us, recover the fire arms and confiscate the dangerous weapons. The earlier stance adopted regarding the use of violence against the police was reiterated. It was stated that we were in possession of more fire arms which would make it easier to challenge the police at any time.

32.

The news of the attack on the police and the robbing of fire arms, led to more people joining the Makarapas. On the 14th of August 2012, more people joined the Makarapas and could be seen undergoing the performance of rituals, as depicted in slides 85, 86 and 90 of Exhibit L. The reason why the persons

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were nude is because they first had to wash with a mixture of intelezi and water before the muti incisions could be done. The sprinkling that occurred on people that were fully dressed was to revive the muti and rituals already performed on the Makarapas.

33.

Whilst we were dancing and chanting, an announcement was made from the police armoured vehicle with a request that we should appoint five people to come forward as our representatives, as the police would like to have a discussion with them. After a caucus by the Committee of 15, Mambush, Xolani, Bhele and two gentlemen whose particulars I do not know, were

appointed as our representatives. The representatives are depicted in slides 95 and 96 of Exhibit L, as they approached and negotiated with the police. On returning to the strikers, we were advised that the police undertook to have a discussion with LONMIN Management with the view to requesting them to enter into negotiations with the strikers.

34.

At sunset the strikers dispersed and the Makarapas returned to the Koppie. During the night on the 14th of August 2012, Xolani advised us that he received a telephone call from Mr Mathunjwa (Mathunjwa) as he would like to come to the Koppie to have a discussion with us. After some discussions, we agreed that he could come, on condition that he did not come to the specific spot where the rituals were performed. I saw Xolani making a call but did not pay attention to the conversation that he had. After some time, I noticed a vehicle with its lights on, approaching the Koppie and indeed

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Mathunjwa arrived. Mathunjwa advised us that there was an attempt on the part of the police to bring him and Zokwana to the Koppie to address the strikers and that the strikers should not welcome Zokwana. He further

indicated that he is interested in numbers and that once we mobilised enough people to join AMCU he would ensure that our demand is met.

35.

On the 15th of August 2012, we spent the better part of the day singing and chanting in anticipation of the arrival of the two Union leaders. During the day I vividly remember that the Committee of 15 met and other Makarapas who were not part of the Committee of 15 were allowed to take part in the deliberations and emphasized that Zokwana should not be allowed to address the strikers. It was agreed that if Zokwana stepped out of the police vehicle, he should be viciously attacked in the presence of the police, as the muti and the rituals would render the police firearms ineffective. The strikers were accordingly advised of the decision taken regarding Zokwana. On that particular day the Committee of 15 only met once in the open for a discussion which I was part of.

36.

Late in the afternoon when we saw a police armoured vehicle approaching the Koppie, we suspected that both leaders of the Unions were coming to the Koppie to address the strikers. Xolani challenged Zokwana using vulgar

words saying he should step out of the Nyala so that the strikers could kill him. Had Zokwana stepped out of the Nyala, he would have been violently attacked by the strikers in the presence of the police. Mathunjwa was at no stage given an undertaking by either the Committee or the Makarapas that the strikers

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were going to lay down their weapons on the 16th of August 2012 in the morning.

37.

On the 16th of August 2012, noting that Mathunjwa did not give us a concrete response from LONMIN Management, the Committee of 15 met and decided that the employer had been given sufficient time to address our demand and if our demand is not met that day, there was going to be bloodshed. It was further discussed that if the demand is not met the police being a stumbling block to the attainment of our demand they should be attacked and be removed. The strikers were advised of the decision reached by Committee of 15.

38.

Whilst we waited for Mathunjwa to return and address us, a car approached the Koppie and two gentlemen got out, one of whom appeared to be a priest. Mambush, Xolani, Bhele, Anele and Kaizer approached the persons, one of whom we were later told is a Bishop. They had discussions with him, but we were not advised of what transpired. In the presence of the Bishop, the

strikers openly displayed an assortments of dangerous weapons in their possession, chanted songs that they were going to kill NUM and its members. The Bishop left and never returned. Had either the Bishop or Mathunjwa

returned with LONMIN Management and gave feedback to the effect that the strikers demands have not been met, LONMIN representatives would have been violently attacked in the presence of the police.

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39.

Mathunjwa returned for the second time without concrete results.

In his

presence violent threatening conduct and attitude was displayed by the strikers towards the police. The threats that were made against the police were made following a decision already taken that they should be violently attacked as they were seen as a stumbling block to the attainment of our objectives. As Mathunjwa was leaving, we were busy dancing, singing and chanting when it came to my attention that the police had started deploying barbed wire and some of the persons at the Koppie were leaving without any hindrance in whatever direction they went.

40.

As the police deployed the barbed wire, Mambush went, confronted them and asked why they deployed the barbed wire. Mambush returned, joined the Makarapas and we proceeded directly to where the police were busy deploying the barbed wire. In a crouching formation as depicted in slide 198 of Exhibit L, we walked next to the Nyala led by Mambush. Once we were next to one of the Nyalas that was busy deploying the barbed wire, I heard and saw some of the strikers hitting their weapons against the Nyala. I was in the middle of the group. At one stage I saw a police Nyala that had blocked an open space, between the Nyala and the kraal. We wanted to use the open space to go and attack the police. The police fired teargas and water, which had no effect on us, as we persisted and proceeded to attack the police.

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41.

As the gap between the Nyala and the kraal had been closed, we moved forward trying to approach the police from the other side of the kraal, with the intention of violently attacking the police. I was following the group that was in front when I heard a volley of shots fired by the police, and saw a number of strikers falling in front of me whilst the shooting was going on. I became scared, shocked and realised that the muti was not effective, decided to turn back and ran towards the informal settlement that is how I survived. Together with other Makarapas we met with the Inyangas in the evening in an open field next to Nkaneng. It is during that meeting that we were told that Mosotho killed a rabbit contrary to the instructions of the Inyangas. The Inyangas told us that the killing of the rabbit rendered the muti ineffective for which they cannot be blamed.

42.

I was shown a video clip of a gentleman who now is known as Mr Phatsa (Phatsa) whilst in hospital, speaking to President Zuma. I recognised him as one of the Makarapas who was present at Koppie.

43.

I was shown the a picture of a gentleman depicted in Exhibit EEE6, photo 1, now known to me as Mr Magidwana (Magidwana). I am aware that he was not employed as a RDO. Magidwana was a member of the Makarapas.

44.

I am aware that both Phatsa and Magidwana were present at the Koppie and underwent the performance of the rituals.

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45.

On the 24th of July 2013 I, in the company of the Investigators of the Commission, namely Piet Byleveld (Byleveld) and Danie van Tonder, members of the South African Police (SAPS) from the Forensic Division, K9 Unit, a photographer, a video operator and SAPS Legal Team, attended an inspection in loco at the Koppie . Byleveld was also in possession of a video camera. The purpose of the inspection in loco was to point out any spot of relevance to the issues to be determined by Commission 46. I pointed out ; 46.1 an open hole which is the spot where the remains of the two sheep were buried. Despite the use of a tracking dog, nothing could be found. 46.2 the spot where the rituals were performed and the two sheep were burned. 46.3 a piece of intelezi next to the spot where the fire was made. 46.4 multi-coloured ropes earlier referred to were found still fastened to the trees on the same spot.

47.

The under mentioned exhibits were collected, sealed and removed at the scene by a police member based at the Forensic Unit. 47.1 47.2 The intelezi ; The soil where the fire was made;

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47.3 47.4

Dry sheep faeces obtained at the spot where the fire was made; The ropes that were fastened to the trees.

48.

I have relayed the contents of this statement in Xhosa which was translated into English.

MR X

SIGNED AND SWORN TO at __________________________ on this____day of ____________________ 2014 by the deponent who has stated that: a. b. c. He knows and understands the contents hereof and that it is true and correct; He has no objection to taking the prescribed oath; and He regards the prescribed oath as binding on his conscience.

Signed before me

Commissioner of Oaths: SIGNATURE Full Names: Capacity: Area:

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