Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four

tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998) Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The

case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner De Knecht Petitioners contention: The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests. Even the claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there would be a saving of P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to the site of the proposed EDSA extension As envisioned by the government, the EDSA extension would be linked to the Cavite Expressway. Logically then, the proposed extension must point to the south and not detour to the north.

De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route will save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people.

Respondents counter-argument: There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the EDSA Extension to Roxas Blvd. When the Ministry of Public Highways decided to change the site of EDSA Extension to Roxas Boulevard from Cuneta Avenue to the Del Pan - Fernando Streets, the residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein Streets who were to be adversely affected by the construction of EDSA Extension to Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed project. Petitioner herein was one of those notified. It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward (from the city center while the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. It must be stated that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted to save the motel located along Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem involved

De Knecht v. Bautista Eminent Domain> Genuine Necessity Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government

Issue: WON there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH

Ruling: ISSUE: Is the approach on tax assessment used by the City Assessor reasonable? NO. The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P, entitled"Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, etc." except to dismiss said case. REYES v. ALMANZOR GR Nos. L-49839-46, April 26, 1991 196 SCRA 322 FACTS: Petitioners JBL Reyes et al. owned a parcel of land in Tondo which are leased and occupied as dwelling units by tenants who were paying monthly rentals of not exceeding P300. Sometimes in 1971 the Rental Freezing Law was passed prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units where rentals do not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00), so that the Reyeses were precluded from raising the rents and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and reassessed the value of the subject properties based on the schedule of market values, which entailed an increase in the corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to file a Memorandum of Disagreement averring that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional" considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties. They argued that the income approach should have been used in determining the land values instead of the comparable sales approach which the City Assessor adopted. HELD: No. The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural classification for purposes of taxation but the government's act must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners who are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the principle of social justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of excessive taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. MANUEL B. PINEDA, as one of the heirs of deceased ATANASIO PINEDA, respondent. G.R. No. L-22734 September 15, 1967; BENGZON, J.P., J Facts: Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the eldest of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a lawyer. The estate was divided among the heirs and Manuel B. Pineda's share amounted to about P2,500.00. After the estate proceedings were closed, the BIR investigated the income tax liability of the estate for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and it found that the corresponding income tax returns were not filed. The representative of the Collector of Internal Revenue filed said returns for the estate and issued an assessment. Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the same. He appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs." The Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment corresponding to his share of the taxes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to the SC and has proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate. Manuel B. Pineda

opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid income tax due the estate only up to the extent of and in proportion to any share he received. Issue: Can BIR collect the full amount of estate taxes from an heir's inheritance Ruling: Yes. The Government can require Atty. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed. Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance. His liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of his share. As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on the P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes a for which said estate is liable. All told, the Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted, because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. And as afore-stated in this case the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax. The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS AQUINO JUNE 15 1988PARAS, FACTS: Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higherlearning duly incorporated with the SEC filed a complaint to annul and declarevoid the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building locatedat Bangued, Abr a, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties. PaternoMillare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincialfiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined hat based onthe evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the schoolbuilding and the school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra ValleyCollege are exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless, the trial courtdisagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said schoolfor residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered theassailed decision ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively foreducational purposes? HELD: NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and nonrestrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educationalpurposes as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made thatexemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessaryfor the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of theschool building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, norby jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building inthe case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to themain or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to theNorthern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination beconsidered incidental to the purposes of education.Under the 1935 Constitution, the rial court correctly arrived at theconclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should betaxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the director andhis family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being usedfor commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the schoolinvolved