Canon 16- A.C. No.

2591

September 8, 2006

LETICIA ADRIMISIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case On 12 September 1983, Leticia Adrimisin ("complainant") She needed the help of a lawyer in having her son-in-law, Alfredo Monterde ("Monterde"), who was charged with the crime of qualified theft, released from the Caloocan City Jail. Complainant claims that respondent advised her to file a bail bond. Complainant informed respondent that her only money was P500. Complainant contends that respondent received the money, issued a receipt2 and promised that Monterde would be released from jail the following day. Complainant also alleges that respondent failed to keep his promise in having Monterde released. Complainant went to respondent's office several times but it seemed that respondent was avoiding her. Monterde was later released upon settlement of the case with his employer. Complainant claims that she demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent failed to return this amount. Respondent did not file any comment or answer. He only appeared in the investigative hearings conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"). Respondent, in his testimony, claims he was not hired by complainant as legal counsel. Respondent alleges complainant only asked his help to secure a bail bond.3 Respondent admits he received P500 for the bail bond and called up Carlos Alberto ("Alberto"), an insurance agent.4 Respondent claims he gave the P500 to Alberto. However, the amount was not sufficient to pay for the bond.5 Respondent denies that he promised to have Monterde released immediately.6 Respondent claims he advised complainant to get back her money directly from Alberto.7 Alberto, the insurance agent, was presented during the hearing. He testified that on 20 July 1983, respondent came to him to secure a bail bond for qualified theft.8 Alberto showed a copy of the personal bail bond dated 20 July 1983, issued by Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc. ("Philippine Phoenix Surety") with a premium ofP940 and costs of documentary stamps, notarial fees and clearances at P279 for a total of P1,219.9 Alberto claimed he issued a genuine bond but it was not filed in court because complainant failed to pay the balance.10 He also testified that Pablo Adrimisin asked for the refund of the P500 but the amount could not be refunded due to expenses already incurred and forfeiture of the remainder in favor of Alberto's office.11 The bail bond which was marked as Exhibit "1" contained a stamped "Limitation of Liability" clause. The clause states "Authorized limit of the bond shall not exceed P20,000 and it is not valid for theft and robbery cases."12 The portion "Not valid for theft and robbery cases" was deleted with a marking pen but this cancellation was not signed or initialed. Alberto was asked why the cancellation was

unsigned. Alberto replied that he had no knowledge on who made the stamp or the cancellation.13 When asked if it is the policy of Philippine Phoenix Surety not to post personal bail bond with respect to theft and robbery cases, Alberto answered in the affirmative.14 Alberto also clarified that he is not connected with Philippine Phoenix Surety but he is an employee of the House of Bonds, which is the general agent of the former.15 Mr. Alfredo Brigoli ("Brigoli"), General Manager of the House of Bonds, was also presented as one of respondent's witnesses. Brigoli explained that he gives Alberto 5 sets of pre-signed bail bond forms.16 However, in theft, robbery and drug cases, Alberto is required to seek his approval before the bond is issued. Brigoli testified that it was Alberto's daughter who called him up for approval to issue a bond for qualified theft.17He informed Alberto's daughter to bring the original bond and its duplicate copies to his office in Intramuros for his signature, but the same was not done. 18 Due to the lack of his signature, Brigoli claimed that the bond has not been approved. 19 Brigoli also testified that since the bond was not forwarded to his office, the same was not recorded and the payment was not remitted. The OSG's Report and Recommendation The OSG's Investigating Solicitor Antonio G. Castro heard the case and submitted a Report and Recommendation ("Report"). The OSG recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for not less than one year. The Report reads: The charge of deceit and misrepresentation against respondent has been sufficiently established. Respondent himself admits that he received from complainant the sum of P500.00 for the bail bond of complainant's son-in-law Alfredo Monterde; that he failed to secure Monterde's release from jail; and that he did not return the sum of P500.00 to complainant (pp. 9-20, tsn, March 14, 1985). xxxx Respondent's defense that he actually secured a bail bond for Monterde is a mere afterthought. Firstly, complainant confided to him that she had no more money except P500.00. He would not, therefore, secure a bail bond with higher premium than P500.00. Secondly, while he declared that the records of Monterde's case in the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch XXV, sala of Judge Oscar Herrera showed that the recommended bail was P8,000.00 (pp. 8-9, tsn, March 14, 1985), the personal bail bond, marked as Exhibit "1", which was allegedly prepared, was forP9,400.00 (Exh. "1", p. 7, Folder of Exhs.). Thirdly, respondent's witness, Alfredo Brigoli, the general manager of the AAF House of Bonds, admitted that Exhibit "1" was not finally approved. On cross-examination, he declared: "Q Have you signed that as finally approved?

A No, sir. When they called up asking for my signature on the deleted portion of the bond, Mr. Alberto never came to my office. Q In other words that bond has not been finally approved. A Not finally approved because there is no signature yet." (p. 20, tsn, Sept. 30, 1985). As held by this Honorable Court in Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, 868-869 (1963), "The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment." And in Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439, 445 (1967), it also held that, "Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality." Specifically, for deceit and misrepresentation, respondent may be suspended or disbarred (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25 [1920]).20 The Court's Ruling The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). The Code mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.21 Consequently, a lawyer should account for the money received from a client.22 The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,23 and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for the bail bond as shown in his testimony and in Exhibit "A". By his receipt of the amount, respondent agreed to take up complainant's cause and owed fidelity to complainant and her cause, even if complainant never paid any fee. Lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.24 Respondent claims that on 12 July 1983, he called up Alberto for the issuance of the bail bond but it took 8 days before the bail bond was prepared. In failing to immediately secure the bail bond, respondent clearly neglected to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill required by the circumstances. There were also irregularities in the personal bail bond. Firstly, it was issued on 20 July 1983 but notarized sometime in 1984 as seen in the Notarial Certificate. The Court therefore agrees with OSG's finding that respondent's defense that he secured a bail bond was a mere afterthought. Furthermore, complainant filed her complaint on 12 September 1983, which means that the bond was notarized only after the complaint was filed. Secondly, the bail bond was not valid for theft and robbery cases. Although there was a cancellation of such phrase through marking pen, the same was not countersigned, and hence the cancellation was void. Thirdly, the payment for the bond was not recorded and neither was it remitted to the issuer of the bond. This means that the bond was a mere piece of paper without any value for it failed to serve its purpose.

Complainant demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent kept on insisting that complainant seek refund from Alberto. Respondent has the duty to account for the money entrusted to him by complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,25 we held that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand." In the present case, money for the payment of the bond's premium was not used for the purpose intended. Hence, respondent must return the amount to complainant upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 26 This is not the first time respondent is found to have unlawfully withheld and misappropriated money. In Igual v. Javier,27 the Court held that respondent had unjustifiably refused to return Igual's money upon demand and his absence of integrity was highlighted by his "half-baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline." The Court suspended Javier from the practice of law for a period of one month and ordered him to restitute the amount of P7,000 to Igual. In that case, we reminded respondent that he was "expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith." 28 We reiterate this reminder. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 29 Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.30 WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Rolando S. Javier from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to restitute complainant Leticia Adrimisin the Five Hundred Pesos (P500) with legal interest computed from 12 September 1983 until full payment. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten (10) days from payment. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all courts of the land for their information and guidance.

Canon 16-- A.C. No. 7057

July 25, 2006 ALMENDAREZ, JR., complainant,

DAVID L. vs. ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

On 5 May 2004, David L. Almendarez, Jr. ("complainant") filed this complaint-affidavit1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit ("respondent") for acts unbecoming a lawyer. The facts are undisputed: Complainant, as attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag Vda. de Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment case before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2 ("trial court"). Respondent served as complainant's counsel. While the case was pending, defendant Roger Bumanlag ("Bumanlag") deposited monthly rentals for the property in dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court. On 3 February 1994, the trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on a compromise agreement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. On 18 December 1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the decision. A court order 2 dated 2 March 2000 granted the Omnibus Motion for Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as complainant's counsel. Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of deposited rentals, which the trial court also granted on 16 March 2000. Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals deposited by Bumanlag. Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court, confirmed this to complainant who received from Daroy copies of the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial court's savings account. One slip dated 10 March 2000 was for P28,000,3 and another slip dated 19 April 2000 was for P227,000.4 Thus, respondent received a total of P255,000, as evidenced by two receipts5 signed by him. The withdrawals were made through Daroy's authorized representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered the money to respondent. Respondent did not inform complainant of these transactions. Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the accounting and return of the P255,000.6 Respondent failed to reply. Hence, complainant filed this case for disbarment against respondent for failing to account for complainant's funds. Complainant further accuses respondent of neglecting to pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment case.

On 12 May 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ("IBP Director Vinluan") ordered respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint. Respondent did not file an answer despite receipt of the notice.7 On 4 October 2004, IBP Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay ("IBP Commissioner Dulay") notified the parties to appear before him for a mandatory conference on 15 November 2004, later reset to 17 January 2005. Only complainant appeared at the conference, prompting IBP Commissioner Dulay to order the conference terminated and to declare that respondent had waived his right to participate in the proceedings. IBP Commissioner Dulay directed the parties to file their respective position papers. Complainant submitted his position paper on 22 March 2005. Again, respondent took no action. Findings and Recommendation of the IBP On 8 June 2005, IBP Commissioner Dulay submitted his Report and Recommendation ("Report") 8 with the finding that respondent failed to account for money he held in trust for complainant. The Report considered complainant's evidence "clear and convincing" enough to justify disciplinary action against respondent for violation of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be declared guilty of gross misconduct and suspended for one year, aside from being ordered to render an accounting of the money he had received. In a Resolution9 dated 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors approved the Report, with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to two years. The Court's Ruling We sustain the findings of the IBP. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states: CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney's fees.10 In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money. Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the legal profession.11 More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Additionally, respondent failed to observe Canon 1712 of the Code, which obligates the lawyer to take up the cause of his client with entire zeal and devotion. It seems that after respondent received the withdrawn deposits, he never contacted complainant again. He did not pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment case, to the prejudice of complainant. By his inaction, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed in him. For in agreeing to be complainant's counsel, respondent undertook to take all steps necessary to safeguard complainant's interest in the case. The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. 13 Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities,14 including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this regard. Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion required by the legal profession from its members. Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, this Court has the right and duty to withdraw his privilege as officer of the Court and member of the Bar. 15 WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Minervo T. Langit GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to RESTITUTE, within 30 days from finality of this Decision, complainant'sP255,000, with interest at 12% per annum from 30 June 2003

until fully paid. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the Court proof of payment within 15 days from payment of the full amount. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their notice and guidance.

Canon 16--A.C. No. 4562

June 15, 2005

DANIEL MORTERA, TERESITA MORTERA, FERDINAND MORTERA and LEO MORTERA Complainants, vs. ATTY. RENATO B. PAGATPATAN, Respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets paid? The answer to this question is stated clearly in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers1and in decisions2 applying the same, but it is apparently not plain enough to the respondent in this case. It therefore behooves us to make an example of him for the improvement of the legal profession. This disbarment case originated from the execution of a judgment in a civil action for "rescission of contracts with a prayer for prohibitory mandatory injunction."3 In brief, the complainants, then the plaintiffs, sued their mother, one Renato C. Aguilar and one Philip Arnold Palmer Bradfield for the rescission of a contract of sale. They secured judgment under which Aguilar was to pay them P155,000 for the property, which this Court affirmed.4 On April 15, 1994, respondent did the unthinkable. Under a secret agreement with Aguilar, he accepted P150,000 from the latter as partial payment of the judgment sum, issuing a receipt for the amount.5 He then deposited the money in his personal bank account without the knowledge of complainants.6 Until now, respondent adamantly refuses to surrender the money to complainants, despite the successive Orders of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.7 For his part, respondent, in his comment8 admits his secret agreement with and receipt of the money from Aguilar, interposing as his defense the fact that the complainants and their mother owed him the money he appropriated for services previously rendered. They would not have paid him his fees had he not done what he did.9 In support of his argument, the respondent narrated his years of service as counsel for the complainants and their mother. He alleged the amounts they owed him although he presented no evidence of any agreement between him and the complainants for the exact amount of his compensation. Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated in Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules governing this situation were: he owed candor to his clients;10 he was bound to account for whatever money he received for and from them; 11 as a lawyer, he was obligated to keep his own money separate from that of his clients; 12 and, although he was entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees, 13 he was also bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon demand or when due. Respondent violated each and every one of these rules.

Respondent cited the need to protect the money from other persons claiming to be heirs of Eusebio Montera14and from the volatile temperament of the complainants15 but did not present any evidence at all to prove either claim. Thus, these claims should be ignored. Because the respondent admitted concealing his clients money, the only question in our minds is how severe his punishment should be. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved 16 to suspend the respondent for one year. We do not agree. In Aldovino v. Pujalte,17 respondent Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte similarly faced disbarment charges for having withheld his clients money in violation of Canon 16. Pujalte alleged a lien for his fees over the contested amount but adduced no evidence of this supposed lien. In disposing of that case, we said: Respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally, as lawyers lien, the sum of P250,000, as attorneys fees. In fact, he did not adduce any proof of such agreement. His mere allegation or claim is not proof. Obviously, his failure to return the money to complainants upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. His act of holding on to their money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right. As a penalty for his infraction, Atty. Pujalte was suspended for a year. However, in the more recent case of de Guzman Buado and Lising v. Layag 18 which involved a violation of Canons 15, 16 and 17, the Court En Banc imposed the much heavier penalty of indefinite suspension. In that case, Atty. Eufracio Layag, the lawyer of the complainants Lising and de Guzman, successfully prosecuted a case against Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland). Pursuant to the judgment, Inland issued three checks, one payable to Layag, one payable to Lising and one payable to de Guzman who had already passed away by then. Layag received all three checks from the deputy sheriff but did not inform the complainants. He then gave them to one Marie Paz Gonzales for encashment on the strength of a special power of attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by the late de Guzman appointing her as his attorney-in-fact. This SPA authorized Gonzales to encash any check or bill of exchange received in settlement of the case. Even after complainants learned of the issuance of the checks two years later and demanded delivery of the proceeds, Layag refused to do so. In imposing upon Layag the penalty of indefinite suspension, the Court En Banc considered his years of experience as a lawyer, his ignorance of the law, specifically the Civil Code, and his violation of not one but three Canons.

Even though, on its face, this case has more in common with Pujalte than with Layag, a one-year suspension seems too lenient for a number of reasons. First, the respondent in this case has been a practicing lawyer since 1974 19 and even runs his own small law firm. For all his vast experience, however, he claims that he has done nothing wrong by concealing and withholding his clients money from them.20 Coming from a seasoned practitioner of the law, this attitude is inexcusable.lawphil.net Second, the respondent had other means of recovering his fees, having filed a case for that purpose which was, however, dismissed for his failure to properly implead an indispensable party.21 In short, having botched his own effort to recover his fees, he sought to simply subvert both law and proper procedure by holding on to the money. Clearly, the respondents actuations were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Thus, a heavier penalty than a mere one-year suspension is definitely called for. WHEREFORE, the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XV-2002-223 in Administrative Case No. 4562, finding respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that instead of a one-year suspension, Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for two years. Respondent is further directed to turn over to the complainants, within five (5) days from receipt of this resolution, the P150,000 he received in their behalf. Respondent is also ORDERED to report to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance herewith within 15 days from such compliance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts. This Resolution is immediately executory.

Canon 16- A.C. No. 8380

November 20, 2009 INC. Complainant,

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, vs. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM:

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client. The Facts and the Case The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University. In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done. On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him. On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him. In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for a survey plan which the DENR-NCR approved for a "facilitation cost" of P500,000.00; second, get a

favorable MMDA endorsement for a "facilitation cost" of another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the Land Registration Authority for a "facilitation cost" of still another P500,000.00. Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacunas instruction. Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it. Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only P45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and adduce evidence in his defense. On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation1 in the case to the Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having bribed a government official. Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna. On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Courts decision.2 The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating theP500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed. The Courts Ruling Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.3 Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him.4 A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.5 Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the Universitys conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement. But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces. Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a dried -up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is

another way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up.1avvphi1 The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include in its decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly gave him that money to spend for "facilitation" and processing. It is not nave. There is no legitimate expense called "facilitation" fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him. Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.

Rule 16.03 G.R. No. 161390 April 16, 2008

RAUL H. SESBREO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PROVINCE OF CEBU, GOV. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, THE PROVINCIAL ENGINEER PATROCINIO BACAY (sued both in their official and personal capacities), respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution 2 dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287. The assailed decision reversed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Cebu City in Civil Case R-19022 insofar as the RTC held the Province of Cebu liable for damages to petitioner Raul H. Sesbreo. The assailed resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros4 hired the petitioner to prosecute Civil Cases Nos. R-109335 and R-11214,6 evidenced by an Agreement,7 the terms of which read as follows: AGREEMENT WE, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that we may recover in the mandamus and other cases that we are filing or have filed against the Province of Cebu, the Provincial Governor, etc., whether or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by final judgment. We shall take care of all expenses in connection with the said cases.8 During the pendency of the aforesaid cases or on April 17, 1979, petitioner registered his charging/retaining lien based on the Agreement.9 The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their original positions with back salaries, together with all privileges and salary adjustments or increases.10 Aggrieved, the Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer filed certiorari cases before this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal assistance and represented the camineros. When respondent Eduardo R. Gullas (Gov. Gullas) assumed the position of governor of Cebu, he proposed the compromise settlement of all mandamus cases then pending against the province which included Civil Cases Nos. R-10933 and R-11214 handled by the petitioner. On April 21, 1979, the camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu, through then Gov. Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement,11 with the following terms and conditions:

1. The respondent Province of Cebu represented in this act by Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, duly authorized by proper resolution of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, hereby agrees to immediately appropriate and pay full backwages and salaries as awarded by the trial court in its decision to all the private respondents-employees from and after July 1, 1968, the date of their termination, up to the date of the approval of the herein Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Supreme Court, except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement whose back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the effective date of their retirement. xxxx 9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned represented by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo is subject to said lawyers charging and retaining liens as registered in the trial court and in the Honorable Court of Appeals. xxxx 11. That upon request of the employees concerned, most of whom are in dire actual financial straits, the Province of Cebu is agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to each employee payable through their counsel, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, deductible from the total amount that each will receive from the Province of Cebu, effective upon confirmation by the Honorable Solicitor General, the Supreme Court and the Philippine National Bank where the JJ (now infrastructure funds) are now in deposit under trust.12 Apparently, the camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the province agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. This Court adopted said compromise agreement in our decision13 dated December 18, 1979.14 In view of the finality of the above decision, the camineros, through their new counsel (who substituted for the petitioner), moved for its execution. The court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing the payment of only 45% of the amount due them based on the computation of the provincial engineering office as audited by the authority concerned. 15 The court did not release the remaining 55%, thus holding in abeyance the payment of the lawyers fees pending the determination of the final amount of such fees.16 However, instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.17 Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract) and Attorneys Fees against the Province of Cebu, the provincial governor, treasurer, auditor, and engineer in their official and personal capacities, as well as against his former clients (the camineros).18 Petitioner anchored his claim on the provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 19 19 thereof. He alleged that by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate their written contract for attorneys fees.20 He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate which, consequently, yielded a lower amount.21 Petitioner went on to say that although he was not a party to the above contracts, by

virtue of the registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal standing to institute the case below.22 On August 23, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case against the camineros after he had entered into an agreement with them and settled their differences.23 The case, however, proceeded against the respondents. On October 18, 1992, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent province of Cebu, the pertinent portion of which reads: Wherefore, for all the foregoing, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Province of Cebu to pay the plaintiff the following sums: (a) P669,336.51 in actual damages; with interest of 12% per annum from date of demand until fully paid; (b) P20,000.00 in moral damages; (c) P5,000.00 in litigation expenses; and (d) To pay the costs.24 While maintaining the validity of the compromise agreement, the trial court found that the petitioners money claims should have been computed based on the national and not the provincial rate of wages paid the camineros. Accordingly, the court declared that the petitioner was prejudiced to the extent of the difference between these two rates. The court further upheld the petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging lien. However, it did not give credence to the petitioners claim that the respondent public officials induced the camineros to violate their contract, and thus, absolved them from liability. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. 25 The appellate court concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced the caminerosto violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to respondents act of directly paying the camineros the amounts due them.26 Hence, the instant petition. In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: 1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION DUE TO LONG DELAY IN DECIDING CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287. 2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287 FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND DUE TO THE FATALLY-DEFECTIVE APPELLANTS BRIEF. 3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION BY DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT FIX THE ATTORNEYS FEES OF PETITIONER

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS CLEAR THAT WHAT WAS ADJUDGED WAS THE DECLARATION THAT THERE WAS BREACH OF THE COMPROMISE CONTRACT AND DAMAGES ARE TO BE AWARDED THE PETITIONER. 4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS GULLAS, RESENTES, SANCHEZ AND BACAY AS PERSONALLY LIABLE AND THAT THEIR PERSONAL LIABILITY IS SOLIDARY WITH THAT OF RESPONDENT PROVINCE OF CEBU. 5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY TO PETITIONER ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY, MORAL, EXEMPLARY, NOMINAL, TEMPERATE DAMAGES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND LOSS OF EARNINGS AND INTERESTS.27 The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner insists that the CA should have affirmed the trial courts decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and should have denied the appeal because of the formal defects in the appellants brief.28 Petitioner cites the cases of Malacora v. Court of Appeals29 and Flora v. Pajarillaga30 where this Court held that an appealed case which had been pending beyond the time fixed by the Constitution should be "deemed affirmed." We cannot apply the cited cases to the one at bench because they were decided on the basis of Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: SEC. 11. x x x (2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the applicable maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision or resolution because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be deemed affirmed x x x. That provision is not found in the present Constitution. The court, under the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated to decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it for determination within specified periods.31 Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirming the RTCs decision. While we do not tolerate delay in the disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely because they had been pending in court for a long period, especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present case. Likewise, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the appealed case be dismissed on account of the formal defects in respondents appellants brief filed before the CA. The requirements laid down by the Rules of Court on the contents of the brief are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case.32 However, despite its deficiencies, respondents appellants brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case, as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the

same.33 Thus, we sustain the CAs decision to rule on the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing it on mere technicality. Now, on the main issue of whether or not respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract. Petitioner clarifies that he instituted the instant case for breach of the compromise agreement and not for violation of the agreement for attorneys fees as mistakenly concluded by th e appellate court. He also cites Calalang v. De Borja34 in support of his right to collect the amounts due him against the judgment debtor (the respondents).35Lastly, petitioner argues that the respondent public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority when they directly paid the camineros their money claims and failed to withhold the petitioners fees. There is, according to the petitioner, a showing of bad faith on the part of the province and the public officials concerned. After a careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts conclusion. We would like to stress at this point that the compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court. Its validity, therefore, had been laid to rest as early as 1979 when the Court promulgated its decision inCommissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos.36 In fact, the judgment had already been fully satisfied by the respondents. It was precisely this full satisfaction of judgment that gave rise to the instant controversy, based primarily on the petitioners claim that he was prejudiced because of the following: 1) the wrong computation in thecamineros money claims by using the provincial and not the national wage rate; and 2) the mode of satisfying the judgment through direct payment which impaired his registered charging lien. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former "thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed." Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word "whatever" shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court. And since the compromise agreement had assumed finality, this Court can no longer delve into its substance, especially at this time when the judgment had already been fully satisfied. We cannot allow the petitioner to question anew the compromise agreement on the pretext that he suffered damage. As long as he was given the agreed percentage of the amount received by the camineros, then, the agreement is deemed complied with, and petitioner cannot claim to have suffered damage. Petitioner likewise claims that he was prejudiced by respondents act in directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, as it rendered inutile the charging lien duly registered for his protection. To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until what is

due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained by the client.37 Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides: Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.38 In this case, the existence of petitioners charging lien is undisputed since it was properly registered in the records. The parties even acknowledged its existence in their compromise agreement. However, a problem arose when the respondents directly paid in full the camineros money claims and did not withhold that portion which corresponds to petitioners fees. When the judgment debt was fully satisfied, petitioner could have enforced his lien either against his clients (thecamineros herein) or against the judgment debtor (the respondents herein). The clients, upon receiving satisfaction of their claims without paying their lawyer, should have held the proceeds in trust for him to the extent of the amount of his recorded lien, because after the charging lien had attached, the attorney is, to the extent of said lien, regarded as an equitable assignee of the judgment or funds produced by his efforts.39 The judgment debtors may likewise be held responsible for their failure to withhold from the camineros the amount of attorneys fees due the petitioner. In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because, according to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference. While the respondents may have impaired the petitioners charging lien by satisfying the judgment without regard for the lawyers right to attorneys fees, we cannot apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v. Judge de Borja,40because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the judgment debtor may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of attorneys fees in accordance with the duly registered charging

lien.41 However, there is a disparity between the two cases, because, in this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal services. The withdrawal was premised on a settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their obligations. This is bolstered by the certification of the clerk of court that his former clients had deposited their passbooks to ensure payment of the agreed fees. Having been paid by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim against the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on. Neither can the petitioner rely on Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, etc.42 where this court declared that satisfaction of the judgment, in general, does not by itself bar or extinguish the attorneys liens, as the court may even vacate such satisfaction and enforce judgment for the amount of the lien.43 However, the satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown either by the attorneys conduct or by his passive omission. 44 In the instant case, petitioners act in withdrawing the case against the camineros and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. No rule will allow a lawyer to collect from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor except, perhaps, on a claim for a bigger amount which, as earlier discussed, is baseless. Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation. 45 Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract against the respondents, even on the basis of Articles 1191 46 or 1311.47 Although we sustain his status to institute the instant case, we cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no breach of contract. Even if there was such a breach, he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him. Thus, no liability can be imputed to the province of Cebu or to the respondent public officials, either in their personal or official capacities. Lastly, we cannot ascribe bad faith to the respondents who directly paid the camineros the amounts due them. The records do not show that when they did so, they induced the camineros to violate their contract with the petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their obligation in order to cause prejudice to the petitioner. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287 are AFFIRMED.

Rule 16.04-A.C. No. 6656 December 13, 2005 (formerly CBD-98-591) BOBIE ROSE vs. ATTY. CARMENCITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, Respondent.

V.

FRIAS, Complainant,

RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: In this disbarment case, we are faced with conflicting versions of the incidents surrounding the filing of the verified complaint1 for deception and malpractice allegedly committed by Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada. For her part, complainant Bobie Rose Frias alleged that respondent became her retained counsel and legal adviser in the early part of 1990. She entrusted to respondent documents and titles of properties in November of that year. Sometime in December 1990, respondent persuaded complainant to sell her house located at 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City. Respondent allegedly acted as broker as she was in need of money. On December 7, 1990 respondent hastily arranged a meeting with her and a prospective buyer, Dra. Flora San Diego, in Valenzuela, Manila. She was allegedly made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)2 without her having read it because "they had to reach the bank before it closed at 3:00 p.m." When they arrived at the Security Bank branch in Valenzuela, San Diego handed respondent P2M in cash andP1M in check, instead of P3M in cash as the down payment3 indicated in the MOA. Out of the P2M in cash, respondent took P1M as her commission without complainants consent. When complainant protested, respondent promised to sign a promissory note later. The P1M check was later on dishonored by the bank because it was a stale check. San Diego eventually backed out from the sale. However, she converted the aborted sale into a mortgage loan at 36% p.a. interest, as provided for in the MOA. Since the transaction between her and San Diego did not materialize, complainant allegedly tried to recover from respondent the title4 to the property and other documents.5 Respondent, however, started avoiding her. Complainant recovered the documents placed inside an envelope only on May 6, 1991. On the same day, however, the envelope was allegedly stolen from her Pajero. She reported the incident to the police.6 She also informed respondent about the incident, and the latter prepared an affidavit of loss.7 Complainant later offered this affidavit as evidence in a petition for issuance of a duplicate copy of the title she filed in the RTC of Makati, Branch 142. 8 A perjury case9 was then filed by San Diego against complainant on the ground that the title to the property was never really lost (as alleged by complainant in the affidavit of loss) but was with San Diego all along. San Diego maintained that complainant handed it to her on the day they signed the MOA. Complainant denied these allegations. She instead claimed that the perjury case was filed by San Diego, with respondent as counsel, to coerce her (complainant) to assign the property to San Diego and to abandon her claim of P1M from respondent.

San Diego also filed a case10 for the return of the P3M she paid complainant, at 36% p.a. interest. Complainant claimed that her failure to return the money to San Diego was by reason of respondents refusal to give back theP1M she took as commission. Complainant was thus constrained to file a civil case against respondent. Despite the favorable decision11 of the trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals12, respondent refused to return the money. In her answer13 to the disbarment complaint, respondent claimed that, although complainant was engaged in the buy-build-and-sell of real property, she represented her only in labor cases relative to the latters overseas recruitment business. Respondent denied that she pe rsuaded complainant to sell the property in Ayala Alabang. Rather, it was complainant who offered to sell or mortgage the property to respondent. Since respondent did not have enough money, complainant requested her to sell or mortgage the property and offered her a loan, commission and attorneys fees on the basis of the selling price. According to respondent, complainant confided that on October 29, 1990 she offered the Alabang property to a certain Nelia Sta. Cruz. Complainant received P400,000 as earnest money in this transaction on the condition that she would return the said amount to Sta. Cruz in two weeks in case the latter decided not to proceed with the sale.14 The said amount would in turn be used to buy another property. Respondent also claimed that on December 4, 1990, she introduced complainant to another client, Dra. San Diego, as a prospective buyer. They visited the Alabang property to check on the house. It was there that complainant offered the house to San Diego for either sale or mortgage. They then discussed the terms and conditions to be contained in the MOA.15 The agreement was thereafter signed in respondents office in Valenzuela, Metro Manila on December 7, 1990, duly notarized by Atty. Manuel Aguinaldo.16 They then proceeded to Prudential Bank (not Security Bank as alleged in the complaint) to withdraw P2M in cash. Upon receipt of P2M in cash and P1M check down payment, complainant gave San Diego the TCT. Complainant then handed to respondent P900,000 as commission and loan, duly receipted in a promissory note.17 Complainant further entrusted P100,000 to respondent to be given to Nelia Sta. Cruz as partial reimbursement of the P400,000 earnest money.18 Respondent maintained that when San Diego backed out from the transaction, the latter demanded the return of only P2M, not P3M, as clearly stated in San Diegos letter19 to the complainant dated March 20, 1991. Respondent denied that complainant previously demanded the return of the P1M until the civil case against her was instituted. She expressed her willingness to pay the P900,000 plus the agreed interest, but not the P1M plus interest baselessly demanded from her by complainant. In an attempt to settle the controversy, respondent offered to pay the P900,000 to complainant in the presence of San Diego, so complainant could in turn pay San Diego theP2M. Respondent also denied that she prepared the affidavit of loss which was offered as evidence by complainant in the petition for issuance of lost title.

Respondent further denied that she represented San Diego in the criminal cases of perjury and false testimony which the latter filed against complainant. In a report and recommendation dated July 25, 2000, the IBP Investigating Commissioner20 found respondent guilty of dishonesty and malpractice for concealing the identity of the person in actual possession of complainants documents and for preparing an affidavit of loss even if she knew that the documents were in San Diegos custody. A suspension for six months from the practice of law was accordingly recommended. A careful study of the records reveals that the IBP recommendation relied sol ely on complainants self-serving and unsupported claims. A re-examination of the differing claims of the parties, however, discloses that, instead of the grounds relied on by the IBP, respondent should be held accountable for certain serious violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present21 or former client.22 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.23 It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in its performance.24 The conflict exists if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against the first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.25 In this case, respondent not only admitted that she represented both complainant and San Diego in unrelated actions but also counseled both of them in the sale of the Alabang property. As their lawyer, she was duty-bound to protect both of their interests. She should have therefore refrained from jumbling their affairs. Yet she introduced complainant to another client of hers as a buyer of the property. She even had the temerity to broker the transaction. At that early stage, she should have realized that her role as their lawyer had been seriously compromised. Since buyer and seller had evident antagonistic interests, she could not give both of them sound legal advice. On top of this, respondents obvious tendency then was to help complainant get a high selling price since the amount of her commission was dependent on it. After several suits were filed as an offshoot of the transaction between her two clients, respondent found herself in a very tight situation. Although she denied that she represented any of them, her active participation in the transaction was obvious and it clearly displayed an utter disregard of the

rule against discharging inconsistent duties to her clients. The great likelihood was that she would be called upon to use against either the complainant or San Diego information acquired through her professional connection with them. Furthermore, her role as their counsel in the other unrelated cases was also compromised. Both parties had, at this point, become wary of her since she had by then taken for her own convenience San Diegos side by refusing to return the P900,000 to complainant until San Diego was paid. It was not surprising therefore that complainant filed this administrative case because of the suspicion that respondent had double-crossed her. The records further establish that respondent collected her full commission even before the transaction between complainant and San Diego was completed. This unmasked respondents greed which she now wants us so badly to ignore. Her integrity was placed in serious doubt the moment her promised commission started motivating her every move. Her behavior was, sad to say, simply distasteful. Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice. A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of clients confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation. Finally, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the court lawfully requires.26 Here, respondent continues to disregard the final order of the Court of Appeals finding her liable for the P900,000 she received from complainant. We see no justification for her continued delay in complying with an order that has long become final. Respondent adamantly insists that she and complainant should simultaneously settle their obligations. As a lawyer, she should have known that her obligation to complainant was independent of and separate from complainants obligation to the buyer. Her refusal to comply with the appellate courts order is, therefore, a willful disobedience to its lawful orders and must not be left unpunished. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondents personal records.

Canon 17- A.C. No. 1526 January 31, 2005 NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM:

SUBSTITUTED

BY

LUCIANO

S.

HERNANDEZ,

JR., complainant,

For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties are from Zamboanga City. The allegations in the letter-complaint are: Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent. Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors. Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant. Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions.1a\^/phi1.net In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the complaint. Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 17812for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving the subject lots. On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to submit his answer. In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her "Lola" due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation. It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation. On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows: "A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974. It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties. The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent. It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties. As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt

hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors." On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years. We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.l^vvphi1.net However, we have to modify its recommended penalty.1a\^/phi1.net Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides: "A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.3 Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at al l times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.4 Canon 17 of the same Code states: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel. Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

profession5 and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 6Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.7 And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.8 Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession. Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.9 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.10 In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11 we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III,12 we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson ,13 we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort ,14 an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for misappropriating his clients money. Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

Canon 17- A.C. No. 7181 February 6, 2009 MARIA ANGALAN, NENA ANGALAN, DIONICIO ANGALAN, MAGDALENA ANGALAN, FRANCISCA ANGALAN, INIS ANGALAN, ROSALINO ANGALAN, AND JOSEFINA ANGALAN, ALL OF WHOM ARE HEIRS OF ANGALAN SAMAL married to SANAAN SAMAL, Complainants, vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena, Dionicio, Magdalena, Francisca, Inis, Rosalino, and Josefina Angalan (complainants) against Atty. Leonido C. Delante (respondent) for gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainants are the heirs of Angalan Samal (Angalan) and Sanaan Samal (Sanaan). Complainants allege that they are illiterate and belong to the Samal Tribe. Angalan, Sanaan, and complainants owned a 9.102-hectare parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The property was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11499.1 On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Navarro R. Eustaquio and Arabella P. Eustaquio (Spouses Eustaquio). To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of the 9.102-hectare property and surrendered OCT No. P-11499 to the Spouses Eustaquio. The Spouses Eustaquio prepared a document 2 and asked Angalan and complainants to sign it. Angalan and complainants affixed their thumb marks on the document. When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover OCT No. P-11499 from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the 8.102-property to his name OCT No. P-11499 was canceled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-99263 in the name of Navarro was issued.1avvphi1.zw+ Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. In a receipt4 dated 18 November 1970, respondent acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from Francisca Angalan and her husband, Macario Capul (Capul), representing the full payment of his professional fees: "Received from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." Respondent filed a complaint5 dated 13 April 1976 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region XVI, Tagum, Davao stating that: 2. x x x Angalan Samal and his children x x x are the original patentees of a certain parcel of land, situated in Ombay, Samal, Davao, covered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499, of the Registry of Deeds of Davao, having acquired the same under HP-No. 65310, pursuant to the provisions of the Homestead Laws of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141); 3. x x x [O]n April 15, 1971, the herein original patentees x x x sold and conveyed said parcel of land covered by the aforesaid title to the herein defendants for the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) x x x;

4. x x x [U]nder the provisions of the Public Land Law, particularly Section 119 thereof and even on the face of the title of said property now under the name of the defendants x x x the herein plaintiffs have the right to repurchase said property within a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance; xxxx 7. [A]s a matter of right under the law, the herein plaintiffs are entitled to the produce of the property at least beginning April 8, 1976; xxxx 9. [B]y reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel x x x6 Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement7 dated 3 September 1977, the parties stated that: 1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as repurchase price which the defendant[s accept]; 2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from the Clerk of Court which amount had been deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to plaintiff[s]; 3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said balance.8 In a Decision9 dated 30 September 1977, the CFI approved the amicable settlement. Complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid. In a letter10 dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, respondent stated that: This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.1avvphi1

When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property to his name TCT No. T-9926 was canceled and TCT No. T-5793211 in the name of respondent was issued. Complainants filed a complaint12 dated 30 April 2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI, Branch 34, Davao City praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared void, (2) TCT No. T-57932 be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to pay damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 57-2004. In his answer13 dated 29 December 2004, respondent stated that: [In] 1971, ANGALAN (SAMAL) [now deceased) [sic] together with his son-in-law, MACARIO CAPUL, the latter being the town mate of herein defendant Delante in Danao, Cebu and who is married to the daughter of the late ANGALAN (SAMAL), came to herein defe ndants office and sought for an advice to borrow money; x x x [T]he late ANGALAN (SAMAL) together with his children in company with MACARIO CAPUL, were directed by herein defendant to inform him why it was necessary for them to borrow money and for whatever [sic] purpose; after their story, herein defendant disagreed as to their justification in borrowing money which was for no other purpose except to have money on their own; xxxx It is preposterous for plaintiff[s] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional services of herein defendant to file an annulment case since plaintiffs never came back apparently ashamed when they were driven out, but worse they had [sic] never paid the herein defendant a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against co-defendant NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO; x x x [T]he transfer of said property consisting of 8.102 hectares under the name of herein defendants was not tainted with any deceit but effected legally by virtue of a valid deed of sale executed by defendants *sic+ spouses EUSTAQUIO in favor of herein defendants. xxxx [T]he absolute deed of sale, [sic] dated 15 April 1971, executed by herein plaintiffs in favor of defendants EUSTAQUIO, speaks for itself. It is a sale of real property and NOT a mortgage. xxxx Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of the plaintiffs, the legal services of defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked defendant from where they could borrow money, and after knowing that they just simply would [sic] like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to repay [sic] back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to look for another person to help them;

Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL, who is a friend and a town mate, and who is the husband of FRANCISCA ANGALAN CAPUL, that the plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO x x x; In September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein defendant DELANTE, who, and his family [sic] are now permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement home, [sic] and he approached herein defendant, in which he was referred to defendant EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon visiting the property of defendant EUSTAQUIO, he was so impressed of the location of the property and decided to buy the same, hence left the money to herein defendant DELANTE and to buy *sic+ said property under defendants name, with the understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall have returned to the country; x x x [S]ince herein defendant is not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for his client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided not to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein defendant to register the Deed of Sale over the property to [sic] his name and directed herein defendant to refund his client. 14 Complainants filed a complaint15 dated 28 December 2005 with the Court charging respondent with gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution 16 dated 3 July 2006, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint and, in a Resolution 17 dated 4 December 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a Notice dated 14 March 2007, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) directed complainants and respondent to appear before the IBP for a mandatory conference. The parties failed to appear at the mandatory conference. In an Order dated 16 May 2007, Commissioner Hababag directed the parties to submit their position papers. In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed with the RTC, respondent and complainants prayed that Civil Case No. 57-2004 be dismissed. Complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment dated 4 April 2007 and an affidavit of desistance dated April 2007. In his position paper dated 2 July 2007, respondent stated that (1) Angalan and Capul went to his office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money; (2) his client from New York bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio; and (3) complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance. In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility: The issue to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and against their will? Weighing evidence presented by both parties, respondent should be punished for his unprofessional and distasteful acts.

xxxx His vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts was too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance. It is unbelievable that a buyer would entrust his money intended for payment of a property but allowed that said property be registered under the name of another, specifically his lawyer, simply runs counter to ordinary human nature. (Emphasis supplied) Commissioner Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report with modification. The Board increased respondents suspension from six months to one year. Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,18 the Board forwarded the case to the Court for final action. The Court sustains the findings of the IBP. Complainants and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainants, they engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property from the Spouses Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and confidence they reposed in him, respondent transferred the title over the property to his name. According to respondent, complainants did not engage his services. His client from New York was the one who bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. After a careful review of the records, the Court gives credence to complainants version of the facts. Respondents credibility is highly questionable. In his answer dated 29 December 2004 and filed with the CFI and in his position paper dated 2 July 2007 and filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that Angalan and Capul went to his office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money. According to respondent, complainants did not engage his services. In his answer, respondent stated that: It is preposterous for [complainants] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional services of herein defendant to file an annulment case since [complainants] never came back apparently ashamed when they were driven out x x x; xxxx Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of [complainants], the legal services of defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked defendant from where they could borrow money, and after knowing that they just simply would like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to repay back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to look for another person to help them; Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL x x x that the plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.19 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court is not impressed. Angalan and complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property. This is obvious. First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel." Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants: This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.20 These clearly show that complainants engaged the services of respondent. In his answer, respondent alleged that complainants did not pay him his professional fees (which, according to him, they did not engage). He stated that, "[complainants] had never paid the herein defendant a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against x x x NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO." The Court is not impressed. Complainants fully paid respondent his professional fees. This is obvious. In a receipt dated 18 November 1970, respondent stated that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." This clearly shows that complainants paid respondent his professional fees. In his answer and position paper, respondent alleged that his client from New York bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio: [I]n September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein respondent, who, and his family [sic] are now permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement home, and he approached herein respondent, in which [sic] he was referred to Navarro Eustaquio; and upon visiting the property of Navarro Eustaquio, he was impressed of [sic] the location of the property and decided to buy the same, hence left the money to herein respondent and to buy [sic] said property under respondents name, with the understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall have returned to the country;

x x x [S]ince herein respondent was not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for his client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided not to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein respondent to register the Deed of Sale over the property under his name and directed herein respondent to refund his client. 21 The Court is not impressed. Complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. This is obvious. First, complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement stating that complainants would repurchase the property from the Spouses Eustaquio: 1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as repurchase price which the defendant[s accept]; 2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from the Clerk of Court which amount had been deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to plaintiff[s]; 3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said balance.22 (Emphasis supplied) Second, in his letter to the barrio captain, respondent stated that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio: This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.23 (Emphasis supplied) These clearly show that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. Respondents story about the client from New York is unbelievable. Respondent did not give any detail or proof to substantiate his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court agrees with the observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondents "vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance." In his position paper, respondent alleged that complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance. This is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the

desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession . Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand.24 Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants charges as malicious and untruthful. Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them . Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name. Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct.25 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. In Hernandez v. Go,26 the Court disbarred a lawyer for transferring the titles over the properties of his client to his name without the knowledge of his client. In Hernandez, the Court held that: Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.27 A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer. WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.