The Process Transparency: Democracy and Legitimacy in Mexico

Roberto Corona Copado

ABSTRACT

This paper is aimed at studying the effects of transparency policies on the performance of government and its relationship with society. In this sense, it is an analysis of the impact of transparency on policies and public decisions in the context of the structures and processes of accountability in Mexico. A particular transparency policy is subject to a double affirmative relationship to the principles of publicity and representation. A policy of transparency in which citizens active their right to request information through access to government documents will yield a better relationship between the principles of publicity and representation, that with respect to that other policy that is triggered by the government to give presented their programs and results through official publication of information in electronic portals and media. This makes it possible to understand that the government's accountability to society plays an affirmative (deliberative) role within the democratic constitutional state. This reasoning requires that transparency is, first, the linchpin of democracy and legitimacy in the center of the array of structures and processes of accountability, secondly, that as the opportunity structure of a regime of free information that encourages civic participation and, finally, that transparency policies are understood as processes, ie the unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, and changing a set of institutions.

Roberto Corona Copado Master in Social Sciences, Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico coronacopado@me.com | roberto.corona@ife.org.mx Advisor Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), Mexico Graduate Student Master in Critical Theory, 17 Instituto de Estudios Crticos, Mexico 1

The Process Transparency: Democracy and Legitimacy in Mexico

Roberto Corona Copado

Introduction: Why Transparency? The government aims to generate legitimacy in the society it represents, through the design and implementation of policies that address the needs and requirements expressed in the preferences of citizens. Of all the policies undertaken by the government, those related to transparency may especially increase the legitimacy of the decision process. We can start from a minimal, at least functional definition of transparency. Transparency can be understood as the knowledge and information openness to public scrutiny of the actions undertaken by the government in exercising its powers. It is a polysemic concept that brings into two positions, that of society (citizenship) and the state (government), and both are driven by a motivation of demand, in the first case, and goal, in the second case. Can transparency generate legitimacy for the decision-making institutions? The key is to move away from a concept of transparency as a value or remedy, and consider instead a more procedural explain how informative opening device is complying with the government's objective to enhance its legitimacy in the citizenship, when carefully motivates the decisions after they have been made "behind closed doors" or even are being made at that time, ie in the internal space corresponding to the decision-making process of public authorities. The question then is oriented around transparency: how it generates legitimacy? And even, how can intervene in that all stakeholders? Finding an answer
2

to glimpse the relationship between legitimacy and transparency should move away from a traditional, paternalistic conception exemplified by the effect of the "glass box" and lead us to adopt a more targeted approach to the relational aspect of power and information. Transparency can provide a better understanding of the reasons supporting a decision and, therefore, provide higher levels of legitimacy to the decisions and therefore for decision makers. 1 The deliberative act is convinced of the merits of the decision by the force of the better argument, while it gets more respect for alternative views. The greater understanding will facilitate people to accept decisions before any disagreements that remain after the deliberations. The process by which a decision is reached can contribute to legitimacy. This concept of transparency as a process is a prerequisite for achieving government impartiality effect that contributes to legitimacy. People who are informed about decisions that affect their daily lives are more willing to accept the process by which decisions were made, if they are given an idea of reason that lies behind the decisions. Only when transparency shows a behavior close to the deliberative democratic ideal of argument and public debate, the total openness of decision process will improve government decision-making to be made "behind closed doors" motivated ex post, ie after the decision.

From this perspective, transparency has the power to "civilize" the policy, insofar as it requires

representatives to switch from one mode to another deliberative negotiation in order to comply with the standard. Jenny de Fine Licht, Daniel Naurin, Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, Does transparency generate legitimacy? An experimental study of procedure acceptance of open- an closed-door decision-making, QoG Working Paper Series 2011:8, Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, 2011, pp. 8, 16. 3

Usually we see transparency as a recipe universally prescribed to treat a broad spectrum of issues related to government inefficiency and poor performance. Even the opening of the debate inspired by transparency has a civilizing effect on political behavior. Needless to say, it is a shield against corruption and bad governance, whose efficiency depends on the policy and institutional design and the willingness of those involved. Thus, there is a perception that the opening wide increases the legitimacy with respect to the decision making. Transparency is a variable that indicates the degree to which the information is available to know how and why decisions occur within a given institution. This concept carries a double distinction: first, that referred to information on the substance of the decision and the facts and reasons upon which it is based, which we will call as transparency as justification, on the other, referred to actions (discussions, negotiations, voting) that take place between those responsible for the decision making process and therefore is connected directly to the decision, we will call as transparency as a process. Transparency as a process will be more vulnerable to the efficiency costs, which are more related to the negotiation and deliberation that take place "behind closed doors", whereas transparency as justification gives decision makers more leeway until decision is made. Transparency policies (government advertising actions and requests for access to documents) are identified between these two functional distinctions. Why transparency generates legitimacy? Transparency can reduce

uncertainty about the governments behavior, whether elected politicians or senior bureaucrats, so that citizens acquire greater confidence to delegate power. Being a collective action problem, the principal-agent relationship between citizens and the
4

government contains information asymmetries with advantages for the latter. Moreover, the agents take into account this effect is likely to offer its main greater opening of its shares in exchange for new "investments" in the exercise of power (reelection, ratification, promotion). The more open decision-making, and how much more information about the motivation of the chosen policy has been gathered participants (society and government), the greater the acceptance of the procedure.2 This implies a greater involvement in decision-making and information, greater acceptance of the procedure, and greater power while accountability. If transparency reveals a close decision to the deliberative democratic ideal here mentioned, a transparency policy as a process will be as or more effective for citizens a different transparency policy as justification. Understand that democracy generates legitimacy involves thinking a reciprocal relationship between society and government, not from above (bureaucratic perspective) or from below (social perspective), but from space establishing the interrelationship that occurs the exercise of fundamental rights and institutional performance. Wonder about the role of citizens in the exercise of their rights, how they are organized to demand compliance and proper performance of government activities, and relationships that hold as civil society against the government on the one hand, and responsibility of the government to meet social demands and respond to an adequate representation of the interests of citizens and society at large, on the other, is the reason for this project.

Ibid., p. 19. 5

A transparency policy establishes a particular relationship between government and society we can call biunivocal correspondence that takes place or is established between the elements of two sets as well as being unambiguous (from government to society, from society to government) is reciprocal, that is, when each element of the second set corresponds unambiguously first one. Legitimacy, which always appeals to the government to justify its actions and performance in society, is closely linked to transparency, and makes that a necessity that can only be solved in a consequentialist, as a product of a process under public scrutiny and policy assessment. Democratic legitimacy comes from the possibility that each individual affected by public issues involved in creating, governing, and changing democratic institutions. That is, there is no legitimacy in a democracy without the participation of its members, either under an arrangement representative or any circumstances that aims to restore the possibility of legitimizing the state based on practices that promote freedom and equality . The rule is always a coalition that seeks to reconcile the demands of principles such as publicity or representation playing in the interrelationship between government and society. The policy is not determined by the state, but in relation to the state; the state is placed in relation to the production of binding decisions3 within the administration and the community. Identify the role of transparency policies around the correlation between democracy and legitimacy at all times playing society and government, is the aim of this article, which in turn

Klaus von Beyme, Teora poltica del siglo XX. De la modernidad a la postmodernidad, Madrid:

Alianza Editorial, 1994 (1991), p. 234. 6

corresponds to the first step of a much more ambitious project on the effects of transparency policies in Mexico over the past ten years.

Transparency policies My intention is to study the effects of transparency policies on the performance of government and its relationship with society, through an analysis of the impact of public policies and decisions by evaluating the structures and processes accountability. A transparency policy establishes a special correspondence between government and society. What do I mean by transparency policies? These are not only aimed at safeguarding the right of access to information, but also to renew the public organizations, improving their management capacity and internal processes to achieve greater satisfaction of the demands. These transparency policies take place in the exercise of the right of access to information generated by the government, scrutiny of public action and accountability requirement; aim to solve or prevent public problems through the availability of information that helps you make better decisions about public goods and services and eventually require collaboration between government and society to solve public problems and under free citizen interest information via internet platforms like. In this sense, we can identify two types of transparency policies. On the one hand, those relating to the publication of official information by government agencies in publicly accessible media like Internet. The Mexican federal government agencies, for example, post on a website (http://portaltransparencia.gob.mx) information regarding the directory, contracts, reports, wages, regulations,
7

subsidies, services, concessions and permits, compliance with the obligations under the Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacin Pblica Gubernamental. Through transparency obligations, policies ranging from government transparency to society, and are in need of legitimacy as their most immediate. On the other hand, there are requests for access to information contained in documents that ask citizens by virtue of their exercise of the right of access to information. The application is written presenting people before government agencies that may require the information contained in documents that generate, obtain, acquire, transform or retain in its archives, and is by nature public. The information requested may be of any activities performed by the government or, on the performance of public servants, and may only be temporarily reserved under certain exceptions (public or national security, industrial or tax secrecy, et cetera). Unlike transparency obligations, these policies go hand in hand with the requirement of citizens to know what the government does, and how it does it, and thus society articulates a demand for democracy to the government, from which has a basis for effective accountability. While there is a widespread perception that informational openness (transparency) increases the legitimacy regarding decision-making, the fact is that transparency also involves costs, resulting in adverse effects on the efficiency of decision-making and quality decisions, for not wanting conformist pressures greater public exposure, public positions and demagogic "plebiscitary rhetoric"4 reducing incentives, delaying the time that must reach a decision and may lead to early termination or the breakdown of the negotiations. In effect, the government-society
4

Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson, Gilljam, op. cit., p. 3. 8

relationship contains information asymmetries lead to the first. The government is induced to respond to the will of the majority under the threat that if he does not, he will be removed in the elections. And on the understanding that the government will never be a perfect agent, citizens must be willing to suffer the costs of government control of information to implement the incentive scheme.5 Under this premise, a transparency policy that goes from government to society means more governmental control of information concerning that other that goes from society to the government. With transparency obligations the government "invests" public availability of certain information with the clear objective to maintain or increase their power, whereas with requests for access to information submitted by citizens, such control out of their hands, and investment of power and influence must be understood otherwise, closer to the good performance of its activities and programs. The twofold transparency reflected in these policies cannot be understood without the interrelationship between government and society. The existence of transparency policies is fundamental and necessary for the public, either individually or collectively, make an effective use for the legal and institutional framework is kept greased and require both a democratic deepening accountability and the exercise of their rights. Indeed, the application of laws and building institutions to make the exercise of citizens rights lead a revolution, of a kind of political and cultural change, in which autonomy plays a key role in building autonomous accountability institutions as the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Informacin y Proteccin de Datos
5

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2010, p. 148. 9

(IFAI), which functions as an entity that catalyzes the effectiveness of policies of transparency between government and society. However, with the passage of time the expectations of social capital and trust that society had deposited in these institutions and the structure of accountability has decreased significantly or has not been adequately powered either by stagnation, bureaucratization and standardization of features that are confused between routine and paperwork, followed away from identifying with the provision of a service for the public, or by a legal design exceeded, resistance from some sectors of government who refuse to give information to provide security reasons, secrets or privacy, or even institutional defects generated and sustained by new or former dynamics often leading to an administrative impasse. All this has led to failures or effectiveness problems of programs and services that the government has, deep institutional crisis and eventually disillusionment among citizens. That is, the relationship between government and society is not adequate and is being perverted. Therefore, in the context of reciprocity that marks the relationship between government and society in transparency policies, one should discuss the fundamental question of accountability: the relationship that explains how certain aspects of effectiveness of governmental programs are structured with the aggregation and expression of social demands.

Structures and processes of accountability Transparency policies can be explained in four broad perspectives and two sets of guiding principles that operate in what I call the array of structures and processes of
10

accountability. Transparency is the linchpin between democracy and legitimacy (Figure 1). The first set corresponds to the study of the right of access to information on the prospects for democracy and constitutionalism, where they articulate the concepts of democratization (consolidation and deepening of democracy) and accountability. The garantismo and deliberative democracy as legal and political paradigms of democracy constitute the substance of the second set of the matrix. This set of perspectives approaches from critical theory from conceptual development of society action in public space developed by Jrgen Habermas's theo of communicative action, Bohman and others theory of deliberative democracy, and its relation to the idea of democracy and constitutionalism and turn in the middle of them, with the theoretical contribution from Luigi Ferrajoli. Now, between these two sets takes place a guiding principle that defines the relationship between government and society in a constitutional democracy. This principle is publicity, which consists of the public exercise of reason that defines the institutional design, which requires transparency in who holds and exercises political power, and also supports the public. The formulation of the principle of publicity is due to Immanuel Kant and has a double meaning, both negative ("all actions affecting the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with the advertising") and so ("all maxims that require publicity not to fail in their purpose, while consistent with law and policy"). I want to understand publicity in its political dimension, namely to make public, ie not only to general knowledge (passive) but also mutual understanding subject to rational public debate.

11

Once drawn the first part of the conceptual map, we must now identify the two remaining sets and have, as it were, a more practical bearing. The third set, the government prospect and the effectiveness of its programs, is defined by a vision of accountability understood under the paradigm of representative government, and that makes the transition from the ideal of political control to the social self-control. Finally, the fourth set, which is related to the previous perspective, is constituted by a vision of accountability from the perspective of self-government and popular sovereignty, which defines accountability from the perspective of civil society theories that handle the concepts of autonomy and community. The intention is to form a notion of citizenship that claims a requirement activism and control over government actions. Among the sets of effectiveness of government programs and aggregation and expression of social demands takes place the principle of representation, following the concept developed by Hanna Pitkin, 6 articulates acting in the best interest of the public and with the best available knowledge, given the pluralism of modern societies and governments, as it relates to the relationship between interests and outcomes, where a government decides whether or not to adopt policies that are designated as preferred by citizens, reflecting best interests (responsiveness), and where citizens can distinguish the results of policies and have the proper ability to punish the government in the framework of accountability.

Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Introduction; Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes,

Bernard Manin (eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 2. 12

I would like to present in more detail what happens in the second set of theoretical perspectives of transparency, which articulates the effectiveness of government programs with aggregation and expression of demands on the principle of representation. The items included in the first set of theoretical perspectives of transparency, and is organized around the principle of publicity, are more general and can be analyzed as a general environment within which it operates this other set of operating look concepts, landed real cases that have to do with government and society actions. All these perspectives deserve analysis, and it will be done in a future larger project of which this article is just the tip of the iceberg. The array of structures and processes of accountability must be studied in the light of the primary problem that arises from the clash of the key concepts of transparency, legitimacy, publicity and representation in the present relationship between the state (government) and society (citizenship) and also on the idea that today power has as raw material policy and its relationship to the idea of control. Authors like Klaus von Beyme argue that modern state suffers a progressive desubstantialization because partial areas of society are gaining autonomy. With the differentiation of settings, including public and private spheres around which political society distinguished civil society (and the market) it became imperative to have a exchange model in which pluralism of macropowers and deconcentration of power announced the arrival of the social self-control. With the dismantling of the elements of domination, policy was understood as coordination and mediation of autonomous subdomains of the political system. The concept of power evolved from centralized planning, to control corporate pragmatism, to finally arrive at a theory of social control with an off-center state, where governmental processes did not
13

consider power but exchange (and communication) as an instrument of control. Public policy is therefore designed as a device for mediating conflicting interests with the baton usually the state, and thus begins the social self-control. The appropriate and not just or necessary appears as the minimum policy outcome. Politics is not a market, but a kind of "insurance model"7 based on the principle of reciprocity. With the theory of self-control, political control is far from hierarchical to become mediated, indicating the possibility of control over the environment corresponding to a social subfield. Democracy always creates two versions of a political, because politics produces results that translate into binary code between government-opposition
7

Beyme, op. cit., p. 139. The author argues (pp. 182ss) that this relationship between government Desubstantialization of power: the power is explained in relational magnitude, which is opposed to the classical idea of sovereign power. It is something that has no residence or institutional home in the form of any type of organizational device called sovereign, but operates on a string, reticulated organizations. The power thus understood cannot be fixed in institutions or given submission modes; becomes a game of unequal relations and mobile, and therefore generates resistance, which is inherent.

and society corresponds to a postmodern conception of politics, with the following features: -

Pluralism as a principle: in politics, it is even more prevalent than in the economy such asymmetric arrangement of exchange relations in society. It is convenient to use generalized exchange theory that views politics as a "mutual insurance system," long-term oriented, unlike other theories oriented in the short term like agency model. Political controversy is channeled without blurring the asymmetrical relations of power, and abandons the assumption that the political outcome of the dispute is the unintended result of the action to the end, but rather the result of the system is sought collectively, regulated by political structures. Multilateral networks develops this kind of exchange in the long term as widespread media require money, power, influence, representing values, trust, legitimacy and information. Also the generalized political exchange model takes into account the role of the segments of society that are not able to exchange or barely are. It uses protection mechanisms of the political order (veto rights, participation offers, delegation of autonomous decision rights) to mitigate conflict.

End of justifying theory of legitimacy: transition from the ideal of good governance advocated in pre-modernity and modernity legitimate state, towards legitimacy by procedure. 14

and government-society. So, there is not a power center occupied by someone, it does not reside in institutions or certain forms of property but the terms of trade are catalyzed through the state, the government and its institutions. The movements arise because who participate in political processes are affected in their individual or collective interests, and had not previously been considered in the political account. They arise when there is the potential and feel the need to share. The increasing indirect state control increases the importance of informal action political actors.8 The minimum consensus, the feasible policy, so it's bet and civil society can make in its relationship with the government. Once exposed the relationship of the concept of power with the dyad government-society, and the result derived in the form of exchange and self-control, I propose to dwell briefly on the guiding principle of representation. When we consider that transparency reduces uncertainty of government actions and facilitates knowledge and scrutiny, we find quite familiar with the concept of political representation. It is important to know the effects of representation in the government, in order to explore the connection between institutions normally associated with representative democracy and how the government acts on it. Since its founding, representative institutions depend on formal

arrangements that somehow induce the government to act in the public interest, but there was no way to know precisely how they would do, ie how the government works, and even how it strives to have identical interests to those of society. A government is representative if it acts in the best interest of the public and with the best available knowledge. Given the conflict of interest that characterizes a
8

Ibid., p. 340. 15

pluralistic and complex society, the government would be representative if it oriented their redistribution acts toward the interest of the majority. Given the conditions of pluralism, political process should include a mandate relationship (agency model) of long range (generalized exchange theory), in which policies are transformed into results under the restrictions and conditions provided by the environment. The cycle is completed with the citizenship role in evaluating and providing support, continuity or promotion, either by voting or otherwise. Which interests does the government represent, when the individual preferences and demands are always in conflict? It was noted that the representation is a relationship between interests and outcomes, where a government responds to the demands expressed by citizens, and where the latter have the ability to assess and sanction policy outcomes performance demanding government accounts. One way to understand if a government is representative is through the design of an accountability mechanism, such as a map showing the results of the actions of public authorities and citizens sanctions. In this sense, a government will be representative if acts responsively and is accountable to society. The degrees of responsiveness and accountability that the government must meet depend on several factors. In fact, a government is responsive, for example, to public opinion, not meant to be representative. The mandate is not an instruction or a citizens order for the politician or bureaucrat, rather they are voters signs. 9 We expect that government do everything possible under the circumstances and constraints to improve our welfare, instead of respecting faithfully the conditions of the contract we established in the agency relationship to elect our representatives. A
9

Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, op. cit., p. 12. 16

special condition is incomplete information. Both sides suffer from uncertainty about the performance possibilities of the caller and the surrounding environment. However, the information asymmetries between government and citizens often hurt particularly the latter. If voters do not observe some conditions that affect outcomes of government actions, they will reelect those less effective policies and sometimes will cause the removal of office of officials who did all that was within reach. Citizens should be self-responsible, in order to have the best knowledge available to rule on whether a policy resulted in a benefit to their own interests. Also, people may have preferences that are inconsistent with the passage of time. A government that, in order to make certain policy in the future needs to sacrifice in the short term, is representative if acts convincingly and bravely. But their actions can be unpopular before seeing off or be disapproved at the end of the period. The future is uncertain, but even public expectations may be incorrect. If individuals are the best judges of their own welfare, who judges properly if a government acts in a representative way? The government is acting on behalf of, or on bequest of citizens, 10 that is what people should want or, what they say they want. The dichotomy that exists within the analysis of the government performance, between what people should want and what they say they want, it is the clash between individual preferences and collective welfare. Representation is necessarily accompanied of a concept of welfare. Representative government aims to meet the ideal of self-government in large societies with heterogeneous preferences, to try to meet at least four conditions: that each participant is able to exert the same
10

Ibid., p. 15. 17

influence (equality), that such influence is effective on collective decisions (participation), these are implemented by those who were elected to implement (responsiveness), and that the legal system allows secure cooperation without undue interference (fairness). 11 Clearly around there is no representation consistent relationship between mandate and responsiveness. According to John Ferejohn 12 the agency model involved in the relationship is peculiar, to the extent that the agent (government) decides which know the principals (citizens) about their actions. There are representation flaws due to asymmetric information. Instead, politicians always prefer to have more resources and be subject to wider scrutiny, than have less power. Why politicians prefer policies responsive to public opinion over the quality of results and performance in office, if they refuse to lose their charge when they generate bad results? This means that voting is not the most effective accountability mechanism. Not only must verify that the representation best reflects the interests of the majority, or at least to protect the interests of the community, but also should review the quality of the implementation of policies, how results are constructed. The government is a compound agent whose structure affects performance. The most important consequence of the governmental structure in representation
11 12

Przeworski, op. cit., p. 32. A certain type of accountability depends on how responsive the government wants to be in front of

citizen preferences. In democratic institutions failures occur in accountability mechanisms, first, by the structure of the electoral system (heterogeneity of voters undermining their ability to demand accountability), the actions of the authorities in real time (allowing avoid electoral accountability regarding particular actions by grouping with other unpopular popular proposals) and to the asymmetry of information (which pays off in a huge advantage over the voter limiting control authority). John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability; Przeworski, Stokes, Manin, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 18

involves indirect control of citizens on public administration, 13 which is not directly elected by them and meets a ratio of second-order term, ie, where the bureaucrat receives as agent of the principal mandate is the official (executive or legislative) elected in the first instance. Democratic institutions do not contain mechanisms that allow citizens to directly sanction the legal actions of the bureaucracy. What kind of representation exercises bureaucracy how responds to the preferences of elected officials and citizens? Ultimately, they are accountable to whom or who put him in office, whether elected official or congressman who monitors their performance. In this sense, accountability is essentially mediated. The power of bureaucracy supposed problems in a democracy because it creates the possibility that no popularly elected officials can impact policies decisively, potentially in ways that ignore the preferences of citizens. Elected officials should monitor bureaucrats, instill democratic preferences and make them accountable to democratic processes. How does accountability help bureaucracy to make it more responsive to the elected official preferences? Government institutions can be designed or evolve in a way that encourages accountability through mechanisms that put the agents conflict with each other in order to produce competitive interaction policies that take into account the preferences of the heterogeneous principal. 14 What is created is a more accountable agency between the same agents and policy alternatives, where the authorities are self-induced to make their actions more controllable by society, in

13 14

Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, op. cit., p. 20. In a typical institutional setting, citizens act as heterogeneous principals because they are unable to

control agents opportunism, so you would have to find ways to mitigate the effects of heterogeneity (social organization) or give up the advantages of entering the relationship principal-agent. Ferejohn, op. cit., p. 149. 19

order to attract resources and support, and where the existence of conditions under which public authorities themselves will be subject to accountability. That mechanism is an instance of the principal (citizens) who puts their agents in a competitive relationship to limit the degree of opportunism that has the government because of benefits such as asymmetric information. If accountability emphasizes sanctions and rewards between the agent and the principal, responsibility places greater stresses on empowerment and discretion among agents.15 Both accountability and responsibility provide a starting point to consider the appropriate mix between elected officials and public servants. Elected officials who are at the head of offices and departments expect public servants to be responsive to them. They have re-election, promotion, public recognition or greater resources and influence as rewards. Responsiveness of bureaucrats will mean greater rewards for elected officials. To be responsive bureaucracy, political leaders must define their responsibility. Thus, the development and transmission of public preferences become policy thanks to the demand for accountability and fairness. Through regular monitoring, surveillance and anticipation, 16 accountability relates to the definition of responsibilities. The principle of representation has the ability to process institutional conflicts as it responds more to a relationship of responsiveness than a criterion of proximity. With appropriate institutional design that favors a regime of free information, governments can be simultaneously more effective and better

15

Delmer D. Dunn, Mixing Elected and Non-Elected Officials in Democratic Policy Making: Ibid., p. 313. 20

Fundamentals of Accountability and Responsibility; en Przeworski, Stokes, Manin, op. cit., p. 299.
16

accountable: we can simultaneously increase their authority and transparency of their actions. 17 The peculiarity of agency model and generalized exchange theory lyings in political representation is that our agents are our leaders: we elect and appoint agents to govern us as authorities, to impose laws that we must follow. On the threshold of the obligation under the undertaking acquired the mandate, looms the right of citizens to hold accountable authorities: we know what the government does and why it does under a regime of free information.18 The authorization to rule should not include the possibility that our authorities hide the information.

Implications of transparency as a process We can structure the double distinction of transparency as a process and as a justification from the perspective of social choice, which focuses on the normative foundations of political and economic institutions and the problem of preference aggregation, that part of the Arrows impossibility theorem,19 which indicates that when voters have three or more alternatives, it is possible to design a system that allows choice reflect the preferences of individuals into a global preference of the community, so that while rational certain criteria are met. This problem can also be treated as indeterminacy of popular unification,20 that part of the double premise of popular sovereignty on which rests a legitimate liberal democratic order and unified
17 18 19

Ferejohn, in Przeworski, op. cit., p. 170. Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, op. cit., p. 24. Herv Moulin, Social Choice; en Barry R. Weingast y Donald A. Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Paulina Ochoa Espejo, The Time of Popular Sovereignty. Process and the Democratic State,

Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 373.

20

University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011, p. 29. 21

people, even when you cannot prove a general consensus at any given time, given the heterogeneous and pluralistic societies. To consider the role of power and information in building transparency policies, it is useful to design social engineering mechanisms oriented to maximization of rights and welfare. This interface will result from the double distinction of transparency we already know, which in turn originates from the double conception of freedom pace Berlin: 21 negative freedom is the extent of my rights, and positive liberty with which I choose my own goals and aspirations, as well as my ability to achieve them. The welfare and rights interface considers a population (N) consisting of the set of individuals who are in society, which in turn are the voters of those responsible for the decisions that translate into policy, and under them are beneficiaries of these policies; a set of resources and constraints (X) that are available to the voters and the choice depends on individual preferences; a welfare function (R) from which the result is obtained after considering the individual preferences into a collective, and the game (G) describing the mechanism by which individual rights are translated to reach the result, ie the welfare function. In this interface, individual preferences (individual rights and demands) affect welfare ex ante, whereas freedom of choice to build own welfare has an effect ex post and follows the liability of actors. The dichotomy between rights and welfare is similar to that which takes place between means and ends, and also includes two notions of justice, although contrasting, not exclusive. The first notion corresponds to distributive justice, where the welfare and rights interface is facing the right result and considers ex post Pareto optimal distribution to assert equitable access to
21

Moulin, op. cit., pp. 374-375. 22

resources and the competitive equilibrium from equal opportunities in property rights. Information on individual characteristics captures the pattern of responsibilities between preferences and constraints. The game (G) is designed around the incentive compatibility for the welfare function (R). Second, the notion of procedural justice is identified with the ex ante fairness leading to a particular result. It is geared towards the game and not the result. In short, procedural justice is guided by the distribution of rights (G), while the welfare function (R) is the ratio of distributive justice. That the welfare function antecedent proper distribution of rights, means that there should be complementarity between the two notions of justice. In this sense, the set (G) comprises a requirement efficiency 22 which seeks to select the best result, ie, obtain an equilibrium. This means that in the course of a given policy distributional consequences occur that keep us from the initial intuition that individuals care about their own rights and their staff decision process. The means matter as much as the end: during the game we cannot ignore our preferences and find the balance, because the actors have unequal rights, coercive threats exist and might even change the way the game. It is indeed a matter of power and influence, in which you have to take into account other. How do we combine the two notions of justice in the interface? The welfare and rights interface model must be strategy-proofness,23 ie, that the preference of an individual or group of individuals is not above the collective arrangement or affect the welfare function, so that a measure is identified with a notion procedural and
22 23

The requirement of efficiency is a Paretos optimal function (equilibrium). Ibid., p. 379. Ibid., p. 381. 23

distributive notion of justice. For the interface produces a transparency policy that generates legitimacy, it is necessary that both power and information taking place between stakeholders within that interface take into account openness and fairness as strategy-proofness, with which it hopes to gain greater efficiency and equity. Following this logic, only bilateral correspondence between government and society will lead to the maximization of individual rights and collective welfare. The most important characterization results of combining strategy-proofness mechanisms with publicity and impartiality rule requirements. Among these mechanisms we emphasize accountability, responsiveness and responsibility, closely linked with the principles of publicity and, as shown in the previous section, representation. Carry out and discuss a policy where rights and welfare combine in a collective equilibrium, takes care of the problem as an encounter between two conflicting objectives: the requirement of a single mechanism (procedural justice) and the requirement of a mechanism that implements desired welfare function as robust a manner as possible (distributive justice). It is an implementation issue; in this case, of transparency policies. The baton is on the track of the government. Transparency policies are generated by government and is a part of itself (elected executive and legislative), not the citizen who acts as principal with respect to government actions.24 The government itself has promoted accountability as a growing trend to open up to external review of its performance and even the sanction that could end in the dismissal from office or criminal punishment. Transparency policies help to increase the level of accountability from the agent.
24

The laws on access to information are a true reflection of the effort between citizens and legislators

to increase the level of scrutiny of the activities of the agency. Ferejohn, op. cit., p. 140. 24

However, there must be the will of the principal to continue participating and investing in competitive agency relationship. The information structure 25 chosen by the agent is modeled in a way that allows the principal to observe ex post a sign of the action of the agent, the principal chooses how much to invest in the relationship and the agent observes the state of things and selects an action, the principal observes the outcome and signal, and reelected to the agent if and only if the agent's performance is satisfactory, if the agent is fired, is replaced by one identical or similar, the principal-agent relationship continues indefinitely in an asymmetric bargaining game. How does articulates a transparency policy? First, the agent proposes an information structure that indicates how their actions will be observable ex post, and the principal choose the amount you want to invest with the agent. She chooses a particular information structure, and following the election of a level of investment by the principal, performs an action that depends on all the previous moves in the game. The principal, after observing the structure of information, choose how much to invest with the agent and, once seen the result and signal, decide to support or not the agent. The principal can control the agent's reelection awarding it two ways: if the results exceed certain thresholds (performance monitoring, policy-oriented advertising transparency of official information) or, if it looks good behavior (monitoring of actions oriented towards a policy of transparency in the access to information). The principal could invest more in the second choice, and even the government's authority has expanded precisely those areas whose observability and
25

Ibid., pp. 141-146. 25

control has increased.26 The agent builds its own evaluation space. Citizens, for being heterogeneous principals cannot control agent opportunism and cannot invest directly in the agency relationship. Agents seeking to improve their powers are interested in making their examined on their actions. In that scenario, the principal will be unwilling to invest more in the agency relationship, monitoring the actions and results. The way public preferences are translated into policies underline how important it is to develop accountability and responsibility mechanisms in favor of responsiveness in democratic governance. 27 Democracies can develop accountability and responsibility mechanisms that define the relationship between elected and non-elected officials (senior bureaucracy, executive-legislative level), in a manner that promotes responsiveness from the bureaucracy (civil servants, operational level). The regime of free information is a fundamental element of the institutionalization of civil society, ie the formation of public associations (groups and citizens) and relatively stable politically relevant, that function not only as a source of authorization to rule but as genuine political subjects. This regime is defined as the act of providing information about the effects of governmental policies and is embodied in the set of fundamental rights, the establishment of a
26 27

Ibid., p. 148. In turn, rules are important in this regard. First, because the reforms taking place in a context that

recognizes the importance of a joint effort between elected and non-elected authorities to achieve effective processes of policy development, and secondly instead, because they protect the bureaucrats and departments involved in issues that alienate supporters of the development and implementation of policies. Citizens also may force elected politicians so that they define the responsibility of bureaucrats. Dunn, op. cit., p. 320. 26

fundamental law supporting the principle of separation of powers and an institutional design that supports autonomous agencies, the institutionalization of a decentralized accessible policy that favors informative openness and independent media, political and economic decentralization involving self-government and federalism, as well as the acceptance and recognition of the operation of civil organizations and institutions involved in surveillance and defense of human rights and accountability. The more developed the institutionalization of civil society, and the stronger the consensus towards democratic design of free and competitive elections and a government that is accountable, the greater the legitimacy and, therefore, stability and quality of democracy. 28 But the simple institutionalization of civil society is not enough. There remains the problem of getting a type of institutionalization that facilitates the emergence of a democratic and participatory citizenship. In this sense, the regime of free information must be understood in the light of institutional design capable of promoting an "opportunity structure" 29 for forms of activity that can positively influence the development of citizenship itself. They must think of new ways of opening as offering certain transparency policies, that does not necessarily depend on the will of the government. Perhaps more effectively than elections, the regime of free information may increase the scope of political participation without incurring high costs of aggregation of preferences or popular unification. Access to information provides resources to participate, an equal say, and equal access.

28

Andrew Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Ibid., p. 77. 27

2000, pp. 71-73.

29

Conclusion: unfolding transparency policies Transparency as a process does not differ from the justification view only by the feeling of let us into the kitchen and know the ingredients and recipes of every dish we taste once the decision is made. Speaking in process terms of transparency policies must lead us going beyond the procedure. Procedures require a particular result, whereas processes have indeterminate futures. The end product of these processes cannot be known in advance because the same circumstances that constitute the process change as they develop. When we gain access to information through documents held by government, not only exercise control over the decisions made by the authority, but rather to give a new link in the policy process: we evaluate the effectiveness of governmental programs, we value the representative or officials efficiency, we create new types of processes for which they must find ways to meet new and original demands. Democratic governance requires the experience of indeterminacy in time. 30 Uncertainty, like conflict, is a necessary element in any political action. It is necessary to hold a conception of self-government in which at all times incorporate change and the experiences of those involved in politics over time, for understanding how the democratic process can provide a normative basis that emerges from the process itself, rather than from the general consensus at a given time. A process conception of transparency policies, transparency as a process, which refers to actions (discussions, negotiations, voting) that take place between those responsible for the decision process and are connected directly to the decision, is precisely the
30

Ochoa Espejo, op. cit., p. 80. 28

unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, and changing a set of institutions, which are the ultimate authority for all those affected by public affairs. 31 With the of process transparency perspective, it is not necessary to have the unification of will and reason of a collection of individuals in the context of a plural and heterogeneous societies. The indeterminacy arising from the problem of preference aggregation goes along the indeterminate future which starts any transparency policy by the fact that anybody requests access to information. Practices that coordinate government institutions allow all individuals to have a voice in the establishment of laws and governance mechanisms. Since all individuals involved in the people have a equal say in the making of institutions, selfgovernment is possible, by which people create themselves and govern themselves. Any person has the right to participate in the process to create, govern and change institutions when their interests are strongly affected by a particular public issue and a set of institutional arrangements. Popular elections are the best known, but there is always room for other events; transparency policies realize it, no matter when and where they arise. This makes it possible to restore the ability to democratically legitimize the state on the basis of practices (transparency policies) that promote freedom and equality. In conclusion, the project that will result from this series of reflections must confront the guiding principles of publivity and representation as pathways dimensions of the (more or less) relationship between transparency and democratic legitimacy in every government-society rendezvous. Inside transparency policies
31

Ibid., pp. 137, 158. 29

converge the government's interests on the one hand, and societys on the other, and of them derives a certain correlation of the principles of publicity and representation: for each of the two types of transparency policy, legitimacy will be oriented towards strengthening governmental-bureaucratic dynamics derived from the effectiveness of governmental policies or, democratic deepening resulting in greater involvement of citizens in public affairs of their interest as a result of the promotion, exercise and guarantee of their fundamental right to information. That is, there are transparency policies designed to reward the governmental performance from its own initiative, and there are others that escape bureaucratic control and wherein the handle is accountability in the public. The relationship between transparency and legitimacy depend on the correlation between the principles of publicity and representation in again and transparency policy. Consequently, the hypothesis that such a project entails planting to any transparency policy implies a doubly affirmative relation of publicity and representation principles; however, that policy where citizenship activates the right to request information through access to government documents will yield a better relationship between those principles, which respect to that other policy that is triggered by the government to publicize their programs and their results through official publication of information. Transparency as a process, including the relationship between experience, time and change, will study how policies are developed at the interface transparency between government and society (Figure 2), as evidence will be analyzed from the testing of two different types of transparency policies around a particular theme, for example, national security, fiduciary secret, trustee government procurement, educational policies, et cetera.
30

Bibliography ARATO, Andrew, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. BEYME, Klaus von, Teora poltica del siglo XX. De la modernidad a la postmodernidad, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994 (1991). FINE LICHT, Jenny de, Daniel NAURIN, Peter ESAIASSON, Mikael GILLJAM, Does transparency generate legitimacy? An experimental study of procedure acceptance of open- and closed-door decision-making, QoG Working Paper Series 2011:8, Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, 2011. OCHOA ESPEJO, Paulina, The Time of Popular Sovereignty. Process and the Democratic State, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. PRZEWORSKI, Adam, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. PRZEWORSKI, Adam, Susan C. STOKES, Bernard MANIN (ed.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. WEINGAST, Barry R., Donald A. WITTMAN (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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