Short history of the world working-class movement from Lassalle to neoliberalism: The distorting hegemony of the unproductive middle

classes - Loren Goldner 1988 text by Loren Goldner on the working class movement and the "unproductive middle-class". !ntroductory "ote# $ugust %&&&' (he )ollowing essay is a kind o) "thought experiment"# attempting to trace the career and impact o) the "man o) negation"# ultimately theori*ed by +egel as the ",russian monarch" who "universally labors" in the realm o) the state and hence art# philosophy and religion- but whose "labor" does not trans)orm nature# does not engage in what the (heses on .euerbach call "sensuous trans)ormative activity". "ature )or this )igure was and is what +egel viewed as the realm o) mere repetition# and "boring". +egel/s "universally laboring" ,russian state bureaucrat is the most elaborate de)inition o) the social type who ultimately became dominant )or an epoch 1801-1901- in the "le)t"# counterposed as 2arx put it in the Grundrisseto "the individuality as all-sided in its production as in its consumption# and whose labor no longer appears as labor# because an historical need has replaced a natural one". (his )igure# ultimately symboli*ed by .erdinand Lassalle# could only thrive in the period

dominated by the kind o) materialism attacked by 2arx in the "(heses on .euerbach"# the materialism )rom anti3uity to .euerbach which has not incorporated "the active side developed by idealism" and which "does not understand activity as ob4ective"# a conception which survived long a)ter 2arx. (he international era o) the state civil servant in the "le)t" demarcates the era o) the centrality )irst# o) German 5ocial 6emocracy Lassalle- and# above all# o) the 7ussian revolution and the centrality o) the "7ussian 3uestion" )or the international de)inition o) the le)t. (oday# it is possible to see the true meaning o) the "line o) continuity" o) this )igure )rom 1089 to 1888 to 1910 to 19019 the meaning is the evolution o) mercantilism and not o) socialist revolution. (he line o) continuity is )rom 5t-:ust to .ichte to "echaev and (chachev to 5talin# 2ao# +o and ,ol ,ot.";ut as long as the revolution is not achieved# as long as the proletariat does not appropriate the instruments o) social labor# this remorseless process o) development creates practically a new class o) petty bourgeoisie. !t is the exact opposite o) the peasant and individual small capitalist as the modern liberal o) state control is the exact opposite o) the old individualistic liberal. !t consists primarily o) the administrators o) the new sociali*ed economic structure# which cannot capitalistically exist without them." <.L.7. :ames. "otes on 6ialectics 1988-

"=hatever their social origin# whatever their sub4ective motives# the )act remains that stalinism )inds this caste o) labor leaders all over the world# in <hina# in >orea# in 5pain# in ;ra*il# everywhere# intellectuals# labor leaders# workers who rise--the caste grows# changes composition# but it remains as an entity. !t )aces death# undergoes torture# )inds energy# ingenuity# devotion# establishes a tradition# maintains it# develops it# commits the greatest crimes with a boldness and con)idence that can only come )rom men who are certain o) their historic mission." ibid."$s ! think over (rotsky/s writings ! can see this se3uence o) cause and e))ect in an endless chain. (his happened# then the other# then the stalinist bureaucracy did this9 then9 and so he keeps up an endless series o) explanations# )ascinating# brilliant# )ull o) insight and illumination# to crash into his catastrophic blunders at the end... =e# on the other hand# who show that stalinist cause could create the mighty worldwide effect because it elicited class )orces hostile to the proletariat and inherent in capitalist society at this stage in its development# we restore to the proletarian struggle the historical struggle o) the classes with social roots. =e )inish away with the demorali*ing# in )act sel)-destroying# theory that everything would have been all right# but )or the intervention o) stalinist corruption." ibid.-

The Anglo-French hase: rior to the !efeat of the "ommune (he classical workers/ movement was the international movement o) working people that appeared# )irst in ?ngland and in .rance# in the closing decades o) the 18th century# o)ten in )orms o) struggle di))icult to distinguish )rom the struggles o) artisans and the urban and rural poor. !n the =estern industrial world o) the second hal) o) the 19th century# it went )rom strength to strength in the )ormation o) mass trade unions and working-class political parties. !t culminated in the period o) its seemingly unstoppable international hegemony# )rom approximately 189& to 19%&# during which many observers# sympathetic or hostile# considered its triumph inevitable. (his movement--the classical workers/ movement--ended in the period o) reconstruction )rom =orld =ar !!# with its de)eated historical legacy embodied in the "real existing socialism" o) the ?astern bloc states and the =estern capitalist wel)are states inspired by its ultimate paradigm# 5ocial 6emocracy. !t should be apparent )rom the above that the term "classical workers/ movement" is by no means coextensive with the working class o) wage laborers whose numbers continued to expand around the globe a)ter =orld =ar !!# and whose remarkable upsurge in the worldwide wave o) strikes and struggles in the

years 19@8-190A laid to rest a postwar ideology o) the "integration o) the working class". (he battered remnants o) the classical workers/ movement persist to this day in the declining trade-union movement and working-class political parties which moved to center stage in the late 19th and early %&th centuries# throughout the =estern world. ;ut i) we speak o) a "classical" phase o) the workers/ movement# it is to connect a certain conception o) it to a speci)ic phase o) history# roughly 188& to 1981. $nd the reality which supports this de)inition is the )act that# in the renewal o) working-class struggle in the period 19@8190A# the organi*ational expressions o) the classical workers/ movement were# on the whole# arrayed against the radical actions o) the working class. 5uch divergences had occurred be)ore in history# many times# but were perceived as "systemic" only by tiny minorities on the )ringes o) the movement. !t is# however# indispensable today to o))er a theory o) the classical workers/ movement to show its extent and its limits. !t is in the context o) an international de)inition o) the classical workers/ movement that it becomes possible to see its o)ten divergent national speci)ics-. (his movement spread throughout the =estern world with capitalist industry and social relations# and became# in mid-19th century =estern ?urope )irst o) all# the bearer o) a vision superceding capitalist social relations# socialism or communism. $s such# it

emerged )rom the explosion o) the ?uropean "(hird ?state"# the liberal movement against the ancien regime. (his separation o) the classical workers/ movement )rom ?uropean liberalism# the appearance by the late 18A&/s in ;ritain- o) the 7icardian socialists and o) the vision o) a "workers/ state"# was cadenced by the radical phases o) the .rench 7evolution# by the :uly 7evolution o) 18A&# and )inally by the :une days in ,aris# 1888. (his last event# more than any other# created the "specter haunting ?urope# the specter o) communism"# invoked in the preceding year by 2arx and ?ngels in the <ommunist 2ani)esto. (he specter o) revolution had been present in ?ngland# as well# in the crisis o) 18A%-18A8# and in 1888# 4ust be)ore the rising o) the workers in ,aris# <hartism had peaked in a near-con)rontation with ?nglish capitalism. (his latter mobili*ation proved to be the apogee o) <hartism# and by the 18@&/s 2arx and ?ngels were already analy*ing the signs o) embourgeoisement in a stratum o) the ?nglish working class. (he ,aris events o) 1888# culminating a development begun with the .rench 7evolution# made .rance# and not ?ngland# the )ocal point o) the emergence o) the political workers/ movement in the 19th century. (he central role o) .rance ended with the crushing o) the ,aris commune in 1801# and therea)ter# leadership o) the movement passed to its ultimate paradigm# the German 5ocial 6emocratic ,arty 5,6-# and its trade

union arm. 5omewhat later# >autsky wrote that the classical workers/ movement had taken its political economy )rom ?ngland# its politics )rom .rance# and its philosophy )rom Germany# although this was already an ideology at odds with 2arx and ?ngels/ )ormulation in the <ommunist 2ani)esto- that communism "is nothing but a real movement un)olding be)ore our eyes"# not the creation o) any world re)ormers. The German- olish-#ussian "orridor 5een in this way# the history o) the classical workers/ movement seems to be a history o) the eastward movement o) its epicenter. .or it is a secret to no one that# soon a)ter >autsky o))ered the above )ormulation# the epicenter o) working-class revolution shi)ted )rom Germany to 7ussia# or better# to the German-,olish-7ussian corridor embodied in )igures such as 7osa Luxemburg# at home in all three worlds- # in 19&1 and even more dramatically# in 1910. (he history o) the classical workers/ movement is a history o) continuities and radical discontinuities# and in the shi)t )rom .rench to German hegemony a)ter 1801# as in the shi)t )rom German to 7ussian hegemony a)ter 1910# the innovators are always theoreticians--one need only think without being a "Leninist" or "(rotskyist" or ";ordigist"- o) the examples o) Lenin# (rotsky and ;ordiga--who seem heretical )rom the vantage point o) the previously dominant paradigm.

"(he turning point o) history where history )ailed to turn" was <L7 :ames/ description o) the world impact o) the 7ussian 7evolution o) 1910. ,rior to that year# the 7ussian revolutionaries were mainly obscure )igures on the edge o) the international movement# whose gargantuan internal )action )ights in the hothouse o) exile seemed o)ten incomprehensible to the gray eminences o) the <entral ?uropean socialist movement who attempted to arbitrate them. (rotsky/s theory o) permanent revolution taking over 2arx/s similar )ormulation o) 1888 with regard to Germany-# prior to 1910# was virtually uni3ue even in the 7ussian movement in ascribing the leading role in the coming overthrow o) (sarism to the working class. Birtually all other 7ussian revolutionaries# including Lenin# remained trapped in a linear# stagist theory o) history# inherited )rom the canons o) the 5econd !nternational centered in the German 5,6. Cnly the events in 7ussia in 1910 )orced Lenin to break with his ow orthodox past and accept a version o) (rotsky/s view# to which they rallied the ;olshevik ,arty in time to stage the "ovember revolution. ?ven a sympathetic observer like $ntonio Gramsci called the 7ussian 7evolution a "revolution against 6as >apital"# a )ormulation with which the ;olsheviks/ 2enshevik opponents in 7ussia and 5ocial 6emocratic opponents abroad were 3uick to agree. $ proletarian revolution in a country where perhaps 11D o) the population worked in industry seemed# outside

the "permanent revolution" strategy# a voluntarist absurdity. !t is essential to trace this "world line" o) the international movement# especially its revolutionary cutting edge# because its history produced the categories with which most people# until recently# analy*ed its tra4ectory# categories which have in)iltrated our thinking to this day. !) the =estern revolutionary le)t is patently in crisis# the crisis is partly one o) the obvious ruins o) an old theoretical paradigm and the absence o) a new one# to understand both the present and )uture# which necessarily re3uires an reinterpretation o) the past. (he 7ussian 7evolution# in the sel)-conception o) the ;olsheviks# was never understood contrary to the common coin in some libertarian and ultra-le)t circlesas a revolution )or the construction o) the later# grotes3ue invention o) 5talin# "socialism in one country". !t was# rather# an unexpected )irst beachhead in an anticipated world revolution )ollowing the .irst =orld =ar. (his revolution# in the annus mirabilis 1919# seemed very close to reali*ation# in Germany# $ustria# !taly# +ungary# and even# momentarily# in ?ngland :anuary 1919-# )ollowed by a serious strike wave in .rance# and with a worldwide strike surge on every continent# including the sprawling colonial sphere. (he center o) ;olshevik strategy# as everyone knew at the time# was Germany# where the advanced material conditions existed to ease 7ussia/s transition

out o) backwardness. ;ut the German revolution was de)eated# in an uneven process o) ruthless repression and cooptation# )rom 1918 to 19%1 with a coda in 19%A-. (he 7ussian 7evolution was isolated# expelling the last military intervention including E.5. troops- )rom abroad only in 19%1. +istory had not turned# and the immediate conse3uences o) the de)eat reached at least into the mid-190&/s. !n the )irst years a)ter 1910# the 7ussian ;olsheviks and their allies including those who eventually opposed them )rom the le)t' the >$,6# )or example# was blowing up munitions trains carrying arms to the =hites as late as 19%1- in the international movement continued to treat the 7ussian 7evolution very much as the )irst# almost accidental skirmish o) a global process centered in Germany. ;ut such halcyon days could not last# and the emergence o) 5talin/s theory o) "socialism in one country" by 19%8 as a minimal de)inition o) the )inal de)eat o) the internationalist impulse o) the revolution- had radically altered the internal dynamic o) the considerable )action o) the world workers/ movement oriented to the young 5oviet state. !n a history that is )airly well known# both in 7ussia and in the )raternal parties o) the <ommunist !nternational# the latter 3uickly became an instrument o) 5oviet )oreign policy# and subordinated the radical workers/ )ractions o) the =est and nationalist movements in the colonial world to the political balance o) )orces within the 7ussian party

and in 7ussian society# and the corresponding international strategy o) those )orces. 2ost o) the radical wing o) the classical movement conse3uently learned to "speak 7ussian" )or an entire epoch. !n the 7ussian 7evolution and its international implications )or the workers/ movement# there was more than one historical novum. !t was already enough o) a break with the world prior to 1918 that a political party# with roots in the 5econd !nternational and calling itsel) 2arxist# stood at the head o) a state calling itsel) socialist. !t was even more o) a break when# within a decade# that state had assumed a radically authoritarian# not to say totalitarian character# as the 5talin )action triumphed over its last organi*ed opposition within the 7ussian party# not to mention those outside it. $s with the 7ussian revolutionaries in the 5econd !nternational# so with the internal li)e o) the ;olshevik ,arty' in 19%8# the internal )actional situation# and the signi)icance o) the de)eat o) (rotsky# was understood by only a small )raction o) communists abroad. ;ut the creation o) the )irst "socialist" state led by an ostensibly "2arxist" party# that by 19%8 was proclaiming the previously unknown and unthinkable doctrine o) "socialism in one country" did not exhaust the innovations o) the 7ussian 7evolution and the creation o) the <omintern. :ust as important# and perhaps# in the long run# more important# was the )ull emergence o) the pre-1918 colonial world as an active

)orce in global history. (he eastward movement o) the epicenter o) revolution )rom .rance to Germany to 7ussia did not stop in 7ussia. !n the decade a)ter 1910# it extended itsel) in the anti-colonial upsurges in 2orocco# ?gypt# !ndia# and <hina# as well as in the 1918 )erment in the most advanced $sian capitalist country# :apan. 5een )rom the vantage point o) ?urope and "orth $merica# the 7ussian 19&1 and 1910 were easily recogni*ed in their continuity and discontinuity with the classical =estern working-class movement. For the "olonial $orld% the #ussian #evolution $as a &ationalist 'vent ;ut to the non-=estern world# 19&1 in particular and 1910 as well had another# seemingly deeper meaning. (he 19&1 revolution in 7ussia had been set in motion by 7ussia/s de)eat at the hands o) :apan. (he :apanese victory was# to the non-=estern colonial sphere# a world historical event o) the )irst order. !t represented the )irst time that a non-=estern country had succeeded in de)eating a =estern power with its own weapons o) economic development and the technology o) modern war)are. (he :apanese victory in 19&1 electri)ied coloni*ed peoples o) color everywhere# as it electri)ied black $mericans in one advanced capitalist country# the Enited 5tates. (he importance o) the emergence o) :apan can hardly be underestimated )or the development o) the non=estern colonial world in the course o) the %&th

century# and cannot be underestimated )or the excolonial world that achieved independence a)ter =orld =ar ! and especially a)ter =orld =ar !!. ?ven throughout :apan/s most aggressive imperialist phase o) 19A1 to 1981# that country was partially success)ul in presenting itsel) to the peoples it con3uered as a liberator )rom =estern colonial oppression. (he colonial world/s perception o) the :apanese victory also in)luenced the perception o) the 7ussian revolutions o) 19&1 and 1910. =hile 7ussia was indubitably a =estern power and "the prison house o) nations"# with imperial ambitions in its own right# it also had the status o) an intermediary country# burdened with )oreign debt and bullied by the same ;ritish and .rench empires which# a)ter 1919# remained the two colonial powers par excellence. (he 7ussian 7evolution o) 1910# there)ore# was )ar more o)ten seen in the colonial and semi-colonial world and was seen by important elements in 7ussia itsel)more as a success)ul movement o) national resurgence than as a success)ul advanced skirmish in a world proletarian revolution centered in Germany# one which moreover never took place. ,articularly a)ter the early 19%&/s# when the internationalist# "cosmopolitan" orientation to the working classes o) the =est disappeared under the nationalism o) 5talin/s "socialism in one country"# the status o) the 5oviet Enion and the <omintern was cemented in the colonial and semi-colonial world on the same level as the :apanese victory o) 19&1# with the same central

core o) national sel)-assertion c). ".rom "ational ;olshevism to ?cology"-. (his new extension o) international working-class politics# along with the very existence o) the 5oviet state# was the central turning point in the %&th century history o) the classical workers/ movement. =hatever the ideological illusions which had previously surrounded its sel)-understanding and the understanding o) those observing or combating it# the workers/ movement in ?urope and the Enited 5tates had always seemed to be a movement o) class against class. $t no point prior to 1910# obviously# had the movement ever been in)luenced by the )oreign policy interests and needs o) an ostensibly "workers/ state"# or later# by the model o) socialism that state claimed to represent. ;ut even less had the classical movement been directly in)luenced by struggles in the colonial or semi-colonial world# or# a)ter the 1989 triumph o) the <hinese revolution# "real existing socialist" states there. (here were# however# anticipations' the impact o) the 5panish-$merican =ar 1898- in the E.5. and o) the ;oer =ar 19&%- in ;ritain9 the 19&@ $gadir crisis in Germany and .rance9 the ;arcelona "(ragic =eek" o) 19&9# set o)) by conscription to put down a revolt in 5panish 2orocco9 in 191% the emergent "communist le)t" in !taly was involved in exemplary actions against the !talian intervention in Libya.- !) the workers/ movement had always been "international" in ultimate sel)-conception# it had# in reality# prior to

1918# been pretty much exclusively a ?uropean and "orth $merican a))air# with resonance and repercussions in :apan and Latin $merica. ;etween 19&1 and 1910# the =estern )ramework that gave birth to the classical workers/ movement had been exploded. !) the advance was one o) actual internationali*ation# the price was a vast detour in the theoretical understanding o) what had happened# and what was un)olding. (his was particularly true because the most radical phase o) the movement# between 189& and 19%&# was )ading as a )rame o) re)erence as the colonial and semi-colonial world moved into the drama in the 19%&/s indeed# the latter was occurring in part because the revolutionary impulse o) the =estern workers/ movement was )ading-. (he )ull implications o) this development and this detour- the con4ugation o) the old "class against class" traditions with the interests o) a national state and with "anti-imperialist" struggles and# later# states in the colonial and semi-colonial world# a trans)ormation o) class struggle in the =est )rom a "vertical" to an apparently "hori*ontal" )ramework-reached )ar into the period a)ter =orld =ar !!. <ertain ob4ections to the portrait sketched here can be raised# and it is essential to deal with them immediately. (he )irst ob4ection is that capitalism has always been an integrally international phenomenon# and that already in the 10th century the $tlantic political economy# including "orth $merica# the

<aribbean# Latin $merica and =est $)rica# shows international waves o) struggles o) wage-laborers# peasants# slaves and !ndians. (his tendency culminates in the international dimension o) the .rench revolution# )irst in its )ull international repercussions )rom ?ngland to 7ussia to the Levant to the =estern hemisphere# and ultimately in the +aitian 7evolution# which shattered "apoleon/s plans in the =estern hemisphere and )orced the 18&A sale o) Louisiana to the E.5. $ second ob4ection might be raised in our )ailure to address the impact o) the rise o) colonialism and imperialism on the classical workers/ movement# particularly a)ter 180&# well be)ore the events o) 19&1 and 1910. (his second ob4ection will be answered momentarily9 to the )irst# we privilege the movement o) wage-laborers in the "orth $tlantic world# particularly ?ngland and .rance# and the movements that ensued there)rom# because it was that movement that set the tone# and provided the models )or the international movement in the movement o) its epicenter )rom west to east. (o introduce the backdrop o) late 19th century imperialism and its impact on the classical workers/ movement is to move to the heart o) the 3uestion posed by the phase change o) 19&1-1910. (he interpretation o) that development by the radical wing o) the movement a)ter 19%1 itsel) became a ma4or# i) not the ma4or# "epistemological lens" on the phenomenon. !t became central to an analysis o) the

nature o) world capitalism# and to the )ate o) the movement# and )inally to the de)eat and )ailure o) the world revolutionary surge o) 1910-19%1 that ultimately le)t the 5oviet state--itsel) turned against world revolution--isolated )or nearly %1 years. From German and (talian )nification to !e"oloni*ation =e begin by recalling certain salient realities that may not be immediately evident to the contemporary reader. !n 1918# the great ma4ority o) nation states now in existence were contained within the ;ritish# .rench# +ohen*ollern# +apsburg# 7ussian and Cttoman empires# with )urther *ones incorporated into the colonies o) the E.5.# +olland# 5pain# ,ortugal and !taly. 2ost o) these nation states achieved )ormal independence through the anti-colonial movements which gained momentum a)ter =orld =ar ! and above all in the wave o) decoloni*ation o) 1981-19@%# )ollowing =orld =ar !!. !n the ,ortuguese colonies and in !ndochina# anti-colonial and anti-imperialist wars continued through the period 19@%-1901#. Latin $merica# most o) which had achieved independence )rom 5pain by 18%@# still was subordinated to virtual neo-colonial status by ?nglish and .rench and# a)ter the 189&/s# $merican- )inance capital. 2odern imperialism had come into existence in the decades a)ter the 180A depression# culminating in the 1881 ;erlin con)erence )or the division o) $)rica among the

=estern powers and by subse3uent =estern coloni*ation o) much o) the remaining world in $sia and Cceania. (he ultimate economic causes o) this imperialist land grab are greatly debated and cannot concern us here. "evertheless# this phenomenon# which already began to make developments in Latin $merica# $)rica and $sia into domestic political issues in the ma4or capitalist powers# was part o) a )undamental trans)ormation o) political li)e in the advanced capitalist world9 to that extent# the classical workers/ movement had already been "internationali*ed" by 19&1. .urther# it must be remembered that as late as 180&# between the original "orth $tlantic core o) capitalism# centered in ?ngland# .rance# ;elgium and the Enited 5tates# and the empires that dominated ?astern ?urope# the !talian and German nation states had not yet )ully constituted themselves. 5uch a ma4or reorientation o) the international balance o) power as the emergence o) a uni)ied !taly and Germany# combined with the 180&-1918 )ormation o) world imperialism# could only have a ma4or impact on the ?uropean working-class movement# and create# particularly in <entral and ?astern ?urope# an atmosphere generally as charged with the national 3uestion as with the social 3uestion. !ndeed# 2arx and ?ngels# and later the German# $ustrian and 7ussian theoreticians o) the 5econd !nternational# had to devote great attention to the national 3uestion as it concerned oppressed national minorities in the )our

<entral and ?astern ?uropean empires. as they also devoted great attention to the !rish 3uestion in ;ritish working-class politics-. !ndeed# the centrality o) the international balance o) power and the strategic options o) workers/ movements within the )ramework o) international politics is a little recogni*ed and central part o) the work o) 2arx and ?ngels# and there)ore o) the legacy o) the old movement. .or them# the )ormulation o) the <ommunist 2ani)esto "the workers have no )atherland" was no mere rhetorical phrase9 it was a working guide to the very complex inter-relationship o) class# nation and international politics. .rom the beginning# they saw the working-class movement as an international movement )irst o) all# and analy*ed its development in each national sector in relation to a strategic view o) the entire international situation. (he 3uestion o) national uni)ication# and the attitudes o) ;ritain# .rance# and the ?astern and <entral ?uropean empires had been )undamental in the revolutions o) 1888 in which they had come to maturity9 the subse3uent 3uestion o) the national uni)ication o) !taly and especially Germany in the 18@&/s had been e3ually central. (he basic working principle o) 2arx and ?ngels in their analyses o) these developments was always to )avor what tended to uni)y the working class# and to oppose what tended to )ragment it. (here is no abstract attitude toward "national liberation" or nationalism generally to be )ound in the concrete writings o) 2arx and ?ngels on these sub4ects9 their

)ramework was always the international dynamic. (hey on occasion opposed nationalist revolts against Cttoman rule because their impact weakened Cttoman containment o) 7ussian (sarist reaction-. 2arx died in 188A and had little time to devote to an analysis o) the newly-emergent imperialism. !ndeed# prior to the 189&/s at the earliest# the theoreticians o) the %nd !nternational paid little attention to social developments in $)rica# Latin $merica and $sia per se# and many o) them looked upon coloni*ation o) these *ones in terms little di))erent than the imperialist ideologues o) the white man/s burden. !ndeed# prior to the 7usso-:apanese =ar and the 7ussian 7evolution o) 19&1# most anti-colonial struggles appeared as backward-looking struggles having no social content o) interest to socialists in advanced capitalist countries. Cne need only measure the distance between the international impact o) the ?thiopian de)eat o) !taly in 189@# or the 5udanese de)eat o) Gen. Gordon in >hartoum in the same year# with the worldwide impact o) the :apanese victory in 19&1 # to see how much the situation changed. ;ut the new world-wide colonialism and competition between colonial powers had# by the mid-189&/s at the latest# created a new political reality that had to a))ect the =estern workers/ movement. (he German sei*ure o) >iouchou in 1898 perhaps )irst illuminated the new importance o) the .ar ?ast in world power politics showing that the ")irst underdeveloped country" was

now competing with the older ;ritish and .rench imperialisms globally-# along with :apan/s occupation o) >orea# signaling a new imperial power on the hori*on a decade be)ore 19&1. (he $nglo-.rench con)rontation and near-war at .ashoda# on the "ile# in 1898 was another step in this process. (he $merican de)eat o) 5pain in 1898 made $merica a colonial power <uba# the ,hilippines# ,uerto 7ico- beyond the "orth $merican continent on a whole new scale. (he naval arms race# and the general arms race already analy*ed by ?ngels in the 188&/s# took on new dimensions as the world entered two decades o) war scares prior to the actual outbreak o) 1918. !nter-imperialist rivalry# war scares and an arms race were the international dimension to a )undamental trans)ormation o) the domestic social and political environments o) the =estern workers/ movement in the decades prior to 1918. (he so-called "second industrial revolution" based on electronics# chemicals and the new (aylorist mass production# the rise o) mass political parties including the workers/ parties o) the %nd !nternational )ounded in 1889-# the reappearance o) anti-5emitism as a ma4or )orce in ?uropean politics# the rise o) a new kind o) nationalist chauvinism whereas nationalism prior to 189& had been considered largely a liberal sentiment tied to bourgeois nation- building-# the rise o) cartels and banking concentration all contributed to e))ace the more "gentlemens/ club" atmosphere and

parliamentary 3uality o) national politics in the world prior to 180&# in which ?nglish and .rench liberalism were models imitated everywhere. .rom an international economic point o) view# the most important phenomena o) the 180&-1918 period is the steady reduction o) ?nglish manu)acture to the status o) primus inter pares by the E.5. and Germany# and ultimately# around 19&&# their de)initive rise to a position o) industrial superiority over ?ngland. !t is not an exaggeration to say that much o) world history )rom 19&& to 1981 was a struggle to bring international institutions# and particularly )inancial institutions# into harmony with the new situation o) 19&&. The "oming of the )nproductive +iddle "lasses ;ut the eclipse o) ?nglish industrial world supremacy by the E.5. and Germany trend which was already attracting comment in the 180&/s--was hardly a mere "economic" reality. !t presented other countries with two "models" )or their own development. !) Germany had the greater initial impact# it was because its status# through its long struggle )or national uni)ication- as the )irst "underdeveloped country" made it closer to many nations in a similar situation. !n the 189&-1918 period# and indeed between 1918 and 1981# the E.5. itsel) borrowed many institutions central banking# cartel organi*ation# research universities- )rom

Germany. ;ut in the longer run# it was the E.5. that was the country o) the )uture. (he world# a)ter and even be)ore- 1981 saw the goal or the threat- as "$mericani*ation"# even i) it was )ar more Germani*ed than is o)ten acknowledged. $s the world emerged )rom the "great depression" or "great de)lation" o) 180A-189@# it entered a phase o) a new kind o) prosperity that )oreshadowed# very modestly# the hal)-decade o) consumerism o) the 19%&/s and most importantly# the so-called "a))luent society" o) the 1981-190A period a prosperity o) course largely limited to the C?<6 *one# and to certain classes and strata within it-. (his new prosperity was based on two new realities o) the late nineteenth century' the reduced cost o) )ood# and hence the decline o) the cost o) )ood as a total percentage o) a working-class income# and the reduced cost o) mass produced consumer goods made possible by the new methods o) mass production. Cne need not exaggerate the extent o) this prosperity# as it a))ected the working classes o) the most advanced capitalist countries# but it was certainly the backdrop to the appearance within the workers/ movement o) the so-called "revisionism" debate# which began o))icially in 1898. (he encounter o) 2arxism with the new realities o) the 189&-1918 period had )ar-reaching implications. (he work o) 2arx and ?ngels had# o) course# been developed in the period )rom 188& to 1891. ;ut when

it is recogni*ed that the bulk o) <apital had already been written by the time o) the appearance o) the )irst volume in 18@0# that most o) the historical material used in the three volumes is drawn )rom the decennial commercial crises o) the )irst two-thirds o) the 19th century# that 2arx devoted much o) the last decade o) his li)e to other matters# and )inally that ?ngels# who outlived 2arx by slightly over a decade# made no )urther contributions to the core o) the theory# it is easier to understand why the 2arxists o) the 5econd !nternational )ounded in 1889 and dominated by the 5,6- )elt themselves# in the 189&-1918 period# con)ronted by a new situation. (he second volume o) <apital was published in 1881 and the third in 189A9 the grey eminences o) the 5,6 determined )or the subse3uent decade what was to be legitimately considered "2arxist economics" as opposed to the criti3ue o) political economy- and schooled the 7ussian revolutionaries whose orthodoxy on these matters would have world conse3uences )or decades a)ter 1910. $lthough ?ngels continued to produce trenchant 4ournalism and populari*ations to the end o) his li)e# there was ultimately little in the work o) the )ounders to guide the radical wing o) the new !nternational in dealing with the emergent world o) imperialism# cartels and trusts# the expanded role o) )inance capital# mass political parties o) the lower middle classes# anti-5emitism# protectionism# growing nationalist chauvinism and war scares# the arms race# the )irst signs o) a new consumerism# the )irst outlines

o) the ?uropean "wel)are state" and corporatism## and )inally# openly integrationist tendencies inside the socialist movement itsel). !n this period# then# "2arxism"# codi)ied by the orthodox o))icialdom o) the %nd !nternational# and taken over to a great extent by the )ounders o) the Ard !nternational# was con3uered by the categories o) the dominant Feitgeist# and trans)ormed )or an epoch by a set o) problematics ultimately )oreign to 2arx. .urther# this trans)ormation o) 2arxism by its encounter with neo-classical economics# Lebensphilosophie# the new German sociology which also came into existence in response to the new period-# the avant-garde# and psychoanalysis overwhelmed the "orthodox" who were themselves ill-e3uipped to deal with the new challenges. (hrough >autsky# and ultimately through Lenin# 2arxism ac3uired a preoccupation with the problems o) organi*ation and consciousness that were ultimately )oreign to it. !n this period# with this new emphasis on consciousness and organi*ation# 2arxism lost its relationship to production and reproduction in a )ashion that paralleled a comparable development in more mainstream bourgeois thought e.g. in the appearance o) neo-classical economics-. c). "(he 7emaking o) the $merican =orking <lass"(he arbiters o) orthodoxy o) the %nd !nternational were the later ?ngels# =ilhelm Liebknecht# >arl

>autsky# $ugust ;ebel# Ctto ;auer# ?duard ;ernstein# .riedrich $dler and# )or the 7ussian sphere at least# Georgi ,lekhanov. C) the younger generation# most had been trained by 2arx and ?ngels# and until ?ngels/ death# covered orthodoxy with the mantle o) direct contact with the )ounders even i) ?ngels was browbeaten# in the last year o) his li)e# into writing a new pre)ace to the <ivil =ars in .rance more in harmony with the already-solidi)ying parliamentary and legalistic aspirations o) the 5,6-. ;ut the 5,6# )ormally )ounded in 18@A# was by no means a strictly "2arxist" political party. !t had had a long history# with roots in the pre-party battles between 2arx and Lassalle in the 181&/s# and had incorporated many strands along with the core o) "orthodox 2arxism" which ultimately seemed to win out in the 189&/s. (he Lassallean tradition already contained# epitomi*ed in the latter/s secret meetings with ;ismarck-# a power)ul impulse toward corporatism and collaboration with the state9 a)ter the emergence o) the 5,6 )rom the 1808-189& period o) illegality a pronounced tendency toward business unionism# parliamentarism and legalism became entrenched in the party apparatus. 2arx had already written# in 1801# the "<riti3ue o) the Gotha ,rogram"# underscoring some o) these realities# summari*ed in the 5,6/s illusions about a "people/s state". ;ut this criti3ue# and some o) 2arx and ?ngels/ scathing comments about their own )ollowers in the 5,6# remained unpublished and essentially unknown# 3uite like their "youth)ul

writings" o) the 188&/s. (he leadership stratum o) the 5,6 which set the tone )or the %nd !nternational as a whole were# as a group# theoretically uninspired. (his should not be surprising# )rom a 2arxist point o) view# since the kind o) revolutionary struggles )rom which 2arxism drew its deepest lessons were absent )rom the ?uropean scene between 1801 and 19&1 <) >arl >orsch# 2arxism and ,hilosophy-. !nevitably# the "2arxist materialism" that was populari*ed in the international movement bore the stamp o) a "pragmatic" gradualism that issued in the revisionist debate o) 1898-19&%# a debate in which >autskyian "orthodoxy" prevailed# but only as an ideological )ig lea) o) the much more prosaic# integrationist daily practice o) the 5,6. 'astward Shift of the 'picenter of #evolution Cn the edges o) this world# in the 7ussian revolutionary milieu# the next discontinuity in the history o) the international workers/ movement was being prepared. !t was a discontinuity as radical as the rise and triumph o) German 5ocial 6emocracy over ?nglish trade unionism and .rench ,roudhonist radicalism a)ter 180&. (he 7ussian revolutionary milieu had been in continuous existence since the 18%&/s9. "no nation in history ever prepared its revolution longer or more sel)-consciously than 7ussia"# as one biographer o) +er*en put it. Bictor 5erge e3ually noted that# )rom the )irst meetings o) the <omintern# it was clear that no other national

grouping o) revolutionaries approached the 7ussians in experience# elan and ruthlessness. (he 7ussian revolutionary intelligentsia was almost a social stratum in its own right# and its decades o) resistance to (sarist autocracy gave it an esprit de corps that no collective experience in the =est could match. (he international milieu o) political exiles and pro)essional revolutionaries went back to the early 19th century9 it stamped the li)e o) London# ,aris# ;russels# Geneva and Furich9 the 7ussians and ,oles had been a presence there since the 188&/s. $s such# its encounter with 2arxism was to be epochal. 7ussia was by the 18A&/s a cultural province o) Germany# and )ollowed the evolution o) international culture )rom the phase o) .rench to German hegemony one or two decades in arrears. (he conversion o) the young ;akunin# +er*en and Cgarev to +egelianism in 188&# their ")arewell to the .rench" as represented by the utopian socialists-# was perhaps the turning point in the "Germani*ation" o) the 7ussian intelligentsia. ;ut as oriented as it was to =estern models# and as closely as it )ollowed the evolution o) the debate on the "social 3uestion" in the =est# the 7ussian revolutionary intellectuals were no mere imitators. (hey )used =estern thought with speci)ically 7ussian messianic and millenarian traditions. ;y the 18@&/s# when ,opulism began to take shape in the wake o) the ser) emancipation# a speci)ically 7ussian radicalism was codi)ied#

expressed best in the "nihilist" movement o) the same decade. =hen# in the 180&/s# ,opulism began its campaign o) assassinations against (sarist o))icialdom ultimately killing two (sars# in 1881 and 1888-# its underground organi*ation# obligatory in the conditions o) 7ussia# brought a new kind o) radical )igure into ?uropean consciousness. (his mentality was brought to its paroxysm by "echaiev# and was well portrayed by 6ostoevsky in (he ,ossessed. =hen 2arxism came to 7ussia# it )used# in Lenin# with "echaiev/s revolutionary catechism# as he had inherited it through his adolescent )ascination with <herneshevsky/s brand o) ,opulism. .ollowing >autsky# who already saw consciousness coming to the working class )rom outside# Lenin added the speci)ic role o) the cadre organi*ation o) pro)essional revolutionaries. !n >autsky# hypostati*ed in Lenin# "consciousness" and organi*ation# and their bearers in the intelligentsia# had moved to the center stage o) 2arxism. (he man o) negation is the man o) consciousness# the state civil servant )irst accorded a role in the "emancipatory movement" in the continental enlightened despotisms o) the 10th and 18th centuries# and )irst linked to mercantilist strategies o) national renewal in early 19th century ,russia. (he rise o) 7ussian 2arxism in the 189&/s was initially the )ruit o) the long work o) )igures such as ,lekhanov )rom the 180&/s onward# much more in the

tradition o) the 5econd !nternational orthodoxy. 2arx had already attacked some o) his early 7ussian )ollowers as apologists )or capitalismG- (hat orthodoxy prescribed# among other things# a strictly linear and stagist theory o) historical progress# which set a bourgeois revolution on the agenda )or 7ussia. 5o deep did this current run in 7ussian 2arxism that Lenin seriously contemplated emigration to the E.5. where socialist revolution seemed more likely than in 7ussia- and in :anuary 1910 told a meeting o) 5wiss socialist youth that the proletarian revolution in 7ussia would occur ca. 191&. ;ut events began to undermine such theoretical mis4udgements. (he serious# undeniable industriali*ation o) 7ussia by the 189&/s )inally enabled the 2arxists to de)eat the remnants o) ,opulism in the intelligentsia# with their emphasis on the working class )irst con)irmed in the strike wave o) 1891. ;ut the storm o) 19&1 which broke over 7ussia and 7ussian ,oland introduced stretched the doors o) perception even )urther. (he establishment o) )actory and regional councils called soviets placed a workingclass creation at the center o) the political struggle that had been )oreseen# and created# by no 2arxist theoretician. !t was an historical creation o) the same epochal importance as the )oreshadowing o) the "dictatorship o) the proletariat" in the ,aris <ommune o) 1801. Lenin later admitted that 19&1 had )orced him to correct some o) his views o) party and

consciousness set down in =hat !s (o ;e 6oneH 19&%-# the document which had )orced the ;olshevik-2enshevik split. (he )rail )orces o) 7ussian liberalism had been so out)lanked in 19&1 and 19&@# and had been so )rightened by the intervention o) the working class# that they had 3uickly sought accommodation with the re-established (sar# even more ab4ectly than the German liberals/ capitulation to ;ismarck a)ter 180&. (he 7ussian and ,olish 19&1# which had )orced the "mass strike" debate on the German 5,6 and thus on the 5econd !nternational# linked to the 7usso-:apanese war# consolidated the eastward shi)t o) the revolutionary epicenter )rom Germany to 7ussia. !n the wake o) 19&1# (rotsky# in)luenced by ,arvus# revitali*ed 2arx/s 181& theory o) "permanent revolution" by applying it to 7ussia. (rotsky did not 4oin the ;olshevik ,arty until 1910# and a)ter the ebb o) the radical wave o) 19&1-19&0 nothing seemed )undamentally di))erent in the international workers/ movement. ;ut the experience o) the soviets# and (rotsky/s theori*ation o) the primacy o) the working class in the overthrow o) (sarism uni3ue# as indicated earlier-# in the 7ussian revolutionary movement prior to 1910- would introduce yet another element o) the legacy o) the classical workers/ movement. ;ut its international signi)icance indeed# its signi)icance in 7ussia itsel)- would only become apparent with the triumph o) the ;olshevik 7evolution in 1910. .or the )irst time in history# a

"socialist" state headed by sel)-styled 2arxists had established itsel). ;ut the world revolution upon which the ;olshevik strategy was premised did not occur# and the new 5oviet state# totally severed )rom any working-class base by civil war and )amine# had to de)end itsel) and seek allies in totally unexpected conditions. =ith the ebb o) the postwar revolutionary )erment in ?urope# the de)eat o) the =hite counter-revolution# and the threat o) internal dissolution signaled by the >ronstadt uprising# the ;olshevik 7evolution settled in )or a period o) retrenchment. (his retrenchment was codi)ied in the 19%1 adoption o) the "?,# the crushing o) >ronstadt# the $nglo-7ussian trade agreement ending the embargo o) the 5oviet state# the conciliation with le)t-wing 5ocial 6emocracy in the (hird <ongress o) the <omintern# and the banning o) internal )actions at the 1&th ,arty <ongress. $s indicated earlier# the revolutionary wave did not die out in 19%1 when the ebb began in ?urope9 it continued in the colonial world up to 19%0. +ere# as also indicated above# the orientation o) the 7ussian state and the <omintern toward developments in 2orocco# !ndia# and most importantly# <hina was ultimately dictated by the )actional situation inside the 7ussian party# which had immediate domestic and )oreign policy conse3uences. (he ascendancy o) 5talin# and the de)eat o) the Le)t Cpposition in the

years 19%8-19%0# centered most importantly# in the international sphere# on the revolutionary crisis in <hina. (he battle between (rotsky and 5talin over the <hinese situation had at its core the interpretations o) the 7ussian 7evolution itsel). (rotsky applied his theory o) combined and uneven development and permanent revolution to <hina# arguing that even the small <hinese working class was the only )orce capable o) leading a conse3uential anti-colonialism9 5talin and the <omintern# on the other hand# pressured the <hinese <ommunists to subordinate themselves to the >uomintang and <hi/ang >ai-shek# the latter an honorary member o) the <omintern ?xecutive when he crushed the <ommunists in 19%0G-. (he <hinese disaster# as is well known# )orced the <omintern to shi)t course. (he de)eat o) (rotsky# the spectre o) the incipient depression in the =est# the beginning o) the )irst .ive Iear ,lan and the collectivi*ations# and )inally 5talin/s move against ;ukharin# all conditioned a new international policy known as the "(hird ,eriod"# which bore its )ruits in Germany. ;ut the <omintern/s orientation to the colonial world# be)ore and a)ter the <hina debacle in 19%0# intersected the newly emergent anti-colonial movement which was gathering steam as a result o) =orld =ar !. (he decade prior to 1918# under the shadow o) :apan/s victory in 19&1# had seen the !ranian 7evolution 19&@-# the Ioung (urk revolt 19&8-# an important

outbreak o) !ndian nationalism 19&8-# the 2exican 7evolution 191&- and the <hinese 7evolution 1911-. $)ter the war# these had been extended in the world wide upsurge o) 1919# with important developments in ?gypt# !ndia# 2orocco# ?ast $)rica# and the 2ay 8th movement in <hina. =ith the implementation o) the "(hird ,eriod"# the <ommunist ,arties in the colonial world embarked on "ultra-le)t" tactics comparable to those implemented in the metropolis# such as the 19A& disasters in <hina and Bietnam on the latter# c). the remarkable 1991 book o) "go Ban Bietnam 19%&-1981$)ter +itler/s sei*ure o) power in Germany had )rightened 5talin and the <omintern into a recognition o) the dead end o) the (hird ,eriod strategy# the threat o) )ascism subsumed all else. (he o))icial adoption o) the ,opular .ront in 19A1 )oreshadowed by in)ormal implementation in 19A8- pushed the world <ommunist movement into a period o) mass growth in .rance# 5pain# the E.5.# and ;ritain. ?xcept )or the interlude o) the 5talin-+itler pact in 19A9-1981# the world <ommunist movement shi)ted into a period o) support )or bourgeois democracy against the )ascist menace. (he period o) the ,opular .ronts and the 7esistance movements in =orld =ar !! created the mass <ommunist ,arties o) the postwar period in .rance# 5pain# !taly# ,ortugal# ;ra*il# <hile# and :apan# and turned the $merican and ;ritish <,s into mini-mass movements. !n the colonial world# it )orced the <ommunist ,arties in the ;ritish and .rench

empires to abandon the anti-colonial struggle )or a de)ense o) democracy as in !ndochina# $lgeria# ?gypt# and !ndia-. (his policy continued into the postwar period# until the beginning o) the <old =ar# to the detriment o) the <ommunist ,arties in those *ones. (hroughout these developments )rom 19&1-1910 until the beginning o) the postwar de-coloni*ation# the world <ommunist movement established itsel) as the dominant le)t-wing )orce in virtually every part o) the world# and the shi)ts o) <omintern policy became internal political events o) serious dimension in those countries. .or the great mass o) participants in these struggles# the 5oviet Enion was a socialist country and the <omintern was the !nternational o) the revolutionary workers/ movement. (here were dissidents the (rotskyists and the ultra-le)t- to the le)t o) the mass <ommunist ,arties# but only in a )ew parts o) the world such as !ndochina and 5outh $merica did (rotskyist critics o) 5talin and the <omintern gain any mass )ollowing or large in)luence over events. "evertheless# )rom 19%& onward# the losers on the radical le)t had begun to analy*e the 5oviet phenomenon# attempting to apply 2arxist criteria to understanding the evolution o) this ostensibly "2arxist state". (he international le)t opposition# a)ter (rotsky/s exile in 19%8# consisted o) ;ordiga/s )action o) the ,<!# and (rotsky/s )ollowers in the other

=estern <,s. $nother current was the German and 6utch ultra-le)t# which had basically given up on the 7ussian 7evolution in 19%&-19%1. ;ecause the weight o) the 5oviet Enion and the <omintern was so great in the international workers/ movement# these oppositional currents were compelled to analy*e the dimensions o) the de)eat. (his was done against the backdrop o) the world depression# the rise o) )ascism# and the impending 5econd =orld =ar. (hese latter created a general climate o) social pressure in which it was easy to portray the little oppositional minorities as )ascist agents# "wreckers and splitters" o) the workers/ movement. (he 3uestion o) 5oviet in)luence in the world workers/ movement# o) course# has to answer the 3uestion o) why mass <ommunist ,arties# themselves based on rich working-class traditions in countries like .rance or Germany# accepted such in)luence. $ )ull answer to this 3uestion re3uires a )uller analysis o) the con4uncture# and the mutation o) the capitalist state then underway# than can be provided here c). however# (he 7emaking o) the $merican =orking <lass- . !t is nevertheless indispensable to divide the interwar years into two periods# prior to and )ollowing 19A&. (he early <ommunist parties came into existence in the revolutionary )erment o) 1910-1919# and everywhere represented mass breakaways )rom the 5ocial

6emocracies that had capitulated to nationalism and participation in the war e))ort. Like the previous !nternationals# the (hird !nternational was born o) a worldwide working class upsurge that )orced innovative structures and strategies onto the scene. (he .irst !nternational was born o) the post-18@8 general upsurge that peaked in the ,aris <ommune9 the 5econd !nternational in the strike wave o) the early 189&/s9 the (hird !nternational out o) the annus mirabilis 1919. ;ut the ebb a)ter 19%1# the "united )ront" )usion with the le)t-wing o) 5ocial 6emocracy a)ter 19%1# the "Finovievi*ation" o) =estern parties a)ter 19%8 and )inally the "ultrale)tist" *ig-*ags o) the (hird ,eriod le)t the <ommunist ,arties in most countries as large sects. (here was a virtual discontinuity between the revolutionary wave that had created them in 191019%1 and the organi*ational shells that grew into mass parties a)ter 19A1# with completely di))erent# accomodationist politics. The )nproductive +iddle "lasses ,oin the $orkers- +ovement 'n +asse =e choose the year 19A& as a turning point in the evolution o) the =estern workers/ movement )or the )ollowing reason. +owever widespead mercantile and statist practices were in the most advanced capitalist countries in 1918# dominant ideology prior to =orld =ar ! was still )undamentally liberal ideology. (he

world economy was still dominated by ?ngland# and ;ritish )inance capital centered in London. (he world economy was still sub4ected to the rigors o) a working gold standard# at least in relations between the ma4or powers. (he state was )undamental everywhere in "creating the conditions )or accumulation"# and was beginning# in the 189&-1918 arms race# to ac3uire its post-1981 )ace as the most important single consumer# but even in such statist economies as Germany# its role was nothing like what it became during =orld =ar !# again under "a*ism# and )inally in the post1981 reconstruction. =orld =ar ! was everywhere an "experiment o) nature" in a vastly increased role o) the state in the total management o) economic and social li)e. .rom 1919 to 19%9# there was a certain illusion o) a "return to normalcy" in the dismantling o) the "state capitalism" that had been established in =orld =ar !# but the social crisis set in motion by the world depression a)ter 19%9 ended that illusion )orever. (he workers/ movement could not be una))ected by these developments. (he participation o) the ma4ority socialist )actions in virtually every country in the post-1918 ";uerg)rieden" or social peace# and the participation o) the trade unions in labor-management boards gave the workers/ movement a social "respectability" and presence that it had largely lacked be)ore 1918. (here had been important anticipations o) these trends be)ore the war# in countries such as

;ritain and 5weden# part o) the )irst steps toward social wel)are policy advocated by the ;ritish .abians and analogous groups on the continent. ;ut labor participation in the state# on any scale# let alone the massive one o) 1918-1918# was anathema to much o) the dominant ideological spectrum i) less so than generally believed at the time-. ;y 19AA# with the coming to power o) +itler and 7oosevelt# and on a lesser scale in ;ritain and the .rance o) the ,opular .ront# the statist management that had worked in the emergency o) 1918-1918 was revived in a "peacetime" context# although signi)icantly associated almost everywhere with an expansion o) war production indeed# it was armaments production that brought Germany out o) the slump# and which revived the E.5.# ;ritish and .rench economies a)ter the second downturn o) 19A0-. +4almar 5chacht in Germany# .ranklin 7oosevelt in the E.5.# and :.2. >eynes in ;ritain# all key )igures in this new crisis management# had all been active in wartime economic management boards in =orld =ar ! as was :ean 2onnet# architect o) the postwar ?uropean <ommon 2arket-. (he stati)ication o) society which took place through this mutation was# inevitably# the stati)ication o) the o))icial labor movement. !t is in this context that one can grasp the discontinuities between the preand post-19A& socialist and above all communist parties# a discontinuity which le)t no place )or anti-

statist currents such as the $merican !== or the revolutionary syndicalists in .rance e.g. 2onatte-. !t is )undamental to note that the creation o) such mass <ommunist ,arties as the .rench# 5panish# ,ortuguese# !talian or :apanese# and such mini-mass parties as the ;ritish and $merican# between 19A1 and 1980# was characteri*ed by the large-scale entry into "<ommunist" movements by the "intelligentsia" recruited )rom the service classes o) the emergent new phase o) capitalism. (he 7ussian revolutionary intelligentsia had constituted a social stratum apart with no real counterpart in the =est. (he intellectuals who had become involved with socialism and communism prior to 19A1 were already distinct )rom the "organic intellectuals" who rose out o) the workers/ movement itsel)# and in no sense constituted an important trend in the wider intelligentsia. (his )undamental discontinuity between the original <ommunist ,arties o) the 1910-19%1 period and the mass parties a)ter 19A1 is important because it underscores the )undamentally social dynamic that made the latter mass parties possible. The $estern "ommunist parties were receptive to the appeal of Stalinism--the Soviet )nion and the "omintern--between ./01 and ./23 because the opular Front policies of the latter meshed with the transformation of the state% and of the emerging service classes in the

state% from which the " s of the opular Front era drew important support4 $s such# they were direct heirs to the Lassallean "people/s state" o) the early 5,6. (he 19%8-19%0 phase o) <omintern policy was sealed with the <hina debacle9 the "(hird ,eriod" the (hird ,eriod o) 5talin/s errors# as (rotsky called it- was sealed with the German debacle9 the ,opular .ront era ended with the )iasco o) the ;lum government in .rance a large ma4ority o) ,opular .ront parliamentarians voted )ull powers to ,etain in 198&-# the de)eat o) the 5panish revolution )irst by the ,opular .ront 7epublic# then by .ranco# and was sealed by the 5talin-+itler pact. ?ach phase o) <omintern policy ended with a new de)eat )or the international working class and was replaced by a new policy preparing the way )or the next de)eat. (he only semi-coherent opposition to these turns were presented by the small (rotskyist groups and the even smaller remnants o) the German and !talian ultra-le)t# but the latter# in particular# were virtually without in)luence on the course o) events. "evertheless# these groups attempted to analy*e the international impact o) the "7ussian phenomenon"# using the tools o) 2arxism# in a way that no one else did between 19%& and 1981. (he 3uestion o) the nature o) the 5oviet phenomenon and o) the world <ommunist ,arties became an

eminently practical one immediately a)ter =orld =ar !!# when the most important international upsurge since 1910-19%1 took place. !ndeed# the (rotskyist wing o) the international le)t opposition expected this wave to be the success)ul completion o) the upsurge de)eated in the early 19%&/s. ;ut nothing o) the kind occured. (he Labour ,arty assumed power in ;ritain9 the .rench# ;elgian# !talian and :apanese <ommunist ,arties participated in or supported bourgeois governments in their countries and )ought any attempts in the working class to 3uestion these arrangements9 the 5ocial 6emocrats# backed by the $llies and the <!$# reasserted dominance over the working class in Germany# and also in)luenced the situation in .rance and !taly. (he contrast between the revolutionary working-class a)ter =orld =ar ! and the containment o) the surge# which never became revolutionary at least in the =est-# a)ter =orld =ar !!# already points to a pro)ound epochal shi)t in the interim period. !t is )or this reason that we identi)y approximately 19A& as the turning point.- The 5uestion of why the $estern working class twice failed to emerge from world war as a successful revolutionary force% and the social content of the regimes that contained it% is the fundamental 5uestion of the fate of the classical workers- movement and of the working class in the 67th century4 (he (rotskyists had explained the de)eat o) the German working class in particular by the "absence o)

revolutionary leadership" in the crucial moments between 1910 and 19%A9 they explained the de)eat o) the .rench and !talian workers a)ter 1981 by the <ommunist ,arties/ en)orcement o) Ialta. (hese are undoubtedly important dimensions# but they make 3uestions o) organi*ation# leaders and consciousness too important )or what are obviously pro)ound structural phenomena. (hey are explanations that do not deal with why the =estern working class in 191019%1 and a)ter 1981 allowed itsel) to be immobili*ed by re)ormism. (he )inal explanation o))ered )or this re)ormism is the Leninist theory o) imperialism# which explains the living standards o) =estern workers# and hence their re)ormism# by "superpro)its" )rom colonial exploitation which subsidi*es an aristocracy o) labor. )or a criti3ue o) Lenin# c). "(he 7emaking o) the $merican =orking <lass"(o take the measure o) the di))erence between the world revolutionary surge o) 1910-19%1 and its absence in 198A-88 is to see that it was the triumph o) a new phase o) accumulation# the "real domination o) capital"# symboli*ed by the world con4uncture )or all their di))erences- o) 7oosevelt# +itler and 5talin in 19AA# which contained the classical workers/ movement and which was the real basis o) post-=orld =ar !! "re)ormism". (he whole period )rom 1918 to 1981 was a transition to this result. The $est-Soviet-Third $orld Triangle

(he new world situation a)ter 1981 pro)oundly altered the international context o) the working-class movement. (he 7ussian 7evolution and the success)ul de)ense o) the 5oviet state a)ter 1910 had been an international event o) the )irst order# but its weakness# problems o) maneuver in a world preoccupied with reconstruction and then with depression a)ter 19%9 had not yet trans)ormed the international balance o) power. $)ter 1981# this was hardly the case. "ot only had the 5oviet state demonstrated its power and the success o) its crash program o) industriali*ation by its victory in the 5econd =orld =ar 5talingrad# in 198A# had turned many pro-"a*i (hird =orld "anti-imperialists" such as "asser and 5adat in ?gypt into pro-5talinists- 9 its sphere o) in)luence was being enlarged by the creation o) a *one o) bu))er states in the )ormer cordon sanitaire o) ?astern ?urope# and mass <ommunist parties vied )or political power in Greece# .rance# !taly and ;elgium. $nd this was 4ust in ?urope. !n $sia# with greatly enhanced authority )rom participation in guerrilla resistance movements in the war# <ommunist parties moved into the vacuum o) power in <hina# >orea# and !ndochina# and the large :apanese <ommunist ,arty was hegemonic in that country/s combative working class. ;y 1980# the $llied solidarity o) the war years was in shambles# and the international situation was polari*ed )or the )irst time between the Enited 5tates and the 5oviet Enion# the sole ma4or powers capable o) real initiative

in the new environment. (he "vertical" class struggles in the =est o) the 189&-19%& period# during the high tide o) the classical workers/ movement# had become inseparably linked to a "hori*ontal" con)rontation o) power blocs. $lthough the Enited 5tates sei*ed the initiative with the creation o) the 2arshall ,lan in the spring o) 1980# and the 5oviet Enion honored the division o) the world negotiated in 198A at Ialta# the <hinese 7evolution o) 1989# the outbreak o) the >orean =ar in 191& and the intensi)ication o) the Biet 2inh insurgency in !ndochina brought the world irreversibly into the <old =ar. $s we have emphasi*ed# the class struggle# in every great international con4uncture# )rom 1089 to 1888 to 1910# had always been inseparable )rom the international balance o) power and relations between nation states. ;ut never# to reiterate- at the height o) the international in)luence o) the German 5,6 in the heyday o) the 5econd !nternational# had the strategy and tactics o) a )raternal socialist party in another country been determined by the 5,6/s needs o) the moment in a provincial by-election in Germany. (he creation o) the 5oviet state# o) the mass <ommunist parties associated with the <omintern# and )inally# a)ter =orld =ar !!# o) a do*en new people/s republics in ?astern ?urope and $sia had introduced into domestic politics# and above all class politics# in every country an immediately international dimension that had never been so palpable in earlier periods. !n a

di))erent way# the evolution o) the world situation a)ter 1981 re-created on a world scale the situation o) ?urope a)ter 1811# when any domestic political development )rom ?ngland to 7ussia had immediate implications )or the entire international balance o) power. (he "7ussian 3uestion" in ?uropean politics )rom 1811 to 1910 had been the attitude o) the (sarist government toward developments )rom the <aucasus to .rance9 the "7ussian 3uestion" a)ter 1910# but particularly a)ter 1981# reached into every country in the world in the )orm o) the indigenous labor movement# peasantry and intelligentsia. ;ut the polari*ation o) world politics around the ?ast=est con)rontation o) the <old =ar# which seemed complete by 191&# is not comprehensible until it is "con4ugated" with the emergent new )orce created by decoloni*ation a)ter 1981. $n incipient triangle o) internationali*ation was already apparent in the world repercussions o) the :apanese victory over 7ussia in 19&1 and in the 7ussian revolution o) the same year. (his triangle was consolidated by the 7ussian 7evolution in 1910 and the intervention o) the <omintern in the anti-colonial struggles o) the 19%&/s. $)ter 1981# de-coloni*ation became a )ront line o) <old =ar con)rontation in every part o) the world. "o )orce o) signi)icance seemed capable o) constituting itsel) independently o) the orbit o) in)luence o) one o) the two competing blocs. (he <hinese 7evolution# the division o) >orea in 191A# and the division o)

Bietnam in 1918 gave )urther weight to the 5oviet bloc/s claim to be the sole serious )orce )or decoloni*ation. (he Enited 5tates# taking up the burden o) the disintegrating ;ritish and .rench empires# consolidated its position as the de)ender o) the global status 3uo# everywhere. (he third corner o) this triangle was the appearance# in the course o) de-coloni*ation# o) (hird =orld ;onapartism. =ith the independence o) !ndia 1980-# !ndonesia 1988-# and the colonels/ revolution in ?gypt 191%-# these regimes# under the leadership o) anti-colonial )igures such as "ehru# 5ukarno and "asser# introduced an apparently new con)iguration to world politics. !n reality# these regimes had strong a))inities to the ?astern and <entral ?uropean dictatorships o) the interwar period# 4ust as the decoloni*ation o) $)rica and $sia had parallels with the emergence o) the new nations and nationalist sentiments )rom the breakup o) the +ohen*ollern# +absburg# 7omanov and Cttoman empires a)ter =orld =ar !. !ndeed# the con)iguration o) a "Germani*ed" nationalism and anti-colonialism reached back into the period o) earliest emergence o) modern anti-colonial struggle in the 189&-1918 period# in )igures such as >emal ,asha c). on German ideological in)luence in post-19&8 developments in the Cttoman and later $rab world# c). ;assam (ibi# $rab "ationalism ?nglish translation 198&- "ote $ugust %&&&' .or Latin $merica# c). :oseph Love#

(he <ra)ting o) the (hird =orld# 199@-. !n the interwar period# ,eron in $rgentina and Bargas in ;ra*il# )avorably in)luenced by the !talian )ascist model# had echoed the rhetoric o) the !talian 6i2ichaelis in denouncing the world hegemony o) "$nglo-.rench plutocracy". !denti)ication with Germany/s struggle against the Bersailles treaty produced pro-"a*i sympathies among many nationalists in the ;ritish and .rench colonial spheres. !t was only a)ter 1981 and the consolidation o) the =est-5oviet-(hird =orld triangle that this consciousness could be purged o) its ?ast and <entral ?uropean birthmarks# and its proto-)ascist origins concealed in the new rhetoric o) the world "progressive" movement. (his con)iguration reached its apogee with the ;andung con)erence in !ndonesia in 1911. (he 5oviet Enion# <hina# and nearly a do*en )urther "socialist" states extended solidarity to the newly independent states o) the emergent (hird =orld# led by !ndia# ?gypt and !ndonesia. =ith the wave o) 1981-19@% decoloni*ation at high tide# each new independent state posed immediate problems o) ?ast-=est rivalry and in)luence. !n 1918# the triumph o) the <uban 7evolution would extend this polari*ation in )ull )orce to the <aribbean and Latin $merica. ;ut the apparently monolithic character which the 5oviet-<hina-(hird =orld )ront presented to the =est in 1911 would not survive the decade. <entri)ugal

)orces were already at work undermining it. (he death o) 5talin in 191A initiated a period o) decompression in the 5oviet Enion and ?astern ?urope concreti*ed above all in the workers/ revolt in ?ast ;erlin in :une o) that year- 9 by 191@# one year a)ter ;andung# the beginning o) the decomposition o) the 5oviet bloc was irreversibly set in motion. !) the 191@ con)rontation over the 5ue* canal was an extension o) the logic o) ;andung# the %&th ,arty <ongress in 2oscow# the ,olish Cctober# the +ungarian 7evolution and the )irst muted signs o) independence in the =estern ?uropean <ommunist parties all represented cracks in the single )ace which the ?astern bloc had presented to the world. =ith the )inali*ation o) the 5ino-5oviet split in 19@&# these )issures became irreparable. $)ter 191@# the easing o) the polari*ation o) world politics o) the immediate postwar period began to create a social space )or independent movement )or the )irst time. (he role o) <hina was# o) course# o) the utmost importance. =e have already seen how the very emergence o) the .ar ?ast as a )actor in the world balance o) power in the 189&/s undermined classical ?uropean diplomacy# centered on the "?astern 3uestion"# the dismemberment o) the Cttoman ?mpire and the inseparable 3uestion o) (sarist 7ussian in)luence in ?uropean a))airs- o) the 19th century. !ts intrusion in "international relations" was simultaneously a rede)inition o) the international

relation that the working class is' the crisis o) the .ar ?ast issued in both the :apanese victory over 7ussia and the 7ussian 7evolution o) 19&1. (he <hinese 7evolution o) 1911 had culminated the cycle o) revolutions in the non-=estern world prior to =orld =ar !9 the revolutionary cycle in <hina )rom the 2ay 8 2ovement o) 1919 to the 5hanghai massacre o) 19%0 had ended the revolutionary cycle a)ter the war9 the :apanese invasion o) 2anchuria in 19A1 was seen# in retrospect# as the real beginning o) =orld =ar !!9 the <hinese 7evolution o) 1989 had made the <old =ar irreversible9 the <hinese break with the 5oviet Enion in 19@& had dealt the decisive blow to the previously monolithic )ace o) the ?astern bloc9 the <hinese shi)t virtually into the =estern camp a)ter 1901# and particularly a)ter 190@# weighed heavily in the demise o) the myth o) the revolutionary (hird =orld. <hina epitomi*ed the "revolutionary (hird =orld"# the indispensable link between the "socialist" bloc and the (hird =orld ;onapartist states.(he initial signi)icance o) <hina/s break with 7ussia was an ostensible radicali*ation o) ideological con)rontation with the =est in the de-coloni*ation process and in (hird =orld hostility to imperialism. (his was visible in the 19@& <ongo crisis. .rom 19@& to 1901# <hina denounced the 5oviet doctine o) "peace)ul coexistence" as a capitulation to capitalism# and seemed to represent the militant alternative. Iet in reality <hina was acting 4ust as much )rom the calculations o) national power politics# and as little in

accord with "proletarian internationalism"# as 7ussia had. .or those who looked closely# it was clear that <hina/s relationship to "anti-imperialism" was no less ambiguous than 7ussia/s. !ts role in the !ndonesian crisis# which culminated in the annihilation o) the !ndonesian <, in 19@1# was the classical 5talinist application o) a ,opular .ront strategy# with the usual result. !n retrospect# it seems clear that <hina was not unambiguous in its support o) Bietnam against the Enited 5tates. $t the very least by the time o) the near-war with the 5oviet Enion on the $mur 7iver in 19@9# <hina was seeking rapprochement with the E.5. +ence)orth# its denunciation o) 5oviet "social imperialism" as the immediate enemy led it to support any )orce in the world hostile to the 5oviet Enion9 by 1901# in the crisis in southern $)rica# <hina was openly working with the Enited 5tates against pro5oviet national liberation movements. (he world situation had evolved considerably since ;andung. <hina was never in the position# a)ter 19@&# to constitute a new international# and probably never intended to do so. (he initial international appeal o) "2aoism" everywhere was to 5talinist hard-liners who could not reconcile themselves to "peace)ul coexistence". !n that sense# on an international level# 2aoism was merely an extension o) 5oviet 5talinism9 it never o))ered a new model o) society and never constituted a mass "2aoist" party or movement. ;y

19@@# however# when <hina entered the phase o) <ultural 7evolution# its anti-bureaucratic rhetoric intersected a comparable impulse in the =estern ""ew Le)t"# and until the early 190&/s "2aoism"# in reality the expression o) the most elphantine bureaucratic state o) modern times# could appear to some- to be the opposite o) what it was. ;ut <hina# )rom 19@& to 1901# never won the place in the international le)t that the 5oviet Enion had occupied in 19A@# and the death o) international 2aoism could never be the "God that )ailed" as 7ussia had been )or a certain =estern le)t in the early years o) the <old =ar. (he decompression o) the extreme phase o) the <old =ar a)ter 191@ opened a new space in the =estern le)t. !mportant minorities le)t the =estern <ommunist parties over the >hruschev revelations and the 5oviet intervention in +ungary. $lthough the impulse o) most but by no means all- o) these )actions was ultimately toward a reconciliation with liberalism or 5ocial 6emocracy# their mere existence was part o) a "de-7ussi)ication" o) the international discussion that had not been possible )or more than %& years. ,erhaps the most important immediate domestic political development in a =estern country coinciding with the initial decompression o) the <old =ar was the intensi)ication o) the movement )or black civil rights in the Enited 5tates. $t the same time this movement was an essential point o) con)rontation in

the <old =ar. (he 1988 clash with the 6ixiecrats in the 6emocratic ,arty# leading to the (hurmond candidacy# and (ruman/s order integrating the armed )orces were themselves an expression o) the internationali*ation o) $merican domestic politics. $lready in =orld =ar !!# the :apanese had used propaganda about the :im <row conditions in the $merican 5outh to good e))ect in the ,aci)ic. (he ;rown decision on school desegregation in 1918 accelerated the opening o) a new period# and the 2ontgomery bus boycott o) 1911 took that impetus into the streets. !t was impossible )or the Enited 5tates to seriously present itsel) as the "liberal democratic" alternative to the 5oviet bloc in $)rica# $sia and Latin $merica while :im <row conditions continued in the $merican 5outh. .rom 191@ to 19@8-19@1# the growth and ultimate success o) the black civil rights movement in the E.5. would become the single most important stimulus to the appearance o) an $merican ""ew Le)t". ;y 19@%# the looming $merican embroilment in 5outheast $sia began to concreti*e the international dimension o) the domestic social crisis represented by resistance to desegregation. (hrough this connection# the 3uestion o) postwar decoloni*ation moved to center stage in $merican politics itsel). (he end o) the period o) postwar de-coloni*ation is conventionally dated in 19@%# marked by $lgerian independence. 19@% also marked the <uban missile

crisis# and the beginning o) serious $merican military commitment in Bietnam. !n a curious way# the two ma4or military extensions o) the postwar decoloni*ation struggles# $merican intervention in !ndochina and the ,ortuguese embroilment in its $)rican colonies# take o)) in the same 19@1-19@% period and come to their denouement in the most important global con4uncture o) the postwar period# 1908-1901. !n 1901# the Enited 5tates con)ronted the deepest world recession to date- in postwar history# the "ew Iork <ity )iscal crisis# the rise o) ?urocommunism in ?urope# the specter o) revolution in 5pain and ,ortugal# the sudden and radical internationali*ation o) the situation in southern $)rica# the ?thiopian revolution# the rise o) the Group o) 00 and the ""ew !nternational ?conomic Crder" at the Enited "ations# and perhaps most o) all# its own utter collapse in !ndochina. (he electoral successes o) the !talian <ommunist ,arty and the momentum )or a le)twing government in .rance in 1908 seemed to pose the specter o) the breakup o) the world dominated by $merican global management since Ialta. Iet only a )ew years later# virtually every one o) these crises had receded# in a most unexpected )ashion. (he neoliberal wave that swept the world in the late 190&/s closed the era that had opened with the 7usso:apanese war o) 19&1. ;y the very completion o) the process begun with German 5ocial 6emocracy in the 18@&/s# the international le)t was thrown into crisis. (he con)rontation o) <hina# 7ussia# Bietnam and

<ambodia in 5outheast $sia# the expulsion o) the "boat people" )rom Bietnam# the triumph o) the mullahs in the !ranian revolution# the rise o) !slamic )undamentalism generally# the eruption o) clerical nationalism in ,oland# the 3uagmire o) the new "2arxist" states in $)rica# the total containment o) the =estern "le)t" by neo-liberalism in every country# led by (hatcher/s ;ritain and 7eagan/s $merica all converged to undermine the mercantilist underpinnings o) the "le)t" in the international balance o) power. (he le)t had been wedded to the state# and the state was in crisis. (he crisis lit up a whole "ontology" embedded in a discourse o) the le)t# in which the problematic o) .ichte and "echaev had )used with the anti-statism o) 2arx. (he le)t# )or more than a century# had been dominated by the man o) negation# the state civil servant. =hen the latter/s role ended# the le)t went into crisis. (he international era o) the state civil servant in the "le)t"# 19&1-1901# demarcates the era o) the centrality o) the 7ussian revolution and the centrality o) the "7ussian 3uestion" )or the international de)inition o) the le)t. (oday# it is possible to see the true meaning o) the "line o) continuity" )rom 1089 to 1888 to 1910 to 19019 the meaning is the evolution o) mercantilism and not o) socialist revolution. (he line o) continuity is )rom 5t:ust to .ichte to "echaev and (chachev to 5talin# 2ao# +o and ,ol ,ot. (he oppositional currents within the workers/ movement# the (rotskyists and the German and !talian

ultra-le)t# had grappled with the "7ussian 3uestion" since 19%&. (hey had analy*ed the 5oviet Enion as a degenerated workers/ state# as bureaucratic collectivism# as state capitalism# as capitalism# period. (hey had seen the soviets and workers/ councils thrown up in 7ussia and Germany in 1910-1918 as the solution to the ")orm" o) workers/ rule. (wo realities since 1901 tend to undermine that conception' the industriali*ation o) the (hird =orld# and the "Grundrisse phase o) capitalism"# the technologyintensive or "high tech" restructuring o) =estern industry since the 190&/s. (he perspective o) "soviets everywhere" was use)ul as long as the working class was growing and was co-extensive with mass production on a global scale. ;ut when world capitalism responded to the working-class o))ensive o) 19@8-190A with this dual assault on the total wage bill# it showed the limits o) any "point o) production" de)inition o) the working class. !t )urther showed the limits o) any de)inition o) socialism based on mere direct democratic control o) the point o) production by the working class. =ith the Grundrisse phase o) capitalism# scienti)ic labor has become a signi)icant source o) value in a way it was not in the era o) mass production. (he man o) negation# the man o) consciousness# the disinherited liberal arts student with no relationship to the trans)ormation o) nature# had a role only in the era o) the state civil servant. (hat role was the abstract posing o) universality# the revolutionary intellectual. (he abstract posing o)

universality is possible and necessary only so long as as it does not exist in actual practice. Cnce a signi)icant part o) society is actually engaged in concrete universal labor# there is no independent positive- space )or the state civil servant. (he tacit acceptance o) atomist ontology by %nd and Ard !nternational 2arxism# its status as the ideology o) the substitute bourgeois revolution# is linked to its )alse appreciation o) the con4uncture# and linked to its statist civil servant vocation. (he )undamental problem o) the 2arxist movement o) the 189&-19%& period was its overestimation o) the capitalist nature o) contemporary ?urope. !t had to think that ?urope was essentially )ully capitalist because it could not grasp its own role in the completion o) the capitalist revolution. ?urope in 1918 had acceded to the completion o) the phase o) )ormal domination and extensive accumulation9 hence)orth# its tra4ectory would be the phase o) real domination and intensive accumulation. (he key to this shi)t was the agrarian 3uestion. The Avant-Garde as the Search for Another 8ind of Activity (he 3uestion o) the avant-garde is not usually considered as part o) the history o) the classical workers/ movement. ;ut its role was not insigni)icant )or the problematic o) the man o) negation# and ultimately )or the vision o) what a supercession o)

capitalism was to be. (his was not clear in the 19th century when the workers/ movement )irst ac3uired a mass )orm in the E.5.# ?ngland# .rance and Germany. (he general conception o) culture then current was a democrati*ation o) existing high bourgeois culture. !ndeed# a vital )unction o) the classical workers/ movement was the providing o) a social )ramework )or general sel)-development o) working people which the larger society denied them. ;ut by the time that the o))icial workers/ movement became seriously institutionali*ed# i.e. by the 18@&/s# a crisis had already mani)ested itsel) within high bourgeois culture itsel). (his crisis took the )orm o) the appearance o) the avant-garde# )irst o) all in .rance. (he avant-garde emerged directly )rom the revolution o) 1888# and some o) its most important )ounders# like ;audelaire# were on the barricades in :une 1888. (he ,arisian ;ohemia o) the 1888-189& period had virtually no counterpart anywhere in the =estern world at that time. ,arisian ;ohemia was a social milieu o) the man o) negation par excellence# but men whose mere social existence posed# in a di))erent way )rom the working class movement# the need )or a new )orm o) social organi*ation. =hat had occurred in 1888# everywhere# was a break in the universal pretensions o) the post-1089 "(hird ?state"# and nowhere more acutely than in .rance. !n 1801# ;ohemia had again mani)ested itsel) in participation in the ,aris <ommune. (he problematic that was emerging here was more than that o) "writers and

artists" sympathetic to the workers/ movement. !t was the problematic o) the creation o) another kind o) social li)e# in which the con)inement o) "aesthetics" to a separate sphere would be overcome. (his was theori*ed by no one at the time9 certainly by no one within the workers/ movement. Iet# as peripheral to that movement as the 3uestion o) "aesthetics" appeared in 181& or 1801 or even in 19%&# it was ultimately tied to the vision o) socialism and to the 3uestion o) "consciousness". (he classical workers/ movement# )rom 188& to 1981# was dominated by populari*ed visions o) 2arxism# economic determinism# bowdleri*ed vulgar materialism and mechanism# and e3ually uninspired visions o) "culture" that were generally out o) touch with the "cutting edge" o) the crisis in bourgeois culture itsel) this is not in itsel) a criti3ue# as that crisis naturally re)lected in part the problems o) a speci)ic# unstable and o)ten hermetic social milieu-. ;ut# with the triumph o) "a*ism in 19AA in particular# there was a general recognition that the world view o) the classical workers/ movement# particular in its populari*ed "vulgar materialist" outlook# was inade3uate to combat )ascism and inade3uate to explain it. =ilhelm 7eich and ?rnst ;loch# in particular# made the daring assertion that the "a*is had won because the le)t/s rigidity had surrended so many "sub4ective" domains to the "discourse" o) the right# and that the le)t had to in e))ect "determinately negate" the appeal o) )ascism by taking those weapons

away )rom it. Bery )ew artists or )or that matter# intellectuals- )rom the ";ohemian" milieu participated in the activities o) the classical workers/ movement# and to the extent that they did# it was as individuals. (o the extent there was an "aesthetic 3uestion" in the 5econd !nternational# it was dominated by a very classical conception# one supported by some o) 2arx and ?ngels/ views on the sub4ect. (here was no theoretician o) note# in any country# with the exception o) (rotsky# who had much to say about the innovations o) the international avant-garde# except to generally condemn them as decadent. ;ohemia and the avant-garde themselves had only moved beyond the ,arisian context ca. 189&# with the generali*ation o) the kind o) consumption that had made it possible in ,aris in the 1888-189& period. (his situation changed considerably in 1910-19%1# when the general radicali*ation o) ?uropean society brought important elements o) the avant-garde to the working-class parties )or the )irst time. $s in the pre1918# the 3uestion was not so much the impact or in)luence o) such elements on the workers/ movement as the in)luence o) the workers/ movement on these elements. ;ut this# in the long run# was to be important because the experience o) the war destroyed the hegemony o) dominant bourgeois ideology in artistic and intellectual strata and had made the signi)icant parts o) the latter see that the "conditions

)or cultural creation" depended on the working-class movement and its triumph. (he relationship between .rench 6ada and surrealism# German expressionism# or 7ussian )uturism and constructivism and the workers/ movement# or o) less cohesive elements in the E.5. and ;ritain who brie)ly gravitated around the new <ommunist ,arties# was short and generally sterile. (he world working class surge was de)eated9 beginning with the brie) world stabili*ation in 19%8# 5talinist theories o) "socialist realism" began to impose themselves# and most artists )ell away )rom their revolutionary social vision o) 1910-19%1 and returned to their separate aesthetic spheres# such as the neue 5achlichkeit in Germany. ;y the time large numbers o) this stratum again began to gravitate around the workers/ movement in 19A1# with the era o) the ,opular .ront# the doctrines o) "socialist realism" had become so entrenched that the real innovations o) the modernist avant-garde were ignored or calomnied. (he actual cultural productions o) the social realist school are today o) exclusively archival interest. 5mall minorities# mainly in the (rotskyist movement e.g. the collaboration o) ;reton# 7ivera and ,eret with (rotsky-# attempted to de)end the innovations o) the modernist avant-garde as an aesthetic revolution which paralleled the social revolution# but they remained small minorities. $)ter =orld =ar !!# the polari*ation between the ?astern and =estern blocs tended to rein)orce the

isolation o) the modernist avant-garde )rom the problematic o) the workers/ movement. (he doctrines o) "social realism" were so pervasive in the o))icial expressions o) the organi*ations o) the movement that the reconstituted ";ohemia" and "avant-garde" a)ter =orld =ar !! tended to pride itsel) on an apolitical# or anti-political aestheticism. (his separation began to break down# except in isolated cases without wider immediate in)luence# only with the appearance o) the ""ew Le)t" a)ter 191@# and in an important way only a)ter the mid-19@&/s. $s a )undamental social stratum o) the "man o) negation" in the new kind o) =estern societies that emerged )rom the 19%9-1981 crisis# the avant-garde was important to the subse3uent development o) the workers/ movement when# in the 19@1-190A period# the preoccupations o) the avant-garde spilled beyond the con)ines o) the aesthetic ghetto into the mass movement o) the "ew Le)t and counterculture. (he e))ect o) this development was to bring the career o) the "man o) negation" to an end in =estern culture. (he avant-garde o) the periods 1888-189&# 189&-19A& and 1981-19@1 they were essentially marginali*ed in the 19A&-1981 by social realism- had been attacks on a classical conception o) culture tied up with one-way communication and the contemplative role o) the audience. Enderneath the successive developments o)

schools was the emerging )undamental pro4ect o) a "new kind o) li)e"# a demand )or a total trans)ormation o) the world which would render the separate aesthetic sphere obsolete. =hen the concerns and "anti-bourgeois" "li)estyle" o) the avant-garde became a mass movement among youth )rom the service sectors o) =estern society ca. 19@1# the separate domain represented by the earlier avant-garde was exploded. =hen# by 190&# mass movements o) racial minorities# women# gays# and ecologists had come into existence# the previous cultural war against the "repression" o) these groups was superceded. (he post-1888 avant-garde disappeared in the generali*ation o) its sensibility and "program" to a large minority o) society. =ith this generali*ation came a )ull-scale attack on the "universalism" o) the previously constituted intelligentsia# the pseudoradical posturing o) "post-modernism"# in the name o) an ultimate ontological "di))erence" that could be subsumed in no universal. 9istorical "larification of $hat "ommunism $as &ot ;ut the vision o) a society beyond capitalism# what we might call the "programmatic imagination" o) socialismJcommunism# was obviously by no means limited to the avant-garde and its relationship to the workers/ movement. !t is# at bottom# this "vision" which is most eroded today. 2arx and ?ngels/ point

o) departure was a break with the "a priori" schema and social blueprints drawn up by the utopian socialists o) the early 19th century# and by utopians in general# be)ore them. "<ommunism is not an idea or a theory sprung )rom the head o) this or that world re)ormer"# said the <ommunist 2ani)esto9 "it is nothing but the real movement# which tends to undermine existing conditions# un)olding be)ore our eyes". (he <ommunist 2an)esto presents a program )or a workers/ government# but one which already by the time o) the %nd !nternational was seen as superceded. +ere# once again# the historical )ate o) the 5,6 is crucial. 2arxism existed as only one current among many in the .irst !nternational9 )or 2arx# "one step )orward by the real movement was worth a hundred programs"# and 2arx and ?ngels accepted the collaboration o) 7icardian socialists# <hartist trade unionists# ;lan3uists# :acobins# ,roudhonist mutualists# .rench utopian socialists# Lassalleans# German "(rue <ommunists" such as =eitling# and ;akuninist anarchists# along with the "pro-2arxist" )action o) the early 5,6. $s with the ,aris <ommune o) 1801# whose repercussions ultimately destroyed the .irst !nternational# 2arx and ?ngels )elt that the most important achievement o) the emergent =estern ?uropean and "orth $merican workers/ movement was "its own existence in practice". (he <ommune had been# in )undamental ways# an elaboration o) the

"dictatorship o) the proletariat"# and 2arx was )rank in acknowledging that it had in)luenced his theory o) the state. (he great )orce o) 2arxism over all rival currents was that it linked the long-standing theories o) utopia and communism to a concrete theory o) history as the "totality o) social relations". !t was# and showed itsel)# to be the theory o) "the real movement un)olding be)ore our eyes". (he "spectre o) communism" terri)ied bourgeois society in 1888 and# )ar more deeply# in 1801# and had given rise to debate# calumny and slander long be)ore the historical appearance o) 2arx and ?ngels. (he re)usal o) 2arx and ?ngels to indulge in empty speculation about the outcome o) history was a healthy reaction# and the only possible one# to the pre1888 proli)eration o) theories o) the world redeemers9 but it le)t the elaboration o) the public )ace o) "socialism" to individuals and movements )ar less capable than they o) determining# at least# what communism was not. 2arx and ?ngels had recogni*ed that the uni)ication o) Germany and the disarray o) their .rench rivals a)ter the de)eat o) the <ommune would )avor the pre-eminence o) the 5,6 and their theory. ;ut i) the leadership o) the 5,6 was directly in)luenced by the )ounders through "2arxists" such as ;ebel# =ilhelm Liebknecht# etc. the very people who prompted 2arx to proclaim that he was "not a 2arxist"- it also included Lassalleans# trade unionists# cooperativists# and later )igures like

?ugen 6uehring who brie)ly introduced German nationalism and anti-5emitism# along with populist "anti-monopoly"views on economics# into the party. (he most important expression o) 2arx/s distance )rom the early 5,6 is the 1801 "<riti3ue o) the Gotha ,rogram"# never published in his li)etime and essentially suppressed by his )ollowers in Germany. (oday# it is )undamental to begin to unearth the discrepancy between 2arx and those who# even be)ore 188A# spoke in his name. (he rise o) the 5,6 to hegemony in the international workers/ movement took place during the decades between the ,aris <ommune o) 1801 and the 7ussian 19&1. (he struggles o) the German working class and the advance o) the party and its trade unions )rightened ;ismarck and the political class o) the 5econd 7eich su))iciently to provoke the outlawing o) the party )rom 1808 to 189&9 the German strikes o) the late 188&/s were an important )actor in =ilhelm !!/s dismissal o) ;ismarck# and German workers again launched strike waves in the last decade be)ore 1918. ;ut in the era o) the 5econd !nternational# they made no collective practical innovation o) a revolutionary character comparable to the <ommune and the 7ussian soviets. Cn the contrary# the 5,6 thrived increasingly on its electoralism# parliamentarism# legalism and its respectable trade unionism. (he signi)icance o) the decades o) social peace in which it won international hegemony was their deleterious

impact on the idea o) what socialism was and how it could be brought into existence. (he 5,6 was a vast "counter-society" within Germany# with vast associations o) all varieties# a party press with do*ens o) local daily newspapers# and workers/ cultural and educational programs that were among its most attractive assets. !n this climate# as the party moved )rom one electoral success to another# there gradually arose the mood captured by ;recht/s remark# a)ter +itler/s triumph in 19AA# that "the German working class was never more disarmed than when it came to believe that its triumph was inevitable." (he 2arxist tradition within the 5econd !nternational con)ronted# and theori*ed# 3uestions o) municipal socialism the so-called "sewer socialism" introduced by German emigres to the E.5.- nationali*ation or sociali*ation# and a"rationallv-planned economv". !t developed theories o) the transition )rom socialism to advanced communism. ;ut until the 7ussian 7evolution o) 19&1 and the world revolutionary wave o) 1910-19%1# above all in its German and 7ussian phases# the speci)ic notion o) the ")orms" o) workers/ rule were vague# ill-addressed. (he 7ussian working class/ invention o) the soviet# the central council o) revocable delegates )rom )actory and regional councils# including peasants/# soldiers/ and sailors/ councils as well# was the historical answer par excellence# in practice# to this previously theoretical 3uestion. ;ut the de)eat# everywhere# o) the world

revolutionary wave led to the destruction o) the soviets# in Germany and in 7ussia# and their revolutionary democratic character# particularly where direct workers/ control o) production was concerned# was largely )orgotten )or hal) a century. !) this experience had brie)ly posed "nationali*ation under workers/ control" as the content o) working-class power# by 19A&# "socialism" outside o) the small )actions o) the international le)t opposition to 5talinism# was associated everywhere with nationali*ation and economic planning# in di))erent guises. .or# even be)ore 1918# the theory o) 2arx and ?ngels# already bowdleri*ed by the public "2arxists" o) the 5econd !nternational# had important rivals' the .abian 5ocialism o) the =ebbs# the municipal "sewer" socialism practiced by local 5ocial 6emocrats in power# the di))erent mutualist schemes o) anarchism# ;ismarckian social insurance. !t may well be their great extension a)ter 1981 that makes them appear# in retrospect# so signi)icant# but the modest growth o) wel)are measures or legislative initiatives )or their implementation in ;ritain# 5weden# "ew Fealand and Germany in the years 4ust be)ore 1918# with hindsight# clearly expressed the )uture. !t was less clear# in 1918# or )or several decades therea)ter# 4ust how this )uture was to come into existence. !t is important to look at this 4uncture# 4ust be)ore the historical appearance o) the 5oviet phenomenon#

which complicated the 3uestion o) the content o) socialismJcommunism even more. !t is important to see )irst o) all how central the state had become )or the classical workers/ movement# under the auspices o) the German 5,6. !t is necessary# in order to critici*e this statism which was the model )or most other subse3uent currents o) signi)icance-# to look )or a moment at 2arx and ?ngels/ actual conception o) communism# one which in reality in)luenced the classical workers/ movement so little. .or 2arx and ?ngels# the key to capitalism was the status o) wage-labor as a commodity# with a status in the market place both identical to that o) any other commodity and at the same time the uni3ue "general commodity" whose value set the value o) all the others. !nso)ar as they de)ined a commodity as being characteri*ed by both use-value and exchange-value# they saw this dual# contradictory status o) labor power- o) real human beings in the material production and reproduction o) themselves- as the source o) a whole series o) other antagonisms. (hough little recogni*ed# the )undamental 2arxian criti3ue o) political economy rests on the problem o) individual creativity in a society where nothing can exist unless it can prove itsel) viable in the market place where commodities con)ront one another. 2arx used the example o) 2ilton to illustrate this point. 2ilton# as a poet# "wrote poetry as a silkworm spins silk". ;ut in a bourgeois society based on commodity production#

2ilton/s work had to pass through the commodity relations with publishers# editors# etc. $ctivity in capitalism became socially "mediate"# i.e. mediated through commodity exchange. <ommunism was# then# the society in which 2ilton/s poetry# written "as a silkworm spins silk"# would become socially immediate# i.e. the goal o) production. <ommunism# at its deepest level# was )or 2arx and ?ngels a society in which the production and reproduction o) creative individuals was the goal o) production# instead o) the incidental spino)) it represents in capitalist conditions. $ll 3uestions o) the suppression o) wage-labor# sociali*ation o) private property# and planning ultimately are subordinated to this goal. ;etween 1918 and 1981# the necessary vagueness o) the "de)inition" o) socialismJcommunism o) 2arx and ?ngels# through the concrete historical experience o) the international workers/ movement# made possible the complete occultation o) this emancipatory core o) 2arxian theory# !n the immediate a)termath o) the <entral and ?astern ?uropean revolutions# extended social debates took place# in every country# about planning# nationali*ation# the role o) the state# wel)are measures# social housing# and under 5ocial 6emocratic governments in the =eimar 7epublic and in $ustria some o) them were translated into law and practice. !n the 5oviet Enion# the de)eat o) the international revolutionary wave# and the isolation o) the ;olsheviks internationally and# 4ust as important#

within 5oviet society itsel)- prepared the terrain )or the industriali*ation debate o) the mid-19%&/s )ollowed by the implementation# in 19%8# o) 5talin/s .irst .ive-Iear ,lan. (he coming to power o) 2ussolini in 19%%# and +itler in 19AA# made )ascism a third# unanticipated participant in the international economic debate# because )ascism borrowed a great deal )rom the socialist movement# and 2ussolini/s labor-industry syndicates )or the regulation o) every sector o) the !talian economy with many ex-anarchosyndicalists in his party- drew international attention as another possible model o) economic regulation. $s indicated earlier# =orld =ar ! had been# among other things# a vast experiment in state economic management# which through its practicioners like .ranklin 6. 7oosevelt# :.2. >eynes# +4almar 5chacht# :ean 2onnet and =alter 7athenau had demonstrated in practice as no theory could- that state regulation and management was not incompatible with capitalism and pro)its )or capitalists. .rom 19%9 to 19AA# a great debate was conducted within the German labor movement and in the German )ascist movement about concrete solutions to the economic depression# and +itler/s >eynesian re)lation# centered on state-)inanced war production and credit creation# was not so )ar in its theory )rom many similar solutions advocated by economists o) the 5,6 c). :ean-,ierre .aye# Langages totalitaires-. ;etween 19%9 and 1981# the belie) that liberal capitalism# and 3uite as likely liberal democracy# as they had existed

prior to 1918 were dead# was widely held all across the political spectrum. ;y the time o) the outbreak o) =orld =ar !!# only a hand)ul o) liberal democracies survived in the advanced capitalist world# and even they were undertaking massive statist action to re)late their economies. (he $merican "ew 6eal and Leon ;lum/s .rench ,opular .ront seemed# to observers at the time# on a close continuum with the economics o) German or !talian )ascism# and 5oviet "communism"9 indeed# to many observers# they seemed to have more in common with each other than any o) them had with the pre-1918 liberal capitalism remembered# moreover# through increasingly rose-tinted lenses-. .igures such as the !talian ;runo 7i**i wrote provocative books on the "bureaucrati*ation o) the world"# and ;erle# 2eans and :ames ;urnham in the E.5. theori*ed a "managerial revolution" in which private capitalists were replaced by technocrats# managers and state administrators9 indeed# many such theorists considered this change to be more revolutionary# and more actually the practical abolition o) capitalism# than 2arxian socialism# in either its popular or more theoretical )orm. (echnocracy itsel)# which had existed as a current )rom the early %&th century# o))ered its version o) a society beyond capitalism# in which engineers would expand their problem-solving methods )rom technical 3uestions to social ones# and would clearly# by their scienti)ic training# be the only social group capable o) doing so. ;y the late 19A&/s# theorists o) a state

regulatory solution to the crisis o) a moribund capitalism took on the appearance o) a veritable "embarras de messies". 5uch currents could only be strengthened by =orld =ar !!# where state management was carried to even greater lengths. ?ven among non-belligerents# as in Latin $merica# the 19%9-1981 period made possible or inevitable a autarchic withdrawal )rom the depressed world market and the wide use o) statist import-substitution and other measures which actually# because o) the demand created by =orld =ar !!# made these years a period o) industrial growth again# c). the book o) :oseph Love-. ;ut it would be a distortion to present the evolution o) the debate# or seeming debate# about the content o) socialism in the interwar period without underscoring the )act that it was the 5oviet Enion and its planned economy which overshadowed all others as a model )or a break with capitalism. !n the midst o) the world crisis# especially in the ,opular .ront era 19A1-19A9# or later during the 1981-1980 years o) the $llied alliance against )ascism# up to the de)initive turn to <old =ar in 1980# it is scarcely possible to underestimate the benevolence with which the 5oviet model was viewed by "progressive" elements in all parts o) the world. ?ven the 19A9-1981 parenthesis o) the 5talin-+itler pact# however much it alienated )ellow travellers o) the 5oviet Enion in the remaining liberal democracies-# served to underscore the

apparently unstoppable rise o) collectivism on a world scale. (his sense# and reluctance to critici*e the 5oviet experiment# extended )ar into the ranks o) socialists and liberals who were not themselves direct advocates o) the 5talinist model. (he death o) millions o) kulaks in the collectivi*ations# the role o) millions more people pressed into slave-labor pro4ects# the 3uasimilitary regimentation o) the working class in the years o) "bacchanalian planning"# or the implications o) the 2oscow trials which wiped out most o) the ;olshevik Cld Guard- were either )latly denied as bourgeois slander or presented# apologetically or pragmatically# as the sine 3ua non o) any bold revolutionary experiment. (he $merican# ;ritish and .rench liberal and le)t milieus o) the 19A&/s were all deeply immersed in 5talinophile bathos. (he .rench Ligue des 6roits de l/+omme supported the 2oscow trials. !n such an atmosphere# it was all too easy to dismiss the small minorities who )ought 5talinism )rom the le)t as irrelevant sects# when not simply police provocateurs or )ascist agents. (he radical mass strikes and upsurges in .rance 19A@- and the social revolution in 5pain 19A@-A0were )ought by the <ommunist ,arties o) those countries without raising any serious 3uestions in these strata. (he radical labor upsurge in the E.5. that began in 19A8 had# by 19A0# been largely trans)ormed into a prop )or "ew 6eal re)orm when the <,E5$

threw its support behind 7oosevelt with the ,opular .ront turn. (he new social strata recruited )rom the service sector which had begun to )lourish )rom the 189&/s onward saw their aspirations mirrored in the 5oviet state the =ebbs# brie)ly also admirers o) 2ussolini# being the paradigmatic case-# and the 5oviet state in turn indirectly inspired the ardor with which such elements ensconced themselves in the rapidly expanding state bureaucracies o) ;ritain# .rance or the E.5. 6uring =orld =ar !!# the $llied war e))ort and plans )or a postwar world order# combined with the emergence o) the continental anti-)ascist resistance movements under "a*i occupation# )ueled these hopes even more. =e have earlier sketched the impact# on the international political and social environment# o) the rapid transition to conditions o) <old =ar among the $llied partners in =orld =ar !!. ;y 191&# the installation o) ,eople/s 6emocracies in ?astern ?urope# the <hinese 7evolution and the outbreak o) the >orean =ar had shown the 5oviet model to have even greater apparent strength and dynamism than had seemed possible in the ,opular .ront era ten years earlier. Ep to the consolidation o) the "restoration" atmosphere in =estern ?urope by the early 191&/s# the ;ritish Labour Government 1981-11-# and le)twing political participation in# or domination o) governments o) national reconstruction in .rance# =est Germany# !taly# and ;elgium seemed to have

laid the )oundations o) "socialist" economies o) some kind through widespread nationali*ations and the broad extension o) social legislation. Enlike =orld =ar !!# =orld =ar ! was not )ollowed in =estern ?urope by a revolutionary upsurge. Endoubtedly as discussed earlier-# the conciliatory roles o) the .rench# !talian and ;elgian <,s in the period 1981-1980 were critical in demobili*ing working-class hopes )or )undamental change a)ter the war# hopes which extended )ar beyond the working class. (he E.5. also poured si*eable resources into the economic political and social stabili*ation o) =estern ?urope# )orcing the polari*ation o) domestic politics on the continent into the battle lines dictated by the emerging <old =ar blocs. !t should )urther be kept in mind that there was widespread anticipation# on all sides# o) a relapse into depression# like the depression o) 1919-19%&# once the conversion to peacetime production was completed. ;ecause the world economy had emerged )rom depression only with the 19A0-19A8 =estern rearmament in anticipation o) =orld =ar !!# it seemed logical to assume that demobili*ation would bring depression. (o ascribe the success o) conservative restoration in =estern ?urope# by 191%# to the submissiveness o) the =estern ?uropean <ommunist ,arties to pressure )rom 5talin and Ialta# in such an environment# begs many 3uestions. Like similar explanations o) the de)eat o) the ?uropean revolutions a)ter 1918 by

5ocial 6emocratic betrayal# such a thesis does not explain why masses o) workers tolerated such compromise# and# perhaps even more seriously# does not pay serious attention to what kind o) "socialism" these parties so submissive to 5talin would have built had they taken power. !n particular# the small revolutionary groups active in the immediate postwar period# like so many others# were blinded with the important exception o) the ;ordigists# who correctly )oresaw decades o) re)ormist hegemony- to the realities o) the period by apocalyptic expectations and predictions o) a repetition o) the post-1910 upsurge. 5uch expectations# and reasonable analogies based on the historical experience o) the interwar period# blinded such currents and 4ust about everyone else- to the deeper )orces working )or stabili*ation and a long postwar economic expansion. =e have re)erred# at several 4unctures# to the importance o) the )ull entry into world history o) the anti-colonial movements in the decade be)ore =orld =ar !# an entry underscored by the :apanese military victory o) 19&1. !n the period o) accelerated decoloni*ation a)ter =orld =ar !!# particularly a)ter ;andung# the newly independent development states such as !ndia# ?gypt# !ndonesia# or later Ghana and )inally $lgeria# )or the )irst time 4oined the growing variety o) states characteri*ed as "progressive" and which served as models )or similar countries and anti-

colonial movements elsewhere. $lthough these states# and their anti-imperialist ideologies# actually drew more directly on the interwar proto-)ascist and )ascist movements o) <entral and ?astern ?urope mediated through the earlier examples o) $ttaturk# !3bal or Bargas-# than on 2arxism# the new post-1981 con4uncture made possible their recycling into the "progressive" camp. (hus the liberal ideology o) the pre-1918 era# while having survived in battered )orm the late 19A&/s "era o) collectivism" and its seeming worldwide extinction# )ound itsel) contending# by 191&# with the 5talinist economies o) the ?astern bloc and with the new "(hird =orld ;onapartist" states. Liberalism o) the 19th century variety# o) course# was virtually dead9 it survived in the "mixed economies # "social market economies" # "wel)are states"# "(hird =ay" ideologies# in power# at least in practice# in =estern ?urope and the Enited 5tates. (he theoretical underpinning o) many o) these institutional arrangements was o) course the theory o) :.2. >eynes# developed in the inter-war period. =hat was at stake in all these arrangements was a relationship between state and market# or plan and market. !t is important to )ollow out the tra4ectory o) these variants because# in the general crisis o) the international le)t in the 190&/s# such 3uestions would return with a vengeance in the new aggressive )orm posed by neoliberalism. Through the #ussian #evolution% the $estern interwar e:perience and the decoloni*ation process% the international left had

swallowed wholesale variations of the ; eople-s State; posed by the Lassallean S ! at Gotha in .<314 (he categories o) 2arxism had been appropriated by the mercantilist categories o) the state civil service. $n excellent discussion o) these themes is 7. 5*porluk# <ommunism and "ationalism. >arl 2arx versus .riedrich List. 1988ostwar =oom: 9eyday of the )nproductive +iddle "lasses (he post-1981 capitalist world economy did not relapse into depression. !t began# through three phases# one o) the longest phases o) expansion in capitalist history. !n a purely economic sense# the boom phase that changed gears in 19@1 and ended in 190A could be dated# at least )or the E.5.# )rom 19A8. <learly no one attempted to designate as "socialist" the international institutions created at the outset o) the postwar recovery-- the ;retton =oods agreement on exchange rates# the !nternational 2onetary .und# the =orld ;ank# the G$((# the C?<6. Iet# as we shall see# one o) the )undamental )laws o) all the statist solutions in the =estern and de-coloni*ed world was to ignore their signi)icance. !n some circumstances# the state was held responsible )or rapid# dynamic growth9 in others# it was held responsible )or stagnation and decay. ;ut no one doubted that it was the state that was the agency in the situation. (he crisis o) the 190&/s would show

otherwise# with disastrous results )or the international le)t. (he le)t had# in a word# been con3uered by institutionalism. (he postwar boom passed through three phases. (he )irst lasted )rom 1981 to 1918. !t was characteri*ed by the 2arshall ,lan# the move toward ?uropean integration# the provision o) international li3uidity through the $merican balance o) payments# rapid low-wage- growth in ?urope# slow growth in the E.5. punctuated by recessions in 1988-89# 191A-18# 191018# 19@&-@1-# and an accelerating marginali*ation o) the (hird =orld by intensive accumulation in "orth $merica# =estern ?urope and :apan. (he second phase o) the postwar boom lasted )rom 1918 to 19@9. !t was characteri*ed by a pro)ound alteration o) the E.5. economy a)ter the recession o) 1910-18# and the acceleration o) productive investment abroad# particularly in =estern ?urope. (he creation o) the ??< 1910- opened up ?urope )or labor mobility as well as )or $merican investment. !n approximately 19@1# investment in production began to move to selected parts o) the (hird =orld# where the productivity o) labor had reached suitable levels and where the in)rastructure existed )or mass manu)acture. !n the second phase o) the postwar boom# the dollar crisis mooted by experts in 1918 began a serious point o) international contention# with strains on )ixed exchange rates# the beginnings o) a move into gold# and the creation o) the ?uro-dollar

market to absorb )oreign-held E.5. dollars )rom a now excessive E.5. balance o) payments de)icit. (he E.5. itsel) en4oyed a boom )rom 19@1 to 19@9# stimulated in part by the Bietnam =ar. 7eal wages hit a plateau )or wage workers in manu)acture in 19@1. !n ?urope# wages began to rise in the late 19@&/s# pushed by working-class militancy taking advantage o) boom conditions and making up )or the general wage austerity o) 1981-19@1. =ith the dollar crisis o) 19@8# the building tension in the ;retton =oods arrangements issued in the $merican recession o) 19@9-1901. (he dynamic o) the international boom had peaked in the ?uropean and :apanese recessions o) 19@1-19@0 and the E.5. mini-recession o) 19@@. (he )inal phase o) the postwar boom# lasting until 190A# was in reality a hyper-in)lated super-boom which no longer drew on dynamism in the productive sphere but depended on massive state credit creation and a basic ransacking o) productive assets. !t is also important to note developments in the 5oviet bloc# )or our discussion o) state# market and plan. $s early as 1988# a discussion o) the operation o) the law o) value had taken place in 5oviet economic circles. 5ince the suppression o) the "?, in 19%8# marketoriented strategies )or industriali*ation had been discredited in 5oviet discussion and practice. (he impressive growth rates achieved in the phase o) primitive accumulation )rom 19%8 to 1981# and similar rates achieved in the period o) reconstruction

)rom =orld =ar !!# had continued to marginali*e these concerns. !n 19@%# however# <*eckoslavakia# which prior to =orld =ar !! had been the most industriali*ed *one o) ?astern ?urope with a per capita living standard roughly comparable to .rance# registered a year o) negative growth. $s the most industrial country o) the 5oviet bloc# this remarkable )act sounded an alarm. (he <*ech problem# which ultimately led to the 6ubcek re)orms o) 19@0-@8# underscored a problem o) the entire bloc' the exhaustion o) accumulation based on extensive growth# the situation =estern economies as a whole had )aced in the period )rom 1918 to 1981. !nso)ar as these structures lie closer to the sur)ace in the ?astern bloc# they illuminate phenomena o) global signi)icance. (he ?astern ?uropean economies )ind themselves blocked by the central planners# whose methods# barely ade3uate )or extensive accumulation# are useless )or intensive accumulation. (he central planners# the "steel eaters" are roughly in the position o) the labor-intensive# nationally oriented manu)acturers in the E.5. who resisted the transition to >eynesianism in the 19A&/s. (he )ailure o) >hruschev# the insigni)icance o) the Liberman re)orms in the 5oviet Enion in 19@1# and the 5oviet invasion o) <*eckoslavakia# merely delayed the day o) reckoning which came# again# with Gorbachev in 1981. (he 5oviet bloc economies are trapped between dismantling the state planning apparatus to rationali*e and dynami*e their economies# and su))ering the

unemployment and social disruption that would )ollow a )ull opening to the market. (he end o) the postwar boom in the =est issued in the crisis o) 1908-1901# to which we alluded earlier. (he illusion o) state agency in economic growth# the perspective o) the state civil servant# the man o) negation# the "moi absolu"# evaporated. (he deindustriali*ation o) the =est accelerated. (he phase o) "high tech" accumulation- the direct appropriation o) scienti)ic knowledge to the production process itsel)intensi)ied. (he rise o) neo-liberalism extended )rom (hatcher/s ;ritain to 7eagan/s $merica to 2itterand/s .rance to Gorbachev/s 7ussia to (eng/s <hina. (he ,olish working class in 198&-1981 demanded# in e))ect# "market socialism". (hroughout the world# the choice between market and plan imposed itsel). (he socialist vision seemed to be in ruins. (here was a general awareness that neo-liberalism was an ideology o) austerity# o) regressive redistribution o) wealth# o) (hird =orld debt austerity# )urther dollar chaos# the subsidi*ation o) the E.5. economy by )oreign capital# the rapid accumulation o) debt# the looting o) corporate assets# gouging o) social programs. ;ut the neo-liberals had painted the world in their new colors what the .rench call "la pensee uni3ue"-# and essentially any ob4ection to the work o) the "market" seemed linked to an apology )or state bureaucracy# and stagnation. (he "le)t" has responded with calls )or "industrial policy". ;ut the problem is the need to

break the international *ero or negative sum game in which the working class is trapped. From the Break Their Haughty Power web site http://home.earthlink.net/ lrgol!ner