Conservatism in India

Conservatism in India Author(s): Howard L. Erdman Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 4, A Century of Conservatism (Oct.
, 1978), pp. 791-802 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260084 . Accessed: 05/02/2014 23:09
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Contemporary History.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 203.232.237.6 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 23:09:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Howard L. Erdman
Conservatism in India
It is often found surprisingthat Indian conservatism, as an organized political force, appears very weak, despite the country's ancient and well-rooted traditions. For example, in the 1930s a self-declared conservative, the Maharajah of Rewa, remarked: 'it must seem strange ... that in a country whose ways of life are so dominated by custom and tradition as India, there should be no political party which calls itself conservative.' Nothing has come of his prediction that with emancipation from British tutelage 'a strong party of experienced and responsible politicians will emerge, which will call itself the Conservative Party.'" Well after independence two leading students of Indian affairs wrote that
It is one of the paradoxes of Indian politics that India's ancien regime, surely one of the oldest and most deeply-rooted in the world, produced no reaction ... Only a few minor local parties today stand for a full return to the rule of Brahmins and Kshatryasaccording to the precepts of dharma or traditional duty and they are ineffectual.2
Nehru, somewhat differently, addressed himself to the same issue: 'Who says that opposition forces are weak in India? The opposition we have to fight is obscurantism and inertia of the people'. Thus, according to the then Prime Minister, although the parties of the right might not have had impressive electoral records there was a passive conservatism at work. Another observer, though missing Nehru's point, underlined the question, when he commented: 'The Prime Minister had in mind mass lethargy and ignorance; but the record of both the religious and secular rightist parties is a sad commentary on this maxim'. Tinker, with others, looked for an electoral impact which Nehru's observation did not imply, but it is clear that
Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol 13 (1978), 791-802
792
Journal of Contemporary History
he, too, found Indian conservatism feeble or worse. Joining in the chorus was one of India's leading journals of opinion, which announced, after the first two general elections, that the country was witness to 'the almost complete political eclipse of our so-called rightist parties.'3 While later elections saw their modest resurgence, the basic proposition would still be valid; and even though the incumbent government is most assuredly right of centre, its formal programme is not. In sum, it is indisputably true that India has not produced an electorally significant party with an explicitly conservative ideology. The question is, what happened to Indian conservatism?
According to one view, albeit a minor one, India in general and Hinduism in particular have been characterizedby openness, flexibility, mutual accommodation, tolerance, etc., so that sharp confrontation between status quo and challenging forces has been unnecessary. Taken at face value, this would mean that such clashes never occur, or, if they are found (and they certainly are), they are the result of outside influences. An example of this is the conflict between Hindus and Muslims which resulted in partition: had it not been for the British policy of divide and rule, it is said, the Indians themselves would have worked things out harmoniously. Hinduism has undoubtedly proved to be adaptive both doctrinally and structurally, but such a theory can scarcely be accepted. India has known and continues to know sharp confrontations and not all of them can be laid at the feet of outside elements. The Rudolphs, for example, who have written extensively on the adaptability of the caste system and on opportunities for upward mobility within it, have also recorded that over the decades upwardly mobile castes have met with stern resistance in various forms, including intimidation and murder.4The press and the government of India (especially through its commissioner for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes) regularly report cases of harassment, assaults, and murders, as higher caste reprisals against untouchables who refuse to know their place. This is only to say for the moment that there have been and are social conflicts in which status quo forces have resisted challengers. This would not be a particularly notable proposition were it not for the fact that in diluted form the genius-of-India argument recurs in the literature.
Erdman: Conservatism in India
793
According to another thesis, that of no-challenge-no-response, the apparent weakness of Indian conservatism is explained by the absence of a significant challenge to established beliefs and practices: no clear and present danger to vested interests, no need for a conservative response. Proponents of this view, especially from the left, implicitly deny the genius-of-India thesis and contend that whenever there has been a significant challenge, there has been a conservative response. The rebellion of 1857, the aristocratic suppression of movements toward democracy in princely India, and the attacks on untouchables are cases in point. But the contention remains that in broad terms no vested interests have 'really' been driven to the wall. For the post-independence period in India this thesis holds, firstly, that despite its political hegemony and increasinglysocialist rhetoric, the ruling Congress party did not attack India's vested interests; and secondly, that the have-nots have failed to generate a challenge of their own, even when leftist political parties (among others) have tried to mobilize them. There is considerable merit in both propositions. Take the latter first. There have been valiant efforts to see a revolutionary upsurge in the rebellion of 1857, in the Quit India movement of the early 1940s, in Ambedkar's efforts to mobilize the untouchables, or in less dramatic and conspicuous struggles. Nevertheless it remains true, as Moore for one contends,5 that India has not experienced any real revolution - certainly not one of India's 'have-nots' versus her own 'haves'. Recent efforts, such as those of the Naxalites, to mobilize the rural landless and poor, have been strictly local and severely suppressed, in some cases by state ministries which included communists. Estimates vary concerning the potential for a revolutionary upsurge; Moore is quite pessimistic, Jannuzi, at least for one Indian state, somewhat more optimistic;6 but both would agree that, despite their best efforts, they have found no revolution. The contention that, despite its hegemony and socialist rhetoric, the Congress party failed to generate a strong challenge from above also has considerable merit. A corollary of this is that even legislation which appears to have such an aim either contains many loopholes, has been subverted in implementation or else has remained unimplemented through lack of commitment or administrative capability. This is obviously an indictment of Nehru's 'revolution without fear' and also of his successors' political stewardship. Such 'slippage', which is by no means confined to India, can be
794
found in almost every policy area. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, the so-called Hindu code legislation sought to systematize and liberalize Hindu law on marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. It generated some very acrimonious debate, demonstrations, and other public protests, and a number of explicitly conservative ad hoc groups emerged to oppose the bills. Some concessions were made, and were no doubt instrumental in the fading away of the organized opposition. But two other factors partly account for the lack of a broad opposition front: the debate took place mainly in urban areas, with very little penetration of the countryside; and even those who were aware of what was going on knew also that even if the will were there, the administrative machinery to implement the legislation in the hundreds of thousands of India's villages was not.7 In two critical areas for India's poor, land reform and the abolition of untouchability, legislation abounds. While the impact has been enormously wide of the officially stated target, some changes have occurred. Still, in stating her emergency-periodaims, Mrs Gandhi reiterated her desire to abolish bonded labour and to implement existing land reform legislation - promises which had been given many, many times before. Jannuzi, for example, documents the long delays, the circumvention and non-implementation of the muchsoftened legislation, which will serve to illustrate the moderate impact of land reform on the relatively well-to-do landholders. Other cases of slipppage could be adduced both in land reform and other policy areas, including the effort to abolish untouchability; but even so, the no-challenge-no-response thesis cannot be accepted without qualification, especially in respect of the old aristocracy. To be sure, the Rajahs and Maharajahs were not packed off to the Andaman Islands let alone led to the firing squad. Many of them have managed to fare quite well. But for them and others, there were genuine reverses, genuine grievances and in many cases bitter resentment against the regime which passed the offending legislation. And from time to time they did express explicitly conservative views. For example, the ruling Congress party was rejected as one 'run by tradesmen who were not born to rule.' The intensity of feeling is evident in the assertion 'When a eunuch is able to serve a woman, then this government will be able to rule with authority, and not before.'8 But these were intermittent outbursts rather than part of a broad pattern of response to the Congress party challenge. The fact that virtually every aristocrat who contested for public office after independence won easily suggests that had they come together
795
on a conservative programme, the Maharajah of Rewa's prediction might have come true. Another explanation, which may be called the time-is-out-of-joint thesis, considers that events in India, as part of a world-wide process, have rendered conservatism, even on the part of the genuinely aggrieved, an exercise in futility.9 One variant on this theme is particularly important in the Indian case: the use of non-conservative rhetoric by conservatives, because of the perceived compulsions of the political arena. In the debates on the Hindu code bills, many opponents argued, inter alia, that the government had no electoral mandate to introduce such sweeping changes in Hindu private law; the restriction of the code to Hindus violated constitutional provisions on equality before the law; the provisions allowing women to inherit property equally with men would further fragment landholdings, and make progressive agriculture more difficult. In Morris-Jones' terms these are arguments from the 'modern' language of politics, which, he says, predominates at the national level, the more traditional language increasing as we approach the grass roots.'? True enough, but in this particularcase, many who used the 'modern' idiom at the centre did so not out of commitment but out of expediency: it was, even at the centre, the traditional language which mattered, but was not found opportune for use in that particular context. A comparable, and more easily documented case, concerns the now virtually defunct Swatantra (Freedom) party, founded in 1959. Its most distinguished promoter, C. Rajagopalachari (Rajaji), quite explicitly viewed it as a conservative party. For example, he wrote that
and distress... everychangemust necessarily producedislocation,disturbance the paininvolved... mustbe takeninto accountin any orderly A party advance. of the right,as it is called,givesexpression to thesedistresses and disturbances, whicharenot less realor important thanthe needfor changeand progress.
Because in his view 'the Congress party has swung to the left, what is needed is not an ultra- or outer-left, but a strong and articulate right.' Referring to the conservative elements within the Congress itself, Rajaji wanted a party which would 'operate not privately and behind the closed doors of the party meetings, but openly and periodically through the electorate.'
796
To give expression to thesebeliefs, Rajajiwantedhis new partyto be called the Conservative party, and his own draft of basic principles included specific referencesto aspects of traditionalIndia In the event,however,he was persuaded whichshouldbe preserved. condinamewould be a liabilityin the prevailing that his preferred as finallyadopted,wereovertions; and the fundamental principles, in tone, with one generalprovisioncallclassical-liberal whelmingly was good in the old culture."For for the of whatever retention ing Rajajiand many of those who joined him, the partywas to play a conservative role, whateverits formal name and basic principles. foundit conveHere, as in the Hinducode case, manyconservatives to use non-conservative nientor necessary terminology. a few comments Of otherpartiesand formaldoctrinalstatements may be made. First, as Rajaji observed,the previously-dominant in a leftistdirection ideologically Congresspartymovedincreasingly and to some degreein policy, while everyoneknew that the party elements.Secondly,the most discipcontainedmany conservative Jan Sanghlined and aggressive partyof the right,the Bharatiya the Indian People's party, now allegedlymergedinto the ruling Janata coalition - also contains many conservativeelements, although its formal ideology is right-radical(some terming it the virtuesof insofaras it emphasizes fascistic).Thirdly,Gandhism, a simple village-based life, in which consensusand harmonyare and in whichvirtuesare to be to conflictualrelationships preferred has served found in followinga traditional occupation, (caste-based) who are by no as a respectableideology for many conservatives meansconvinced,as was Gandhi,that the existingruralorderhas to stressesthe trusteeship be purifiedin important respects.Gandhism of the rich, the wise, and the well-bornfor those who are less fortunate;it prefersmoral suasionratherthan coercion(and in some Gandhianeyes, legislationis a form of coercion)as the means of to enpurification.Obviously,therefore,it is not very threatening is trenched interests. This point especiallyimportant, given the renewedemphasis on Gandhismby the present Prime Minister, MorarjiDesai. thesis is the Implicitin many commentson the time-is-out-of-joint to are central fact that(perceived) among groups relationships power societies of student As one the of developing problem. analysis any put it, it may safely be assumed that 'groups which have
797
would like to keep what they have', but that before this can be translated into meaningful political terms, it must also be clear 'what they think they will permit themselves to do toward that end .. . how much real power they have relative to other groups . . ., and the actual state of the competitive situation in which they find
themselves.'12
There have been and still are circumstancesin which the 'haves' of India have allowed themselves to do a great deal to protect their positions: aggrieved secular and religious elites took to the battlefield in the rebellion of 1857, a demonstrably conservative response to the inroads made by British reformers and their Indian supporters. Higher caste Hindus who murder untouchables who do not 'know their place' in contemporary India fall into the same general category, whether this behaviour is matched by a formal conservative ideology or not. Up to independence and for a short time thereafter, some aristocrats insisted that they would resist by force any effort to diminish their position further, although only a handful did so. It may safely be assumed that, if any government sets out to effect a massive change in rural India across a broad front, conservative behaviour, if not ideology, will not be difficult to find. No imaginable ruling group in India is likely to possess the capability even if it had the will - to intimidate or otherwise curb opponents of such a major transformation. But there is no great likelihood of any such attempt. Some additional observations on India's aristocracy may help to clarify the situation. Having relied heavily on the British to protect them, and having, by this, offended even conservative elements in the nationalist movement (not to mention their suppression of nationalist efforts in princely India), the aristocrats found themselves substantially isolated from those who inherited power in 1947. Some ceremonial positions for leading maharajahs might be in order, concessions might be made, but no one of any consequence in the Congress elite could countenance the preservation of over 500 largely autonomous princes whose recent record was one of conspicuous consumption and a stubborn determination to widen their autonomy. For a Congressman like Sardar Patel - the 'Bismarck of India' - and for militant Hindu nationalists - the Jan Sangh and kindred elements - India had to be united if it were to do anything, and princely autonomy stood in the way. Even the quite restrained Rajaji, who could see some virtue in ceremonial roles for the maharajahs, insisted that this did not mean that 'you should have
798
560 princes to confuse matters.' Patel, Rajaji and others felt that the old aristocracy could contribute to stability in the face of radical efforts, but, considerations of caste outlook apart, they would not accept the aristocraticviewpoint. Indeed, after independence, the Congress rapidly penetrated princely India and sought to undermine further the obvious influence of the aristocracy in those areas. This, and similar developments, virtually debarred any rapprochement between the aristocrats and conservative Congressmen at a later juncture when more radical programmes might seem to threaten both. To illustrate further, it need only be pointed out that in the initial settlement with the maharajahs (and with the landed gentry) the government of the day controlled a variety of carrots and sticks. Most notable among the concessions and perquisites was the annual 'privy purse' which allowed most princes to maintain some semblance of aristocratic respectability, even if they had to convert a palace or two into a luxury hotel to make ends meet. Ambassadorships and other enticements kept some happy. But the other side of the coin was the threat that, although constitutionally guaranteed, the privy purse could easily be terminated if the maharajahs misbehaved - a threat which was used with monotonous regularity whenever too many showed signs of fighting the ruling party. In a well-known analysis of the 1960s Indian situation, Kothari presents a view of the Congress 'system' in which the ruling party dominates the political spectrum, including many significant elements well to the left and right of centre.'3 Part of his argument holds that because of its pre-eminent position and pragmatic character Congress could shift, in terms of personnel, policy, etc., to undercut challenges from any non-Congress body (cf. the genius-ofIndia thesis). What is not clearly stated in Kothari's argument, however, is the coercive dimension which served to inhibit expression of explicitly rightist positions. And it should be further noted that Nehru and (Indira) Gandhi were far more severe in criticizing the right than the left, a further disadvantage for India's conservatives. Some of the latter were obviously intimidated, and did not enter the public arena at all; others who did were most circumspect, some boring away from within the Congress, others allying themselves with parties of the right, which, by and large, eschewed formal conservative ideologies. The condition of Indian conservatism cannot be explained fully by
799
reference to the combination of factors cited above. Part of the failure is surely attributable to the inability of aggrieved elements to submerge differences in the interests of generating a common political front. Well before independence, for example, India's aristocracy even when the writing was on the wall - were in disarray. The socalled Chamber of Princes, established by the British as something of a forum for the aristocratic point of view, was ignored by many of the leading maharajahs as beneath their dignity; and hundreds of petty princelings felt ignored and embittered because they were denied any form of representation in the Chamber. At later stages, when the integration of the princely states and abolition of certain forms of landlordism came to the fore, the disunity was astounding. The power relationships were not so obviously inimical to the interests of conservatives that a big push must necessarily have failed. The big push never came, however, and while other factors played a part, the segmentation of Indian society, with caste and related status considerations as a major component, was a key element. If 'big' aristocrats would not consort with 'little' ones; if a Rajput prince would not readily consort with a non-Rajput prince who might be his political and economic equal (or superior, for that matter), anyone who attempted to fashion a consequential party of the right would have rough going, indeed. To include non-aristocratic conservatives in a coalition would be more difficult still (except insofar as aristocrats could effectively mobilize the common people, which they did with astounding success in former princely India but which they could not do elsewhere). And it should be remembered that the maharajahs had been displaced by the British in about 60 per cent of India, introducing an element of discontinuity in social structure which also played a part. An effort at mobilization was, in fact, made.The Swatantra party (formed in 1959), while it rejected the label 'conservative' and an explicitly conservative ideology, did seek to establish a broad, right-ofcentre coalition to oppose the Congress. The old aristocracy were unashamedly recruited, as were aggrieved industrialists who played a major role in forming the party in the first place. In addition, following the Congress party's resolution in favour of 'joint co-operative farming', the Swatantra leadership sought to portray this as the advent of collectivized agriculture in India and to recruit the 'kulaks' on this basis. It did not succeed. Facing enormous political odds, the Swatantra
800
party, despite its willingness to serve as a broad umbrella for disparate disaffected groups, could not rally the potential faithful. It was largely eclipsed in the parliamentary (and some state assembly) elections of 1971, was further battered in the state assembly elections of 1972, and very nearly wrote itself off, well before its formal merger with other anti-Indira Gandhi forces to form the Janata (Peoples) party in 1977. Deaths and defections - crucial in a party heavily dependent on local notables - played a part, as did the manoeuverings of the ruling Congress party and its 'system'. But it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the unwillingness to compromise, to create a broad front, also played a major role in this failure. Those to whom the party sought to appeal never accepted the notion that they faced a 'clear and present danger', that they had better hang together, lest they all hang separately. I believe that they could have escaped reprisals. The ruling Janata party, which at least nominally incorporates the so-called 'old' Congress, the Jan Sangh, Swatantra, and other political formations, is most assuredly a 'right-of-centre coalition', as the Rudolphs have argued.14 Hastily engineered when Indira Gandhi called elections early in 1977, it brought together groups whose association was sought much earlier (and it included some, like the Socialist party, which did not bulk large in earlier right wing manoeuverings). Would-be party builders of the right long aspired to unite the Congress 'right' with some elements, at least, of the Jan Sangh and Swatantra, and this for the time being has been achieved. But the questions remain: why, and to what effect? Obviously Indira's emergency played a major role: here was a clear and present danger that many people could recognize. But the Janata party is not simply a rassemblement of the rightist forces in India. It benefited from many grievances among deprived groups, including untouchables and Muslims (for whom over-aggressivebirth control and slum-clearance programmes were anathema); and many trade union elements - rightly identified by Mrs Gandhi as privileged in Indian terms - who were denied wage increases, cost-of-living allowances, bonuses and the right to strike under the 1975-1977 emergency, also rallied to the cause of Janata. Had its success depended solely on the conspicuously privileged in Indian society, it would not be in power today; and this, in turn, imposes some limitations on its policy options.
801
The Janata government's first instinct is simply to ease the pressure imposed by Mrs Gandhi, so that it will allow more 'business as usual' throughout Indian society, and this will benefit conservative elements. A village-India focus, small scale projects to help the common man, destitution to be abolished in a decade, etc., are part of the avowed approach of the new regime. No doubt many conservatives will find this renewal of Gandhism a safe refuge, especially if the lot of the common man is to be improved without 'dislocation, disturbancesand distress' to the relatively privileged, or if improvement is to be sought by moral suasion, emphasis on 'trusteeship', and kindred Gandhian notions. Everythingconsidered, this may be the best for which India's conservatives could hope and, given the historical record, they may fare very well beneath the attractive veneer of Gandhian solicitude for the common man. We should not, therefore, expect to find a political party with an explicitly conservative ideology in India's immediate future. However, this is far from saying that India's conservatives have abandoned the field to others.
Notes
1. Quoted in H. Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), 10-11. 2. L. and S. Rudolph quoted in ibid., 10. 3. Ibid., 10. 4. L.I. and S.H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago 1967), Part I. 5. B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston 1966), ch. VI. 6. F.T. Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis in India (Austin, Texas, 1974), especially chs. 8 and 9. 7. G. Overstreet, 'The Hindu Code Bill', in L. Pye, ed., Cases in Comlparative Politics: Asia (Boston 1970), 161-88. 8. Erdman, op. cit., 27. 9. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, III, 292, states that 'political conservatism is a posture, whether adopted by individuals, classes, or parties, that is increasingly difficult to maintain in the twentieth century.' 10. Government and Politics of India (London 1971), ch.2. 11. See Erdman, op. cit., chs. 4, 5, and 8. 12. K. Silvert, quoted in Erdman, op. cit., 3 13. R. Kothari, 'The Congress "System" in India' in Asian Survey, IV, 12 (December 1964). 14. R. and S. Rudolph, 'India's Election: Backing Into the Future' in Foreign Affairs, 55, 4 (July 1977).
802
Journal of Contemporary History Howard L. Erdman Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, is the author of The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism (1967), Political Attitudes of Indian Industry (1971) and Politics and Economic Development in India (1973). He is at present working on a study of conservative politics in the 'third world' and a study of the evolution of industrial policy in India, focusing on the fertilizer industry.

Conservatism in India

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Conservatism in India

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Conservatism in India Author(s): Howard L. Erdman Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 4, A Century of Conservatism (Oct.

Journal of Contemporary History

Erdman: Conservatism in India

Journal of Contemporary History

Erdman: Conservatism in India

Journal of Contemporary History

Erdman: Conservatism in India

Journal of Contemporary History

Erdman: Conservatism in India

Journal of Contemporary History

Erdman: Conservatism in India

You might also like