Cirilo Mapa, petitioner-appellee vs The Insular Government Willard, J.

Facts: The petitioner applied to the Court of Land Registration to have a 16-hectare land in Mandurriao, Iloilo registered under his name. The Court decided in his favor basing its ruling on Act. No. 926, section 54 (6):All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. The Attorney-General, acting on behalf of the Insular Government, objected the decision thus this recourse. Issue: Whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of Act 926. Ruling: Yes. Notwithstanding the absence of an express definition of the phrase agricultural land in the Act, the Court cited Section 13 for guidance: That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands Thus, the phrase agricultural land used in Act No. 926 pertains to those public lands acquired from Spain which are (1) agricultural in nature and (2) neither timber nor mineral land. The land in controversy, which is lowland and being used as a fishery, is susceptible of cultivation and is in nature agricultural. The ruling of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed. G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.*THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent. FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. ISSUE: What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known? Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution or are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership. RULING: Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the a forecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED. DENR et al VS. YAP et al DENR et al VS. YAP et al G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008 FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under

the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable). On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming

suchpresumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. NOTES: 1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. 2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land. 3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Cornelio Ramos, petitioner-appelantvs The Director of Lands, objector-appelleeNovember 19, 1918Malcolm, J.: Facts: Sometime in February 1907, petitioner purchased a larger portion of a tract of landin San Jose, Nueva Ecija from Restituto Romero. The latter obtained a possessoryinformation title to the subject land under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1984.Petitioner instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered which theDirector of Lands opposed. According to the objector, petitioner had not acquired agood title from the Spanish government and that the subject land was forest landthus inalienable. The trial court ruled in favor of the objector, thus this recourse. Issue: Whether the petitioner proved a title to the tract of land for which he askedregistration. Ruling: Yes. For a land to come under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, it must havebeen shown that it was cultivated for six years previously and that it is not part of aforest zone. Petitioner and his predecessor-ininterest, who gained possession of thesubject land in 1882, fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition thatthe subject is agricultural public land. Citing the decision in Mapa vs. InsularGovernment, it was said that the phrase agricultural public lands as used in ActNo. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber ormineral lands.On the contention of the objector that the subject land was forest land, the Courtstated that when the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to aparticular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate thatthe land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the courtconvincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forestpurposes.However, no such certification as to whether the subject land is better adapted andmore valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes was submitted by theDirector of Forestry. The ruling of the trial court was reversed RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- ADVERSE POSSESSION The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. FACTS: Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such. Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title. ISSUE: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land. On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted. Ramos vs. Director of Lands Posted on August 21, 2013 39 Phil 175 G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918 Topic: Property; Possession Facts: Restituto Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have the title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. Issue: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land. Held: Yes, based on the doctrine of constructive possession. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari 24SEP Chavez v. Pea and Amari Fact: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP). PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams). Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void. Issue: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. Held: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. 2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Chavez vs. PEA- Amari Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003 Carpio, J. Doctrine: In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila -Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts July 9, 2002 decision which declared the amended JVA null and void ab initio were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the Court as follows: The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Issue: Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be reversed.

Held: No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA. PEA cannot claim that it is similarly situated as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma. Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation on February 27, 2012 09 July 2002 Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. Carino v the Insular Government Mateo Carino (plaintiff in error) vs. Insular Government of the Philippines (defendant in error)212 US 449, 41 Phil Justice HolmesHow it reached the court:-Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but theGovernment of the Philippines and the government of the United states appealed to theCourt of

first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property for public and militarypurposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by thePhilippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.Facts:-Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30 years before the treaty of Paris. Heand his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as theowners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around theproperty. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according toIgorot custom. Although no title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twiceto have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed apetition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.- P r e m i l i n a r y i s s u e s . o Whether the mode of reaching the US supreme court was right (this was a writ of error, some were saying that it should have been an appeal) Holmes said that themode was correct. Writ of error was the general rule, appeal is the exception. He sawno reason not to apply the general rule to this case. o Another issue was that even if Carino was able to have a title over the land, he couldnot have it registered because Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in thePhilippine Commissions act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONSGOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THEPUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS). But that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that hecould register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered theentire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if ownershipcan be maintainedMain issue: whether Carino owns the land. o Governments argument: Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except thoseit saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued bySpain that required registration within a limited time. Carinos land wasnt registeredand so in effect it became public land. USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow thatthe US would view plaintiff to have lost all his rights to the land this wouldamount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spainwould not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of theirlands. Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquiredthere by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This samestatute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the constitution, itprovides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to anyperson therein the equal protection of the laws. It would be hard to believethat that any person didnt include the inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meantproperty to refer only to those lands which had become such under aceremony(of registration) many of the people of the land may have not evenheard of.Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine commission U.S. Supreme Court Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909) Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands No. 72 Argued January 13, 1909 Decided February 23, 1909 212 U.S. 449 Syllabus Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land. Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago. While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.

Page 212 U. S. 450 The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law. The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act. Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof. 7 Phil. 132 reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Page 212 U. S. 455 Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources. MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT on January 29, 2012 Land Titles and Deeds Regalian Doctrine Statute of Limitations On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government. ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time. HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner. Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 Posted by Pius Morados on November 21, 2011 (Land Titles and Deeds Native Title) Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown. Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine. Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. Case Digest on Isagani Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et al FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed. HELD: After due deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. Isagani Cruz vs DENR on January 29, 2012 Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine. Cruz vs Denr Secretary EN BANC [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000] ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs . SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT andCHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUSPEOPLES, respondents. HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMIMANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMOCARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES,BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATUBALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTOSABASALES, DATUEDUAARDOBANDA,DATUJOELUNAD,DATURAMONBAYAAN,TIMUAYJOSEANOY,TIMUAYMACARIOD. SALACAO,TIMUAYEDWINB.ENDING,DATUSAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZASAWAY,BAYINAYDAYA-MELINDAS.REYMUNDO,BAITINANGHAGAHELINITAT.PANGAN,

DATUMAKAPUKAWADOLINOL.SAWAY,DATUMAUDAYAW-CRISPENSAWAY,VICKYMAKAY,LOURDES D.AMOS, GILBERTP.HOGGANG,TERESAGASPAR,MANUELS. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDECARANTES,LYNETTECARANTES-VIVAL,LANGLEYSEGUNDO,SATURS.BUGNAY,CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIOCAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,PERFECTOB.GUINOSAO,WALTERN.TIMOL,MANUELT.SELEN,OSCARDALUNHAY,RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.MANSANG-CAGAN,PAQUITOS.LIESES,FILIPEG.SAWAY, HERMINIAS.SAWAY,JULIUSS.SAWAY,LEONARDASAWAY,JIMMYUGYUB,SALVADORTIONGSON,VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAYDIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATOT. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented byher father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICOD. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors .COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor .IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THECONSERVATIONOFNATURAL RESOURCES,INC., intervenor .R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM :Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus ascitizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.