Affirmative

2ac Permutation
The permutation is the best example of cooperative interaction claims of mutual exclusivity reinforce dualisms that make alternative solvency impossible Nelson 11 PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ UC-Davis, most known for her application of feminist
theory to questions of the definition of the discipline of economics, and its models and methodology Julie, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 29-30 The vision of a better world at its best, a fully peaceful society, founded on localism, communalism, smallscale non-profit enterprise and spiritual values, and populated by wise and compassionate enlightened people runs through a number of Buddhist writings. (3) And it has its place in motivating certain kinds of change. But it can also be a dangerous delusion, if held too tightly. Does our vision of the kind of economy we want bring us more into the world, or distract us from it? Zen, and the general practice of living in the now instead of some imagined future, warns us against being distracted by our thoughts, and by our imagined requirements about how the world should be. While we can certainly criticize the over-individualism of the neoclassical view of economics actors as radically autonomous, self-interested and suited for a highly competitive and global economy, we should be careful about flipping to the oppo- site extreme of assuming that people are radically connected, altruistic and suited for a highly cooperative and local economy. Such thinking, in fact, merely stays inside common, age-worn dualisms. In certain traditions of Western marriage, for example, the man was supposed to be the visible, individuated, achieving, instrumental- oriented party, who ventures out in the wide world to compete in (presumably) dog-eat-dog commerce. Meanwhile, the woman was supposed to put the interests of the family before her own, and (invisibly) concentrate on expressive work, within her very small sphere of (presumably) cooperative family relations. (4) Breaking out of this sort of dualist association requires noticing that that the identification of men with only individuality, and of women with only intimacy, are distorting and unhealthy on both sides. We are all, in fact, both individuated and connected in relationships. Or, as put by Robert Aitken in a Buddhist context, You and I come forth as the possibilities of essential nature, alone and independent as stars, yet reflecting and being reflected by all things. My life and yours are unfolding realization of total aloneness and total intimacy. The self is completely autonomous, yet exists only in resonance with all other selves. (Aitken 1984, 13) Notice that this does not come with caveats that it applies only to men, or only to women, or only to people in selected aspects (e.g., non-economic ones) of our lives. To imagine an economy in only local, altruistic, cooperative terms denies our indi- vidual and expansive side, just as much as conventional economic thinking denies our communal and nurturing side. While the notion of separate spheres for men and women was supposed to lead to harmonious families, it too often led to unhappiness, oppression and even abuse. Just because an organization is presumably motivated by love does not mean that it will actually be loving and nurturing or even merely fair and nonlethal, as daily news of domestic violence reminds us. There are similar problems with the prescription that economic organizations be small and/or non-profit. Anyone with experience in a non-profit or community group (as well as a family) has likely observed that such structures do not necessarily foster wisdom and compassion, and certainly do not make people immune to greed, anger and ignorance. Yet the arguments for utopian societies often seem to border on denigrating spiritual values, by arguing for struc- tural solutions to economic problems in such a way that value issues are essentially made moot. The idea that structures should be local in order to increase accountability, has some rationale to it. But I also detect an overtone here of demanding that Indras Net (6) somehow become tiny, because we individually feel more secure when we can personally observe what we want to control. One endpoint of this path is the gated community, where we achieve a semblance of local harmony only by segregating ourselves away from the rest of the world. I worry about the damage a one-sided emphasis on localism could do to some of the economically marginal areas of the world. In some places, where trade and tourism now support a larger population than a country could otherwise

support. Too much emphasis on localism could, in some cases, cause harm. Even a goal of organic agriculture can be grasped overly tightly. There are many debates about what organic actually means, and many good practices that are not covered by this term. Issues of scale and structure need to be addressed as we deal with economic life and global pain as it presents itself. But simply reacting to dogmatic neoliberal globalization, marketization and dreams of technological progress with an equally dogmatic localism, communalism and idolization of the natural causes us to miss opportunities. These are the opportunities to authentically respond, in ways that work for the whole human person and the whole of Indras Net.

1ar Permutation
Engagement is key Nelson 11 PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ UC-Davis, most known for her application of feminist
theory to questions of the definition of the discipline of economics, and its models and methodology Julie, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 32 Sometimes I am accused of being Pollyannaish (7) about large corporations, because I do not firmly condemn greedy global corporate capitalism. But this is not so. Rather, I am an equal-opportunity skeptic. I do not believe that any sort of institution business, government, non-profit, local enterprise, community, family or, alas, even sangha has an essential nature that makes it automatically serve human (and ecological) ends, people being who we are. Our poisons, our thirst, our suffering, cannot be made to magically disappear by some perfection of system, structure or scale. Yet, in each moment, we have an opportunity to respond. A key contribution of Buddhism, I believe, is in reminding us about non- attachment, and warning us against latching onto us-versus-them thinking. Applied to economic suffering, this does not mean inactivity, and does not mean that attempts at transformation, including through local community action, must be abandoned. But the teachings of the Middle Way, I suggest, should also encourage us to be alert to the temptations of selfrighteousness and to be more open to wide and deep engagement with businesses, governments and the larger, painful world.

Economic pluralism is net-beneficial Essen 11 PhD in Cultural Anthropology, Professor @ Soka

Juliana, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 75-76 One last point for consideration is that while concerned scholars, practitioners and global citizens may find Buddhist economic ethics quite appealing, this essay does not suggest facilely replacing the dominant neoliberal economic model with a Buddhist one. Instead, economic pluralism is advocated, consisting of the myriad approaches to material and social wellbeing that are culturally and environmentally appropriate. In fact, Buddhist economic ethics core condition of mental develop- ment presupposes such an approach. This is essential for a vital global economy because, quite simply, different problems require different solutions. Nevertheless, actors in community, national and global economies might learn from alternative economic models so that we may achieve not merely universal freedom to survive, as Shiva hopes, but universal freedom to be well.

Only the perm solves- both the spiritual and material sides solve best Dharmakosajarn 11 (Dr. Phra Dharmakosajarn, Venerable Professor at Mahachulalongkornrajvidyalya University,
Chairman at ICDV & IABU, Rector at MCU, Buddhist Virtues in Socio-Economic Development, p.71, May 2011, BG) There has been increasing inequality both within and across countries. Progress has varied and people in some regions have experienced periods of regress. The root cause for sufferings and socio-economic inequalities lies in craving, which is a characteristic of a materialistic society. And eventually craving leads to greed and suffering, the reality of materialistic society. This results in increasing gap between the rich and the poor, imbalanced social structure and sufferings. The answer to most of the socio-economic problems of the day is the eradication of craving through embracing Buddhist virtues, precepts, principles and Buddhist economics. The Noble Eightfold path is ~u driving force of Buddhist economics. In Buddhism, the spirituality and the socioeconomic development go together. Buddhism's middle path balances both spiritual and materialism to lead a contended life without harming others interests on the principles of sharing and caring for the welfare of the society. The chariot model of holistic development implies that the spirituality would guide the humanity to establish socio-economic equality and development and strives to achieve a balance. If, there is more

emphasis on materialistic development, it would lead to social and economic problems as it is widely evident in the today's world, due to more and more craving and greed. Similarly, if there is an emphasis only on spirituality development alone then there would be no material progress, and this condition would lead to poverty, health and deteriorate standard of living. This shows that spiritual development alone or material development alone is not adequate to lead a happy life, both are important. The Buddhist virtues, precepts principles and values help in establishing harmony of spiritual and material side of life, leading to socioeconomic equality and development.

Epistemology
Radical epistemological critiques of IR should be rejected. Our knowledge claims have value even if they are imperfect, and methodological pluralism is better than pure reflectivism. Niarguinen 1
Dmitri, IR at Central European University, Transforming Realism: Irreducible Core Gives Life to New Interpretations and Flexible Incarnations, RUBIKON E-JOURNAL, December 2001, the original website is inactive but remains available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/dmitri.htm. For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either Sokal-hoax type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyperreflectivism [may] be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant [51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homers Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature[53]. With all my attachment to Realism, there are certain pitfalls to be aware of and to avoid. What I do
not argue about is Realism being an all-encompassing thought trespassing all possible borders and conquering both terra incognita and terra cognita. In a world full of anomalies, Realism is neither sufficiently established nor sufficiently precise to be treated as a sacrosanct paradigm to which other lines of argumentation must defer[54]. Moreover, it is a matter of attitude. Neoliberalists could claim with the same success that constructivism, for example, is doing a great job on their behalf[55]. Also, there is scholarship working on the extreme polar of reflectivism. Being appealing and powerful, it is unbridgeable epistemologically with Realism not only at the extreme positivist polar but even on the gray territory. To dis regard or downplay this school would be, to say the least, inadequate. Having acknowledged this, however, it is tempting to illustrate on the example of the English School of Realism how indeed far Reali sm can stretch*56+. For the English School, international system is a society in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in conventional and customary international law. Sociological imaginary is strong in the English School: it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms[57]. The English School thinkers encourage us to think about international relations as a social arena whose members sovereign states relate to each other not only as competitors for power and wealth, but also as holders of particular rights, entitlements, and obligations. In terms of method, they emphasize the importance of a historical approach. Michael Walzer and John Vincent are particularly concerned with the relationship between human rights and the rights of sovereign states[58]. They seek ways in which to reconcile the society of states with cosmopolitan values. Terry Nardin, building his theory on the ideas of political philosopher Michael Oakenshott, argues that international society is best seen as a practical association made up of states each devoted to its own ends and its own conception of the good. The common good of this inclusive community resides not in the ends that some, or at times most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices.*59+ Martin Wights triptych of international thought is extremely eclectic, not simply because of his refusal to delineate these traditions with any philosophical or analy tic precision, but also because of his personal reluctance either to transcend them or to locate his own views consistently with the parameters of any single one[60]. Wight has written widely about the cultural and moral dimensions of international relations, and his work is a constant reminder that what may appear to be new disputes in the field about contemporary issues are in fact extensions and manifestations of

the English School is an underutilized research resource and deserves a prominent role in International Relations because of its distinctive elements: methodological
very old arguments, although couched in a different idiom. It is now acknowledged that

pluralism, historicism, and its inter-linkage of three key concepts: international system, international society, and world community.[61] International system, thus, is associated with recurrent patterns of behavior that can be identified using positivist tools of analysis . By contrast, international society needs to be explored using hermeneutic methods that focus on the language that lies behind the rules, institutions, interests, and values that constitute any society. Finally, world community can only meaningfully be discussed by drawing on critical theory. To refigure the value of Realism in a period of rapid systemic change means to interpret it as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory-practice, and other

synchronic and scholastic antinomies of world politics. It gives notice of how Realism in its universalistic philosophical form and particularistic state application has figuratively and literally helped to constitute the discordant world it purports to describe[62]. This is an attempt to open up the hermeneutic circle, to enlarge the interpretive community, to break out of the prison-house of a reductive vocabulary that has so attenuated the ethico-political dimension of realism*63+. Thus, it is important to consider the paradox that the power of Realism lies not in its immanence but in its distance from reality, from realities of contingency, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that Realism tries to keep at bay. *** It is often argued that globalization - the growth of transnational economic forces, combined with a growing irrelevance of territorial control to economic growth and the international division of labor rendered Realism obsolete, with the end of the Cold war as a fatal blow for the theory. Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be 'yes.' I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, the approach of rational behavior, as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory*65+. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the 'middle ground' and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices the more that states think like Realist the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics*71+. Ergo, ita est. ***END OF ARTICLE***LAST FOOTNOTE CITES THE GUZZINI EVIDENCE

Alt Fails
Rejection is untenable integrating Buddhist ethics into globalization is preferable Daniels 11 PhD in Economics, Senior Lecturer, Griffith School of Environment
(Peter, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 35)//BB To consider the maintenance of consumption as a laudable goal in Buddhism may seem as quite untenable. To consume can be depicted as opposing the essence of every major Buddhist principle for the path to alleviate suffering. But to simply abrogate consumption in any prescription for achieving sustainable and acceptable human quality of life on this planet over the next 50 years is not a viable approach or solution. When a significant portion of the worlds population is moving into consumer lifestyles held by the high income nations of Europe, North America, Australia, the Middle East and East Asia, the ability to create a sustainable global society will have accept growth in total consumption albeit in a modified form in terms of its nature and composition and with better understanding and knowledge of its well-being impacts as a guide for motives, expectations and choices. Unless abruptly halted by global environmental or geopolitical catastrophe, there will be an inevitable tidal wave of market exchange of goods and services over the next few decades (Schor 2005). Rather than simply opposing this powerful force, and extolling the virtues of strong constraints upon material well-being, the Buddhist world view has much wisdom to offer to aid the transformation of this phenomenon in a way that reduces suffering and enhances prospects for sustainability. The environmental (and socio-psychological) challenges accompanying the age of consumerism are amongst the most recent and cogent reasons to search for strongly modified or new visions for society and its economic subsystem. The sustainable development paradigm is one major option to have emerged. The paradigm embraces some, limited, ethical principles about keeping natural capital stocks and their quality of life services constant, and accessible across current and future populations, but is still largely a series of technical conditions for doing so.

Buddhism doesnt require a rejection of modern economics Payutto 88 (a well-known Thai Buddhist monk, an intellectual, and a prolific writer. He is among the most brilliant
Buddhist scholars in the Thai Buddhist history. He authored Buddha Dhamma, which is acclaimed to as one of the masterpieces in Buddhism that puts together Dhamma and natural laws by extensively drawing upon Pali Canon, Atthakatha, Digha, etc., to clarify Buddha's verbatim speech, Buddhist Economists: A middle way for the Marketplace, pg 6) //T.C. Truly rational decisions must be based on insight into the forces that make us irrational. When we understand the nature of desire, we see that it cannot be satisfied by all the riches in the world. When we understand the universality of fear, we find a natural compassion for all beings. Thus, the spiritual approach to economics leads not to models and theories, but to the vital forces that can truly benefit our world - wisdom, compassion and restraint. In other words, the spiritual approach must be lived. This is not to say that one must embrace Buddhism and renounce the science of economics, because, in the larger scheme of things, the two are mutually supportive. In fact, one needn't be a Buddhist or an economist to practise Buddhist economics. One need only acknowledge the common thread that runs through life and seek to live in balance with the way things really are.

Alt Fails IR
Critical rejection and Buddhism leaves mainstream IR intacttheir alt is doomed to irrelevance Rytvuori-Apunen 5 - Professor of Intl Relations, U of Tampere, Finland
(Helena, Forget Post-Positivist IR! COOPERATION & CONFLICT, 40(2), p. 147-49)//BB Abstract The relationship between critical international relations (IR) and the conventional mainstream or alleged orthodoxy needs to be better articulated. Without connecting to previous theory it cannot logically seek to introduce new turns for disciplinary development, and intellectual movement remains isolated
choreography contributing to a field that is global only in the scope of its dispersion. Proceeding from this argument, the article undertakes some of the groundwork so often neglected in the interests of coming up with new theory and approaches or of presenting the next stage for disciplinary discussion. A reexamination of post-positivism as a corporate self-definition of critical IR produces an identification of the disciplinary mainstream that highlights the legacy of IR theory in theory-centred approaches and universal taxonomy, thereby providing a locus for a pragmatist turn in the study of IR. Although pragmatist approaches have already won a place in the field, the challenge remains of transcending the dichotomies of the episteme that leaves this research at the margins of the mainstream. Pragmatism is a way of inquiry opposed to dogmatism and can facilitate communication through which a more global discipline can be created. The way proposed by the author combines Deweyan ethics with C. S. Peirces logic of the sign. Keywords: Critical IR; disciplinary development and reconstruction of theory; disciplinary orthodoxy; (Post -)Positivist IR; pragmatism and IR; theory-centred knowledge and taxinomia Towards a More Global Discipline Beyond the Multiplicity of Images In his influential work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty suggests that the intellect that has lost its confidence in given foundations works in the interplay of what he calls the epistemological and hermeneutical moment. The epistemological ambition proceeds on the assumption that contributions to a given discourse are commensurable; hermeneutics frees us from this point of departure. It rejects the presupposition of an antecedently existing common ground and a disciplinary matrix that unites the speakers. The relations between various discourses are seen as strands in a possible communication, and interlocutors are united by the edifying faculty or civic virtue of conversation rather than by the common end in shared knowledge. The hope is for some agreement, or at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement (Rorty, 1980: 318). In the disciplinary discussions of international relations (IR) during past decades, the epistemological ambition, in this case in the form of a rationalist epistemology that relies on scientific inference, has been clearly articulated by the neo-realist and neo-liberal programmes of research which connect with the names of Kenneth N.Waltz (1979) and Robert O. Keohane (1989), respectively. In his 1988 address at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Keohane presented his rationalist theory to the study of international institutions and outlined this programme in opposition to what he called reflectivist approaches. The rationalist theory proceeds on certain assumptions concerning state behaviour and seeks empirically to test the hypotheses derived accordingly. Keohanes reflectivists referr ed to the alkers, ashleys, kratochwils and ruggies of IR, i.e. to a group of (in Keohanes reference, North American) scholars who in various ways are oriented towards interpretation and the study of intersubjective meaning. Keohane argued that this critical orientation lacked a positive programme and did not look for possible synthesis with the rationalist theory. Si nce then, the reflectivists have presented their replies in many different ways and presented what arguably constitutes a positive programme of research (e.g. Alker, 1996; Kratochwil, 1989). The present paper does not second Keohanes request of combining elements in synthesis but

critical scholarship has failed to articulate the critical relationship between the two types of approaches for IR. Although a welcome turning point in disciplinary discussions, the declaration to do research other-wise (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 263) has meant ignorance of the opposed mainstream rather than an ambition to communicate how critical scholarship is different from this Other and can also contribute more than show the limits of IR theory and disciplinary boundaries. For the interpretatively oriented scholars the ideal of
argues instead that cumulative knowledge, which Keohane outlines in terms of scientific inference, obviously speaks for its own limitations (cf. also King et al., 1994). But avoiding this Scylla need not mean the Charybdis

to remain at the critical edges of the alleged mainstream and, in effect, in this way leaves the authority of respectable research (variously claimed by notions such as solid, systematic, empirically based, etc.) to the mainstream that is the target of its criticism. Although I applaud the movement that takes distance from the founding fathers of the discipline by looking for alternative insight in something like la Botie (Bleiker, 2000) or versions of Buddhism (Chan, 2000), I also miss the epistemic reflections that, on this basis, can put critical IR better on par with the conventional mainstream. Since the post-behaviouralist phase of the discipline (Alker and Biersteker, 1984; Banks, 1985; Holsti, 1985), the movement towards a more global IR has
where critical IR lives on the border lines (Ashley, 1989) or chooses meant acknowledgement and encouragement of the situation of incommensurable paradigms or contrasted images. Although fruitf ul in the emancipatory sense, this logic is now also conducive to what

The post-culture that has dominated critical IR during the past decade or two has already performed its task. It is time to move beyond the concept that, in its disbelief in (an often caricaturist notion of) science and critique of extreme forms of rationality, has produced a bifurcated and (as I will argue in greater detail below) not
many argue is already the state of IR: dispersion of the discipline into an increasingly scattered field of International Studies. altogether adequate account of the historical discipline.

Alt Fails Spillover

Alt doesnt solve relying on value shift cant prevent environmental harm others will consume if a large population adopts a sufficiency lifestyle Alcott 8 - Ecological Economist Masters from Cambridge in Land Economy
Blake, The sufficiency strategy: Would rich-world frugality lower environmental impact? Ecological Economics 64 (4) p. Science Direct The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its attractiveness increasing along with awareness that not much can be done to stem population growth and that energy-efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire, part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility, effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can be drawn. The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound are not yet part of mainstream discussion. Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the frugality shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction in world aggregate consumption or impact: Poorer marginal consumers increase their consumption. The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question. The concepts of North and South are not relevant to the consumption discussion. Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts by the rich would effect some lowering of total world consumption, changing human behaviour through argument and exhortation is exceedingly difficult. While our moral concern for present others is stronger than that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no way incompatible with non-sustainable impact. Since savings effected by any one country or individual can be (more than) compensated by other countries and individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world. No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in I = f(P,A,T) guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever. Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually complicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political left-side strategies directly lowering impact. Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to directly lower impact both in terms of depletion and emissions. Lower consumption may have advantages on the individual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling the Kantian criterion that ones acts should be possible universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air, less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space. And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or to buy goods such as petrol and cars. However, given global markets and marginal consumers, one persons doing without enables another to do with: In the near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person can get fully replaced. And given the extent of poverty and the temptations of luxury and prestige consumption, this near run is likely to be longer than the time horizon required for a relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital species and natural resources .

AT: Consumption Impacts Inevitable

Limiting consumption fails we can make current consumption practices ecologically sustainable Martens and Spaargaren 5 - * Researcher at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University,
**Professor of Environmental Policy @ Wageningen (Martens, S. & Spaargaren, G. 2005. The politics of sustainable consumption: the case of the Netherlands. Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy 1(1):29-42. Proquest)//BB We argue that policymakers should not confront the issue of consumption from a one-sided perspective informed exclusively by environmental scientists and commitments to limit aggregate consumption. In this sense, we do not endorse efforts to tame the treadmill of consumption as a narrow objective (see also Princen et al. 2002). Policy programs that aim to lessen the environmental consequences of consumption by reducing (or radically restructuring) consumption will likely lead to questionable social and economic outcomes. These so-called de-modernization strategies tend to underestimate the potential to improve the environmental consequences of contemporary consumption by promoting more ecologically rational practices. Without taking a strong position on the desirability of limiting consumption in the absolute sense, we maintain the need to embed consumption in policy objectives developed by democratic environmental reform processes over the last several decades.

Consumption inevitable social consumption theory Ash 11 Lecturer in Economics @ U of Reading

(Colin, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 115)//BB Social comparison (or rivalry) puts us on another inherently unsatisfactory tread- mill. Once again there is strong empirical evidence that what matters for individual happiness is not so much our own income or consumption in isolation, but our income or consumption compared with that of others: see Clark et al. (2008) for an excellent survey of the relevant literature. Relative income matters to happiness at least as much as our absolute level of income. Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) show that individuals happiness is particularly sensitive to relative losses. Given others income, a loss of, for example, $100 hurts more than the extra happiness enjoyed from $100 gained. They explain this in terms of increasing financial obstacles to social participation when relative income falls. Consumption is positional and often deliberately conspicuous. We want to keep up with the Joneses, and ideally get ahead. Data for the US suggests that if one persons income goes up, the loss to others is 30% of his or her initial gain in happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004). In the limit, if everyones income increased at the same rate, no-one would be better off. Social comparison helps to explain why rich Americans are happier than the poor, and yet neither group seems to have been made much happier even though there has been sustained income growth across the whole country since the 1950s. The futile attempt by each of us to have higher income or consumption than everyone else puts us on a social status treadmill. The resulting income arms race is inefficient. People spend too much time working to achieve what is at best a temporary gain in relative income. All would be happier if overworking were deterred. Frank (1985, 1999, 2005) in the US, and Layard (2005, 2006) in the UK therefore advocate taxation on income or consumption in order to correct this inefficient misallocation of time. More leisure time could then be spent investing in interpersonal relationships e.g. with fam- ily, friends and within the community. Happiness research consistently reveals that, once a fairly basic level of real income has been achieved, extra income or consump- tion gives very little additional happiness, compared with enjoying such relatively time-intensive relationships as these. Like adaptation, social comparison may be part of human hardwiring . It has been suggested by Nettle (2005) that our early ancestors learnt about the availability of subsistence essentials such as food, shelter and primitive tools by observing the possessions of

their neighbors; also, those with better food, shel- ter, etc. implicitly signaled their superior genetic fitness. If these were indeed the original reasons for social comparison and rivalry, they are largely redundant today.

AT: Consumption Impacts Aff Good

Permutation do both solves better and the aff is a net-benefit Bryant and Goodman 4 - * PhD in Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, **Professor of
Communication Studies (Raymond and Michael, Consuming Narratives: The Political Ecology of 'Alternative' Consumption, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 3)//BB The consumption practices of the conservation- and solidarity-seeking commodity cultures described here offer one alternative to the call for a politics of redistribution. In the end, these cultures offer a privileged notion of transnational 'commun- ity' given the relatively high cost of purchasing commodities such as organic cereal and fair trade coffee. True, commodities that 'speak' to 'altern- ative' consumers can possibly make them more aware of what is happening to tropical environ- ments and small-scale producers. And yet, only those that can afford to pay the economic premium can take part in this form of 'resistance'. Thus, 'moral' commodities may become 'alternative' in the larger sense by eschewing more progressive re- constructions of 'moral economy'. The creation of niche markets gives the North, albeit in geographi- cally variable ways, the ability to 'tune in but drop out' of both conventional global economies and more demanding forms of resistance to social injus- tice and environmental degradation. A field of political ecology oriented towards the conceptual- ization of production and consumption dynamics is uniquely situated to explore the ambiguities of North/South connections evinced by alternative consumption-related politics. Third, this paper builds on work that challenges dualistic thinking that has bedevilled human geo- graphy for some time. Examples of these schisms (and authors that challenge them) include those of nature/society (e.g. Murdoch 1997; Whatmore 2002), discursive/material (e.g. Cook and Crang 1996) and cultural/economic (e.g. Jackson 2002b; Sayer 2001). Considering together consumption and the commoditization of political ecology narratives further complicates the 'hybrid' or 'mutant' notions of landscape change and development (Escobar 1999; Arce and Long 2000; Bebbington 2000). Breaking down the dualisms of production and consumption thus should provide critical space from which to examine the political ecologies of (alternative) development .9 In some ways, starting from processes of commoditization and associated narratives of development allows the researcher to go 'forward' into the processes and meanings of consumption as well as 'backwards' along the powerful socio-economic and ecological networks of production and development.

The alternative isnt feasible production-focus is net-better Winter 3 PhD in Psychology, Professor @ Whitman
(Deborah, The Psychology of Environmental Problems, Google Book)//BB Giving up comforts and conveniences may be more than we can fathom, and reverting to preindustrial culture is probably impossible anyway. Even if we could scale down consumption to preindustrial levels, most people would not want to. However, many preindustrial cultures have sustained themselves for centuries, demonstrating that sustainable culture is possible. While copying preindustrial cultures may not be feasible, selecting certain features might be useful. In addition, sustainable cultures may offer some benefits to human psychological needs that are not well provided for by industrialized cultures. The modern Western tradition of emphasizing the individual has given us both unsustainable technology and increasing social alienation. Embedded in the modern Western worldview, we try to use the former to mitigate the latter. It may not even be necessary to "give anything up" in order to ac-complish a reduction or reversal of environmental degradation. Improving efficiency or productivity is typically much more effective than significantly reducing overall use, and much relevant technology is already available. For example, it would be far easier

to find an automobile with twice the fuel efficiency of our present cars than to cut our driving in half, and buying an efficient water heater is a lot easier than reducing our use of hot water (Stern, 2000).

AT: Kappeler
Link turn policy illusion is a tool not a trap Shove & Walker 7 - *Sociology @ Lancaster, **Geography @ Lancaster
Elizabeth CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management Environment and Planning C 39 (4) For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of innovation studies, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as weve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an illusion of agency , and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues illusions are productive because they motivate action and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the dynamics of change : even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within . This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

w/ Renewables Aff
Wholesale rejection of energy use is pointless evaluate specific costs and benefits before reaching any conclusion Zsolnai 11 - professor and director of the Business Ethics Center at the Corvinus University of Budapest
Laszlo, Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation A Buddhist Approach, p. 6 Whenever we use things, be it food, clothing, paper or electricity, we should take the time to reflect on their true purpose, rather than using them heedlessly. By reflecting in this way we can avoid heedless consumption and so understand the right amount, the middle way. We also come to see consumption as a means to an end, which is the development of human potential. With human development as our goal, we eat food not simply for the pleasure it affords, but to obtain the physical and mental energy necessary for intellectual and spiritual growth toward a nobler life. Buddhist economics understands that non-consumption can also contribute to well-being. Though monks eat only one meal a day, they strive for a kind of well-being that is dependent on little. However, if abstinence did not lead to well- being, it would be pointless , just a way of mistreating ourselves. The question is not whether to consume or not to consume, but whether or not our choices lead to self-development. Production is always accompanied by destruction. In some cases the destruction is acceptable, in others it is not. Production is only truly justified when the value of the thing produced outweighs the value of that which is destroyed. In some cases it may be better to refrain from production. In industries where production entails the destruction of natural resources and environmental degradation, non-production is sometimes the better choice. To choose, we must distinguish between production with positive results and production with negative results; production that enhances well-being and that which destroys it. In this light, non-production can be a useful economic activity. A person who produces little in materialistic terms may consume much less of the worlds resources and lead a life that is beneficial to the world around him or her.

w/ K aff
The Affs use of Buddhism accelerates capitalist dynamics by allowing them to publicly renounce capital while remaining an active participantWestern appropriation of Buddhism is the perfect phantasmatic supplement to global capital because it makes participation in hegemony easier to stomach Zizek 1
Slavoj, On Belief (Thinking in Action), New York City: Routledge, 2001, 12-3 The ultimate postmodern irony is thus the strange exchange between Europe and Asia: at the very moment when, at the level of the economic infrastructure, Euro pean technology and capitalism are triumphing world-wide, at the level of ideological superstructure, the Judeo Christian legacy is threatened in the European space itself by the onslaught of the New Age Asiatic thought, which, in its different guises, from the Western Buddhism (todays counterpoint o Western Marxism, as opposed to the Asi atic Marxism Leninism) to different Taos, is establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism. Therein resides the highest speculative identity of the opposites in todays global civilization: although Western Buddhism presents itself as the remedy against the stressful tension of the capitalist dynamics , allowing us o uncouple and retain inner peace and Gelassenheit, it actually functions as its perfect ideological supplement. One should mention here the well-known topic of future shock. i.e. of how, today, people are no longer psychologically able to cope with the dazzling rhythm of technological development and the social changes that accompany it things simply move too fast. Before one can accustom oneself to an invention, it s already supplanted by a new one, so that more and more one lacks the most elementary cognitive mapping. The recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which definitely works better than the des perate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to cope with the accelerating rhythm of technological progress and Social changes, one should rather renounce the very endeavor - retain control over what goes on, rejecting it as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, "let oneself go," drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance of this accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being One is almost tempted to resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist clich of religion as the "opium of the people," as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the "Western Buddhist" meditative stance is arguably the most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist dynamic while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber were alive today, eh would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic, entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of Global Capitalism. 7

Focusing on the inner self trades off with the fight against global injustice Zizek 1
Slavoj, On Belief (Thinking in Action), New York City: Routledge, 2001, 13-5 Western Buddhism thus perfectly fits the fetishist mode of ideology in our allegedly post-ideological era, as opposed to its traditional symptomal mode, in which the ideological lie which structures our perception of reality is threatened by symptoms quo returns of the repressed, cracks in the fabric of the ideological lie. Fetish is effectively a kind of inverse of the symptom. That is to say, the symptom is the exception which disturbs the surface of the false appearance, the point at which the repressed Other Scene erupts, while fetish is the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth. Let us take the case of the death of a beloved person: in the case of a symptom, I repress this death, I try not to think about it, but the repressed trauma returns in the symptom; in the case of a fetish, on the contrary, I rationally fully accept this death, and yet I cling to the fetish, to some feature that embodies for me the disavowal of this death. In

this sense, a fetish can play a very constructive role in allowing us to cope with the harsh reality: fetishists are not dreamers lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly realists, able to accept the way things effectively are since they have their fetish to which they can cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality. In Nevil Shutes World War II melodramatic novel Requiem For a WREN, the heroine survives her lovers death without any visible distress, she goes on with her life and is even able to talk rationally about the lovers death because she still has the dog who was the lovers favored pet. When, some time after, the dog is accidentally run over by a truck, she collapses and her entire world disintegrates. In this precise sense, money is for Marx a fetish I pretend to be a rational, utilitarian subject, well aware how things truly stand but I embody my disavowed belief in the money-fetish . . . Sometimes, the line between the two is almost indiscernable: an object can function as the symptom ( of a repressed desire) and almost simultaneously as a fetish (embodying the belief which we officially renounce). For instance, a relic of the dead person, a piece of his/her clothing, can function as a fetish (in it, the dead person magically continues to live) and as a symptom (the disturbing detail that brings to mind his/her death). Is this ambiguous tension not homologous to that between the phobic and the fetishist object? The structural role is in both cases the same: if this exceptional element is disturbed, the whole system collapses. Not only does the subjects false universe collapses if he is forced to confront the meaning of his symptom; the opposite also holds, i.e. the subjects rational acceptance of the way things are dissolves when his fetish is taken away from him. So, when we are bombarded by claims that in our post-ideological cynical era nobody believes in the proclaimed ideals, when we encounter a person who claims he is cured of any beliefs, accepting social reality the way it really is, one should always counter such claims with the question: OK, but where is the fetish which enables you to (pretend to) accept reality the way it is? Western Buddhism is such a fetish: it enables you to fully participate in the frantic pace of the capitalist game while sustaining the perception that you are not really in it, that you are well aware how worthless this spectacle is what really matters to you is the peace of the inner self to which you know you can always withdraw(In a further specification, one should note that fetish can function in two opposite ways: either its role remains unconscious as in the case of Shutes heroine who was unaware of the fetish-role of the dog or you think that the fetish is that which really matters, as in the case of a Western Buddhist unaware that the truth of his existence is the social involvement which he tends to dismiss as a mere game.