Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kritik Answers
Floating Subjectivity Bad (1/3) ...................................................................... 97 **Pragmatism** ........................................................................................... 100 Pragmatism Good: 2AC (1/3) ...................................................................... 100 Plan focus good: Rorty (1/2) ........................................................................ 105 **Realism**.................................................................................................. 107 Realism Good: 2AC (1/2) ............................................................................. 107 #1 Mearsheimer: 1AR .................................................................................. 109 #1 Mearsheimer: Ext..................................................................................... 110 #2 Guzzini: 1AR ............................................................................................ 111 #2 Guzzini: Ext ............................................................................................. 112 #3 Murray: 1AR............................................................................................. 113 #3 Murray: Ext.............................................................................................. 114 Democratic Realism Solves the Links .......................................................... 115 Violence is Endemic ...................................................................................... 116 Realism Good: Prevents Nuclear War .......................................................... 118 Realism Good: Prevents War (1/3)............................................................... 119 Realism Good: Militarism Solves War (1/2) ............................................... 124 Realism Good: Militarism Solves Genocide ................................................ 126 Realism Good: Militarism Solves Democracy .............................................. 127 Alt Bad: Could Make Things Worse............................................................. 128 Alt Fails: Realism Inevitable (1/2)............................................................... 129 Alt Fails: Realism Will Reasset Itself............................................................ 131 IR is Realist Now (1/2)................................................................................. 132 Miscalculation Inevitable............................................................................. 134 Perm Solves: Realism Necessary to Understand Parts of IR ...................... 136 A2 9/11 Disproves Realism ........................................................................ 137 A2 Cold War Disproves Realism (1/2) ..................................................... 138 A2 Cold War End Proves Liberalism ........................................................ 140 A2 Cooperation Good (1/2) ....................................................................... 141 A2 Democracy Solves War ........................................................................ 144 A2 Defense Solves ......................................................................................145 A2 Human Nature..................................................................................... 146 A2 Mindset Shift ........................................................................................ 147 A2 Realism Assumes States Rational ....................................................... 149 A2 Realism Constructs Threats ................................................................ 150 A2 Realism is Amoral ................................................................................ 151 A2 Realism is a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (1/2) ..........................................152 A2 Social Constructivism (1/3) .................................................................. 155 A2 State/Sovereignty Bad ......................................................................... 158 **Calculability/Util** ...................................................................................159 Utilitarianism Good: 2AC (1/2) ....................................................................159 Utilitarianism Good: 1AR ............................................................................. 161 Calculability Good: 2AC (1/2) ...................................................................... 163 A2 Tyranny of Survival (1/2) .................................................................... 166 A2 Ontology First: 2AC ............................................................................. 169 A2 Your Impact is Inevitable: 2AC ........................................................... 170 A2 Your Impact is Inevitable: 1AR ............................................................ 171 A2 Your Impact = Bare Life: 2AC (1/3) ..................................................... 172 A2 No Value to Life: 2AC (1/3) ..................................................................176 No Value To Life Justifies Genocide.......................................................... 179 No Value To Life Justifies Nazism............................................................ 180 Theres Always Value To Life ........................................................................ 181 A2 Communication Scholar Framework: 2AC ......................................... 182 **Democratic Talk** .................................................................................... 183 Democratic Talk Turn: 2AC (1/2) ................................................................ 183 Democratic Talk Turn: 1AR (1/3) ................................................................ 185 Debate Solves Democratic Talk: Ext ........................................................... 189 Democratic Talk Key to Autonomy: Ext ....................................................... 191 Democratic Talk Key to Checking Right: Ext .............................................. 192 Restoring Public Sphere Solves Oppression: Ext ........................................ 194 Talk is Action: Ext .........................................................................................195 **Performance** .......................................................................................... 196 A2 Performativity (1/2)............................................................................. 196 Performance is Commodified (1/2) ............................................................. 199 Performance Fails ........................................................................................ 202 **Link Answers: General**.......................................................................... 203 A2 The Case is Apolitical/Has No Theory ................................................ 203 **Alternative Answers: General** ............................................................... 204 Individual Action Fails................................................................................. 204 Mann ............................................................................................................ 205 Power Vaccuum ........................................................................................... 206 **SPECIFIC K ANSWERS** ........................................................................ 207 **Apocalyptic Rhetoric** ............................................................................. 207
Kritik Answers
Perm Solvency .............................................................................................. 207 Apocalyptic Rhetoric Good (1/3) .................................................................208 **Badiou** ................................................................................................... 212 A2 Badiou: 2AC ......................................................................................... 212 Perm Solvency (1/3)..................................................................................... 213 Human Rights Solve .................................................................................... 216 Double Bind .................................................................................................. 217 Alternative Fractures Coalitions .................................................................. 218 Divorcing Politics from State Bad ............................................................... 219 **Baudrillard** ............................................................................................ 220 Baudrillard Destroys Social Change (1/2) ................................................... 220 Alternative Masks Violence ......................................................................... 222 Our Representations Solve .......................................................................... 223 Baudrillard is Wrong (1/2) .......................................................................... 224 A2 Disaster Porn (1/3) .............................................................................. 226 **Butler** ..................................................................................................... 230 Butler Answers: 2AC (1/2) ........................................................................... 230 A2 Legal Categories Bad ........................................................................... 232 **Biopolitics** ............................................................................................. 233 Agamben Answers: 2AC (1/6) ..................................................................... 233 #2 Alternative Kills Liberation: 1AR (1/2) .................................................. 243 #5 Perm: 1AR ............................................................................................... 246 #5 Perm: Ext ................................................................................................ 248 #7 Good Biopower: 1AR (1/2)...................................................................... 249 #9 Essentialism: 1AR (1/2) .......................................................................... 252 #9 Essentialism: Ext .................................................................................... 254 #10 Criticism Causes Powerlessness: 1AR (1/2) ......................................... 255 #10 Criticism Causes Powerlessness: Ext (1/3) .......................................... 257 A2 Neilson Conclude Negative: 1AR......................................................... 261 #11 Agamben Misunderstands Sovereignty: 1AR........................................ 262 #11 Agamben Misunderstands Sovereignty: Ext (1/2)................................ 264 #13 Praxis: 1AR ............................................................................................ 267 #14 Liberalism Doesnt Cause Exception: 1AR ........................................... 268 Agamben Collapses the State....................................................................... 270 **Foucault**.................................................................................................. 271 Foucault Answers: 2AC (1/3)........................................................................ 271 #2 Perm: 1AR ............................................................................................... 276 Juxtaposition Solves: 1AR (1/2) .................................................................. 277 #5 Demands on the State Good: 1AR (1/4) ................................................. 279 #6 Nihilism (Cook): 1AR (1/2) .................................................................... 284 #10 Reformism Good: 1AR .......................................................................... 286 Alt Fails: Body Cannot Be a Site of Resistance ............................................ 287 Alt Fails: Cannot Escape Subjectivity .......................................................... 288 Alt Fails: Geneologies Dont Produce Change ............................................. 289 Alt Fails: Remains Enmeshed in Power ...................................................... 290 Alt Fails: Praxis ............................................................................................ 291 Alt Fails: Suspicion ...................................................................................... 294 **Benjamin** ............................................................................................... 295 Benjamin Answers: 2AC .............................................................................. 295 **Chaloupka** ............................................................................................. 296 Chaloupka Answers: 2AC (1/3) ................................................................... 296 **CLS** ........................................................................................................ 302 CLS Answers: 2AC (1/4) .............................................................................. 302 #4 Permutation: 1AR (1/2) .......................................................................... 307 #7 Experiential Deconstruction Turn: 1AR ................................................. 309 A2 Religious Institution Rationalized Oppression: 1AR ........................... 311 #8 Liberalism Good Turn: 1AR ................................................................... 312 No Links (1/2) .............................................................................................. 314 Turns: Ricoeur ............................................................................................. 316 Turns: Judicial Oppression .......................................................................... 317 Turns: Criticism Perpetuates Capitalism .................................................... 318 Turns: Law Key to Solving Atrocity ............................................................. 319 Turns: Law Key to Solving Exploitation ...................................................... 321 Turns: Rights Good (1/4) ............................................................................. 323 Turns: Alternative Causes Rights Rollback ................................................. 328 Turns: Minorities ......................................................................................... 329 Turn: Working in System Good (1/2) .......................................................... 330 Indeterminacy False (1/4) ........................................................................... 332 A2 Language Makes Law Indeterminate: 2AC ......................................... 338 CLS Recreates Oppression (1/2).................................................................. 339 CLS is Nihilistic ............................................................................................ 341 No Alternative (1/2) ..................................................................................... 342 Alternative Fails: Elitism ............................................................................. 345
Kritik Answers
Alternative Fails: Fractures Movement ....................................................... 346 Alternative Fails: Indeterminacy Kills Criticism ......................................... 347 Alternative Fails: Historical Record of Marxism ........................................ 348 Alternative Fails: Non-Rights Strategies Bad.............................................. 349 Alternative Fails: Praxis (1/3)...................................................................... 350 A2 Thats Not Our Indeterminacy Thesis: 1AR ........................................ 354 A2 Reification: 2AC................................................................................... 355 A2 Rights Tradeoff: 2AC ........................................................................... 356 A2 Feminist Jurisprudence: 2AC ............................................................. 357 A2 Fem K of Intl Law: 2AC ....................................................................... 358 **CRT**........................................................................................................ 360 CRT Answers: 2AC (1/4) .............................................................................. 360 #5 Perm: 1AR ............................................................................................... 366 **Cuomo** ................................................................................................... 367 Preventing Nuke War Is a Prerequisite to Positive Peace ........................... 367 Negative Peace Key to Positive Peace .......................................................... 368 Absolutism Bad ............................................................................................ 369 **Deep Ecology**......................................................................................... 370 Permutation Solvency: 2AC ......................................................................... 370 Permutation Solvency: 1AR .......................................................................... 371 Anthro Good/Inevitable (1/3) ..................................................................... 372 Human Intervention Good .......................................................................... 376 Deep Ecology Justifies Ecocide (1/2) .......................................................... 377 Deep Ecology Reinscribes Anthropocentrism (1/2).................................... 379 Deep Ecology Justifies Nazism: 2AC ........................................................... 382 Deep Ecology Justifies Nazism: Ext (1/2) ................................................... 385 A2 Were Not Fascists: 1AR ...................................................................... 388 Deep Ecology Justifies State/Capitalism..................................................... 389 Deep Ecology Creates Suffering................................................................... 390 Case Comes First .......................................................................................... 391 Alternative Fails: Bad Activism ................................................................... 392 Alternative Fails: Premodern Society Bad .................................................. 393 Asteroid Turn ............................................................................................... 394 HIV Turn ...................................................................................................... 395 African AIDS Outweighs .............................................................................. 396 Singularity Turn ........................................................................................... 397 **Deleuze and Guattari** ............................................................................ 398 Perms ........................................................................................................... 398 Alternative Increases Oppression................................................................ 399 Deleuze Bad (General) ................................................................................. 401 D & G Exclude Women ................................................................................ 402 A2 Life is Carbon....................................................................................... 403 A2 Death Doesnt Destroy Being: 2AC (1/2) ............................................ 405 A2 Life is Meaningless Because the Sun Will Go Out: 2AC ..................... 407 **Derrida** .................................................................................................. 409 A2 Deconstruction ...................................................................................... 409 A2 New International (1/2) ...................................................................... 410 **Discourse Kritiks (General)** .................................................................. 413 Discourse Kritik Answers: 2AC (1/3) .......................................................... 413 Newspeak Turn: 1AR ................................................................................. 417 #2 Newspeak Turn: Ext (1/5) ...................................................................... 418 #4 Censorship Bad Turns: 1AR ................................................................... 425 #4 Censorship Bad Turns: Ext (1/4) ........................................................... 426 #7 Discourse Focus Trades off with Action: 1AR ........................................ 431 #7 Discourse Focus Trades off with Action: Ext ......................................... 432 #8 Alternative Fails: 1AR ............................................................................. 433 Holocaust Trivialization Answers: 2AC (1/3).............................................. 435 A2 Representation Links (1/4) ................................................................. 439 A2 Indigenous Peoples Labels Bad: 2AC .................................................. 443 EPrime Answers: 2AC (1/3) ......................................................................... 444 EPrime Bad (Jack Attack!) .......................................................................... 447 **Fear Bad** ................................................................................................ 448 A2 Fear of Death Bad: 2AC (1/5) .............................................................. 448 #3 Good Fear of Death: 1AR (1/2) ............................................................... 454 #4 Repression Turn: 1AR (1/3) ................................................................... 456 #5 Fear is Key to Love: 1AR ......................................................................... 459 #6 Inaction Turn: 1AR ................................................................................. 460 #7 Fear Solves War: 1AR ............................................................................. 461 Spectacle of Death Good (1/4) ..................................................................... 463 **Empire** ................................................................................................... 469 Movements Fail............................................................................................ 469 Alternative Causes Violence ........................................................................ 470 Alternative is False Radicalism..................................................................... 471
Kritik Answers
Capitalism is Sustainable ............................................................................. 472 Resistance Fails............................................................................................ 473 Alternative = Oppression ............................................................................. 474 Alternative Fractures Other Movements ..................................................... 475 Alternative Causes Terrorism ...................................................................... 476 **Exceptionalism (USC)**........................................................................... 477 Exceptionalism Answers: 2AC ..................................................................... 477 **Feminism** .............................................................................................. 479 Feminism Answers: 2AC (1/2)..................................................................... 479 White Feminism Bad: 1AR........................................................................... 484 **Gift**......................................................................................................... 486 A2 The Gift: 2AC (1/4) .............................................................................. 486 Anti-Globalization Turn: 1AR (1/2) ............................................................. 490 Anti-Globalization Movements Up Now (1/2) ............................................ 493 Provisional Truth Turn: 2AC (1/2) .............................................................. 496 Provisional Truth: 1AR ................................................................................ 498 **Global/Local**.......................................................................................... 499 Micropolitics Only Benefit Privileged.......................................................... 499 Localism Causes Oppression (1/2) .............................................................. 500 Globalism Key to Resistance........................................................................ 502 Alternative Kills Movements ....................................................................... 503 Rejection Bad ............................................................................................... 504 A2 Localism............................................................................................... 505 Permutation ................................................................................................. 506 **Habeas Corpus** ...................................................................................... 507 Habeas Corpus Answers: 2AC (1/3) ............................................................ 507 **Habermas** ...............................................................................................512 Habermas Answers: 2AC ..............................................................................512
Ethics Turn....................................................................................................513 Ontological Fascism Turn: 2AC ....................................................................514 Ontology = Nazism: 1AR...............................................................................516 Ontology = Nazism: Ext (1/3) ....................................................................... 517 A2 We Dont Advocate Nazism: 1AR ........................................................ 522 A2 Nazism is Inauthentic: 1AR ................................................................. 523 Heidegger Kills Change................................................................................ 525 Heidegger Irrelevent .................................................................................... 526 Rejecting Tech Leads to Extinction ............................................................. 527 Alternative Fails: Lapses Into Ontic Thought ............................................. 528 Alternative Fails: Tech Returns ................................................................... 529 Alternative Causes Suffering ....................................................................... 530 Alternative Causes Paralysis (1/2) ................................................................531 Heidegger Was a Nazi .................................................................................. 533 Anti-Humanism Justifies Genocide ............................................................ 534 Liberal Humanism Solves Oppression ........................................................ 535 Humanism Solves Genocide ........................................................................ 537 A2 Reject Technology: 2AC ...................................................................... 538 A2 Spanos: 2AC (1/3)................................................................................... 539 A2 Spanos: 2AC (3/3) ...................................................................................541 HR Bad Answers: 2AC (1/4) ........................................................................ 542 #3 Essentialism Turn: 1AR .......................................................................... 547 #5 Relativist Apologism Turn: 1AR ............................................................. 548 #8 Permutation: 1AR (1/3) .......................................................................... 549 #10 Zizek Presymbolism: 1AR (1/2) ............................................................ 553 No Link......................................................................................................... 555 Relativism Is Self-Refuting .......................................................................... 556 Defense: Non-Westerners Want Dignity ..................................................... 558 A2 Foundationalism Bad .......................................................................... 559 A2 Morality Is Culturally Created............................................................. 560 K = Imperialist ..............................................................................................561 **Kappeler** ................................................................................................ 562 Kappeler Answers: 2AC (1/5) ...................................................................... 562 #5 Alternative Causes Violence: 1AR (1/2) ................................................. 567 #7 Negation: 1AR ......................................................................................... 569 #8 Subversion: 1AR ..................................................................................... 570 #12 Authenticity: 1AR ................................................................................... 571 **Kato** ....................................................................................................... 573 Kato Answers: 2AC (1/4) ............................................................................. 573 **Levinas/Derrida** .....................................................................................577 A2 Infinite Responsibility (1/3) .................................................................577
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Levinas Destroys Ethics (1/2) ...................................................................... 580 Levinas/Derrida Destroy Ethics .................................................................. 583 **Nietzsche** ............................................................................................... 585 Nietzsche Answers: 2AC (1/6) ..................................................................... 585 Nietzsche = Nihilism.....................................................................................591 Nietzsche Legitimizes Genocide (1/2) ......................................................... 593 Nietzsche Legitimizes Patriarchy ................................................................ 596 Alternative Causes Annihilation .................................................................. 597 Nihilism Fails ............................................................................................... 598 Nihilism Causes Terrorism (1/2) ................................................................. 599 Nihilism Causes Terrorism (2/2) ................................................................600 Nihilism is the Root Cause of Violence........................................................ 601 Nihilism Causes Authoritarianism .............................................................. 602 **Nonviolence** .......................................................................................... 603 Nonviolence Answers: 2AC (1/6)................................................................. 603 #2 Pragmatic Pacifism Perm: 1AR (1/2) ..................................................... 612 A2 Violence Snowballs: 1AR ..................................................................... 614 #5 Violence Inevitable: 1AR......................................................................... 616 #7 Pacifism Allows Atrocity: 1AR .................................................................617 Pacifism = State Collusion (1/2) .................................................................. 618 Embracing Violence = Nonviolence ............................................................ 622 Pacifism = Violence (1/3)............................................................................. 623 Pacifism Doesnt Solve Violence .................................................................. 626 Pacifist Activism Fails: General ................................................................... 627 Pacifist Activism Fails: Law is Violent ......................................................... 628 Pacifist Activism Fails: Final Solution (1/3)................................................ 630 Pacifist Activism Fails: Final Solution (3/3) ............................................... 633 Civil Disobedience Fails (1/2) ...................................................................... 634 A2 Violence Alienates the People: 2AC .................................................... 637 A2 Non-Violence Key to Prevent Eradication of Movement: 2AC........... 638 Pacifism Bad: War Good (1/2) ..................................................................... 639 Pacifism Bad: Unethical............................................................................... 641 Pacifism Causes Oppression ........................................................................ 642 Pacifism Causes Aggression (1/2)................................................................ 643 **Normativity** ........................................................................................... 646 Normativity Answers: 2AC (1/7) ................................................................. 646 #3 Permutation: 1AR ................................................................................... 655 #3 Permutation: Ext .................................................................................... 656 #5 Sublime Justice: 1AR .............................................................................. 657 #7 Alt Reinscribes Subject: 1AR (1/2) ......................................................... 659 #9 Normativity Good: 1AR .......................................................................... 661 #10 Simulation/Roleplaying Good: 1AR (1/3) ............................................ 662 #11 Alt Lapses Back into NLT: 1AR ............................................................. 666 #11 Alt Lapses Back into NLT: Ext .............................................................. 668 Normative Thought Inevitable (1/3) ........................................................... 669 Alternative Fails ........................................................................................... 673 Pragmatism Good ........................................................................................ 674 **Nuclearism** ............................................................................................ 675 Nuclearism Answers: 2AC (1/3) .................................................................. 675 #1 Permutation: 1AR.................................................................................... 680 #5 Fear of Nuc Weapons Solves Usage: 1AR ............................................... 682 #5 Fear of Nuc Weapons Solves Usage: Ext ................................................ 683 #5 Nuclear Imagery Good: 1AR ................................................................... 689 A2 Nuclear Numbing: 2AC ....................................................................... 690 A2 Nuclear Deterrence Immoral: 2AC (1/2) ............................................ 691 A2 Proliferation K: 2AC ............................................................................ 693 **Religion** ................................................................................................. 694 Wrath of God Answers: 2AC (1/6) ............................................................... 694 #1 Finite Quantum States: 1AR ................................................................... 700 A2 Cant Disprove Gods Existence: 1AR .................................................. 702 #7 Religious Suffering: 1AR (1/3) ................................................................ 703 A2 Those Ppl Werent Real Christians: 1AR ............................................. 706 #8 Evilution Disproves Religion: 1AR ......................................................... 708 Evolution Contradicts Christianity: Ext (1/2) ............................................. 709 A2 Evolution Is Only a Theory: 1AR .......................................................... 712 A2 Evolution Contradicts Thermodynamics: 1AR .................................... 713 A2 No Transitional Fossils: 1AR ................................................................ 714 #12 Sexual Abuse: 1AR ................................................................................. 715 Christianity = Sex Abuse: Ext (1/3) .............................................................. 716 A2 Life Without God Pointless: 1AR ........................................................ 720 A2 Life Without God is Terrifying: 1AR ................................................... 722 Alternative Hurts Religion........................................................................... 723 **Securitization** ........................................................................................ 724
Kritik Answers
Security Good: Helps Marginalized People ................................................. 724 Alt Bad: Allows Suffering to Continue......................................................... 725 Alt Fails: Engagement/Nonengagement Doublebind ................................. 726 Alt Fails: Securitizes Itself ........................................................................... 727 Perm Solves: Starting Point ......................................................................... 728 Perm Solves: Must Act ................................................................................. 729 A2 Dillon: 2AC .......................................................................................... 730 **Speaking for Others** .............................................................................. 732 A2 Speaking for Others: 2AC (1/2) ........................................................... 732 #3 Retreat: 1AR ............................................................................................ 736 #3 Retreat: Ext ............................................................................................. 737 #6 Perm: 1AR ............................................................................................... 738 #9 Reductionism: 1AR ................................................................................. 739 The Alternative is a Fantasy ......................................................................... 741 **State Bad, Juhdge** ................................................................................. 742 Strategic Use of State Good ......................................................................... 742 State is Key to Solving Oppression (1/2) ..................................................... 744 State Key to Solving War (1/2) .................................................................... 748 Alternative Creates Worse Oppression (1/2) .............................................. 750 Alternative Causes Nuclear War .................................................................. 753 Permutation Solvency (1/3) ......................................................................... 755 No Link......................................................................................................... 758 No Alternative .............................................................................................. 759 A2 Borders: 2AC ....................................................................................... 760 **Terror Talk** ............................................................................................. 761 Terror Talk Answers: 2AC (1/5) ...................................................................761 Terror Discourse Good: 1AR ........................................................................ 768 Counterspeech Solves: 1AR ......................................................................... 769 **Threat Construction** .............................................................................. 770 Threat Construction Answers: 2AC (1/3) .................................................... 770 #2 Threat Rhetoric Deters War: 1AR ...........................................................775 #5 Realism Inevitable: 1AR ......................................................................... 776 #7 Scenario Analysis Good: 1AR (1/3) ......................................................... 777 #9 Prefer Our Args: 1AR .............................................................................. 780 Dillon Supports Acting Against Terrorism ...................................................781 **Zizek: Psychopolitics**............................................................................. 782 Lacan Destroys Social Change (1/2) ............................................................ 782 Lacan = Being Towards Death ..................................................................... 784 Lacan = Oppression ..................................................................................... 785 A2 Stavrakakis: 2AC ................................................................................. 786 Marxism Answers: 2AC (1/2) ...................................................................... 787 Brown Turns (1/2) ....................................................................................... 789 Permutation Key to Socialism ..................................................................... 792 **Miscellaneous**........................................................................................ 793 A2 Art (1/2) ............................................................................................... 793 A2 Love...................................................................................................... 796 A2 Poetry ................................................................................................... 797 A2 Silence .................................................................................................. 798 A2 Third World Bad ................................................................................ 799
Kritik Answers
Kritik Answers
**GENERAL K ANSWERS**
**Framework** Fiat Good: 2AC
Next, our interpretation is that plan is a yes/no question. If its better than the squo or a compet ing policy option, we win. Thats good because A. It is the most predictable because the resolution asks a question about federal action. The lack of individual agency stipulations in the resolution mean that introducing such questions are outside the scope of the subject matter we were asked to prepare to debate. We would be happy to address such concerns under different resolutions It facilitates the best policy analysis because it ensures that we are not forced to compare aff apples versus neg oranges Aff choice justifiesthey can run critical affirmatives if they want and we will engage themthey should reciprocally respect our choice to play the fiat game Our affirmative impact claims necessitateclaims of individual agency beg the question of the efficacy of liberal politics, and we impact turn such claims by proving that their drive for unfettered autonomy lets the government get away with destroying the world Most educationalkritiks are run in debate because graduate assistants like to talk about their course readings with debaterswe lack the foundational understanding to engage in high speed discourse about such arguments until weve done our homework, whereas high school civics provides adequate grounding for policy debate. We think that there should be two debate leagues: a policy circuit for undergrads and a critical circuit for grad students. Even if we lose the fiat debate, we still get to leverage our aff impacts against those of the kritik the discursive (or other) mechanism through which their alternative solves is just as available to our message about the necessity of authoritarianism. We are both theoretical kritiks of the status quo
B. C. D.
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Yet, Mitchell goes too far. In two important areas, his argument is slightly miscalibrated. First, Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. There is greater value in the somewhat insular nature of our present activity than he assumes. Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modem political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society. Second, Mitchell overextends his concept of activism. He argues fervently for mass action along ideological lines. Such a turn replaces control by society's information elite with control by an elite all our own. More than any other group in America today, practitioners of debate should recognize the subtle issues upon which political diversity turns. Mitchell's search for broad themes around which to organize mass action runs counter to this insight. As a result, Mitchell's call for an outward activist turn threatens to subvert the very values it seeks to achieve.
KRITIK CANT SOLVE THE AFF EXTEND THE TRIBE AND LARSON EVIDENCE. IF THE COURTS DONT ACT, BUSH WILL CONTINUE DETAINMENT, WHICH IS WORSE THAN PLAN WE OUTWEIGH: FAILURE PASS PLAN THREATENS MULTIPLE EXTINCTION SCENARIOS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW, MULTILATERALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, DEMOCRACY, AND RUSSIAN INDEPENDENCE. EVEN IF THEY WIN ONE BIG IMPACT, WERE HOSING THEM PLAN SOLVES BETTER THAN THE ALTERNATIVE Cole 2003
[David, Prof. Georgetown U. Law Center, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2565, August, LN//uwyo-ajl]
To be sure, judicial decisions are not the only forces that may constrain government actors in the next emergency. Developing cultural norms may also play a role. As noted above, Korematsu has never been formally overruled, but it is nonetheless highly unlikely that anything on the scale of the Japanese internment would happen again. The cultural condemnation of that initiative, reflected in Congress's issuance of a formal apology and restitution, n52 has been so powerful that the option is a nonstarter even without controlling Supreme Court law. But even here, the legislative apology followed judicial decisions nullifying the convictions on writs of coram nobis. n53 In addition, the formal
requirements that judges give reasons that are binding on future judges means that judicial decisions are likely to play a more specific constraining function than the development of cultural norms. Indeed, John Finn has argued that the obligation to give reasons is constitutive of constitutionalism and underscores the necessity of judicial review to any meaningful system of constitutional law. n54 Cultural norms and political initiatives are rarely as clear-cut as a legal prohibition, and their very contestability means that they are likely to exert less restraining
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force than a judicial holding. Court decisions are, of course, also contestable, but generally along a narrower range of alternatives.
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we are at
the rule of law is essential. We hear a lot about security. But our best we are not making the case as well as we ought. It could be, to use a Pacific metaphor, that the tide has gone out and we're on the beach. But a tsunami of expectations and discontent and demands and dissatisfaction may soon sweep in upon us. We must explain to the rest of the world the meaning, the essentiality and the purpose of the rule of law as it's understood by the American people and by other democracies throughout the world. And we must begin to do a better job of it, and we must begin that now. (Applause.) I was
security, ultimately our only security, is in the world of ideas. And I sense a slight foreboding. I sense that here in Hawaii, Governor Lingle, just a few months ago and met with the University of Hawaii law students. And I asked them, "What does the rule of law mean?" You know, I never heard that term when I was in law school. And lawyers bandy it about a lot. Should it not be defined? If you parse it as a grammarian might, it doesn't always work. You might have a dictator with laws that are known and that are enforced, but that can't be the rule of law. The rule of law does not exist just because a dictator makes the trains run on time. And so I tried to define the rule of law. And before doing so, there were certain caveats. There are certain risks. The phrase has a resonance, an allure, that you're reluctant to destroy. And we're often reluctant to talk about universal truths lest our efforts at formulating their specifics seem too bland, too insufficient, for the great purpose behind the phrase. So there's a risk, when we talk about the rule of law, that you say too little or that you say too much; that you say too little and you're facile, thereby preventing us from discovering other truths; that you say too much and that you're prolix. There's a reluctance to open the bidding so that every interest group has its particular interest, its particular goal, incorporated in the rule of law. I always wanted to teach a law school course in constitutional law to some very bright students who had never read the Constitution. And the way I'd do it is I'd say, "Now, here it is, but you can't read it. I want you to tell me what you think the Constitution should contain if it's a model Constitution." They'd look. I'd say, "Now, don't peek." And just as an academic trick, I would get them interested. I've done the same thing for you, and I'm glad it's dark, because I don't want you to look at it. I've given you a little definition of the rule of law. I have one for all the Kameamea students. What would you put in your definition of the rule of law? Would you talk about process, knowing that there are certain truths that are not evident to us now, that we're blind to the injustices and the prejudices of our own times? So you just talk about process? That really doesn't suffice. It's not elevating enough. So you must talk about substance. What is the substance which you include? I suggested that the rule of law has three parts. This is simply a working definition. If we were in the law school class at the University of Hawaii, or if we had more time, you could probably make some suggestions for how this should be improved. But I think it's important for us to begin assessing where we are in this campaign to explain the meaning of freedom, the meaning of the rule of law, to a
There's a jury that's out. It's half the world. The verdict is not yet in. The commitment to accept the western idea of democracy has not yet been made, and they are waiting for you to make the case. I suggest that the rule of law has three parts. The first is that the law is binding on the government and all of its officials. This may seem a rather self-evident matter, but it's
doubting world. My friends, make no mistake: a proposition that most government officials in most countries do not fully understand. If an administrative agency and an administrator in that agency is charged with giving you a permit, the permit is not given to you as a matter of grace. It's given to you because you're entitled to it, and it's his or her duty to give it to you. Very few countries in the world understand this. This is an essential lesson that must be taught if the corruption and the greed and the graft President Greco referred to are eliminated. The second part of the rule of law is there
The rule of law binds the government and all of its officials.
the rule of law must respect the dignity, equality and human rights of every person. And then there's a second sentence, and the second sentence says that the people are entitled to have a voice in the laws that govern them. So there's a process element. But it isn't just process, because the right to participate in government is nothing less than the right to help shape your own destiny. And the framers of our Constitution made it very clear that each generation has a share, has a chance to determine its own destiny, to determine its own direction. What are human rights? Is it the right to
for you on the little slip. It is, I think, in a sense, the most troubling for me. I'm not sure that it's complete. It says that subsistence, the right to enough to eat, the right to breathe clean air, the right to an education? At this point the rule of law, as we, I think, would want to define it, may depart from the idea of a model constitution. These are two different things. In the Constitution of the United States, there are a series of essentially negative commands. "Congress shall make no law restricting free speech or the free press." "There shall be no unreasonable search and seizures." These are negative commands. It's easier to have the Ten Commandments -- "Thou shalt not steal" -- than the Sermon on the Mount -- "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." It's harder to enforce the latter. But what about affirmative rights? Aren't there some basic human entitlements? You see a man on a steam grate in the cold winter in Washington, D.C. and you say, "Well, you have the right to a jury trial, and you actually have a right to own a newspaper." He'd say, "I'm cold. I'm hungry. I want to eat." Americans
if the rule of law is to have meaning, substance, hope, inspiration for the rest of the world, it must be coupled with the opportunity to improve human existence. I became interested a
must understand that few years ago in water systems in Africa, and I have attended a few lectures about it. Not long ago I heard a speaker say the following. He asked this question: "How many hours of human labor per year are spent in the continent of Africa getting clean water?" This is work that falls on the shoulders of women. The answer was 8 billion hours a year. I was sitting in an audience like yours, thinking, "Now, did he say 8 million? No, that can't work out. Was it 80 million?" The answer is 8 billion.
The biggest single cause of infant mortality in Africa and other undeveloped nations is diarrhea. Children with a slight body mass dehydrate quickly, and there's nothing for the heart to pump against. The heart can't pump if it's dry. This can be fixed. This is not rocket science. One of the reasons it can't be fixed, under present conditions, is that governments are corrupt. And people have a right to improve their lives, to gain basic security, without corrupt governments depriving them of the very means of existence. CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGEAnd I asked him about it later. He said, "This is very conservative, because I'm just talking about the water that's clean when it gets back to the source."
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every person has a right to know what the laws are and to enforce them without fear of retaliation or retribution. This is almost a process-sounding precept, but it's again substantive as well. It's part of your identity, it's part of your self-definition, to know the laws that protect you, to know the laws that are respected by your neighbors and friends and family. This is part of who you are. And you're entitled to know this, and you're entitled to enforce them. I
was talking with some lawyers and judges not long ago from Bangladesh. They told me that a standard criminal sentence works something like this: A fine of three dollars or nine to 12 months in jail, and at least 1,000 people a year spend a year in jail for want of the three dollars. I said, "Well, I'm not a man of great means, but I'll write you a check for $1,000. That'll take care of 333 people." And they said, "Well, no, but then there'd be no deterrence." Is a nation, is a people, is a culture, is a
we must find some ways to link the rule of law with real progress in improving the condition of humankind. We must have
society able to embrace the western idea of the rule of law under such conditions? I suggest to you the answer is no. And
some measures to assure that the vast aid, the work of the NGOs, the work of this association, has some immediate, visible, tangible return so that we can make the case. You were gracious to mention my remarks, President Greco, in San Francisco, when you last met in that city. We talked about the criminal justice system. And I mentioned at the time a book by called "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." And it occurred to me, when we were coming here to Hawaii, that Solzhenitsyn might be relevant in a somewhat different connection. He was a writer whom I greatly admired. He had escaped from the Soviet Union and from a gulag in order to write about that experience, and he was living in the United States. He was invited to Harvard to give the most important address given every year to the Harvard students. It was in the mid or late '70s. I was living in California at the time. I was thrilled that my hero was addressing the Harvard College. And this was pre-fax and Internet days, so it took me one or two days to get the text of his remarks, the text of his remarks from The New York Times.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn
attacked the West, and particularly the law and the legal system. And he said that any society that defines the tissues of human existence in legalistic terms is condemned to spiritual mediocrity. My hero was saying this about my profession,
And I was shocked, stunned, terribly disappointed to read his remarks, in which he about the Constitution that is America's self-identity, about the Constitution that Americans still think as defining who they are as a people?I reflected on it for a few days, and then I got the answer. culture
We just define law differently than Solzhenitsyn did. From his era, from his , law was a dictat, a ucas (ph) -- a command, a mandate. In sum, it was a cold decree. That's not the meaning of law as our nation and our co- democracies define it. For us, law is a liberating force. It's a promise. It's a covenant. It says that you can hope, you can dream, you can dare, you can plan. You have joy in your existence. That's the meaning of the law as Americans understand it, and that's the meaning of the law that we must explain to a doubting world where the verdict is still out. You can make this case. You must make this case. And that is because freedom -- your freedom, my freedom and the freedom of the next generation -- hangs in the balance. I'm confident you will do this.
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Because a legislative practice can only be undertaken jointly, a monological, egocentric operation of the generalization test in the manner of the Golden Rule will not suffice.
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intercollegiate policy debate is an odd and magical place, where a keen spirit of competition drives debaters to amass voluminous research in preparation for
The world of tournaments, and where the resulting density of ideas spurts speakers to cram arguments into strictly timed presentation periods during contest rounds. Expert judges trained in policy analysis
keep track of such contests as they unfold at breakneck speed, with speakers routinely delivering intricate argumentation at over 300 words per minute. To the
uninitiated onlooker, this style of debate reveals itself as an unintelligible charade, something like a movielength Federal Express commercial or an auctioneering competition gone bad. But there are rich
rewards for participants who master policy debate's special vocabulary, learn its arcane rules, and acclimate themselves to the style of rapid-fire speaking needed to keep up with the flow of arguments. The rigorous dialectical method of debate analysis cultivates a panoramic style of critical thinking that elucidates subtle interconnections among multiple positions and perspectives on policy controversies. The intense pressure of debate competition instills a relentless research ethic in participants. An inverted pyramid dynamic embedded in the format of contest rounds teaches debaters to synthesize and distill their initial positions down to the most cogent propositions for their final speeches.
FOURTH, ONLY STATE-CENTERED DISCUSSION ABOUT POLITICS CAN REVERSE THE TREND TOWARD TOTALITARIANISM. THIS DESTROYS DEBATE TORGERSON 99
[Douglas, Prof and Chair Dept. Political Studies @ Trent U., The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere, Duke University Press//uwyo-crowe]
One rationale for Arendt's emphasis on the intrinsic value of politics is that this value has been so neglected by modernity that politics itself is threatened. Without a celebration of the intrinsic value of politics, neither functional nor constitutive political activity has any apparent rationale for continuing once its ends have been achieved. Functional politics might well be replaced by a technocratic management of advanced industrial society. A constitutive politics intent on social transformation might well be eclipsed by the coordinated
direction of a cohesive social movement. In neither ease would any need be left for what Arendt takes to be the essence of politics:
there would be no need for debate. Green authoritarianism, following in the footsteps of Hobbes, has been all too ready to reduce politics to governance. Similarly, proponents of deep ecology, usually vague about politics, at least have been able
to recognize totalitarian dangers in a position that disparages public opinion in favor of objective management." Any attempt to plot a comprehensive strategy for a cohesive green movement, moreover, ultimately has to adopt a no-nonsense posture while erecting clear standards by which to identify and excommunicate the enemy that is within. Green politics from its inception, however, has challenged the officialdom of advanced industrial society by invoking the cultural idiom of the carnivalesque. Although tempted by visions of tragic heroism, as we saw in chapter, green politics has also celebrated the irreverence of the comic, of a world turned upside down to crown the fool. In a context of political theater, instrumentalism is often attenuated, at least momentarily displaced by a joy of performance. The comic dimension of political action can also be more than episodic. The image of the Lilliputians tying up the giant suggests well the strength and flexibility of a decentered constitutive politics. In a functional context, green politics offers its own technology of foolishness in response to the dysfunctions of industrialism, even to the point of exceeding the comfortable limits of a so-called responsible foolishness. Highlighting the comic, these tendencies within green politics begin to suggest an intrinsic value to politics. To the extent that this value is recognized, politics is inimical to authoritarianism and offers a poison pill to the totalitarian propensities of an industrialized mass society." To value political action for its own sake, in other words, at least has the significant extrinsic value of defending against the antipolitical inclinations of
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modernity. But what is the intrinsic value of politics? Arendt would locate this value in the virtuosity of political action,
particularly as displayed in debate. Although political debate surely has extrinsic value, this does not exhaust its value.
Debate is a language game that, to be played well, cannot simply be instrumentalized for the services it can render but must also he played for its own sake. Any game pressed into
the service of external goals tends to lose its playful quality; it ceases to be fun.
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force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.
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argumentative agency involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public
deliberation. Pursuit of argumentative agency charges academic work with democratic energy by linking teachers and students with civic organizations, social
argumentative agency links decontextualized argumentation skills such as research, listening, analysis, refutation and presentation, to the broader political telos of democratic empowerment. Argumentative agency fills gaps left in purely simulation-based models of argumentation by focusing pedagogical energies
movements, citizens and other actors engaged in live public controversies beyond the schoolyard walls. As a bridging concept, on strategies for utilizing argumentation as a driver of progressive social change. Moving beyond an exclusively skill-oriented curriculum, teachers and students pursuing argumentative agency seek to put argumentative tools to the test by employing them in situations beyond the space of the classroom. This approach draws from the work of Kincheloe (1991), who suggests that through "critical constructivist action research," students and teachers cultivate their own senses of agency and work to transform the world around them
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All must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree. To present persuasively the arguments for a position with which one disagrees is, perhaps, the greatest need and the highest ethical act in democratic debate. It is the greatest need because most minority views, if expressed at all, are not expressed forcefully and persuasively. Bryce, in his perceptive analysis of America and Americans, saw two dangers to democratic government: the danger of not ascertaining accurately the will of the majority and the danger that minorities might not effectively express themselves. In regard to the second danger, which he considered the greater of the two, he suggested: The duty, therefore, of a patriotic statesman in a country where public opinion rules, would seem to be rather to resist and correct than to encourage the dominant sentiment. He will not be content with trying to form and mould and lead it, but he will confront it, lecture it, remind it that it is fallible, rouse it -out of its self-complacency To present persuasively arguments for a position with which one disagrees is the highest ethical act in debate because it sets aside personal interests for the benefit of the common good. Essentially, for the person who accepts decision by debate, the ethics of the decisionmaking process are superior to the ethics of personal conviction on particular subjects for debate. Democracy is a commitment to means, not ends. Democratic society accepts certain ends, i.e., decisions, because they have been arrived at by democratic means. We recognize the moral priority of decision by debate when we agree to be bound by that decision regardless of personal conviction. Such an agreement is morally acceptable because the decision-making process guarantees our moral integrity by guaranteeing the opportunity to debate for a reversal of the decision. Thus, personal conviction can have moral significance in social decision-making only so long as the integrity of debate is maintained. And the integrity of debate is maintained only when there is a full and forceful confrontation of arguments and evidence relevant to decision. When an argument is not presented or is not presented as persuasively as possible, then debate fails. As debate fails decisions become less "wise." As decisions become less wise the process of decision-making is questioned. And finally, if and when debate is set aside for the alternative method of decision-making by authority, the personal convictions of individuals within society lose their moral significance as determinants of social choice.
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since representations of the marginalized are few, the few available are thought to be representative of all marginalized peoples. The few images are thought to be typical, sometimes not only of members of a particular minority group, but of all minorities in general. It is assumed that subalterns can stand in for other subalterns. A
prime example of this is the fact that actors of particular ethnic backgrounds were often casted as any ethnic "other". (Some examples include Carmen Miranda HYPERLINK "http://www.emory.edu/ENGLISH/Bahri/carmen.gif" in The Gang's All Here (1943), Ricardo Mantalban in Sayonara (1957), and Rudolph Valentino in The Son of the Sheik ). This collapsing of the image of the subaltern reflects not only ignorance but a lack of respect for the diversity within marginalized communities. Shohat also suggests that representations in one sphere--the sphere of popular culture--effects the other spheres of representation, particularly the political one: The denial of aesthetic representation to the subaltern has historically formed a corollary to the literal denial of economic, legal, and political representation. The struggle to 'speak for oneself' cannot be separated from a history of being spoken for, from the struggle to speak and be heard. (173) It cannot be ignored that representations effect the ways in which actual individuals are perceived. Although many see representations as harmless likenesses, they do have a real effect on the world. They are meant to relay a message and as the definition shows, 'influence opinion and action'. We must ask what ideological work these representations accomplish.
Both the scarcity and the importance of minority representations yield what many have called " the burden of representation". Since there are so few images, negative ones can have devastating affects on the real lives of marginalized people. We must also ask, if there are so few, who will produce them? Who will be the supposed voice of the subaltern? Given the allegorical character of these representations, even subaltern writers, artists,
Representations or the 'images or ideas formed in the mind' have vast implications for real people in real contexts. and scholars are asking who can really speak for whom? When a spokesperson or a certain image is read as metonymic, representation becomes more difficult and dangerous. Solutions for this conundrum are difficult to theorize. We can call for increased "self representation" or the inclusion of more individuals from 'marginalized' groups in 'the act of representing', yet this is easier said then done. Also, the inclusion of more minorities in representation will not necessarily alter the structural or institutional barriers that prevent equal participation for all in representation. Focusing on whether or not images are negative or positive, leaves in tact a reliance on the "realness' of images, a "realness" that is false to begin with. Finally, I again turn to Spivak and her question, 'Can the Subaltern Speak'. In this seminal essay, Spivak emphasizes the fact that representation is a sort of speech act, with a speaker and a listener. Often, the subaltern makes an attempt at selfrepresentation, perhaps a representation that falls outside the 'the lines laid down by the official institutional structures of representation' (306). Yet, this act of representation is not heard. It is not recognized by the listener, perhaps because it does not fit in with what is expected of the representation. Therefore, representation by subaltern individuals seems nearly impossible. Despite the fact that Spivak's formulation is quite accurate, there must still be an effort to try and challenge status quo representation and the ideological work it does. The work of various 'Third world' and minority writers, artists, and filmmakers attest to the possibilities of counter-hegemonic, anti-colonial subversion. It is obvious that representations are much more than plain 'likenesses'. They are in a sense ideological tools that can serve to reinforce systems of inequality and subordination; they can help sustain colonialist or neocolonialist projects. A great amount of effort is needed
this force is not completely pervasive, and subversions are often possible. 'Self representation' may not be a complete possibility, yet is still an important goal.
to dislodge dominant modes of representation. Efforts will continue to be made to challenge the hegemonic force of representation, and of course,
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, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it
is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a peoples foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private
citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples
citizens, we say, as before, that ideally
AND, ROLE-PLAYING DEBATES PROMOTE PREPARE US FOR REAL WORLD ACTIVISM BY GIVING US A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLICY WORKS, MAKING US AFFECTIVE AGENTS TO ACHIEVE CHANGE. THIS ALLOWS US AS INDIVIDUALS TO BECOME ACTORS WHO COULD INDEED TRANSFORM INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Joyner 1999
[Christopher, Professor international Law @ University of Georgetown, Teaching International Law: Views from an international relations political scientist]. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
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The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism, but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marxs philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semiconscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academyand, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneylandas a country of simulacraand to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toiletsmight revitalize leftist politics.
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Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social
sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. [*386] By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces
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students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
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Arendt sees the categorical imperative as an absolute in the Platonic/authoritarian sense, standing above men and the realm of human affairs, measuring them without any concern for context, specificity, or the "fundamental relativity" of the "interhuman realm."(30) Arendt emphasizes this inheritance of Platonism because she sees it as inculcating a habit of mechanical, unthinking judgment.
The more judgment is identified with the application of a rule or an unvarying standard, the more our powers of judgment atrophy, and the less we are able to "stop and think" in the Socratic sense. Moreover, the insistence that judgment is dependent on such standards
leads to a "crisis in judgment" when these standards are revealed to be without effective power. This, according to Arendt, is what happens in the course of the modern
. This process--call it the crisis in authority or, to use Nietzsche's symbolic formulation, the "death of God"--comes to its conclusion with the advent of the evils of totalitarianism, evils so unprecedented that they "have clearly exploded our categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgment."(31) The
age, as new and unprecedented moral and political phenomena reveal the hollowness and inadequacy of the "reliable universal rules" the tradition had offered
failure of the inherited wisdom of the past, the fact of a radical break in our tradition, throws us back upon our own resources. Potentially, Arendt notes, the crisis is liberating, as it frees the faculty of judgment from its subservience to objectivist regimes such as Plato's ideas or Kant's categorical imperative. As Arendt puts it in "Understanding and Politics": Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure, and rules under which to subsume the particular, a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality.(32) The hope that the "crisis in authority" will lead to the rebirth of a genuinely autonomous faculty of judgment runs up against Arendt's own deeply
Minus the presence of Socrates (who, like an electric ray, paralyzes his partners in dialogue, forcing them to stop and think), the likely result of such a crisis is thankfulness for anything that props up the old set of standards or provides the semblance of a new one. Responding to Hans Jonas's call for a renewed inquiry into ultimate, metaphysical grounds for
ingrained sense that ordinary individuals will find it difficult indeed to wean themselves from pregiven categories and rules. judgment at a conference on her work in 1972, Arendt declared her pessimism that "a new god will appear," and went on to observe: If you go through such a situation [as totalitarianism] the first thing you know is the following: you never know how somebody will act. You have the surprise of your life! This goes throughout all layers of society, and it goes throughout various distinctions between men. And if you want to make a generalization, then you could say that those who were still very firmly convinced of the so-called old values were the first to be ready to change their old values for a new set of values, provided they were given one. And I am afraid of this, because I think that the moment you give anybody a new set of values--or this famous "bannister"--you can immediately exchange it. And the only thing the guy gets used to is having a "bannister" and a set of values, no matter.(33) Arendt thought that the natural tendency of the ordinary person, when faced with the destruction of one set of authoritative rules, would not be Socratic examination and perplexity (which only further dissolves the customary), but rather a grasping for a new code, a new "bannister." Thinking, especially It is, as Arendt says, a "dangerous and resultless enterprise," one that can just as easily lead to cynicism and nihilism as to independent judgment and a deepened moral integrity.(34) Arendt agrees with the analysis Kant gives in "What Is Enlightenment?": most people would simply prefer not to make the effort that independent judgment demands, let alone risk the taken-for-granted moral presuppositions of their existence. Yet however real this aversion to thinking or "paralysis" is
, Arendt holds onto the Socratic possibility that ordinary individuals will remain open to the "winds of thought." She profoundly agrees with Socrates that it is only through such examination that the individual is likely to avoid complicity with the moral horrors perpetrated by popular political regimes. Socratic thinking--which, in its relentless negativity, is the very opposite of all foundational or professional philosophical thinking--liberates the faculty of judgment from the tyranny of rules and custom. In this way, it
prevents the individual from being "swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in."(35) Independent judgment is, according to Arendt, the
) Thinking may not be able to "make friends" of citizens as Socrates had hoped, but it can "prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when
"by-product" of this liberating effect of thinking; it "realizes" thinking "in the world of appearances."(36 the chips are down."(37)
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These various yet related definitions are all implicated in the public debates about representation. Theorists interested in Postcolonial studies, by closely examining various forms of representations, visual, textual and otherwise, have teased out the different ways that these "images" are implicated in power inequalities and the subordination of the 'subaltern'. Representations-- these 'likenesses'--come in various forms: films, television, photographs, paintings, advertisements and other forms of popular culture. Written materials--academic texts, novels and other literature, journalistic pieces--are also important forms of representation. These representations, to different degrees, are thought to be somewhat realistic, or to go back to the definitions, they are thought be 'clear' or state 'a fact'. Yet how can simulations or "impressions on the sight" be completely true? Edward Said, in his analysis of textual representations of the Orient in Orientalism, emphasizes the fact that representations can never be exactly realistic: In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a represence, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such real thing as "the Orient". (21) Representations, then can never really be 'natural' depictions of the orient. Instead, they are constructed images, images that need to be interrogated for their ideological content.
In a similar way, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak makes a distinction between Vertretung and Darstellung. The former she defines as "stepping in someone's place. . .to tread in someone's shoes." Representation in this sense is "political representation," or a speaking for the needs
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and desires of somebody or something. Darstellung is representation as re-presentation, "placing there." Representing is thus "proxy and portrait," according to Spivak. The complicity between "speaking for" and "portraying" must be kept in mind ("Practical Politics of the Open End," The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues.)
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PLAN FOCUSED DEBATES ALWAYS PROVIDE A CLEARER, FAIRER, AND MORE EDUCATION FRAMEWORK
Jeff Parcher, February 26, 2001, www.ndtceda.com
This is absolutely devastating to the performance arguments. And even if we could hodgepodge together some inevtiably subjective criteria in each individual debate, they simply could never match the benefits of debate provided by a clear plan/resolution focus. Performance debates would be incredibly repetitive in that they would always be 90% about methodolgy rather than the substance of performances. Because the limits to possible performances are so large - both sides would always have an incentive to focus on methodology rather than substance. The affirmative will be on an endless search to coopt the negative performance (in the words of the Fort, "We are in solidarity with these words"). The negative on an endless search to exclude the affirmative performance through topicality or general kritiks. Rarely do I think we would ever have debates which engaged the two performances. The current puryeyors of this type of debate have certainly relied much more on competitiveness arguments than on actual substantive engagement (as far as I've seen anyway).
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Competition Good
COMPETITION IS IS NECESSARY FOR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Gary Olson
and Jean- Franois Lyotard, Resisting a Discourse of Mastery: A Conversation with Jean-Franois Lyotard, JAC 15.3, 1995,
http://jac.gsu.edu/jac/15.3/Articles/1.htm, accessed 1/21/02
Second, competition is not competition between different groups in a cultural reality. Not at all. The notion of competition as a male model is a notion I reject, maybe because I am a male, but, in fact, because there is not any other way to understand the domination of the competitive pattern in our society. I mean, this system has competed against all other systems, all the other ways of organizing human communities. And we can consider human history not as a linear succession with a sort of causality between each segment of this line, but as the opposite, as the contingent and different ways in which human communities have tried to organizeexactly in the same terms that so-called life has fortuitously produced different forms of living beings. And between these different entitiesanimals, vegetables, human beings, or human communitiescompetition was necessarily open. They are all open systems; they need to grasp energy from outside in order to maintain themselves, and if they have to grasp energy from outside, they are competitive with other systems. Thats true for animals, even vegetables, and for human communities. And thats how our system, now, won against other ways that communities have tried to organize themselves, and it has internalized competition itself in order to continue to be able to grasp outside and inside energies as much as possible. Its not a male idea; there is no argument against it. There is no doubt: its not a male idea. And Im sure women are perfectly able to understand this, even if they hate it; so do I. But we are in this condition.
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ALSO, PURE CRITICISM FAILS, ONLY COMBINATION OF CONTRADICTORY IDEAS SOLVES Walt 98
[Stephen M., Prof. Pol. Sci, U. of Chicago, International Relations: one world, many theories, Foreign Policy, March 22, LN] No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. Although we should take care to emphasize inventiveness over invective, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.
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AND, JUXTAPOSITION OF INCOMPATIBLE IDEAS AVOIDS THE PROBLEMS OF TRADITIONAL THEORY AND ENABLES A PROCESS OF CONSTANT CRITICISM Marcus '98
[George E., Professor of Anthro at Rice University, Ethnography through Thick and Thin, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, 186-7//uwyo-ajl]
The postmodern notions of heterotopia (Foucault), juxtapositions, and the blocking together of incommensurables (Lyotard) have served to renew the long-neglected practice of comparison in anthropology, but in altered ways. Juxtapositions do not have the obvious meta-logic of older styles of comparison in anthropology (e.g., controlled comparisons within a cultural area or "natural" geographical region); rather, they emerge from putting questions to an emergent object of study whose controus are not known beforehand, but are themselves a contribution of making an account which has different, complexly connected real-world sites of investigation. The postmodern object of study is ultimately mobile and multiply situated, so any ethnography of such an object will have a comparative dimension that is integral to it, in the form of juxtapositions of seeming incommensurables or phenomena that might conventionally have appeared to be "world apart." Comparison reenters the very act of ethnographic specificity by a postmodern vision of seemingly improbably juxtapositions, the global collapsed into and made and integral part of a parallel, related local situations rather than something monolithic and external to them. This move toward comparison as heterotopia firmly deterritorializes culture in ethnographic writing and simulates accounts of cultures composed in a landscape for which there is as yet no developed theoretical comparison
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Bakhtins dialogism, a theory of knowledge and language that tries to avoid the excluding accepts the existence of multiple meanings, draws connections between differences, and searches for possibilities to establish conceptual and linguistic dialogues among competing ideas,
values, speech forms, texts, and validity claims, and the like. Jurgen Habermas attempts to theorize the preconditions for ideal speech situations. Communication, in this case, should be as unrestrained as possible, such that claims to truth and rightness can be discursively redeemed, alb eit, one should add, though a rationalism and universalism that it violently anti-Bakhtinian and anti-Adornian. Closer to the familiar terrain of IR we find Christine Sylvesters feminist method of
empathetic cooperation, which aims at opening up questions of gender by a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears, and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to heeding when building social theory. But how does one conceptualize such attempts if
concepts can ever do justice to the objects they are trying to capture? The daring task is, as we know from Adorno, to open with concepts what does not fit into concepts, to resist the distorting power of reification and return the conceptual to the nonconceptual. This disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of critical philosophy. It impedes the concept from developing its own dynamics and from becoming an absolute in itself. The first step toward disenchanting the concept is simply refusing to define it monologically. Concepts should achieve meaning only gradually in relation to each other. Adorno even intentionally uses the same concept in different way in order to liberate it from the harrow definition that language itself had already imposed on it. That contradictions could arise out of this practice does not bother Adorno. Indeed, he considers them essential
. One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary, and the discontinuous. Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior universal standard of reference. What is different appears as divergent, dissonant, and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalizing standpoint, which we must avoid if we are to escape the reifying and excluding dangers of identity thinking. Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity then is not to be found be evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be referred over artificially constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus, Adorno advocates writing
in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, and place. He adheres to Nietzsches advice that one should approach deep problems like taking a cold bath, quickly into them and quickly out again. The belief that one does no t reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those who fear cold water. But Nietzsches bath has already catapulted us into the vortex of the ne xt linguistic terrain of resistance the question of style.
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It must be noted that Malcolm's concept of any means necessary includes, but is not limited to non-violent civil disobedience. n29 If non-violent civil disobedience does not change the system, then any means necessary allows the oppressed to consider armed resistance. The oppressed may use multiple strategies. One group among the oppressed, for example, may use non-violent means to fight oppression; another may advocate more radical methods to change the system. This multi-faceted approach creates more pressure on the oppressor to lift oppression. In order for such a movement to be effective, however, the oppressor must believe that those who are involved are serious about [*87] their cause. Those who are oppressed must be willing to sacrifice their lives to abolish the state of subjugation. n30 It is also important that the oppressed maintain their underlying solidarity because it is inevitable that they will encounter efforts to divide them and turn them against each other.
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Here I will argue that eco-radical political strategy, if one may call it that, is consummately self-defeating. The theoretical and empirical rejection of green radicalism is thus bolstered by a series of purely pragmatic objections. Many eco-radicals hope that a massive ideological campaign can transform popular perceptions, leading both to a fundamental change in lifestyles and to large-scale social reconstruction. Such a view is highly credulous. The notion that continued intellectual hectoring will eventually result in a mass conversion to environmental monasticism (Roszak 1979:289)marked by vows of poverty and nonprocreationis difficult to accept. While radical views have come to dominate many environmental circles, their effect on the populace at large has been minimal. Despite the greening of European politics that recently gave stalwarts considerable hope, the more recent green plunge suggests that even the European electorate lacks commitment to environmental radicalism. In the United States several decades of preaching the same ecoradical gospel have had little appreciable effect; the public remains, as before, wedded to consumer culture and creature comforts. The stubborn hope that nonetheless continues to inform green extremism stems from a pervasive philosophical error in radical environmentalism. As David Pepper (1989) shows, most eco-radical thought is mired in idealism: in this case the belief that the roots of the ecological crisis lie ultimately in ideas about nature and humanity As Dobson (1990:37) puts it: Central to the theoretical canon of Green politics is the belief that our social, political, and economic problems are substantially caused by our intellectual relationship with the world (see also Milbrath 1989:338). If only such ideas would change, many aver, all would be well. Such a belief has inspired the writing of eloquent jeremiads; it is less conducive to designing concrete strategies for effective social and economic change. It is certainly not my belief that ideas are insignificant or that attempting to change others opinions is a futile endeavor. If that were true I would hardly feel compelled to write a polemic work of this kind. But I am also convinced that changing ideas alone is insufficient. Widespread ideological conversion, even if it were to occur, would hardly be adequate for genuine social transformation. Specific policies must still be formulated, and specific political plans must be devised if those policies are ever to be realized.
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Derrida believes that subversion and inversion both culminate in the same thing the reinvention of authority, in different guises. Thus, the
forms of political power must be abolished as the first revolutionary act. However, anarchist critique is based on the Enlightenment idea of a rational and moral human essence that power denies, and yet we know from Derrida that any essential
, anarchism substituted political and economic authority for a rational authority founded on an Enlighten- ment-humanist subjectivity. Both radical politico-theoretical strategies then the strategy of inversion, as exemplified by Marxism, and the strategy of subversion, as exemplified by anarchism are two sides of the same logic of logic of place. So for Derrida:
identity involves a radical exclusion or sup- pression of other identities. Thus What must occur then is not merely a suppression of all hierarchy, for an- archy only consolidates just as surely the established order of a metaphys- ical hierarchy; nor is it a simple change or reversal in the terms of any given hierarchy. Rather the Umdrehung must be a transformation of the hierar- chical structure itself. In other words,
to avoid the lure of authority one must go beyond both the anarchic desire to destroy hierarchy, and the mere reversal of terms. Rather, as Derrida suggests, if one wants to avoid this trap the hierar- chical structure itself must be transformed. Political action must invoke a rethinking of revolution and authority in a way that traces a path between these two terms, so that it does not merely reinvent the place of power. It could be argued that Derrida propounds an anarchism of his own, if by anarchism one means a questioning of all authority, including
textual and philosophical authority, as well as a desire to avoid the trap of reproducing authority and hierarchy in ones attem pt to destroy it. This deconstructive attempt to transform the very structure of hier- archy and authority, to go beyond the binary opposition, is also found in Nietzsche. Nietzsche believes that one cannot merely oppose auth- ority by affirming its opposite: this is only to react to and, thus, affirm the domination one is supposedly resisting.
One must, he argues, tran- scend oppositional thinking altogether go beyond truth and error, beyond being and becoming, beyond good and evil. For Nietzsche it is simply a moral prejudice to privilege truth over error. However, he does not try to counter this by privileging error over truth, because this leaves the opposition intact. Rather, he refuses to confine his view of the world to this opposition: Indeed what compels us to
assume that there exists any essential antithesis between true and false? Is it not enough to suppose grades of apparentness and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of appearance? Nietzsche displaces, rather than replaces, these oppositional and authoritarian structures o f thought he displaces place. This strategy of displacement, similarly adopted by Derrida, provides certain clues to developing a non-essentialist theory of resist- ance to power and authority
. Rather than reversing the terms of the binary opposition, one should perhaps question, and try to make prob- lematic, its very structure.
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Zizek: Im trying to avoid two extremes. One extreme is the traditional pseudoradical position which says, If you engage in politics - helping trade unions or combating sexual harassment, whatever - youve been co-opted and so on. Then you have the other extreme which says, Ok, you have to do something. I think both are wrong. I hate those pseudo-radicals who dismiss every concrete action by saying that This will all be co-opted. Of course, everything can be co-opted [chuckles] but this is just a nice excuse to do absolutely nothing. Of course, there is a danger that - to use the old Maoist term, popular in European student movements thirty some years ago, the long march through institutions will last so long that youll end up part of the institution. We need more than ever, a parallax view - a double perspective. You engage in acts, being aware of their limitations. This does not mean that you act with your fingers crossed. No, you fully engage, but with the awareness that - the ultimate wager in the almost Pascalian sense - is not simply that this act will succeed, but that the very failure of this act will trigger a much more radical process.
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these three responses stand in an approximately analogous relationship to the archetypal forms in which consciousness, in a state of anxiety, shrinks from the violence of determinate negation and 'strives to hold on to what it is in danger
of losing'. 59 At various points throughout the present work I have used the terms 'decadence', 'irony' and 'relativism' to refer to these instances of an epistemological loss of nerve, this ; it may be as well here to remind ourselves of the terms in which Hegel describes these manifestations of a retreat from truth. Consciousness, he says, at the decisive moment in which it is required to go beyond its own limits, (i) 'wishes to remain in a state' of unthinking inertia'; (ii) gloats over its own understanding, 'which knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego instead of any content'; (iii) 'entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be good in its kind'. 60 condition - by which I mean that a series of critical-theoretical strategies has attained a certain concrete form -
cultural anxiety; postmodernism becomes synonymous, therefore, with deceleration, with a sense of cultural and political conclusivity; postmodernism is the principal vehicle of what Baudrillard calls 'the illusion of the end'.
AUTHENTICITY FETISHIZATION AND ITS FEAR OF REASON AND VIOLENCE ALLOW US TO SPEND HOURS DEBATING THE FINE POINTS OF BAUDRILLARIAN ETHICS WHILE GAS CHAMBERS ARE BUILT Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997,146-7//uwyo-ajl] If it is unreasonable to suppose that the Final Solution was potentiated or even necessarily facilitated by Schmitt's theories, it is certainly the case that this metaphysical structure of domination in the Third Reich, whereby the status of public citizens is reduced to a level determined entirely in the 'natural' or biological realm of necessity, is foreshadowed in his 1927 essay. In an abstract and insidious way Schmitt introduces the idea that the 'transcendent' realm of the political, as a matter of course, will not accommodate a people with insufficient strength to ensure its own participation, and that such a fact is ipso facto justification for its exclusion. 'If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'130 Schmitt's concept of the 'political', quite simply, is nothing of the sort - is instead weighed down by necessity, in the form of what Marshall Berman calls German-Christian interiority - by its preoccupation with authenticity, that is to say, and true political 'identity'. Auschwitz is a corollary not of reason, understood as risk, but of the fear of reason, which paradoxically is a fear of violence. The stench of burning bodies is haunted always by the sickly aroma of cheap metaphysics.
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It is this question of Hitler's 'integrity', perhaps more than anything, which leads to the intellectual paralysis characteristic of postmodernity, of which the most typical symptom is cynicism, in its various forms. On one level, of course, Hitler's programme was thoroughly 'integrated', if by this is meant 'internally coherent'. Certainly the consistency with which both 'good' and 'bad' Jews were persecuted - and Eichmann's diligence, it emerged, was exemplary in this regard - ensured that the Third Reich could indeed boast of a mindless sort of integrity. It is this consistency, together with what he calls its 'cosmic scope', which for Fackenheim elevates Nazi ideology to the
prerequisite and an important if unacknowledged constituent of the postmodern 'critique' of rationality. status of a Weltanschauung, deserving of 'respect, even awe' .154 In this, how ever, Fackenheim's conception of what is or is not appropriate to the machinery of a political regime is warped, his values infected by those of the very society he is attempting (or refusing) to analyse. Integrity, to begin with, is not a political virtue, since it is one of those characteristics (like honesty, or moral scrupulousness) which cannot by their very nature appear intact in the public sphere. Furthermore
integrity, particularly in this narrow sense of 'internal coherence' (and this is the third point), has no positive correlation with rationality, and is in fact profoundly opposed to the processes of reason conceived, as Gillian Rose has defined it, in terms of risk '1" as a continually hazardous endeavour of going beyond existing limits, a spirit directed towards progress and the future, in which the "Hegelian moment of determinate negation is actively and recursively constitutive. The violence' represented by determinate negation is in essence mobilized against integration, just as it is perpetrated by the 'disintegrated' figures of Rameau, Daisy Miller, or Walter Benjamin's 'destructive character' against the philosopher) Diderot-Moi, the dullard Winterbourne, and the 'etui-man' of Benjamin's essay.
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, success is not defined in terms of getting, but rather in terms of solving through consensus. Deliberation is thus an end in itself, and citizens have succeeded whenever they are able to secure a realm of deliberative politics where the aim is forging consensus among participants, rather than achieving victory by some over others.
Through the creation of numerous networks of communication and the generation of publicity, citizen action furthers democracy by assuming a substantive role in governing and by forcing participants in the policy process to legitimate their positions politically rather than technically. Hager maintains that a sense of political efficacy is enhanced by this politically interactive role even though citizens were only minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate, and experienced a real lack of autonomy as they were coerced into adopting the terms of the technical debate. She agrees with Alberto Melucci that the impact of [these] movements cannot.., be judged by normal criteria of efficacy and success .... These groups offer a different way of perceiving and naming the world. They demonstrate that alternatives are possible, and they expand the communicative as opposed to the bureaucratic or market realms of societal activity.(87) Yet her analysis is incomplete. Like Habermas, Hager relies too heavily on a discursive reconstitution of political action. Though she recognized many of the limitations of Habermas's theory discussed above, she insists on the :innovative and creative potential of citizen initiatives. She insists that deliberative politics can resist the tendency toward authoritarianism common to even a communicative, deliberative search for objective truth, and that legitimation debates can avoid the tendency to devolve into the technical search for the better argument. She bases her optimism on the non-hierarchical, sometimes even chaotic and incoherent, forms of decisionmaking practiced by citizen initiatives, and on the diversity and spontaneity of citizen groups. Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of communicative action. It is here that a performative conception of
, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for deliberative to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and its participants. While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, a performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and often uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication. When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the out come of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.
political action implicitly informs Hager's discussion. From a performative perspective politics, but
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Praxis Turn:1AR
AND, EXTEND THE 2AC #__, ROUTLEDGE PRAXIS ARGUMENT. THEORETICAL ENGAGEMENT REMOVES ITSELF FROM LIVED EXPERIENCE, RENDERING ITSELF ANOTHER COMMODITY TO BE BOUGHT AND SOLD, PREVENTING TRANSFORMATION AND, THINKING ABOUT THINKING IS USELESS. THINKING ABOUT DOING IS KEY TO CHANGING STRUCTURAL WRONGS Booth 97
[Ken, Chair of Intl Pltcs @ Wales, Critical security studies, Ed. Krause & Williams, p. 114//uwyo] study of security can beneft from a range of perspectives, but not from those who would refuse to engage with the problems of those, at this minute, who are being starved, oppressed, or shot. It is therefore legitimate to ask what any theory that purports to belong within world politics has to say about Bosnia or nuclear deterrence. Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing. For those who believe that we live in a humanly constituted world, the distinction between theory and practice dissolves: theory is a form of practice, and practice is a form of theory. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for critical security studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, and sites of change, to help humankind in whole or in part, to move away from its structural wrongs.
Security is concerned with how people live. An interest in practice (policy relevance) is surely part of what is involved in being a security specialist. The
ALSO, MUST LINK PROTEST TO DEMANDS ON THE STATE OR WE LAPSE INTO POLITICAL PARALYSIS IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION Foucault 82
[Michel, God, Politics and Ethics: An Interview, The Foucault Reader, Trans. Catherine Porter, Ed. Paul Rabinow, 377//uwyo-ajl]
Q. And this is hard to situate within a struggle that is already under way, because the lines are drawn by others. . . . M.F. Yes, but I think that ethics is a practice; ethos is a manner of being. Let's take an example that touches us all, that of Poland. If we raise the question of Poland in strictly political terms, it's clear that we quickly reach the point of saying that there's nothing we can do. We can't dispatch a team of para- troopers, and we can't send armored cars to liberate Warsaw. I think that, politically, we have to recognize this, but I think we also agree that, for ethical reasons, we have to raise the problem of Poland in the form of a
nonacceptance of what is. happening there, and a nonacceptance of the passivity of our own governments. I think this attitude is an ethical one, but it is also political; it does not consist in saying merely, "I protest," but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as substantial as possible, and one which those who govern, here or there, will sooner or later be obliged to take into account.
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so much the external In-itself it tries to dominate but, rather, the obscene supplement which sustains its own operation.
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in order to stand outside this discursive enclosure thus to repudiate the hard core representations of the anarcy problematique one must condemn oneself to a position of practical futility, no matter how self-righteous it may be. Saying no to a powerful discourse that participates in the construction of the selfevIdent truth of the anarchy problematique, one is left to construct subjective counter-truths that cannot be effective precisely because they remove themselves from the workings of objective sources of power in history.
knowledgeable practices by which the anarchy problematique is constituted as a self-evident and objective condition of life. On the other hand,
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AND, FOREIGN POLICY CRITICISMS BECOME COMPLICIT WITH THE STRUCTURES THEY OPPOSE Ashley 96
[Richard, Erics Best Friend for Life & Prof. of Poli Sci @ ASU, The achievements of post-structuralism, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 247-8]
And to these four premises I might add just one more. Under these circumstances, it can make little sense to rehearse all those strains of argument that have explored the limitations of the model of critical activity I have been discussing this in the hope that I might thereby open up a conversation that seems so disposed to closure. Call them post-structuralist or call them what you will, these, once more, are strains of argument that have rigorously demonstrated how very paradoxical is every attempt to cling fast to this model of criticism in the face of all manner of excessive happenings that transgress or overflow the limits of every rendition of it; how much every such attempt depends upon strategiems for disciplining excess whose arbitrariness, whose violence, is right there on the surface for all to see; how much, therefore, every such attempt must rely upon effecting a blindness to its own emergence; and how readily, thanks to all of this, these attempts can be drawn into a complicity (thought not a secret complicity) with those very practices that would arrest ambiguity, discipline the proliferation of possibilities, tame resistances, and sustain structures of domination ostensibly opposed.
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alternatives, or assign political responsibility to address such issues, or even say without hesitation that wealthy nations that steadfastly ignore pockets of virulent poverty are immoral, then the worst nightmares of the most cynical post-modernists will likely come to life. Such an overarching refusal to address these issues is at least as dangerous as any overarching affirmation of beliefs regarding ways to go about solving them. Post-modernism suffers from -- and is defined by -- too much indeterminacy. In order to achieve anything, constructive or otherwise, human beings must attempt to understand the nature of things, and to evaluate them. This can be done even if we accept that we may never understand things completely, or evaluate them
correctly. But if paralysis is the most obvious political consequence of post-modernism, a graver danger lies in the rejection of the "Enlightenment ideals" of universality and impartiality. If the resounding end to the Cold War has taught us anything, it should be tha not invariably a coexistence of "little narratives": it can be, and frequently
What we need are specific solutions to specific problems: to trade disputes, . If one cannot prioritize public policy
t the opposite of "universalism" is is, some combination of intolerance, local prejudice, suspicion, bigotry, fear, brutality, and persecution. The uncritical affiliation with the community of one's
birth, as Martha Nussbaum notes, "while not without causal and formative power, is ethically arbitrary, and sometimes ethically dangerous -- in that it encourages us to listen to our unexamined preferences as if they were ethical laws."[10]
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a hermeneutics of faith to be one that treats the object of study as possessing inherent meaning on its own terms. In contrast, the hermeneutics of suspicion seeks to expose societal practices as illusory edifices that mask underlying contradictions or failures of meaning. I will return to the first pole in Part Four of this
what Ricoeur means by these two categories. Nevertheless, I understand Essay, but for now I wish to focus on the hermeneutics of demystification and suspicion.
t each of these thinkers makes "the decision to look upon the whole of consciousness primarily as "false' consciousness." 25 Ricoeur sees this perspective as an extension of Descartes' fundamental position of doubt at the dawn of the
Ricoeur locates in the work of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud the central hallmarks of this suspicious approach. He argues tha Enlightenment. According to Ricoeur, "The philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not such as they appear; but he does not doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself; in consciousness, meaning and consciousness of meaning coincide." 26
The hermeneutics of suspicion takes doubt one step farther, by distrusting even our perceptions.
This suspicious position questions the so-called "correspondence [*104] theory" of truth. As we go through our lives, most of us generally assume that our mental perceptions accord with reality because we believe we have direct access to reality through our senses or through reason. This is the legacy of the Enlightenment, the "answer" to the fundamental Cartesian doubt. But the hermeneutics of suspicion maintains that human beings create false truths for themselves.
Such false truths cannot be "objective" because they always serve some interest or purpose.
By discovering and revealing those interests or purposes, suspicious analysis seeks to expose so-called "false consciousness" generated through social ideology or self-deception. False consciousness may arise in many different ways. Nietzsche looked to people's self-deceit in the service of the "will to power." Marx focused on the social being and the false consciousness that arises from ideology and economic alienation. Freud approached the problem of false consciousness by examining dreams and neurotic symptoms in order to reveal hidden motivations and desires. Thus, "the Genealogy of Morals in Nietzsche's sense, the theory of ideologies in the Marxist sense, and the theory of ideas and illusions in Freud's sense represent three convergent procedures of demystification." 27
AND, SKEPTICISM STOPS SOCIAL CHANGE THEIR PARANOIA FORECLOSES UPON REVOLUTION Berman 2001
Of course
[Paul Schiff, Assoc. Prof. Law @ U. of Connecticut, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, LN]
, one might view this as a positive development. One might think people should stop being lulled into a false sense of believing that the rhetoric of public life really matters. If people began to view such rhetoric as a construction of entrenched power, so the argument might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly revolutionary political movement. I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to occur. Moreover, I am not sure that a culture of suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek political (or personal) change anyway.
Suspicious analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity, but there are dangers that arise from relentless disenchantment as well. As [*123] Richard K. Sherwin has observed,
Without the means of experiencing more profound enchantments, without communal rituals those beliefs ultimately lose their meaning and die... . Forms of enchantment in the service of deceit, illicit desire, and self-gratification alone must be separated out from forms of enchantment in the service of feelings, beliefs, and values that we aspire to affirm in light of the self, social, and legal realities they help to
and social dramas through which the culture's deepest beliefs and values may be brought to life and collectively reenacted, construct and maintain. 112
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of Foucault often come away believing that no shackles have been broken in the past two hundred years: the harsh old chains have merely been replaced with slightly more
comfortable ones. Heidegger describes America's success in blanketing the world with modern technology as the spread of a wasteland. Those who find Foucault and Heidegger convincing often view the United States of America as ... something we must hope will be replaced, as soon as possible, by something utterly different. 110 If that is one's viewpoint, it will inevitably be difficult to muster one's energy to believe
in the possibility of positive action in the world, short of revolution (and even revolution is probably inevitably compromised). As Rorty points out, though the writers of supposedly "subversive" works "honestly believe that they are serving human liberty," it may ultimately be "almost impossible to clamber back down from [these works] to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy." 111
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skeptical postmodernism "manifests a marked inclination toward pessimism and disenchantment." n128 If truth, meaning, and reality are no longer discernible, and if any sense of the unified self or human agency is illusory, he argues, we risk living in a world where "individuals can no longer be held accountable for having "authored' their acts or caused an event to happen." n129 According to Sherwin, "In the end the skeptical postmodern is left with nothing more than endless play and detached irony." n130 Nevertheless, like me, Sherwin refuses to jettison postmodern theory altogether. Instead, he contends, "Postmodernism need not be skeptical... . A story might concede the demise of the autonomous modern subject, but still find meaning through the distributed self: an identity made up of multiple cultural and social constructs shared by others in particular communities." n131 Similarly, taking Sherwin's [*129] "affirmative postmodern" view, we might recognize that concepts such as truth and justice are contingent, but still see those ideas as coherent. "Abstraction may give way to particularity, contextuality, multiplicity; judgment may turn toward characteristic voices and localized accounts. But localization and contextualization are not fatal to meaning. It remains possible to seek rather than abandon meaning for concepts like truth and justice - even in the face of contingency, unpredictability, and spontaneity." n132
have earlier in this Essay) against what he calls "skeptical postmodernism." Referring to Baudrillard, Sherwin observes that Following Sherwin's suggestion, I wish to pursue a story about law that makes no attempt to return to a formalist world where legal rules are "truths" to be "discovered" by judges. Rather, I accept the idea that there is an infinite number of possible narratives for describing reality and that each narrative is inevitably a product of many cultural forces. Further, I will accept that, at least within a certain range, none of these narratives necessarily has a stronger claim to truth than any other. In such a world, how might one understand and justify law practice in America? n133 My suggestion is that
we might conceive of law as a site for encounter, contestation, and play among various narratives. I draw on Hannah Arendt's conception of the "public" as a space of appearance where actors stand before others and are subject to
mutual scrutiny and judgment from a plurality of perspectives. n134 The public, on this view, "consists of multiple histories and perspectives relatively unfamiliar to
By communicating about their differing perspectives on the social world in which they dwell together, people and communities can collectively constitute an enlarged understanding of the world. n136 In this Part, therefore, I will first outline a
one another, connected yet distant and irreducible to one another." n135
prominent conception of "communicative democracy" that builds on Arendt, offered by political theorist Iris M. Young. Then, I will speculate about law's potential as a site for the type of idealized public discourse Young envisions. n137
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jargonistic postmodernisms that now dot the landscape. They are worse are neither capable of understanding and analyzing the power structure of this country nor are they capable of understanding the particular aesthetic merit of an individual work of art. Whether you call it deconstruction or postmodernism or poststructuralism or post-anything, they all represent a sort of spectacle of giving back
tickets that the entrance and saying, were really out of it. We want to check into our pri vate resort and be left alone. [317]
Reengagement with intellectual processes has very little to do with being politically correct, or citing fashionable names, or striking acceptable poses, but rather having to do with a return in a way to a kind of old-fashioned historical, literary, and above all, intellectual scholarship based upon the premise that human beings, men and women, make their own history. And just as things are made, they can be unmade and re-re-remade. That
sense of intellectual and political and citizenry empowerment is what I think the intellectual class needs. Theres only one way to anchor oneself, and that is by affiliation with a cause, with a political movement. There has to be some identification, not with the powers that be, with the Secretary of State or the great leading philosopher of the time or sage
; there has to be an affiliation with matters involving justice, principle, truth, conviction. Those dont occur in a laboratory or a library. For the American intellectual, that simply means, at bottom, in a globalized environment, that there is today one superpower, and the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world, based upon profit and power, has to be altered from an imperial one to one of coexistence among human communities that can make and remake their own histories together. This seems to me to be the number-one priority---theres nothing else.
An American has a particular role. If youre an anthropologist in America, its not the same thing as being an anthropologist in India or France; its a qualitatively different thing. HARLOW: Were both professors in English departments, despite the fact that the humanities have been quite irresponsible, unanswerable SAID: Not the humanities. The professors of humanities. HARLOW: Well, OK, the professors, but there is this question SAID: I take the general view that, for all its inequity, for all its glaring faults and follies, the university in this society remains a relatively utopian place, a place of
. There needs to be some sense of the university as a place in which these issues are not, because it is that kind of place, trivialized. Universities cannot afford to become just a platform for a certain kind of narcissistic specialization and jargon. What you need is a regard for the product of the human mind. And thats why Ive been very dispirited, I must tell you, but aspects of the great
great privilege Western canon debate, which really suggest that the oppressed of the world, in wishing to be heard, in wishing their work to be recognized, really wish to do dirt on everything else. Thats not the spirit of resistance. We come [318] back to Aime Cesaires line, There is room for all that at the rendezvous of victory. Its not that some have to be pushed off and demeaned and denigrated. The question is not whether we should read more black literature or less literature by white men. The issue is excellence---we need everything, as much as possible, for understanding the human adventure in its fullest, without resorting to enormous abstractions and generalizations, without replacing Euro-centrism with other varieties of ethnocentrism, or say, Islamo-centrism or Afro-centrism or gyno-centrism. Is it a game of substitutions? Thats where intellectuals have to clarify themselves. HARLOW: I agree, but at least within certain university contexts there have been lately two major issues: the Gulf War and multiculturalism. I have not seen any linkage between the two. SAID: The epistemology and the ethic of specialization have been accepted by all. If youre a literature professor, thats what you talk about. And if youre an education specialist, thats what you talk about. The whole idea of being in the university means not only respect for what others do, but respect for what you do. And the sense that they all are part of a community. The main point is that we ascribe a utopian function to the intellectual. Even inside the university, the prevalence of norms based upon domination and coercion is so strong because the idea of authority is so strong---whether its authority derived from the nation-state, from religion, from the ethnos, from tradition---is so powerful that its gone relatively unchallenged, even in the very disciplines and studies that we are engaged in. Part of intellectual work is
And if you can understand that, they your work is conducted in such a way as to be able to provide alternatives to authoritative and coercive norms that dominate so much of our intellectual life, our national and political life, and our international life above all.
understanding how authority is formed. Like everything else, authority is not God-given. Its secular.
HARLOW: What can alternative publications do to interrupt that particular way of presenting authority? SAID: One is to remind readers that there are always other ways of looking at the issue---whatever it happens to be---than those that are officially credentialed. Second, one of the things that one needs to do in intellectual enterprises is to---Whitehead says somewhere---always try to write about an author keeping in mind what he or she might say of what youre writing. To adapt from that: some sense in which your constituency might be getting signals about what youre doing. The agenda isnt set only by you; its set by others. You cant represent the others, but you can take them into account by soliciting their attention. Let such a publication be a place in which its pages that which is occluded or suppressed or has disappeared from the consciousness of the West, of the intellectual, can be allowed to appear. Third, some awareness of the methodological issues involved, and the gathering of information, the production of scholarship, the relationship between scholarship and knowledge. The great virtue of these journals is that they are not guided by professional norms. Nobody is going to get tenure out of writing for these journals. And nobody is trying to advance in a career by what he or she does there. So that means therefore that one can stand back and look at these things and take questions having to do with how people know things. In other words, a certain emphasis on novelty is important and somewhat lacking. You dont want to feel too virtuous in what you are doing: that Im the only person doing this, t herefore, I must continue doing it. Wit is not such a bad thing.
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The fundamental vocation of the intellectual is to figure things out, you know, intellego, to understand. And politics isn't about understanding, politics is about getting things done. Understanding can be an instrument of getting things done, but nuance and complexity of understanding can be an obstacle to getting things done. Politics - it's the art of the possible, and sometimes in order to do the best that can be done, you have to ride roughshod over what are, for an intellectual, important distinctions - for example, between the truth and the untruth.
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Snyder, Doctoral Fellow in the English Department at Louisville, Boundary Dissolution in film, photography & advertising, 2000, http://athena.louisville.edu/as/english/babo/snyder/bountexts.html, accessed 10/15/02
The argument I am making about the postmodern theories of subjectivity and global capitalism are similar to arguments made about multiculturalism and global capitalism by David Rieff and Slavoj Zizek. Rieff suggests that multiculturalism is a byproduct or corollary of a specific material integument (62). Rieffs position is that although multiculturalists often regard their work as politically leftist: resulting in the breakdown of patriarchal, European hegemony and the ascendancy of the previously marginalized, they actually function as the silent partner of global capitalism. Additionally, Rieff points out how closely the buzz words of multiculturalism--cultural diversity, difference, the need to do away with boundariesresemble the stock phrases of the modern corporation: product diversification, the global marketplace, and the boundary-less company (Rieff). Similarly, Zizek contends that postmodern identity politicswhile ostensibly seeking to subvert capitalismare made possible only in the field of global capitalism. He writes that cultural studies, is performing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism and that the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism (218; 216).My argument is that postmodern theories and global capitalism dialectically influence one another. Postmodern theory is generated by the material conditions of labor and production in late capitalism, which needs consumers who will disregard national boundaries. By the logic that all products of the system are necessary to the system, we assume that anything the system produces, it needs. Ideological state apparatuses, like the university, do the work necessary to interpellating the ideal subject of global capitalism. My thought is that global capitalism needs postmodern theories of subjectivity because they produce subjects who are seamlessly articulated with the structures of global capitalism. While postmodern subjectivity may seem wildly radical at firstbreaking down boundaries between genders, between machines and humansthe similarities between its subjectivities and the structures of global capitalism are eerily similar. Fluidity, flexibility, and boundary dissolution equally describe both. The celebration of the loss of the unified, coherent subject of modernity and the new fluid, flexible, fragmented subject of postmodernity is the stuff of Millenial Dreams, Paul Smiths term for the rhetoric of globalization and the array of ideological forms which interpellate the desired subject of global capitalism. Smith writes that the annunciation of globalization itself is part of the ideological battery used to interpellate subjects in the current conjuncture . . . and attempt to regulate the moral and cultural practices of subjects (46). I agree with Tereas Ebert that post-al theories are complicit with patriarchal capitalism. Rather than seeking the liberation of the exploited workers of late capitalismprimarily third-world, minority, poverty-stricken womenpostmodern theorists celebrate a liberatory freedom experienced by a small percentage of the first world at the expense of the rest of the world.
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Snyder, Doctoral Fellow in the English Department at Louisville, Boundary Dissolution in film, photography & advertising, 2000, http://athena.louisville.edu/as/english/babo/snyder/bountexts.html, accessed 10/15/02
This web site explores the ways postmodern theories of subjectivity facilitate global capitalism. The seed for this project was planted during Deconstructed Selves, Postmodern Narratives, a session at the 20th Century Lit. Conference. I had just heard a paper on Crash so thoughts of cyborgs and strange postmodern desires were already mingling with a project topic that was due in my Theories of Interpretation seminar. While Silvio Gaggi flashed slides of Cindy Shermans photographythe pictures of her well-groomed, appropriately feminized body, a 50s starlet in juxtaposition with images of excrement, false eyelashes, cigarette butts--I discovered my topic: the ways that the postmodern notion of subjectivity--fluid, unfixed, transgressed boundaries--and the modern notion of subjectivitystable, unified, coherent, preserved boundaries-are analogous to the evolution from classical to global/late capitalism. My theory: While the dissolution of boundaries in postmodern subjectivity may at first seem wildly radical, it actually facilitates the hegemony by interpellating the ideal subject of global capitalism, one who can manipulate fluid capital, produce/consume intangible data, and accept the dissolution of national boundaries for the purpose of exporting manufacturing work to 3rd world countries, for the purpose of global e-commerce, and for the formation of multinational corporations.
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However, the influence on American cultural studies of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England, with which Hall and Gilroy are associated, has generally been limited. American studies of diasporan cultures have tended to uphold a more innocent concept of the essential diasporan subject, one that celebrates hybridity, cultural border crossing, and the production of difference. In the United States, the conjuncture of postcolonial theory and diaspora studies seems to produce a bifurcated model of diasporan cultures. Some scholars dwell on narratives of sacrifice, which are associated with enforced labor migrations, as well as on critiques of the immorality of development. Others, who write about displacements in borderland areas, emphasize subjects who struggle against adversity and violation by affirming their cultural hybridity and shifting positions in society. The unified moralism attached to subaltern subjects now also clings to diasporan ones, who are invariably assumed to be members of oppressed classes and therefore constitutionally opposed to capitalism and state power. Furthermore, because of the exclusive focus on texts, narratives, and subiectivities, we are often left wondering what are the particular local-global structural articulations that materially and symbolically shape these dynamics of victimhood and ferment.
Snyder, Doctoral Fellow in the English Department at Louisville, Boundary Dissolution in film, photography & advertising, 2000,
With its dependence on fluid capital and the production/consumption of intangible data, global capitalism demands the dissolution of national boundaries for the purpose of exporting manufacturing work to 3rd world countries, for the purpose of global ecommerce, and for the formation of multinational corporations. Global capitalism makes similar demands on its ideal producing and consuming subject, who is articulated as fluid, fragmented, and flexible. Clearly, this subject is a radical reconfiguration of the unified, coherent subject of classical capitalism, who is articulated for the purposes of producing and consuming solid material goods and preserving national boundaries.
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leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multisyllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or
Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We
"When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."
don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words
, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the
country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke
, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based
the words of King, and with reference to the American society initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as
. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the
part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"
The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from
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which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their
snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
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. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course,
the bad is not merely the level of erudition comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical
it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis , and no selfWhat Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia. Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better
sensibilities, respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this.
It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Luk cs, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these
other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, I try and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for
they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukcs, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of
culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase
such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukcs everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.
their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But
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, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I mean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough
it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels
grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here. But there are few people like George Soros around, and I think that the improbability of philosophers emerging as a special class of social auditor also marks the limits
philosophers are the class most likely to see the places at which bridges of true understanding can be built not only between an inimical Right and Left, but between public policy and the deep and relevant reflections upon our humanity in which philosophers routinely engage. If philosophers seek to remain what the public thinks we are anyway, a class of persons of whom it can be
of social hope, inasmuch as said, as Orwell put it, One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that; no ordinary man could be such a fool, then I do not know from what other class of persons to turn to navigate the complicated intellectual and emotional obstacles that prevent us from the achievement of our country
. For I do not see how policy wonks, political hacks, politicians, religious ideologues and special interests will do the work that needs to be done to achieve the kind of civic consensus envisioned in our Constitution and Declaration of Independence. Without a courageous new breed of public intellectual, one that is able to help articulate new visions for community and social well being without fear of reaching out to others that may not share the narrow views of the Cultural Left and Cultural Right, I do not see how America moves beyond a mere land of toleration and oligarchy.
David E. , New School University, The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope, Presented at the 20 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm.
Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but are not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning to learn to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities, though we delude ourselves into believing that we have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest, will bear a small harvest of unintended and positive
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if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to meet the not-too-wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendevous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probably has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a little more sympathetic to what the other side might, in good faith, believe is at stake. They might leave behind some of the baggage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization, or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neocapitalist hegemonies, and join the political fray by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. The operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders.
consequences, although I remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of George W. Bush. But
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THE FACT THAT SOMETHING IS PRODUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE DOESNT ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR CONCRETE POLICY ACTION
Richard Rorty, Professor, Humanities, University of Virginia, TRUTH, POLITICS, AND POSTMODERNISM: SPINOZA LECTURES, 1997, p. 51-52.
Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad
This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately
represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
to describe intellectual progress.
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The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with
the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism, but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marxs philosophy of
history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semiconscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the
This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for the system and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academyand, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillards account of America as Disneyland as a country of simulacraand to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a Peoples Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals toiletsmight revitalize leftist politics.
late Sixties.
. Sixties leftists skipped lightly over all the questions which had been raised by the experience of nonmarket economies seemed to be suggesting that once we were rid of both bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, the people would know how to handle competition from steel mills or textile factories in the developing world, price hikes on imported oil, and so on. But they never told us how the people would learn how to do this. The cultural Left still skips over such questions. Doing so is a consequence of its preference for talking about the system rather than about specific social practices and specific changes in those practices. The rhetoric of this Left remains revolutionary rather than reformist and pragmatic. Its insouciant use of terms like late capitalism suggests that we can just wait for capitalism to collapse, rather than figuring out what, in the absence of markets, will set prices and regulate distribution. The voting public, the public which must be won over if the Left is to emerge from the academy into the public square, sensibly wants to be told the details. It wants to know how things are going to work after markets are put behind us. It wants to know how participatory democracy is supposed to function. The cultural Left offers no answers to such demands for further information, but until it confronts them it will not be able to be a political Left. The public, sensibly, has no interest in getting rid of capitalism until it is offered details about the alternatives. Nor should it be interested in
in the so-called socialist countries. They participatory democracythe liberation of the people from the power of the technocratsuntil it is told how deliberative assemblies will acquire the same know-how which only the technocrats presently possess. Even someone like myself, whose admiration for John Dewey is almost unlimited, cannot take seriously his defense of participatory democracy against Walter Lippmanns insistence on the need for expertise
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attack each other and might have the motive to do so any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them.
Add to this the 911 problem the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Morever, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse, the former can lead to
war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense because the stakes are great . States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because
other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: todays alliance partner might be tomorrows enemy, and todays enemy might be tomorrows alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.
Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and a ware that they oeprate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival
is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither
Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler,
to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world , if that were possible. Survival would then be almost guaranteed
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, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.
daily politics. But staying at distance, or
THIRD, THE PERM SOLVES BEST REALISM OPENS UP SPACE FOR ONGOING CRITICISM, MAKING THE ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H.,
objectives, but also upon the resolution of more- immediate difficulties. Given that,
in the absence of a resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem to offer a more effective strategy of transition than relativism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such strategies are divorced from an awareness
of the immediate problems which obstruct such efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, they are divorced from the current realities of international politics altogether,
realism's emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals,
emphasizing simply the necessity of a restrained moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of mutual understanding in
, they at least seek to take advantage of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardizing the possibilities of order. Realism's gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic process, ultimately suggests the
international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community which might underlie a more comprehensive international society basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist perspectives, however dramatic, can offer. For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticized for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticized for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of
Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and relativism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by
establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasize the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a viable synthesis. Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that all politics are power politics. It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it would not be eliminated altogether.67 The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para)military but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of
, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the reformist zeal of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver's sensible caution that before reform is attempted, whatever measure of security is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured
politics; it is not something which can be banished, only tamed and restrained. As a result
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#1 Mearsheimer: 1AR
EXTEND THE 2AC #___ MEARSCHEIMER 2001 EVIDENCE. THE SELF-HELP INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MAKES REALISM INEVITABLE BECAUSE OF STATE COMPETITION AND THE DESIRE FOR SURVIVAL. TRYING TO BREAK DOWN THAT SYSTEM CAUSES POWER DIFFERENTIALS THAT RESULT IN MASS WAR AND DEATH THAT MAKES THEIR ARGUMENT TERMINALLY NOT UNIQUE, BECAUSE STATES WILL STILL COMPETE AND FILL THE VOID AND YOU VOTE ON ANY RISK OF WAR ALSO, STATES ALWAYS ACT TO INCREASE THEIR RELATIVE POWER, MAKING SECURITY COMPETITION INEVITABLE Mearscheimer 2001
[John J., Prof. of Pol. Sci @ U. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Warfare]
Given the difficulty of determing how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it already had sufficient power to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system. All states are influence by this logic, which means htat not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, hwere states are wiling to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is nt liekly to break out in this world.
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#1 Mearsheimer: Ext
THEIR CRITICISM DOESNT PROVIDE US WITH A ROADMAP WHICH ENSURES VIOLENCE REALISM IS NEEDED TO KEEP THE BALANCE OF POWER STABLE IT IS ON BALANCE BETTER Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H.,
Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 188-9)
His disagreement with realism depends on a highly contestable claim - based on Herz's argument that, with the development of global threats, the conditions which might produce some universal consensus have arisen - that its 'impossibility theorem' is empirically problematic, that a universal consensus is achievable, and that its practical strategy is obstructing its realisation. In much the same way, in `The poverty of neorealism', realism's practical strategy is illegitimate only because Ashley's agenda is inclusionary. His central disagreement with realism arises out of his belief that its strategy reproduces a world order organised around sovereign states, preventing exploration of the indeterminate number of - potentially less exclusionary - alternative world orders. Realists, however, would be unlikely to be troubled by such charges. Ashley needs to do rather more than merely assert that the development of global threats will produce some universal consensus, or that any number of less exclusionary world orders are possible, to convince them. A universal threat does not imply a universal consensus, merely the existence of a universal threat faced by particularistic actors. And the assertion that indeterminate numbers of potentially less exclusionary orders exist carries little weight unless we can specify exactly what these alternatives are and just how they might be achieved. As such, realists would seem to be justified in regarding such potentialities as currently unrealizable
Despite the adverse side-effects that such a balance of power implies, it at least offers us something tangible rather than ephemeral promises lacking a shred of support. Ultimately, Ashley's demand that a new, critical approach
ideals and in seeking a more proximate good in the fostering of mutual understanding and, in particular. of a stable balance of power.
be adopted in order to free us from the grip of such 'false conceptions depends upon ideas about the prospects for the development of a universal consensus which are little more than wishful thinking, and ideas about the existence of potentially less exclusionary orders which are little more than mere assertion. Hence his attempts, in 'Political realism and human interests', to conceal these ideas from view by claiming that the technical base of realism serves only to identify, and yet not to reform, the practical, and then, in 'The poverty of neorealism', by removing the technical from investigation altogether by an exclusive reliance on a problem of hermeneutic circularity. In the final analysis, then, boils down to little more than a critique which fails. It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices, such that it presumes that the entirety of the solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It alternative - no , no proximate goals, indeed, little by way of goals at all. If, in constructivism, the progressive purpose leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, in post-
strategies
critique ultimately proves unsustainable. With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. If realism is, as Ashley puts it, 'a tradition forever immersed in the expectation of political tragedy'. it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and ways in which to achieve them which his own
structuralism it generates a complete absence of strategies altogether. Critique serves to fill the void, yet this position. forever immersed in the expectation of deliverance- is manifestly unable to provide."
AND, COMPETITION AMONG STATES IS INEVITABLE 3 REASONS: 1) NO CENTRAL AUTHORITY 2) STATES HAVE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES 3) VAGUE INTENTIONS MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 3. )
Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other. 2) the fact that states always have some offensive mili- tary capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Given this fear-which can never be wholly eliminat- ed-states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.
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#2 Guzzini: 1AR
REALISM MUST BE USED STRATEGICALLY BECAUSE REALWORLD ACTORS RELY ON IT
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1998, p. 235
Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand, realist assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in plural
, to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as
terms. On the other hand also provide them with legitimacy. Despite
particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action. They
realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is. Realism is not a causal theory that explains International Relations, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly and uncritically reproduce it.
REJECTION FAILS IT REPRODUCES SOVEREIGNTY AND PERPETUATES EXPLOITATION ACTION MUST BE TAKEN Agathangelou, Director of the Global Change Institute, 1997 (Anna M., Studies
in Political Economy, v. 54, p. 7-8)
Yet, ironically if not tragically,
dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims
that a coherent paradigm or research program even an alternative one reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden powermongering of sovereign scholarship. Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives, writes Jim George must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in readymade alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning
dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities. Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take a critical distance or position offshore from which to see the possibility of change. But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes critically from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.
of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What
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#2 Guzzini: Ext
BALANCE OF POWERS REMAINS A TOP PRIORITY- STATES WILL STILL FEAR EACH OTHER POST THE ALT Mearsheimer, Professor of Pol Sci at University of Chicago, 01, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchythe driving force behind great-power behaviordid not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.
OTHERS WONT FOLLOW OUR LEAD MAKES REALISM NECESSARY Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H.,
Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 181-2)
This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the
intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, What is problematic is his faith that such chance, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the
belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything in his account, is up for gabs: there is no
core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of. This venerates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the
intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of 'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively culminates in a demand that the state
undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously. might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world. or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited. are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a
systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.
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#3 Murray: 1AR
REALISM IS THE BEST MIDDLE GROUND IT SYNTHESISES CRITICAL THEORIES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE REAL POSSIBILITY FOR TRANSFORMATION Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H.,
Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 178-9)
I n Wendt's constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of human nature. In Linklater's critical theory it moves a stage farther, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state-centrism. In Ashley's post-structuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickner's feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarching, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory. Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative. rationalist camp is untenable but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive
purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counterproductive. In critical theory it moves a stage further producing strategies so abstract that one is at a
loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of
such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism. of conservatism and progressivism might be built.
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#3 Murray: Ext
REALISM BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN CRITIQUE AND THE NEED FOR POLITICAL ACTION IT CAN ENCORPORATE ALL OF THEIR ARGUMENTS WHILE STILL RECOGNIZING THAT TEHRE ARE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE WORLD TODAY Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H.,
Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 202-3)
Ultimately, the only result of the post-positivist movement's self-styled 'alternative' status is the generation of an unproductive opposition; between a seemingly mutually exclusive rationalism and reflectivism. Realism would seem to hold out the possibility of a more constructive path for international relations theory. The fact that it is engaged in a normative enquiry is not to say that it abandons a concern for the practical realities of international politics, only that it is concerned to bridge the gap between cosmopolitan moral and power political logics. Its approach ultimately provides an
overarching framework which can draw on many different strands of thought, the 'spokes' which can be said to be attached to its central hub, to enable it to relate empirical concerns to a normative agenda. It can incorporate the lessons that geopolitics yields, the insights that neorealism might achieve, and all the other information that the approaches which effectively serve to articulate the specifics of its orientation generate, and. once incorporated within its theoretical framework, relate them both to one another and to the requirements of the ideal, in order to support an analysis of the conditions which characterise contemporary international politics and help it to achieve a viable political ethic. Against critical theories which are incomprehensible to any but their authors and their acolytes and which prove incapable of relating their categories to the issues which provide the substance of international affairs, and against rationalist, and
especially neorealist, perspectives which prove unconcerned for matters of values and which simply ignore the relevance of ethical questions to political action, realism is capable of formulating a position which brings ethics and politics into a viable relationship. It would ultimately seem to offer us a course which navigates between the Scylla of defending our values so badly that we end up threatening their very existence, and the Charybdis of defending them so efficiently that we
become everything that they militate against. Under its auspices. we can perhaps succeed in reconciling our ideals with our pragmatism.
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Violence is Endemic
POLITICS MUST INCORPORATE THE EXISTENCE OF ENDEMIC VIOLENCE. WE CAN INCORPORATE THIS WITHOUT BUYING INTO EVERY REALIST PREMISE
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European University, The enduring dilemmas of realism in International Relations, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, December 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gus02/gus02.pdf, accessed 8/13/02 Until now, the purpose of this article might have appeared to be just another, perhaps more systematically grounded, critique of the difficulties realist theories of International Relations have been facing. By drawing on the lessons one can learn from these dilemmas, this conclusion wants to suggest a way forward. Once we know where realism gets stuck in its analytical justification, the study of its dilemmas should open a more reflexive way to reapprehend Realism as a double negation and the trap of the realism-idealism debate In what follows, I argue that the underlying reason why realists are not facing up the implications of the identity (distinctiveness/determinacy) and the conservative (science/tradition) dilemma consists in the terms of the first debate in which many realists feel compelled to justify realism. According to this self-understanding, realists are there to remind us about the fearful, the cruel side of world politics which lurks behind. This distinct face of international politics inevitably shows when the masquerade is over. In the Venetian carnival of international diplomacy, only the experienced will be prepared when the curtain falls and world history picks up its circular course. By trying to occupy a vantage point of (superior) historical experience, science came then as an offer, IR realism could not refuse. IR Realism has repeatedly thought to have no other choice but to justify this pessimism with a need to distance itself from other positions, to be nonsubsumable. It needed to show that whatever else might temporarily be true, there is an unflinching reality which cannot be avoided. Realism needed to point to a reality which cannot be eventually overcome by politics, to an attitude which would similarly rebuff the embrace by any other intellectual tradition. The first debate is usually presented as the place in which this negative attitude has been played out, indeed mythically enshrined. It is to this metaphorical foundation to which many self-identified realists return. Yet, I think that the first debate is a place where the thoughts not only of so-called idealist scholars, but also of self-stylised realists look unduly impoverished exactly because it is couched in terms of an opposition. When scholars more carefully study the type of opposition, however, they quickly find out that many so-called realist scholars have been not only critical of utopian thought and social engineering, but also of Realpolitik. In other words, if one concentrates on scholars and their work, and not on labels, one sees realism not simply as an attitude of negation which it is but as an attitude of double negation: in the words of R.N. Berki, realism must oppose both the conservative idealism of nostalgia and the revolutionist idealism of imagination. Norberto Bobbio has developed this double negation in his usually lucid style as both a conservative realism which opposes the ideal, and a critical realism which opposes the apparent, a difference too few realists have been able to disentangle. For this double heritage of political realism is full of tensions. Realism as anti-idealism is status-quo oriented. It relies on the entire panoply of arguments so beautifully summarised by Alfred Hirschman. According to the futility thesis, any attempt at change is condemned to be without any real effect. The perversity thesis would argue that far from changing for the better, such policies only add new problems to the already existing ones. And the central jeopardy thesis says that purposeful attempts at social change will only undermine the already achieved. The best is the enemy of the good, and so on. Anti-apparent realism, however, is an attitude more akin to the political theories of suspicion. It looks at what is hidden behind the smokescreen of current ideologies, putting the allegedly self-evident into the limelight of criticism. With the other form of realism , it shares a reluctance to treat beautiful ideas as what they claim to be. But it is much more sensible to their ideological use, revolutionary as well as conservative. Whereas anti-ideal realism defends the status quo, anti-apparent realism questions it. It wants to unmask existing power relations.
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Realism Inevitable
WE MUST USE REALISM BECAUSE OTHERS RELY ON IT
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1998, p. 227 The main line of critique can be summarized as follows: realism does not take its central concepts seriously enough. To start with, its critiques claim that realism is a sceptical practice which however, stops short of problematizing the inherent theory of the state. It is, second, a practice which informs an international community. Third, international politics is not power politics because it resembles realist precepts, but because the international community which holds a realist world-view acts in such a way as to produce power politics: it is a social construction. Realist expectations might hold, not because they objectively correspond to something out there, but because agents make them the maxims that guide their actions. Finally, this can have very significant policy effects: even at the end of the Cold War which might have shattered realist world-views, realist practices could mobilize old codes, such as to belittle the potential historical break of the post-Berlin wall system. Realism still underlies major re-conceptualization of the present international system, from Huntington's geocultural reification to `neomedievalism' - and justifies the foreign policies which can be derived from them.
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. Although offensive realists who see aggression and expansionism as omnipresent (or who believe that security requires expansion) stress the prevalence of extreme conflict of interest, defensive realists believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners dilemma or a more complex security dilemma. The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft consists of structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The everpresent fear that others will take advantage of the state and the knowledge that others have reciprocal worries leads diplomats to seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concerns. Even if international politics must remain a Prisoners Dilemma, it can often be made into one that is more benign by
realists see that politics is often tragic in the sense of actors being unable to realize their common interests altering the pay-offs to encourage cooperation, for example, by enhancing each states ability to protect itself should the other seek to exploit it and increasing the transparency that allows each to see what the other side is doing and understand why it is doing it.
The knowledge that even if others are benign today, they may become hostile in the future due to changes of mind, circumstances, and regimes can similarly lead decision makers to create arrangements that bind others and themselves, as previously noted.
WAR AND VIOLENCE ARE ENDEMIC TO IR POLITICS, MOVING AWAY WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN GREAT POWER WARS MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg xi-xii. ) The twentieth century was a period of great international violence .In World
War I (1914-18), roughly nine million people died on European battlefields. About fifty million people were killed duringWorld War 11(1939-45), well over half of them civilians. Soon after the end of World War II, the Cold War engulfed the globe. During this con-frontation, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies never directly fought the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies,but many millions died in proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Millions also died in the century's lesser, yet still fierce, wars, including the Russo-Japanese con-flicts of 1904-5 and 1939, the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1920, the Russo-Polish War of 1920-
Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means
21, the various Arab-Israeli wars, and the han-Iraq War of 1980-88. This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium.
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to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation, but there is no escaping it unless the states that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, however, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics.
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deal. Power, according to this logic, is not a means to an end (survival), but an end in itself.2'
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the keystone of American strategy should be an effort to preserve and sustain the situation as well and as long as possible. America's most vital interest, therefore, is maintaining the general peace, for war has been the swiftest, most expensive, and most devastating means of changing the balance of international power. But peace does not keep itself, although one of the most common errors in modern thinking about international relations is the assumption that peace is natural and can be
Few, if any, nations in the history of the world have ever enjoyed such a favorable situation. It stands to reason that preserved merely by having peace-seeking nations avoid provocative actions. The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggests the opposite conclusion:
major war is more likely to come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take an active part in the preservation of peace. It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of U.S. power and credibility, which would follow on a policy of reduced responsibility, would thus not be a neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be a critical step in undermining the stability of the international situation. Calculations based on the absence of visible potential enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, instability, and the likelihood of war would be infinitely greater than the cost of continuing to uphold the existing international structure.
AND, NON-VIOLENCE DOESNT SOLVE ITS JUST WISHFUL THINKING Regan, Political Science Professor at Fordham, 1996 (Richard, Just War: Principles
and Causes, p. 6)
Pacifists generally argue that nonviolence and nonresistance will ultimately win the minds and hearts of aggressors and oppressors, but that argument is neither convincing nor dispositive. The success of Gandhi or King may have been due (at least in part) to the appeal of their nonviolent campaigns to the conscience of their oppressors. But if that is true, it is because Gandhi could appeal to the moral conscience of a free British electorate over the heads of colonial administrators, and King could appeal to the moral conscience of the national American electorate over the heads of regional southern officials. There is no reason to believe that such campaigns would have been successful against the rulers of Nazi Germany. Second, the argument rests on an extremely optimistic view about the reformability of human behavior. Hobbes was surely correct in describing a persistent conflictual pattern of human behavior. To imagine that every or even most human beings will behave like saints seems to be wishful thinking. And even were human beings to be so transformed at some indefinite future point of time, why should innocent human beings suffer oppression in the intervening short run?
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assuming that a world without effective rules and the power to enforce them would be any more benign than Hobbes imagined it would be, or that a world full of escalating rivalries, arms buildups, aggression, repression, genocide, and war would not ultimately threaten our values, our security, and our way of life. Especially now, in a turbulent era of power instabilities and rapidly resurgent nationalisms, world order will depend heavily on preeminent American military power, selectively but strategically engaged around the world in the service of liberal principles. In the necessary task of reconfiguring U.S. foreign
policy for a new century, liberal internationalism offers the best, wisest, most secure, and most humane foundation on which to build.
EVEN IF THEY WIN THAT THE PLAN DOESNT PASS WELL WIN THAT THE KRITIK SANCTIONS GENOCIDE Willis 12-19-95 (Ellen, The Village Voice)
If intellectuals are more inclined to rise to the discrete domestic issue than the historic international moment, this may have less to do with the decay of the notion of international solidarity than with the decay of confidence in their ability to change the world, not to mention the decay of anything resembling a coh erent framework of ideas within which to understand it. Certainly the received ideas of the left, to the extent that a left can still be said to exist, have been less than helpful as a framework for understanding the Bosnian crisis or organizing a response to it. Although the idea of American imperialism explains less and less in a world where the locus of power is rapidly shifting to a network of transnational corporations, it still fuels a strain of reflexive anti-interventionist sentiment whose practical result is paralyzed dithering in the face of genocide. Floating around "progressive" circles and reinforcing the dithering is a brand of vulgar pacifism whose defining characteristic is not principled rejection of violence but squeamish aversion to dealing with it. In the academy in particular, entrenched assumptions about identity politics and cultural relativism promote a view of the Balkan conflict as too complicated and ambiguous to allow for choosing sides. If there is no such thing as universality, if multiethnic democracy is not intrinsically preferable to ethnic separatism, if there are no
clear-cut aggressors and victims but merely clashing cultures, perhaps ethnic partition is simply the most practical way of resolving those "implacable ancient rivalries."\
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we remain globally powerful and engaged - and that a dictatorship does not rise to hegemonic power within any major region.
LITTLE B: DEMOCRACY PREVENTS WAR, MASS DEATH, AND GENOCIDE Rummel, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii & Director of the Haiku Institute of Peace Research, 1994 (Rudolph J., Power, Genocide and Mass
Murder, Journal of Peace Research, February, Volume 31, Nubmer 1)
The principal empirical and theoretical conclusion emerging from this project confirms previous work on the causes of war: Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely. The more
power a regime has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite. The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state
apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects and the more insistently it can declare war on domestic and foreign enemies. By contrast, the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects, the more constrained the power of a regime - the more
political power is diffused, checked, and balanced - the less it will aggress on others and commit democide. This finding holds up through a variety of multivariate
analyses comprising over a hundred different kinds of political, cultural, social, and economic variables. All considered, including the partial correlations, regression analysis, and the independent dimensions defined through factor analysis, a measure of democracy versus totalitarian regimes and measures of war and rebellion are the best independent predictors of democide (Rummel, 1995). At the extremes of power, the totalitarian regimes murdered their people by the tens of millions, while many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers. The
way to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom. This is the ultimate
conclusion of this project.
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This is not merely to indulge in yet another interminable discourse on the lessons of Munich, rejecting all strategies of assurance for more famil iar policies of deterrence. A realist perspective does not, as Wendt seems to assume, require worst-case forecasting, nor does it adopt an ethic of sauve qui peut. But it is to suggest that, when realism emphasizes the need for a cautious, gradual approach to attempts to transform the nature of the system, it had a point . In Wendts analysis, change ultimately becomes as privileged as the status quo in rationalist perspectives. If he does not hold that history is progressive, he does hold that change is. If he is not idealistic about the possibilities of effecting a transformation of the system, he is with regard to the way in which it might be accomplished. Yet, even if we acknowledge that a transformation in the structure of international politics would be beneficial, this does not imply the acceptance of a desperate gamble to accomplish it. And, at the end of the day, if we can accept that the current structure of international politics contains many injustices, there is no guarantee that its transformation would remove such iniquities anyway. The only thing that the quest to overthrow the status quo does not guarantee to do is to undermine those fragments of order that we currently possess. Ultimately, constructivism can be seen to rest upon a value of judgment which sacrifices the safe option of remaining within the current situation for the attempt to explore its possibilities. It can be seen to rest on a progressive philosophy which privileges the possible over the extant and sacrifices stability on the altar of transformation.
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This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other- that are merely concerned with their own survival- nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us, he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out. Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way, it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latters integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage Chinas transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe. Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail.
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t in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the "911" problem-the absence of a cen- tral authority to which a threatened state can turn for help-and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for pun- ishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplIfy the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great pow- ers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as
immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany.' The basis of this fear is tha mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies.
Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own sur- vival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states can- not depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own sur- vival. In international politics, God helps those who help
themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances." But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's affiance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War H, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own sell-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the inter- ests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international com- munity. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as weli as in the long term, because if a state loses in the
short run, it might not be around for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-
states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any
help system, of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible."12 Survival would then be almost guaranteed." Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means-economic, diplomatic, and military-to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile.
Because one state's gain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this
competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that
states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.'4
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Miscalculation Inevitable
POWER MISCALCULATION IS INEVITABLE 1. STATES LIE 2. THEY MAKE MISTAKES IN CALCULATED STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 38. )
Nevertheless, great powers miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make important decisions on the basis of imperfect informa- tion. States hardly ever have complete information about any situation they confront. There are two dimensions to this problem. Potential adver- saries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to conceal their true aims.24 For example, a weaker state trying to deter a stronger state is likely to exaggerate its own power to discourage the potential aggressor from attacking. On the other hand, a state bent on aggression is likely to emphasize its peaceful goals while exaggerating its military weakness, so that the potential victim does not build up its own arms and thus leaves itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was better at practicing this kind of deception than Adolf Hitler. But even if disinformation was not a problem, great powers are often unsure about how their own military forces, as well as the adversary's, will perform on the battlefield. For example, it is sometimes difficult to determine in advance how new weapons and untested combat units will perform in the face of enemy fire. Peacetime maneuvers and war games are helpful but imperfect indicators of what is likely to happen in actual combat. Fighting wars is a complicated business in which it is often diffi- cult to predict outcomes. Remember that although the United States and its allies scored a stunning and remarkably easy victory against Iraq in early 1991, most experts at the time believed that Iraq's military would be a formidable foe and put up stubborn resistance before finally succumbing to American military might.25
Great powers are also sometimes unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies. For example, Germany believed that if it went to war against France and Russia in the summer of 1914, the United Kingdom would probably stay out of the fight. Saddam Hussein expected the United States to stand aside when he invaded Kuwait in
August 1990. Both aggressors guessed wrong, but each had good reason to think that its initial judgment was correct. In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler believed that his great-power rivals would be easy to exploit and isolate because each had little interest in fighting Germany and instead was determined to get someone else to assume that burden. He guessed right. In short
, great powers constantly find themselves confronting situations in which they have to make important decisions with incomplete information. Not surprisingly, they sometimes make faulty judgments and end up doing themselves serious harm. Some defensive realists go so far as to suggest that
the constraints of the international system are so powerful that offense rarely succeeds, and that aggressive great powers invariably end up being punished.2' As noted, they emphasize that 1) threatened states balance against aggressors and ultimately crush them, and 2) there is an offensedefense balance that is usually heavily tilted toward the defense, thus making conquest especially difficult. Great powers, therefore, should be content with the existing balance of power and not try to change it by force. After all, it makes little sense for a state to initiate a war that it is likely to lose; that would be self- defeating behavior. It is better to concentrate instead on preserving the balance of power.27 Moreover, because aggressors seldom succeed, states should understand that security is abundant, and thus there is no good strategic reason for wanting more power in the first place. In a world where conquest seldom pays, states should have relatively benign inten- tions toward each other. If they do not, these defensive realists argue, the reason is probably poisonous domestic politics, not smart calculations about how to guarantee one's security in an anarchic world.
ITS IMPOSSIBLE FOR STATES TO ADEQUATELY PERCIEVE FUTURE POWER RELATIONMISCALCULATION IS INEVITABLE
MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 35. )
Second, determining how much power is enough becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power wifi be distributed among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of individual states vary over time, sometimes markedly, and it is often difficult to predict the direction and scope of change in the balance of power. Remembet few in the West antidpated the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first hail of the Cold War, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventually generate greater wealth than the American economy, which would cause a marked power shift against the United States and its allies. What the future holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power will look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee.
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America stands only as an obstacle that will be overcome on the road to inevitable progress. Such claims have all the ingredients of a fine press release, but the reality is more depressing. It is true, for example, that European governments increasingly subscribe to the ideology -- some would say the secular religion -- of human rights. But then so does the United States; after all, the official position of the U.S. government is that the intervention in Iraq was undertaken at least in part in the name of human rights. Now a doctrine that
world; even so,
can be claimed by the United States of America as well as the still social democratic nations of Western Europe, and the nongovernmental organizations that view the United States as little more than a rogue state -- not to mention major transnational corporations that have signed on to a U.N. "compact with business" -- has become elastic to the point of fatuousness. If we all claim to be pledged to the cause of human rights (and who, it seems, does not?), then it is hard not to think of Dr. Johnson's remark about patriotism, that it is the last refuge of a scoundrel.
There is the United Nations sunk in irrelevancy, except as the world's leading humanitarian relief organization. There is a landscape of international relations that seems far more to resemble the bellicose world of pre-1914 Europe than the interdependent, responsible world imagined by the framers of the U.N. Charter. There is an entire continent, sub-Saharan Africa, mired in an economic calamity largely not of its own making. There is a Europe that pays lip service to human rights, but remains intransigent where its own real interests -- such as farm subsidies that effectively condemn subSaharan Africa to grinding poverty by limiting its agricultural exports -- are concerned. And then there is the United States, seemingly bent on empire.
As far as the international system is concerned, what are the most striking aspects of the current situation? Where was the good news again? That Augusto Pinochet was briefly detained in London, or that Slobodan Milosevic will likely spend the rest of his life in a U.N. jail? This, while somewhere between 2 and 4 million Congolese die in the first general war in Africa since decolonization? The truth is that, outside the developed countries
, much of the world is actually in worse shape than it was just a few decades ago. Where there has been progress, if that term is even appropriate in so apocalyptic a context, it has been in the realm of norms - that is, the laws that nations try to evade and ignore, and in which many of the most decent people on this slaughterhouse of a planet continue to believe. But we are deep in loaves-and-fishes land here. To believe that states will suddenly come to their senses and behave as responsible members of an "international community," when few states have ever done this, is, indeed, to believe in miracles.
There is unquestionably a globalized world economy, which remains largely dominated by the United States and is administered through central banks, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. But at least not one worthy of the name -- assuming, that is, we mean a community of shared values and interests, not just shared membership in the United Nations. For that matter,
even the old, Cold War-era blocs are disintegrating: The G-77, the major international organization representing the developing world, now has trouble agreeing on anything beyond the most generic recommendations. The run-up to the Iraq war showed the depth of the divisions within the so-called transatlantic family, and equally sharp splits were evident within Europe during the same period. Never mind community; how can there be any international system when what we have actually witnessed in the period since 9/11 has been the steady erosion of the very idea of consensus in international relations?
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(Andrew, December, Structural Realism and Interconnectivity, Perspectives on Structural Realism, p. 200-201)
But the occurrence of war was never the sole reason why structural realism explained international behavior. It was only its most dramatic, and in some ways, its most important. Structural realism today can be expected to endure as long as state preeminence endures and states remain the most important actors in the international system, even in peace, for in peace one finds the rudiments of war. In
explanatory power. recent years, non-state and near-state actors have been put forth as decisive new units in a world now focused on economics, limited campaigns or on terrorism. The state therefore is said to have declined in relative importance. But one needs to identify the impact of such non-state actors in the world before we can make an assessment about the significance of the new relations they create, and the theory that explains them.
Interconnectivity is the relationship between states as conditioned by structure and state motive. Interconnectivity, as a feature of the prevailing international structure, allows that significant internal or even multilateral actors can forge relations across borders. The inside-out and outside-in perspectives can be seen to combine when individual personalities of key leaders, for example, may be pushed by
internal, historical or group dynamics to act outwardly. An international organization may decide on an agenda simply from the internal inertia of its members. But
personalities and organizations are important, in part, because they represent a state's power, and to be effective they must push with that state and act with one eye on their external environment. Personalities and organizations may initiate foreign policy, bin foreign policy action that stems from internal drives but which goes against the grain of structure is risking failure, and over time, successful leadership will see that.1 The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the center stage for some seems to mean that suddenly unit-level
explanations have replaced structure. But in reality the unipolarity that was created when the Soviet Union slid away merely gives unit-level actors like personalities the appearance of .1 greater relative profile because they stand on a narrower stage. They went there before. Systemic dynamics that operated then continue to persist.
We should not be repulsed by the continuation of the familiar just because it did not explain all actions in the past. As the simplest
A change in history does not necessarily require a change in the general theory that explains history. states could only watch, wait and weather as best they can.
structure, unipolarity may not seem as threatening to all states as bipolarity had been. If, however implausible, under bipolarity then-was a direct U.S.Soviet conflict of any proportion, the results would have significant systemic effects. But since the onset of unipolarity if the U.S. and any other power engaged in a conflict, there would be much less system it impact. Thus all states feel the release of dread that accompanied the prospect of superpower confrontation in which they as smaller
The change from bipolarity to unipolarity is forcing most states to learn more about themselves, and their world. Structure still instructs. With a lone superpower, the challenge today is not only what the U.S. might do to second states, and they may feel the U.S. has less urgency to shape some of them as formerly was the case, but what other second states could do to them, directly or indirectly. Whether it was true or not, states believed that strong bipolar confrontations would have negative consequences sooner or later . Unipolarity, whether it is a moment or a few decades in length, has ushered in a more variegated and self-help environment and has thus caused states to focus on their most likely or immediate problems. Neither Asia nor a united
Europe, as David Rieff believes, is likely to successfully challenge U.S. hegemony in the twenty-first century. In pan, this is
because European armies are shrinking both in "size and in capability. The only threats to U.S. leadership terrorism, failed states, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosivic or even the heirs to Osama bin Laden are limited." In bipolarity, major confrontations being rare and their prevention by the action of lesser states was not possible, the international system below the level of the superpowers was, in a sense, frozen in time. Their maneuvers mattered less because it was the potential top tier movement that held the greatest leverage. Thus the orbit of state actions took place within a relatively immobile, stable and patterned bipolar world, as
. With the erosion to unipolarity, the calculus has changed considerably. Now more states must watch more states. There are not just two sides, therefore there is no "protection," sociology or structure of belonging to East or West. There is a sense of greater anarchy, or at least, greater uncertainty as to both the movement and consequences of the actions of states in an unbalanced world. This is worrisome particularly to smaller states because the prospect of rescue in unipolarity is reduced as the U.S. has greater choices of how and if to prop up second states in proportion to their value in a less bifurcated world. Both Africa and Latin America have received less attention and aid from the U.S. since 1990. This has caused Kenneth Jowitt to remark that large parts of the world today are now "disconnected" from the main states of the world. Therefore, many things suddenly become or appear to become important to smaller states: their economies, militaries, allies, rivals, relations with the U.S. and even their relations with bigger states like Russia, China or other regional powers. Everything matters more because the importance of margins has increased in a unipolar world as small gains or losses tilt states no longer buoyed by a superpower sponsorship. Indeed, the fact that the U.S. remains the only important superpower may have
structuralists have predicted led Osama bin Laden to target the "World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, as he and his al Qaida group tried to "balance" or, in their minds, punish or alter U.S. behavior in the Middle East
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STATES COOPERATE TO GAIN POWER OVER POTENTIAL RIVALSEVERY COOPERATION IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN
MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 48ish]
One might conclude from the preceding discussion that my theory does not allow for any cooperation among the great powers. But this Conclusion would be wrong. States can cooperate, although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating.'3 Ultimately, great powers live in a fundamentally competitive world where they view each other as real, or at least potential, enemies, and they therefore look to gain power at each other's expense. Any two states contemplating cooperation must consider how profits or gains will be distributed between them. They can think about the division in terms of either absolute or relative gains (recall the distinction made earlier between pursuing either absolute power or relative power; the concept here is the same). With absolute gains, each side is concerned with maximizing its own profits and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. With relative gains, on the other hand, each side considers not only its own individual gain, but also how well it fares compared to the other side. Because great powers care deeply about the balance of power, their thinking focuses on relative gains when they consider cooperating with other states. For sure, each state tries to maximize its absolute gains; still, it is more important for a state to make sure that it does no worse, and perhaps better, than the other state in any agreement. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve, however, when states are attuned to relative gains rather than absolute gains.~' This is because states concerned about absolute gains have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, they are get- ting at least some portion of the increase, whereas states that worry about relative gains must pay careful attention to how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts. Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. Great powers are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage. This concern is especially acute in the military realm, causing a "special peril of defection." because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts
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in the balance of power.5' Such a development could create a window of opportunity for the state that cheats to inflict a decisive defeat on its victim. These barriers to cooperation notwithstanding, great powers do cooper- ate in a realist world. Balance-of-power logic often causes great powers to
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A2 Defense Solves
OFFENSE IS THE BEST DEFENSEWHOEVER COMMITS THE FIRST STRIKE WINS 60% OF WARS
MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 38. )
There is no question that systemic factors constrain aggression, especially balancing by threatened states. But defensive realists exaggerate those restraining forces.28 Indeed, the historical record provides little support for their claim that offense rarely succeeds. One study estimates that there were 63 wars between 1815 and 1980, and the initiator won 39 times, which translates into about a 60 percent success rate. Turning to specific cases, Otto von Bismarck unified Germany by winning military victories against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870, and the United States as we know it today was created in good part by conquest in the nineteenth century. Conquest certainly paid big dividends in these cases. Nazi Germany won wars against Poland in 1939 and France `0 1940, but lost to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. Conquest ultimately did not pay for the Third Reich, but if Hitler had restrained himself after the fall of France and had not invaded the Soviet Union, conquest probably would have paid handsomely for the Nazis, In short, the historical record shows that offense sometimes succeeds and some- times does not. The trick for a sophisticated power maximizer is to figure out when to raise and when to fold.
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A2 Human Nature
THE ANARCHIC SYSTEM OF IR IS THE REASON WHY OFFENSIVE REALISM IS CORRECTWE NEVER MAKE CLAIMS ABOUT HUMAN NATURE
MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 56-7]
In sum, my argument is that the structure of the international system. not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to thinic and act offensively and to seek hegemony.6C I do not adopt Morgenthau's claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired into them. Instead, I assume that the prin- cipal motive behind great-power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively Nor does my theory classify states as more or less aggressive on the basis of their eco- nomic or political systems. Offensive realism makes only a handful of assumptions about great powers, and these assumptions apply equally to all great powers. Except for differences in how much power each state con- trols, the theory treats all states alike. I have now laid out the logic explaining why states seek to gain as much power as possible over their rivals. I have said little, however, about the object of that pursuit: power itself. The next two chapters provide a detailed discussion of this important subject.
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A2 Mindset Shift
INEVITABLY PARANOIA AND DISAGREEMENTS OVER COOPERATION MAKES REALIST IDEOLOGY INEVITABLE MOVING AWAY RISKS A DECAPITATING BLOW BY AN INVADING NATION MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg 40. ) The claim Is sometimes made that great powers can transcend realist logic by working together to build an international order that fosters peace and justice. World peace, it would appear, can only enhance a state's pros- perity and security. America's political leaders
paid considerable lip service to this line of argument over the course of the twentieth century. President Clinton, for example, told an audience at the United Nations in September 1993 that "at the birth of this organization 48 years ago a generation of gifted leaders from many nations stepped forward to organize the world's efforts on behalf of security and prosperity . . . Now history has granted to us a moment of even greater opportunity . . Let us resolve that we will dream larger. . . . Let us ensure that the world we pass to our children is healthier, safer and more abundant than the one we inhabit today."" This rhetoric notwithstanding, great powers do not work together to promote world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is likely to clash with the goal of creat- ing and sustaining stable international orders. This is not to say that great powers never aim to prevent wars and
keep the peace. On the con- trary, they work hard to deter wars in which they would be the likely vic tim. In such cases, however, state behavior is driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power, not by a commitment to build a world order independent of a state's own interests. The United States, for exam- ple, devoted enormous resources to deterring the Soviet Union from start- ing a war in Europe during the Cold War, not because of some deep-seated commitment to promoting peace around the world, but because American leaders feared that a Soviet victory would lead to a dangerous shift in the balance of power.46 The particular international order that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self-interested behavior of the system's great powers. The configuration of the system, in other words, is the unintended conse- quence of great-power security competition, not the result of states acting together to organize peace. The establishment of the Cold War order in Europe illustrates this point. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intended to establish it, nor did they work together to create it. In fact, each superpower worked hard in the early years of the Cold War to gain power at the expense of the other, while preventing the other from doing likewise.47 The system that emerged in Europe in the aftermath of World War II was the unplanned consequence of intense security compe- tition between the superpowers. Although that intense superpower rivalry ended along with the Cold War in 1990. Russia and the United States have not worked together to create the present order in Europe. The United States, for example, has rejected out of hand various Russian proposals to make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe the central organizing pillar of European security (repladng the U.S.-dominated NATO). Furthermore, Russia was deeply opposed to NATO expansion, which It viewed as a serious threat to Russian security. Recognizing that Russia's weakness would pre- clude any retaliation, however, the United States ignored Russia's concerns and pushed NATO to accept the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members. Russia has also opposed u.S. policy in the Balkans over the past decade, especially NATO's 1999 war against Yugoslavia. Again, the United States has paid little attention to Russia's concerns and has taken the steps it deems necessary to bring peace to that volatile region. Finally, it is worth noting that although Russia is dead set against allowing the United States to deploy ballistic missile defenses, it is highly likely that Washington will deploy such a system if it is judged to be technologically feasible. For sure, great-power rivalry will sometimes produce a stable interna- tional order, as happened during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the great powers will continue looking for opportunities to increase their share of world power, and if a favorable situation arises, they will move to undermine that stable order. Consider how hard the United States worked dur- ing the late 1980s to weaken the Soviet Union and bring down the stable order that had emerged in Europe during the latter part of the Cold War.48 Of course, the states that stand to lose power will work to deter aggression and preserve the existing order. But their motives will be selfish, revolving around balance-of-power logic, not some commitment to world peace.
states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering peace. Certainly, international relations scholars have never reached a consensus on what the blueprint should look like. In fact, it seems there are about as many theories on the causes of war and peace as there are scholars studying the subject. But more important, poll- cymakers are unable to agree on how to create a stable world. For exam- ple, at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, important differences
Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two reasons. First, over how to create stability in Europe divided Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson.49 In particular, Clemenceau was determined to impose harsher terms on Gennany over the Rhineland than was either Lloyd George or Wilson, while Lloyd George stood out as the
. The Treaty of Versailles, not sur- prisingly, did little to promote European stability.
hard-liner on German reparations Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early days of the Cold War.' The key elements for a sta- ble and durable system were in place by the early 1950s. They included the division of Germany, the positioning of American ground forces in Western Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman administration, however, disagreed about whether a divided Germany would be a source of peace or war. For example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, who held important positions in the State Department, believed that a divided Germany would be a source of instability whereas Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought to end the American commitment to defend Western Europe and to provide West Germany with its owr~ nuclear deterrent. This policy, which was never fully adopted, nevertheless caused significant instability in Europe. as it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 196l.~' Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace because they cannot be sure that their efforts will succeed. If their attempt fails, they are likely to pay a steep price for having neglected the balance of power, because if an aggressor appears at the door there will be no answer when they dial 911. That is a risk few states are willing to run. Therefore, prudence dictates that they behave according to realist logic. This line of reasoning accounts for why collective security schemes, which call for states to put aside narrow con- cerns about the balance of power and instead act in accordance with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.
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states:
. The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumptions about their behavior. A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. Obviously, the system wont work if all states lose interest in preserving themselves. It will, however, continue to work if some states do, while others do not, choose to lose their political identities, say, through amalgamation. Nor need it be assumed that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system.
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1997, p. 182
This is not merely to indulge in yet another interminable discourse on the `lessons of Munich', rejecting all strategies of assurance for more familiar policies of deterrence
. A realist perspective does not, as Wendt seems to assume, require worst-case forecasting, nor does it adopt an ethic of `sauve qui peut'. But it is to suggest that, when realism emphasises the need for a cautious, gradual approach to attempts to transform the nature of the system, it has a point. In Wendt's analysis, change ultimately becomes as
privileged as the status quo in rationalist perspectives. If he does not hold that history is progressive, he does hold that change is. If he is not idealistic about the possibilities of effecting a transformation of the system, he is with regard to the way in which it might be accomplished. Yet, even if we acknowledge that a transformation in the structure of international politics would be beneficial, this does not imply the acceptance of a desperate gamble to accomplish it. And,
at the end of the day, if we can accept that the current structure of international politics contains many injustices, there is no guarantee that its transformation would remove such iniquities
anyway. The only thing that the quest to overthrow the status quo does guarantee to do is to undermine those fragments of order that we currently possess. Ultimately,
constructivism can be seen to rest upon a value judgment which sacrifices the safe option of remaining within the current situation for the attempt to explore its possibilities. It can be seen to rest on a progressive philosophy which privileges the possible over the extant and sacrifices stability on the altar of transformation. This is not to attempt to level a charge of
utopianism, as Wendt complains that Mearsheimer does, by emphasising constructivism's normative rather than explanatory commitment. As Wendt responds: `Constructivists have a normative interest in promoting social change, but they pursue this by trying to explain how seemingly natural social structures, like self-help or the Cold War, are effects of practice ... If critical theorists fail, this will be because they do not explain how the world works, not because of their values."' All theories ultimately have normative commitments; the fact of their existence does not allow us to question the validity of constructivism's explanatory power. What
Just as reflectivists argue that the implicit conservatism of neorealism generates its ahistoricism, the implicit progressivism of constructivism generates its unwillingness to acknowledge even the possibility of elements of permanency. And, just as reflectivists argue that the implicit conservatism of neorealism generates strategies which threaten to become self-perpetuating, so the implicit progressivism of constructivism generates strategies which threaten to become counter-productive.
does, however, is the impact of these normative assumptions on its account of international politics.
1997, p. 184-5
Now, if this is directed at realism, as it would seem to be, it seriously misinterprets its approach. First, as we have seen, the `logic of anarchy' that realism portrays is not a material phenomenon, but the intersubjective emanation of cumulative past choices, albeit choices rooted in a material account of human nature. If realism maintains that this logic represents a relatively entrenched structure, it nevertheless holds that it is, potentially at least, malleable by judicious statecraft. If it takes the state to be the principal focus of this logic in contemporary world politics, there is no sense that this is permanent or final - indeed, no sense that it is even unproblematic. Second, the notion that realism ignores the clash between the individual's simultaneous identification as both man and citizen mistakes the entire thrust of its work. If realism is concerned with the duties owed to the state, it is only for the conflict that this produces with the cosmopolitan moral obligations which fall upon men. Third, if realism insisted that change must be compatible with the national interests of the state, it also recognised that, particularly in an age of interdependence and nuclear weapons, a stable international order could ultimately only be built on some broader sense of community than that which existed in states alone, and was thus centrally concerned with the extension of community in international relations.
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A2 Realism is Amoral
THEY DONT UNDERSTAND REALISMIT IS AN EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF MORAL AGENTS
Alastair J.H. Murray, RECONSTRUCTING REALISM: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND COSMOPOLITAN ETHICS, Keele University Press: Edinburgh, 1997, p. 2.
Consequently, realism is portrayed by its opponents not only as being silent in the contemporary normative debate, but as being incapable of saying anything. Such a conception of realism is, however, fundamentally erroneous. Realism arose in opposition to idealism; and, given that the locus of idealism was a concern with the moral, realisms genesis was oriented towards normative issues. Of course, it never sought to engage in the type of abstract moral principles, and to introduce an awareness of the pervasive influence of power in the determination of political outcomes. Yet, whilst this presupposed an intimate involvement with the facts as they really are, the realist concern with the real was not exclusive, but rather a function of its desire to juxtapose it to the ideal. It sought to interrelate morality and power in a viable synthesis, to generate a practical ethic which might prove more realistic, and more productive, than those which ignored the rules of international politics. Realism ultimately represented a fundamentally practical tradition of thought, centrally concerned with the moral understandings of participants, with the productive application of these understandings, and with the task of generating some form of moral consensus in international relations which might support a stable international order. Whatever the merits of its solutions to these issues, it clearly was not a positivist, explanatory theory; it was profoundly concerned for normative issues, and, in particular, for the articulation of a selfconsciously political ethic.
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REALISM DOES NOT REQUIRE WORST CASE FORECASTINGIT SIMPLY DOES NOT SACRIFICE STABILITY FOR UTOPIANISM Murray, Professor of Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H., Reconstructing
Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 192) This is not merely to indulge in yet another interminable discourse on the "lessons of Munich', rejecting all strategies of assurance for more familiar policies of deterrence. A realist perspective does not, as Wendt seems to assume, require worst-case forecasting, nor does it adopt an ethic of "sauve qui peut'. But it is to suggest that, when realism emphasizes the need for a cautious, gradual approach to attempts to transform the nature of the system, it has a point. In Wendt's analysis, change ultimately becomes as privileged as the status quo in rationalist perspectives. If he does not hold that history is progressive, he does hold that change is. If he is not idealistic about the possibilities of effecting a transformation of the system, he is with regard to the way in which it might be accomplished. Yet, even if we acknowledge that a transformation in the structure of international politics would be beneficial, this does not imply the acceptance of a desperate gamble to accomplish it. And, at the end of the day, if we can accept that the current structure of international politics contains many injustices, there is no guarantee that its transformation would remove such iniquities anyway. The only thing that the quest to overthrow the status quo does guarantee to do is to undermine those fragments of order that we currently possess. Ultimately, constructivism can be seen to rest upon a value judgment which sacrifices the safe option of remaining within the current situation for the attempt to explore its possibilities. It can be seen to rest on a progressive philosophy which privileges the possible over the extant and sacrifices stability on the altar of transformation. This is not to attempt to level a charge of utopianism, as Wendt complains that Mearsheimer does, by emphasizing constructivism's normative rather than explanatory commitment. As Wendt responds: "Constructivists have a normative interest in promoting social change, but they pursue this by trying to explain how seemingly natural social structures, like self-help or the Cold War, are effects of practice... If critical theorists fail, this will be because they do not explain how the world works, not because of their values."1 All theories ultimately have normative commitments; the fact of their existence does not allow us to question the validity of constructivism's explanatory power. What does, however, is the impact of these normative assumptions on its account of international politics. Just as reflectivists argue that the implicit conservatism of neo-realism generates its ahistoricism the implicit progressivism of constructivism generates its unwillingness to acknowledge even the possibility of elements of permanency. And, just as reflectivists argue that the implicit conservatism of neorealism generates
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strategies which threaten to become self-perpetuating, so the implicit progressivism of constructivism generates strategies which threaten to become counter-productive.
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In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu-ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, selfserving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the-ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical
heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? actors in international politics. What
imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our lmowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as
does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary-or is in some way badis a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?"
marginalized, oppressed, and des-titute? How does To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help-ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti-cally excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's
poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana-lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he
assertions, then, a must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal
, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha-sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwarranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality. " All theory is socially constructed
places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use?
Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow
the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar-ily inscribed diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not malce its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it .
That international politics and states would not exist with-out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con-structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all reality is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec-ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representation. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no
great conse- quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long talcen care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley.40
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aversion to difference is the human condition; rather, it is the West's partial but breathtaking ability to overcome tribalism and exclusion that demands explanation, above all in the singular American accomplishment. Anti-Semitism is not surprising; the opening of Christian America to Jews is what should amaze. Racial aversion and injustice are not sources of wonderment; the Fourteenth Amendment and its gradual implementation are what should astonish. It is not the abuse of power that requires explanation--that is the human condition--but the Western rule of law. Similarly, it is not coerced religious conformity that should leave us groping for understanding, but the forging of values and institutions of religious toleration. It is not slavery that requires explanation, for slavery is one of the most universal of all human institutions; rather, it is the values and agency by which the West identified slavery as an evil and, astonishment of astonishments, abolished it. Finally, it is not relative pockets of poverty in the West that should occasion our wonder,
because we used to term almost infinitely worse absolute levels of poverty simply "the human condition." Instead, what is extraordinary are the values, institutions, knowledge, risk, ethics, and liberties that created such prosperity that we even notice that poverty at all, yet alone believe that it is eradicable. We are surprised, in a
we lose our wonder at the accomplishments and aspirations of our civilization as a tragic result. Depravity should never startle us; rather, the identification and naming of
failure of intellectual analysis, by all of the wrong things, and depravity should amaze us, and the attempt, frequently successful, to contain it should fill us with awe. Indeed, that attempt has been so successful in the West, relative to the human condition, that the other world fantasized by the multiculturalists seeks entrance, again and again, at our doors, and the multiculturalists are not
the multiculturalists' ostensible rejection of the West's philosophical realism--their vaunted "social constructionism"-does not stay with them past their medical doctor's door. In the final analysis, it is that last trait, the West's commitment to a logically ordered
riding leaky boats to the otherness of the Third World. Most obviously, with brilliance and profundity in our history,
philosophical realism, that undergirds its ways of thinking, valuing, and, indeed, worshiping. Such philosophical realism was defended by Augustine, Aquinas, and almost all fathers and doctors of the Church. While various extreme epistemological and ontological skepticisms and radical irrationalisms have flourished, sometimes
Western civilization has always had at its core. a belief that there is a reality independent of our wishes for and ideas of it; that natural knowledge of that reality is possible and indeed indispensable to human dignity; that such knowledge must be acquired through a discipline of the will and mind; and that central to that discipline is a compact with reason. The West has willed, in theory at least, to reduce the chaos of the world to natural coherence by the powers of the mind. Indeed, the belief that truth is independent of a particular time and place is precisely what has led the West to borrow so much from other cultures, such that, ironically, whole schools of tendentious thought decry
Western "thefts," as if the recognition of compelling example and argument in others were a weakness, not a strength. The West recognized and adopted Eastern systems of numbers superior to that of the Romans; it took the Aristotelianism of the High Middle Ages from the Islamic scholars who had preserved and interpreted it in manners superior to the schools of the West; it took music, art, forms of expression, and new foods from around the earth that, in large part out of restless curiosity about realities beyond its own, it had explored. The West has always renewed and revitalized itself by means Of recognizing superior ways to its own. It did so, however, with a commitment to being a rational culture. The Greek principle of self-contradiction as the touchstone of error, and thus its avoidance as a touchstone of truth, is the formal expression of a commitment to reason that the Christian West always understood to separate us from beasts and madmen. To live with selfcontradiction was not merely to fail an introduction to philosophy, it was to be less than human. Induction from experience always had a logic, and the exploration of that logic was one of the great and ultimately triumphant pursuits of the Western mind. To live with error was to deny oneself the fruits of human light. Again, the core philosophical assumption of Western civilization is that there is a reality that exists independently of our will and wish, and that this reality can be known by human inquiry and reason. There were many radical ruptures in the history of certain disciplines in the West; there were no radical ruptures with the Western compact with reality and reason. It is that compact that led to a civilization of self-scrutiny and honest borrowings; to a civilization in which self-criticism gave rise to a critical scholarship that could question and either strengthen or repair the West's received beliefs themselves; to a civilization in which the mind could appeal, with ultimate success, against the irrational to the rational; to a way of understanding that led to the sciences that have changed both the entire human relationship to nature and our sense of human possibilities, always tempered by our knowledge of human nature.
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. The West has altered the human relationship to nature from one of fatalistic helplessness to one of hopeful mastery. It has made possible a human life in which biological atavism might be replaced by cultural value, the rule of law, individuation, and growing tolerance. It also created an intellectual class irrationally devoted to an adversarial stance. That adversarial view of the West, in the past generation at least,
had become a neo-Gramscian and thus neo-Marxist one in which the West was seen as an unparalleled source of the arbitrary assignment of restrictive and lifestultifying roles. The enemies of the West--for some, in practice; for others, increasingly in the ideal represented a fictive make-believe that supposedly cast grave doubt upon the West's claim of enhancing freedom, dignity, and opportunity. With the triumph of the West in reality, and with the celebration of Marxism and the
the adversarial intellectual class appears to be retreating into ideologies and philosophies that deny the very concept of reality itself. One sees this in the growing strength in the humanities and social sciences of critical theories that view all representations of the world as mere text and fiction. When the world of fact can be twisted to support this or that side of delusion (as in astrology or parapsychology), pathology tries to appropriate what it can of the empirical. When the world of fact manifestly vitiates the very foundations of pathological delusion, then
Third World shown more and more to have been truly delusional, it is the claim of facticity or reality per se that must be denied. This is what we now may expect: the world having spoken, the intellectual class, the left academic wing of it above all, may appropriate a little postcommunist chaos to show how merely relative a moral good the defeat of Stalin's heirs has been. If it does so, however, it
In Orwell's 1984, it was the mark of realistic, totalitarian power to make its subjects say that all truth was not objective but political--"a social construction," as intellectuals would say now--and that, in the specific case, 2 + 2 = 5. By 2004, making students in the humanities and social sciences grant the
will assail the notion of reality itself. equivalent of 2 + 2 = 5 will be the goal of adversarial culture. They will urge that all logical--and, one should add, inferential--inductive truths from experience are arbitrary, mere social constructions. The West Has Indeed Survived,, So Far The ramifications of that effort will dominate the central debates of the humanities in the generation to come. Until there is a celebration and moral accounting of the historical reality of "The Triumph of the West," that "triumph" will be ephemeral indeed. Academic culture has replaced the simplistic model that all culture was functional, a model that indeed could not account for massive discontents
Whole disciplines now teach that propositions are to be judged by their therapeutic value rather than by their inductive link to evidence until, in the final analysis, feeling good about saying something determines the truth-value of what is said. Understanding human weakness, however, the West has always
or revolutionary change, let alone for moral categories, by the yet more astonishing and absurd model that virtually all culture is dysfunctional. and our propensity for self-serving error. humanistic theory
believed that it is precisely when we want to believe something self-gratifying that we must erect barriers of experiment, rigor, and analysis against our self-indulgence
The human ability to learn from experience and nature, so slighted in current , is not merely an object of cultural transmission, let alone of social control, but an evolutionary triumph of the species, indeed, a triumph on which our future ultimately depends. There is nothing more desperate than helplessness, and there is no more inveterate cause of helplessness than the inability to affect and mitigate the traumas of our lives. If the role of both acquired knowledge and the transmission and emendation of the means of acquiring knowledge is only a "Western" concern, then it is a Western concern upon which human fate depends. In the current academic climate of indoctrination, tendentiousness, and fantasy, the independence of critical intellect and the willingness to learn open-mindedly from experience of a reality independent of the human will are the greatest hopes of our civilization. Has Western civilization survived? That is, has a human
relationship to the world based upon the assumption of a knowable reality, reason, and a transcendent value of human dignity and responsibility survived? Has a will to know oneself and the world objectively survived? Has a recognition of human depravity and the need to limit the power of men over men survived? I do not think that free men and women will abandon that hard-won shelter from chaos, ignorance, parochial tribalism, irrationalism, and, ultimately, helplessness. Has Western civilization survived, its principle of reality justified and intact? Yes, indeed, though it requires constant defense. The demand for perfection is antinomian, illogical, and empirically absurd. The triumph of the West is flawed but real. While everyone else around you weeps, recall Alexander Ushakov, and celebrate the fall of the Soviet threat as he celebrated the fall of Grenada. Then recall how everything depends on realism in our understanding, and rejoin the intellectual struggle.
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A2 State/Sovereignty Bad
INTERNATIONAL GOALS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY STATES. ONLY REALISM ESCAPES THE TYRANNY OF SMALL DECISIONS
Kenneth
Waltz, Travis BFF, Neorealism and its Critics, ed. by Robert Keohane, 1986, p. 105-108
We may well notice that our behavior produces unwanted outcomes, but we are also likely to see that such instances as these are examples of what Alfred E. Kahn
people are victims of the tyranny of small decisions, a phrase suggesting that if one hundred consumers choose option x, and this causes the market to make decision X (where X equals 100x), it is not necessarily true that those same consumers would have voted for that outcome if that large decision had ever been presented for their explicit consideration (Kahn 1966:523). If the market does not present the large question for decision, then individuals are doomed to making decisions that are sensible within their narrow contexts even though they know all the while that in making such decisions they are bringing about a result that most of them do not want. Either that or they organize to overcome some of the effects of the market by changing its structurefor example, by bringing consumer units roughly up to the size of the units that are making producers decisions. This nicely makes the point: So long as one leaves the structure unaffected it is not possible for change in the intentions and the actions of particular actors to produce desirable outcomes or to avoid undesirable ones. Structures may be changed, as just mentioned, by changing the distribution of capabilities across
describes as large changes that are brought about by the accumulation of small decisions. In su ch situations units. Structures may also be changed by imposing requirements where previously people had to decide for themselves. If some merchants sell on Sunday, others may have to do so in order to remain competitive even though most prefer a six-day week. Most are able to do as they please only if all are required to keep comparable hours. The only remedies for strong structural effects are structural changes. Structural constraints cannot be wished away, although many fail to understand this. In every age and place, the units of self-help systems nations, corporations, or whateverare told that the greater good, along with their own, requires them to act for the sake of the system and not for their own narrowly defined advantage. In the 1950s, as fear of the worlds destruction in nuclear war grew, some concluded that the alternative to world destruction was world disarmament. In the 1970s, with the rapid growth of population, poverty, and pollution, some concluded, as one political scientist put it, that states must meet the needs of the political ecosystem in its global dimensions or court annihilation (Sterling 1974:336). The international interest must be served; and if that means anything at all, it means that national interests are subordinate to it. The problems are found at the global level.
Solutions to the problems continue to depend on national policies. What are the conditions that would make
nations more or less willing to obey the injunctions that are so often laid on them? How can they resolve the tension between pursuing their own interests and acting for the sake of the system? No one has shown how that can be done, although many wring their hands and plead for rational behavior. The very problem, however, is that rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results. With each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system. A strong sense of peril and doom may lead to a clear definition of ends that must be achieved. Their achievement is not thereby made possible. The possibility of effective action depends on the ability to provide necessary means. It depends even more so on the existence of conditions that permit nations and other
. World-shaking problems cry for global solutions, but there is no global agency to provide them. Necessities do not create possibilities. Wishing that final causes were efficient ones does not make them so. Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability. That is why states, and especially the major ones, are called on to do what is necessary for the worlds survival. But states have to do whatever they think necessary for their own preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them. Why the advice to place the international interest above national interests is meaningless can be explained precisely in terms of the distinction between micro- and macrotheories. Among economists the
organizations to follow appropriate policies and strategies distinction is well understood. Among political scientists it is not. As I have explained, a microeconomic theory is a theory of the market built up from assumptions about the behavior of individuals. The theory shows how the actions and interactions of the units form and affect the market and how the market in turn affects them. A macro-theory is a theory about the national economy built on supply; income, and demand as systemwide aggregates. The theory shows how these and other aggregates are interconnected and indicates how changes in one or some of them affect others and the performance of the economy. In economics, both micro- and macrotheories deal with large realms. The difference between them is found not in the size of the objects of study; hut in the way the objects of study are approached and the theory to explain them is constructed.
A macrotheory of international politics would show how the international system is moved by system-wide aggregates. One can imagine what some of them might beamount of world GNP, amount of world imports and exports, of deaths in war, of everybodys defense
spending, and of migration, for example. The theory would look something like a macroeconomic theory in the style of John Maynard Keynes, although it is hard to see how the international aggregates would make much sense and how changes in one or some of them would produce changes in others. I am not saying that such a theory cannot be constructed, but only that I cannot see how to do it in any way that might be useful. The decisive point, anyway, is that
a macrotheory of international politics would lack the practical implications of macroeconomic theory. National governments can manipulate system-wide economic variables. No agencies with comparable capabilities exist internationally. Who would act on the possibilities of adjustment that a macrotheory of international politics might reveal? Even were such a theory available, we would still be stuck with nations as the only agents capable of acting to solve global problems. We would still have to revert to a micropolitical approach in order to examine the conditions that make benign and effective action by states separately and collectively more or less likely. Some have hoped that changes in the awareness and purpose, in the organization and ideology of states would change the quality of international life. Over the centuries states have changed in many ways, but the quality of international life has remained much the same. States seek reasonable and worthy ends, but they cannot figure out how to reach
them. The problem is not in their stupidity or ill will, although one does not want to claim that those qualities are lacking. The depth of the difficulty is not understood until one realizes that
intelligence and goodwill cannot discover and act on adequate programs. Early in this century Winston States facing global problems are like individual consumers trapped by the tyranny of small decisions.
Churchill observed that the British-German naval race promised disaster and that Britain had no realistic choice other than to run it.
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the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this
the survival of the species, on the other. For absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives
SECOND, SURVIVAL OF POLITICAL ORDER KEY TO ETHICS Stenlisli, 2003 (Pace nr.1 accessed onlinehttp://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ )
The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics. In PACEM 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen(1) in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen, A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics. Rolfsen`s aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an undemocratic environment.(2) Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people.(3) This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between realis ts and idealists. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept.(4) In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthaus Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him.(5) Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions,(6) but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it
since the existence of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and theories implicitly rest on minimum requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism.(7) Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into
is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding of PR. The reason simply is, that paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.
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there is a limit on the weight of my right, on its capacity to restrain maximiza- tion; a right provides a moral reason that can be outweighed. As an aside, note that, like the limit on the extension of rights, this limit would seem to have to be based on consequentialist considera- tions, on
weighing the frustration and confusion occasioned by infring- ing our deep-seated intuitions about rights against the frustration and suffering caused
when It comes to the precise weight of rights, no less than their extension, we see that it cannot be fixed unless we transcend the natural rights framework in favour of a consequentialist one.
by respecting them. Thus,
UTILITY CALCULUS ALLOWS ACTION, MORAL DOGMATISM FREEZES US INTO INACTION Smart, 1973
(J.J.C prof. of philosophy, Australian riatibual university. Utilitarianism: For and Against uw//wej) lf we are able to take account of probabilities in our ordinary prudential decisions it seems idle to say that in the field of ethics, the field of our universal and humane atti- tudes, we cannot do the same thing, but must rely on some dogmatic morality, in short on some set of rules or rigid criteria, Maybe sometimes we just will be unable to say whether we prefer for humanity an improbable great advantage or a probable small advantage, and in these cases perhaps we shall have to toss a penny to decide what to do. Maybe we have not any precise methods for deciding what to do, but then our imprecise methods must just serve their turn. We need not on that account be driven into authori.- tarianism, dogmatism or romanticism.
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Fourth, Ingmar Person explains even rights must be weighed against each other, but that deontology doesnt allow preferential treatment of one right over another without resorting to consequentialism, making consequentialism inevitable, or action impossible. Fifth, Smart in 73 illustrates how consequentialism avoids dogmatic action, making it flexible in dealing with different situations UTILITARIANISM IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO EXTINCTION, OUTWEIGHING RIGHTS Ratner 84
[Leonard G., Legion Lex Prof. Law @ USC, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, Spring, LN//uwyo-ajl]
The search for the ought is a search for the goals of human behavior. Underlying the ought of every goal is an implicit description of reality that predicts the consequences for humans of compliance or noncompliance with the ought. n49 Humans choose the goals. n50 And the perceived accuracy of the description, along with the perceived value of the consequences predicted by the description, influence the choice. Ought and is thus coalesce.
The goal of enhanced human need/want fulfillment implies that such enhanced fulfillment is possible and will facilitate long-run human existence.Goals that facilitate human existence are persistently chosen by most humans, because human structure and function have evolved and are evolving to facilitate such existence. The decisionmaking organism is structured to generally prefer survival, although some may trade long-term existence for short-term pleasure, and physiological malfunction or traumatic experience may induce the preference of a few for personal nonsurvival. Intermediate human goals change with human structure and function; long-run human survival remains the ultimate human goal as long as there are humans.
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the pursuit of infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it are unavailable in the crush of time. Nor can the crush of time be avoided,
required immediately, right away. This necessary haste has unavoidable consequences because even by unlimited time, because the moment of decision as such always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation. The decis ion is always structurally finite, it aalways marks the interruption of the juridico - or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it. That is why, invoking Kierkegaard, Derrida, declares that the instant of decision is a madness. The finite nature of the decision may be a madness in the way it renders possible the impossible, the infinite character of justice, but Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, alth ough Derridas argument concerning the decision has, to this pint, been concerned with an account of the procedure by which a decision is possible, it is with respect to the ncessity of the decision that Derrida begins to formulate an account of the decision that bears upon the content of the decis ion. In so doing, Derridas argument addresses more directly more directly, I would argue than is acknowledged by Critchley the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination.
undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridicopolitical battles, within an institution or a state , or between institutions or states and others. Indeed, incalculable justice requires us to calculate . From where do these insistences come? What
That exceeds the determinalbe cannot and is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that
left
(donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it
most perverse calculation. The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid the bad, the perverse calculation, even the worst. This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the at least necessary condition, for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical
political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.
SECOND, EVEN IF WE OBSCURE THE INCALCULABLE, WE HAVE AN ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CALCULATE DEATH BECAUSE ITS OUR ONLY MEANS OF FIGHTING INJUSTICE Santilli 2003
[Paul C., Siena College, Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badious Ethic of the Truth Event, World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue, May 18-22, www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf, acc. 9-2406//uwyo-ajl]
From the standpoint of an ethics of subjection there is even something unnecessary or superfluous about the void of suffering in the subject bearers of evil. For Levinas, the return to being from the ethical encounter with the face and its infinite depths is fraught with the danger the subject will reduce the other to a "like-me," totalizing and violating the space of absolute alterity. As Chalier puts it, "Levinas conceives of the moral subject's awakening, or the emergence of the human in being, as a response to that pre-originary subjection which is not a happenstance of being." But if there really is something inaccessible about suffering itself, about the 'other' side of what is manifestly finite, subjected, and damaged, then to a certain extent it is irrelevant to ethics, as irrelevant as the judgment of moral progress in the subject-agent. Let me take the parent-child relation again as an example. Suppose the child to exhibit the symptoms of an illness. Are not the proper "ethical" questions for the parent to ask questions of measure and mathematical multiples: How high is the fever? How long has it lasted? How far is the hospital? Can she get out of bed? Has this happened before? These are the questions of the doctor, the rescue squads and the police. They are questions about being, about detail, causes
Ethically our response to the needs of must be reduced to a positivity simply because we have access to nothing but the symptoms, which are like mine. Our primary moral responsibility is to treat the symptoms that show up in being, not the radically other with whom I cannot identify. Say we observe someone whose hands have been chopped off with a machete. How would we characterize this? Would it not be slightly absurd to say,
and effects.
"He had his limbs severed and he suffered," as though the cruel amputation were not horror enough. Think of the idiocy in the common platitude: "She died of cancer, but thank God, she did not suffer", as though the devastating annihilation of the human by a tumor were not evil itself. For ethics, then, the only suffering that matters are the visible effects of the onslaught of the world. All other suffering is excessive and inaccessible. Therefore, it is in being, indeed in the midst of the most elemental facts about ourselves and other people, that we ethically encounter others by responding to their needs and helping them as best we can
by identifying being and not pretending that we know any thing about suffering, other than it is a hollow in the midst of being, that we can act responsibly. What worries me about Levinas
It is precisely
is that by going beyond being to what he regards as the ethics of absolute alterity, he risks allowing the sheer, almost banal facticity of suffering to be swallowed in the infinite depths of transcendence. Indeed, it seems to me that Levinas too often over emphasizes the importance of the emergence of the subject and the inner good in the ethical encounter, as though the point of meeting the suffering human being was to come to an awareness of the good within oneself and not to heal and repair. I agree with Chalier's observation that Levinas's "analyses adopt the point of view of the moral subject, not that of a person who might be the object of its solicitude."
an ethics that would be oriented to the vulnerabilities of the subjected (which are others, of course, but also myself) needs to address the mutilation, dismemberment, the chronology of torture, the numbers incarcerated, the look of the bodies, the narratives, the blood counts, the mines knives, machetes, and poisons. Evil really is all that. When the
Ethics has limits; there are situations like the Holocaust where to speak of a moral responsibility to heal and repair seems pathetic. But
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mind does its work, it plunges into being, into mathematical multiples and starts counting the cells, the graveyards, and bullet wounds. Rational practical deliberation is always about the facts that encircle the void inaccessible to deliberation and practical
reason.
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. Not only must we calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without the sort of rule that wouldn't have to be reinvented there where we are cast, there where we find ourselves; but we must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond
the -already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on. This requirement does not properly belong either to justice or law. It only belongs to either of these two domains by exceeding each one in the direction of the other. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very 4bundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited.
This was true for example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geopolitical scale, beyond
all self-serving interpretations, beyond all determined and particular reappropriations of international law, other areas must constantly open up that at first can seem like secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a violence, indeed a terrorism and other forms of hostage-taking are at work (the examples closest to us would be found in the area of laws on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine conception; bio-engineering, medical experimentation, the social treatment of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, the homeless, and so on, without forgetting, of course, the treatment of what we call animal life, animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I'm coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure, if not quite traditional).
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But let us assume that the stage of a dark cloud on some distant horizon has been passed, and the evidence is good that serious deterioration has already set in. At what point in the deterioration should survival become a priority? Observe that I said a priority; it should never become the priority if that means the sacrifice of all other values. But there are surely conditions under which it could become a priority, and a very high one. The most important of those conditions would be the existence of evidence that irreversibility was beginning to set in, making it increasingly impossible to return to the original conditions. That situation, combined with visible evidence of serious present deterioration-for instance, an urgent need to develop compensatory technologies-would warrant a focus on survival; for that is just what would be at stake.
FOURTH, EXTINCTION OF THE SPECIES IS THE MOST HORRIBLE IMPACT IMAGINEABLE, PUTTING RIGHTS FIRST IS PUTTING A PART OF SOCIETY BEFORE THE WHOLE Schell 1982
(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)
Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and
the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this
the survival of the species, on the other. For
absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives
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The irony with which Rieff analyzes psychological man makes evident his distrust and final rejection. But Rieff offers little to put in its place, in great part because he does not offer a positive view of culture which would strike a good bargain between the demands of the individual and of the culture. No more than Freud can he offer the foundation for a social ethic which would integrate a range of values in a way that would enable the individual and civilization to mutually behave toward each other in ways which respected the requirements of each. What Rieff has done is to lay bare the hubris and folly of an individualism run amuck, seeking a final break from all cultural restraints. But having rejected that form of individualism, what are the alternatives? Not an ethic of survival, which would manage to keep the individual in line at the price of a final victory of the community over the individual, resolving all tensions, ending the possibility of a mutual respect. If the tyranny of individualism, inherent in the mode of life of psychological man, presents only the prospect of a culture of self-contained human monads occasionally jostling each other, the tyranny of survival projects a world where the individual is effaced altogether. Both tyrannies are proof against any kind of social ethic, for both dissolve that necessary dialectic between individual and community which is the prime requirement of such an ethic. A failure in the first place to posit the validity of both individual and community will make it impossible in the end to combat the virulence of individualism and survivalism, a virulence which not paradoxically draws them closer together with every advance in technology and affluence. The first step, then, in constructing a social ethic for technological societies is to reject the polarities of the analytic attitude, on the one hand, and the species attitude, on the other. The analytic attitude dissolves all of life into a cunning detachment of individual from community, providing the former with the psychological weapons to keep other human beings at bay. The species attitude, seeking only survival and perpetuation, provides no less effective weapons for keeping human beings at bay, only this time in the name of a future made safe for the future. The great threat to the possibility of a social ethic for a technological society is less the absence of all values than the triumph of one value over all others. Both individualism and survival are struggling to achieve that position, with a striking degree of success. Nothing is more important than to deny both the triumph they seek.
SIXTH, SURVIVAL AS THE HIGHEST VALUE CAN'T JUST BE REPLACED WITH UNCRITICAL INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AS THE HIGHEST VALUE.
Daniel Callahan, Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, The Tyranny of Survival, 1973, p. 57-8 Moreover, as I will develop more fully in later chapters, technological societies impose both a tyranny of survival and a tyranny of individualism. They impose the former because, in times of stress, their extreme fragility (stemming from the high base of expectation they engender and the high degree of total control their complexity demands) is instantly and terrorizingly apparent, creating a natural environment for an obsessive fear of annihilation, i.e., a tyranny of survival. They impose the latter-monomaniacal individualism-because only the privatized life seems viable or endurable in the midst of a system which presents itself as impersonal and uncontrollable. Thus is intensified the tyranny of individualism, which demands that each person create his or her own world ex nihilo: self-direction, self-realization, self-fulfillment-self, self, self.
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1989
Critical Inquiry, Winter, p. 424 I understand Levinas work to suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: The dimension of the divine opens forth froni the human face. Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted in our relations with men. . . . The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men .. . that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.35 Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face; and, in a clear reference to Heideggers idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associates himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgment of others: As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldnt the other suffer the fate of God? ... I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God. [CR, p. 47Oj The suppression of the other, the human, in Heideggers thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will.38 So Levinas can see in Heideggers silence about the gas chambers and death camps a kind of consent to the horror.39 And Cavell can characterize Nazis as those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do.4 Where was Heideggers horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valerys aphorism, Les evenments ne sont que lcume des choses (Events are but the foam of things).4 I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.
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despite the invasion of Iraq and other outbreaks of fighting, the overall decline of war continues. This even as the global population keeps rising, which might be expected to lead to more war, not less.
of the study, published last week, shows that,
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no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately
make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherines choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting h er. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patients interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one persons life and is measured against that persons needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherines position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth Write a list of three things that make living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this;
a case-based, contextsensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case,
they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve,
CONTINUED
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the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a
suggests that the determination of comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not .
To ignore or overlook patients judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their
past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.
THIRD, REFUSAL TO ASSIGN A VALUE TO LIFE RENDERS LIFE VALUELESS Phera.com 2005
[www.phera.com/value_of_life]
Refusal to assign any value to life often leads, ironically, to ''no'' value being attached to life. So, treating an endangered human life, or even the value of Earth itself, in economics formally as a commodity can be morally justified, in that risks of failure to protect it, thus become costs.
FOURTH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IS A HORROR ON PAR WITH GENOCIDE BECAUSE OF HOW IT INDISCRIMINATELY AND ABSOLUTELY DESTROYS INNOCENT LIFE Evans 95
[Gareth, Ministor of Foreign Affairs, Australia, On the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice, October 30, disarm.igc.org/oldwebpages/icjquote.html, acc. 8-24-05//uwyo-ajl] The right to self-defence is not unlimited. It is subject to fundamental principles of humanity. Self-defence is not a justification for genocide, for ordering that there shall be no enemy survivors in combat or for indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. Nor is it a justification for the use of nuclear weapons. The fact remains that the existence of nuclear weapons as a class of weapons threatens the whole of civilization. This is not the case with respect to any class or classes of conventional weapons. It cannot be consistent with humanity to permit the existence of a weapon which threatens the very survival of humanity.
There are some weapons the very existence of which is inconsistent with fundamental general principles of humanity. In the case of weapons of this type, international law does not merely prohibit their threat or use. It prohibits even their acquisition or manufacture, and by extension their possession. Such an attitude has been manifested in the case of other types of weapons of mass destruction. Both the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention do not merely prohibit the use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, but prevent their very existence.
As was hideously demonstrated at Hiroshima, where a relatively minuscule atomic bomb was detonated, and as the release of radiation by the Chernobyl disaster showed to our horror, any use of nuclear weapons, anywhere at any time, would be
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devastating and in no way comparable to any use, in whatever magnitude, of conventional weapons
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alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others. Indeed, incalculable justice requires us to calculate. From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is
animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that left to itself, the incalculable and given (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid the bad, the perverse calculation, even the worst. This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the at least necessary condition, for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.
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We have stated that that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoners inner self was not so much the enumerated psychophysical causes as it was the
only the men who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to subside eventually fell victim to the camps degenerating influences. The question now arises, what could, or should, have constituted this inner hold? Former prisoners, when writing or relating their experiences,
result of a free decision. Psychological observations of the prisoners have shown that
agree that the most depressing influence of all was that a prisoner could not know how long his term of imprisonment would be. He had been given no date for his release. (In our camp it was pointless even to talk about it.) Actually a prison term was not only uncertain but unlimited. A well-known research psychologist has pointed out that life in a concentration camp could be called a provisional existence. We can add to this by defining it as a provisional existence of unknown limit. New arrivals usually knew nothing about the conditions at a camp. Those who had come back from other camps were obliged to keep silent, and from some camps no one had returned. On entering camp a change took place in the minds of the men. With the end of uncertainty there came the uncertainty of the end. It was impossible
A man who could not see the end of his provisional existence was not able to aim at an ultimate goal in life. He ceased living for the future, in contrast to a man in normal life. Therefore the whole structure of his inner life changed; signs of decay set in which we know from other areas of life. The unemployed worker, for example, is in a similar
to foresee whether or when, if at all, this form of existence would end. The latin word finis has two meanings: the end or the finish, and a goal to reach. position. His existence has become provisional and in a certain sense he cannot live for the future or aim at a goal. Research work done on unemployed miners has shown that they suffer from a peculiar sort of deformed timeinner time-which is a result of their unemployed state. Prisoners, too, suffered from this strange timeexperience. In camp, a small time unit, a day, for example, filled with hourly tortures and fatigue, appeared endless. A larger time unit, perhaps a week, seemed to pass very quickly. My comrades agreed when I said that in camp a day lasted longer than a week. How paradoxical was our time-experience! In this connection we are reminded of Thomas Manns The Magic Mountain, which contains some very pointed psychologic al remarks. Mann studies the spiritual development of people who are in an analogous psychological position, i.e., tuberculosis patients in a sanatorium who also know no date for their release. They experience a similar existence without a future and without a goal. One of the prisoners, who on his arrival marched with a long column of new inmates from the station to the camp, told me later that he had felt as though he were marching at his own funeral. His life had seemed to him absolutely without future. He regarded it as over and done, as if he had already died. This feeling of lifelessness was intensified by other causes: in time, it was the limitlessness of the term of imprisonment which was most acutely felt; in space, the narrow limits of the prison. Anything outside the barbed wire became remoteout of reach and, in a way, unreal. The events and the people outside, all the normal life there, had a ghostly aspect for the prisoner. The outside life, that is, as much as he could see of it, appeared to him almost as it might have to a dead man who looked at it from another world. A man who let himself decline because he could not see any future goal found himself occupied with retrospective thoughts. In a different connection, we have already spoken of the tendency there was to look into the past, to help make the present, with all its horrors, less real. But in robbing the
danger. It became easy to overlook the opportunities to make something positive of camp life, opportunities which really did exist. Regarding our provisional existence as unreal was in itself an important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life; everything in a way became pointless. Such people forget that often it is just such an exceptionally difficult external situation which gives man
present of its reality there lay a certain the opportunity to grow spiritually beyond himself. Instead of taking the camps difficulties as a test of their inner streng th, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in the past.
meaningless.
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persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this
essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherines choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations ca n be used to protect the patients interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one persons life and is measured against that persons needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her lif e before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherines position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth Write a list of three things that make living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve, the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests
the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but
that the determination of internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not.
To ignore or overlook patients judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative
consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves
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sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly effect. The ultimate cause of my friends death was that the expected liberation did not come and he was severely disappointed. This suddenly lowered his bodys resistance against the latent typhus infection. His faith in the future and his will to live had become paralyzed and his
connection is between the state of mind of a manhis courage and hope, or lack of themand the state of immunity of his body will understand that the body fell victim to illnessand thus the voice of his dream was right after all. The observations of this one case and the conclusion drawn from them are in accordance with something that was drawn to my attention by the chief doctor of our concentration camp. The death rate in the week betwe en Christmas, 1944, and New Years, 1945, increased in camp beyond all previous experience. In his opinion, the explanation for this increase did not lie in the harder working conditions or the deterioration of our food supplies or a change of weather or new epidemics. It was simply that the majority of the prisoners had lived in the naive hope that they would be home again by Christmas. As the time drew near and there was no encouraging news, the prisoners lost courage and disappointment overcame them. This had a
any attempt to restore a mans inner strength in the camp had first to succeed in showing him some future goal. Nietzsches words, [One] He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how, could be the guiding motto for all psychotherapeutic and
dangerous influence on their powers of resistance and a great number of them died. As we said before,
psychohygienic efforts regarding prisoners. Whenever there was an opportunity for it, one had to give them a whyan aimfor their lives, in order to strengthen them to bear the terrible how of their existence. Woe to him who saw no more sense in his life, no aim, no purpose, and therefore no point in carrying on. He was soon lost. The typical reply with which such a man rejected all encouraging arguments was, I have nothing to expect from life any more. What sort of answer can one give to that? What was really needed was a fundamental change in our attitude toward life. We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to teach the despairing men,
We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to thisnk of ourselves as those who were being questioned by lifedaily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for
that it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. each individual.
SEVENTH, EXTINCTION OF THE SPECIES IS THE MOST HORRIBLE IMPACT IMAGINEABLE, PUTTING RIGHTS FIRST IS PUTTING A PART OF SOCIETY BEFORE THE WHOLE Schell 1982
(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)
Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most
it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this
important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but
absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives
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relinquishes a vital power of government but also exposes its remaining powers of deliberation and decision to ongoing subversion. What counts as an "issue" or a "problem" and how such issues or problems are formulated may to a large extent predetermine what decisions are reached. For example, the choice between building a small freeway and a twelve-lane
interstate highway in lower Manhattan may seem of little moment to those who prefer to solve the problems of urban transportation with mass rail transit. Or the right to choose among six mildly rightof-center candidates may fail to exercise the civic imagination of socialists. Nor is it sufficient to offer
a wide variety of options, for what constitutes an option-how a question is formulated-is as controversial as the range of choices offered. Abortion is clearly an issue that arouses intense
public concern at present, but to say that it belongs on the public agenda says too little. The vital question remains: How is it presented? In this form: "Do you believe there should be an amendment to the Constitution protecting the life of the unborn child?" Or in this form: "Do you believe there should be an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting abortions?" When asked the first question by a New York Times-CBS poll, over one-half responded "yes," whereas when asked the second question only 29 percent said "yes .,,25 He who controls the agenda-if only its wording-controls the outcome. The battle for the Equal Rights Amendment was probably lost because its enemies managed to place it on the public agenda as calling for "the destruction of the family, the legitimization of homosexuality, and the compulsory use of coed toilets." The ERA's supporters never succeeded in getting Americans to see it as "the simple extension of the Constitution's guarantees of rights to women"-a goal that most citizens would probably endorse. The ordering of alternatives can affect the patterns of choice as decisively as their formulation. A compromise presented after positions have been polarized may fail; a constitutional amendment presented at the tail end of the period of change that occasioned it may not survive in a new climate of opinion. A proposal paired with a less attractive alternative may succeed where the same proposal paired with some third option would fail. What these realities suggest is that
in a genuine democracy agenda-setting cannot precede talk or deliberation, and decision but must be approached as a permanent function of talk itself. Relegating agenda-setting to elites or to some putatively "natural" process is an abdication of rights and responsibilities.
Unless the debate about Manhattan's interstate freeway permits people to discuss their fundamental priorities for mass transportation, energy, and ecology, it is a sham. Unless the debate over abortion permits people to discuss the social conditions of pregnancy, the practical alternatives available to the poor, and the moral dilemmas of a woman torn between her obligations to her own body and life and to an embryo, such debate will treat neither pregnant women nor unborn babies with a reasonable approximation of justice. For these reasons, strong democratic talk places its agenda at the
center rather than at the beginning of its politics. It subjects every pressing issue to continuous examination and possible reformulation. Its agenda is, before anything else, its agenda. It thus scrutinizes what remains unspoken, looking into the crevices of silence for signs of an unarticulated problem, a speechless victim, or a mute protester. The agenda of a community tells a community where and what it is. It defines that community's mutualism and the limits of mutualism and draws up plans for pasts to be institutionalized or overcome and for futures to be avoided or achieved. Far from being a mere preliminary of democracy, agenda-setting becomes one of its pervasive, defining functions. 180-182
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to choose not between independence or dependence but between citizenship or slavery. Without citizens, Rousseau warns, there will be neither free natural men nor satisfied solitaries-there will be "nothing but debased slaves, from the rulers of the state downwards." To a strong democrat, Rousseau's assertion at the opening of his Social Contract that [an individual] is born free yet is everywhere in chains does not mean that [an individual] is free by nature but society enchains him [or her]. It means rather that natural freedom is an abstraction, whereas dependency is the concrete human reality, and that the aim of-politics must therefore be not to rescue natural freedom from politics, but, to invent and pursue artificial freedom within and through politics. Strong democracy aims not to disenthrall [individuals] but to legitimate their dependency by means of citizenship and to establish their political freedom by means of the democratic community. 216
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Liberal critics of participation, imbued with the priorities of privatism, will continue to believe that the neighborhood-assembly idea will falter for lack of popular response. "Voters," writes Gerald Pomper, "have too many pressing tasks, from making money to
making love, to follow the arcane procedures of government." If the successful and industrious will not participate because they are too busy, and the poor and victimized will not participate because they are too apathetic, who will people the assemblies and who will give to talk a new democratic life? But of course people refuse to participate only where politics does not count-or
counts less than rival forms o private activity. They are apathetic because they are powerless, not powerless because they are apathetic. There is no evidence to suggest that once empowered, a people will refuse to participate. The historical evidence of New England towns, community school boards, neighborhood associations, and other local bodies is that participation fosters more participation. 272
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living and bring fundamental changes in the meaning or valuation of words. Major shifts in ideology and political power are always accompanied by such paradigmatic-shifts in language usage-so much so that historians have
begun to map the former by charting the latter. The largely pejorative meaning that the classical and early Christian periods gave to such terms as individual and privacy was transformed during the Renaissance in a fashion that eventually produced the Protestant Reformation and the ethics of commercial society. Eighteenth-century capitalism effected a transvaluation of the traditional vocabulary of virtue in a manner that put selfishness and avarice to work in the name of public goods. (George Gilder's Wealth and Poverty is merely the last and least in a long line of efforts to invert moral categories.) The history of democracy itself is contained in the history of the word democracy. The battle for selfgovernment has been fought over and over again as pejorative valuations of the term have competed with affirmative ones (pitting Plato or Ortega or Lippmann or modern political science against Machiavelli or Rousseau or Jefferson). The terms ochlocracy, mob rule, tyranny of the majority, and rule-of the masses all reflect hostile constructions of democracy; communitarianism, participationism, egalitarianism, and -it must be admittedstrong democracy suggest more favorable-constructions. Poverty was once a sign of moral weakness; now it is a badge of environmental victimization. Crime once proceeded from original now it is an escape from poverty. States' rights once bore the stigma of dishonor, then signified vigorous sectionalism, then was a code word for racism, and has now become a byword for the new decentralized federalism. Busing was once an instrument of equal educational opportunity; now it is a means of destroying communities. The shifts in the meaning of these and dozens of other key words mirror fundamental national shifts in power and ideology. The clash of competing visions-of social Darwinism versus collective responsibility and political mutualism, of original sin and innate ideas versus environmentalism, of anarchism versus collectivism ultimately plays itself out on the
field of everyday language, and the winner in the daily struggle for meaning may emerge as the winner in the clash of visions, with the future itself as the spoils of victory. An ostensibly free citizenry that leaves this battle to elites, thinking that it makes a sufficient display of its freedom by deliberating and voting on issues already formulated in concepts and terms over which it has exercised no control, has in fact already given away the greater part of its sovereignty. How can such a citizenry -help but oppose busing if busing means the
wrecking of communities and only the wrecking of communities? How can it support the right to abortion if abortion means murder, period? To participate in a meaningful
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decisive political conception. The anti-Vietnam War movement of the 1960s did just this, of course; it won no elections, it participated in no votes, and it contributed to no legislative debates. But it radically altered how most Americans saw the war and so helped bring it to an end. If language as a living,
changing expression of an evolving community can both encapsulate and challenge the past, it also provides a vehicle for exploring the future. Language's flexibility and its
susceptibility to innovation permit [people] to construct their visions of the future first in the realm of words, within whose confines a community can safely conduct its deliberations. Language can offer new solutions to old problems by altering, how we perceive these problems and can make new visions accessible to traditional communities by the imaginative use (and transvaluation) of familiar language. This-is the essence of public thinking."
The process moves us perforce from particularistic and immediate considerations of our own and our groups' interests, examined in a narrow temporal framework ("Will there be enough gasoline for my summer vacation trip?" for example), to general and long-term considerations of the nature of the communities we live in and of how well our life plans fit in with that nature ("Is dependence on oil a symbol of an overly materialistic, insufficiently self-sufficient society?" for example). In sum, what we call things affects how we do things; and despite the lesson of Genesis, for mortals at least the future must be
named before it can be created. Language is thus always the crucial battlefield; it conserves or liquidates tradition, it challenges or, champions established power paradigms and it is the looking glass of all future vision. If language is alive, society can grow; if it is dialectical, society can reconcile its parts-
past and future no less than interest and interest or class and class. As Jurgen Habermas has understood, democracy means above all equal access to language, and strong
democracy means widespread and ongoing participation in talk by the entire citizenry. Left to the media, the bureaucrats, the professors, and the managers, language quickly degenerates into one more weapon in the armory of elite rule. The professoriate and the literary establishment are all too willing
to capture the public with, catch phrases and portentous titles. How often in the past several decades have Americans been made to see themselves, and thus their futures, through the lens of a writer's book title? Recall The True Be liever, The Managerial Society, The End of Ideology, The Other America, The Culture of Narcissism, The Greening of America, The Totalitarian Temptation, The Technological Society, The Two Cultures, The Zero-Sum Society, Future Shock. We are branded by words and our future is held hostage to bestseller lists'.195-197
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A RENEWAL OF DEMOCRATIC TALK VIA COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS IS KEY TO CREATING A FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY- ALLOWING US TO INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL REALM Cohen 03--Professor of Political Science at Columbia University( Jean L., Civic Innovation in
America: Towards a Reflexive Politics, The Good Society 12.1 (2003) 56-62,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v012/12.1cohen.html)
Civic Innovation in America is a refreshing addition to what has become a growth industry of writing on American civil society. Unlike the influential approach of Robert Putnam, this is not a backward-looking lament about the decline of associational life, although Sirianni and Friedland are aware of the worrisome signs of civic disaffection and citizen passivity in the U.S. 1Yet they don't join neo-communitarian efforts to revive traditionalistic types of "mediating institutions" in order to secure social integration. 2Although not adverse to mobilizing old forms of social capitalsuch as congregation-based community organizations within and across denominational linesthey are primarily interested in networks that expand local organizing capacities for new purposes and with fresh democratic methods. 3 Indeed, the focus of Civic Innovation is on significant recent attempts "from below" to reinvent and revitalize American democracy. Accordingly, the book points the reader to the ongoing public work of citizens and the actual processes of civic innovation that have sprung up in recent years. The authors maintain that: "Over the past several decades American society has displayed a substantial capacity for civic innovation, and the future of our democracy will depend on whether we can deepen and extend such innovation to solve major public problems, and transform the way we do politics." 4Theirs is a forward-looking approach: it highlights new forms of cooperative civic participation in civil society and discusses the new modes of governance needed to support them.
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significant role in buttressing the autonomy of individual wills that is essential to democracy. It is through talk that we constantly reencounter, reevaluate, and repossess the beliefs, principles, and maxims on the basis of which we exert our will in the political realm. To be free, it is not enough for us simply to will what we choose to will. We must will what we possess, what truly belongs to us. John Stuart Mill commented on the "fatal tendency of
mankind to leave all thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful." He ascribed to this tendency "the cause of about half [men's] errors." Mindless convictions not only spawn errors, they turn
those who hold them into charlatans of liberty. Today's autonomously held belief is tomorrow's heteronomous orthodoxy unless, tomorrow, it is reexamined and repossessed. Talk is the principal mechanism by which we can retest and thus repossess our convictions, which means that a democracy that does not institutionalize talk will soon be without autonomous citizens, though men and women who call themselves citizens may from time to time deliberate, choose, and vote. Talk immunizes values from ossification and protects the political process from rigidity, orthodoxy, and the yoke of the dead past. This, among all the functions of
talk, is the least liable to representation, since only the presence of our own wills working on a value can endow that value with legitimacy and us with our autonomy. Subjecting a value to the test of repossession is a measure of legitimacy as well as of autonomy: forced knowingly to embrace their prejudices, many men falter. Prejudice is best practiced in the dark by dint of habit or
passion. Mobs are expert executors of bigotry because they assimilate individual wills into a group will and relieve individuals of any responsibility for their actions. It is above all the
imagination that dies when will is subordinated to instinct, and as we have seen, it is the imagination that fires empathy. Values will, naturally, conflict even where they are thoughtfully embraced and willed; and men's souls are sufficiently complex for error or even evil to dwell comfortably in the autonomous man's breast. Autonomy is no guarantee against moral turpitude; indeed, it is its necessary condition. But in the social setting, it seems evident that maxims that are continuously reevaluated
and repossessed are preferable to maxims that are embraced once and obeyed blindly thereafter. At a minimum, convictions that are reexamined are more likely to change, to adapt themselves to altered circumstances and to evolve to meet the challenges offered by competing views. Political willing is thus never a one-time or sometime thing (which is the great misconception of the social-contract tradition), but an ongoing shaping and reshaping of our common world that is as endless and exhausting as our making and remaking of our personal lives. A moment's complacency may mean the death of liberty; a break in political concentration may spell the atrophy of an important value; a pleasant spell of privatism may
yield irreversible value ossification. Democratic politics is a demanding business. Perhaps this is why common memory is even more important for democracy than for other forms of political culture. Not every principle of conduct can be tested at every moment; not every conviction can be exercised on every occasion; not every value can be regarded as truly ours at a given instant. Thus remembrance and imagination must act sometimes as surrogates for the actual testing of maxims. Founding myths and the rituals associated with them (July 14 in France or August 1 in Switzerland), representative political heroes who embody admired convictions (Martin Luther King or Charles de Gaulle), and popular oral traditions can all revivify citizens' common beliefs and their sense of place in the political culture. These symbols are no substitute for the citizenry's active reexamination of values through participation in political talk, but they can and do supplement such talk through the imaginative reconstruction of the past in live images and through the cultivation of beliefs that are not necessarily involved in a given year's political business. 190-191
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if the pressures of globalization create such castes not only in in all the old democracies, we shall end up in an Orwellian world
to insist that the primary responsibility of each democratic nation-state is to its own least advantaged citizens. These two responses obviously conflict with each other. In particular, the
must share its wealth with the Southern. The second is first response suggests that the old democracies should open their borders, whereas the second suggests that they should close them.8 The first response comes
comes naturally to members of trade unions, and to the marginally employed people who can most easily be recruited into rightwing populist movements. Union members in the United States have watched factory after factory close, only to reopen in Slovenia, Thailand, or
naturally to academic leftists, who have always been internationally minded. The second response Mexico. It is no wonder that they see the result of international free trade as prosperity for managers and stockholders, a better standard of living for workers in developing countries, and a very much worse standard of living for American workers. It would be no wonder if they saw the American leftist intelligentsia as on the same side of the managers and stockholdersas sharing the same class interests. For we intellectuals, who are mostly academics, are ourselves quite well insulated, at least in the short run, from the effects of globalization. To make things worse, we often seem more interested in the workers of the developing world than in the fate of
democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book
our fellow citizens. Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized The Endangered American Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workersthemselves
something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote forsomeone will assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salemen, and
desperately afraid of being downsizedare not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At that point, chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that
postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis novel It Cant Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler
the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words nigger and kike will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly
selfishness. For after
educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of
my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make peace with the international superrich, just as Hitler made with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to provoke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left
channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossesed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called
national politics.
first is that
the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in
It is not the sort of the Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The
. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman
might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Deweys Reconstruction in Philosophy in whi ch he expresses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of individualism versus communitarianism. Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order.9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of todays academic leftists says that some topic has been inadequately theorized, you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacans impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by problematizing familiar concepts. Recent attempts to subvert social institutitons by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic
it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate or a political strategy. Even though what these authors theorize
philosophizing at its worts. The authors of these purportedly subversive books honestly believe that the are serving human liberty. But is often something very concrete and near at handa curent TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandalthey offer the most absract and barren explanations
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. These futile attempts to philosophize ones way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec- tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The
imaginable cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund- son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10
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appears as a mediator of affection and affiliation as well as of interest and identity, of patriotism as well as of individuality. It can build community as well as maintain rights and seek consensus as well as resolve conflict. It offers, along with meanings and significations,
silences, rituals, symbols, myths, expressions and solicitations, and a hundred other quiet and noisy manifestations of our common humanity. Strong democracy seeks institutions that can give these things a voice-and an ear. The third issue that liberal theorists have underappreciated is
the complicity of talk in action. With talk we can invent alternative futures, create mutual purposes, and construct competing visions of community. Its potentialities thrust talk into the realm of intentions and consequences and render it simultaneously more provisional and more concrete than philosophers are wont to recognize. Their failure of imagination stems in part from the passivity of thin democratic politics and in part from the impatience of speculative philosophy with contingency, which entails possibility as well as indeterminateness. But significant political effects and actions are possible only to the extent that politics is embedded in a world of fortune, uncertainty, and contingency. Political talk is not talk about the world; it is talk that makes and remakes the world. The posture of the strong democrat is thus
"pragmatic" in the sense of William James's definition of pragmatism as "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." James's pragmatist "turns toward concreteness and adequacy, toward facts, toward action, and toward power.... [Pragmatism thus] means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretense of finality in truth." Strong democracy is
oriented disposition of strong democratic talk embodies James's instinctive sense of pragmatism's political implications. Future action, not a priori principle, constitutes such talk's principal (but not principled) concern. 177-178
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1997, n2 p315(32)
We bring normativity to our performances as ethical principles that are themselves subject to resistance. By unearthing the contingency of the "self-evident," performative resistance enables politics. Thus
, the question is not should we resist (since resistance is always, already present), but rather what and how we should resist. This notion of performativity is also important for
understanding the possibilities for innovation in Habermasian deliberative participation. Just as a protestor exposes the contingency of concepts like justice, a dialogue exposes the limits and contingency of rational argumentation. Once we are sensitive to the performative nature of speech, language and discourse, then we can see that deliberative politics cannot be confined to the rational statement of validity claims. performance of deliberation that that which cannot be argued for finds expression
Deliberation must be theatrical: it is in the . Indeed it is precisely the non-rational aspects of deliberation that carry the potential for innovation. In his description of the poignant reminders of demonstration Chaloupka recognizes that it is at the margins that the actual force of the demonstration resides, no matter what happens at the microphone. The oral histories of demonstrations (the next day over coffee) linger over the jokes and funny signs and slogans, the outrages and improprieties, more than the speeches and carefully coherent position papers. (68)
PERFORMANCE IS ALWAYS CONTEXT-DEPENDENT. OUR CRITICISM CAN ONLY BE EVALUATED IN THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE
Jessica Kulynych, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter,
1997, n2 p315(32)
Consequently, a performative concept of political participation changes debates within the traditional participation literature over the inclusion of protest activities and community decisionmaking in the definition of political participation. While these debates have generally been conducted on familiar terrain, justifying the inclusion of such activity by delineating its impact on the distribution of goods, services, or political power by the government, a performative concept of participation breaks down this distinction altogether.(75) Because performative participation is defined by its relation to a set of normalizing disciplinary rules and its confrontation with those rules, nothing can be categorically excluded from the category of political participation. As Honig eloquently puts it, "not everything is political on this (amended) account; it is simply the case that nothing is ontologically protected from politicization, that nothing is necessarily or naturally or ontologically not political."(76) Therefore, the definition of political participation is always context dependent; it depends upon the character of the power network in which it is taken. Political participation is not categorically distinguished from protest or resistance, but rather the focus is on the disruptive potential of an action in a particular network of power relations. To say that participation is context dependent means not only that any action is potentially participation, but also that no particular action is necessarily a participatory act. Housecleaning is a good example. The character of the power network in which one exists defines housecleaning as a potential act of political participation. In her description of the defensive strategies of Black women household workers, Bonnie Thorton Dill argues that the refusal to mop the floor on hands and knees, or the refusal to serve an extra dinner, constitutes an effective act of resistance.(77) It is not the act itself that is politically definitive, but rather the context. Black domestic laborers, who in this context are constructed as desperate, willing to do any type of work, and always immediately available for service, resist that construction by acting as if they have other choices. Thus it is the context of the domestic labor relationship that defines the repertoire of political actions. Similarly, Jonathan Kozol describes poor welfare mothers living in the degrading conditions of the South Bronx whose homes "no matter how besieged, are nonetheless kept spotless and sometimes even look cheerful."(78) For women who are constructed as thoroughly dependent, irresponsible, unfit, and unclean, cleaning the house takes on the character of resistance; it becomes a political act. Housecleaning itself is not necessarily political, rather,
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the disciplinary context of a gendered social welfare state gives political import to seemingly banal, everyday activities.
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A2 Performativity (2/2)
COALITIONS MUST PRECEDE VICTORY THROUGH PERFORMANCE
Jessica Kulynych, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter,
1997, n2 p315(32)
A performative perspective on participation enriches our understanding of deliberative democracy. This enlarged understanding can be demonstrated by considering the examination of citizen politics in Germany presented in Carol Hager's Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the West German Energy Debate.(86) Her work skillfully maps the precarious position of citizen groups as they enter into problemsolving in contemporary democracies. After detailing the German citizen foray into technical debate and the subsequent creation of energy commissions to deliberate on the long-term goals of energy policy, she concludes that a dual standard of interpretation and evaluation is required for full understanding of the prospects for citizen participation. Where traditional understandings of participation focus on the policy dimension and concern themselves with the citizens' success or failure to attain policy preferences, she advocates focusing as well on the discursive, legitimation dimension of citizen action. Hager follows Habermas in reconstituting participation discursively and asserts that the legitimation dimension offers an alternative reason for optimism about the efficacy of citizen action. In the discursive understanding of participation, success is not defined in terms of getting, but rather in terms of solving through consensus. Deliberation is thus an end in itself, and citizens have succeeded whenever they are able to secure a realm of deliberative politics where the aim is forging consensus among participants, rather than achieving victory by some over others.
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CHALLENGES TO CONFORMITY ONLY CEMENT THE OVERARCHING CONTROL OF THE DOMINANT LANGUAGE
Dr. Lee Spinks lectures in English Literature at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, Writing, Politics, and the Limit: Reading J. H. Prynne's "The Ideal Star-Fighter," Intertexts, Fall 2000 v4 i2 p144(23) The central claim of this essay is that these critical debates concerning the dialectic between totality and difference in modern cultural production provide the most rewarding context within which to discuss the relationship between textuality and politics in Prynne's poetry. For Prynne's work takes as its subject the very status of writing, and the epistemological practices writing both produces and brings into question, in a cultural sphere dominated by the power of instrumental reason to enforce a principle of "equivalence" where "whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect" (Adorno and Horkheimer 6). The importance of style, or the mode of relation between thought and its representation, to this question becomes apparent when we consider that the failure to challenge this universal principle of equivalence means to accept that the "identity of everything with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be identical with itself" (Adorno and Horkheimer 12). Yet any challenge to this process of abstraction and exchange based upon the formal autonomy or "difference" of style is vulnerable to Adorno's charge
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that it is through difference and exchange "that non-identical individuals and performances become commensurable and identical" (Adorno, Negative Dialectics 146-47).
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Performance Fails
FAITH IN PERFORMANCE IS NAVE AND FAILS TO CHANGE POLITICS Rothenberg & Valente 97
[Molly Anne, Assoc. Prof. English @ Tulane, & Joseph, Prof. @ Illinois, Performative Chic: The Fantasy of a Performative Politics, College Literature 24: 1, February, ASP] The recent vogue for performativity, particularly in gender and postcolonial studies, suggests that the desire for political potency has displaced the demand for critical rigor.[1] Because Judith Butler bears the primary responsibility for investing performativity with its present critical cachet, her work furnishes a convenient site for exposing the flawed theoretical formulations and the hollow political claims advanced under the banner of performativity. We have undertaken this critique not solely in the interests of clarifying performativity's theoretical stakes: in our view, the appropriation of performativity for purposes to which it is completely unsuited has misdirected crucial activist energies, not only squandering resources but even endangering those naive enough to act on performativity's (false) political promise. It is reasonable to expect any practical political discourse to essay an analysis which links its proposed actions with their supposed effects, appraising the fruits of specific political labors before their seeds are sown. Only by means of such an assessment can any political program persuade us to undertake some tasks and forgo others. Butler proceeds accordingly: "The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed to repeat, and through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable repetition itself" (Gender Trouble 148). Here, at the conclusion to Gender Trouble, she makes good her promise that subjects can intervene meaningfully, politically, in the signification system which iteratively constitutes them. The political "task" we face requires that we choose "how to repeat" gender norms in such a way as to displace them. According to her final chapter, "The Politics of Parody," the way to displace gender norms is through the deliberate performance of drag as gender parody.
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2005
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Mann
THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE COOPTS THE CRITICISM SINCE IT IS ANTICIPATED AND FOOTNOTED ALTERNATIVE TACTICS WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR IT TO HAVE AN EFFECT
Paul Mann, professor of comparative literature at Pomona college, Masocriticism, 1999, pg. 106-107.
Without exception, all positions are oriented toward the institutional apparatus. Marginality here is only relative and temporary: the moment black studies or womens stud ies or queer theory conceives of itself as a discipline, its primary orientation is toward the institution. The fact that the institution might treat it badly hardly constitutes an ethical privilege. Any intellectual who holds a position is a function of this apparatus; his or her marginality is, for the most part, only an operational device. It is a critical commonplace that the state is not a monolithic hegemony but rather a constellation of disorganized and fragmentary agencies of production. This is often taken as a validation for the political potential of marginal critical movements: inside-outside relations can be facilely deconstructed, and critics can still congratulate themselves on their resistance, but the contrary is clearly the case. The most profitable intellectual production does not take place at the center (e.g., romance philology), where mostly obsolete weapons are produced; the real growth industries are located precisely on the self-proclaimed margins. It will be argued that resistance is still possible, and nothing I propose here argues against such a possibility. I wish only to insist that effective resistance will never be located in the position, however oppositional it imagines itself to be. Resistance is first of all a function of the apparatus itself. What would seem to be the transgressive potential of such institutional agencies as certain orders of gender criticism might demonstrate the entropy of the institution, but it does nothing to prove the counterpolitical claims of the position. Fantasies of resistance most often serve as mere alibis for collusion. Any position is a state agency, and its relative marginality is a mode of orientation, not an exception. Effective resistance must be located in other tactical forms
CRITICISM CAN NEVER BE MAINTAINED AND IS IGNORED BECAUSE OF ITS PROLIFIC NATURE
Paul Mann, professor of comparative literature at Pomona college, Masocriticism, 1999, pg. 16-17.
The avant-garde, which always began in brilliant refusals and destructions, must in the end abandon those economies that, with frightening efficiency, have put it to use, made it instrumental, profited from it, developed ways to get a return even from negation, even from the death drive itself. In the light of the sun of expenditure, such a culture seems the narrowest of misconceptions . Imagine instead that the vast proliferation of writing, drawing, painting, performancenot just what cultures have preserved for us through the filtration systems of their own values, but all writing, all music, and so on is the actual, lived field of culture; that culture is waste, expenditure: productivity and destruction without any exclusion or discrimination; that all of these works have been produced not so that a few precious articles of value, the best that has been known and thought, can, through a sort of reasoned brokerage, be conserved as culture per se, but so that they would be destroyed; that what is most important about all of those poems and paintings and constructions is precisely that the vast majority of them disappear even as they are born, that they dismember and consume themselves without our ever knowing them, vanish in the air, into the death they most desired, never to be remembered again. Imagine a writing that saw itself in
this light, a light that never shines on most of what we call culture, that never consigns itself to productive discourse but always escapes, that is valuable only because it escapes, because it is elsewhere, nowhere. Or imagine a certain book: it arrives uncalled for, unpredicted, perhaps in the mail, perhaps fallen from the sky, unmarked by a publishers apparatus, by advertising, even by an authors name; a book made of white noise that erases itself as it goes along and everything you say for weeks is stolen from it; a book that you cut into pieces and disseminate at random (on the street, on walls, through the mail) or that you burn without having read it and scatter the ashes to the four winds; or imagine such a book that you never receive in the first place. Perhaps that is the useless book one must learn to write, that is the only book one ever writes. Or perhaps it is precisely a book one cannot write, but only imagine, and in imagining it call it down upon ones writing, to tear ones own writing apart. As this talk, this argument that began at cross -purposes and went nowhere, unravelling itself as it proceeded, even now beginning to cease vibrating in the air, will soon vanish ,
leaving nothing but a fading imprint on your memories, soon to be effaced as you turn toward more productive labors, and itself only the trace of an expenditure whose disappearance it briefly betrayed
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Power Vaccuum
POWER IS ZERO SUM THE ALTERNATIVE ONLY SHIFTS POWER ELSEWHERE
John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics p. 34)
Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the
balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of meanseconomic, diplomatic, and militaryto shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one states gain in power is another states loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other
states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.
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CONFRONTING THE APOCALYPSE CAUSES SOCIAL TRANCENDENCE- ITS THE ONLY WAY TO RESCUE PEOPLE WINK in 2001
//wyo-pinto] If that were the whole story about apocalyptic, many of us would want nothing to do with it. That is not the whole story, however. There is a positive role for apocalyptic as well as its better-known negative. The positive power of apocalyptic lies in its capacity to force humanity to face threats of unimaginable proportions in order to galvanize efforts at self and social transcendence. Only such Herculean responses can actually rescue people from the threat and make possible the continuation of humanity on the other side. Paradoxically, the apocalyptic warning is intended to remove the apocalyptic threat by acts of apocalyptic transcendence. [Walter, nqa, Apocalypse Now? Christian Century, Oct 17,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_28_118/ai_79514992
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http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_28_118/ai_79514992 //wyo-pinto]
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SOUTH AFRICA PROVES THAT OUR MODEL OF APOCALYPSE WORKS- WE MUST INCITE ACTION WINK in 2001 [Walter, nqa, Apocalypse Now? Christian Century, Oct 17,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_28_118/ai_79514992 //wyo-pinto]
BUT THE VERDICT is not yet in. It is late, but a positive response to the real apocalypse of our time is still possible. Consider South Africa. When I was there in the 1980s, it appeared that armed revolution was inevitable. Blacks were becoming more desperate by the day. Teenage boys were confronting the police and army without concern for their safety. Chaos was beginning to overtake the townships, as children, outraged by the timorousness of their parents, seized the initiative themselves. Whites were taking an increasingly hard line. It was a recipe for disaster. The whole scene reeked of an apocalypse of the negative sort. Then the most unexpected thing happened. The white government chose, under intense internal and international pressure, to relinquish power, and negotiated with its former black enemies a process that led to the election of a black president, a model constitution, and relatively low casualties, considering the alternatives. No one to my knowledge anticipated this turn of events. What had appeared as an inevitable (negative) apocalyptic bloodbath turned out to have been a (positive) apocalyptic situation instead, thanks to the "anti-apoca
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harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identifiction with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it, but is simultaneously obfuscated by it
and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what
'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here,
have faith in a Truth-Event;
Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou: God not only is but always-already was dead - that is to say, after Freud, one cannot directly
every such Event ultimately remains a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination
of the exact status of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan, Badiou delineates the contours of a domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection: the 'death drive' is not the outcome of the morbid
confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law. For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain 'between the two deaths', the pre-ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the immortality of participating in Truth, but in the sense of what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
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WE SHOULD COMBINE BADIOUS GENERIC CONCEPTION OF BEING WITH OUR DESCRIPTION OF THE SPECIFIC, WHICH DOESNT RESULT IN DEPICTION OF THE SINGULAR Hallward, Lecturer in the French Department @ Kings College, 2K3 (Peter Badiou: A
Subject to Truth, P. 274) At each point, the alternative to Badious strictly generic conception of things is
a more properly specific understanding of individuals and situations as conditioned by the relations that both enable and constrain their existence. In
order to develop this alternative, it is essential to distinguish scrupulously between the specific and what might be called the specified (Badious objectified).5 Actors are specific to a situation even though their actions are not specified by it, just as a historical account is specific to the facts it describes even though its assessment is not specified by them. The specific is a purely relational subjective domain. The specified, by contrast, is defined by positive, intrinsic characteristics or essences (physical, cultural, personal, and so on). The specified is a matter of inherited instincts as much as of acquired habits. We might say that the most general effort of philosophy or critique should
be to move from the specified to the specificwithout succumbing to the temptations of the purely singular. Badiou certainly provides a most compelling critique of the specified. But he hasat least thus far inadequate means of distinguishing specified from specific. The result, in my view, is an ultimately unconvincing theoretical basis for his celebration of an extreme particularity as such.
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presentative, and thus anti-democratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). A philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the "democratic" submission to the world as it is (Entretien avec Alain Badiou, 1999: 2). But he seems m ore willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repre. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign for instance, electoral contests or petition movements that operates as a prisoner of the parliamentary space (LDP, 19 -20.04.96: 2). It remains an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm.
their separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought (LDP, 6.05.93: 1).24 The OP now conceives itself in a tense, non-dialectical vis--vis with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses any antagonistic conception of their operation, any conception that smacks of classism. There is to no more choice to be made between the state or revolution; the vis--vis demands the presence of the two terms and not
The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics. On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that the annihilation of one of the two (LDP, 11.01.95: 3-4). Indeed, at the height of the December 95 strikes, the OP recognised that the only contemporary movement of dstatisation with any real power was the corporate-driven movement of partial de-statification in the interests of commercial flexibility and financial mobility. Unsurprisingly, we are against this withdrawal of the state to the profit of capital, through general, systematic and brutal privatisation. The
state is what can sometimes take account of people and their situations in other registers and by other modalities than those of profit. The state assures from this point of view the public space and the general interest. And capital does not incarnate the general interest (LDP, 15.12.96: 11). Coming from the author of Thorie de la contradiction, these are
remarkable words.
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With Badiou we have an ethics of truths which hunts down those exceptional political statements in order to subtract from them their egalitarian core, thereby striking a blow for justice against the passive democracy of the State. Overall we might say that the general area of agreement lies in the fact that, in
has an equal chance of counting in the democratic sphere. each case, democracy remains a rational possibility. In particular, for both Balibar and Badiou, it is love as an amor ous feeling towards or encounter with ones fellow man a recognition that the fraternal part that is held in common between human beings is somehow greater than the whole of their differences which forges the social bond. However, on the precise nature of the ratio of this bond their respective paths diverge somewhat. In Balibars case we are dealing with an objective illusion wherein one imagines that the love one feels for an object (an abstract egalitarian ideal, say) is shared by others. Crucially, love in this sense is wholly ambivalent, wildly vacillating between itself and its inherent opposite, hate.18 On this evidence we might say that a communist peace would be really indi stinct from a fascist one. Therefore, the challenge for Balibar is to construct a prescriptive political framework capable of operating without repression in a utilitarian public sphere where the free exchange of opinions is more likely than not to result in the self-limitation of extreme views.
In Badious case what we are dealing with, on the other hand and what we have been dealing with more or less consistently throughout this book is a subjective reality. The social contract is forever being conditioned, worked on practically from within by the political militants, in readiness for the occurrence of the truth-event. This is the unforeseen moment of an amorous encounter between two natural adversaries (a group of students mounting a boycott of university fees, for instance) which retrieves the latent communist axiom of equality from within the social process. Here we have a particular call for social justice (free education for all!) which strikes a chord with the whole people (students and non-students alike). Crucially, love in this sense is infinite, de-finite, in seizing back (at least a part of) the State power directly into the hands of the people.
Moreover, in this encounter between students and the university authorities there is an invariant connection (of communist hope) which is
the challenge is to develop and deepen an ethical practice, not in any utilitarian or communitarian sense since the latter would merely risk forcing a political manifesto prematurely, perhaps giving rise to various brands of State-sponsored populism9 but in the sense of a politics capable of combating repression; a politics which, in its extreme singularity, holds itself open to seizure by Truth.
shared by all, and where any difference of opinion is purely incidental. Momentarily, at least. For Badiou,
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military intervention. No one doubts the murderous hypocrisy with which the Western powers, led by the US, have invoked the language of
'human rights' have also been a rallying call for many activists around the globe. In the form of the Helsinki Accords, they were a major focus for the East European opposition in the years leading up to 1989- They were equally important tactically for Latin America's struggle against the dictatorships, and continue to provide a vital political point of leverage for many indigenous populations, not to mention the Tibetans, the Burmese, the Palestinians. The United States, as is well
known, continues to refuse recognition to the recently established International Criminal Court, fearful, no doubt, that members of its own armed forces, and perhaps of former administrations, could be amongst those arraigned before it.
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Double Bind
BADIOU IS IN A DOUBLE-BIND: EITHER THERES NO WAY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TRUE AND FALSE EVENTS WHICH MEANS THE ALTERNATIVE CANT SOLVE, OR SUBJECTS OF THE EVENT GO INTO IT WITH A PRECONCEIVED NOTION OF THE EVENT, WHICH MAKES TRUE FIDELITY IMPOSSIBLE Hallward, Professor of French at Kings College, London, 2K4 (Peter, Think Again:
Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, P. 15-16)
Badiou insists on the rare and unpredictable character of every truth. On the other hand, we know that every truth, as it composes a generic or egalitarian sampling of the situation, will proceed in such a way as to suspend the normal grip of the state of its situation by eroding the distinctions used to classify and order parts of the situation. Is
One implication of this last point is easily generalized. this then a criterion that subjects must presume in advance or one that they come to discover in each case? If not the former,
if truth is entirely a matter of post-evental implication or consequence, then there can be no clear way of distinguishing, before it is too late, a genuine event (which relates only to the void of the situation, i.e. to the way inconsistency might appear within a situation) from a false event (one that, like September 11th or the triumph of National Socialism, reinforces the basic distinctions governing the situation). But if there is always an initial hunch which guides the composition of a generic set, a sort of preliminary or prophetic commitment to the generic just as there is, incidentally, in Cohens own account of generic sets, insofar as this account seeks to demonstrate a possibility implicit in the ordinary extensional definition of set25 then it seems difficult to sustain a fully post-evental conception of truth. In short: is
the initial decision to affirm an event unequivocally free, a matter of consequence alone? Or is it tacitly guided by the criteria of the generic at every step, and thereby susceptible to a kind of anticipation?
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is it enough to explain the process of subjectivation, the transformation of an ordinary individual into the militant subject of a universalizable cause, or truth, mainly through analogies with the process of conversion? It is certainly essential to maintain (after Saint Paul) that anyone can become the militant of a truth, that truth is not primarily a matter of background or disposition. If it exists at all, truth must be equally indifferent to both nature and nurture, and it is surely one of the great virtues of Badious account of the
or ego in the ordinary sense. On the other hand,
subject that it, like Zizeks or Lacans, remains irreducible to all the forces (historical, social, cultural, genetic .. .) that shape the individual
the lack of any substantial explanation of subjective empowerment, of the process that enables or inspires an individual to become a subject, again serves only to make the account of subjectivation unhelpfully abrupt and abstract. Isnt there a danger that by disregarding issues of motivation and resolve at play in any subjective decision, the militants of a truth will preach only to the converted? Doesnt the real problem of any political organization begin where Badious analyses tend to leave off, i.e. with the task of finding ways whereby a truth will begin to ring true for those initially indifferent or hostile to its implications?
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Badiou, the intermittence of event and subject renders the very idea of politics problematic. According to him, politics defines itself via fidelity to the event whereby the victims of oppression declare themselves. His determination to prise politics free from the state in order to subjecrivize it, to deliver it from history in order to hand it over to the event, is part of a tentative search for an autonomous politics of the oppressed. The alternative effort, to subordinate politics to some putative meaning of history, which has ominous echoes in recent
is the periodic occurrence of the a priori conditions of chance. However,
history, is he suggests to incorporate it within the process of general technicization and to reduce it to the management of state affairs. One must have the courage to declare that, from the point of view of politics, history as meaning or direction does not exist: a ll that exists
this divorce between event and history (between the event and its historically determined conditions) tends to render politics if not unthinkable then at least impracticable (PP 18).
BADIOUS ALTERNATIVE FAILS BECAUSE HES BLIND TO POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURES HIS DEMAND TO DIVORCE POLITICS FROM THE STATE MEANS IT CANT DEAL WITH TODAYS MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS Hallward, Professor of French at Kings College, London, 2K4 (Peter, Think Again:
Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, P. 18-19) to what extent can we abstract an exclusively political truth from matters relating to society, history and the state? Take those most familiar topics of cultural politics: gender, sexuality and race. No doubt
Most obviously, role in the slow movement towards racial or sexual indistinction, precisely? More importantly: since
the greater part of the still incomplete transformation here is due to militant subjective mobilizations that include the anti-colonial wars of liberation, the civil rights movement, the feminist movements, Stonewall, and so on. But has cumulative, institutional change played no
under the current state of things political authority is firmly vested in the hands of those with economic power, can a political prescription have any enduring effect if it manages only to distance or suspend the operation of such power? If a contemporary political sequence is to last (if at least it is to avoid the usual consequences of capital flight and economic sabotage) must it not also directly entail a genuine transformation of the economy itself, i.e. enable popular participation in economic decisions, community or workers control over resources and production, and so on? In todays circumstances, if a political prescription is to have any widespread consequence, isnt it essential that it find some way of bridging the gap between the political and the economic? Even Badious own privileged example indicates the uncertain purity of
matters of education, employment and administration as with issues of equality and power. Is
politics. The declaration of 18 March 1871 (which he quotes as the inaugural affirmation of a proletarian political capacity) commits the Communards to taking in hand the running of public affairs,3 and throughout its short existence the Commune busies itself a s much with
a sharp distinction between politics and the state helpful in such circumstances? Do forms of discipline subtracted from the state, from the party, apply in fact to anything other than the beginning of relatively limited political sequences? Does the abstract ethical imperative, continue!, coupled with a classical appeal to moderation and restraint,38 suffice to safeguard the long-term persistence of political sequences from the altogether necessary return of state-like functions (military,
bureaucratic, institutional . . .)? To what extent, in short, does Badious position, which he presents in anticipation of an as yet obscure step beyond the more state-centred conceptions of Lenin and Mao, rather return him instead to the familiar objections levelled at earlier theories of anarchism?
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modified
Baudrillards alternative is stated clearly enough: a hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and the simulated generation of difference (p. 167). It is a vision which should bring great comfort to government advisers, PR experts, campaign managers, opinion-pollsters, media watch-dogs, Pentagon [spokespeople] spokesmen and others with an interest in maintaining this state of affairs. Baudrillards imagery of orbital recurrence and the simulated generation of difference should commend itself to advocates of a Star Wars program whose only conceivable purpose is to escalate EastWest tensions and divert more funds to the military-industrial complex. There is no denying the extent to which this and similar strategies of disinformation have set the agenda for public debate across a range of crucial policy issues. But the fact remains (and this phrase carries more than just a suasive or rhetorical force) that there is a difference between what we are given to believe and what emerges from the process of subjecting such beliefs to an informed critique of their content and modes of propagation. This process may amount to a straightforward demand that politicians tell the truth and be held to account for their failing to do so. Of course there are cases like the IrangateContra affair or Thatchers role in events leading up to the Falklands war where a correspondence-theory might seem to break down since the facts are buried away in Cabinet papers, the evidence concealed by some piece of highlevel chicanery (Official Secrets, security interests, reasons of state, etc.), or the documents conveniently shredded in time to forestall investigation of their content. But there is no reason to think as with Baudrillards decidedly Orwellian prognosis that this puts the truth forever beyond reach, thus heralding an age of out-and-out hyperreality. For one can still apply other criteria of truth and falsehood, among them a fairly basic coherence-theory that would point out the various lapses, inconsistencies, non-sequiturs, downright contradictions and so forth which suffice to undermine the official version of events. (Margaret Thatchers various statements on the Malvinas conflict especially the sinking of the General Beigrano would provide a good example here.)29 It may be argued that the truth-conditions will vary from one specific context to another; that such episodes involve very different criteria according to the kinds of evidence available; and therefore that it is no use expecting any form of generalised theory to establish the facts of this or that case. But this ignores the extent to which theories (and truth-claims) inform our every act of rational appraisal, from commonsense decisions of a day-to-day, practical kind to the most advanced levels of speculative thought. And it also ignores the main lesson to be learnt from Baudrillards texts: that any politics which goes along with the current postmodernist drift will end up by effectively endorsing and promoting the work of ideological mystification.
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radically devalues life and focuses with a fascinated gaze on that which is most terrible death. In a popular French reading of Nietzsche, his transvaluation of values demanded negation of all repressive and life- negating values in favor of affirmation of life, joy and happiness. This philosophy of value valorized life over death and derived its values from phenomena which enhanced, refined and nurtured human life. In Baudrillard, by contrast, life does not exist as an autonomous source of value, and the body exists only as the caarnality of signs, as a mode of display of signification. His sign fetishism erases all materialjty from the body and social life, and makes possible a fascinated aestheticized fetishism of signs as the primary ontological reality. This way of seeing erases suffering, disease, pain and the horror of death from the body and social life and replaces it with the play of signs Baudrillards alternative. Politics too is reduced to a play of signs, and the ways in which different politics alleviate or intensify human suffering disappears from the Baudrillardian universe. Consequently Baudrillards theory spirals into a fascination with signs which leads him to embrace certain privileged forms of sign culture and to reject others (that is, the theoretical signs of modernity such as meaning, truth, the social, power and so on) and to pay less and less attention to materiality (that is, to needs, desire, suffering and so on) a trajectory will ultimately lead him to embrace nihilism (see 4.4). Thus Baudrillards interpretation of the body, his refusal of theories of sexuality which link
moment, the instant in which his thought it with desire and pleasure, and his valorization of death as a mode of symbolic exchange which valorizes sacrifice, suicide and other symbolic modes of death are all part and parcel of a fetishizing of signs, of a valorization of sign culture over all other modes of social life. Such fetishizing of sign culture finds its natural (and more harmless) home in the fascination with the realm of sign culture which we call art. I shall argue that Baudrillards trajectory exhibits an ever more intense aestheticizing of social theory and philo sophy, in which the values of the representation of social reality, political struggle and change and so on are displaced in favor of a (typically French) sign fetishism. On this view, Baudrillards trajectory is best interpreted as an increasingly aggressive and extreme fetishizing o f signs, which began in his early works in the late 1 960s and which he was only gradually to exhibit in its full and perverse splendor as aristocratic aestheticism from the mid-1970s to the present. Let us now trace the evolution of his fascination with art, a form of sign culture which Baudrillard increasingly privileges and one which provides an important feature attraction of the postmodern carnival.
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for Derrida language is inherently violent in that it is always a reduction, a totalization, he reaches the conclusion that even a Levinasian ethics cannot ever avoid violence: "One never escapes the economy of war." The origin of this violence inherent in discourse is the act of inscribing the other in the definitions and terms of the same: Predication is the first violence.
Since the verb to be and the predicative act are implied in every other verb, and in every common noun, nonviolent language, in the last analysis, would be a language of pure invocation . . .purified of all rhetoric [in Levinas' terms] . . . . Is a language free from all rhetoric possible? Derrida answers his own question in the negative, affirming that "there is no phrase which is indeterminate, that is, which does not pass through the violence of the concept. Violence appears with articulation." Foucault has expressed this same sentiment, maintaining that "We must conceive discourse as a violence we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them." Naming and predication-two acts essential to language-confine what is being described, and fix it in one's own terms. As we shall see from an examination of Hiroshima non amour, memory works the same way, attempting to enclose the past within determinate parameters, employing the same brand of totalization to whose presence in language Derrida has gestured. Concern over the necessary violence of memory as representation to the consciousness, as willed inscription in one's own terms of what is other because past, is perhaps the most obvious point at which Derrida, Levinas, Duras, and Resnais converge, for the impossibility of remembering an historical event as it was-of actually arriving at a clear understanding of a past event by imaging it through memory, by re-presenting it to our memory-is a chronic preoccupation of Hiroshima mon amour. Resnais confronted this dilemma as well in the process of constructing Nuit et brouillard. Claiming historical authority over Auschwitz, or giving the
illusion that it is comprehensible, would only, in Resnais' opinion, "humaniz[e] the incomprehensible terror," thereby "diminishing it," perhaps even romanticizing it; so, unable to describe the violence, and unwilling to inscribe it, Resnais opted instead to document our memory of it. Resnais carries no illusions that the past can be duplicated to any
significant degree, rendered for us now as it was then. Given the accepted generic constraints of a film, he says, "it is absolutely absurd to think that in that space of time one can properly present the historical reality of such a complex event. [Historical facts] were the bases for our `fiction,' points of departure rather than ends in themselves." This explains what Leo Bersani has described as Resnais' clear favoring of the word "imagination" over the word "memory" when referring to his own films." However, in the case of Hiroshima mon amour, instead of filling in with imagination the details between the historical "facts," the film throws its hands up at any effort to "remember" or "see" the tragedy at Hiroshima. Thus, Hiroshima mon amour, in the words of one critic, turns out "to be a film about the impossibility of making a documentary about Hiroshima"1' or, in Armes' more broadly epistemologically oriented phrase, "a documentary on the impossibility of comprehending." Duras reminds us of this in her synopsis of the screenplay: "Impossible de parler de HIROSHIMA. Tout ce qu'on peut faire c'est de parler de l'impossibilite de parler de HIROSHIMA (Impossible to speak of HIROSHIMA. All one can do is speak of the impossibility of speaking of HIROSHIMA)." She then drives the point home in Hiroshima mon amour's unforgettable opening sequence, as Okada incessantly reminds Riva that she can never know Hiroshima's tragedy. Riva knows, for example, that there were two hundred thousand dead and eighty thousand wounded, in nine
seconds; she can rattle off the names of every flower that bloomed at ground zero two weeks after the bombing; she has been to the museum four times, seen the pictures, watched the films. As if to accentuate the veracity of' Riva's learned data, Duras alerts the reader in a footnote to the
origin of the details, and there is hardly a more famous or traditionally reputable source on the immediate aftermath of the bombing than John Mersey's Hiroshima. And yet, as one critic has commented, "les images collees aux murs . . . sont incapables de faire revivre completement la realite du fait (images pasted to walls . . . are incapabale of completely restoring the reality of the fact)."
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Despite Riva's wealth of statistical (read: historically trustworthy) data, Okada is able to refute her with confidence, "Tu n'as rien vu a Hiroshima (You saw nothing at Hiroshima)," and
the almost incantatory continued
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Okada points out that the entire world was celebrating while Hiroshima smouldered in ashes. This fact forces another, similar question, one that I myself must confront on reading or watching Hiroshima mon amour: How could the Westerners in the audience ever expect to grasp the tragedy that they originally celebrated as the end of the war? These reminders have
their own Verfremdungseffekt further alienating the audience/reader from the history of Hiroshima, dispelling any lingering notion that historical tragedy can ever be
. Riva's optimism is almost infectious, though, and she indeed believes that she can master the history behind the leveling of Hiroshima. She claims to know everything, and she is once again swiftly negated by the Japanese. She
fully comprehended
contents herself by concluding that, even if she does not know yet, ca s'apprend (one learns)."" She is not gifted with memo ry, though, as Okada reminds her and thus all she can claim to know about Hiroshima is what she has "invente." This particular verbal exchange is highlighted by the fact that it is for the first time in the text Riva's turn to use the word "rien," until this point a word uttered frequently and only by Okada: ELLS: Je n'ai rien invente. (SHE: I invented nothing.) LUI: Tu as tout invente. (HE: You invented everything.) Proof of her inability to approach comprehension of Hiroshima arrives in the form of a laugh, when Riva asks her lover if he was at Hiroshima the day of the bombing and he laughs as one would laugh at a child. She shows herself further distanced from the historical event by the manner in which she sounds out the name of the city, "Hi-ro-shi-ma," as if it were-or rather because it is-radically foreign to her. (Later, in the same manner, Okada sounds out Riva's youth, the story of which will always be unknown and incomprehensible to him: "Jeune-a-Ne-vers [ Young-in-Nevers].") Her memory of Hiroshima, created by herself and inscribed in terms that she can understand from photographs taken by other people, is mere "illusion," truth several times removed. She remembers, though, and almost obsessively, because she knows that it is worse to forget sometimes violently so, according to a Derridean understanding of it, because it is always a form of representation and thus of predication. A less diplomatic statement made by Okada goes so far as to suggest that : "Est-ce que to avais remarque," he asks, "que c'est toujours dans le meme sens que l'on remarque les chows? (Did you ever notice that one always notices things in the same way?)." We notice what suits us, in
However, just as language-the system of -carries in its every use the violence inherent in its reductiveness, we use it anyway, as it enables far more than inhibits. In Levinas's formulation, not only is discourse our primary means of relating to and maintaining the other, but the absence of it, silence, "is the inverse of language . . . a laughter that seeks to destroy language . " Derrida accords with Levinas: "denying discourse" is "the worst violence," "the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse." Despite the violence that Riva's impulse toward memory commits against any ideal or "objective" history, absolute forgetting is far more dangerous; by any account, remembering and representing past violence must be seen as a necessary evil, as a sort of metaphysically violent means of averting future real, physical violence. Still, the partial forgetting of the unforgettable tragedy is inevitable, as John Ward points out in his treatment of Resnais' films: "With the passage of time we become so insensitive to other people's suffering that we can lie in the disused ovens of Auschwitz and have our photographs taken as souvenirs."
the direction and sense which we prefer, and we notice it in the manner in which we can best use it. representation par excellence Duras' text also renders disturbing images of forgetting, of loubli. Riva confesses to her own struggle against ignorance: "mei aussi, j'ai essaye de lutter de toutes mes forces contre l'oubli . . . . Comme toi, j'ai oublie (me too, I've tried to struggle with all my strength against forgetting . . . . Like you, I've forgotten). "During the third part of Duras' script, at the staged demonstration against nuclear armaments, Okada seems far too preoccupied with taking Riva back to his family's house to care about the demonstration, even if it is only a performance for a film. Immediately after explaining the appearance of the charred skin of Hiroshima's surviving children, he informs her, "Tu vas venir avec moi encore une fois (You will come with me once again)." Remembering the bombing is quite obviously not a first priority for him. There are other grim reminders of the forgetting in the reconstruction of Hiroshima and the importation of American culture. At one point, Riva and Okada enter a nightclub called "Casablanca" -a strange immortalization of American pop culture in a city leveled by an American bomb less than two decades earlier. Moreover, the Japanese man who tries to converse with Riva in the Casablanca gladly (and proudly, it seems) speaks the language of the conquerors, the bomb-droppers. The attitude on display in this scene is reminiscent of one in John Hersey's account of the months following the bombing, in Hiroshima: [Dr. Fujiil bought [the vacant clinic] at once, moved there, and hung out a sign inscribed in English, in honor of the conquerors: M. MUJII, M.D. MEDICAL & VENEREAL Quite recovered from his wounds, he soon built up a strong practice, and he was delighted, in the evenings, to receive members of the occupying forces, on whom he lavished whiskey and
While there is certainly something to be said for not bearing a grudge, the speed of the forgetting and forgiving seems unbelievable. Memory represents historical tragedy insufficiently, in violently subjective
practiced English. reductions; we are never able to experience being there and can never know the event, can never have witnessed it firsthand. Thus, we forget. Duras' script clearly stresses both the necessity and difficulty of remembering, but demonstrates, perhaps pessimistically, that we will veer slightly but inexorably toward l'oubli. And
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I have tried to demonstrate through this reading of Hiroshima mon amour that Resnais' and Duras' text falls prey to the violence of historical memory and to the worse violence of absolute oblivion. Strictly following a theoretical apparatus reconstructed from the thought of Levinas and Derrida, Hiroshima mon amour seems to participate, through the apparently deliberate reduction to race and place and event of two already allegorical and emblematic characters, in the very violence which Resnais and Duras set out initially to document, the most reductive of predications. The script trades in an economy of violence, dealing out the abstractions and totalizations that are the seed of every Holocaust, that mark every uninhabitable corner of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This conclusion seems to me, though, far too conclusive, far too reductively critical and discomforting, far too dependant on a great deal of interpretive faith, not unmerited but certainly not absolute, in the debate between and formulations of Levinas and Derrida What I am trying gingerly to say is that our reading should remain sensitive, attentive and open enough to discover those points at which the theoretical scaffolding may fail us, points at which a Levinasian/Derridean reading seems to stall; I believe a conclusive dismissal of Hiroshima mon amour as a text governed and permeated by violence is probably one such moment. I would propose instead a different, and hopefully more useful, reading of my reading of this well-intentioned script and film. For, while Hiroshima mon amour is certainly guilty of the very violence it claims as its object, it is likely from this portrayal and mobilizing of violence that the film sees its greatest anti-violent gesture; all that is required is a return to Duras' stated desire to avoid the banal describing of "l'horreur par l'horreur." Instead of horrifying us with horror, as she refused to do, Duras' screenplay has shown us the humble beginnings of horror: the total forgetting of past horrors, and the blatant inscribing of infinite Others within the finitudes of the language of the Same. And in this, Duras and Resnais may have succeeded, ultimately, in their declared mission to bring the horrifying tragedy of Hiroshima back to life, to see it reborn, out of the ashes.
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Butler, resistance is always imagined as personal, more or less private, involving no unironic, organized public action for legal or institutional change. Isn't this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change, but you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal freedom within those acts of carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the institution of slavery can be changed, and was changed-- but not by people who took a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed because people did not rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some extent they got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional
structures that shape women's lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, has at least improved; the law of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before; marriage is no longer regarded as giving men monarchical control over women's bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not take parodic performance as
Butler not only eschews such a hope, she takes pleasure in its impossibility. She finds it exciting to
their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice.
contemplate the alleged immovability of power, and to envisage the ritual subversions of the slave who is convinced that she must remain such. She tells us--this is the central thesis of The Psychic Life of Power-- that we all eroticize the power structures that oppress us, and can thus find sexual pleasure only within their confines. It seems to be for that reason that she prefers the sexy acts of parodic subversion to any lasting material or institutional change. Real change would so uproot our psyches that it would make sexual satisfaction impossible. Our libidos are the creation of the bad
parodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful tenured academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the symbolic, her proud neglect of the material side of life, becomes a fatal blindness. For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however parodically, the conditions of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape. Such women prefer food, schools, votes, and the integrity of their bodies. I see no reason to believe that they long sadomasochistically for a return to the bad state. If some
enslaving forces, and thus necessarily sadomasochistic in structure. Well, individuals cannot live without the sexiness of domination, that seems sad, but it is not really our business. But
when a major theorist tells women in desperate conditions that life offers them only bondage, she purveys a cruel lie, and a lie that flatters evil by giving it much more power than it actually has.
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. Agamben clearly hopes that his theoretical analysis could contribute to the political struggle against authoritarianism, yet he only offers tantalizingly abstract hints about how this might work. Beyond the typical academic conceit that theoretical work is a decisive element of political struggle, Agamben seems to embrace a utopianism that provides little guidance for political action. He imagines, "One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for good." (64) More troubling is his messianic suggestion that "this studious play" will usher in a form of justice that cannot be made juridical. Agamben might do well to consider Hannah Arendt's warning that the belief in justice unmediated by law was one of the characteristics of totalitarianism.
It might seem unfair to focus too much attention on Agamben's fairly brief discussion of alternatives to the sovereignty-exception-law nexus, but it is precisely those sections that reveal the flaws in his analysis. It also brings us back to our original question about how to resist the authoritarian implications of the state of exception without falling into the liberal trap of calling for more law
. For Agamben, the problem with the "rule of law" response to the war on terrorism is that it ignores the way that the law is fundamentally implicated in the project of sovereignty with its corollary logic of exception. Yet the solution that he endorses reflects a similar blindness. Writing in his utopian-mystical mode, he insists, "the only truly political action, however, is that which severs the nexus between violence and law."(88) Thus Agamben, in spite of all of his theoretical sophistication, ultimately falls into the trap of hoping that politics can be liberated from law, at least the law tied to violence and the demarcating project of sovereignty.
THIRD, PLAN IS NECESSARY FOR THE ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE THE EXECUTIVE WILL STILL VIOLENTLY DETAIN. THIS CREATES A DOUBLE BIND: EITHER THE END RESULT OF THE ALT IS PLAN AND THERES NO LINK DIFFERENTIAL OR IT DOES THE STATUS QUO AND DOESNT SOLVE FOURTH, PERM RECOGNIZE THE TENSION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION AND ENGAGE IN THE RESISTANCE OF THE 1AC
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. If, with Rancire, we define politics not through the institution of sovereignty, but as a continual struggle for the recognition of basic equality, and thereby strongly distinguish politics from the police order viewed as the functional management of communities (Rancire 1999), then it is possible to acknowledge the normative break introduced by the democratic revolutions of the modern age without falling into a one-sided view of modernity as a neat process of rationalisation. What should be stressed about modernity is not primarily the list of substantive inalienable and imprescriptible human rights, but the equal entitlement of all to claim any rights at all. This definition of politics must be accompanied by the parallel acknowledgment that the times
47 that saw the recognition of the fundamental equality of all also produced the total negation of this principle. But this parallel claim does not necessarily render the first invalid. Rather between the political demands of equality and the systemic tendencies that structurally produce stigmatisation and exclusion. 48.
One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancire remarks, Foucaults late hypothesis is more
about power than it is about politics (Rancire 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancire suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of
The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as
politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical,
exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.
SIXTH, NO ALTERNATIVE AGAMBEN ISOLATES SOVEREIGNTY AS INEVITABLY EXCLUSIONARY OF NONPOLITICAL LIFE, MEANING THERES NO WAY TO ESCAPE THAT SYSTEM, RENDERING THEIR OFFENSE INEVITABLE
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Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)
the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both are instances of the disciplinary
society and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that
analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those
programs to enforce it.
cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory
But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of liberty, just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not opposites, in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept power should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively the same. Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, tactically polyvalent. Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create multiple modernities, modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.
EIGHTH, POWER IS ZERO SUM THE ALTERNATIVE ONLY SHIFTS POWER ELSEWHERE
John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics p. 34) states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of meanseconomic, diplomatic, and militaryto shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile . Because one states gain in
Consequently, Specifically, they
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power is another states loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states
maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short,
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Agamben is not interested in such weighing of costs and benefits because he assumes from the outset that taking care of the survival needs of people in distress is simply the reverse side of the modern inclination to ignore precisely those needs and turn life itself into a tool and object of power politics. By way of conclusion, I will indicate briefly how his view differs from two other, often no less shattering critiques of
modern humanitarianism. Martti Koskenniemi warned that humanitarian demands and human rights are in danger of degenerating into "mere talk."[47] The recent crisis in Darfur, Sudan, can be cited as an example for a situation in which the repeated invocation of human rights standards and jus cogens norms, like those articulated in the Genocide Convention, might ultimately damage those norms themselves if states are unwilling to act on them.[48] This criticism implies that human rights should be taken seriously and applied in a reasonable manner. Both David Kennedy and Oona Hathaway have gone one step further by taking issue even with those who proved to be serious by joining treaties or engaging in advocacy. In a controversial quantitative study, Hathaway contended that the ratification of human rights treaties by sets of given countries not only did not improve human rights conditions on the ground, but actually correlated with increasing violations.[49] In a similar vein, David Kennedy radicalized Koskenniemi's point by arguing that human rights regimes and humanitarian law are rather part of the problem than part of solution, because they "justify" and "excuse" too much.[50] To some extent, this is an effect of the logic of legal reasoning: marking a line between noncombatants and combatants increases the legitimacy of attacking the latter, granting privileges to lawful combatants delegitimizes unlawful belligerents and dramatically worsens their status. On the whole, Kennedy is more concerned about the dangers of leaving human rights to international legal elites and a professional culture which is blind for the mismatch between lofty ideals and textual articulations on the one side, and real people and problems on the other side.[51] Whereas these authors reveal the "dark sides" of overly relying on human rights talk and treaties, the moral fervor of activists or the routines of the legal profession, Agamben claims that something is wrong with human rights as such, and that recent history has demonstrated a deep affinity between the protection and the infringement of these rights. Considered in this light, the effort of the British aid organization Save the Children, for instance, to help children in need both in Britain and abroad after World War I faithful to George Bernard Shaw's saying, "I have no enemies under seven"is only the flip side of a trend to declare total war on others regardless of their age and situation. This assertion clearly goes far beyond the voices of other pessimists. Agamben's work is understandable only against the backdrop of an entirely familiar mistrust of
According to Agamben, democracy does not threaten to turn into totalitarianism, but rather both regimes smoothly cross over into one another since they ultimately rest on the same foundation of a political interpretation of life itself.[52] Like Carl Schmitt, Agamben sees the invocation of human rights by democratic governments as well as the "humanitarian concept of humanity"[53] as
liberal democracy and its ability to cultivate nonpartisan moral and legal perspectives. much unlike Schmitt, the Italian philosopher
deceptive manouvers or, at least, as acts of self-deception on the part of the liberal bourgeois subject. The difference between Agamben and Schmitt lies in the fact that Schmitt fought liberal democracy in the name of the authoritarian state, while Agamben sees democracy and dictatorship as two equally unappealing twins. Very
confronts us with a mode of thinking in vaguely felt resemblances in lieu of distinctly perceived differences. Ultimately, he offers a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays the difference between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship a difference about which Adorno once said that it "is a total difference. And I would say," he added, "that it would be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if one were to ignore this difference."[54]
TENTH, DESIRE IS TOO DYNAMIC TO BE CONTAINED BY THE SOVEREIGN ITS FLUDITY ENABLES BIOPOWER THAT TRANSCENDS THE STATE OF EXCEPTION BY CREATING NEW FORMS OF LIFE OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM *** Neilson 2004
[Brett, University of Western Sydney, Potenza Nuda? Sovereignty, Biopolitics, Capitalism, Contretemps 5, December 2004, www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/neilson.pdf, acc 1-7-04//uwyo-ajl]
Like Agamben, Hardt and Negri take as a point of departure the Foucauldian account of biopolitics as a system of rule that emerges at the beginning of the modern era with the exercise of power over life itself. Importantly, however, they extend Foucaults argument by drawing on Gilles Deleuzes Postscript on the Society of Control. Foucault describes the modern system of disciplinary rule that fixes individuals within institutions (hospitals, schools, prisons, factories, and so on) but does not
, Hardt and Negri trace the emergence of a new mode of power that is expressed as a control that extends throughout the consciousness and bodies of the populationand at the same time across the entirety of social relations.9 In so doing, they
succeed in consuming them completely in the rhythm of productive practices or productive socialization. By contrast combine the Deleuzian emphasis on free-floating and mobile logics of control (data banking, risk management, electronic tagging, and so on) with an attention to the productive dimension of biopower (living labour) derived from the work of exponents of Italian operaismo like Paolo Virno and Christian Marazzi. While Hardt and Negri question the tendency of these thinkers to understand all contemporary forms of production on the horizon of communication and language, they are clearly indebted to their notions of immaterial labour and general intellect (which in turn derive from a reading of the famous Fragment on Machines from Marxs
productive aspect of biopower that places Hardt and Negri at odds with Agamben on bare lifea concept that, for them, excludes the question of labour from the field of theoretical observation. Thus, in a footnote, they comment
Grundrisse). It is this emphasis on the critically on a line of Benjamin-inspired interpretations of Foucault (from Derridas Force of Law to Homo Sacer itself): It seems fundamental to us, howeve r, that all of these discussions be brought back to the question of the productive dimension of the bios, identifying in other words the materialist dimension of the concept beyond any conception that is purely naturalistic (life as zo) or simply anthropological (as Agamben in particular has a tendency to do, making the concept in effect indifferent).10 With this identification of what Agamben calls indistinction as indifference (indifference to productive power of cooperation between human minds
, Agambens philosophical specification of the negative limit of humanity displays behind the political abysses that modern totalitarianism has constructed the (more or less heroic) conditions of human passivity.11 The apparatus of the sovereign ban condemns humanity to inactivity and despair. By contrast, Hardt and Negri claim that bare life must be raised up to the dignity of productive power. Rather than reducing humanity to mere living matter, the exceptional power of the modern state becomes effective at precisely the moment when
and bodies), Hardt and Negri voice their most severe reservations about the concept of bare life. For them
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social cooperation is seen no longer the result of the investment of capital but an autonomous power, the a priori of every act of production.12 Try as it may to relegate humanity to minimal naked life (or zo), the modern constituted order cannot destroy the enormous creativity of living labour or expunge its powers of cooperative production.
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The most significant difference between our projects, though, is that Agamben dwells on modern sovereignty whereas we claim that modern sovereignty has now come to an end and transformed into a new kind of sovereignty, what we call imperial sovereignty. Imperial sovereignty has nothing to do with the concentration camp. It no longer takes the form of a dialectic between Self and Other and does not function through any such absolute exclusion, but rules rather through mechanisms of differential inclusion, making hierarchies of hybrid identities. This description may not immediately give you the same sense of horror that you get from Auschwitz and the Nazi Lager, but imperial sovereignty is certainly just as brutal as modern sovereignty was, and it has its own subtle and not so subtle horrors.
TWELFTH, AGAMBENS USE OF THE CAMP CONFLATES VICTIM WITH OPPRESSOR, PREVENTING US FROM HOLDING PERPETRATORS RESPONSIBLE AND DESTROYING ANY ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO ACT SINCE WE POSIT EVERYONE AS THE VICTIM Sanyal, Assist Prof of French @ UC Berkeley, 2K2 (Debarati, A Soccer Match in Auschwitz:
Passing Culpability in Holocaust Criticism, Representations, Issue 79, Caliber) Agambens radicalization of Levis gray zone has even more disturbing consequences for understanding the relations of power within the camps. The unstable boundary between oppressor and oppressed in the gray zone is radicalized in Agambens account such that the two positions appear to be reciprocal and convertible: It seems, in fact, that the only thing that interests him [Levi] is what makes judgement impossible: the gray zone in
Beyond the problems inherent in a transhistorical treatment of shame and complicity, which victims become executioners and executioners become victims (Remnants, 17).18 While Agamben nowhere suggests that perpetrators and victims truly did exchange positions,
his emphasis on the camps as sites for a potentially endless circulation of guilt nevertheless takes the convertibility of victims and executioners as a structural given. Primo Levi, however, was at pains to emphasize that this convertibility was a politically expedient fiction designed to erase the difference between victim and executioner by forcing Jews to participate in the murder and cremation of their own. He also stressed the singular, unimaginable strain such a predicament must have exerted upon the SK. To transform such a charged, ambiguous lived reality into a formal conception of convertibility has disturbing ethical consequences. It suggests that the perpetrators too, by virtue of occupying this zone of radical inversion and participating in the traumatic conditions of camp life, could be perceived as victims. The fallacy
of this structural reciprocity, however, is refuted by Levi in a cautionary preface to his discussion of the Sonderkommando: This mimesis, this identification or imitation or exchange of roles between oppressor and victim, has provoked much discussion. . . . I do not know, and it does not much interest me to know, whether in my depths there lurks a murderer, but I do know that the murderers existed, not only in Germany, and still exist, retired or on active duty, and that to confuse them with their victims is a moral disease or an aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign of complicity; above all, it is a precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the negators of truth. (Drowned, 50)
The conceptualization of the gray zone as a transhistorical and trans-subjective site of culpability, in which victims become executioners and executioners become victims, thus conflates the positions of Muslims, Prominents, Kapos, and SS in a gesture that reaches beyond the concentration camp experience to include us in a general condition of traumatic culpability. This blurring of subject positions leads to a vision of inescapable guilt, in which we are always already collectively steeped in the eliminationist logic that led to the concentration camp and continue unknowingly to perpetuate its violence. But just as this vision posits an ever-encroaching web of complicity, it also, paradoxically, proposes an infinitely elastic notion of victimhood. If we are obscurely complicit with the logic of the soccer match, the irrealization of violence in daily life, we are also comparably violated by the historical trauma of the camps. The generalization of complicity and victimization not only dismantles the historical specificity of the camps and
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the survivors testimonies. It also, more disturbingly, coopts the figure of the victim as an other who is but an avatar of ourselves, a point I will address in a moment.
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After explaining how Heidegger's thought indeed constituted a political disaster, he mentioned one of his professors who was a great Kantian, very well-known in the '30s, and he explained how astonished and disappointed he had been when, while looking through card catalogues one day, he found some texts from around 1934 by this illustrious Kantian that were thoroughly Nazi in orientation.
has left me musing, and it's something I'd like to mull over further.
I have just recently had the same experience with Max Pohlenz, who heralded the universal values of Stoicism all his life. I came across a text of his from 1934 devoted to Fiihrertum in Stoicism. You should reread the introductory page and the book's closing remarks on the Fuhrersideal and on the true humanism constituted by the Volk under the inspiration of the leader's direction-Heidegger never wrote anything more disturbing. Nothing in this condemns Stoicism or Kantianism, needless to say.
there is a very tenuous "analytic" link between a philosophical conception and the concrete political attitude of someone who is appealing to it; the "best" theories do not constitute a very effective protection against disastrous political choices; certain great themes such as "humanism" can be used to any end whatever-for example, to show with what gratitude Pohlenz would have greeted Hitler. I do not conclude from this that one may say just anything within the order of theory, but, on the contrary, that a demanding, prudent, "experimental" attitude is necesary; at every moment, step by step, one must confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, with what one is. I have never
But I think that we must reckon with several facts: other hand,
been too concerned about people who say: "You are bor-rowing ideas from Nietzsche; well, Nietzsche was used by the Nazis, therefore. . ."; but, on the
I have always been concerned with linking together as tightly as possible the historical and theoretical analysis of power relations, institu-tions, and knowledge, to the movements, critiques, and experiences that call them into question in reality. If I have insisted on all this "practice," it has not been in order to "apply" ideas, but in order to put them to the test and modify them. The key to the Personal poetic attitude of a philosopher is not to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophicallife, his ethos.
Among the French philosophers who participated in the Resistance during the war, one was Cavailles, a historian of mathematics who was interested in the development of its internal structures. Merleau-Ponty-none of them
FOURTEENTH, EVEN IF THE LAW WAS ORIGINALLY FOUNDED ON VIOLENCE, IT NOW OPERATES IN A NONVIOLENT WAY Deranty 2004
[Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights, borderlands e-journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm, acc 1-7-05//uwyo-ajl]
this strategic use of the decisionistic tradition is that it does not do justice to the complex relationship that these authors establish between violence and normativity, that is, in the end the very normative nature of their theories. In brief, they are not saying that all law is violent, in essence or in its core, rather that law is dependent upon a form of violence for its foundation. Violence can found the law, without the law itself being violent. In Hobbes, the social contract, despite the absolute nature of the sovereign it creates, also enables individual rights to flourish on the basis of the inalienable right to life (see Barret-Kriegel
29. The problem with 2003: 86). 30. In Schmitt, the decision over the exception is indeed "more interesting than the regular case", but only because it makes the regular case possible. The "normal situation" matters more than the power to create it since it is its end (Schmitt 1985: 13). What Schmitt has in mind is not the indistinction between fact and law, or their intimate cohesion, to wit, their secrete indistinguishability, but the origin of the law, in the name of the law. This explains why the primacy given by Schmitt to the decision is accompanied by the recognition of popular sovereignty, since the decision is only the expression of an organic community. Decisionism for Schmitt is only a way of asserting the political value of the community as homogeneous whole, against liberal parliamentarianism. Also, the evolution of Schmitts thought is marked by the retreat of the decisionistic element, in favour of a strong form of institutionalism. This is because, if indeed the juridical order is totally dependent on the sovereign decision, then the latter can revoke it at any moment. Decisionism, as a theory about the origin of the law, leads to its own contradiction unless it is reintegrated in a theory of institutions (Kervgan 1992).
Agamben sees these authors as establishing a circularity of law and violence, when they want to emphasise the extra-juridical origin of the law, for the laws
31. In other words, sake. Equally, Savignys polemic against rationalism in legal theory, against Thibaut and his philosophical ally Hegel, does not amount to a recognition of the capture of life by the law, but aims at grounding the legal order in the very life of a people (Agamben 1998: 27).
For Agamben, it
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, the origin and the essence of the law are synonymous, whereas the authors he relies on thought rather that the two were fundamentally different. 32. Agamben obviously knows all this. He argues that it is precisely this inability of the decisionists to hold on to their key insight, the anomic core of norms, which gives them the sad distinction of accurately describing an evil order. But this reading does not meet the objection to his problematic use of that tradition.
seems
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27. Certainly calls for making all residents of extraterritorial space (which would include both citizen and non-citizen) as existing within a position of exodus or refuge, and in this we can perhaps see some basis for resistance. A position of refuge, he argues, would be able to "act back onto" territories as states and 'perforate' and alter' them such that "the citizen would be able to recognize the refugee that he or she is" (Agamben, 2000: 26). In this Agamben directs our attention usefully to the importance of the refugee today both in terms of the plight of refugees and their presence in questioning any assumption about citizen rights, and also in placing the refugee, or "denizen" as he says using Tomas Hammar's term, as the central figure of a potential politics (Agamben, 2000: 23). But he also
reduces the concepts of right and the values they involve to forms of State control, eliding all difference within right and thereby terminating an understanding of the reasons for a disjuncture between legality and morality and of an existing separation of rights from the ideal of ethicality, in which liberation and dignity exist to be realized beyond any form of contract.
28. It is always possible to suppose that a self-fashioned potentiality is simply available to us, and in some senses it is, but not because a type of theory merely posits the social and the historical as completely open to our manipulation or 'perforation'. Likewise, we cannot merely assume that changing 'forms of life' necessarily amount to types of refusal. Such a claim would only make sense if it were put forward on the basis of an appreciation of an impulse to freedom from particular types of constraint and oppression. It would also require a sense of how this impulse takes place within a variety of conditions, some of which might be easily altered and some of which might not. In the absence of an engaged sense of what this impulse means, and of the context in which elements of freedom and unfreedom do battle, it is
Agamben merely presumes that a strategy by which we all identify as refugees will renew a politics and thereby end the current plight of the refugee, as if no other reality impinges on this identification. This is also assumed on the basis that the State in Agamben's theorizing, the abstraction of an allencompassing, leviathan State is equally, readily and easily liable to perforation. This contradiction is indicative of a wider problem where what we encounter is a form of critique that is oddly inappropriate to the type of issue it addresses. 29. Much can be said in criticism of the doctrine of right, of the limited nature of the understanding of freedom and
impossible to speculate on the nature of the subjectivity or potentiality which might be emerging or which might be in stages of decomposition. rights in documents on rights, of the assumption of the place of citizen rights as the locus of the fundamental rights of the human, and most significantly, the absence
But what must be stated, I feel, is that it would be a serious impoverishment of the ethical problem that we currently face to deny any potential value of rights in carrying forth traces of an impetus towards human dignity, of the ideals of freedom and equality, and to thus reduce rights to what might be termed an absolute politics. Rights cannot be reduced to citizenship rights as if the ideas of rights and citizenship are coterminus. What most critically needs to be understood is, firstly, why values of freedom and equality have such a limited and fragile place within conditions of such inordinate legalism, and, secondly, what the absence of freedom, which the cause of human rights inevitably suggests, means for the installation of any such rights. Without such an understanding we are left with a gestural politics that contains a posture of radicalism but one which fails to connect the aspirations of those who are struggling to achieve elementary rights with a vision of a world that could accord them a degree of dignity. To acknowledge this is not to be seduced by concepts of right or law, but is rather to refuse the denial of a radical questioning of the possibilities with which a discourse presents us. Benjamin's understanding of a genuinely messianic idea is something that is "not the final end of historical progress, but rather its often failed and finally accomplished interruption" (Benjamin,
of any sense of the undetermined nature of what being might mean.
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We find this in values that resist exploitation and assaults upon human dignity. And it is this realm that currently requires urgent, emphatic and significant renewal.
1974: 1231).
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Institute, Why It Can Happen Again, Ayn Rand Institute, April 22, 2003, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7888&news_iv_ctrl=1021, UK: Fisher Most people avoid these stark implications by retreating to a compromise between selfsacrifice and self-interest. Calls for sacrifice are proper, they say, but should not be taken "too far." The Fascists condemned this approach as hypocrisy. They took the morality of sacrifice to its logical conclusion. They insisted, in the words of Italian Fascist Alfredo Rocco, on "the necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of sacrifice, even up to the total immolation of individuals." And the Nazis certainly practiced what Rocco preached. A central goal of the concentration camps, wrote survivor Bruno Bettelheim, was "to break the prisoners as individuals, and to change them into a docile mass." "There are to be no more private Germans," one Nazi writer declared; "each is to attain significance only by his service to the state." The goal of National Socialism was the relentless sacrifice of the individual: the sacrifice of his mind, his independence, and ultimately his person. A free country is based on precisely the opposite principle. To protect against what they called the "tyranny of the majority," America's Founding Fathers upheld the individual's right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The implicit basis of American government was an ethics of individualism--the view that the individual is not subordinate to the collective, that he has a moral right to his own interests, and that all rational people benefit under such a system. Today, however, self-sacrifice is regarded as self-evidently good. True, most people do not want a pure, consistent system of sacrifice, as practiced by the Nazis. But once the principle is accepted, no amount of this "virtue" can ever be condemned as "too much." We will not have learned the lessons of the Holocaust until we completely reject this sacrifice-worship and rediscover the morality of individualism.
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#5 Perm: 1AR
EXTEND THE PERM. RECOGNIZING MODERNITYS PROBLEM WITH EXCLUSION WHILE USING DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE ENABLES A CONTESTATION OF DIGNITY THAT CHALLENGES THE EXCEPTION, AS SHOWN BY DERANTY 2004 ALSO, SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE USED STRATEGICALLY CRITIQUE CAN BE SIMULTANEOUS Lombardi, Assoc Prof of Political Science @ Tampa, 96 (Mark Owen, Perspectives on ThirdWorld Sovereignty, P. 161) Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for international scholars and actors. The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty, as has been done in many instances, does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into studies of Third-World issues and problemsolving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.
THE PERM USES POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT TO AVOID THE ESSENTIALISM OF THE SOVEREIGN AND AGAMBENS ALTERNATIVE BY USING CONTINGENCY TO CHALLENGE THE ATROCITY THAT BOTH MAKE INEVITABLE Deranty 2004
[Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights, borderlands e-journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm, acc 1-7-05//uwyo-ajl]
49. This proposal rests on a logic that challenges Agambens reduction of the overcoming of the classical conceptualisation of potentiality and actuality to the single Heideggerian alternative. Instead of collapsing or dualistically separating potentiality and actuality, one would find in Hegels modal logic a way to articulate their negative, or reflexive, unity, in the notion of contingency. Contingency is precisely the potential as existing, a potential that exists yet does not exclude the possibility of its opposite (Hegel 1969: 541-554). Hegel can lead the way towards an ontology of contingency that recognises the place of contingency at the core of necessity, instead of opposing them. The fact that the impossible became real vindicates Hegels claim that the impossible should not be opposed to the actual. Instead, the possible and the impossible are only reflected images of each other and, as actual, are both simply the contingent. Auschwitz should not be called absolute necessity (Agamben 1999a: 148), but absolute contingency. The absolute historical necessity of Auschwitz is not "the radical negation" of contingency, which, if true, would indeed necessitate a flight out of history to conjure up its threat. Its absolute necessity in fact harbours an indelible core of contingency, the locus where political intervention could have changed things, where politics can happen. Zygmunt Baumans theory of modernity and his theory about the place and relevance of the Holocaust in modernity have given sociological and
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contemporary relevance to this alternative historical-political logic of contingency (Bauman 1989).
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#5 Perm: Ext
AMBIGUOUS MODERNITY THAT ACKNOWLEDGES INCOMPLETION PROVIDES THE TOOLS FOR RESISTING OPPRESSION Deranty 2004
[Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights, borderlands e-journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm, acc 1-7-05//uwyo-ajl]
50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systemic necessity. An ontology of contingency provides the model with which to think together both the possibility, and the possibility of the repetition of, catastrophe, as the one heritage of modernity, and the contingency of catastrophe as logically entailing the possibility of its opposite. Modernity is ambiguous because it provides the normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modern subjects to rights. Modern subjects are able to consider themselves autonomous subjects because legal recognition signals to them that they are recognised as full members of the community, endowed with the full capacity to judge. This account of rights in modernity is precious because it provides an adequate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for rights. We can see now how this account needs to be complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modern subjects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that they should be rejected as illusion, on the grounds that they were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their contingency should be the reason for constant political vigilance.
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The effectiveness of bio-power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive fr
ins from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing peoples lives. om the demand of justice. In biopolitical societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crim e itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others. However, given that the right to k ill is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio-political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely biopolitical. Perhaps, thereneither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio-political. Nevertheless, the fact is that presentday
European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer excep tions. It is the very right to kill that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question becaus e of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio-political thinking and practice.
For all these reasons, Agambens thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West, has to be corrected.
The biopolitical paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the presentday welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the biopolitical society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish socialdemocrat. Although this figure is an object and a product of the huge biopolitical machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest crim e against the machinery. (In bio-political societies, death is not only something to be hidden away, but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most shameful thing of all. ) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the biopolitical machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily even when, in biological terms, he should have been dead longago. This is because biopower is not bloody power over bare life f or its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the li ving, the condition of all life individual as well as collective that is the measure of the success of biopower.
BIOPOLITICS IS NOT THE PROBLEM IN AND OF ITSELF ITS BIOPOLITICS DEPLOYED IN TOTALITARIANS SOCIETIES WHICH IS BAD OUR STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES SOLVES THEIR IMPACT Dickinson, Prof @ University of Cincinnati, 2K4 (Edward Ross,
Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)
In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucaults ideas have fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its microphysics.48 The broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus on technocr atic reason and the ethical
But the power-producing effects in Foucaults microphysical sense (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of an entire institutiona l apparatus and system of practice ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the vlkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly.
unboundedness of science was the focus of his interest.49 For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other United States had already begun doing so in 1907.
states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s indeed, individual states in the Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism mass sterilization, mass eugenic abortion and murder of the defective. Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor
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their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.
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11. In the case of empirical examples, the erasure of difference between phenomena seems particularly counter-intuitive in the case of dissimilar modes of internment. From a practical point of view, it seems counter-productive to claim that there is no substantial difference between archaic communities and modern communities provided with the language of rights, between the lawlessness of war times and democratic discourse. There must be a way of problematising the ideological mantra of Western freedom, of modernitys moral superiority, that does not simply equate it with Nazi propaganda (Ogilvie 2001). Habermas and Honneth probably have a point when they highlight the advances made by modernity in the entrenchment of rights. If the ethical task is that of testimony, then our testimony should go also to all the individual lives that were freed from alienation by the establishment of legal barriers against arbitrariness and exclusion. We should heed Honneths reminder that struggles for social and political emancipation have often privileged the language of rights over any other discourse (Fraser, Honneth 2003). To reject the language of human rights altogether could be a costly gesture in understanding past political struggles in their relevance for future ones, and a serious strategic, political loss for accompanying present struggles. We want to criticise the ideology of human rights, but not at the cost of renouncing the resources that rights provide. Otherwise, critical theory would be in the odd position of casting aspersions upon the very people it purports to speak for, and of depriving itself of a major weapon in the struggle against oppression.
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AGAMBENS TRANSHISTORICAL MODEL OF BIOPOWER COLLAPSES HISTORY, IGNORING ITS CONTEXTUAL FUNCTION Panagia 99
[Davide, The Sacredness of Life and Death: Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer and the Tasks of Political Thinking, Theory & Event 3:1, Muse//uwyo-ajl] What emerges through the logic of the paradox of sovereignty is an event Agamben calls the zone of indistinction. In the suspension of the rule through the state of exception, what we are presented with is a complex plateau where such philosophically distinct categories as state of nature and law, outside and inside, exception and rule flow through one another to the point of literal indistinction. On Agamben's account, the operation of sovereignty abandons individuals whenever they are placed outside the law and in so doing, exposes and threatens them to a sphere where there is no possibility of appeal. (Agamben, p. 29) What is crucial for Agamben's entire project, then, is to point out how the zone of indistinction collapses the possibility of making distinctions - which is to say further, to point out how political philosophy finds the limit of thinking in the paradox of sovereignty. In the sphere of indistinction, we cannot think as if distinctions operated as they might in everyday life.6. The political point here is, I think, insightful and worth pursuing. What makes this insight problematic, however, is Agamben's treatment of history and the status of homo sacer therein. Part of the task of this book is to ascertain how the category of homo sacer is a specifically historical category. This is evident in Agamben's constant referral to ancient Roman legal documents as well as his exploration of the reappearance of homo sacer throughout history. But it is precisely the possibility that homo sacer is something that occurs 'throughout history' that makes Agamben's analysis at times difficult to swallow. At the purely conceptual level, one might be willing to accept the meta claim that Agamben seems to be making. But Agamben does not want to limit himself to the conceptual level. He wants to insist on the material dimension of homo sacer and the actuality of this category in contemporary life. There is thus a substantial tension between the particularity of homo sacer as a material instance of modern politics and the trans-historical category of homo sacer as a category constituted by the paradox of sovereignty and the state of indistinction.
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#9 Essentialism: Ext
AGAMBEN CONFLATES DIFFERENT HISTORICAL PERIODS INTO A SINGULAR AND STABLE TRANSHISTORICAL BIOPOLITICS THAT NEVER EXISTED, MEANING NONE OF THEIR HISTORICAL IMPACTS APPLY Wark 2004
[McKenzie, Re: <nettime> Agamben: No to Bio-Political Tattooing, posted to nettime mailing list, January 27, amsterdam.nettime.org/ListsArchives/nettime-l-0401/msg00092.html, acc 1-7-2004//uwyo-ajl]
Eugene asks about Georgio Agamben. Below is a short note on him. I find his writings on the state les interesting and useful than his return to the question of commodity fetishism, which is a refreshing revisiting of a neglected concept. On the state, his approach seems more philological than
historical. By not bringing his thinking on the commodity and on the state more closely together, one is not really given much of a handle on how developments in the commodity form may have transformed the state. 'Biopower' becomes a vague, transhistorical notion in Agamben. Agamben is one of the few contemporary thinkers to try to think
*past* Debord's Society of the Spectacle, which I think is still an untranscended horizon in its matching of political and theoretical intransigence. And so in the note below I concentrate on his handling of Debord.
AND, NAZISM AND CONTEMPORARY DECENTRALIZED CONTROL FUNCTION DIFFERENTLY Neilson 2004
[Brett, University of Western Sydney, Potenza Nuda? Sovereignty, Biopolitics, Capitalism, Contretemps 5, December 2004, www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/neilson.pdf, acc 1-7-04//uwyoajl]
Negris ruse in this review is to suggest that the permanent state of exception specified by the first Agamben describes the new condition of global Empire. But he counters Agamben on his own terms, charging that it is inaccurate to fix everything that happens in the world today onto
static and totalitarian horizon, as under Nazism. Such an equation, for Negri, is anachronistic and inaccurate, since it conflates the fascist rule of the twentieth century with contemporary modes of decentralized global control. With implicit
reference to the first chapter of Stato di Eccezione, where Agamben describes the current world situation as global civil war (a term initially used by both Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt), Negri questions the notion of a sovereign ban that renders constituent and constituted power indistinct: But things are differentif we live in a state of exception it is because we live through a ferocious and permanent civil war, where the positive and negative clash: their antagonistic power can in no way be flattened onto indifference.18 There can be no doubt that Stato di Eccezione finds Agamben writing of a positive counterpower that breaks the connection of violence to law posited by Schmitts exceptionalist model of sovereignty. For Schmitt, the state of exception exists only as a means of maintaining and restoring the constituted sovereign order. By contrast, Agamben follows the argument of Benjamins Critique of Violence, which posits a divine or revolutionary violence that intercedes upon the struggle of constituent and constituted power, breaking the connection of violence to law that, in the final instance, undergirds their interrelation. By opening the possibility of a power that operates in complete independence from the law, Agamben claims, Benjamin specifies the nature of the violence that pertains in the permanent state of exception. Furthermore, by virtue of the influence of his essay, Benjamin provokes the negative reaction of Schmitt, whose entire political theory can be read as a fearful response to the prospect of an exception that does not return to the norm. This is not to claim, however, that Stato di Eccezione affirms Negris equation of constituent violence with living counterpower. Rather the Benjaminian violence celebrated by Agamben remains separate from the whole complex of constituent and constituted power, both interceding upon them with an energy that makes the paradigm of modern sovereignty obsolete and, in so doing, maintaining them in indistinction.
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But still none of that addresses the passivity you refer to. For that we have to look instead at Agamben's notions of life and biopower. Agamben uses the term "naked life" to name that limit of humanity, the bare minimum of existence that is exposed in the concentration camp. In the final analysis, he explains, modern sovereignty rules over naked life and biopower is this power to rule over life itself. What results from this analysis is not so much passivity, I would say, but powerlessness. There is no figure that can challenge and contest sovereignty. Our critique of Agamben's (and also Foucault's) notion of biopower is that it is conceived only from above and we attempt to formulate instead a notion of biopower from below, that is, a power by which the multitude itself rules over life. (In this sense, the notion of biopower one finds in some veins of ecofeminism such as the work of Vandana Shiva, although cast on a very different register, is closer to our notion of a biopower from below.) What we are interested in finally is a new biopolitics that reveals the struggles over forms of life.
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Far from opening a zone of indistinction, Negri believes this alternative to open a choice, at least when it is not closed off by the dogma that reduces power to a pre-existing physical fact, finalized order, or dialectical result. And the philosophical conduit
of this opening is the great current of modern political thought, from Machiavelli to Spinoza to Marx, which understands constituent power as an overflowing expression of desire, an
absence of determinations, and a truly positive concept of freedom and democracy. For Negri, the danger of Agambens thought lies not in its Aristotelian rigour or formal elegance but in its inability to open a panorama of revolutionary struggle that can oppose the modern order of sovereignty and the transcendental ideal of power that backs it up. As long as constituent power remains caught in the paradox of sovereignty and the constituted order produces bare life as the limit condition of an exception that has become the rule, there can be no hope of questioning the transcendentalism of sovereign power or imagining a form of political conduct that remains free of the impositions of the modern state. Thus it is the concept of bare life that becomes the primary
object of Negris critique of Agambens understanding of sovereignty. This much is clear in Empire, where Negri and his co-author Michael Hardt distance themselves from the notion of bare life.
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biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.
sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the
THEIR ALTERNATIVE ENSURES THE PERPETUAL REPLICATION OF SOVEREIGNTY ONLY WORKING THROUGH THE SPECIFIC PRACTICES OF SOVEREIGNTY CAN SUCCEED ATTEMPTS TO MOVE AWAY FROM IT OUTSIDE OF THE STATE REPRODUCE SOVEREIGN POWER Walker, Prof of International Relations @ Arizona State U, 2K2 (RBJ, Reframing
the International, P. 3-5)
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the act), he poses the Spinozan vision of potentiality (potenza) as the unstoppable and progressive expansion of desire (cupiditas). By this view, fully developed by Negri in The Savage Anomaly, the construction of politics is a process of permanent innovation. Desire is the determinant force of the constitution of the sociala creative project that is continually reopened and defined as absolute in this reopening. At once conflictual and constituent, desire in this analysis functions without lack and provides the basis for an absolute democracy that reaches beyond modern political representation.
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TD: In that regard, my sense is that you both recognize the power of Giorgio Agamben's argument in Homo Sacer concerning the extraordinary violence of sovereignty at the end of modernity and yet you seek to overcome what may (not too unjustly) be thought of as a terrifying passivity that his position could result in.14. MH: Our argument in Empire does share some central concerns with Agamben's Homo Sacer, particularly surrounding the notions of sovereignty and biopower. Agamben brilliantly elaborates a conception of modern sovereignty based on Carl Schmitt's notions of the decision on the exception and the state of emergency, in which the modern functioning of rule becomes a permanent state of exception. He then links this conception to the figure of the banned or excluded person back as far as ancient Roman law with his usual spectacular erudition. The pinnacle and full realization of modern sovereignty thus becomes the Nazi concentration camp: the zone of exclusion and exception is the heart of modern sovereignty and grounds the rule of law. My hesitation with this view is that by posing the extreme case of the concentration camp as the heart of sovereignty it tends to obscure the daily violence of modern sovereignty in all its forms. It implies, in other words, that if we could do away with the camp then all the violence of sovereignty would also disappear.
BIOPOWER DOESNT EMERGE FROM THE SOVEREIGN, BUT FROM SOCIAL RELATIONS THAT ARE BEYOND PLAN Lazzarato no date
[Maurizio, From Biopower to Biopolitics, Trans. Ivan A. Ramirez, www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/csisp/papers/lazzarato_biopolitics.pdf, acc 1-7-05//uwyo-ajl] Foucault needs a new political theory and a new ontology to describe the new power relations expressed in the political economy of forces. In effect, biopolitics are grafted and anchored upon a multiplicity of disciplinary [de commandemant et d'obissance] relations between forces, those which power coordinates, institutionalizes, stratifies and targets, but that are not purely and simply projected upon individuals. The fundamental political problem of modernity is not that of a single source of sovereign power, but that of a multitude of forces that act and react amongst each other according to relations of command and obedience. The relations between man and woman, master and student, doctor and patient, employer and worker, that Foucault uses to illustrate the dynamics of the social body are relations between forces that always involve a power relation. If power, in keeping with this description, is constituted from below, then we need an ascending analysis of the constitution of power dispositifs, one that begins with infinitesimal mechanisms that are subsequently invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed and institutionalized by ever more general mechanisms, and by forms of global domination. Consequently, biopolitics is the strategic coordination of these power relations in order to extract a surplus of power from living beings. Biopolitics is a strategic relation; it is not the pure and simple capacity to legislate or legitimize sovereignty. According to Foucault the biopolitical functions of coordination and determination concede that biopower, from the moment it begins to operate in this particular manner, is not the true source of power. Biopower coordinates and targets a power that does not properly belong to it, that comes from the outside. Biopower is always born of
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something other than itself.
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Agamben
is this impossibility of distinguishing between zoe and bios, between man as a living being and man as a political subject, the product of the action of sovereign power or the result of the action of new forces over which power has no control? Agambens response is very ambiguous and it oscillates continuously between these two alternatives. Foucaults response is entirely different: biopolitics is the form of government taken by a new dynamic of forces that, in conjunction, express power relations that the classical world could not have known. Foucault described this dynamic, in keeping with the progress of his research, as the emergence of a multiple and heterogeneous power of resistance and creation that calls every organization that is transcendental, and every regulatory mechanism that is extraneous, to its constitution radically into question. The birth of biopower and the redefinition of the problem of sovereignty are only comprehensible to us on this basis. Foucaults entire work leads toward this conclusion even if he did not coherently explain the dynamic of this power, founded on the freedom of subjects and their capacity to act upon the conduct of others, unt il the end of his life.
POWER ISNT STATE-CENTERED OR INSTITUTIONAL BUT RATHER, A MULTIPLICITY OF DISPERSED SOCIAL FORCES Foucault 78
[Michel, God, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Volume I, trans. Robert Hurley, New York City: Random House, Vintage Books Edition, 92-3//uwyo-ajl]
Hence the objective is to analyze a certain form of knowl-edge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of power. But the
word power is apt to lead to a number of misunderstandings-misunderstandings with re-spect to its nature, its form, and its unity. By power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domi-nation exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process
which, through ceaseless strug-gles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the con-trary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystalliza-tion is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise, even in its more "peripheral" effects, and which also makes it possible to use its mech-anisms as a grid
must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and de-scendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is
of intelligibility of the social order, everywhere; not because it em-braces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. and "Power," insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that I;ests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their move-ment. One needs to be nominalistic, 110 doubt:
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structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attrib-utes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.
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power over the offender's life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death. Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in
seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a specific right that was manifested with the formation of that new juridical being, the sovereign?2 ln any case, in its modern form-relative and limited-as in its ancient and absolute form, the right of life and death is a dlissymmetrical one. The sovereigm exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The
right which was formulated as the "power of life and death" was in reality the right to take life or let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must be re-ferred to a historical type of society in which Power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (prelewement), a subtraction meclhanism, a right to appropriate
a portion of the wealth, a tax: of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on. the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a riglht of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.
Since the classical age the West has undergome a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" hasl tended to be no longer the major form of power but
merelly one element among others, wlorking to incite, reinforce, control" monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering
them, rather than one Idedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a Parallel shift in the right of death, (or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis-tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now mamifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or deveIop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as
they have been since the nineteenth century, and, all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death -and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicisom with which it has so greatly expanded its limits -now
presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeawors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to Iprecise controls
and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no Ronger waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on 1behalf of the existence of everyone:; entire popula-tions are mobilized for the purpose of wholes:ale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as manage:rs of life and survival, of bodies amd the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so' many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars bias caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiattes them and the one that terminaltes them are in fact increa:singly informed by the naked questtion of survival. The atomilc situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an irudividual's con-tinued existence. The principle underlying tbie tactics of bat-tle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent returm of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the largescale phenomema of population.
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35. But this and the alternatives should be confronted more explicitly. This lack of a substantial engagement with other legal alternatives becomes obvious a few pages later, when analyses once more the specific problem of the application of the law. When he writes that "in the case of the juridical norm, the reference to the concrete case supposes a "process" that always implies a plurality of subjects, and that culminates in the last instance in the enunciation of a sentence, that is to say, a statement whose operative reference to reality is guaranteed by institutional powers" (Agamben 2003: 69), he
Agamben
simply formulates a classical distinction that can receive an entirely different treatment with no less plausibility. A recent philosophical solution to the gap between justification and application has been famously given by Habermas (1990 and 1996). Chapters 5
and 6 of Between facts and norms in particular provide an excellent overview of plausible alternatives to Schmit ts decisionistic theory of adjudication, from Kelsen to Critical Legal Studies.
Agamben cannot simply use the fact that "the application of a norm is not contained in it" as leading directly to the theory of the state of exception, since from the very same premise another form of political grounding of the legal could be advanced, one, for instance, that focuses on intersubjectivity and the institutionalisation of dissensus. The "violence" that realizes the statement is not necessarily "without logos". For Schmitt, it draws its authority from the
36. But then political, that is, the logos of the polis as ethnos; for another tradition, it would do so from the logos of intersubjectively constituted and essentially contested institutions
RIGHTS ONLY JUSTIFY EXCLUSION IF THEYRE ABSTRACT MODERNITY DISTILLS THEM INTO UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP PREVENTING THE STATE OF EXCEPTION Deranty 2004
[Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights, borderlands e journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm, acc 1-705//uwyo-ajl]
17 quotes Arendts critical conclusion: the conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships except that they were still human (Arendt 1966: 299; Agamben 1998: 126). But he
. Agamben
fails to quote the very next line, which makes all the difference: "The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of the human being" (Arendt 1966: 299). 18. What Arendt means is that only when they are realised in a political "commonwealth" do human rights have any meaning. They are an abstraction otherwise. More important than the right to freedom or the right to justice is "the right to have rights", that is, to be the member of a political community. Arendt therefore asserts the opposite of what Agamben wants to say: she believes that the political solution lies in what he considers to be a fiction, namely the citizen. Her point is that when man and citizen come apart, we realise that man never really existed as a subject of rights. This is the exact opposite of Agamben for whom the citizen is just a travesty.
19. Despite this opposition, Agamben borrows Arendts critical interpretation of the French revolution and modernity in gener al, even though this interpretation itself is not beyond doubt. The French declaration makes it clear that
human rights lose all significance if they are not reinscribed within a political community that transforms them into constitutional principles, and the American constitution also defines a clear link between individual freedom and a political order
whose goal is freedoms protection. Yet, Agamben reads the first article of the Declaration of 1789, "all men are born and re main free and equal in rights" as proof that modern sovereign power applies to bare life, here in the form of birth (Agamben 1995: 128). But this seems disingenuous
. Birth here refers not to nationality, but simply to the fundamental fact of the equality of all human beings in right. The term effectuates the radical break with ancient and absolutist natural law, a break that is synonymous with legal modernity. In ancient natural law, rights were associated with the social position or the notion of a perfect cosmic order underpinned by God .
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doubt Agamben's new community is actually coming. It remains far from clear that communities without identities are emerging anywhere except in the febrile imaginations of a few philosophers. It is not that I dislike the dream. It is for me the most attractive dream there is. It is that I am skeptical that such "whatever singularities" are possible on more than the level of personal behavior. Politics is too clunky for such subtlety. Even the new social movements seem far more down-to-earth and prone to defining themselves than Agamben's theorizing. Politics, alas, xdemands more leaden language. Still, the image of the state fighting communities is one worth pondering. Its distance from earlier welfare state thinking could not be more dramatic. Instead of the state embodying the will of the nation, we have a picture of numerous communities at war with the state. It is, and I say this with no relish, a far more plausible picture of our emerging politics than Walzer's happy pluralism. Just think of insurance companies, Perotistas, and gay and lesbian activistsall communities distrustful of the state, all committed to struggling with the state. Agamben does not ask what this perpetual warfare will do to government. Like Walzer, he assumes that the state will trudge on as before. Yet if this warfare between humanity and the state is constant, is it not plausible to surmise that hostility to the state will become permanent? With the fiction that the state embodies the nation's will dying, who will defend the state? Who will keep it from becoming the recipient of increasing rancor and from being permanently wobbly? Isn't that a good way of understanding recent politics in the US? And as
for Agamben's own Italy the past decade has revealed a public far more disgusted with the state than even in America.
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Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.
In these circumstances, criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation.
as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible.
On the other hand, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are forced to make the necessary concessions to reality. In fact I think
It is not therefore a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming,
the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.
D.E. But do you think the intellectual must have a programmatic role in this transformation? FOUCAULT , confrontation, struggle, resistance To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. His role, since he works specifically in the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality.
It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a reform. If at the base there has not been
the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same.
THIRD, NO LINK PLAN DOESNT EXERCISE POWER OVER THE BODIES AT GUANTANAMO. IT ONLY OVERRULES ONE ASPECT OF DETAINMENT
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modest demand of the excluded group for the full participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant social values" and the assertion of the superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women
are "ontologically false." lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life, is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevation of' women that makes them 'too good" for the banality of men's rights. Finally, the point about inherent transgression
is not that every opposition, every attemot at subversion is automatically "co-opted." On the contrary, the very fear of being co-opted that makes us search for more and more radical, "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be sometimes. A small distance is much more explosive for the system that an ineffective radical rejection. In religion. A small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hardline Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As Le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committees is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aimi ng only at improving the system, making it more efficient - he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the
inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freuds claim from the Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows - the
system is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc. Can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences).
appear (it can co-opt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also
SIXTH, FOUCAULDIAN CRITIQUE DENIES AGENCY BY IGNORING ANY SOCIAL JUSTICE OR USEFUL HUMAN ACTION
Anthony Cook, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law, NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW, Spring, 1992
Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These
values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say and do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are
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not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counterhegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.
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represents a continuation and intensification of what goes on in more ordinary places-and wouldn't be possible if it didn't. So we all live to a time schedule, get up to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in the eye of authority, are periodically subject to examination and inspection. No one is entirely free from these new forms of social control. It has to be added, however, that subjection to these new forms is not the same thing as being in prison: Foucault tends systematically to underestimate the difference, and this criticism, which I shall want to develop, goes to the heart of his politics.
NINTH, THEIR TOTALIZING CRITICISM OF POWER PREVENTS REFORMWE MUST USE THE STATE FOR INCREMENTAL ENDS.
James D. Faubian, professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xxxi-xxxii
Foucault wanted, then, to move both the descriptive and prescriptive functions of political analysis away from the juridico-discursive language of legitimation. To try to put the matter as simply as possible: he does not think that all power is evil or all government unacceptable, but does think that theorems claiming to confer legitimacy on power or government are fictions; in a lecture of 1979, he expresses sympathy with the view of earlier political skeptics that civil society is a bluff and the social contract a fairy tale. This does not mean that the subject matter of political philosophy is evacuated, for doctrines of legitimation have been and may still act as political forces in history. But his analytic quarrel with legitimation theory is that it can divert us from considering the terms in which modern government confers rationality, and thus possible acceptability, on its activity and practice. This is the main reason why he argues political analysis is still immature, having still not cut off the kings head.1o The deployment and application of law is, for Foucault, like everything else, not good or evil in itself, capable of acting in the framework of liberalism as an instrument for economizing and moderating the interventions of governmental power, necessary as an indispensable restraint on power in some contexts, uses, and guises; it is to be resisted as an encroaching menace in others. In his governmentality lectures, Foucault investigates the evolution, from the era of the police states through the development of parliamentary liberal government, of the ambiguous and dangerous hybridization of law with a rationality of security and with new theories of social solidarity and social defense. This historical analysis and diagnosis informs Foucaults commentary on the civil liberties politics of seventies France, with its distinctive contemporary recrudescence of raison detat and the police state. But at the same time, in a way we tend not to think of as typically French, he dryly mocked and debunked the excesses of what he called state phobiathe image of the contemporary state as an agency of essential evil and limitless despotism. The state, he said, does not have a unitary essence or indeed the importance commonly ascribed to it: what are important to study are the multiple governmental practices that are exercised through its institutions and elsewhere. (In a lecture describing the seventeenth-century
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theory of raison detat, Foucault characterized it as a doctrine of the permanent coup detata piquant choice of phrase, because it had been the title of a polemical book written against de Gaulle by Francois Mitterrand. We know that Foucault did not share the view, common in the French Left, of de Gaulles government as an antidemocratic putsch with crypto-fascistic tendencies. The Left, he also suggested, should expect to win elected power not by demonizing the state (never a very convincing platform for a socialist party) but by showing it possessed its own conception of how to govern.
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#2 Perm: 1AR
PERM SOLVES BEST - MICROPOLITICS AND LARGER STRUGGLES AGAINST OPPRESSION SHOULD BE COMBINED, CREATING A RADICAL REFORMISM IN OPPOSITION TO TOTALIZING POLITICS May 93
[Todd, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 118//wfi-ajl] The risk of a totalizing theory of politics is that it will unsuspectingly promote what it struggles against, because it is ignorant of oppressions at the micropolitical level. The alternative to this, though, is not a bourgeois reformism but what one critic has called a "radical reformism" (Gandal 1986, p. 122). This radical reformism recognizes both that a change of power which comes solely at the top hazards a repetition of the old forms of domination and that not just any small reform will change micropolitical domination. Instead, what the radical reformist seeks are changes at the micropolitical level which actually change the relations of power between groups. Those changes involve very different types of struggle, depending upon the situation of the groups involved. They cannot be cast in a common form or be reduced to a common goal. But they possess a solidarity that derives from a complementarity investing all struggles against domination under capitalism. I , Micropolitical struggles do not replace the struggle against exploitation, and no one of them can be substituted for the others. What binds them is the recognition that in the modern epoch power operates in many and diffuse ways, and that to end the domination of such power is a matter of many independent but mutually reinforcing struggles both at the micropolitical and the macropoliticallevel. And thus, there is a need for the kinds of analyses which are situated not in the region of general political theory, but in the domains of struggles which occur both beneath and across that region. "I am attempting. . . apart from any totalization-which would be at once abstract and limiting-to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible, problems that approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal, problems that are at once constituents of our history and constituted by that history" (Foucault 1984b, pp. 375-76).
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JUXTAPOSITION OF INCOMPATIBLE IDEAS AVOIDS THE PROBLEMS OF TRADITIONAL THEORY AND ENABLES A PROCESS OF CONSTANT CRITICISM Marcus '98
[George E., Professor of Anthro at Rice University, Ethnography through Thick and Thin, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, 186-7//uwyo-ajl]
The postmodern notions of heterotopia (Foucault), juxtapositions, and the blocking together of incommensurables (Lyotard) have served to renew the long-neglected practice of comparison in anthropology, but in altered ways. Juxtapositions do not have the obvious meta-logic of older styles of comparison in anthropology (e.g., controlled comparisons within a cultural area or "natural" geographical region); rather, they emerge from putting questions to an emergent object of study whose controus are not known beforehand, but are themselves a contribution of making an account which has different, complexly connected real-world sites of investigation. The postmodern object of study is ultimately mobile and multiply situated, so any ethnography of such an object will have a comparative dimension that is integral to it, in the form of juxtapositions of seeming incommensurables or phenomena that might conventionally have appeared to be "world apart." Comparison reenters the very act of ethnographic specificity by a postmodern vision of seemingly improbably juxtapositions, the global collapsed into and made and integral part of a parallel, related local situations rather than something monolithic and external to them. This move toward comparison as heterotopia firmly deterritorializes culture in ethnographic writing and simulates accounts of cultures composed in a landscape for which there is as yet no developed theoretical comparison
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Were those possibilities explored, the boundaries of American identity and the realm of the political would be very different from that which currently predominates, for the distinction between what counts as normal and what is thus pathological would have been refigured. Besides, the evident differences in emergent discourse of danger
pertinent to United States Foreign Policy.
demonstrates how even those articulations with the most affinity do not mechanically reproduce a monolithic identity. Of course, the pursuit of new possibilities through different interpretations is often strongly contested. Even recommendations to redirect political practices so as to confront new challenges sometimes do not escape old logic. For example, the effort to address environmental issues within the parameters of international relations and nation security often involves simply extending the old registry of security to cover his new domain. Usually signified by the appropriation of the metaphor of war to a new problem , this is evident in some of the literature that advocates the importance of global cooperation and management to counter environmental degradation, where ecological danger often replaces fading military threats as the basis of an interpretation designed to sustain sovereignty. 35 Yet as I noted in Chapter 7,
As a danger that can be articulated in terms of security strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of the political. Recognizing the possibility of rearticulating danger
environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of American and western identity. that such possibilities exist only in the future. Indeed,
leads us to a final question: what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to answer such a question is beyond the ambit of this book. But it is important to note that asking the question in this way mistakenly implies
the extensive and intensive nature of the relations of power associated with the society of security means that there has been and remains a not inconsiderable freedom to explore alternative possibilities. While traditional analyses of power are often economistic and negative, Foucaults understanding of power emphasizes its productive and enabling nature. 36 Even more important, his understanding of power emphasizes the ontology of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to
institute negative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in a way that required containment so as to effect order. 37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. ON the contrary,
because it is only through power that subjects exercise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Foucault maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an agonism of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face-toface confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation. 38 The political possibilities enable by permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the bio -power discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in western nations have been increasingly directed towards modes of being and forms of life such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government the ongoing agonism between those practices and the freedom of the counter demands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activist have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These
claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the strategic reversibility of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the history of government as the conduct of conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting counter-conducts Indeed, the emergence of the
state as the major articulation of the political has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they r ule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, the core of what we now call citizenship consists of multiple bargains hammered out b y rulers and ruled in the course of there struggle over means of state action, especially in the making of war. In more recent times, constituencies associated with womens, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resi stances are evidence that the break with the discursive / non discursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation underlining this analysis is (to put in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted.. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of the political has been a necessary precondition for makin g sense of Foreign Policys concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political i mplications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of polit ics; rather it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.
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This argumentation may appear Eurocentrist, condemning the colonized to repeat the European imperialist pattern by means of the very gesture of resisting it however, it is also possible to give it precisely the opposite reading. That is to say: if we ground our resistance to imperialist Eurocentrism in the reference to some kernel of previous ethnic identity, we automatically adopt the position of a victim resisting modernization, of a passive object on which imperialist procedures work. If, however, we conceive our resistance as an excess that results from the way brutal imperialist intervention disturbed our previous self-enclosed identity, our position becomes much stronger, since we can claim that our resistance is grounded in the inherent dynamics of the imperialist system that the imperialist system itself, through its inherent antagonism, activates the forces that will bring about its demise. (The situation here is strictly homologous to that of how to ground feminine
resistance: if woman is 'a symptom of man', the locus at which the inherent antagonisms of the patriarchal symbolic order emerge, this in no way constrains the scope of feminine resistance but provides it with an even stronger detonating force.) Or to put it in yet another way the premise according to which resistance to power is inherent and immanent to the power edifice (in the sense that it is generated by the inherent dynamic of the power edifice) in no way obliges us to draw the conclusion that every resistance is co-opted in advance, including in the eternal game Power plays with itself the key point is that through the effect of proliferation, of producing an excess of resistance, the very inherent antagonism of a system may well set in motion a process
which leads to its own ultimate downfall. It seems that such a notion of antagonism is what Foucault lacks: from the fact that every
resistance is generated ('posited') by the Power edifice itself, from this absolute inherence of resistance to Power, he seems to draw the conclusion that resistance is co-opted in advance, that it cannot seriously undermine the system that is, he precludes the possibility that the system itself, on
account of its inherent inconsistency, may give birth to a force whose excess it is no longer able to master and which thus detonates its unity, its capacity to reproduce itself. In short, Foucault does not consider the possibility of an effect escaping, outgrowing its cause, so that although it emerges as a form of resistance to power and is as such absolutely inherent to it, it can outgrow and explode it. (the philosophical point to be made here is that
this is the fundamental feature of the dialectical-materialist notion of 'effect': the effect can 'outdo' its cause; it can be ontologically 'higher' than its cause.) One is thus tempted to reverse the Foucauldian notion of an all-encompassing power edifice which always-already contains its transgression, that which allegedly eludes it: what if the price to be paid is that the power mechanism cannot even control itself, but has to rely on an obscene protuberance at its very heart? In other words: what effectively eludes the
controlling grasp of Power is not so much the external In-itself it tries to dominate but, rather, the obscene supplement which sustains its own operation. And this is why Foucault lacks the appropriate notion of the subject: the subject is by definition in excess over its cause, and as such it emerges with the reversal of the repression of sexuality into the sexualization of the repressive measures themselves. This insufficiency of Foucault's theoretical edifice can be discerned in the way, in his early
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History of Madness, he is already oscillating between two radically opposed views: the view that madness is not simply a phenomenon that exists in itself and is only secondarily the object of discourses, but is itself the product of a multitude of (medical, legal, biological...) discourses about itself; and the opposite view, according to which one should 'liberate' madness from the hold exerted over it by these discourses , and 'let madness itself speak'.
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Given his belief that even our modern discourses of liberation, rights, and humanism are all deeply entangled in the inarticulable and inescapable background web of power practices, Foucault's only option to passive nihilism seems to be the perpetuation and amelioration of the conditions that make struggle itself possible 77 And this political task of promoting the pathos of struggle functions as an alternative to the ascetic ideal: creating and maintaining many sites of resistance to the numerous forms of domination, exploitation, and subjectification present in the social and political body. 78 Admittedly, the pathos of struggle has a strong (and from a Nietzschean perspective, a possibly suspect) negative component: struggling against any system of constraints or technologies of power that prevent individuals (affected by the systems) from having the possibility of altering them or the means of modifying them. 79 As an ethico-political ideal, the pathos of struggle would call for the negation of all political, social, and cultural conditions that preclude the possibility of struggling to change these conditions. As Foucault writes, perhaps one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against
gaiety, lucidity and determination as possible. 76 nonconsensuality. 80 But it would also contain an affirmative component as well, a struggle for something: Minimally, it will be a struggle for the establishing of conditions in which self-creation is made possible, in which the assertion of individuality and otherness is viable. 81 As with Nietzsche's alternat ive ideals (of recurrence and will to power), the final trajectory of the pathos of struggle remains undetermined. It can't tell us beforehand what our goals should be, only that (a) the conditions of their conception and articulation must remain polymorphous and unhierarchical, and that (b) whatever they are, they should remain rooted in gratitude and service to life a joyful creative, and self-constituting engagement rather than resentment against it. 82 But as with Nietzsche's nonascetic ideals, the pathos of struggle might also supply some affirmative content as well: the doing of what is necessary to affirm your creative freedom and enha nce the ongoing process of self-definition and social definition (within the constraints of not excluding or disempowering the viab le other). For example, overcome the oppression of your present situation if it prevents you from getting a sufficient sense of power and effectiveness in relation to life except by devaluing life. 83 In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Schiller's attempt to instill an aesthetic education in humanity to promote political freedom,
we might view Foucault as attempting to instill an agonistic education a will to struggle within an overarching aesthetics of lifeto prepare the ground for, and manifest, our creative freedom. 84 According to Foucault, glimpses of freedom and creation of the self as a work of art are prompted by continuous acts of resistance and political struggle that serve to loosen the hold of those vast matrices of disciplinary power and technologies of the body that threaten to overwhelm and homogenize us (cf. HS, 2,:io-n). 85 As Foucault sees it, then, a will to struggle, an aesthetic agonism, becomes the defining characteristic and alternate (nonascetic) ideal that allows us to best live out our unresolved existencesurrounded by ubiquitous, inescapable power arrangements and tottering on the abyss of nihilism.
McClean
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Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social
critiques.
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REJECTING DISCIPLINE CREATES NEW FORMS OF UTOPIAN DOMINATION ONLY ANALYZING HOW POWER CONSTITUTES KNOWLEDGE ALLOWS RESISTANCE Cook 92
[Anthony, Associate Professor of Law @ Georgetown, Hangs out with Gingrich, New England Law Review, LN//wfi]
Third, Foucault's intervention at these localized sites of domination is not a mere seizing of power that replaces one utopian vision with another that is likely to be as dominating as its predecessor when based on the same techniques and knowledge systems embedded in the displaced system. Instead, Foucault's intervention has a theoretical dimension that is of primary importance. He wants first and foremost to challenge the specific ways in which knowledge is produced and constituted. That is, he wants to explore the ways in which we are socialized into seeing the world and its possibilities in a certain way and dismissing other visions as "unreasonable" or "impossible." We must understand the extent to which we all carry around in our heads fascist, [*759] racist, homophobic, and sexist constructs that are produced and reproduced by received discourses of knowledge that are inextricably connected to the exercise of power and domination of certain groups. When this is realized, the possibility of building around rather than on these constructs is enhanced. All of this, I believe, is good.
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Because Foucault filters out the internal aspects of the development of law, he can inconspicuously take a third and decisive step: Whereas the sovereign power of Classical formations of power is constituted in concepts of right and law, this normative language game is supposed to be inapplicable to the disciplinary power of the modern age; the latter is suited only to empirical, at least nonjuridical, concepts having to do with the factual steering and organization of the behavioral modes and the motives of a population rendered increasingly manipulable by science: "The procedures of normalization come to be ever more constantly
constitute the proper theme of Discipline and Punish. engaged in the colonization of those of the law. I believe that all this can explain the global functioning of what I would call a society of normalization."33 As the transition from doctrines of natural law to those of natural societies shows,34
the complex life-context of modern societies as a whole can as a matter of fact be less and less construed in the natural-law categories of contractual relationships. However, this circumstance cannot justify the strategic decision (so full of consequences for Foucault's theory) to neglect the development of normative structures in connection with the modern formation of power. As soon as Foucault takes up the threads of the biopolitical establishment of disciplinary power, he lets drop the threads of the legal organization of the exercise of power and of the legitimation of the order of domination. Because of this, the ungrounded impression arises that the bourgeois constitutional state is a dysfunctional relic from the period of absolutism. This uncircumspect leveling of culture and politics to immediate substrates of the application of violence explains the ostensible gaps in his presentation. That his history of modern penal justice is detached from the development of the constitutional state might be defended on methodological grounds. The theoretical narrowing down to the system of carrying out punishment is more questionable. As soon as he passes from the Classical to the modern age, Foucault pays no attention whatsoever to penal law and to the law governing penal process. Otherwise, he would have had to submit the unmistakable gains in liberality and legal security, and the expansion of civil-rights guarantees even in this area, to an exact interpretation in terms of the theory of power. However, his presentation is utterly distorted by the fact that he also filters out of the history of penal practices itself all aspects of legal regulation. In prisons, indeed, just as in clinics, schools, and military installations, there do exist those "special power relationships" that have by no means remained undisturbed by an energetically advancing enactment of legal rights Foucault himself has been politically engaged for this cause. This selectivity does not take anything away, from the importance of his fascinating unmasking of the capillary effects of power. But his generalization, in terms of the theory of power, of such a selective reading hinders Foucault from perceiving the phenomenon actually in need of explanation: In the welfare-state democracies of the West, the spread of legal regulation has the structure dilemma, because it is the legal means for securing freedom that themselves endanger the freedom of their presumptive beneficiaries. Under the premises of his theory of power, Foucault so levels down the complexity of societal modernization that the disturbing paradoxes of this process cannot even become apparent to him.
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Moreover, Foucaults analysis of the systematic arrangement of the elements of discourse3 leads him to conclude that the figure of Man was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. The existence of Man is contingent on the ru les of regulation and systematic relations that constitute the modern episteme. Humanism presupposes the existence of Man, who for Foucault is a figure of discourse which appeared only at the end of the eighteenth century. The startling implication of this is that [i]f those arrangements were to disappear .. . then one can certainly wager that Man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea (1973b: 387). Indeed, Foucault suggests that the modern episteme is coming to an end, having exhausted the possible constellations of theory available between the three sets of doubles (l972a: 70). Humanism is a failed philosophical project because it takes Man to be its foundation for knowledge, whereas he is one of its effects. Foucault not only declares the demise of the modern episteme but aims to contribute to it. What Foucault was trying to achieve in his archaeological discourse was his (in)famous decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre, especially the subject (1972a: 205). Foucault argues that Man, the subject or the author cannot be considered as the foundation, origin or condition of possibility of discourse. Rather, the subject, and especially the author, can be defined as an element within a discursive field, a particular space from which it is possible to speak or write and which must be filled if the discourse is to exist (1972a: 956). For example, the subject of a discourse such as medicine is a function of legal rights, criteria of competence, institutional relations and professional hierarchy. Doctors can only operate as the subjects of medical discourse if they speak from the correct institutional sites: the hospital, laboratory, the professional journal. They also have different roles depending on the object of discourse they speak about, sometimes observing, sometimes questioning, listening or seeing, which also vary with the institutional site they are in. Since, in relation to medical discourse, we find a variety of subject roles in different positions, it is concluded that discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but ... a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined (1972a: 545). Discourses of knowledge should not be analysed as unities by reference to psychological individuality or to the opinions of a particular person (63, 70).
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So what was I going to say to you this year? That Ive just about had enough; in other words, Id like to bring to a close, to put an end to, up to a point, the series of research projects well, yes, researchwe all talk about it, but what does it actually mean?that weve been working on for four or five years, or practically ever since Ive been here, and I r ealize that there were more and more drawbacks, for both you and me. Lines of research that were very closely interrelated but that never added up to a coherent body of work, that had no continuity. Fragments of research, none of which was completed, and none of which was followed through; bits and pieces of research, and at the same time it was getting very repetitive, always falling into the same rut, the same themes, the same concepts. A few remarks on the history of penal procedure; a few chapters on the evolution, the institutionalization of psychiatry in the nineteenth century; considerations on sophistry or Greek coins; an outline history of sexuality, or at least a history of knowledge about sexuality based upon seventeenth-century confessional practices, or controls on infantile sexuality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; pinpointing the genesis of a theory and knowledge of anomalies, and of all the related techniques. We are making no progress, and its all leading nowhere. Its all repetitive, and it doesnt add up. Basically, we keep saying the same thing, and there again, perhaps were not saying anything at all. Its all getting into something of an inextricable tangle, and its getting us nowhere, as they say. I could tell you that these things were trails to be followed, that it didnt matter where they led, or even that the one thing that did matter was that they didnt lead anywhere, or at least not in some predetermined direction. I could say they were like an outline for something. Its up to you to go on with them or to go off on a tangent; and its up to me to pursue them or give them a different configuration. And then, weyou or Icould see what could be done with these fragments. I felt a bit like a sperm whale that breaks the surface of the water, makes a little splash, and lets you believe, makes you believe, or want to believe, that down there where it cant be seen, down there where it is neither seen nor monitored by anyone, it is following a deep, coherent, and premeditated trajectory.
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Analysis at self-formation contributes to a broader social critique. Modern subjection of the insane took the form of an ethical self-recognition. In Tukes asylum, the inmates were made to feel guilty for the negligence which led to their loss of reason. They became aware of themselves as guilty, as objects of punishment and therapy and as unequal to their keepers, who had not exceeded their liberty but submitted it to the reason of morality and reality. It was through awareness of themselves as objects that the mad were restored to awareness of themselves as responsible subjects, capable of restraining their own behaviour rather than being restrained by the paternal authority of the asylum. The asylum. . . organized. . . guilt. . . for the madman as a consciousness of himself (1965: 24750). On a grander scale, the definition of European Man, identified with his reason, can be drawn by its opposition to the experience of madness, now understood as mental illness. That form of human selfrecognition and type of subjecting thought puts in question . . . the limits rather than the identity of a culture (xiii). We are limited to the identities in which we recognize ourselves as ethical as well as scientific beings.
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PROTEST ISNT ENOUGH MUST LINK IT TO PRACTICE AND DEMANDS ON THE STATE OR WE LAPSE INTO POLITICAL PARALYSIS IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION Foucault 82
[Michel, God, Politics and Ethics: An Interview, The Foucault Reader, Trans. Catherine Porter, Ed. Paul Rabinow, 377//wfi-ajl]
Q. And this is hard to situate within a struggle that is already under way, because the lines are drawn by others. . . . M.F. Yes, but I think that ethics is a practice; ethos is a manner of being. Let's take an example that touches us all, that of Poland. If we raise the question of Poland in strictly political terms, it's clear that we quickly reach the point of saying that there's nothing we can do. We can't dispatch a team of para- troopers, and we can't send armored cars to liberate Warsaw. I think that, politically, we have to recognize this, but I think we also agree that, for ethical reasons, we have to raise the problem of Poland in the form of a nonacceptance of what is. happening there, and a
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nonacceptance of the passivity of our own governments. I think this attitude is an ethical one, but it is also political; it does not consist in saying merely, "I protest," but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as substantial as possible, and one which those who govern, here or there, will sooner or later be obliged to take into account.
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Cavell meant this reflection to be taken non-pejoratively because he seems to take Benjamin more seriously as an aesthetician and literary metaphysician (in Rorty-speak, as a "strong poet") than as a serious, social commentator with good ideas. Keeping Benjamin and his cohorts in the box of aesthetics and metaphysics is, I believe, good intellectual policy for social critics seeking to be relevant. They should be cited for seasoning and not for meat. Yet I am not at all convinced that anything I have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actually run the risks that come with being taken seriously and held accountable for actual policy-relevant prescriptions. Why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a priori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats I mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how great the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salient, or less pernicious, to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virtue aren't equally silly and pernicious.
But it seems to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to measure herself.
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The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to nostalgic, essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing facts and realities, while a postmodern President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls nuclear opposition or antinuclearists at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the failure of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and ineffective partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.
FOURTH, TURN DEBATE ISNT A TRAGIC PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR WAR ITS A COMICAL GAME IN WHICH WE THROW AROUND SCENARIOS THAT WE TAKE WITH A
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SEVENTH, IMAGINING NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION IS A PROJECT OF SURVIVAL THEIR ALTERNATIVE CREATES REPRESSION AND DENIAL WHICH MAKES NUCLEAR WAR MORE LIKELY Lenz, Science and Policy Professor at SUNY, 90 (Nuclear Age Literature For Youth, p. 9-10)
A summary of Franks thought in Psychological Determinants of the Nuclear Arms Race notes how all
people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of the threat of nuclear arms and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have actually experienced can have true emotional
in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched, we
impact. Since Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and nuclear weapons poised for ann ihilation
find it easy to imagine ourselves immune to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay Neither Victims nor Executioners of the
inability of most people really to imagine other peoples death (he might have added or their own). Commenting on Camus, David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that this
distancing from deaths reality is yet another aspect of our insulation from lifes most basic realities. We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding. If we are to heed Camuss call to refuse to be either the victims of violence like the Jews of the Holocaust, or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners of
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the death camps, we
must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails. It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because letting [the
instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of anxiety or other painful emotions. In most life threatening situations, an organisms adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, adapting psychic toll.
ourselves to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our doom more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a
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This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida
the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray,
usually replies that Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more
. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the
generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. "
metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from
psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect
which the Enlightenment offered. that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
NINTH, MEDIA IMAGES PLAY THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REVEALING THEIR OWN ILLUSIONS
Jean Baudrillard, professor of philosophy of culture and media at Univ. or Paris, 1994, Illusion of the End, pg. 60-61 And yet there will, nonetheless, have been a kind of verdict in this Romanian affair, and the artificial heaps of corpses will have been of some use, all the same. One might ask whether the Romanians, by the very excessiveness of this staged event and the simulacrum of their revolution, have not served as demystifiers of news and its guiding principle. For, if the media image has put an end to the credibility of the event, the event will, in its turn, have put an end to the credibility of the image. Never again shall we be able to look at a television picture in good faith, and this is the finest collective demystification we have ever known. The finest revenge over this new arrogant power, this power to blackmail by events. Who can say what responsibility attaches to the televisual production of a false massacre (Timisoara), as compared with the perpetrating of a true massacre? This is another kind of crime against humanity, a hijacking of fantasies, affects and the credulity of hundreds of millions of people by means of television a crime of blackmail and simulation. What penalty is laid down for such a hijacking? There is no way to rectify this situation and we must have no illusions: there is no perverse effect, nor even anything scandalous in the Timisoara syndrome. It is simply the (immoral) truth of news, the secret purpose [destination] of which is to deceive us about the real, but also to undeceive us about the real. There is no worse mistake than taking the real for the real and, in that sense, the very excess of media illusion plays a vital disillusioning role. In this way, news could be said to undo its own spell by its effects and the violence of information to be avenged by the repudiation and indifference it engenders. Just as we should be unreservedly thankful for the existence of politicians, who take on themselves the responsibility for that wearisome function, so we should be grateful to the media for existing and taking on themselves the triumphant illusionism of the world of communications, the whole ambiguity of mass culture, the confusion of ideologies, the stereotypes, the spectacle, the banality soaking up all these things in their operation. While, at the same time, constituting a permanent test of intelligence, for where better than on television can one learn to question every picture, every word, every commentary? Television inculcates indifference distance, scepticism and
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unconditional apathy. Through the worlds becoming-image, it anaesthetizes the imagination, provokes a sickened abreaction, together with a surge of adrenalin which induces total disillusionment. Television and the media would render reality [le reel] dissuasive, were it not already so. And this represents an absolute advance in the consciousness or the cynical unconscious of our age.
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, this does not mean that people should stop trying to organize the working class or to influence the exercise of state power; it means only that they have to do so pragmatically and experimentally, with full knowledge that there are no deeper logics of historical necessity. . . . Yet, if the real enemy is us -- all of us, the structures we carry around in our heads, the limits on our imagination -- where can we even begin? Things seem to change in history when people break out of their accustomed ways of responding to domination, by acting as if the constraints on their improving their lives were not real and that they could change things; and sometimes they can, though not always in the way they had hoped or intended; but they never knew they could change them at all until they tried. n122 Gordon's conclusion is profound. But it contradicts the view that a negative attack on liberal legal doctrine is the key path to a liberated future. n123 People break out of their accustomed ways of responding to [*558] domination by acting as if they could change things. "Acting as if they could
Of course change things" does not mean confining scholarly endeavor to negative doctrinal analysis, even though negative doctrinal analysis may be one helpful step towards
. Acting means struggling for and living a different way, even if only "experimentally," and this requires praxis, theory which guides and is in turn influenced by action. n124 Yet the whole of Gordon's piece, until his conclusion, is an exposition which
acting becomes a polemic -- almost an apology -- for the negative Critical analysis which constitutes virtually the sole response to the practitioners' yearning for helpful theory
FIFTH, SPECIFIC SOLVENCY TRUMPS PREFER OUR TRIBE AND KATYAL EV SHOWING THAT OVERRULING QUIRIN CREATES EFFECTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS SIXTH, HERES MORE EV INDETERMINACY MEANS YOU HAVE TO EVALUATE THE EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION OF OUR SOLVENCY CLAIMS Hasnas 95
[John, JD & PhD Phil @ duke, Asst. prof. Bus Ethics @ Georgetown, Back to the Future, 45 Duke L.j. 84, October, LN//uwyo-ajl] I have suggested that this greatly overstates what the indeterminacy argument actually implies. Rather, the proper inference to draw from a demonstration that the law is indistinguishable from politics is that the cases in which the law should be employed to reform society are limited to those in which the desired reforms can be effectively realized through political action. The insight the legal realists provided long ago was that to identify these cases, one must undertake the pragmatic examination of how the law works in practice relative to alternative methods of social control. Thus, there is a need for empirical investigation to determine how the expected outcomes of collective political action compare with those of politically unrestrained individuals functioning in a market environment. Further, to be valid, this investigation must compare like with like; it must compare what can reasonably be achieved [*131] through real-world political processes staffed by less than perfect human beings with what is likely to result from unrestrained human interaction in the flawed markets that actually exist, not the utopian results of an ideal political system with those of imperfect,
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real-world markets. Because this is the case and because the Crits have resisted undertaking such investigations, I have argued that they have missed the point of the indeterminacy argument, and that if this argument is in fact correct, the way forward into our jurisprudential future lies in a return to the uncompleted project of the realists.
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Because he appreciated the dialectic of theory and the broad-based confrontational strategies of socially transformative action, King stands as the paradigmatic organic intellectual of twentieth-century
American life. King's method and practice offer direction to progressive scholars concerned about the exclusionary, repressive, and non-communal dimensions of American life. [*1013] Gramsci's conception of the organic intellectual provides a useful framework for understanding the thought of King and what it has to offer CLS. The organic intellectual brings philosophy to the masses, not for the merely instrumental purposes of unifying them, "but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc
Gramsci's organic intellectual struggles to transform those who are oppressed as a means of transforming the conditions under which they are oppressed. n79 Gramsci understands domination in terms of both coercion and consent, the latter
which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups." n78 constituting what he refers to as hegemony. Under his formulation, hegemony consists, then, of "[t]he 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group." n80 Gramsci argues that "this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production." n81 Thus, oppression is not only physical and psychological but also cultural. n82
King, like Gramsci's organic intellectual, empowered his community through a practical effort to bridge the gap between theory and lived experience. King's work consisted of four interrelated activities. First, he used theoretical deconstruction to free the mind to envision alternative conceptions of community. Second, he employed experiential deconstruction to understand the liberating dimensions of legitimating ideologies like liberalism and Christianity, dimensions easily ignored by the abstract, ahistorical, and potentially misleading critiques that rely exclusively on theoretical deconstruction. Third, he used the insights gleaned from the first two activities to postulate an [*1014] alternative social vision intended to transform the conditions of oppression under which people struggle. Drawing from the best of liberalism and the best of Christianity, King forged a vision of community that transcended the limitations of each and built upon the accomplishments of both. Finally, he created and implemented strategies to mobilize people to secure that alternative vision. I refer to this multidimensional critical activity as "philosophical praxis."
Although many critical theorists engage primarily in theoretical deconstruction, and some appreciate certain forms of experiential deconstruction, n83 few have
reconstructive theorizing and socially transformative struggle. n84 These dimensions of critical activity directly confront the material conditions of oppression whereas the preoccupation with deconstructing theory does not. King went further than these critical theorists by examining the subtle and complex ways in which consent was shaped, while fully appreciating the role of state and private coercion in legitimating authority in the lives of the oppressed. This Part examines how King filtered his theoretical deconstruction of hegemonic theologies through his knowledge of the history and experience of oppression, and thereby made that theoretical deconstruction richer, more contextual, and ready to engage the existential realities of oppression. The interplay between King's theoretical and experiential deconstruction is best illustrated by reference to the African-American Church -- the
embraced either a full experiential deconstruction or the third and fourth dimensions of philosophical praxis -institution providing the organic link between philosophy and the masses, theory and praxis. n85 My analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I examine how African-American religion served at once to legitimate slave society, delegitimize that society, and inform alternative visions of community. Second, I examine King's use of theoretical deconstruction and illustrate its dependence on the historic mission of the AfricanAmerican Church. Like a true organic intellectual engaged in a philosophical praxis, King used theoretical deconstruction to illustrate the possibilities [*1015] of his reconstructive vision and the centrality of social struggle in realizing that vision. Third, I discuss King's experiential deconstruction, his unwillingness to be distracted
the combination of theoretical and experiential deconstruction results in a more contextual framework -- one more appreciative of the conditions of choice within which authority is legitimated and challenged through reconstructive vision and struggle.
by the reified abstractions of theoretical deconstruction. Finally, I show how
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, the critique lends itself to exaggeration. This observation may be appreciated by considering what happens when Critical legal theorists themselves make tentative gestures at the social direction in which we should move. Such gestures, even from the most vigorous critics of liberalism, do not escape from liberalism and, indeed, liberal rights theory. Nevertheless, those gestures have great merit, particularly because of their use of liberal rights. For example, Frug, while expounding his vision of the city as a site of localized power and participatory democracy, attacks liberal theory and its dualities as an obstacle to his vision. n19 At the same time, without [*518] acknowledging the significance of what he is doing, Frug relies on the liberal image of law and rights to defend the potential of his vision. He writes: It should be emphasized that participatory democracy on the local level need not mean the tyranny of the majority over the minority. Cities are units within states, not the state itself; cities, like all individuals and entities within the state, could be
subject to state-created legal restraints that protect individual rights. Nor does participatory democracy necessitate the frustration of national political objectives by
. The liberal image of law as mediating between the need to protect the individual from communal coercion and the need to achieve communal goals could thus be retained even in the model of participatory democracy. n20
local protectionism; participatory institutions, like others in society, could still remain subject to general regulation to achieve national goals
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REJECTION FAILS- MUST COMBINE THE PLAN AND THE ALTERNATIVE HUTCHINSON AND MONAHAN 84
(Allan and Patrick, Asst Prof @ NYU and Asst Prof @ Ottawa U, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM: Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, MosE) The development and implementation of such an enlarged notion of legal doctrine would require a complete restructuring of the existing order. Unger, of course, is not blind to this. With a truly grand sweep, he drafts the essential framework of such a society; he substantiates and formalizes the "structure of no-structure." He envisages the establishment of a "rotating capital fund" n150 to finance individual projects and to effect a decentralization of production and exchange. The legal counterpart of this notion would be "the disaggregation of the consolidated property right." n151 Yet Unger recognizes that some regime of rights would be necessary for his proposals to succeed. n152 He therefore suggests the creation of four kinds of rights: immunity rights which give individuals the power to resist interference and domination by any other individual or organization, including the state; destabilization rights which entitle individuals to demand the disruption of established institutions and forms of social practice; market rights which give a conditional claim to divisible portions of social capital, in place of the existing absolute property rights; and solidarity rights which foster mutual reliance, loyalty, and communal responsibility. Such arrangements, according to Unger, need not be established all at once, but can be introduced gradually. n153 Unger finds this scheme attractive because it accommodates continuing conflict between transitory factions of society; it allows [*233] "history itself [to] become a source of moral insight." n154
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2. The Role of Religion in the Delegitimation of Authority. -- Although the use of religion as an instrument of social control often necessitated oversight by white masters, n101 strict enforcement was not maintained, and slaves often met separately for religious services, including weekly and Sunday evening services. n102 It was within the freedom provided for religious worship that Africans began to assert some control over how the void created by the disintegration of their historical identity and community would be filled. In this small space of freedom, an alternative conception of community was defined and the history of a new American people began to emerge. African-American religion and its primary vehicle of expression, the African-American Church, supplied the needed catalyst for the reconstruction of community destroyed by slavery. n103 To the surprise and fear of many whites, slaves transformed an ideology intended to reconcile them to a subordinate status into a manifesto of their God-given equality. n104 This deconstruction was both revolutionary and pragmatic in nature. The Africans' appropriation of conservative evangelicalism as a bulwark against the degradation and countless microaggressions of slavery proved that there were alternate interpretations of the text that supposedly justified their subjugation. Slaves demonstrated that scripture was subject to an alternative interpretation that called for the eradication of the very social structure evangelicals sought to legitimate. n105 In short, slaves deconstructed ideology through their struggles against oppression. Although slavemasters and evangelicals attempted to limit the transmission of counterhegemonic interpretations of scripture, their [*1019] efforts met with limited success. African gospel preachers and slaves who learned to read against their masters' wishes (and, many times, against state law as well) were determined to read the Bible in light of their own experiences. Many slaves realized that the message of submission, docility, and absolute obedience to the master was a distorted picture of the Bible's eternal truths. n106
Unlike some CLS scholars, King understood the importance of a system of individual rights. CLS proponents have urged that rights are incoherent and indeterminate reifications of concrete experiences; they obfuscate, through the manipulation of abstract categories, disempowering social relations. n158 King, on the other hand, understood that the oppressed could make rights determinate in practice; although "law tends to declare rights - it does not deliver them. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into a judicial decision." n159 For King, the catalyst was persistent social struggle to transform the oppressiveness of one's existential condition into ever closer approximations of the ideal. The hierarchies of race, gender, and class define those conditions, and the struggle for substantive rights closes the gap between the latter and the ideal of the Beloved Community. Under the pressures of social struggle, the oppressed can alter rights to better reflect the exigencies of social reality -- a reality itself more fully understood by those engaged in transformative struggle. King's Beloved Community accepted and expanded the liberal tradition of rights. King realized that notwithstanding its limits, the liberal vision contained important insights into the human condition. For those deprived of basic freedoms and subjected to arbitrary acts of state authority, the enforcement of formal rights was revolutionary. African-Americans
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understood the importance of formal liberal rights and demanded the full enforcement of such rights in order to challenge and rectify historical practices that had objectified and subsumed their existence.
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King's synthesis of pragmatic and revolutionary evangelicalism was most powerfully expressed in his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail." n151 Conservative evangelicalism's dichotomy between the spiritual and the secular caused many religious leaders, just as in the days of slavery, to continue to oppose any interpretation of Christianity demanding that equality before God in the spiritual realm also be embodied in the legal and social relations defining the secular realm. These leaders still offered patience as a panacea for the pain of persecution and the joys of an afterlife as an answer for the sufferings of this life. If integration was the will of God, He and not humans would change people's hearts in His own way and time. Be patient, they urged, and wait on the Lord. n152 King discerned the hegemonic role of this theology and boldly challenged the injustice to which it gave rise wherever he encountered it. To those who urged that nonviolent, [*1033] direct action was "unwise and untimely," King sharply retorted: We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have never yet engaged in a direct action movement that was "well-timed," according to the timetable of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the words "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with a piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." . . . We must come to see with the distinguished jurist of yesterday, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied." n153 King expressed his great disappointment with this otherworldly orientation of the white Church: In the midst of blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro, I have watched white churches stand on the sideline and merely mouth pious irrelevancies and sanctimonious trivialities. In the midst of a mighty struggle to rid our nation of racial and economic injustice, I have heard so many ministers say, "Those are social issues with which the gospel has no real concern," and I have watched so many churches commit themselves to a completely otherworldly religion which made a strange distinction between body and soul, the sacred and the secular. n154 Thus, King spent his life leading African-Americans into direct confrontation with oppressive institutions and practices. Through direct action the African-American community exposed the contradictions and violence endemic to American society. In this way, the civil rights movement King led was itself a powerful form of experiential deconstruction, one that provided fertile ground for a new vision of community in America.
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ther are some liberating as well as legitimating aspects of the line-drawing or boundary-setting enterprise we critique. Democratic socialism, the American Revolution, the African-American civil rights movement, and other social movements were based, in part, on the liberating dimensions of liberal theory. Failing to recognize this, some scholars unwittingly fall into too simplistic an analysis of the problem and its possible solutions. When we appreciate the liberating dimension of ideology, revealed by experiential deconstruction, we might conclude that there are
Second, when we adopt this more contextual and experiential approach to understanding oppression, we will realize that many dimensions of the present system that are good and quite enabling. Thus, although I share critical methods, I question the conclusions of CLS. The CLS critique rightly points out that we need not accept oppressive institutions and practices as unalterable expressions of truth, because the premises on which they are based are contradictory and indeterminate at best. The critique suggests, therefore, that we are free to envision and construct alternative forms of community that represent a more accurate or at least more plausible conception of human nature -- one believed to be fundamentally good, which may replace "our pervasive alienation and fear of one another with something more like mutual trust." n74 But
From this optimistic view, one might envision emerging a quite oppressive community in which groups, behind the guise of love and mutual dependency, legitimate [*1011] behavior that is more oppressive than anything imagined by Hobbes' sovereign. When, therefore, CLS proponents argue that liberalism's public-private dichotomy undermines a society's transformative potential, we should also ask how and when does it advance those efforts. Indeed, if CLS' primary concern is one of legitimation and power, it is important to ask under what conditions the liberal discourse of rights may be strategically delegitimizing and substantively empowering.
should we be so certain that this optimistic view of human nature is clearly more liberating than the insights provided by Hobbes or Locke?
EVEN IF THEYRE RIGHT, WE SHOULD STILL FIGHT FOR RIGHTS TO MAKE A HUMANE SOCIETY THE ALTERNATIVE IS ETHICAL ABDICATION Sparer 84
[Ed, Prof. Law and Soc Welfare @ Pennsylvania, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January, ln//uwyo-ajl]
My point is that both liberal and radical theory (including Critical legal theory) must balance competing values. Of course, the same problem affects any statement of
. There is no way of generalizing a resolution of all potentially contradictory values in This impossibility, however, does not necessarily implicate the virtues of and need for rights themselves. Nor does it mean that we should not struggle to alter the political and social context in which rights operate or to win preference for certain rights over others. The significance of the CLS overemphasis on and exaggeration of contradictions is that it increases the tendency on the part of some Critical legal theorists to emphasize negative critique because they are overwhelmed by the very deficiencies they criticize in liberal legal theory. n21 At the same time, some Critical legal theorists lose an appreciation [*519] of the potential contribution of rights, a potential contribution which coexists with their negative potential. Exaggeration thereby promotes an "undialectical" approach despite Critical theory's emphasis on dialectics.
"rights" as well all situations.
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rights consciousness may have the unintended consequences of disempowering the racially oppressed while leaving white supremacy basically untouched.
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No Links (1/2)
YOUR ARGUMENT ASSUMES THE WRONG LIBERAL LEGALISM- THE AFF HAS A COMMITMENT TO NEUTRALITYWE CAN NEVER ACHIEVE WHAT YOUR ALTERANTIVE CALLS FOR ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 102-103) PHM This chapter has examined three important lines of argument in the CLS literature. All three attempt to establish that liberal theory is internally inconsistent, and all three claim that the inconsistency arises from the liberal embrace of pluralism, neutrality, and the rule of law. The central contention of these arguments is that it is impossible to satisfy both the demands of legality and those of neutrality in a context of moral, religious, and political pluralism. I found that the three main lines of argument deployed to support such a contention are all wanting. The arguments rest to a large degree on a confused understanding of the liberal commitment to neutrality. In addition, the more radical CLS arguments rest on a seriously inadequate understanding of linguistic meaning. Once those confusions and inadequacies are remedied, it becomes clear that the requirements of legality and neutrality can be met in a pluralist context.
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No Links (2/2)
NO LINK- LIBERAL LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOESNT SAY THAT LAW SOLVES ALL OUR PROBLEMS, BUT THAT IT IS BETTER THAN DOING NOTHING- YOU MUST WIN EVERY INSTANCE OF LAW IS BAD ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 200) PHM In the course of criticizing liberal legal philosophy, Robert Gordon has argued against "the kind of rule fetishism that supposes salvation comes through rules, rather than through the social practices that the rule makers try to symbolize and crystallize."65 It should now be apparent that Gordon's criticism of liberalism in this regard rests on several misconceptions. First, liberal theory does not promise salvation through legal rules; what it promises is a society that does a better job of protecting people from intolerance, prejudice, and oppression than it would if law was dispensed with. Second, Gordon poses a false dichotomy: Protection must be attempted either through rules (presumably he has legal rules in mind) or through the nonlegal practices of society. The soundest version of liberal theory will reject this dichotomy and argue that protection from intolerance, prejudice, and oppression requires both legal rules and at least some complementary social practice.
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Turns: Ricoeur
CLS CREATES AN EXTREME LEGAL HERMEUTICS OF SUSPICION, PREVENTING ANY LEGAL REFORM Hasnas 95
[John, JD & PhD Phil @ duke, Asst. prof. Bus Ethics @ Georgetown, Back to the Future, 45 Duke L.j. 84, October, LN//uwyo-ajl]
Unlike the mainstream Crits, n83 This is because, as their designation [*104] suggests, they believe that reason is impotent to resolve legal and moral issues. Heavily influenced by the philosophy of Richard Rorty n84 and the deconstructionist school of literary criticism associated with Jacques Derrida, n85 the irrationalists believe that objective knowledge is impossible. Following Rorty, they reject the correspondence theory of truth that holds that a statement is true when it is an accurate representation of an underlying reality. n86 They assert that since it is impossible "to step outside our skins--the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism--and compare ourselves with something absolute," n87 reality is socially constructed, i.e., the result of social practices that "embody contingent choices concerning how to organize the thick texture of the world in consciousness." n88 Thus, the irrationalists adopt the coherence theory in which "the meaning of words are not determined by external referents, but
This, however, implies that "the attempt to fix the meaning of an expression leads to an infinite regress," n90 and hence, that "meaning is ultimately
instead by their coherence with other words or judgments within our total body of knowledge." n89 indeterminate." n91 Since this is true generally, it obviously must be true within the legal realm as well. n92 Therefore, for the irrationalists, the indeter- [*105] minacy of the law is merely a consequence of the inherent indeterminacy of human language. n93
This philosophical position, which has been described as radical subjective idealism, n94 leads the irrationalists to embrace an extreme form of epistemic skepticism in which "it is impossible to say anththing true about the world." n95 This, of course, entails a commitment to ethical relativism such that "any action may be described as right or wrong, good or bad." n96 Thus, for the irrationalists, reason is irrelevant to our normative pursuits. Since there are no objective moral or legal truths, reason cannot help us find them: "Legal and moral questions are matters to be answered by experience, emotion, introspection, and conversation, rather than by logical proof." n97
Hence, when judges decide cases, they should do what we all do when we face a moral decision. We identify a limited set of alternatives; we predict the most likely consequences of following different courses of action; we articulate the values that are important in the context of the decision and the ways in which they conflict [*106] with each other; we see what relevant people (judges, scholars) have said about similar issues; we talk with our friends; we drink enormous amounts of coffee; we choose what to do. n98
SKEPTICISM STOPS SOCIAL CHANGE THEIR PARANOIA FORECLOSES UPON REVOLUTION Berman 2001
Of course
[Paul Schiff, Assoc. Prof. Law @ U. of Connecticut, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, LN]
, one might view this as a positive development. One might think people should stop being lulled into a false sense of believing that the rhetoric of public life really matters. If people began to view such rhetoric as a construction of entrenched power, so the argument might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly revolutionary political movement. I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to occur. Moreover, I am not sure that a culture of suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek political (or personal) change anyway.
Suspicious analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity, but there are dangers that arise from relentless disenchantment as well. As [*123] Richard K. Sherwin has observed,
Without the means of experiencing more profound enchantments, without communal rituals those beliefs ultimately lose their meaning and die... . Forms of enchantment in the service of deceit, illicit desire, and self-gratification alone must be separated out from forms of enchantment in the service of feelings, beliefs, and values that we aspire to affirm in light of the self, social, and legal realities they help to
and social dramas through which the culture's deepest beliefs and values may be brought to life and collectively reenacted, construct and maintain. 112
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[Kenney, Prof. of Law @ Arizona, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1203, July, ln//uwyoajl]
I fear deconstruction because people might come to believe in it, come to believe that the Rule of Law is a hoax masking illegitimate power. I believe this would be a bad thing. I offer, in support, one war story
and one literary quote. In the summer of 1965, I went south as a member of the Law Student Civil Rights Research Council. I worked with attorney C.B. King in Albany, Georgia. That summer there were many civil rights marches, and the police often refused to protect the demonstrators. I recall sitting in a Federal District Court with C.B. King and listening to the judge tell a rural sheriff, "The law requires you to protect the demonstrators. If you don't, I have no choice but to hold you in contempt." Be this illusion, I would not blithely dispel it.
Law can protect the weak from the strong. Economic and racial minorities would be in a worse condition in a deconstructed world, for our southern sheriff would argue, "The only reason I must protect them folks is to protect their first amendment rights, and the only reason they have first amendment rights is to get their voices heard, and, what with television being what it is, I can assure them of a much larger audience by turning my dogs on them." Right on, Sheriff! n38
[*1220] A character in Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, argues that he would "cut down every law in England" to get the Devil. n39 Sir Thomas More responds: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned around on you -- where would you hide, the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast . . . and if you cut them down . . . d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? n40 I realize that one war story and one literary quote will not prove the need for the Rule of Law. I realize there are counter examples and, indeed, conflicting images: "In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb," Grant Gilmore assures us, while "[i]n Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
, the issue of the importance of the Rule of Law ultimately resolves itself into a vision of human nature. Morton Horwitz has written that to see the Rule of Law as an "unqualified human good" is to "succumb to Hobbesian pessimism" and to embrace a "conservative doctrine." n42 One hates to admit to being suspicious, fearful and, perhaps, even mean-spirited. Yet, we live in a century that has produced Hitler and Stalin. Perhaps now is not the time to dump the Rule of Law.
meticulously observed." n41 No doubt "Goodbye to Deconstruction" -- I stole the title. In 1936 Fred Rodell of Yale wrote a delightful essay, "Goodbye to Law Reviews." n43 Mostly he pokes fun at the pomposity of law reviews. There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is style. The other is content. That, I think, about covers the ground. [*1221] . . . [I]t seems to be a cardinal principle of law review writing and editing that nothing may be said forcefully and nothing may be said amusingly. This, I take it, is in the interest of something called dignity. n44 Rodell's ultimate point goes, however, to content. And in this he is quite serious.
. With law as the only alternative to force as a means of solving the myriad problems of the world, it seems to me that the articulate among the clan of lawyers might, in their writings, be more pointedly aware of those problems, might recognize that the use of law to help toward their solution is the only excuse for the law's existence, instead of blithely continuing to make mountain after mountain out of tiresome technical molehills. n45 Articulate deconstructionists, instead of blithely denying the existence of the mountain with tiresome epistemology, might better devote their obvious talents to making it more habitable. n46
I do not wish to labor the point but perhaps it had best be stated once in dead earnest
THE ALTERNATIVE TO LAW IS A WORLD WHERE THERE IS NO ORDER AND PEOPLE DO WHAT THEY WANT- JUSTIFIES EVEN WORSE ATROCITIES THAN YOUR IMPACT ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 128) PHM Consider the legal duty to aid a person to whom one owes no contractual or statutory obligation. The traditional common law rule is that there is no legal duty to aid such a person (a "stranger"). But there are a series of rules that qualify and carve out exceptions to the traditional rule. Thus, there is a rule that if the actions of the defendant helped to create the dangerous situation in which the plaintiff found himself, the defendant may have had a duty to render aid.32 There is a rule that if the plaintiff and the defendant stand in some "special relationship," there may be a duty to render aid, even if there is no statute or valid contract between the two requiring the aid.33
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RULE OF LAW IS THE ONLY OPTION IN A WORLD OF THE NATION-STATE- THE ALTERNATIVE ALLOWS THE PRIVELEDGED TO EXPLOIT THE DISADVANTAGED ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 200-201) PHM Morton Horwitz has correctly pointed out that the rule of law can constrain not only oppressive and misguided uses of power but also benevolent and beneficial ones.66 Whether the rule of law is to be prized, then, hinges on the question of whether there is a greater need to confine through the rule of law the intolerant and oppressive impulses of humans or to liberate the tolerant and benevolent impulses from the constraints of legality. I do not believe that there is an a priori answer to this question. To that extent, Horwitz is quite right to say that it is a mistake to characterize the rule of law as an "unqualified human good," a characterization made by E. P. Thompson.67 However, the sorry human history of
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persecution, prejudice, and intolerance over the past several centuries makes one conclusion inescapable: Within the context of the nation-state and over the foreseeable future, the need to confine the impulses of intolerance and oppression with the requirements of legality will continue to be far greater than the need to liberate the impulses of of tolerance and benevolence from the restrictions of the rule of law.68
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INFLUENCE: From the Worlds of "Others": Minority and Feminist Responses to Critical Legal Studies, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 683)
Civil rights claimants, who understood experientially the were not likely to underestimate the challenge posed to the traditional social order by their assertion of mainstream equality. n26 As Crenshaw suggests, [*692] people of color knew that when powerful elements in society had defined particular racial characteristics as conclusive proof of inferiority, an equality claim was a potent assault on these collective psychological structures. n27 By proclaiming the unthinkable -- that people understood to be inferior were entitled to equality -- the civil rights movement, through simple assertion of rights routinely granted to whites, began delegitimating the ideology of race consciousness. In a powerful deconstructive move, the reified abstractions harbored by masses of white Americans concerning the characteristics attributed to African-Americans were thrown into question by African-Americans' assertion of mainstream equality. n28 Crenshaw and others suggest that the feature of this story that African-Americans continue to need most to deconstruct is the racist imagery, not the rights imagery. n29 Liberal legal notions, such as rights, represent strategies to be deployed in this deconstructive enterprise. n30 The recognition of African-Americans as rights-bearers, as members of the American community, transformed the experience of race oppression . In Patricia Williams' words: [*693] Rights imply a respect which places one within the referential range of self and others, which elevates one's status from human body to social being. For blacks , then, the attainment of rights signifies the due, the respectful behavior, the collective responsibility properly owed by a society to one of its own . n31 The civil rights movement reinforced one ideological support of American society -- legal consciousness -- to undermine another ideological support of American society -- race consciousness. As Crenshaw explains, the effect of the latter ideology had been to isolate African-Americans so effectively that no other route to social power was available. Only by playing the logic of the two prevailing ideologies against one another, applying the language of rights to the situation of African-Americans, could the movement hope to achieve any progress at all. The contradiction between American legal mythology and the systemic treatment of African-Americans created the only room within which the racially subordinated could maneuver. n32 The weight of daily oppression created an urgency that impelled African-Americans to seize the only viable opportunity for change that presented itself. n33
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LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY INTEGRATES NON-LEGAL SOLUTIONS AS A COMPANION TO LAW- THERE IS NO NORMATIVE VIEW INHERENT IN OUR REPRESENTATIONS AND ONLY THE AFF CAN CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 101-102) PHM In addition, it would be a distortion of liberal theory to suggest that it has no place for nonlegal modes of social regulation, such as mediation. Liberals can and do acknowledge the value of such nonlegal mechanisms in certain social contexts and can consistently allow a place for them in liberal society. And those who reject the rule of law can argue in the political arena for extending the role of such informal mechanisms. Of course, a liberal state could not allow the antinomians to eradicate legal institutions; in that sense, one might say that the liberal rule of law is not neutral. But the kind of political neutrality which the liberal defends does not aim to guarantee that any normative view has an opportunity to remake society wholly in its vision. It does guarantee an opportunity to negotiate and compromise within a framework of individual rights, and there is no reason why those who defend nonlegal modes of social regulation cannot seize the opportunity under a liberal regime to carve out a significant role for nonlegal modes of social regulation within the liberal state.
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The liberal version of political neutrality demands that antinomians have such an opportunity, but there is nothing remotely inconsistent in liberal thought in making that demand or prohibiting anti legalism from going so far as to destroy all legal institutions.
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Turns: Minorities
CLS DISEMPOWERS MARGINALIZED GROUPS WHO USE LEGAL DISCOURSE IN TRANSFORMATIVE WAYS
Phyllis Goldfarb, Associate Professor, Boston College Law School, New England Law Review, Spring, 1992, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 683 Viewed through Minow's eyes, rights talk represents a demand for public airing that makes pre-existing conflicts "audible and unavoidable." It is a "process by which hurts that once were whispered or unheard have become claims, and claims that once were unsuccessful, have persuaded others and transformed social life." Rights, Minow argues, can remake relationships; in relating her view, Minow helps us remake our relationship to rights. This transformative approach to rights, adopted by movements of the disempowered, is a view that feminist scholars and scholars of color have urged proponents of Critical Legal Studies to embrace. The foregoing descriptions comprise content-oriented critiques of certain CLS theories. Feminists and minorities would offer a methodological critique as well, a critique rooted in sensitivity to the methods by which one builds theory. Each has implicitly and explicitly criticized certain CLS literature for its contextual failures, its inattention to the specific ways that diverse groups of people experience society and feel its impact in their everyday lives. Each would contribute to CLS a theory-building epistemology grounded in political struggle, attentive to the conditions in which people live, and inclusive of the perspectives they express. The infusion of these diverse perspectives, especially from the voices of the disempowered, and attention to political practice are likely to affect CLS theories. For feminists and critical race scholars, this infusion of voices and involvement in practice represent a moral and epistemological imperative for a transformative project aimed at reducing hierarchy.
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RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, Harvard Law Review, May, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331)
trashing offers no idea of how to avoid the negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse or how to work around such consequences. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in terms of legal discourse, we must nevertheless exist in a present world where legal protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one. The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area. The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for
liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their
focus on delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of domination. Unfortunately, no such strategy has yet been articulated, and it is difficult to imagine that racial
minorities will ever be able to discover one. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [*1367] excellent account of the civil rights movement,
popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to that logic. n137 People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging . n138 Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic -- that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology -- will probably be ineffective . n139 The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. n140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences
[*1368] of maintaining the contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. n141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction. This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology.
Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the
practice of absolute racial subordination. Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship entailed.
By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology , Blacks relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wres
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Kennedy has defined rule application in such a way that only a completely determined decision will count as a decision that is not indeterminate. The difficulty with this definition is that legal rules (or, more broadly, doctrines) can significantly constrain outcomes even if they do not mechanically determine them. My general argument against the internal skeptic's defense is that underdeterminacy is not the same as indeterminacy and
limits himself to identifying those aspects of the situation which, per se, trigger his response." n47 For two principal reasons
that a case need not be indeterminate to be hard. With all this in mind, I can agree with critical scholars that there are some cases that appear easy on their surface but are actually hard. But the internal skeptics believe that by demonstrating that easy cases are hard cases, they have also demonstrated that the law is indeterminate. At this stage in the argument, I part company with these advocates of indeterminacy.
, the internal skeptic cannot demonstrate that all law is indeterminate through conventional legal argumentation. The first reason is conceptual: if a decision is not determinate, it does not follow that it is also not underdeterminate and, therefore, indeterminate. Neither does it follow that
because a case is hard, it is indeterminate. Even if all seemingly easy cases were actually hard cases, it would not follow that the law is indeterminate with respect to all these cases -- although it would follow that the law is less determinate than we might have thought. Hard cases can be very hard, even if their results are not completely indeterminate. I submit further that even the hardest of hard cases are merely underdetermined by the law, not indeterminate. But I defer discussion of this point until later in this essay.
there are at least some very easy cases that are completely determinate. For example, if I were sued by Gore Vidal for slander on the basis of the first paragraph of this [*476] article, the only possible outcome would be a verdict for me. A skeptic might respond that it is possible to think of an argument suggesting that I should lose the case, or that the judge could simply rule against me without explanation. But it is simply incredible to say that any such argument or arbitrary ruling would be considered acceptable by the legal profession. That is, this sort of defense of indeterminacy is not internal to the law. It may, however, have some critical bite -- a matter I turn to in the
The second reason internal skepticism cannot prove complete indeterminacy is rooted in the standards implicit in the practice of acceptable legal argument: following discussions of external skepticism and the epiphenomenalist defense.
THE VAST MAJORITY OF CASES ARE DETERMINATE YOU JUST DONT HEAR ABOUT THEM Hegland 85
[Kenney, Prof. of Law @ Arizona, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1203, July, ln//uwyoajl]
Let us return to the mundane -- can legal doctrines determine the outcome of specific legal controversies? I think the acne case establishes, at least in theory, that legal rules and doctrines can determine outcomes and that they can constrain judicial discretion and immunize decisions from subjective preference. But even if I have won my quarrel theoretically, I have not done much to save the legal order if all I have shown is that legal doctrine determines outcome only in what I must now concede to be the most ridiculous of hypotheticals. What of the real world of judges, lawyers and clients? Does doctrine determine outcome there? My sense is that legal doctrines determine the outcomes in most cases. I do not believe this is due to the litigants' lack of imagination or resources. It is because doctrines are not mirages; they have real substance and are what they appear to be. Law professors teach the difficult cases of the casebooks, read the novel cases of the advance sheets, and fret over "major" Supreme Court decisions. Law professors overestimate the degree of legal uncertainty. I teach a course in contracts, and last summer I took a week to read every appellate decision in my home state dealing with that subject over the last several years. It is, by and large, boring stuff: "The rule is X, the facts are Y, and therefore we hold for the plaintiff." I realize that in the process of writing an opinion an uncertain case may become certain. Nonetheless, in most of the opinions I read, there was simply no sign of doctrinal uncertainty: seldom were there dissenting opinions, seldom were cases distinguished, and seldom did the court discuss "social policy" to convince the reader that the legal doctrine should apply. Typically, the doctrine was recited and then applied. It was a long week.
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Now it may be that, for some dark or benign purpose, the judges of Arizona are out to hoodwink us, or for perhaps some climatic reason, Arizona lawyers have been made dumb and their clients poor. But, if my reading of the cases is fair, I think that as an empirical matter the deconstructionists have some explaining to do -- and it will not do to simply assert, rather than prove, that Sun-Belt lawyers lack imagination and resolve.
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YOUR INDETERMINACY ARGUMENT ASSUMES THE PAST DONT MANIFEST IN FUTURE DECISIONS- PAST MISTAKES GUIDE FUTURE- ADDITIONALLY, YOUR ARGUMENT THAT LAW CANNOT HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT IS WRONG- POWER DISTRIBUTION PROVES ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 177-178) PHM Ultra-theory relies, in fact, upon a seriously flawed conception of social reality and rests upon several fallacious inferences. We may begin the criticism of it with a point to which I have already alluded, concerning the issue of whether the social past can control the social future. The CLS ultra-theorist correctly believes that the social past can never guarantee the character of the social future. It is never a necessary truth that the social world will continue to turn in the way it has been turning up to now. However, ultra-theorists fallaciously infer from this that the social past cannot control the social future, that social rules cannot constrain and channel human social behavior and thought. This inference is a fallacy because control is always a matter of degree; it may never reach the point of constituting a necessary connection between past and future, but it does not follow that there is no control. 35 CLS ultra-theorists have been led astray here by an ill-conceived reliance on the metaphysical categories of contingency and necessity. They reason that the social future is contingent, that it does not have to be a certain way; in particular, it does not have to be a repetition of the social past. They fallaciously conclude that the social past can exert no control over the social future. Underlying this fallacious inference is the mistaken belief that there can be a relation of control between x and y only if x's prescription that y behave in a certain way necessarily leads to y behaving in that way. Moreover, the ultra-theorist's view that control requires necessary connections contradicts his own view that one individual can control another. Recall that the CLS ultra-theorist denies that social rules have the power to control the behavior and thought of individuals but that he simultaneously affirms that individuals (e.g., slaveowners) can control other individuals (e.g., their slaves). Yet the ultra-theorist argument explaining why rules cannot control individuals also defeats the possibility of individuals controlling other individuals. Nothing makes it impossible for slaves to revolt, for workers to rebel, for the oppressed to rise up. The ultra-theory argument would force one to conclude that masters exert no control over slaves, bosses no control over workers, the oppressors no control over the oppressed. These conclusions are flatly inconsistent with the claims of CLS ultra-theorists,
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in addition to being wholly implausible. The conclusion to draw from the fact that the oppressed can revolt at any time is not that the oppressors do not exert control over them but that the control is not total. And exactly the same conclusion should be drawn about social rules: The fact that such rules can be trashed at any moment does not show that they exert no control, only that the control is not total.
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it does not follow from this admission that critical scholars have made out a case for complete indeterminacy of justification. Some specific legal rules may necessarily follow from a broad social theory; many legal rules may be incompatible with a given theory. [*467] Moreover, indeterminacy of justification does not entail indeterminacy in a set of legal rules. n16 A number of competing theories could be used to justify or critique a wide range of legal doctrines, while the legal doctrines themselves nonetheless would constrain the outcome of particular cases. n17 For example, one could make consequentialist arguments for and against the doctrine of promissory estoppel, while the doctrine
legal rules, much less the precise set of rules we have now. However, itself remained determinate in application. Of course, if (as is often the case) the justification for a rule is used to guide its application, indeterminacy of justification will lead to greater indeterminacy of legal outcomes. n18
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INFLUENCE: From the Worlds of "Others": Minority and Feminist Responses to Critical Legal Studies, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 683)
The decision to pursue a rights strategy may well represent a conscious and critical assessment of the constraints imposed by the conditions of racial subjugation. n36 The denial of this possibility may itself represent a form of false consciousness. n37 As Crenshaw observes: "In the context of white supremacy, engaging in rights discourse should be seen as an act of self-defense." n38 [*695] Richard Delgado suggests that rights can protect minorities from those who, in the absence of legal sanctions, would feel freer to act upon racist impulses . n39 Although certain CLS scholars despair of the vision of atomized individuals that underlies rights language, n40 Delgado states that minorities, who regularly experience the intrusions of oppression, value the distance that rights place between themselves and others . n41 Such distance offers a measure of safety from race-based violence, contempt and abuse. In the sort of informal community that some CLS writers prize, a community operating by fluid and flexible exercises of discretion unbounded by rights and rules , n42 Delgado wonders what structures would protect minorities from racist behavior. n43 For minorities, Delgado indicates, abandoning formality may mean abandoning security, making the informal community a setting of disproportionate vulnerability for people of color. n44 These different attitudes about rights and rule structures are vividly portrayed in a story related by Patricia Williams. In renting an apartment in
dispossessed. n35 New York City, Williams insists on a conventional lease to demonstrate her trustworthiness, while Peter Gabel, her white male colleague, demonstrates his trustworthiness by avoiding a lease and engaging in an informal conversational transaction. n45 Williams rejects the CLS critique of legalism and formality not because it is inaccurate, but because it voices a single perspective that grows from a particular social experience, ignoring the experiences of other social groups. n46 Her conclusion is that we should not abandon rights language for all purposes, but that we should "listen intently to each other," to "bridge the experiential distance" between us, n47 and to "attempt to become multilingual in the semantics of each others' rights-valuation." n48 Robert Williams also ties differential rights-valuation to the social experiences of different social groups. Williams asserts that CLS theory [*696] has underestimated peoples of color when it worries that they have come to believe in the "truth" of rights rather than in the simple instrumental character of attaining rights. n49 From the standpoint of the empowered, Williams observes, rights represent abstract, metaphysical concepts, but
from the standpoint of the subordinated, rights have a more palpable reality: One cannot experience the pervasive, devastating reality of a "right," . . . except in its absence. One must first
be denied that seat on the bus, one must see the desecration of one's tribe's sacred lands, one must be without sanitary facilities in a farm field, to understand that a "right" can be more than a concept. A right can also be a real, tangible experience. . . . What else could a right be other than an abstraction to someone who has never had their abstractions taken away or denied. . . . Arising from the historical experience of peoples of color in United States society "concepts" such as "rights" or "justice" assume a life of their own in an experiential sense. It is in this struggle for the tangible benefits of these "concepts" that peoples of color mobilize themselves to forge their own discourse. Unavoidably and irredeemably derivative in part of the majority society's discursive practices . . . . this type of discourse which finds its genesis in the historical struggles of peoples of color strategically employs those concepts, such as "rights," which speak most directly and forcefully to the prejudices
many people of color reject the CLS critique of rights consciousness in its present form. They view the CLS emphasis on delegitimating legal ideology as a project that relinquishes too much, since appeals to legal ideology represent one of the only strategies that has effectively elicited a response to the desperate needs of subordinated people . Minority scholars
of the dominant culture. n50 Because differences in rights-valuation grow out of their different social experiences, limited array of options, to risk such engagement.
seem to read CLS rights critiques simply as cautionary tales about the dangers of engaging liberal ideology, while they continue to make realistic decisions, given the
Debunking legal ideology may indeed meet the needs of those who experience oppression primarily in terms of feelings of alienation from community. People of color, however, have often chosen another strategy, for regardless of the status of legal consciousness, they have identified racism as an ideology more threatening to their lives
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CLS is Nihilistic
CLS COLLAPSES INTO NIHILISM Johnson 84
[Phillip E., Prof. Law @ Berkeley, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical? 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] The seemingly sophisticated tendency of Critical scholars to see "politics" at the root of every practice is also unsatisfying. Politics deals with the accommodation and adjustment of claims backed by power, and to see nothing but politics in law is to adopt the claim of Thrasymachus that justice is the will of the stronger. n110 That amounts to nihilism, which is a coherent position only if one is prepared to accept the implication that might makes right. It is clear that the Critical scholars do not want to accept that implication, which, after all, would make them very wrong indeed. They want to escape the impasse of nihilism by liberating themselves from an inherited burden of false consciousness that makes hard choices seem inevitable.
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No Alternative (1/2)
CLS HAS NO HARD REFERENCE, PREVENTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE Johnson 84
[Phillip E., Prof. Law @ Berkeley, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical? 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] The second major problem with a purely negative use of Marxism is that criticism itself is meaningless without a standard of reference, whether express or implied. Critical scholars who describe "capitalist" society as oppressive or hierarchical are like New Yorkers who speak of Cleveland as being in the "West." Contemporary capitalist society may be oppressive and hierarchical judged by some ideal standard and yet have less oppression and hierarchy than most or even all other societies that have ever existed. Critical legal writing systematically evades the question, "Compared to what?" My point is not that one always has to propose an alternative [*261] when one criticizes, but rather that failure to specify the standard of reference robs the criticism of meaning. When Critical scholars say that life in a capitalist society is alienating, I do not know if they mean that this is true because of some particular characteristic of capitalist society or because life in every known from of society is alienating. If the latter is the case, then blaming alienation on capitalism is absurd. In a word, the relationship of Critical legal though to Marxism or any other ideological position is obscure. Without a firm ideological basis the Critical viewpoint is itself obscure, and indeed it is not easy to explain how Critical scholarship differes from "liberal" or "traditional" scholarship, except in its greater obscurity. n42 Liberal scholarship itself is strongly Critical, and may even have prepared the way for nihilism by undermining so much that had seemed certain.
THE CRITICAL LEGAL ALTERNATIVE IS SO VAGUE THAT IT JUSTIFIES MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO Johnson 84
[Phillip E., Prof. Law @ Berkeley, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical? 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] There is no mystery about what the Critical legal scholars are against: They are against capitalism, liberalism, and illegitimate hierarchy. It is much harder to say what they are for. In fact, Critical legal writing has practically nothing to suggest in the way of a positive political program. For a movement that claims to be political, this is truly an astonishing vacuum. At the 1981 Yale Symposium on Legal Scholarship, for example, Duncan Kennedy called for "utopian speculation," "dreaming up the ways we think things might be better than they are," because radicals need to ask, " What would we do with power, anyway?" n89 On the same occasion, Alan Freeman chided his colleagues for failing to follow through on the radical implications of their papers. The most he could propose himself, however, was that radicals should escape from liberal thinking by incorporating "insights from other methods: structuralism, phenomenology, advanced Marxist thought, radical empiricism, and comparative methods." n90 Roberto Mangabeira Unger concluded his book Law in Modern Society by observing that the solution to the conflict between personal autonomy and community "could be fully worked out only with the help of a metaphysics we do not yet possess." n91 Whatever may have been their authors' intentions, the political [*282] implications of these messages seem concervative to me. If we not only don't know how to get there from here, but also don't know where "there" is, doesn't it follow that we should stay here until more information comes along?
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No Alternative (2/2)
CLS HAS NO ALTERNATIVE, REPLACING POLITICAL ACTION WITH USELESS DREAMING Johnson 84
[Phillip E., Prof. Law @ Berkeley, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical? 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] The Critical scholars sincerely want to be radicals: Indeed, some of them formed their standards of right and wrong in a counterculture that associated radical politics with goodness itself and identified liberalism with "selling out." They are also aware that the existing legal order is not as securely founded upon reason as some people like to pretend. Unfortunately, they do not have a radical alternative to propose. Their strategy in this awkward situation is to retreat into a mystical utopianism that is couched in political language but in fact has little to do with politics. The "incoherence" of liberalism is their incoherence, its "failure" their failure. Critical legal writing provides a way of sounding like a radical when you don't know how to be one.
THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO LAW- IT IS THE MOST COHERENT WAY TO SETTLE SOCIAL ISSUES ALTMAN 90
(Andrew, Prof of Philosophy @ Georgia State, 1990, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Pg. 119) PHM There are serious problems with this CLS view of the implications of the patchwork thesis. Even if there are incompatible principles that underlie different segments of doctrine, it does not follow that the judge is free to choose which principle to rely on in deciding a case. Recall from the discussion in chapter 2 that our legal culture incorporates a convention that requires that cases be decided in a way that provides the greatest degree of logical coherence with the settled rules and decisions. Suppose that in most cases a decision relying on a particular principle fits better with the settled materials than one relying on a competing principle. The supposition is not inconsistent with the patchwork thesis, but if it is true, then it would be wrong to claim, as Dalton does, that equally forceful legal arguments could be given for both sides in almost any case. The better legal argument would be the one that displays the better fit with the settled decisions and norms, and the law itself would be highly determinate, even if the patchwork thesis were true.
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community might look and be implemented, one must consider carefully the view from the bottomnot simply what oppressors say but how the oppressed respond to what they say. The view from the bottom may offer insights into why individuals accept their subordinate status in society despite the illogic and inconsistency of the dominant ideology.
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. There are powerful forces of self-preservation operating to retard the impact of transformative proposals, and when one adds to those forces a newly emergent skepticism about the wisdom of elites, one can readily imagine a scenario in which Critical legal scholars preach their transformative proposals to audiences wearing headsets.
equalized even with other law professors, let alone with maintenance workers
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY IS INSULATED WITHIN THE ACADEMY, REINSCRIBING CAPITAL Johnson 84
The irony is that
[Phillip E., Prof. Law @ Berkeley, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical? 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] nothing is more vulnerable to a Marxist critique than the CLS movement itself. Most of these scholars are law professors at prestigious universities, predominantly at Harvard and Stanford; such a career implies acceptance by the legal intellectual establishment. From this platform they preach a sort of nihilistic utopianism, a most unconvincing doctrine that in no way threatens the existing order of society. Their visibility at the elite universities lends credibility to the image of neutrality and tolerance that the Ruling Hegemony wishes to project. Their rhetoric reassures law students that the only alternatives to the present system are "utopian." The obvious Marxist explanation of the CLS movement is that it permits a few harmless academic leftists to adopt a radical pose, while receiving good salaries and excellent fringe benefits for serving the interests of the capitalists. n54
YOUR ALTERNATIVE HAS BEEN FRACTURED- CLS IS ONLY COMPREHENSIBLE WITHIN ELITE CIRLCES AND IT IS DEAD NEASCU 00
(Dana, Former Asst. Corporate Counsel, 8 J.L. & Pol'y 415, CLS stands for Critical Legal Studies, if Anyone Remembers, MosE) Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), n1 which started as a Left movement within legal academia, n2 has undergone so many [*416] changes, that one may liken it to products of pop culture, such as the television cartoon show, South Park. n3 South Park features a character named Kenny, totally unlike any other cartoon hero, tragic or otherwise. Like Kenny, who is an outsider and who speaks a language unintelligible to all except, astonishingly, his classmates, CLS no longer seems to possess a voice comprehensible to anyone outside its own small circle. Kenny, unlike all other cartoon figures, dies in every episode. n4 Significantly, often Kenny's death has been self-inflicted - though not necessarily intentional - when, for instance, he ignores warnings of imminent danger. Like Kenny, CLS has suffered many often self-inflicted injuries. Like South Park, generally, CLS is certainly colorful, but often little more than that and, as in the cartoon, except for the
certainty of Kenny's death and later resurrection, there seems more flash than substance in its existence. We are left to guess whether CLS will prove to be as resilient after apparent death, as Kenny
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the strong indeterminacy thesis undercuts, rather than advances, the projects of both internal and external critique. Because the strong indeterminacy thesis calls for disengagement from the form and conventions of discourse that makes legal practice possible, the thesis blunts an internal critique of the law. Stanley Cavell puts the point as follows:
The internal tyranny of convention is that only a slave of it can know how it may be changed for the better, or know why it should be eradicated. Only masters of a game, perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to establish conventions which better serve its essence. This is why deep revolutionary changes can result from attempts to conserve a project, to take it back to its idea, keep it in touch with its history. To demand that the law be fulfilled, every jot and tittle, will destroy the law as it stands, if it has moved too far from its origins. Only a priest could have confronted his set of practices with its origins so deeply as to set the terms of Reformation. n105 Cavell's idea can be put into a legal context by examining the critical legal theory of Roberto Unger. Unger identifies "deviationalist doctrine" as the positive alternative for legal scholarship. The project of deviationalist doctrine must maintain "the minimal characteristics of doctrine" that is "the willingness to take the extant [*499] authoritative materials as starting points." n106 Like the Reformation, Unger's program acknowledges the structure from which it hopes to deviate. The indeterminacy
. If there is a measure of determinacy in the law, and legal discourse and reasoning are more than mere apologies for domination, then Unger's deviationalist doctrine begins with a flawed, but at least functional, language with which to embark on the creation of a more humane legal order. But if the law is indeterminate, and legal reasoning a sham, then they cannot serve as the raw material for constructing a body of doctrine with emancipatory potential -- deviationalist doctrine itself would be incapable of effecting real change. Instead, the social order would remain governed by the underlying ideology or political and economic forces -- and if the forces were to change, then the doctrine would not need to do so. Under the strong indeterminacy thesis, legal doctrine
thesis, however, undercuts the project of deviationalist doctrine at its starting point becomes "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it," and so it "is not part of the mechanism." n107
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Critics are correct in observing that engaging in rights discourse has helped to deradicalize and co-opt the challenge. Yet they fail to acknowledge the limited range of options presented to Blacks in a context where they were deemed "other," and the unlikelihood that specific demands for inclusion and equality would be heard if articulated in other terms . This abbreviated list of options is itself contingent upon the ideological power of white race consciousness and the continuing role of Black Americans as "other." Future efforts to address racial domination, as well as class hierarchy, must consider the continuing ideology of white race consciousness by uncovering the oppositional dynamic and by chipping away at its premises. Central to this task is revealing the contingency of race and exploring the connection between white race consciousness and the other myths that
of racial equality. In the quest for racial justice, winning and losing have been part of the same experience. The legitimate both class and race hierarchies. Critics and others whose agendas include challenging hierarchy and legitimation must not overlook the importance of revealing the contingency of race. Optimally, the deconstruction of white race consciousness might lead to a liberated future for both Blacks and whites. Yet,
until whites recognize the hegemonic function of racism and turn their efforts toward neutralizing it, African-American people must develop pragmatic political strategies -- selfconscious ideological struggle -- to minimize the costs of liberal reform while maximizing its utility. A primary
step in engaging in self-conscious ideological struggle must be to transcend the oppositional dynamic in which Blacks are cast simply and solely as whites' subordinate "other." n200 The dual role that rights have played makes strategizing a difficult task. Black people can afford neither to resign themselves to, nor to attack frontally,
The subordinate position of Blacks in this society makes it unlikely that African-Americans will realize gains through the kind of direct challenge to the legitimacy of American liberal ideology that is now being waged by Critical scholars. On the other hand, delegitimating [*1386] race
the legitimacy and incoherence of the dominant ideology. consciousness would be directly relevant to Black needs, and this strategy will sometimes require the pragmatic use of liberal ideology. This vision is consistent with the views forwarded by theoreticians such as Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Antonio Gramsci, and Roberto Unger. Piven and Cloward observe that oppressed people sometimes advance by creating ideological and political crisis, but that the form of the crisis-producing challenge must reflect the institutional logic of the system. n201 The use of rights rhetoric during the civil rights movement created such a crisis by presenting and manipulating the dominant ideology in a new
Challenges and demands made from outside the institutional logic would have accomplished little because Blacks, as the subordinate "other," were already perceived as being outside the mainstream. The struggle of Blacks, like that of all subordinated groups, is a struggle for inclusion, an attempt to
and transformative way. manipulate elements of the dominant ideology to transform the experience of domination. It is a struggle to create a new status quo through the ideological and political tools that are available. Gramsci called this struggle a "War of Position" and he regarded it as the most appropriate strategy for change in Western societies. According to Gramsci,
direct challenges to the dominant class accomplish little if ideology plays such a central role in establishing authority that the legitimacy of the dominant regime is not challenged. Joseph Femia, interpreting Gramsci, states that "the dominant ideology in modern capitalist societies is highly institutionalized and widely internalized. It follows that a concentration on frontal attack, on direct assault against the bourgeois state ('war of movement' or 'war of manoeuvre') can result only in disappointment and defeat." n202 Consequently, the challenge in such societies is to create a
counter-hegemony by maneuvering within and expanding the dominant ideology to embrace the potential for change. Gramsci's vision of ideological struggle is echoed in part by Roberto Unger in his vision of deviationist doctrine. Unger, who represents another strand of the Critical approach, argues that,
rather than discarding liberal legal ideology, we should focus and develop its visionary undercurrents :
[T]he struggle over the form of social life, through deviationist doctrine, creates opportunities for experimental revisions of social life in the direction of the ideals we defend. An implication of our ideas is [*1387] that the elements of a formative institutional or imaginative structure may be replaced piecemeal rather than only all at
Liberal ideology embraces communal and liberating visions along with the legitimating hegemonic visions. Unger, like Gramsci and Piven and Cloward, seems to suggest that the strategy toward meaningful change depends on skillful use of the liberating potential of dominant ideology .
once. n203
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THE ALTERNATIVE IS REDUCTIONISTIC AND MIRED IN THEORY, PREVENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS AGAINST OPPRESSION Sparer 84
[Ed, Prof. Law and Soc Welfare @ Pennsylvania, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] Gabel is entirely right when he insists on understanding people and social relations in the real, concrete, specific world in which they exist. But surely that part of the concrete world he summarizes with such eloquence is not "the social totality within which the psyche is formed." At least a fair number of people do have experience with a more genuine, personal love. Some people do seek something better in "work" than "mechanical functioning," at least when they are assured of a job to support their existence. People, at least a fair number, are frequently dissatisfied with the "packaged emptiness" on which they spend their wages. n126 I agree with Karl Klare when he writes: "I regard as inaccurate the view that . . . it is possible to describe the working class as in any sense satisfied with current standards of living in either the material or cultural aspects." n127 But if this is so, then it should be possible to struggle now over the conditions which Gabel describes. Nevertheless, neither Gabel's work nor that of most other Critical legal theorists provides theory that can aid such struggle. Indeed, it does not even recognize the need for new directions in scholarship which [*560] would aid such struggle. In the course of constant efforts at delegitimation, some Critical legal theorists begin to think and talk about "the law" as if it were no more than litigation, doctrines, and case outcomes -- precisely the narrow view of most conventional legal theorists. Critical theorists rarely conceive of legal strategies to employ outside the
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courtroom for the purpose of building social movement.Somehow, the affirmative relationship of law to social movement becomes lost. n128
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This silence results because Kennedy and many other Critical scholars agree with the crux of Freeman's formulation. They do not see what else theory can effectively do, and thus they concentrate on the inadequacies of liberal doctrines (broadly defined) and on the ways liberal ideology rationalizes the way things are. n117 But the situation remains unsatisfactory, and I
themselves. n116 But even he has little to say about theory's use in transformative social struggle in the world outside the law schools. cannot help but believe that some of the same Critical legal scholars who justify the divorce of theory from the world of social struggle know this. They know this even when they seek to evade it.
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A2 Reification: 2AC
REIFICIATION ISNT INTRINSICALLY BAD ITS A NECESSARY TOOL TO PREVENT FUTURE DOMINATION Sparer 84
[Ed, Prof. Law and Soc Welfare @ Pennsylvania, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January, ln//uwyo-ajl] But is it bad to "reify"? In Marxist thinking, to reify a concept such as a right is to invest it with qualities over and above those of the particular human beings who created or use it. It is as if the right had a life of its own. It exists independently of the particular social setting from which it came and continues regardless of the conscious choices of the people in a later setting. Reification, as a general proposition, can have serious and negative consequences but not all "reifying" is necessarily bad. It is true that when we characterize a certain legal right as "universal" or "inalienable," we are reifying it. But this may have a legitimate purpose. For example, we may fear that some group may in the future dominate our society and attempt to stifle all dissent. We should protect as best we can against such an event by today acknowledging that dissent is a human value that needs protection. In so doing, we reify the legal right to dissent in order to protect the human right of self-expression and free conscience. We should do the same with certain rights of working people. In spite of the difficulties of drawing a "coherent" line as to what is "inalienable" and what is not, concern for the human values of free conscience and mutual association, coupled with a deduction from history about what happens in the absence of such legal rights, justifies such an effort. n42
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p. 89-90
Within the context of antifeminist backlash, the effect of gynocentric feminism may be accommodating to the existing structure. Gynocentric feminism relies on and reinforces gender stereotypes at just the time when the dominant culture has put new emphasis on marks of gender difference. It does so, moreover, by relying on many of those aspects of women's traditional sphere that traditional patriarchal ideology has most exploited and that humanist feminists such as Beauvoir found most oppressive--reproductive biology, motherhood, s domestic concerns. Even though its intentions are subversive, such renewed attention to traditional femininity can have a reactionary effect on both ourselves and our listeners because it may echo the dominant claim that women belong in a separate sphere. Humanist feminism calls upon patriarchal society to open places for women within those spheres of human activity that have been considered the most creative, powerful, and prestigious. Gynocentric feminism replies that wanting such things for women implies a recognition that such activities are the most humanly valuable. It argues that in fact, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy, competition for recognition, and the instrumentalization of nature and people entailed by these activities are basic disvalues.24 Yet in contemporary society, men still have most institutionalized power, and gynocentric feminism shows why they do not use it well. If feminism turns its back on the centers of power, privilege, and individual achievement that men have monopolized, those men will continue to monopolize them, and nothing significant will change. Feminists cannot undermine masculinist values without entering some of the centers of power that foster them, but the attainment of such power itself requires at least appearing to foster those values. Still, without being willing to risk such co-optation, feminism can be only a moral position of critique rather than a force for institutional change. Despite its intention, I fear that gynocentric feminism may have the same consequence as the stance of moral motherhood that grew out of nineteenth century feminism a resegregation of women to a specifically women's sphere, outside the sites of power, privilege, and recognition. For me the symptom here is what the dominant culture finds more threatening. Within the dominant culture a middle-aged assertive woman's claim to coanchor the news alongside a man appears considerably more threatening than women's claim to have a different voice that exposes masculinist values as body-denying and selfish. The claim of women to have a right to the positions and benefits that have hitherto been reserved for men, and that male dominated institutions should serve women's needs, is a direct threat to male privilege. While the claim that these positions of power themselves should be eliminated and the institutions eliminated or restructured is indeed more radical, when asserted from the gynocentric feminist position it can be an objective retreat. Gynocentrisms focus on values and language as the primary target of its critique contributes to this blunting of its political force. Without doubt, social change requires changing the subject, which in turn means developing new ways of speaking, writing, and imagining. Equally indubitable is the gynocentric feminist claim that masculinist values in Western culture deny the body, sensuality, and rootedness in nature and that such denial nurtures fascism, pollution, and nuclear games. Given these facts, however, what shall we do? To this gynocentrism has little concrete answer. Because its criticism of existing society is so global and abstract, gynocentric critique of values, language, and culture of masculinism can remove feminist theory from analysis of specific institutions and practices, and how they might be concretely structurally changed in directions more consonant with our visions.
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[*380] The philosopher Elizabeth Grosz has pointed out that feminist theorizing typically requires an unarticulated balance between two goals. Feminist analysis is at once a reaction to the "overwhelming masculinity of privileged and historically dominant knowledges, acting as a kind of counterweight to the imbalances resulting from the male monopoly of the production and reception of knowledges" and a response to the political goals of feminist struggles. n2 The dual commitments of feminist methods are in complex and uneasy coexistence. The first demands "intellectual rigor," investigating the hidden gender of the traditional canon. The second requires dedication to political change. The tension between the two leads to criticism of feminist theorists both from the masculine academy for lack of disinterested scholarship and objective analysis and from feminist activists for co-option by patriarchal forces through participation in male-structured debates. n3 Feminist methodologies challenge many accepted scholarly traditions. For example, they may clearly reflect a political agenda rather than strive to attain an objective truth on a neutral basis and they may appear personal rather than detached. For this reason, feminist methodologies are regularly seen as unscholarly, disruptive or mad. They are the techniques of outsiders and strangers. Just as nineteenth-century women writers used madness to symbolize escape from limited and enclosed lives, n4 so twentieth-century feminist scholars have developed dissonant methods to shake the complacent and bounded disciplines in which they work. At the same time, most feminists are constrained by their environment. If we want to achieve change, we must learn and use the language and methods of the dominant order.
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There are difficulties, in attempting to use Critical themes and ideas to understand the civil rights movement and to describe what alternatives the civil rights constituency could have pursued, or might now pursue. While Critical
The Critics offer an analysis that is useful in understanding the limited transformative potential of antidiscrimination rhetoric. however, scholars claim that their project is concerned with domination, few have made more than a token effort to address racial domination specifically, and their work does not seem grounded in the reality of the racially oppressed. This deficiency is especially apparent in critiques that relate to racial issues. Critical scholars have criticized mainstream legal ideology for its tendency to portray American society as basically fair, and thereby to legitimate the oppressive policies that have been directed toward racial minorities. Yet Critical scholars do not sufficiently account for the effects or the causes of the oppression that they routinely acknowledge. The result is that Critical literature exhibits the same proclivities of mainstream scholarship -- it seldom speaks to or about Black people. The failure of the Critics to incorporate
this failure leads to an inability to appreciate fully the transformative significance of the civil rights movement in mobilizing Black Americans and generating new demands. Further, the failure to consider the reality of those most
racism into their analysis also renders their critique of rights and their overall analysis of law in America incomplete. Specifically, oppressed by American institutions means that the Critical account of the hegemonic nature of legal thought overlooks a crucial dimension of American life -- the ideological role of racism itself. Gordon, Freeman, Tushnet, and Gabel fail to analyze racism as an ideological pillar upholding American society, or as the principal basis for Black oppression. The Critics' failure to analyze the hegemonic role of racism also renders their prescriptive analysis unrealistic. In the spirit of Alan
if trashing is the only path that might lead to a liberated future, Black people are unlikely to make it to the Critics' promised land . n97 The Critics' commitment to trashing is premised on a notion that people are mystified by
Freeman's declaration, Critics often appear to view the trashing of legal ideology "as the only path that might lead to a liberated future." n96 Yet [*1357] liberal legal ideology and consequently cannot remake their world until they see how contingent such ideology is. The Critics' principal error is that their version of domination by consent does not present a realistic picture of racial domination. Coercion explains much more about racial domination than does ideologically induced consent. n98 Black people do not create their oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created and maintained by others. Moreover, the ideological source of this coercion is not liberal legal consciousness, but racism. If racism is just as important as, if not more important than, liberal legal ideology in explaining the persistence of white supremacy, then the Critics' single-minded effort to deconstruct liberal legal ideology will be futile. Finally, in
Critics also disregard the transformative potential that liberalism offers. Although liberal legal ideology may indeed function to mystify, it remains receptive to some aspirations that are central to Black demands, and may also perform an important function in combating the experience of being excluded and oppressed. n99 This receptivity to Black aspirations is crucial given the hostile social world that racism creates. The most troubling aspect of the Critical program, therefore, is that "trashing" rights consciousness may have the unintended consequence of disempowering the racially oppressed while leaving white supremacy basically [*1358] untouched. These difficulties are discussed below as they relate to the critiques of Gordon, Freeman, and Tushnet. I. Gordon: The Underemphasis on
addition to exaggerating the role of liberal legal consciousness and underestimating that of coercion,
Coercion. -- Robert Gordon's explanation of ideological domination illustrates how an exclusive focus on consent leaves gaping holes in his reader's understanding of hegemony. Gordon writes that beliefs are "the main constraints upon making social life more bearable." n100 Yet how can others understand the fact that Black people, although unable to bring about a world in which they fully participate, can imagine such a world? Clearly, something other than their own structure of thought prevents Blacks from changing their world. This fact suggests that a more complete explanation of domination requires that coercion and consent be considered together.
The coercive power of the state operates to suppress some groups , particularly when there is consensus Racism serves to single out Blacks as one of these groups "worthy" of suppression. n101 Gordon, however, does not offer any way to understand this. If his exclusive focus on ideological domination is to be
among others that such coercion is warranted. taken literally, one is left believing that Black Americans are unable to change their world because they accept the dominant ideology and thus cannot imagine an alternative existence. Yet to say that the beliefs of Black Americans have boxed them into a subordinate existence because of what they believe is to ignore the history of coercive racial subordination. Indeed, it would be difficult for Blacks, given the contradiction between American fiction and Black American reality, to believe as much of the American mythology as whites do. n102
The most significant aspect of Black oppression seems to be what is believed about Black Americans, not what Black Americans believe. Black people are boxed in largely because there is a consensus among many whites that the oppression of Blacks is legitimate. This is where consensus and coercion can be understood together: ideology convinces one group that the coercive domination of another is legitimate. It matters little whether the coerced group rejects the dominant ideology [*1359] and can offer a competing conception of the world; if they have been labeled "other" by the dominant ideology, they are not heard. n103 Blacks seem to carry the stigma of "otherness," which effectively precludes their potentially radicalizing influence from penetrating the dominant consciousness. n104 If this is the case, then Blacks will gain little through simply transcending their own belief structures. The challenge for Blacks may be to pursue strategies that confront the beliefs held about them by whites. For Blacks, such strategies may take the form of reinforcing some aspects of the dominant ideology in attempts to become participants in the dominant discourse rather than outsiders defined ,
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by that discourse. In this sense, the civil rights movement might be considered as an attempt to deconstruct the image of "the Negro" in the white mind. By forcing the political system to respond to Black demands, Blacks rejected images of complacency and docility that had been invoked by some whites to dismiss Black demands . n105
objectified, and reified
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CRT's commitment to the liberation of people of color - and the project of critical social science (generally) and normative legal scholarship (in particular) as a way to further that liberation - suggest a faith in certain concepts and institutions that postmodernists lack. When race-crits tell modernist stories, they assume that "people of color" describes a coherent category with at least some shared values and interests. They assume that the idea of "liberation" is meaningful - that racism is something that can one day somehow cease to exist, or cease to exert any power over us. Modernist narratives assume a "real" reality out there, and that reason can bring us face to face with it. And modernist narratives have faith that once
enough people see the truth, right action will follow: that enlightenment leads to empowerment, and that empowerment leads to emancipation. Modernist narratives, then, are profoundly hopeful. They assume that
people of color and whites live in the same perceptual and moral world, that reason speaks to us all in the same way despite our different experiences, and that reason, rather than habit or power, is what will motivate people. Modernist narratives also can be profoundly romantic. They imagine
heroic action by a formerly oppressed people rising up as one, "empowered" to be who they "really" are or choose to be, breathing the thin and bracing air of freedom. This optimism and romanticism, though easy to caricature, cannot be easily dismissed. As Patricia Williams and Mari Matsuda have pointed out,
faith in reason and truth and belief in the essential freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to survive and resist subordination. n63 Political modernism, more generally, has been a powerful force in the lives of subjugated peoples; as a practical matter, politically liberal societies are [*754] vastly preferable to the alternatives. n64 A faith in reason has sustained efforts to educate people into critical thinking and to engage in debate rather than violence. n65 The passionate and constructive energy of modernist narratives of emancipation is also grounded in a moral faith: that human beings are created
equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights; that oppression is wrong and resistance to oppression right; that opposing subjugation in the name of liberty, equality, and true community is the obligation of every rational person. In its modernist moments,
SIXTH, THIS ISNT OFFENSE THE FACT THAT WE CANT SOLVE EVERY PROBLEM DOESNT MEAN WE SHOULDNT DO SOMETHING SEVENTH, DE-POLITICIZATION OF LAW FAILS- MEANS A SEPERATION OF LAW AND POLITICS THAT CREATS A STRUGGLE FOR STATE POWER- THIS MAKES THE ALT POWER-DRIVEN AS OPPOSED TO DRIVEN FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS ALFIERI ET AL 98
(Anthony, Law Prof and Director @ U Miami Law, Spring, BOOK REVIEW: Black And WhiteCritical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, La Raza Law Journal, l/n, MosE) At bottom, the conflicts within CRT and the attacks upon it emanate from CRT's own growing antipathy toward the traditional civil rights discourse that animates liberal race reform. To Critical Race theorists, liberal faith in a court-driven, technocratic eradication of racial bias is misplaced. n33 Faith in the rationality of progressive law reform, they argue, rests on principles of neutrality, objectivity, and value-free reasoning. Obtaining a set of nonideological, regulative principles, however, requires a depoliticization of the legal process. Depoliticization, in turn, compels the separation of law and politics. When
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pushed outside the domain of liberal theory, CLS teaches, the conceptual separation of law and politics collapses in the raw, delegitimating competition for state power. n34 Because of this material inseparability, the depoliticization of law and the liberal state fails. In this way, the CRT politics of race represents a complex variant of the CLS politics of law: powerdriven, instrumental, and value-laden.
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Because he appreciated the dialectic of theory and the broad-based confrontational strategies of socially transformative action, King stands as the paradigmatic organic intellectual of twentieth-century
American life. King's method and practice offer direction to progressive scholars concerned about the exclusionary, repressive, and non-communal dimensions of American life. [*1013] Gramsci's conception of the organic intellectual provides a useful framework for understanding the thought of King and what it has to offer CLS. The organic intellectual brings philosophy to the masses, not for the merely instrumental purposes of unifying them, "but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc
Gramsci's organic intellectual struggles to transform those who are oppressed as a means of transforming the conditions under which they are oppressed. n79 Gramsci understands domination in terms of both coercion and consent, the latter
which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups." n78 constituting what he refers to as hegemony. Under his formulation, hegemony consists, then, of "[t]he 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group." n80 Gramsci argues that "this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production." n81 Thus, oppression is not only physical and psychological but also cultural. n82
King, like Gramsci's organic intellectual, empowered his community through a practical effort to bridge the gap between theory and lived experience. King's work consisted of four interrelated activities. First, he used theoretical deconstruction to free the mind to envision alternative conceptions of community. Second, he employed experiential deconstruction to understand the liberating dimensions of legitimating ideologies like liberalism and Christianity, dimensions easily ignored by the abstract, ahistorical, and potentially misleading critiques that rely exclusively on theoretical deconstruction. Third, he used the insights gleaned from the first two activities to postulate an [*1014] alternative social vision intended to transform the conditions of oppression under which people struggle. Drawing from the best of liberalism and the best of Christianity, King forged a vision of community that transcended the limitations of each and built upon the accomplishments of both. Finally, he created and implemented strategies to mobilize people to secure that alternative vision. I refer to this multidimensional critical activity as "philosophical praxis."
Although many critical theorists engage primarily in theoretical deconstruction, and some appreciate certain forms of experiential deconstruction, n83 few have
reconstructive theorizing and socially transformative struggle. n84 These dimensions of critical activity directly confront the material conditions of oppression whereas the preoccupation with deconstructing theory does not. King went further than these critical theorists by examining the subtle and complex ways in which consent was shaped, while fully appreciating the role of state and private coercion in legitimating authority in the lives of the oppressed. This Part examines how King filtered his theoretical deconstruction of hegemonic theologies through his knowledge of the history and experience of oppression, and thereby made that theoretical deconstruction richer, more contextual, and ready to engage the existential realities of oppression. The interplay between King's theoretical and experiential deconstruction is best illustrated by reference to the African-American Church -- the
embraced either a full experiential deconstruction or the third and fourth dimensions of philosophical praxis -institution providing the organic link between philosophy and the masses, theory and praxis. n85 My analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I examine how African-American religion served at once to legitimate slave society, delegitimize that society, and inform alternative visions of community. Second, I examine King's use of theoretical deconstruction and illustrate its dependence on the historic mission of the AfricanAmerican Church. Like a true organic intellectual engaged in a philosophical praxis, King used theoretical deconstruction to illustrate the possibilities [*1015] of his reconstructive vision and the centrality of social struggle in realizing that vision. Third, I discuss King's experiential deconstruction, his unwillingness to be distracted
the combination of theoretical and experiential deconstruction results in a more contextual framework -- one more appreciative of the conditions of choice within which authority is legitimated and challenged through reconstructive vision and struggle.
by the reified abstractions of theoretical deconstruction. Finally, I show how
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#5 Perm: 1AR
WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM ALLOWS US TO TAKE IT DOWN- EDUCATION IS PROOF THAT WE CAN EFFECTIVELY FIGHT RACISM LADSON-BILLINGS 99
(Gloria, Prof @ U Wisconsin-Madison, Race isRace isnt, Pg. 23) PHM Examples of pedagogical countermoves are found in the work of both Chicago elementary teacher Marva Collins and Los Angeles high school mathematics teacher Jaime Escalante. Although neither Collins nor Escalante is acclaimed as a "progressive" teacher, both are recognized for their persistence in believing in the educability of all students. Both remind students that mainstream society expects them to be failures, and prod them to succeed as a form of counterinsurgency. Their insistence on helping students achieve in the "traditional" curriculum represents a twist on Audre Lorde's notion that one cannot dismantle the master's house with the master's tools. Instead, they believe one can only dismantle the master's house with the master's tools.
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peace deals with symptoms of underlying problems -"putting out fires" -- while positive peace deals with the underlying, "combustible" problems themselves. Why doesn't traditional diplomacy deal with positive peace? One reason is that diplomats are trained in dispute
settlement -- reaching agreements about how to establish negative peace -- without, good intentions to the contrary, necessarily addressing the underlying problems that gave rise to the disputes that are being settled. Hence, negotiations to end wars or to control or reduce armaments, resulting in treaties or other agreements, are efforts to halt or manage actual or threatened violence resulting from conflicts without necessarily dealing with their underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions. [CONTINUES] The stage has been set for this: NATO, under U.S. leadership, established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994, to reach out to, and collaborate with, its former Warsaw Pact adversaries. These developments are a powerful sign that the Cold War is over and therefore, by implication, that nations are undergoing a shift from a narrow world view based on national security to a comprehensive one based on common security. Hence, the United States and its security partners are conceptually able to move beyond negative into positive peace. What this will entail in Bosnia is for the United States and its NATO and other partners to remain there long enough to ensure that negative peace holds. At the same time, they should work with international governmental and nongovernmental (including conflict
With secure negative peace as a point of departure, positive peace in Bosnia begins with the reconstruction of
resolution) organizations, and with the conflicting parties, to pursue, achieve, and maintain positive peace. the country. But lest the United States and its partners repeat the failure of the European Union to achieve positive peace in the Bosnian city of Mostar through substantial investments in rebuilding Mostar's infrastructure, this reconstruction must reflect a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy -- reconciliative as well as physical -- over a period of time. Some frameworks that could be useful in guiding U.S.led activities in this regard are: the "contingency model" of Ron Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, which matches an intervention with the intensity of a given conflict, and then follows up with other interventions designed to move the parties toward positive peace; the "multitrack framework" of IMTD's Ambassador John McDonald and Louise Diamond, which combines the resources of nongovernmental conflict resolution practitioners with those of the business and religious communities, media, funders, and others as well as governmental actors, in the pursuit of positive peace; and my own design for a "new European peace and security system" which combines elements of these and other frameworks within the context of the OSCE. There is a working hypothesis implicit in all this: by
expanding their options to include cooperative processes geared to positive peace as well as competitive processes associated with negative peace, the United States and its partners will enhance their prospects for success in dealing with the deep-rooted intrastate ethnic and other conflicts that seem to be the dominant form of warfare in the post-Cold War world. Intervening in such conflicts may mean "taking casualties," particularly in cases where one party is attempting to impose a genocidal "final solution" on another, as in Rwanda or Bosnia. In such situations, the use of an appropriate amount of force to achieve negative peace may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of positive peace. We should not, in such cases, allow the U.S. experience in Somalia to prevent us from acting. Genocide in Rwanda or Bosnia does, sooner or later, affect the
interests of the United States and others. The use of such extreme violence to "resolve" conflicts anywhere in the world is not only morally reprehensible, but constitutes a model for others to emulate, perhaps increasing the costs of dealing with it later on. The
implicit emphasis here on early warning and early action is part of the gist of conflict resolution: being proactive instead of reactive. A proactive approach to problem solving worldwide is in the U.S. national interest.
This means, among other things, pursuing a bipartisan U.S. foreign policy to avoid the necessity of having to issue unrealistic timelines in any future deployment of forces, plus paying the massive U.S. debt to the United Nations so that the United States can more credibly and effectively lead in the debate over U.N. reform as well as in efforts to craft effective international responses to problems worldwide.
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Absolutism Bad
ABSOLUTIST REJECTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY UNPRODUCTIVE WE MUST EMBRACE THE DIFFERENCES IN PEACE THEORY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS Folk, Prof of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 78 (Jerry,
The conflicting positions held by various researchers, educators, and activists in the peace studies field can be seen as complementary rather than contradictory. Tensions, disagreements, and arguments of considerable intensity are unavoidable and indeed desirable in this as in other fields of endeavor. Such dialectical tensions ensure a depth and breadth of perception which one position alone could not produce. Truth is often paradoxical, and therefore a dialectical approach to it is most appropriate. Antagonisms insure that the dialectic is kept alive. They introduce a third dimension into one's understanding of truth and preserve it from petrification and sterility. Therefore, premature closures, mutual excommunications, and fixations on a particular but incomplete position or approach should be avoided. On the other hand, there may indeed be some fringe groups or persons in the field who, by the ultimate and legalistic commitment to a particular approach or ideology and the absolute rejection of any other ideas or approaches, call their legitimacy as peace researchers, educators or activists into question. An absolutistic commitment to the status quo would be one example. Absolutistic and rigid commitments to the capitalist, Marxist or liberal democratic systems might be another. Rigid and fanatic loyalty to a particular revolutionary or reformist tradition or to the reformist or revolutionary tradition itself would be a third. None of the approaches or positions with regard to peace studies which this paper discusses, however, are identical with any of these ideological orientations. Moreover, it is time particularly in the peace studies field, that the ultimate value commitments of individuals and groups be given more weight than their politics and philosophical preferences. The preference of one individual or group for Marxist socialism might be based on precisely the same value commitments which have led another to prefer liberal democracy. In summary, a well-balanced peace studies program ought to involve researchers, educator and activists. At all three levels, it ought to include some participants who approach the field primarily from the standpoint of negative peace and others who approach it using primarily the positive peace paradigm. Among the latter group some should be highly sympathetic to the radical revolutionary tradition and others more in sympathy with the reformist approach of liberal democracy. Moreover, through the structure and interactions of the program not only the tension and conflicts but also the positive interrelationships between these various groups ought to become visible. A program structured according to such principles would admittedly be difficult to construct and even more difficult to administer. It would, however, be more that merely comprehensive. It would be a microcosm of the world and therefore a laboratory in which to experiment with the actual building of creative peace among groups and individuals of the most divergent persuasions. Peace Educations Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach, Peace & Change, Vol. V, No. 1, Spring, P. 59)
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"the field where experience occurs, where my life and the lives of others arise and take place." n41 He believes that pragmatism commits us to treating all places where
, people are encouraged to "restructure our social institutions" so that the public is afforded "a real voice in determining the kinds of environments we inhabit." n43 Like Parker, Sandra B. Rosenthal and Rogene A. Buckholz also emphasize the organic unity of the individual embedded in his or her environment. n44 To them, human beings are biological creatures, part of, and continuous with, nature. n45 In light of this, the philosophical argument over anthropocentrism is meaningless since no real line may be drawn between human and environmental well-being. n46 Rosenthal and Buckholz see the "systematic focus" of
pragmatism as being on "science as method, or as lived through human activity, on what the scientist does to gain knowledge." n47 Humans exist in the world as active experimenters who create knowledge and formulate ethical values by integrating "potentially conflicting values and viewpoints." n48 Another leading environmental pragmatist, Bryan G. Norton, also advocates a pluralistic approach. n49 In Norton's opinion: The goal of seeking a unified, monistic theory of environmental ethics represents a misguided mission, a mission that was formulated under a set of epistemological
The search for a "Holy Grail" of unified theory in environmental [*8] values has not progressed towards any consensus regarding what inherent value in nature is, what objects have it, or what it means to have such a value. n50
and moral assumptions that harks back to Descartes and Newton. . . . Norton's expressed preference is for the integration of multiple values on three "scales" of human concern and valuation: (1) locally developed values that reflect the preferences of individuals; (2) community values that protect and contribute to human and ecological communities; and (3) global values, which express a hope for the long-term survival of our species. n51 As Norton views it: A good environmental policy will be one that has positive implications for values associated with the various scales on which humans are in fact concerned, and also on the scales on which environmentalists think we should be concerned if we accept responsibility for the impacts of our current activities on the life prospects and options--the "freedom" of future generations. n52
One particularly provocative aspect of environmental pragmatic thought is its desire for compatibilism, i.e., a philosophical framework within which competing environmental theories may be compatible in practice. n53 Andrew Light is an advocate for this view. n54 Light contrasts the views of social ecologists
and materialists, such as Murray Bookchin and Herbert Marcuse, n55 who view environmental degradation as presupposed by a capitalist economy, and ontologists, including "deep ecologists" like Arne Naess, n56 whose focus is on reform of the self, and one's relationship with the non-human world, as expressed in individual identity. n57 To harmonize these mutually antagonistic schools of environmental thought, Light proposes a pragmatic "principle of tolerance." n58 [*9] Under it, theorists and practitioners are required to communicate a "straightforward public position" that endorses the considerations on which they agree, and the practices best suited to meeting their mutually desired goals, while leaving some questions that divide them to private dispute. n59
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THE PROBLEM OF SHALLOW ECOLOGY ISNT ANTHROPOCENTRISM, BUT A SHORT-TERM FOCUS SHOULD COMBINE QUALIFIED ANTHROPOCENTRISM WITH BROADER CONCERN FOR THE HUMAN WORLD OVERCOMES THIS Grey 93
[William, Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Australia, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, no 4, 1993, www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, acc 9-30-04//uwyo-ajl] That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this parochialism, we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston 1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive. We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called "shallow" views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion.
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. A second worry focuses on the way that we tend to treat humans and human activity in isolation from, rather than as a part of nature. This is often characterized as an atomistic
tropical rain forest or a coral reef. "Nature knows best", it is said conception of humans as discrete and separate interacting units, in contrast to the holistic organic conception of organisms as nodes in complex biotic webs. The sharp separation between humanity and nature is said to be one of the characteristic deficiencies of shallow thought, which is often accompanied by the denial that the nonhuman world possesses intrinsic value. A third common worry concerns the extremely short-term view which people commonly take about the consequences of their actions. <466>
There is an obvious tension which arises when attempting to rectify the first two worries at the same time. For extolling the virtues of the natural, while at the same time vilifying the man-made or artificial, depends on a distinction between the natural and the artificial which the stress on a continuity between human and nonhuman (the focus of the second worry) undermines. On the one side there is emphasis on continuity and dependency, and on the other on
distinctness and separation. It seems that, while we are a part of nature, our actions are nevertheless unnatural. This is one of the points where
deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systemsthat is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from the natural worldmeans that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world. If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world.
ANTHROPOCENTRISM IS NOT ONLY INEVITABLE, BUT NECESSARY TO STOP THE COMING GREAT AGE OF EXTINCTION Grey 93
[William, Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Australia, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, no 4, 1993, www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, acc 9-30-04//uwyo-ajl]
If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates of deep ecology are expressed as concerns about the fate of the planet, then these concerns are misplaced.
From a planetary perspective, we may be entering a phase of mass extinction of the magnitude of the Cretaceous. For planet earth that is just another incident in a four and a half billion year saga. Life will go onin some guise or other. The arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost certainly be around for a few billion years more. And with luck and good management, some of the more complex and interesting creatures, such as ourselves, may continue for a while longer as well. Of course our present disruptive and destructive activities are, or should be, of great concern to us all. But that is a quite properly human concern, expressing anthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspective. Life will continue; but we should take steps to maintain and preserve our sort of living planet; one that suits us and, with a few exceptions, our biotic co-existents. I will illustrate the way that allegedly non-anthropocentric points of view incorporate a covert anthropocentrism with some representative examples which, I believe, reveal the inevitability of
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anthropocentrism and show that it is not necessarily something to be deplored. Anthropocentrism is natural and inevitable, and when properly qualified turns out to be perfectly benign. The first illustration concerns a proposal to develop a non-anthropocentric basis for value by grounding it in
the naturalness of an historical process.
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a far graver problem with deep ecology lies in its appeal to those who might translate a nature-centered ideology into coercive political action. By promoting the idea that nature has intrinsic value, deep ecologists necessarily promote an antihuman, antitechnology, and antimodern worldview, Ferry believes. If we assert that humans are merely "part" of the natural order, our
According to Ferry, position in that order must be a humble one: The entire Cosmos may well be assigned a positive coefficient higher than that of humankind itself, since in the hierarchy of beings it constitutes the primary condition: nature can do without men, but not vice versa, which is why the idea of a "preference for nature" finds itself gradually legitimized as all in all the most logical metaphysical horizon of deep ecology. n105
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NAZI GERMANY JUSTIFIED IMPERIALIST EXPANSION INTO EASTERN EUROPE ECOLOGICALLYPROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE PEOPLE WHO WERE POLLUTING IT STAUDENMAIER IN 98
(Peter, anarchy theorist, Professor for the Institute for Social Ecology, Fascist Ecology: The "Green Wing" of the Nazi Party and its Historical Antecedents, February 1998, http://www.spunk.org/library/places/germany/sp001630/peter.html)
Darr was one of the party's chief "race theorists" and was also instrumental in galvanizing peasant support for the Nazis during the critical period of the early 1930s. From 1933 until 1942 he held the posts of Reich Peasant Leader and Minister of
Agriculture. This was no minor fiefdom; the agriculture ministry had the fourth largest budget of all the myriad Nazi ministries even well into the war.38 From this position Darr
was able to lend vital support to various ecologically oriented initiatives. He played an essential part in unifying the nebulous proto-environmentalist tendencies in National Socialism: It was Darr who gave the ill-defined anti-civilization, antiliberal, anti-modern and latent anti-urban sentiments of the Nazi elite a foundation in the agrarian mystique. And it seems as if Darr had an immense influence on the
ideology of National Socialism, as if he was able to articulate significantly more clearly than before the values system of an agrarian society contained in Nazi ideology and -- above all -to legitimate this agrarian model and give Nazi policy a goal that was clearly oriented toward a far-reaching re-agrarianization.39 This goal was not only quite consonant with
imperialist expansion in the name of Lebensraum, it was in fact one of its primary justifications, even motivations. In language replete with the biologistic metaphors of organicism, Darr declared: "The concept of Blood and Soil gives us the moral right to take back as much land in the East as is necessary to establish a harmony between the body of our Volk and the geopolitical space."40 Aside from providing green camouflage for the colonization of Eastern Europe, Darr worked to install
environmentally sensitive principles as the very basis of the Third Reich's agricultural policy. Even in its most productivist phases, these precepts remained emblematic of Nazi doctrine. When the "Battle for Production" (a scheme to boost the productivity of the agricultural sector) was proclaimed at the second Reich Farmers Congress in 1934, the very first point in
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the program read "Keep the soil healthy !" But Darr's most important innovation was the introduction on a large scale of organic farming methods, significantly labeled "lebensgesetzliche Landbauweise," or farming according to the laws of life. The term points up yet again the natural order ideology which underlies so much reactionary ecological thought. The impetus for these unprecedented measures came from Rudolf Steiner's anthroposophy and its techniques of biodynamic cultivation.41
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is the endangered Houston toad, an animal with no demonstrated or conjectural resource value to man. n113 He observes that due to the dominant worldview, species and communities that lack economic value are not easily protected. Thus, a "value" must be discovered by which the non-resource can metamorphose into a resource. n114 He notes the practical political weakness of concocting a "value" for a non-resource; this kind of value is not as appealing as those backed by the promise of a short-term economic gain. He notes that "when everything is called a resource, the word loses all meaning - at least in our value system." n115 From a conservation viewpoint, it may become quite risky to find economic values for nonresources.
conventional resources. His example of a non-resource
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Asteroid Turn
ANTHROPOCENTRISM IS NECESSARY TO STOP NATURAL PHENOMENA LIKE ASTEROID COLLISIONS AND ICE AGES, WHICH THREATEN MASS EXTINCTION ON A SCALE MUCH MORE THREATENING TO THE BIOSPHERE AND BIODIVERSITY THAN HUMAN ACTIVITY EMPIRICALLY PROVEN BY THE GREAT EXTINCTIONS OF THE PAST Grey 93
[William, Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Australia, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, no 4, 1993,
www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, acc 9-30-04//uwyo-ajl]
Robert Goodin has proposed a "moderately deep" theory of value, according to which what imparts value to an outcome is the naturalness of the historical process through which it has come about (Goodin 1991, p. 74). Putting aside the problem, mentioned above, that the distinction between what is natural and what is cultural (or technological, or artefactual) is problematic,
the deliverances of natural historical processes are not necessarily benign, nor ones which should command our approval. The traumatic disruptions to the planet brought about by natural forces far exceed anything which we have been able to effect. Consider, first, what Lovelock (1979) has called the worst atmospheric pollution incident ever: the accumulation of that toxic and corrosive gas oxygen some two billion years ago, with devastating consequences for the then predominant anaerobic life forms. Or the Cretaceous extinction 65 million years ago, which wiped out the large reptiles, the then dominant life forms. Or the Permian extinction some 225 million years ago, which eliminated an estimated 96 per cent of marine species. Like the eruption of Mt St Helens, these were
natural events, but it is implausible to suppose that they are to be valued for that reason alone. There is of course an excellent reason for us to retrospectively evaluate these great planetary disruptions positively from our current position in planetary history, and that is that we can recognise their occurrence as a necessary condition for our own existence. But what could be more anthropocentric than that? However, as Gould has pointed out,
mass extinctions are awful for those who are caught up in them. Suppose that astronomers detect a modest asteroid or comet, say five or ten kilometres diameter, on collision course with planet Earth [8]. The impending collision would be perfectly natural all right, and cataclysmic enough to do to us what another one rather like it probably did to the dinosaurs. Such periodic disruptive events are natural all right, though they probably destroy most of
the then extant large life forms. These times of renewal provide opportunities for smaller, flexible organisms to radiate opportunistically into vacated niches, and life goes on. From a biocentric or ecocentric perspective there is little doubt that our demise would provide comparable opportunities for
Should we, in <470>such circumstances, step aside so that evolution can continue on its majestic course? I think not, and I think further that interference with the natural course of events, if it could be effected, would be no bad thingat least from our point of view and in
development which we currently prevent. terms of our interests, which it is quite legitimate to promote and favour.
Suppose again that we are entering one of the periodic epochs of reduced solar energy flux. An ice age is imminent, with massive disruptions to the agriculturally productive temperate zones. However suppose further that by carefully controlled emissions of greenhouse gases it would be possible to maintain a stable and productive agriculture. No doubt this would be to the detriment of various arctic plant and animal species, but I do not think that such interference,
though "unnatural" would be therefore deplorable. Nature in and of itself is not, I suggest, something to be valued independently of human interests. It could be argued moreover that in thus
modifying our natural environment, we would be following the precedent of three billion years of organic evolution, since according to the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock (1979), the atmosphere and oceans are not just biological products, but biological constructions. Other natural propertiessuch as biodiversity, beauty, harmony, stability, and integrityhave been proposed to provide a non-anthropocentric basis for value. But unless we smuggle in some anthropocentric bearings, they fare no better than the property of being the outcome of a natural process in providing an intuitively plausible ordering of better and worse states of the world. For example, if biodiversity is taken as a basic value-giving characteristic, then the
state of the planet just after the Cambrian explosion (about 570 million years ago) would be rated much more highly than the world of the present, as it was far richer in terms of the range and diversity of its constituent creatures. Most biology textbooks recognize between twenty and thirty extant animal phylathe phylum being the fundamental design plan of an organism (and the second broadest classification, following 'kingdom', in biological taxonomy). Yet the Burgess Shale, one small quarry in British Columbia dating back some 530 million years, contains the remains of fifteen
In terms of basic diversity, a far greater range of radically different anatomical types existed at that epoch of evolutionary development.
to twenty organisms so unlike one another, or anything now living, as to each constitute a separate phylum (Gould 1989).
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HIV Turn
DEEP ECOLOGY PREVENTS US FROM FIGHTING VIRII LIKE HIV AND SMALLPOX OUT OF RESPECT FOR VIRAL AUTONOMY Grey 93
[William, Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Australia, Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, no 4, 1993, www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, acc 9-30-04//uwyo-ajl] There are a number of problems with such a permissive criterion of moral considerability. One is that there are conflicts of interest between goal-directed entities, and something needs to be said about how these are to be resolved. Smallpox and HIV no doubt have their own viral autonomy (as well as being the products of natural historical processes), but for all that it is perfectly legitimate to disregard their interests when they conflict with our own. Yet it is hard to see how a decision to deny them a place in the scheme of things can be defended except by appeal to a value system which favours human interests. Plumwood allows that in casting the moral net widely we will have to "make distinctions for appropriate treatment within each class of items" (p. 147). It seems reasonable to suspect that human standards of appropriateness will be brought to bear to settle cases where such conflicts arise.
NEW WAVE OF SUPER VIRII LIKE AIDS WILL USE HUMAN TRAVEL TO CAUSE EXTINCTION Leibovich 97
[Lori, staff, X stands for eXtinction: Interview with Frank Ryan, M.D., a prominent physician, Salon, Newsreal, March 1997, www.salon.com/march97/news/news2970321.html, Acc 9-30-04//uwyo-ajl] And "Virus X" is one of them? What is "Virus X"? The title of my book, "Virus X," means a virus that threatens human extinction. The X stands for "eXtinction." I should add that most of the book is devoted to less terrible, scary but interesting, scenarios. But it would be foolish not to face the worst-case scenario, which I discuss in the book. There were fears that AIDS might fit that description. Is it because of international transportation and ease of travel that these viruses have become so threatening? Yes. Human behavior has greatly changed the natural goal posts with regard to the threat of new plague viruses. Take AIDS, for example. According to my hypothesis, in the past a band of hunters might have been bitten or scratched by chimpanzees harboring the virus; the result would have been a lethal attack localized to the hunter band -- or at worst their home village. Today, thanks to the global village, a new plague virus could perambulate the globe at the speed of a passenger jet. Then a new step in the plague scenario would take place in the massively populated cities -- they would become viral "amplification zones."
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THE DEVASTATION OF THE AIDS VIRUS IN AFRICA IS A MANIFESTATION OF GLOBAL APARTHEID OPPOSITION TO ALL DEVALUATION OF BLACK LIFE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT DISCURSIVE STEP IN FIGHTING RACISM AND COLONIALISM Deen 2001
[Thalif, Staff, Rights: Caste, Drugs, AIDS have Racism Links, Say US Groups, Inter Press Service, August 23, 2001, www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010807.html , acc 8-3004//uwyo-ajl] Meanwhile, the Washington-based NGO Africa Action said that the global AIDS pandemic must be seen as a matter of international racism. "The AIDS crisis - whose epicentre is Africa - is the harvest for an international system of global apartheid, where the consequences of racism, slavery and colonialism have, five centuries on, impoverished the African continent and left it on its own to combat the worst plague in human history." AIDS, it said, is the black plague. So while AIDS is a global threats that knows no borders and does not discriminate by race, it is mainly killing black people. Africa Action said the racism conference should recognise that the resolution of the global AIDS pandemic is directly dependent upon the international fight against racism. "It is the devaluation of black life that has enabled the Western world to turn its eyes away from this global health crisis," it added. "Of all of the struggles against racism that we will discuss in Durban, none has farther reaching consequences for the immediate future of our common humanity."
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Singularity Turn
HUMAN TECHNOLOGY IS A COMPONENT OF NATURAL COSMOLOGICAL EVOLUTION RESISTING ANTHROPOCENTRISM BLOCKS THE SINGULARITY NECESSARY TO SOLVE ALL WORLDLY PROBLEMS Glasser 2006
[Micah J., Independent Philosopher, Cosmological Deep Ecology and the Singularity, Event Horizon, January 25, http://technoeventhorizon.blogspot.com/2006/01/cosmological-deep-ecology-and.html, acc. 10-4-06//uwyo-ajl]
Man is a part of a system. As Man evolves both biologically and technologically so does that system. The system I am talking about is our environment and that environment is the entire Cosmos. Of course the most important part of that environment is the earth itself.
Some ecologists and environmentalists seem to view man and his technology as something over and against nature. This position couldn't be further from the truth. Both man and his technology are outgrowths of nature. Nature is not a thing that is static, that, if it wasn't for man and his technology, would be pristene. Nature is a part of the ever changing Flux and as such it is always in motion and ever changing. The history of the Cosmos is a history of extraordinary change and complexification. As the Cosmos unfolds new properties emerge. Two of those properties, at this late stage of cosmological development, are intelligent life and technology.
Are we to believe that the emergence of intelligent life in the Cosmos is merely an accident a contingent epiphenomena and that its purpose as a component of that vast system is merely to destroy itself no sooner than it emerges? I find such gross pessimism to be both ill founded and, ultimately, misanthropic. The truth of the matter is that, even though as individuals we may be self-determined, the Cosmos, of which we are an inextricable part, is determined. This
the exponential technological evolution that leads to singularity is a natural part of the cooling and development of the Cosmos. This does not mean that human civilization can abandon all pretenses of responsibility, but what it does mean is that as our civilization approaches technological singularity our true nature will become manifest. We will, at that point, be denuded. The inconceivable technological power unleashed by the event of the singularity will empower man to fulfill that which he most fundamentally
determination indicates to me that desires, or in other terms, technological singularity will be the point at which man bears the fruit that was latent in the seed which is man. In any case what ever happens will be a natural occurrence that is no more capable of being controlled than is the gravitational constant or the speed limit of light
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rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had led to Pol Pot.
Frequence Libre proved, this
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S BELIEF IN TRANSFORMATION THROUGH FREEDOM FROM DIALECTICAL OPPOSITION FAILS THE FIGURES AND INSTITUTIONS WHICH COULD CREATE THIS FREEDOM ARE REAPPROPRIATED BY CONTEMPORARY OPPOSITIONAL POLITICS, FORECLOSING EXITS FROM THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM Mann, Prof of English at Pomona, 95 (Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3,
Project MUSE) Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid
underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue
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nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself. It is not yet time to abandon work that so deeply challenges our intellectual habits as does that of Deleuze and Guattari, and yet, before it has even been comprehended, in the very process of its comprehension, its fate seems secure. One pursues it and knows that the pursuit will prove futile; that every application of these new topologies will only serve to render them more pointless. The stupid optimism of every work that takes up these figures is, by itself, the means of that futility and that immanent obsolescence. One must pursue it still.
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Man is always the subject of any becoming, even if "he" is a woman. A woman who is not a "woman-become" is a Manand a subject to that extent and to that extent only. Woman is never a subject but a limita border of and for Manthe "becoming woman" is l'avenir de l'homme tout entierthe future of all Mankind. For D + G, She is what the entire world must become if Man men and womenis truly to disappear. But to the extent that women must "become woman" first (in order for men, in D + G's words, to "follow her example"), might that not mean that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the process of "becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of women becoming obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations. A silent, mutable, head-less, desire-less, spatial surface necessary only for His metamorphosis? Physicists say: Holes are not the absence of particles, but particles going faster than light. Flying anuses, rapid vaginas, there is
subject of a becoming.... A woman has to become woman, but in a becoming-woman of all of mankind" (MP, p. 357). That is, no castration. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux Most important theorists have a repertory of exemplary fictions, fictions that they call upon frequently to interact with their specific theories in creative if predictable ways. Between the scene of Lacanian psychoanalysis and that of Lol V. Stein's ravishing, for example, the privileged rapport is one of repetition: for Lacan, Marguerite Duras understood and repeated his teachings without him.19 Or, between the invagination of Derrida's ecriture and that of the narrator in Maurice Blanchot's L'Arret de mort, what is privileged is the process of mime: for Derrida, Blanchot understood his writings with him, inseparably. 20 D + G's exemplary fiction writers include Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, and Michel Tournierto mention only a few. What all of these writers' texts share with those of D + G is the surface quality of their figures: the privileged modality of relationship between the configurations of Deleuzian becoming and those of fiction is allegory. This is made most clear through Deleuze's essay on Tournier's 1967 novel, Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. 21 There it is no longer a question of whether Duras's Lol, as hysterical body, is or is not a subject of narrative; of whether Blanchot's J. and N., as organs of a hysterical text, are or are not simply new angles for modernity. For here it is a question of Speranza, a true Body-without-Organs: a woman who is not a woman but a female figure (an island), a space to be unfolded, molded, into new configurations for the metamorphosis of Man. In t, we first stumble across Robinson just after he has been shipwrecked on his island. Finding himself completely alone, the Only and perhaps Last Man on this island, he first succumbs to depression, evasion, infantile panicleaving himself exposed, helpless. For Deleuze, this signals Man's first steps outside of intersubjectivity: "What happens when others are lacking in the structure of the world? There only reigns the brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, of an insupportable light and an obscure abyss . . ." (LS, p. 355). To avoid loss of self, however, this twentieth-century Robinson first tries the old solutions. He creates for himself a task: he spends months, perhaps years, perhaps even decades the length of time does not matterbuilding a new boat-structure in which he might escape. But once the vessel is completed, it is too large, too heavy, and too cumbersome for him to push to the sea towards freedom. Robinson succumbs, once again, to the deepest depressionand, indeed, abjection: He kept eating, his nose to the ground, unspeakable things. He went underneath himself and rarely missed rolling in the soft warmth of his own excrement.... He moved about less and less, and his brief movements always brought him back to the wallow. There he kept losing his body and delivering himself of its weight in the hot and humid surroundings of the mud, while the noxious emanations of the stagnating waters clouded his mind. (VLP, p. 38) Haunted by his lost sister (the one who died young), his mother (sometimes cold but always self-sacrificing), his wife (left behind in old England), Robinson-the-Man has a brush with what the Man calls insanity. And so, as a Man, Robinson decides that he must henceforth master both himself and the island if he is to survive. He sets about building a kingdom: he creates a calendar; he invents a way to write; he builds a house, cultivates the land. He names the island Speranza and realizes that now, in time and mastery, she is his slave. Woman is, therefore, no longer absent from Man's adventures, even though he remains outside of inter-subjectivity: Besides, it seemed to him, when looking a certain way at the map of the island which he had sketched approximately, that it could represent the profile of a headless female body, a woman, yes, seated with her legs folded under her, in a posture within which it would have been impossible to sort out what there was of submission, of fear, or of simple abandonment. This idea crossed his mind, then it left him. It would come back. (VLP, p. 46)22 In spite of various humiliations, depressions, and disappointments, Robinson continues his mastery over Speranza. A decisive step is the introduction of time into this one-Man kingdom with a kind of primitive clock. In the "future," Robinson succumbs to his former states of abjection within the space of Speranza only when that clock of progress stops. Slowly, however, and in spite of his frenzied, productive activity, Robinson realizes that his relationship with "himself" is changing. His "self," in fact, can no longer exist in a world without the Other. Robinson is ready to lose his Self, his Manhood: "Who I? The question is far from being pointless. It isn't even insoluble. Because if it's not him, it must be Speranza. There is from here on a flying I which will sometimes alight on the man, sometimes on the island, and which makes of me, in turn, one or the other" (VLP, pp. 88-89).
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A2 Life is Carbon
THE AFF IS WRONG THE HUMN BODY ISNT LIMITED TO CARBON, BUT IS SILICONIC IN THE MACHINIC WAY IT EMERGES FROM INTERSUBJECTIVE FLOWS LIKE COMMUNICATION AND CAPITAL, INDICATING MEANING TO LIFE BEYOND THE MATTER THAT COMPOSES US Beddoes no date
[Diane J., Material gadget, Breeding Demons: A critical enquiry into the relationship between Kant and Deleuze with specific reference to women, Transmat, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Beddoes/BD7s4.htm, acc 1-15-05]
Deleuze notes that biologists have often questioned why life is effected through carbon, rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that la vie des machines modernes passe par le silicium (the life of modern machines runs through silicon).[377] This is where becoming-women moves, where money released from capital moves, where life becomes non-organic, nature becomes a thinking machine, infinities of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated and fluid movement, eroding the statues of power, the historical . Becoming-woman moves towards becoming-imperceptible, but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is rather than life itself becomes mobile, because it is not longer in the womb nor arranged in the organisms which emerge from them, but instead becomes a movement, a cycle that turns on its hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged class, but the surrogate reproductive machinery of a machinic phylum which is passing across into a different base, in a movement which effects the conjunction of teleology and mechanism, and transforming the nature of intelligence.
HUMAN IDENTITY IS MORE THAN CARBON ITS CODED BY COMMUNICATION FLOWS, THAT RECOGNITION IS NECESSARY TO RESIST CAPITALIST ALIENATION Brassier 2001
[Ray, Doctoral candidate at University of Warwick, Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter, Doctoral Thesis, April, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Brassier/ALIENTHEORY.pdf, acc 1-1405//uwyo]
Yet it is a failure which transcendental scepticism may yet help circumvent through the Alien-subjects unilateralising force-(of)-thought; an intrinsically sceptical force which constitutes an instance of a priori cognitive resistance to those epistemic norms and informational codes via which a triumphant World-Capitalism maintains the structural isomorphy between material power and informational force, thereby ensuring its quasitranscendental dominion over all cognitive experience. A transcendental scepticism agrees with eliminative naturalism: human beings are simply carbonbased information processing machines. But it also recognises the necessity of cross-pollinating that assessment born of evolutionary reductionism with transcendental insight; an insight which consists in radicalising and generalising Marxs identification of the material infrastructure as the ultimate determinant for the ideological superstructure315: World-Capitalism is now the global megamachine determining a priori the cognitive parameters within which the phenomenological micromachinery of organically individuated sapience operates. By acknowledging the fact that political intervention can no longer
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afford to ignore this insight; by recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing capitals all-encompassing universality as WorldCapitalism, transcendental scepticism constitutes an instance of a priori political resistance.
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THIRD, THIS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER ARGUMENTS BECAUSE 20TH CENTURY GENOCIDE DEMONSTRATES THE SHEER HORROR OF EXTERMINATING LIFE Tipler 94
[Frank J., Professor of Mathematical Physics at Tulane University, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York: Doubleday, 1994, 11-12//uwyo-ajl]
I shall obtain a hold on this future reality by focusing attention on the physics relevant to the existence and behavior of life in the far future. I shall provide a physical foundation for eschatology-the study of the ultimate future--by making the physical assumption that the universe must be capable of sustaining life indefinitely; that is, for infinite time as experienced by life existing in the physical universe. All physical scientists should take this assumption seriously because we have to have some theory for the future of the physical universe--since it unquestionably exists-and this is the most beautiful physical postulate: that total death is not inevitable. All other theories of the future necessarily postulate the ultimate extinction of everything we could possibly care about. I once visited a Nazi death camp; there I was reinforced in my conviction that there is nothing uglier than extermination. We physicists know that a beautiful postulate is more likely to be correct than an ugly one. Why not adopt this Postulate of Eternal Life, at least as a working hypothesis? I shall show in Chapter n that the universe is in fact capable
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of sustaining life at least another million trillion years. Specifically, I shall demonstrate that it is technically feasible for life to expand out from the Earth and engulf the entire universe, and that life must do so if it is to survive.
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**Derrida** A2 Deconstruction
DERRIDEAN DECONSTRUCTION PREVENTS POLITICAL STRATEGIZING Crawford, Prof of Humanities and Comparative Lit @ U of Minnesota, 90 (Claudia, Nietzsche
as Postmodernist?, Ed. Clayton Koelb, P. 197)
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Derrida, who like many a appears to feel (it is a matter of sensibility rather than reasoned conviction) that the dominant is ipso facto demonic and the marginal precious per se. One condition of the unthinking postmodern equation of the marginal with the creative, apart from a convenient obliviousness to such marginal groups as Fascists, is the rolling back of political movements which are at once mass and oppositional. The mark of a genuine radical is a hearty desire to stop having to be
so obdurately oppositional, a sentiment one can hardly imagine as dear to the heart of a deconstructionist. If one takes the point of James Joyce's retort to an invitation to return to a newly independent Irish republic - `So as to be its first critic?' - one also registers the self-indulgence. Derrida has now taken Marxism on board, or at least dragged it halfway up the gangplank, because he is properly enraged by liberal-capitalist complacency; but there is also something unavoidably opportunist about his political pact, which wants to exploit Marxism as critique, dissent, conveniently belabouring instrument, but is far less willing to engage with its positivity. , in effect, , which is to say a Marxism on his own coolly appropriative terms. `We would be tempted to distinguish this spirit of the Marxist critique ... at once from Marxism as ontology, philosophical or metaphysical system, as "dialectical materialism", from Marxism as historical materialism or method, and from Marxism incorporated in the apparatuses of party, State, or workers' International.' It would not be difficult to translate this into the tones of a (suitably caricatured) liberal Anglicanism: we must distinguish the spirit of Christianity from such metaphysical baggage as the existence of God, the divinity of Christ, organized religion, the doctrine of the resurrection, the superstition of the Eucharist and the rest. Or: one would wish to distinguish the spirit of deconstruction from the dreary intellectual paraphernalia of `writing', `difference', `trace', organized journals and conventions, formal reading groups, movements to install the teaching of philosophy in French schools and so on. It is entirely possible to approve of the
What he wants
If Derrida thinks, as he appears to do, that there can be any effective socialism without organization, apparatuses and reasonably well-formulated doctrines and programmes, then he is merely the victim of some academicist fantasy which he has somehow mistaken for an
spirit of the Huns, with all its admirable robustness, while deploring what they actually got up to. enlightened anti-Stalinism. (He has, in fact, no materialist or historical analysis of Stalinism whatsoever, as opposed to an ethical rejection of it, unlike many more orthodox currents of Marxism.) The truth is that
he is hardly concerned with an effective socialism at all. Deconstruction, with its preoccupation with slippage, failure, aporia, incoherence, not-quiteness, its suspicion of the achieved, integral or controlling, is a kind of intellectual equivalent of a vaguely leftish commitment to the underdog, and like all such commitments is nonplussed when those it speaks up for come to power. Poststructuralism dislikes success, a stance which allows it some superbly
illuminating insights into the pretensions of monolithic literary texts or ideological self-identities and leaves it a mite wrong-footed in the face of the African National Congress.
Derrida's indifference to almost all of the actual historical or theoretical manifestations of Marxism is a kind of empty transcendence - a typically deconstructie trumping of some alternative position which leaves one's own
case invulnerable only in proportion to its contentlessness. Much the same can be said of his curiously empty, formalistic messianism, which voids this rich theological tradition of its content and retains its ghostly impulse only, somewhat akin to the Kafka who (as Walter Benjamin remarks) is left with nothing but the transmissible
The critical, negative passion of his politics in this book is one which ought rightly to embarrass every academic radical for whom deconstruction is a sexy form of common-or-garden scepticism, or yet another way of keeping the literary canon alive by plodding through it yet again, this time with a scalpel in hand.
forms of a tradition which has dwindled to nothing.
Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the `end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. This is not the kind of thing that is likely to go down well in Ithaca or Irvine, where they learnt long ago that ideology had ended and the great emancipatory
And what does Derrida counterpose, in the very next paragraph, to the dire condition he so magnificently denounces? A `New International', one `without status, without title, and without name ... without party, without country, without national community ...' And, of course, as one gathers elsewhere in the book, without organization, without ontology, without method, without apparatus. It is the ultimate poststructuralist fantasy: an opposition without anything as distastefully systemic or drably `orthodox' as an opposition, a dissent beyond all formulable discourse, a promise which would betray itself in the act of fulfilment, a perpetual excited openness to the Messiah who had better not let us down by doing anything as determinate as coming. Spectres of Marxism indeed. 85-87
discourses run thankfully aground.
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New forms of struggle and especially new agents of social change, it is claimed, must either be found or theorized into existence. Hence, the perceived need arises for something on the order of Derrida's New International `without common belonging to a class'. I argued above that the contemporary working class includes both `blue collar' and `white collar'
workers, and that the internationalization of capitalism has created a growing international working class. I thereby sought to contest the claim that the working class is increasingly smaller and irrelevant as a social force. I also indicated that divisions among the working class along lines of gender, race, nationality and sexual orientation have traditionally been the object of intense activity and theoretical discussion within Marxism. While recognizing the formidable obstacles encountered, I
it is possible to overcome such divisions through common struggle. Finally, I argued that only the working class - that is, individuals who may embody a number of specific identities but who act collectively on the basis of their shared interests as workers - possesses the structural capacity both to bring down capitalism and to create socialism. On this view, it
emphasized that the contemporary world system, as well as a serious critique of recently published apologies for capitalism. As I have endeavored to show, however,
is both theoretically and politically necessary to affirm the working class as the primary agent of social transformation. Derrida's SM provides a stinging indictment of
SM also presents an elaborate case for reform socialism over and against revolutionary socialism . This case is based on what, in a friendly spirit, might be termed a `misreading' of the Russian Revolution. Moreover, the main tenet of the case is the repudiation of the notion that the working class remains central to the project of winning socialism. Among the more astounding dimensions of SM, therefore, surely must figure the social contexts in which the book appears. Derrida suggests a reformist road to socialism precisely at the end of a period in which the political and moral hollowness of traditional social democracy could not be in greater evidence. Socialist parties all over Western Europe, but particularly in France, Spain, Italy and Germany, have failed to preserve - much less extend - the gains
for workers once embodied in the so-called `welfare state' (Anderson and Camiller 1994; Ross and Jensen 1994; Camiller 1994; Abse 1994; and Padgett and Paterson 1994). These same Socialist parties have not just collaborated with but in numerous instances have actually initiated the attacks on workers, immigrants and the poor. As if all that were not enough, European social democracy has signally failed to organize an effective movement from below against the resurgence of Fascism and neoFascism. Everything that can be said in criticism of Europe's Socialist parties equally applies to the Democratic Party in the us. An openly capitalist party, the us Democratic Party advertises itself as the friend of workers and minorities, relying on its image as a `lesser evil' to secure electoral victories. Throughout the ReaganBush years, however, Democraticcontrolled congresses signally failed to challenge the basic premises and policies of Reaganism. Even today, when faced with a cynically selfstyled `Republican Revolution', disagreements between Republicans and Democrats concern only how fast and how deep to cut social programs. If Republicans demand $270 billion in Medicare cuts, for example, Democrats respond by demanding $145 billion. The logic and necessity of slashing social programs are never questioned .24 Similarly, the Democrats collude with Republicans on issues of racism and immigration. Clinton, as much as any Republican, has contributed to the false stereotyping of the recipients of public assistance as African-American `welfare queens'. And, while many Democrats are on record as deploring Proposition 187 as a legal measure, nearly all Democrats concede to Republicans that an immigration `problem' exists. Thus, the Clinton administration has recently
Derrida's proposal for a New International represents in part a call to return to the values of `authentic' reform socialism. In the us, Derrida's
beefed up the number of border cops and ordered harsher treatment of undocumented workers. No doubt proposal represents a call to return to genuinely `progressive' values. The bankruptcy of European social democracy, as well as the vicissitudes of the American Democratic Party, does indeed create political openings in which the socialist Left can and must seek to rebuild.
Yet two points remain, each suggesting that attempts to revive reform socialism waste energies . First, the European Socialist parties which eventually found themselves
authoring and imposing austerity measures on workers and minorities started out long ago with sterling anti-capitalist principles. Good intentions are not enough in this regard, however, since politics and the economy are separated in capitalist society, and the latter wields greater clout. Second, transformed by the discipline demanded by international capitalism, these nominally `socialist' parties occupy several of the very governments against which workers are presently demonstrating in large numbers. . Callinicos has cogently summarized the current crisis in Europe in this way: `a major recession which has highlighted longer term weaknesses of European capitalism; a withdrawal of popular support from the mainstream political parties; and the resort to forms of political and social action which, consciously or unconsciously, tend to escape the limits of liberal bourgeois politics' (1994, 9). Soon after the publication of SM in France, for example, the country was rocked by militant strikes and demonstrations lasting almost nine months between fall 1993 and summer 1994: Air France workers; 1,000,000 French citizens marching against plans to privatize sectors of education; fishing workers; farmers; hundreds of thousands of French workers marching several times against unemployment and austerity decrees; tens of thousands of students marching, building barricades and burning fires in protest against tuition hikes and the uncertain, potentially dismal future they face. Even as the recession seemed to be coming to an end in Europe, the anger of French workers and students exploded again in fall 1995 - this time with sufficient force to sustain a three-week strike in the public sector. Importantly, in the Air France strike, the anti-privatization campaign in education, the fight against changes in the universities and the recent public sector strike, real concessions were wrested from the state. None of this renewed workers' activity, nor the fact that victories can be claimed, provides strong support for SMs assertions that barricades and working-class militancy are out of fashion. In the us, too, polls show today that Americans are more skeptical about their government and its political parties than at any time in memory. A wave of militant demonstrations followed the 1994 congressional elections that gave Gingrich and the `Contract With America' a majority in the Senate and House of Representatives. Massive marches on Washington in support of gay rights, women's rights and civil rights have also taken place since the 1994 elections. The number of strikes, moreover, as well as the number of production hours lost and workers participating in strikes, increased significantly in 1994. And no one who spent any time during the early 90s in Decatur, Illinois or Detroit, Michigan can have any doubts about the willingness of us workers to fight back. Both areas - which include the struggle of locked-out Staley Workers in Decatur and striking newspaper workers in Detroit - have been accurately referred to as `war
In every part of the globe political developments during recent years have been characterized by their speed and volatility. It is important, however, to emphasize the still uneven and ambiguous character of the emerging challenge to the existing order: `It has begun to liberate forces - in the shape of renewed workers' resistance to capitalist attacks - which could unleash another upturn in the European [and us, my insertion] class struggle. But it has also given an opening to elements of barbarous reaction that had been confined to the political margins since 1945' (Callinicos 1994, 37). Nothing guarantees the growth of the Left as a result of the major struggles that look likely to occur over the next few years. The same political vacuum which creates opportunities for the Left is also creating, at least at this juncture, opportunities for the Right: `As yet there is no clear cut direction to events that would mark a decisive shift either to the right or to the left. But
zones'. The violence routinely used by state and local cops has been fiercely answered by the militancy and stamina of workers and their families.
the dynamic evolution of the crisis since 1989 gives no reason for thinking that the situation will remain so open' (Callinicos 1994, 36-7). In time, events will show whether their future directionality owes more to the subjective agency of the Left in this period - or to the Right. That is why the question of socialist organization stands at the forefront of debate among the Left today. Derrida's SM, with its call for a New International, should be discussed as a serious contribution to this debate. Nevertheless, SM's 'hauntological politics' must be firmly rejected as incapable of answering the demands of our time. `The time is out of joint': Derrida repeatedly works this line from Hamlet in order to suggest that socialist revolution is impossible because of the meta physical limitations of Marxism .25 Our present time may indeed be `out of joint', but it is not so because of bad metaphysics.
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deepening anger among the world's exploited and oppressed, and sharper divisions both within and among national and international ruling classes - these developments make our time one in which classical Marxism and its tradition of revolution from below have much more to offer than hauntology does in the international struggle for a democratic socialist society. 157-161
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Does not the same go for the gradual replacement of (sexually, racially...) aggressive with more 'correct' expressions, like the chain nigger - Negro - black - African American or crippled - disabled - bodily challenged? This replacement functions as a metaphorical substitution which potentially proliferate and enhances the very (racist, etc.) effect it tries to banish, adding insult to injury. In analogy to Delumeau, one should therefore claim that the only way actually to abolish the hatred-effect is, paradoxically, to create the circumstances in which one can return to the first link in the chain and use it in a nonaggressive way -like following the patterns of 'life as usual' the second time in the case of plague. That is to say: as long as the expression 'crippled' contains a surplus, an indelible mark, of aggressivity this surplus will not only be more or less automatically transferred on to any of its 'correct' metaphorical substitutes, it will even be enhanced by dint of this substitution. The strategy of returning to the first link, of course, is risky; however, the moment it is fully accepted by the group targeted by it, it definitely can work. When radical African-Americans call each other 'niggers', it is wrong to dismiss this strategy as a mere ironic identification with the aggressor; rather, the point is that it functions as an autonomous act of dismissing the aggressive sting.
reality of plague, but, rather its exact opposite: resigned acceptance of it . . . .
THIS HAS TWO IMPLICATIONS IT MOOTS ALL OF THEIR OFFENSE BECAUSE THE MEANING OF A LABEL IS RECONCEPTUALIZED AND REINSCRIBED IT FLIPS THEIR TURN, PROLIFERATING THE OPPRESSION THAT IT TRIES TO SOLVE THIRD, SPEAKING ERRORS ARE INEVITABLE AND GOOD BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE A LOCUS FOR CONSTANT CRITICISM, SOMETHING THE NEG BY ITSELF PRECLUDES Alcoff 92
[Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter 91-2, 22//uwyo] it is both morally and politically objectionable to structure ones actions around the desire to avoid criticism, especially if this outweighs other questions of effectivity. In some cases perhaps the motivation is not so much to avoid criticism as to avoid errors, and the person believes that the only way to avoid errors is to avoid all speaking for others. However, errors are unavoidable in the theoretical inquiry as well as political struggle, and moreover they
But surely
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often make contributions. The desire to find an absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive posotion wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged and thus is master of the situation. From such a position ones own location and positionality would not require constant interrogation and critial reflection; one would not hae to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome endeavor and would be immune from the interrogaton of others. Such a desire of rmastery and immunity must be resisted.
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FIFTH, LANGUAGE DOESNT HAVE A DETERMINATE EFFECT WORDS ARE EMPTY ABSENT CONTEXT, MEANING OUR RHETORIC CAN BE READ IN A HETERODOX MANNER TO CHALLENGE VIOLENCE SIXTH, PERM, DO PLAN AND THE ALTERNATIVE. REPRESENTATIONAL VIOLENCE DOESNT PRECLUDE THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION
Richard Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, 1997, p. 51-2
This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida
the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found
usually replies that labeled ` presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately
represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we
to describe intellectual progress. have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky .
offered.
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identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the
manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions
relatively unarticulated and . We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Dont mourn, moralize.
, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain unaddressed
EIGHTH, REJECTING DISCOURSE DOES NOTHING AND LEAVES ATTITUDES UNCHANGED. Kelly, 12/98
not to pass judgment.
Peace Review
One might ask, in "listening" to violent language and to the people who use it, whether we are actually condoning such language. This is far from the case. To listen is
When I listen to a person who, for example, uses sexist language, I am not lending my approval to sexist language. Instead, what I am saying is that the person behind the language, and my desire to make a connection with that person, are more important than the sexist language. If I refuse to listen to the person who uses sexist language, then I might prevent one particular case where sexist language is used. But I do nothing to overcome the person's sexist attitudes. She will continue to use sexist language long after I am out of sight. But if I give her a voice, if I show her respect, if I try
to take her seriously as a person, then In the future pershapes she will be more apt to take what I say about sexism seriously. If she knows that sexist language bothers me, then perhaps she will be less likely to use it around me.
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POLITICALLY CORRECT SIGNIFER REPLACEMENT ALLOWS NEW, AGGRESSIVE FORMS OF DISCRIMINATORY HUMILIATION IN THE GUISE OF DISTANCE Zizek '99
[Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 253-4//uwyo-ajl] Take politically correct probing into hate speech and sexual harassment: the trap into which this effor falls is not only that it makes us aware of (and thus generates) new forms and layers of humiliation and harassment (we learn that 'fat', 'stupid', 'short-sighted' . . . are to be replaced by 'weight-challenged', etc.); the catch is, rather, that this censoring activity itself, by a kind of devilish dialectical reversal, starts to participate in what it purports to censor and fight is it not immediately evident how, in designating somebody as 'mentally challenged' instead of 'stupid', an ironic distance can always creep in and give rise to an excess of humiliating aggressivity one adds insult to injury, as it were, by the supplementary polite patronizing dimension (it is well known that aggressivity coated in politeness can be much more painful than directly abusive words, since violence is heightened by the additional contrast between the aggressive content and the polite surface form...). In short, what Foucault's account of the discourses of discipline and regulate sexuality leaves out of consideration is the process by means of which the power mechanism itself becomes eroticized, that is, contaminated by what it endeavours to 'repress'. It is not enough to claim that the ascetic Christian subject who, in order to fight temptation, enumerates and categorizes the various forms of temptation, actually proliferates the object
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he tries to combat; the point is, rather, to conceive of how the ascetic who flagellates in order to resist temptation finds sexual pleasure in this very act of inflicting wounds on himself.
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THE REPLACEMENT OF OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE WITH NEW SIGNIFIERS IS EVEN WORSE, UNDERESTIMATING THE GAP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THE CONSCIOUS REGULATION OF ITS EFFECTS AND ENSURING THAT ANY RESOLUTION IS ARBITRARY Zizek 99
[Slavoj, Steelers Linebacker, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 332-3//uwyo-ajl]
In all these domains, the difJerend seems to be irreducible - that is to say, sooner or later we find ourselves in a grey zone whose mit cannot be dispelled,.by the application of some single universal rule. Here we encounter a kind of counterpoint' to the 'uncertainty principe' of quan-tum physics; there is, for example, a
Confronted with such a dubious statement, a 'politically correct' radical a priori tends to believe the complaining victim (if the victim experienced it as harassment, then harassment it was. . .), while a diehard orthodox liberal tends to believe the accused (if he sincerely did not mean it as harassment, then he should be acquitted. . .). The point, of course, is that this undecidability is structural and unavoid-able, since it is the big Other (the symbolic network in which victim and offender are both embedded) which ultimately 'decides' on meaning, and the order of the big Other is, by definition, open; nobody can
structural difficulty in determining whether some comment was actually a case of sexual harassment or one of racist hate speech. dominate and regulate its effects.
That is the problem with replacing aggressive with 'politically correct' expressions: whan one replaces 'short-sighted' with 'visually challenged', tone can never be sure that this replacement itself will not generate new effects of patronizing and/or ironic offensiveness, all the more humiliating inasmuch as it is masked as benevolence. The mistake of this 'politically correct' strategy is that it underestimates the resistance of the Ianguage we actually speak to the conscious regulation of its effects, epecially effects that involve Fower relations. So to resolve the deadlock, one convenes a committee to formulate, in an ultimately arbitrary way, the precise rules of conduct. It is the same with medicine and 'biogenetics (at what point does an
acceptable and even desirable genetic experiment or intervention turn into unacceptable manipulation?), in the application of universal hum all rights (at what point does the protection 0f the victim's rights turn into an imposition of Western values?), in sexual mores (what is the proper, non-patriarchal procedure of seduc-tion?), not to mention the obvious case of cyberspace (what is the status of sexual harassment in a virtual community? How does one distinguish between 'mere words' and
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'deeds'?). The work of these committees is caught in a symptomal vicious cycle: on the one hand, they try to legitimate their decisions by reference to the most advanced scientific ,knowledge (which, in the case of abortion, tells us that a foetus does not yet possess self-awareness and experience pain; which, in the case of a mortally ill person, defines the threshold beyond which euthanasia is the only meaningful solution); on the other hand, they have to evoke some non-scientific ethical criterion in order to direct and posit a limitation to inherent scientific drive.
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DIALOGUE OVER LABELS WITH A FIXED GOAL OF EMPOWERMENT AS A KNOWN AND STABLE END GUARANTEES HEGEMONIC REGIMES OF TRUTH MORE DISCURSIVELY VIOLENT THAN THE ORIGINAL Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997, 87-9//uwyo-ajl] The disavowal of political representation, combined with the seduc-tiveness of a 'political' ideology of absolute sincerity, is one explanation for the appeal of the Communitarian agenda. Another is (ii) the fetishization of specificity. Etzioni favours localized as opposed to centralized legislation, and
informal as opposed to formal structures of law enforcement. Thus divorce, the principal 'threat' to family life (a tautologous diagnosis that resembles John Major's cosmetic proposals to solve the problem of 'yobbery'), should be not banned or condemned, but discouraged.98 Similarly 'hate' (in the form of racism or sexism, for
of the 'discussions' initiated following incidents of campus racism is voyeuristic, almost pornographic in its attention to episodic detail. One has a sense of salivation, more bloodthirsty than at any seventeenth-century public evisceration, and of tri-umphalism over the ritual punishment of the guilty parties: humiliation by workshop.
example) is best coun-tered not by legislation but by 'dialogue' and 'education'. Etzioni's account The next evening the [offended] women organized a meeting with some students in the same dormitory and discussed the matter. They were joined by a supportive professor. Several white people made it clear that they were deeply embarrassed. The session was followed up by more forums, a press conference, and a seminar at the law school. These dis-cussions, in turn, triggered a campus-wide debate on the issues at hand. The local newspapers also took note. The article in the campus news-paper included an apology from the person who had put up the form in the first place. The four women said that toward the end they no longer felt like victims but rather 'empowered'.99 The Communitarian citizen, then, fills the gaps left by the skeletal legal framework, makes 'complete' a legislative structure which must refrain from explicit adjudication on its own account. By maintaining instead a 'hands-off' policy of implicit governance, Communitarianism proposes an ethos of unwritten rules of
. A society of unwritten -that is, not legally binding - laws is assumed to be freer; in fact, as we can see, the tacit legislature of Communitarianism effects a far more thorough and indeed repressive policing of the individual. The figure who arouses the most sympathy in Etzioni's story is the quitevobviously cynical student who, as his college campus succumbed o the
behav-iour, under the sign of 'empowerment', which are no less powerful and effective because they are implicit
viral effect of a positivistic 'anti-racist' consensus, took to emblazoning his notebooks and the walls of his room with swastikas. 'The work of education is never done,' says Etzioni, a little sinisterly. Clearly not education but rather the problematic of Dostoevsky's man underground is the issue here: the necessity to prove that one is 'a man and not a prig in a .barrelorgan:. The dawning Influence of Commumtanamsm in British political life IS a symptom of the 'epidemic of consensus' identified by Baudrillard as a millenarian phenomenon, and of the fear of violence - political, semiotic, historical-identified by Hegel as a crisis of healthy 'philosophical scepticism.
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The changeable life of that term does not preclude the possibility of its use. If a term becomes questionable, does that mean it cannot be used any longer, and that we can only use terms that we already know how to master? Why is it that posing a question about a term is considered the same
as en ac tin g a p rohi bi ti on agains t use? Why is it that we sometimes do feel that if a term is dislodged of its prior and known contexts, that we will not be able to live, to survive, to use language, to speak for ourselves? What kind of guarantee does this effort to refer the speech act back to its originating context exercise, and what sort of terror does it forestall? Is it that in the ordinary mode, terms arc assumed, terms like "the subject" and "universality," and the sense in which they "must" be assumed is a moral one, taking the form of an imperative, and like some moral interdictions, a defense against what terrifies us most?
Are we not paralyzed by a fear of the unknown future of words that keeps us from interrogating the terms that we need to live, and of taking the risk of living the terms that we keep in question?
DISALLOWING MODIFICATION IGNORES THE POTENTIAL FOR RE-APPROPRIATION BY RE-ITERATING THE USEFUL CONCEPTS OF THOSE WE CRITICIZE FOR THEIR EXCLUSIONS
Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC Berkeley, The Psychic Life Of Power: Theories In Subjection, 1997, p. 93. For Foucault, the subject who is produced through subjection is not produced at an instant in its totality. Instead, it is in the process of being produced, it is repeatedly produced (which is not the same as being produced anew and again). It is precisely the possibility of a repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity, the subject, but which proliferates effects which undermine the force of normalization. The term which not only names, but forms and frames the subjectlet us use Foucaults example of homosexuality-mobilizes a reverse discourse against the very regime of normalization by which it is spawned.
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SUPPRESSING LANGUAGE BECAUSE IT IS OFFENSIVE PRESERVES ITS INJURIOUS MEANING ONLY BY USING THE LANGUAGE CAN SPACE BE OPENED TO RECONSTRUCT A MORE HUMANE MEANING Kurtz and Oscarson, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2K3 (Anna and Christopher, BookTalk: Revising the
Discourse of Hate, ProQuest)
However,
Butler also argues that the daily, repeated use of words opens a space for another, more empowering kind of performance. This alternative performance, Butler insists, can be "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an original subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open" (p. 38). To think of words as having an "open" future is to recognize that their authority lies less in their historical than in their present uses; it is to acknowledge that people can revise the meaning of words even as we repeat them; it is to embrace the notion that the instability of words opens the possibility that we can use them to (re)construct a more humane future for ourselves and others. Because words can be revised, Butler contends that it would be counterproductive simply to stop using terms that we would deem injurious or oppressive. For when we choose not to use offensive words under any circumstance, we preserve their existing meanings as well as their power to injure. If as teachers, for instance, we were simply to forbid the use of speech that is hurtful to LGBT students we would be effectively denying the fact that such language still exists. To ignore words in this way, Butler insists, won't make them go away. Butler thus suggests that we actually use these words in thoughtful conversation in which we work through the injuries they cause (p. 1.02). Indeed, Butler insists that if we are to reclaim the power that oppressive speech robs from us, we must use, confront, and interrogate terms like "queer." We must ask how such terms affect both the speaker and the subject, what the purpose of their use is, and how their meaning can be altered to empower those whom they name. Thus, as Butler helps us see, language is violence, but only if we allow it to be. She encourages us to believe that words can take on new meanings-ones which forbid stasis, challenge our habits, and open the possibility that teachers and students might be able to create spaces for learning in which everyone feels safe.
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Butler now argues that to speak is not quite the same as to act. For Butler the conservative conflation of speech and act is neither
performative nor, in her sense of the word, constructionist, because it argues for a notion of free speech that presumes an unconstrained, sovereign subject. Butler considers this problem and its possible remedies in her ana lyses of Supreme Court decisions, anti-pornography arguments, and the policy against homosexuals in the military. In every instance, she complicates the relation of speech to act, by introducing fantasy, linguistic instability, and temporality, arguing aga inst censorship and the legal redress of hate speech and for its critical re-articulation. The key move in the analysis comes in the opening chapter, "On Linguistic Vulnerability," where Butler deconstructs the relation of the body to speech. Working from texts by Toni Morrison and Shoshana Felman, Butler argues that language and the body are neither strictly separable nor simply the same, but speak together, as it were, to produce the effect known as the social speaking subject. Thus verbal threats, for ex ample, are also, in some way, bodily ones: "[T]he body is the blindspot of speech, that which acts in excess of what is said, but which also acts in and through what is said" (11). Once the body/speech relation is deconstructed, censorship, with its assump tions of causality between
because speech threatens, delivers and delays, it opens up a future of options. It is the gap between speech and conduct
word and act, becomes even more troubling. Butler finds promise in this problem, arguing that, not referential, but a social gest, playful and capable of change. Indeed
she wants to emphasize. In theatrical terms, this is the gap in which Brecht sees the actor intervening --in his view performance is
Butler's notion of performativity, sometimes understood as the ability of language to produce what it names, is nearly the opposite of referentiality: it is an effect of representation that cannot wholly be controlled. Performativity is what gives a future to the name in name-calling. In the process of coming out, for example, homosexuality is named but never fully defined: while coming out "renders homosexuality discursive," Butler emphasizes, "it does not render discourse referential . . . . [I]t is important not to close the gap between the performative and the referential" (125). To close this gap is to leave no remedy for hate speech short of state intervention, and the state is certainly not neutral. Butler points out that the Supreme
Court has tended to protect racist behavior as speech, while restricting pornogr aphic literature. In censoring pornography, the court appears to agree with feminist arguments that pornographic representation is a discriminatory act. Similarly,
the policy against gays in the military assumes that to identify oneself as a homosexual is to act upon another person in a homosexual way, to make such an identification "contagious," as Butler puts it. And yet, in a case of cross burning, the Supreme Court found that when he burned a cross in front of a black family's house, a white teenager was expressing a "viewpoint" in the "free marketplace of ideas" (53). These decisions imply that language should not have power to do what it says, but that the state, in regulating speech, should. When speech becomes injurious act in some cases and remains free speech in others, it is clear that a theory of speech, and not a legal remedy, is what is most urgently needed. Consequently, Butler opposes linguistic determinism and the "anti-intellectualism" of the academy's efforts to return to "direct" speech. Language is politically and socially useful, she argues , precisely to the extent that it is "excitable"--by which she means "out of control", in play, "performative:" "Indeed, the act-like character of certain offensive utterances may be precisely what keeps them from saying what they mean to say or doing what it is they say" (72). Language is
neither fully social nor fully semantic but socially performed and cited, interpellating a body and a social self while exclu ding "impossible" bodies, selves and speech. In a brief reference to the argument elaborated in her book The Psychic L ife of Power (also 1997), legal"
Butler counters the legal arguments for restricting hate speech with Foucault's "less notion of power as an effect, produced through multiple forces. Foucault's idea of power eliminates the sovereign, accountable subject (or state) that speech regulation seeks to restore. It is power, Butler argues, that makes speech into censorship, by legislating what counts. Thus, not all social forms are simply censored, tainted or unusable: the terms of legibility produce the possibility of breaking silence, of thwarting exclusion, and of acting "with authority without being authorized" (157), as in the civil disobedience of Rosa Parks. [End Page 348] Rather than offer prescriptions, Butler uses her own writing to illustrate the power of resignification. In her rhetorical readings of Supreme
Court decisions, for example, the justices' words become surprisingly rich and suggestive. She is herself an expert resignifi er. Resignifying words, Butler acknowledges, does not take away their hurt. She does think that sometimes people should be prosecuted for injurious speech and that universities might need to regulate speech --but should do so only when they have "a story to tell" about its harmful effects. She is not opposed to all speech regulati on. But exciting risk of language, where a threat might also be a promise.
Excitable Speech asks whether regulation makes it easier or harder to reappropriate speech, and why we fear to take the
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In Excitable Speech, she rebuts the work of the theorists who introduced hate speech into the legal arsenal. Whereas they share her premise that we are linguistic beings, Butler charges that in advocating speech codes, censorship, and other regulatory approaches to linguistic injury, hate speech theorists destroy "something fundamental about language and, more specifically, about the subject's constitution in language" (ES, 27 ). Butler proposes to counter injurious speech with "subversive resignification": the insubordinate use of a derogatory term or authoritative convention to defuse its power to injure and to expose "prevailing forms of authority and the exclusions by which they proceed" (ES, 157-58). These two books are especially important for answering the charge that poststructuralist critics of humanism demolish political agency when they take issue with autonomy. Butler's theory of "insurrectionary" speech acts opens up the possibility of an agency that does not fantasize "the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech" but, rather, plays our dependency on sanctioned forms of address into an everyday resistance (ES, 145,15). Insurrectionary speech does considerable theoretical work to break the impasse between autonomy and determinism that stalls many discussions of political agency in "postliberatory times" (The
'unthreatened' bearings of the self in the midst of community" (CR, 140).
Psychic Life of Power [PL], 18). And although this contribution is significant, it may strike some readers as incom plete. Butler is more attentive to examples where dominant institutions (such as the courts and the military) have subversively resignified potentially insurrectionary initiatives (such as hate speech) than she is to instances where per formative agency has
the "politics of the performative" is a politics of insurrection. First, I offer a brief summary of Butler's concepts "heterosexual
transformed the status quo. Even if Butler's own examples do not establish it as such, I will argue that matrix," "heterosexual melancholy," and "gender performativity," as these are indispensable to appreciating her recent writings.
CENSORSHIP WILL BE COOPTED BY CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS TO DESTROY MINORITY RIGHTS INSTEAD LANGUAGE SHOULD BE USED TO SUBVERT THE CONVENTIONAL MEANINGS OF THE WORDS Nye, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Wisconsin Whitewater, 99 (Andrea, Excitable Speech: A Politics of
the Performative; In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology, JSTOR)
Excitable Speech and In Pursuit of Privacy will appeal to very different audiences. Judith Buder is a theorist's theorist whose mastery of the complex intellectual gyrations of poststructuralism and postmodernism will be daunting to all but an initiated few, while Judith Wagner DeCew is a legal scholar who uses traditional reviews of case law and standard techniques of rational argument to make her point. Nevertheless, they ask the same important questionIn promoting the rights of women, to what extent should feminists call for state action? and they give the same negative answer: Not very far at all. Butler's concern is with recent controversies surrounding regulation of "hate language," specifically decisions that broadly interpret the "fighting words 55 doctrine, which makes certain uses of speech unprotected under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. She argues against Catharine MacKinnon5s claim that pornography is subject to government intervention because it is action that effectively silences women. DeCew, on the other hand, defends a broad view of the "right to privacy55 that protects not only private information but also individual decision making from state interference. Their methods in making these points could not be more different. Butler works meticulously through a dense thicket of the analytic speech act theory of John Austin, the structuralist and poststructuralist theories of Jacques Derrida and Pierre Bourdieu, psychoanalytic constructions in the style of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, and German critical theory to conclude that state regulation of hate language should be resisted. gues,
Once the state has the power to legislate what can be said and not said , she arthat power will be coopted by conservative elements to defeat liberal causes and minority rights. State power will also curtail the freedom of speech of private individuals that is the very basis for effective antidotes to derogatory name calling. DeCew, however, painstakingly reviews the legal and
philosophical history of privacy rights as well as current debates about its scope and status before she takes on the question of whether feminists have any interest in preserving a private sphere. For DeCew, too, a major target is MacKinnon, specifically her argument that leaving alone the privacy of home and family means leaving men alone to abuse and dominate women. DeCew argues that decisions that protect the use of sexually explicit materials in the home, consensual sex practices in private, and personal decisions about abortion are in the interest of women as well as men, even though in some cases, such as wife beating, there may be overriding considerations that justify state intervention. Both authors argue persuasively for a more careful look at the dangers lurking behind calls for state action.
For Butler, the danger is that the state becomes arbiter of what is and is not permissible speech, allowing rulings that the erection of burning crosses by the Ku Klux Klan is protected speech but that artistic expressions of gay sexuality or statements of gay identity are actions rather than speech and so are not protected. The danger DeCew sees is that once the right to privacy is denied or narrowly defined, the state
can, on the grounds of immorality, move into women's personal lives to interfere with sexual expression, whether homosexual or heterosexual, or with the right to choose an abortion established in Roe v. Wade. Both DeCew and Butler, however, provide alternative remedies for the admitted harm that state action is intended to redress. For DeCew, the right to privacy is not absolute; like freedom, it can be overridden by other rights thus the state can intervene in domestic abuse cases
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Given the postmodern view that the subject can never magisterially use a language with fixed meanings according to clear intentions, it is always possible to subvert the conventional meanings of words. What is said as a derogatory slur"nigger," "chick," "spic," or "gay," for example can be "resignified," that is, returned in such a manner that its conventional meaning in practices of discrimination and abuse is subverted. Butler gives as examples the revalorization of terms like "black" or "gay," the satirical citation of
because of the physical harm being done. Butler's remedy for harmful hate language is more deeply rooted in postmodern theories of the speaking subject. racial or sexual slurs, reappropriation in street language or rap music, and expressions of homosexual identity in art depicting graphic sex. These are expressions that any erosion in First Amendment rights might endanger.
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and Joe Peabody, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments, 1991,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 10/17/02 As Brennan notes, the mandate "to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." (Brennan 577). Not only does the first amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language "arguments", the principles it defends also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman observe, university scholars must be allowed to "think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable" because "major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly unsettling and distasteful to the existing order." This leads them to conclude that "we cannot afford" to impose "orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). Given the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such changes, the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a "Zionist language" argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has argued, The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. (Katz 156).
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There's a grosser irony about Politically Correct English. This is that PCE purports to be the dialect of progressive reform but is in factin its Orwellian substitution of the euphemisms of social equality for social equality itselfof vastly more help to conservatives and the U.S. status quo than traditional SNOOT prescriptions ever were. Were I, for instance, a political conservative who opposed taxation as a means of redistributing national wealth, I would be delighted to watch PCE progressives spend their time and energy arguing over whether a poor person should be described as "low-income" or "economically disadvantaged" or "preprosperous" rather than constructing effective public arguments for redistributive legislation or higher marginal tax rates on corporations. (Not to mention that strict codes of egalitarian euphemism serve to burke the sorts of painful, unpretty, and sometimes offensive discourse that in a pluralistic democracy leads to actual political change rather than symbolic political change. In other words, PCE functions as a form of censorship, and censorship always serves the status quo.)
FOCUSING ON HOW WE TALKED ABOUT THE ISSUE, RATHER THAN HOW TO DEAL WITH IT, TRADES OF WITH ACTIVISM AND DESTROYS THE ABILITY TO FORM COALITIONS
Ward Churchill, Keetoowah Cherokee, 25+ year member of the American Indian Movement and Professor, Indigenous Studies, University of Colorado Boulder. FROM A NATIVE SON, 1996 p. 460.
There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension. By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate and unite them. Nonetheless, such issues of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers or persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what theyve said, but about how theyve said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda, but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of a progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Maos principle of criticism/self-criticism now variously called process, line sharpening, or even struggle in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about the issues. All of this happens at the direct expense of actually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something meaningful. In the end, it reduces to a tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that its high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.
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Language Arguments, 1991, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 10/17/02 Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).
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It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins-the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism-and compare ourselves with something absolute. This Platonic urge to escape from the finitude of one's time and place, the "merely conventional" and contingent aspects of one's life, is responsible for the original Platonic distinction between two kinds of true sentence. By attacking this latter distinction, the holistic "pragmaticising" strain in analytic philosophy has helped us see how the metaphysical urge -common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razor-sharp "scientific realists"-works. It has helped us be sceptical about the idea that some particular science (say physics) or some particular literary genre (say Romantic poetry, or transcendental philosophy) gives us that species of true sentence which is not just a true sentence, but rather a piece of Truth itself. Such sentences may be very useful indeed, but there is not going to be a Philosophical explanation of this utility. That expl anation, like the
original justification of the assertion of the sentence, will be a parochial matter-a comparison of the sentence with alternative sentences formulated in the same or in other vocabularies. But such comparisons are the business of, for example, the physicist or the poet, or perha ps of the philosopher - not of the Philosopher, the outside expert on the utility, or function, or metaphysical status of Language or of Thought. The Wittgenstein-Sellars-QuineDavidson attack on distinctions between classes of sentences is the special cont ribution of analytic philosophy to the anti-Platonist insistence on the ubiquity of language. This insistence characterises both pragmatism and recent "Continental" philosophising. Here are some ex amples: Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some other man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn around and say: You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then onl y so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought. . . . . . . the word or sign which man uses is the man himself Thus my language is the sum-total of myself; for the man is the thought. (Peirce) Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de -construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. (Derrida) . . . psychological nominalis m, according to which all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities-indeed, all awareness even of particulars-is a linguistic affair. (Sellars) It is only in language that one can mean something by something. (Wittgenstein) Human experience is essentially linguistic. (Gadamer) . . . man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon. (Foucault) Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object . . . and then its reality vanishes. (Heidegger) This chorus should not, however, lead us to think that something new and exciting has recently been
They are saying that attempts to get back behind language to something which "grounds" it, or which it "expresses," or to which it might hope to be "adequate," have not, worked. The ubiquity of language is a matter of language moving into the vacancies left by the failure of all the various candidates for the position of "natural starting-points" of thought, starting-points which are prior to and independent of the way some culture speaks or spoke. (Candidates for such
discovered about Language-e.g., that it is more prevalent than had previously been thought. The authors cited are making only negative points.
starting-points include clear and distinct ideas, sense-data, categories of the pure understanding, structures of prelinguistic consciousness, and the like.) Peirce and Sellars and Wittgenstein are saying that the regress - of interpretation cannot be cut off by the sort of "intuition" which Cartesian epistemology took for granted. Gadamer and Derrida are saying that our culture has been dominated by the notion of a "transcendental signifie d" which, by cutting off this regress, would bring us out from contingency and convention and into the Truth. Foucault is saying th at we are gradually losing our grip on the "metaphysical comfort" which that Philosophical tradition provided -its picture of Man as having a "double" (the soul, the Noumenal Self) who uses Reality's own language rather than merely the vocabulary of a time and a place. Finally, Heidegger is cautioning that if we try to make Language into a new topic of Philosophical inquiry we shall simply recreate the hopeless old Philosophical puzzles which we u sed to raise about Being or Thought. This last point amounts to saying that what Gustav Bergmann called "the linguistic turn" should not be seen as the logical positivists saw it -as enabling us to ask Kantian questions without having to trespass on the psychologists' turf by talking, with Kant, about "expe rience" or "consciousness."
analytic philosophy of language was able to transcend this Kantian motive and adopt a naturalistic, behaviouristic attitude toward language. This attitude has led it to the same outcome as the "Continental" reaction against the traditional Kantian problematic, the reaction found in Nietzsche and
That was, indeed, the initial motive for the "turn,"" but (thanks to the holism and pragmatism of the authors I have cited)
Heidegger. This convergence shows that the traditional association of analytic philosophy with tough-minded positivism and of "Continental" philosophy with tender-
The pragmaticisation of analytic philosophy gratified the logical positivists' hopes, but not in the fashion which they had envisaged. it did not find a way for Philosophy to become "scientific," but rather found a way of setting Philosophy to one side.
minded Platonism is completely misleading. This post-positivistic kind of analytic philosophy thus comes to resemble the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida tradition in beginning with criticism of Platonism and ending in criticism of Philosophy as such. Both traditions are now in a period of doubt about their own status. Both are living between a repudiated past and a dimly seen post-Philosophical future.
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3. ENDORSING THE UNIQUENESS OF THE HOLOCAUST IMPLICITLY DENIES OTHER HISTORICAL GENOCIDES, MAKING FUTURE GENOCIDE INEVITABLE Stannard 96
[David E., Prof. Am Studies @ Hawaii, Uniqueness as Denial, Is the Holocaust Unique? Ed. Rosenbaum, 197]
In addition to the damage that is inherent tin the cultural violence of genocide denial there is the matter of the future dangers that it promotes. As Roger Smith, Eric
: Where scholars deny genocide, in the face of decisive evidence that it has occurred, they contribute to a false consciousness that can have the most dire reverberations. Their message, in effect, is: murderers did not really murder; victims were not really killed, mass murder requires no confrontation, no reflection, but should be ignored, glossed over. In this way scholars lend their considerable authority to the acceptance of this ultimate human crime. More than that, they encourage indeed invite a repetition of that crime from virtually any source in the immediate or distant future. By closing their minds to truth, that is, such scholars contribute to the deadly psychohistorical dynamic in which unopposed genocide begets new genocides.
Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton recently have written regarding the continuing denial of the Armenian holocaust This, of course, is one of the great and justified fears that Jews long have harbored regarding the threat of Holocaust denial that it invites repetition and anti-Jewish mass violence and killing. But
when advocates of the allegedly unique suffering of the Jews during the Holocaust themselves participate in denial of other historical genocides and such denial is inextricably interwoven with the very claim of uniqueness they thereby actively participate
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in making it much easier for those other genocides to be repeated. And, in the case of genocides against the native peoples of the Americas, not to be repeated but to continue. As, indeed, they are at this very moment. For never, really, have they stopped.
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the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found
usually replies that labeled ` presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately
represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we
to describe intellectual progress. have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky .
offered.
the Enlightenment has been reconceptualized as the universal killer, armed with the most potent of weaponsrepresentation. In their Introduction to the
identified as the subject of violence. The universal Man of
collection typically entitled Violence of Representation Armstrong and Tennenhouse offer the basic formula of this approach: The violence of representation is the suppression of difference (8). In this particular reading of Foucault the discursive constructedness of identity is directly responsible for corporeal violence inflicted by some (post)modern subjects upon others. In his recent book Serial Killerr and in the series of articles that preceded it Mark Seltzer applies this insight to the fascinating and grisly phenomenon of serial killing, variously identified also as stranger killing and sometimes lust murder. For Seltzer the enigma of the serial killers personality consists in an experience of typicality at the level of the subject
The serial killer, I will be arguing, is in part defined by such a radicalized experience of typicality within. Simply put, murder by numbers (as serial murder has been called) is the form of violence proper to statistical persons. (30-1) Violence of representation, representation of violence and violence per se smoothly link into an unbroken chain, leading from statistics to mayhem and from typology of subjects to fingertyping of putrefying bodies. My goal in this essay is to put a hitch into this chain, to question the easy fit between discursive moulds of identity and the individual self-experience of serial killers, and to suggest that represenration may be not so much the cause of violence as a post factum defence against it. I do not imply, however, that violence in general or serial murder in particular are totally free from the constraints of discourse or that
the identity of the serial killer is not constructed using the building blocks of cultural narratives (though the narratives in question are more variegated than Seltzer
the serial form of violence is conditioned not so much by the monolithic coherence of representation as by its breakdown. The violent behavior of a serial killer is not a direct
suggests). Rather, I would claim that
outcome of any social construction but a random, causeless choice which is retrospectively incorporated into a generic narrative of identity. The repeated ritualistic violence, then, becomes a means of reinforcing this identity but achieves precisely the opposite, its complete disintegration. Rather than being generated by representation, corporeal violence offers a resistance to it.
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that Dora's behavior manifests an unconscious desire for Frau K., her father's lover and suitor's wife. For Freud her desire does not indicate any sexual instability. Instead, through an identification with her father's desire, it signals an unconscious paternal identification. In other words, for Freud the
significant aspect of Dora's phantasy is not the sexual content of the desire but rather the paternal position from which she engages with it. By parity of reasoning, it follows that quite "normal" male readers of porn may identify with the position of woman victim rather than male aggressor, in which case their aggressive tendencies cannot be reinforced in the simplistic way that MacKinnon suggests.3 In short, as Laura Kipnis points out, neither the biology nor gender of readers of Hustler magazine determines the form of their identification with its pornographic materials, let alone forces them into a common psychic response (Kipnis 1996, 196). In the same way, one may argue, gender-swapping phantasy games
played by Net users do not indicate their gender instability. On the contrary. one might turn the argument around and conclude that the preponderance of biological males among Net users suggests that even when playing at being a woman, they are engaging in a "boys' game."
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, we have to ask ourselves whether we can cleanse thought of the risky vocabulary of representation, whether we can return to the lived immediacy of pre-modern pre-subjective mutual recognition, or whether we
subject who then represents can paste over our Cartesian separation and think a world that is not written by us but that writes itself. Is the representational antinomy or paradox an accident and is it curable? We might consider post-Kantian anti-representationalism as an increasing anti-subjectivism. Talk of schemes, representations, constructions, and paradigms does generate notions of what these schemes are schemes of. To talk of representation as a construction, schematization or structuration also implies that there is one who constructs, or that there is (to use Nietzsche's phrase) a doer behind the deed (Nietzsche 1967, 45). Representation presents us with what Michael Dummett refers to as the danger of falling back into psychologism (1993, 129). How possible is it to overcome these illusions and to remain within representation without appealing to what is, or, more important, without demanding autonomy? Perhaps representation in both its epistemological and ethical/political senses is valuable precisely for the contradictions and tensions it presents for thought. Consider, to begin with, knowledge as representation and the possibility that we might no longer trouble ourselves with an ultimate foundation for our representations, and this because any attempt to do so would bring us up against our own representational limit. In Realism with a Human Face, Hilary Putnam distinguishes between two broad readings of Wittgenstein's notion that the limits of my language are the limits of my world. The first response to such a predicament would be to rule out as nonsensical any attempt to think outside my world. The second response, favored by Putnam, would be that this recognition brings us up against the very notion that my world is my world (Putnam 1990, 28). While we have no appeal or foundation that lies outside representation, we sustain a philosophical question in the face of this inability. We might say, then, that rather than be ruled out of court as a nonsensical illusion, representation functions as a useful antinomy. The idea that our world is always a represented world renders us both responsible for that world, at the same time as we recognize our separation or non-coincidence with the world. And this might be how we can retrieve a notion of autonomy through representation in the second, ethical, sense. As I have already suggested, autonomy need not be defined as the feature of pre-social or pre-linguistic [End Page 60] moral individuals. Rather, to take an act of speech as autonomous is to see it as not grounded in a pre-given, law, nature or being. Thus the "subject" on this account would not be a substantive entity that authors its own meaning fully, but would be effected through acts of representation. Why save a notion of subjective autonomy? Think of the converse situation: a world of writing effects, disowned speech acts, performances without performers or moves in a game without players. Such a world imagines that it is possible to have a form of speech that does not carve out a point of view, that is not located in a way of being, that presents no resistance to perpetual coming and self-invention. It is a world in which the representational illusion is disavowed, a world in which speech takes place without the reifying error that I imagine myself as one who speaks. The idea that there is a writing, speaking or language that represents and that can't be owned by subjects does, quite sensibly, challenge the idea that what we say is a straightforward representation of some pre-linguistic meaning or ownness. But
what such an idea of a radically anonymous writing in general precludes is the autonomy effects generated through processes of representation. Just as cultural studies--we are told--dreams of a
world in which truth claims, foundations and representational claims are no longer made, and just as Richard Rorty imagines a world of ironists who accept their language games as nothing more than games and themselves as nothing more than players (Rorty 1989, 80), so the attempt to think beyond autonomy imagines a world in which what I say is not taken as issuing from the intention of some reified, congealed and illusory notion of man. But we might think of autonomy alongside the antinomy of representation. To take demands as autonomous is to recognize them as both ungrounded, as well as being demands for a certain grounding. If what I say makes a claim for autonomy, then it is both owned as what I say (and thereby institutes me as a subject), at the same time as the claim for autonomy separates this saying from any pre-given subject. To be autonomous, a claim would have to be more than a determined expression of a subject; it would have to have its own positive, singular and effective force. As Kant argued, true autonomy could not be thought of as issuing from a natural ground; but once we think an autonomous law this generates the regulative idea (but not knowledge) of a subject from whom this law has issued. Consider this antinomy in terms of some of the typical approaches to representation in popular culture--in particular, in popular feminism. It is widely asserted that women are subordinated to alien domains of representation. Eating disorders are explained by referring to the non-representative nature of bodies in the media (Wolf 1990); pornography is [End Page 61] criticized as a misrepresentation of women as passive and compliant sexual objects (Dworkin 1982); and, in general, the notion of stereo-type functions throughout feminism and other critical movements to suggest that subjects suffer from alien representations. This critical approach to alien,
representations more often than not issues in the demand for more accurate, authentic or autonomous representations. In its simplest forms, the diagnosis of certain practices as a form of representational violence is tied to the demand for an overcoming of the representational divide. This demand would supposedly be met by more realistic images of women, by non-patriarchal or nonimposed or stereotypical objectifying erotica, and through the freeing of women from the representational closure of the beauty myth. What is demanded, in short, is that the subject be continuous with representations: that there might be a public domain of representation that is at one with one's inner being, where subjects would not regard themselves as extrinsic to, or belied by, a general representational norm. However, it is just this demand for non-separation from representation that sustains the problem, and part of this problem lies in not addressing the predicament of autonomy
. The idea of a representation that would not be alien to my being would only be possible on two counts: either by resisting the necessary discontinuity of representation and insisting on the possibility of a proper or essential representation, or by imagining that we could do away with being altogether, such
that representation would not be seen as discontinuous or alien to any pre-presentational thing. These two possibilities might be cashed out as follows. On the one hand, we could achieve a social domain of complete mutual recognition (perhaps something like the Greek polis or the bourgeois public sphere) in which the individual is thoroughly at one with the social whole. There would be no need for a demand for representation precisely because what functioned as a normative representation of the individual would already be thoroughly normal. The domain of representation would be entirely proper, not an alienation of my being, but its adequate expression. On the other hand, the representational scar might be healed by a radical resistance to representation in general: the refusal of all norms, stereotypes or reified concepts of the individual. This would issue in the pulverization of the representational domain, a multiplication of images, writing effects, simulacra or texts without author, identity or subject. On both these accounts, what is resisted, refused or targeted as a symptom is autonomy: the idea of a self or subject outside the domain of representation. In the first model of recognition, autonomy is lamented as a [End Page 62] symptom of a public/private divide that has alienated the subject from socially recognizable being. For, it is argued, I need only demand autonomy in a world that already seems set over against me, in a world that is not fully my world. In the second antirepresentational model of proliferating simulacra or the virtual, what is resisted is the idea that there is an autonomous subject who represents (or is represented). There is, rather, nothing other than representation; and this means that, strictly speaking, we are no longer talking about representation. In both these cases, one imagines a continuity with the world, a non-separation of representation such that the horrors of anthropologism are resisted: life is not subordinated to some alien, imposed, or externally given notion of man.
continued
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the dream of a pre-representational world in which disavows the extent to which this common good, as common, must already have separated itself from the immediacy of any single experience. If
oneself a law, but in recognizing an effected lawfulness of the self. By contrast, all human beings recognized themselves in a common good, we think of autonomy as a responsibility for the essential separation of representation, then we bring back a fruitful tension.
To represent oneself is to submit to a trans-individual system of language, signification or representation. But any such representational scheme can never be fully disowned, rendered anonymous, collective, inhuman or fully dispersed beyond all subjectivity. Rather, the act of representation institutes autonomy, or places
The idea of autonomous representation is, perhaps, an oxymoron. a self in a point of view. Autonomy ought not to be [End Page 63] defined in terms of a being that is then expressed. Rather, the procedure of autonomy is a recognition that there is no foundational being other than its continual institution through a representation that dislocates itself from a prior presence. If we do not recognize that representation effects an autonomy that it can then be seen to belie, if we try to overcome this scar of representation, then we do so at the expense of forgetting what it is to think. In short, we attack the error of anthropologism--the idea of a general human subject who represents us all--with the error of anthropomorphism: the idea of a world that is fully and adequately given, without representation, separation or the contribution of thought
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FOCUSING ON LABELS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES REIFIES NON-INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO LAND AND DEFLECTS LEGITIMATE CRITICISM, CREATING MORE DISEMPOWERMENT dErrico 98
[Peter, Prof of Legal Studies at University of Massachusettes/Amherst, Native American Studies A Note on the Name, www.umass.edu/nativestudies/name.html, April 1998, acc 9-20-04//uwyo-ajl] Concern for political correctness focused more on appearances than reality. As John Trudell observed at the time, "They change our name and treat us the same." Basic to the treatment is an insistence that the original inhabitants of the land are not permitted to name themselves. As an added twist, it seems that the only full, un-hyphenated Americans are those who make no claim of origin beyond the shores of this land. Many of these folk assert that they are in fact the real "native" Americans.
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YOUR CONFLICT CLAIMS ARE BULLSHIT- CONTEXT SOLVES THE LINKS TO YOUR ARGUMENT FRENCH 1992
[James D, Computer Programmer that writes a lot about linguistics and semantics including articles published in The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Top Ten Arguments Against Eprime, Et Cetera, http://learn-gs.org/library/etc/49-2-french.pdf //wyo-pinto] The harmful effects that may result from the use of the isofidentity and the is-of-predication are often ameliorated by the context, and so the need to eliminate all such statements from our language is not as great as the advocates of E-Prime apparently assume. It is one thing to say, "The rose is red" in a flat statement of "fact"; it is quite another to say, "The rose is red to me." If in response to the question, "What does John Jones do for a living?" I answer, "He's a professor," there seems to be little that a general semanticist should quarrel with, given that the response is occurring within the context of asking what the man does for a living, a context that greatly affects the meaning of the answer .
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IS IT POSSIBLE TO ACTUALLY SCRAMBLE SPEECH? A FAR-REACHING BIOLOGIC WEAPON CAN BE FORGED FROM A NEW
LANGUAGE. In fact such a language already exists. It exists as Chinese, a total language closer to the multi-level structure of experience, with a script derived from hieroglyphs, more closely related to the objects and areas described. The equanimity of the Chinese is undoubtedly derived from their language being structured for greater sanity. I notice the Chinese, wherever they are, retain the written and spoken language, while other immigrant peoples will lose their language in two
. THE AIM OF THE PROJECT IS TO BUILD A LANGUAGE IN WHICH CERTAIN FALSIFICATIONS INHERENT IN ALL EXISTING WESTERN LANGUAGES WILL BE INCAPABLE OF FORMULATION. The follow-falsifications to be deleted from the proposed language. The IS of identity. You are an animal. You are a body. Now whatever you may be you are not an "animal," you are not a "body," because these are verbal labels. The IS of identity always carries the implication of that and nothing else, and it also carries the assignment of permanent condition. To stay that way. All naming callling presupposes the IS of identity. The concept is unnecessary in a hieroglyphic language like ancient Egyptian and in fact frequently omitted. No need to say the sun IS in the sky, sun in sky suffices. The verb to be can easily be omitted from any language and the followers of Count Korzybski have done this, eliminating the verb to be in English. HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO TIDY UP THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE BY ARBITRARY EXCLUSION OF CONCEPTS WHICH REMAIN IN FORCE SO LONG AS THE UNCHANGED LANGUAGE IS SPOKEN"
generations
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Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here, Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou: God not only
every such Event ultimately remains a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination of the exact
status of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan, Badiou delineates the contours of a domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection: the 'death drive' is not the
outcome of the morbid confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law. For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain 'between the two deaths', the pre-ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the immortality of participating in Truth, but in the sense of what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
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8. FEAR OF DEATH IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT GENOCIDE AND EXTINCTION Beres, PhD at Princeton, 96 (Louis Rene, No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and
the Meaning of Anxiety, www.freeman.org/m_online/feb96/beresn.htm) Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers
its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting
acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives
death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness , a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of
course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing. An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "Anxiety
is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized." This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a national self-delusion which augments
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enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the Jewish State, a lack of pertinent anxiety, of the positive aspect of
Angst, has already led its people to what is likely an irreversible rendezvous with extinction.
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one may not, when one wants to comprehend the whole problem of death, look only ahead towards ones own death. However, it is this shall once more be expressly exhibited just as necessary, to go against the other extreme which confronts us in modern sociological observations of images of death. Its characteristic is that it thematizes only death, more exactly: the dying of others. This modern approach blocks so we think from its point of view the
constriction of the problematic. Thus, thematizing only my death or observing only the dying of others one
complex of questions in an almost stronger way than the existentialist perspective, insofar as here the fact is excluded along with disregarding his own death that man is a self-understanding and as such fears death. In opposition to the one-sidedness of both either
ought to treat the phenomenon of death dialectically; that is, to refer to the facts, that man following Kierkegaard is himself and the same time his species. In The
Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard brought to our attention the meaning of this complex in relation to history. Every individual for himself takes as his point of departure his history and advances the history of the species which, however, represents its own dimension. This means that the individual can just as little be released from universal history as the latter can be released from the individual, whereby the individuals history and the history of the species can exhibit not only different tendencies, but also both make it possible to experience in
This dialectical approach, which has still in no way been philosophically estimated in its universal meaning, now says in our context we are here pulling together our argumentation my death as an individual and death in general, which occurs to the human species, must not be thought without the other. My death appears to me as the essential, and at the same time I do in fact know that my death is only a special case of death in general. This dialectic , from which a mediation appears possible between existential introspection and sociological extrospection, becomes first concrete through the insertion of a mediating determination between my death and death in general. This mediating determination is the death of other men or women, which, existentially and sociologically regarded, can in fact become relevant for me in thoroughly different degrees and under the most differentiating respects. None of these three determinations dyingness in general, the death of others
relation to one another a different evaluation: one can lose oneself in universal history or over-emphasize ones own singularity. and my death are, however, posited for themselves, rather all of them are to be mediated with the other. The structure of this mediation shall be made more clear by way of example in the brevity required here. The general determination of dyingness and transitoriness becomes for me first and foremost tangible and concrete in the death of others. It becomes in no way superfluous through this concretization. It remains essential as a background determination, and that means it indicates the possibility of my death. The observation of death, more exactly, the dying of others, is certainly the only real experience of death. But in this extrospection the possible relation to my death comes into play and plays along always already more or less concealed, because the other and myself are subjugated to the same destiny of dying. Vice versa: the passing into death or more simply said: the thought, I myself must die, which comes over the aging human being becomes a little more tolerable in dialectically looking away from myself, that means in view of the universal lot of dying, that itself only appears in stark reality, when we actually see humans dying and observe the uncanny change from life to death in order to cite an interpretation of Max Schur on Freuds sentence from the work Reflections upon War and Death: Human beings
actually die, not only a few, rather all of them, each and every one of us, when it is his turn.
both tendencies at work today the
This dialectic - in which I look away from myself to others or from others to myself, uniting us under the universal lot of transitoriness is no solution to the problem of death, not even a recipe against the fear of death. But the possibility of a resigned acquiesce that stands opposite
struggle against violent death over against the help for the dying indicates certainly here that they can be taken up in their positivity without falling into the illusion that death can be abolished and that the fear of death is an archaic remnant and in itself irrational. Both these tendencies find their foundation in the thought of a universal sympathy that binds me to all things living. This sympathy actualizes itself as sympathy, which means as a return behind selfishness in all its forms. This return is identical with the immediate recognition that the other is equal to me insofar as he is also a living thing, which must expire and become nothing. This connectedness between human beings that reveals itself in the light of the common determinateness of death retains in its ground that is, in the thought of universal transitoriness the form of negativity. But it also refers to the fact that the individual does not have to stare spellbound at his own imminent end. Rather if surely also to a small degree only the individual is able to think beyond his death in view of the task common to everyone, reducing suffering within the world in the face of death.
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Love is compatible with fear as are more affected by fear appeals targeted at their loved ones than by those aimed at themselves. Ironically, one of the classic studies from the early 1960s tried to persuade citizens to support community fallout shelters; strong fear appeals threatening family safety worked better than threats to the individual.(17) But love is not compatible with psychic numbing. Just as numbness interferes with the ability to love freely, so active love drives away the numbness. Antinuclear activists almost universally report that they remain active less for themselves
love not languid that has captured the imaginations of peace activists around the world. well. As we suggested earlier, some evidence indicates that people than for those they love, and that without love they could not stay with the fight. This is not to suggest that these activists are more loving than their neighbors, only that their love helps them stay active and that their activism is a powerful expression of love. It is relevant that
Just as activists rely on love to keep them going, one can mobilize the uninvolved by talking about the people, places, and values one holds dear and encouraging listeners to do the same. Something or someone to fight for is as indispensable to activism as something or someone to fight against.
the children of activists are far more confident of their futures than most children.(18)
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than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]
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Security is a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realize that we cannot
There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace.35 not the absence of fear and anxiety, but security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact.
entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the
The disease for which we must find the cure also requires that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. 36 In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert J. Lifton points out, confronting massive death helps us bring ourselves more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life.
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the minutiae. Read the last pages of Ivan Ilyich, to find there a recreation of every sensory impression, the sounds, the sights, the odors that impressed a child. Vladimir Jankelevitch points out that this is one constant throughout the whole Tolstoyan work. He revels in the details, in the concrete particularities.
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image. Mass carnage grows apace: over a million Iraqui civilians have now died as a result of our sanctions; more civilians (collateral damage) have now died in Afghanistan as a result of our bombings than perished at the WTC. But the knowledge of these things has become virtual, disembodied, imageless and thus is already fading, leaving no residue in the national consciousness.
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gesture towards the Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game in a straight way, and are
pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt towards the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obliges no one to anything determinate.
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Capitalism is Sustainable
HARDT AND NEGRIS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INSTABILITY OF CAPITALISM ARE WRONG THE KRITIK WILL FAIL Kimball, Managing Editor of New Critierion, 2K1 (Roger, The new antiAmericanism, The New Critierion, Vol. 20, No. 2, October, http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/oct01/empire.htm)
ingress: no hint of reality is allowed to seep in. I suspect that part of the reason Empire is such a hit in the academy is its superior insulation. Hardt and Negri have sealed every point of
The single greatest embarrassment to Marxist theory has always been the longevity of capitalism. It was supposed to implode from internal contradictions long ago. But here it is 2001 and capitalism is still going strong and making the world richer
imperialist conflicts as symptoms of an impending ecological disaster running up against the limits of nature? They
and richer. Attempting to explain this is the greatest test of a Marxists ingenuity. Here is how Hardt and Ne gri handle the problem: As we write this book and the twentieth century draws to a close, capitalism is miraculously healthy, its accumulation more robust than ever. How can we reconcile this fact with the careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors at the beginning of the century who point to the
offer three hypotheses for this imponderable situation. One, that capitalism has reformed itself and so is no longer in danger of collapse (an option they dismiss out of hand). Two, that the Marxist theory is right except for the timetable: Sooner or later the once abundant resources of nature will run out. Three well, it is a little difficult to say what the third hypothesis is. It has to do, they say, with the idea that capitalisms expansion is internal rather than external, that it subsumes not the noncapitalist environment but its own capitalist terrain that is, that the subsumption is no longer formal but real. I wont attempt to explain this for the simple reason that I havent a clue about what it means. Is there any important option they have neglected? Could it, just possibly, be that the careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors was just plain wrong? This is a possibility apparently too awful to contemplate, for Hardt and Negri never raise it.
THE ALT FAILS EMPIRE WILL NOT OVERSHOOT AND CAPITALISM WILL NOT COLLAPSE ON ITSELF Kimball, Managing Editor of New Critierion, 2K1 (Roger, The new anti-Americanism, The
New Critierion, Vol. 20, No. 2, October, http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/oct01/empire.htm) Empire is based on a laughably tiny idea, and one that is also old and wrong. The idea, again, is Marxs idea about the inevitable collapse of capitalism. It seemed big once upon a time. It is now as thoroughly discredited as an historical or political idea can be. Hardt and Negri gussy up Marx with a formidable panoply of New Age rhetoric about globalization. But the creaking you hear as you make your way through the book is the rusty grinding of the dialectic: it goes nowhere, it means nothing, but it keeps creaking along.
Eakins is also wrong to suggest that Empire may represent the Next Big Idea. This is mainly because
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Resistance Fails
RESISTANCE FROM THE MULTITUDES WILL FAIL 9/11 PROVES THAT ACTS OF RUPTURE WILL BE RECUPERATED Passavant and Dean, Assoc Profs of Political Science @ Hobart and William College, 2K2 (Paul and Jodi, Representation and the Event, Theory and Event, Vol. 5, No. 4)
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Alternative = Oppression
CALLS FOR UNITY EXCLUDE MARGINALIZED POSITIONS HARDT AND NEGRIS VISION OF THE MULTITUDE WILL OPPRESS AND IGNORE DISADVANTAGED VOICES WE SHOULD FIGHT CAPITALISM FROM THE INSIDE Rofel, Prof of Anthropology @ UC Santa Cruz, 2K1 (Lisa, Discrepant Modernities and Their
Discontents, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, Vol. 9, No. 3, Project Muse) Why can we not dream of flexible alliances and articulations? On one level Hardt and Negri would certainly agree. Their vision of rhizomatic politics inspired by Deleuze and Guattari leaves room for a wide variety of alliances. Yet I find their dream of a common language frightening. Who will establish the proper grammar of this language? Who will set the communicative import of terms? What of those who wish to speak in multiple tongues? They traipse over the issue of translation as if it were merely a pragmatic dilemma rather than, as many scholars have shown, a question of power. For those who live on the sexual margins, for example, the dream of the multitude brings not hope but fear. What reassurances do Hardt and Negri offer that the recent history of degraded existence for those forced out of the multitude in the name of sexual respectability will not be repeated in their version of unity? Can we not dream of fighting capitalism through articulations and alliances of variously identified subjects? Can we not dream of fighting capitalism in the manner, for example, of those who have fought AIDS? AIDS activism has addressed the mutual imbrication of power in the endless relays between expert discourse and institutional authority, between medical truth and social regulation, and between popular knowledge practices and struggles for survival. AIDS activism has thus multiplied the sites of political contestation to include immigration policy, public health policy, the practice of epidemiology and clinical medicine, the conduct of scientific research, the operation of the insurance and pharmaceutical industries, the role of the media, the decisions of rent-control boards, the legal definition of family, and ultimately the public and private administration of the body.17 It is unsettling that Hardt and Negri do not discuss these politics. Why must they dismiss them as merely about co-optation? Hardt and Negri have missed the enormous body of work that has shown that we do not have to pit class against other identities but, rather, can conceive of class in a manner that does not implicitly make the class subject a white, masculine, Euro-American subject. If bodies do matter, then Hardt and Negri still have a long way to go.
Why must we be forced into a dream of unity?
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Is there an alternative to this nexus of anomie and nomos produced by the state of exception? Agamben invokes genealogy and politics as two interrelated avenues of struggle. According to Agamben, "To show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means to open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself the name of 'politics'." (88) In a move reminiscent of Foucault, Agamben suggests that breaking the discursive lock on dominant ways of seeing, or more precisely not seeing, sovereign power is the only way to disrupt its hegemonic effects. Agamben clearly hopes that his theoretical analysis could contribute to the political struggle against authoritarianism, yet he only offers tantalizingly abstract hints about how this might work. Beyond the typical academic conceit that theoretical work is a decisive element of political struggle, Agamben seems to embrace a utopianism that provides little guidance for political action. He imagines, "One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for good." (64) More troubling is his messianic suggestion that "this studious play" will usher in a form of justice that cannot be made juridical. Agamben might do well to consider Hannah Arendt's warning that the belief in justice unmediated by law was one of the characteristics of totalitarianism. It might seem unfair to focus too much attention on Agamben's fairly brief discussion of alternatives to the sovereignty-exception-law nexus, but it is precisely those sections that reveal the flaws in his analysis. It also brings us back to our original question about how to resist the authoritarian implications of the state of exception without falling into the liberal trap of calling for more law. For Agamben, the problem with the "rule of law" response to the war on terrorism is that it ignores the way that the law is fundamentally implicated in the project of sovereignty with its corollary logic of exception. Yet the solution that he endorses reflects a similar blindness. Writing in his utopian-mystical mode, he insists, "the only truly political action, however, is that which severs the nexus between violence and law."(88) Thus Agamben, in spite of all of his theoretical sophistication, ultimately falls into the trap of hoping that politics can be liberated from law, at least the law tied to violence and the demarcating project of sovereignty.
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FOURTH, THIS ISNT OFFENSE, ITS A BAD PMN PLAN CREATES COMPARATIVELY MORE DUE PROCESS, SOLVING OUR INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION ADVANTAGES [READ YOUR AGAMBEN ANSWERS]
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heterosexuality on the description of bodies. One might claim that sex is here according to a heterosexual morphology. The category of "sex" thus establishes a principle of intelligibility for human beings, which is to say that no human being can be taken to be is human, unless that being is fully and coherently marked by sex And yet it would not capture Foucault's meaning merely to claim that there are humans who are marked by sex and thereby become intelligible. The point is stronger: to qualify as legitimately human, one must be coherently sexed. The incoherence of sex is precisely what marks off the abject and the dehumanized from the recognizably human.
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A2 Feminism: 1AR
FEMINIST IDENTITY CATEGORIES ARE CONSTITUTED BY NORMALIZATION ONLY QUESTIONING THEM CAN PROVIDE FREEDOM FROM GENDER SUBORDINATION Butler 95
[Judith, Prof of Rhetoric at UC Berkeley, Contingent Foundations, Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, New York: Routledge, 50//wfi-ajl]
Paradoxically, it may be that only through releasing the category of women from a fixed referent that something like "agency" becomes possible. For if the term permits of a resignification, if its referent is not fixed, then possibilities for new configurations of the term become possible. In a sense, what women signify has been taken for granted for too long, and what has been fixed as the "referent" of the term has been "fixed," normalized, immobilized, paralyzed in positions of subordination. In effect, the signified has been conflated with the referent, whereby a set of meanings have been taken to inhere in the real nature of women themselves. To recast the referent as the signified, and to authorize or safeguard the category of women as a site of possible resignifications is to expand the possibilities of what it means to be a woman and in this sense to condition and enable an enhanced sense of agency.
FEMINISMS STABLE FEMININE SUBJECT NORMALIZES IDENTITY, VIOLENTLY MARGINALIZING THE PEOPLE IT CLAIMS TO DEFEND, REINSCRIBING OPPRESSION *** Butler 99
[Judith, prof. of rhetoric at UC Berkeley, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: Routledge, 1999, 7-8//wfi-ajl]
My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effecitvely undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from women whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics. The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself consturcts has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely strategic purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as such an unintended yet consequential meaning. By conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation.
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transformative justice, we (as social and political beings) must go beyond what is consciously imaginable, calculable, and knowable. We must go beyond the realm of recognized possibility. This article does not assume the position, as some critics of Derrida may suggest, that, given the ruse of the gift, affording minority populations opportunity to attain equality should therefore be discarded entirely (see Rosenfeld, 1993, on the dilemmas of a Derridean and deconstructive framework for affirmative action). This article is far from a right-wing cry for
cessation of those undertakings that would further the cause of equality in American society. This article is also not a statement of despair , a skeptical and nihilistic pronouncement on the (im)possibility of justice (Fish, 1982) in which we are all rendered incapable of establishing a provisional, deconstructive political agenda for meaningful social change and action.
THEIR ARGUMENT IS THAT THE STATE SHOULD NEVER TAKE ANY ACTION AND THEY ABANDON ALL LAWS IN WHICH CASE THEY LINK TO ALL OF OUR STATE GOOD ARGUMENTS AND ALL OF OUR ANARCHY BAD ARGUMENTS THEIR ALTERNATIVE IN THIS CASE INCREASES HUMAN SUFFERING AND ABANDONS STRATEGIES THAT CAN CHIP AWAY AT STATE POWER Chomsky, Renowned Political Activist & Linguistics Professor at MIT, 4-24-2K
(Noam, Talking 'Anarchy' With Chomsky, By David Barsamian, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000424/chomsky)
Comment on an African proverb that perhaps intersects with what we're talking about: "The master's tools will never be used to dismantle the master's house." If this is intended to mean, don't try to improve conditions for suffering people, I don't agree. It's true that centralized power, whether in a corporation or a government, is not going to willingly commit suicide. But that doesn't mean you shouldn't chip away at it, for many reasons. For one thing, it benefits suffering people. That's something that always should be done, no matter what broader considerations are . But even from the
point of view of dismantling the master's house, if people can learn what power they have when they work together, and if they can see dramatically at just what point
The alternative to that is to sit in academic seminars and talk about how awful the system is .
they're going to be stopped, by force, perhaps, that teaches very valuable lessons in how to go on.
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What we do suggest, however, is simply the following: That political and/or legislative attempts at empowerment (as they currently stand) are insufficient to attain the deconstructive and discursive condition of equality for minority citizen groups (Collins, 1993). More significant, we contend that construction of these initiatives as Derridean gifts advance , at best, fleeting vertiginous moments of inequality and injustice. Still further, we recommend the (im)possible; that which, at first blush, admittedly delivers no pragmatic value for social analysts. Our invitation is for a fuller, more complete displacement of equality and initiatives pertaining to it such that there would be no giving for its own sake; that giving would not be
construed as giving, but as the way of democratic justice (i.e., its foreseeabilitywould be [un]conscious, its recognizability would be with[out] calculation). If we are able to give without realizing that we have done so, the possibility of reciprocation, reappropriation, and the economy of narcissism and representation are abruptly interrupted and perhaps indefinitely stalled. This form of giving more closely embodies the truth of human existence; that which betters life for all without regard for differential treatment, neither promoting nor limiting those who are other in some respect or fashion. This re-presentation of equality,
this justice both of and beyond the calculable economy of the law (Derrida, 1997), requires a different set of principles by which equality is conceived and justice is rendered. What would this
difference entail? Howwould it be embodied in civic life? In the paragraphs that remain, our intent is to suggest some protean guidelines as ways of identifying thework that lies ahead for the (im)possibility of justice and the search for aporetic equality.
A cultural politics of difference grounded in an affirmative postmodern frameworkwould necessarily prevail (Arrigo, 1998a; Henry&Milovanovic, 1996). In this more emancipatory, more liberatory vision, justice would be rooted in contingent universalities
(Butler, 1992; McLaren, 1994). Provisional truths, positional knowledge, and relational meanings would abound (Arrigo, 1995). New egalitarian social relations, practices, and institutions would materialize, producing a different, more inclusive context within which majority and minority sensibilities would interact (Mouffe, 1992). In otherwords, the multiplicity of economic, cultural, racial, gender, and sexual identities that constitute our collective society would interactively and mutually contribute to discourse on equality and our understanding of justice. These polyvalent contributions would signify a cut in t he fabric of justice, a text that pretends to
Equality on these terms would become an ethical, fluid narrative: an anxiety-ridden moment of suspense (Derrida, 1997, pp. 137-138) cycling toward the possibility of justice. For Derrida (1997), this is the moment of undecidability.
be a whole (i.e., the whole of democratic justice) (Derrida, 1997, p. 194). The cacophony of voices on which this aporetic equality would be based would displace any fixed (majoritarian) norms that would otherwise ensure an anterior, fortified, anchored justice. Instead,
the undecidable, as an essential ghost (Derrida, 1994), would be lodged in every decision about justice and equality (Desilva Wijeyeratne, 1998). For Derrida (1997), this spectral haunting is the trace, the differance.19 It is the avenir or that which is to come. The avenir is the event that exceeds calculation, rules, and programs: It is the justice of an infinite giving (Desilva
Wijeyeratne, 1998, p. 109). It is the gift of absolute dissymmetry beyond an economy of calculation (Derrida, 1997). This is what makes justice, and the search for equality, an aporia: It is possible only as an experience of the impossible. However,
it is the very (im)possibility of justice itself that renders the experience, and the quest for equality, amovement toward a destination that is forever deferred, displaced, fractured, and always to come.
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in his misappropriation of Marx, Derrida offers the young idealists of today a brand of anarchism they can consume in the belief that their actions constitute a rebellion for "democracy" and "emancipation" against the dehumanising norms and conventions that alienate them. Just as Stirner's "association of egoists" was a figment of his "Thought", Derrida's new International has the potential to divert a new generation of alienated youth into discursive acts against the symptomatic phrases rather than the materialist substance of capitalist crisis . 72. In his response to his critics who deride the idea of an
71. So
"international" without class he replies: Whenever I speak of the New International in Specters of Marx, emphasising that, in it, solidarity or alliance should not depend, fundamentally and in the final analysis, on class affiliation, this in no wise signifies, for me, the disappearance of "classes" or the attenuation of conflicts connected with "class" differences or oppositions (or, at least, differences or oppositions based on the new configurations of social forces for which I do in fact believe that we need new concepts and therefore, perhaps new names as well) . . . the disappearance of power relations, or relations of social domination . . . . At issue is, simply, another dimension of analysis and political commitment, one that cuts across social differences and oppositions of social forces (what one used to call, simplifying, "classes"). I would not say that such a dimension (for instance, the dimension of social, national, or international classes, or political struggles within nation states, problems of citizenship or nationality, or party strategies, etc.) is superior or inferior, a primary or a secondary concern, fundamental or not. All that depends, at every instant, on new assessments of what is urgent in, first and foremost, singular situations and of their structural implications. For such an assessment, there is, by definition, no pre-existing criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on the condition constituted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, decision and political responsibility -- repoliticization.108 73. In
the term "international" is a mystique. It covers for a nihilistic cult. Its Marxist meaning is inverted; just as messianicity is messianism without a given messiah -- because everyone is one's own messiah. There is no prior knowledge that can guide any collective action because that pre-anything (society, religion, etc.) is spectral, is the unfilled "void". There are only irreducible acts which individuals perform at any given moment by personally attempting to calculate, on the spot as it were, which of many "dimensions" or "forces" immediately concern them, "responsibly" and in the name of "justice " (whose gift?). If there is one name to apply to this contingent conjunction of
other words, "forces" which tries to "name" the "new" it is as I have argued above, performativity.109 Moreover, as I set out to prove, Derrida's performativity is the idealist philosophical license for the political/social concept of reflexivity as developed by Soros and Giddens to express their abstract understanding of the 'structure-agency' problem in the new global economy.110 Teamed-up, as performo-reflexivity,
we could not get a better prescription for "demobilising" and "depoliticising" the masses in the face of the current world crisis of capitalism.
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. The rebellion on the streets and the rebellion within the W.T.O. negotiations has started a new democracy movement - with citizens from across the world and the governments of the South refusing to be bullied and excluded from decisions in which they have a rightful share. Seattle had been chosen by the U.S to host the Third Ministerial conference because it is the home of Boeing and Microsoft, and symbolises the corporate
power which W.T.O rules are designed to protect and expand. Yet the corporations were staying in the background, and proponents of free-trade and W.T.O were going out of their way to say that W.T.O was a "member driven" institution controlled by governments who made democratic decisions. The refusal of Third World Governments to rubber-stamp decisions from which they had been excluded has brought into the open and confirmed the non-transparent and anti-democratic processes by which W.T.O rules have been imposed on the Third World and has confirmed the claims of the critics. W.T.O has earned itself names such as World Tyranny Organisation because it enforces tyrannical anti-people, anti-nature decisions to enable corporations to steal the world's harvests through secretive, undemocratic structures and processes. The W.T.O institutionalises forced trade not free trade, and beyond a point, coercion and the rule of force cannot continue. The W.T.O tyranny was apparent in Seattle both on the streets and inside the Washington State Convention centre where the negotiations were taking place. Non violent protestors including young people and old women, labour activists and environmental activists and even local residents were brutally beaten up, sprayed with tear gas, and arrested in hundreds. The intolerance of democratic dissent, which is a hallmark of dictatorship, was unleashed in full force in Seattle. While the trees and stores were lit up for Christmas festivity, the streets were barricaded and blocked by the police, turning the city into a war zone. The media has referred to the protestors as "power mongers" and "special interest" groups. Globalisers, such as Scott Miller of the U.S. Alliance for Trade Expansion said that the protestors were acting out of fear and ignorance. The thousands of youth, farmers, workers and environmentalists who marched the streets of Seattle in peace and solidarity were not acting out of ignorance and fear, they were outraged because they know how undemocratic the W.T.O is, how destructive its social and ecological impacts are, and how the rules of the W.T.O are driven by the objectives of establishing corporate control over every dimension of our lives - our food, our health, our environment, our work and our future. When labour joins hands with environmentalists, when farmers from the North and farmers from the South make a common commitment to say "no" to genetically engineered crops, they are not acting in their special interests. They are defending the common interests and common rights of all people, everywhere. The divide and rule policy, which has attempted to put consumers against farmers, the North against the South, labour against environmentalists had
the broad based citizens campaigns stopped a new did launch their own millennium round of democratisation of the global economy. The real Millennium Round for the W.T.O is the beginning of a new democratic debate about the future of the earth and the future of it's people. The centralized, undemocratic rules and structures of the W.T.O that are establishing global corporate rule based on monopolies and monocultures need to give way to an earth democracy supported by decentralisation and diversity. The rights of all species and the rights of all people must come before the rights of corporations to make limitless profits through limitless destruction. Free trade is not leading to freedom. It is leading to slavery. Diverse life forms are being enslaved through patents on life, farmers are being enslaved into high-tech slavery, and countries are being enslaved into debt and dependence and destruction of their domestic economies. We want a new millennium based on economic democracy not economic totalitarianism. The future is possible for humans and other species only if the principles of competition, organised greed, commodification of all life, monocultures, monopolies and centralised global corporate control of our daily lives enshrined in the W.T.O are replaced by the principles of protection of people and nature, the obligation of giving and sharing diversity, and the decentralisation and self-organisation enshrined in our diverse cultures and national constitutions. A new threshold was crossed in Seattle - a watershed towards the creation of a global citizen-based and citizen-driven democratic order. The future of the World Trade
failed. In their diversity, citizens were united across sectors and regions. While Millennium Round of W.T.O from being launched in Seattle, they Organisation will be shaped far more by what happened on the streets of Seattle and in the non-governmental (NGO) organisation events than by what happened in the Washington State Convention Centre.
The rules set by the secretive World Trade Organisation violate principles of human rights and ecological survival. They violate rules of justice and sustainability. They are rules of warfare against the people and the planet. Changing these rules is the most important democratic and human rights struggle of our times. It is a matter of survival.
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is to assemble and gather individuals but to recognize that the option of community vs. individualism plays the same game, based on the same conception of the modern subject as autonomous and autarkic. U.S. society offers good evidence for this: it is everything except a society, while displaying a most
are uninterested in politics or who seek an alternative way free radicals in the margins. In general, the point precisely depressing show of people obsessed by community whatever it may be: it starts with the neighborhood or the churches, not to mention family and its values, of course. Yet there has never been a more dissociated and divided society.
Essentially there has never been a more destructive myth than that of the individual who associates with others to form a we that is nothing but a facade or may even be completely factitious. First and this should be the starting point there is no individual who cannot be infinitely divided. Should there be only one, the individual is
stretching it to the limit.
never one, except materially, if I may say so, although nearly every part of the body is replaceable now adays (not to mention the sex). And now here is we, of this new International (which has never existed and thus is not new in the sense that we speak of a new car model): it (we) should not designate a community to which we belong except in terms of that to which we do not belong: not a family, not a nation, not a party, not a sex, not a language, and so on everything and anything,
Yet surely if we belong to nothing at all, it will not take anyone long to notice that we are nothing at all an abstraction, a ghost, even more so than the clouds of ideology and also that we
cannot help but belong de facto to a language, for instance: just as the International(e) was written in French. But that didnt stop it from b ecoming the Soviet anthem until Stalin replaced it with his anthem, with its clear nationalist resonance. An untimely link is a link nonetheless, or rather an alliance an engagement, complete with a commitment and a (diamond) ring. But this alliance does not rely on any positive contents for its definition, or on the items of a program to be carried out. That might imply that this alliance does not commit to anything only to witnessing itself (herself, alliance being feminine): like language said by Holderlin (quoted by Derrida in Specters) to have been given to human beings so that they can bear witness to what they are: speaking beings, first and foremost. Having quoted precisely the same fragment by Holderlin, I called this circularity deposition: What man [the human being] is he receives it from the word, and this being is being the witness of the word or its warden answering for it. Deposition is what one might call such circularity: to be the depositary of Being and making a deposition for its manifestness in speaking the received language.8 But it is important always to underscore, as Derrida does, that Inheritance is never a given, it is always a task9 ; that the human being has to be, like Dasein. (Have / to [a / a` ]: have as in have to. . . and not possess such is the sense of the ownmost in Heidegger. At least in one of several Heideggers, the one I address in that he speaks to me.) Further, a language has to be learned, starting with ours, the one we owe it to (so) to speak; the one we owe ourselves to, inasmuch as it has given us its word, given not as a fact but as a promise. Such circularity without origin constitutes a ring: infinite circulation of meaning, stopping nowhere (this would translate into the concept of God if God could be a concept and therefore nowhere a God or nowhere as God). What I also call langagement gives the formal structure of language (in quotation marks: the concept of formality is just meant to pr event any positive content from keeping its countenance): its transmissibility (or translatability) precisely prohibits any closure and thus any appropriation without remainder in one unique and universal language. To the very extent that the promise (the gift of language, of the word as given word) is not incarnated in any determined language just as there cannot really be any country corresponding to the Promised Land10 to that (de-ceptive) extent the idiom bears witness to this infinite engagement: it (the idiom) is the witness that, at the heart of that which allows the circulation of meaning, there is some resistance. The idiom will not yield to translatability unabridged and integral, and likewise the new International attests to the existence or occurrence in the bosom of universal westerniz ation the merchandising of the planet now called globalization of some thing that resists any appropriation insofar as this thing is not actually a thing and, deep down, is nothing at al l or is this nothing without
This sketchy alliance is spectral, first of all. It haunts the home like nihilism, described by Nietzsche
which, as it happens, no whole or totalization is possible (thus impossible: no totalization is able to totalize nothing or a bunch of spectres). as the uncanniest, most unheimlich of guests. I need not really mention again how it all starts and what ushers in the Specters, namely that it is Marx himself who speaks of the specter of communism.1 1 But I will mention it because
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Continues
dead at last, for good, once and for all.
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The need urgent and challenging to conceive the struggle in terms that do not call for opposition, of classes for instance, is plain. Is class struggle nothing but the same old song echoing? Has it outlived its given time, its usefulness? But that still doesnt entitle anyone to be so naive (full of counterfeit or rather interested naivete) and proclaim, urbi et orbi, that there is no struggle left , nothing but the euphoria of a classless society. The struggle is lasting, the fight goes on, even if the last fight (It is the last fight / The International(e) / Shall be the human race (all of humankind) [Cest la lutte finale / LInternationale /
might be cut off from its stubborn sprite without which it could not even pretend to be true)? Sera le genre humain]) is also a struggle for the end of fighting. (Unlike the Marseillaise, the International(e) has no war mongering and nationalist strain but delivers a vibrant call to abolish all discipline and
Whoever proclaims that there should be nothing but the International(e) as the whole of seems to give in to a dangerous or at least idealistic utopia: the ends of the new Alliance, deep down, are the dissociation of any (interest) group, including the association of the International, by the same token (Let us band together: that is its motif, if I may repeat it;
encourage deserters.) humankind in the future with an us possible only if it is opposed to them).
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Experts see evidence of the movement's growing influence in other arenas. Several high-profile economists, including Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, have endorsed some of the specific criticisms and objectives of the movement. Their
critique was reinforced by growing evidence of the failure of "Washington consensus" formulas to foster growth in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The issue of Third World debt relief resonated with a much wider audience when Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill and Irish rock star Bono jointly toured some of sub-Saharan Africa's poorest countries. Many development experts point to Jubilee 2000, the Third World debt-relief group whose work has been championed by Bono, as the nongovernment organization with perhaps the most influence over public policymaking. "
Jubilee 2000 had a tremendous impact in mobilizing focus and political support for the decisions that were eventually made," said Mats Karlsson, the World Bank's vice president for external affairs. The result, he said, "is a very radical debt relief program
that is now being implemented country by country." Other groups have had an effect too. Oxfam, the London-based relief organization, made waves with a report stating that more trade liberalization, if managed properly, is the best prescription for reducing world poverty. The International Labor Organization has convened a
All of the major organizations have grown enormously more powerful and effective. The only thing that's shrunk is the street protests," said Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the liberal Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington. "The movement hasn't lost momentum at all. It just shifted to a different set of tactics." For every organization involved in what some call the "movement of movements," there have also been smaller but symbolically important victories . Jubilee USA's
high-profile working group to assess the social implications of globalization. " talked to the city of Milwaukee."
crusade has been joined by a remarkably wide range of organizations, from conservative evangelical churches to the San Francisco 49ers football team. For the World Bank Bond Boycott, which hopes to generate the kind of financial pressure that helped end apartheid, a big turning point was the Milwaukee City Council's 13-1 vote this spring to join the campaign. "We've seen a huge shift," said boycott coordinator Neil Watkins. "When we started in 2000, there's no way we could have even
Leaders say the movement's evolving profile reflects a deliberate decision to tone down the increasingly provocative street mobilizations staged outside meetings of the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization and other global institutions. Although authorities said the
vast majority of participants were peaceful, small groups of Black Bloc anarchists and other extremists were giving the protests a violent edge. In Seattle, their antics contributed to $2 million in property damage and 500 arrests. Then came Sept. 11. Public revulsion for terrorism and heightened concern about security created even more ambivalence within the movement about the merits of street mobilizations. Anti-globalization groups had been planning a Seattle-size protest at the fall 2001 meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington, but the sessions were canceled shortly after Sept. 11. When the institutions held their spring meetings here in April, only 1,000 or so protesters rallied outside their headquarters. "After 9/11, the U.S. movement obviously reevaluated its tactics and its tone," said Lori Wallach, who has directed Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch operation since 1990. "But even before 9/11, there was a strategy judgment that we needed to diversify the ways
the movement's current level of energy and engagement far exceeds what prevailed during the struggle over ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
in which we organized and mobilized." Wallach said
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the movement has got bigger and ever more clearly targeted on the real enemy: the capitalist system . Since Seattle, tens of thousands of police,
democracy by the governments of G8 and their pliant international agencies. Along the way,
innumerable rounds of tear gas, batons, steel perimeter fences, vicious police dogs, exclusion orders, sealed borders, closed airports, blockaded roads, midnight raids all have been deployed by the capitalist governments to stop our voices being heard. But despite all that. Seattle, 30 November, was a defining moment when the movement became conscious of its power. But it did not come from nowhere. Years of grassroots collective action in the USA culminated in Seattle. Students had been at the heart of it, campaigning against the unleashing of corporate depravity that marked politics in the Clinton years. A new generation of activists on campuses across the USA and Canada became politicised by the invasion of the mind-snatchers as the big corporations made their move to take over of education. Faced with the hubris of money, student politics moved on from the politics of identity and introspection to anti-corporatism - to stem and turn back the agents of Nike, Coca-Cola and McDonalds dressed up as educationalists. Heavy-handed attempts at censorship or blackmail in the face of criticism of the big brand names only radicalised them more. They investigated the operations of the big corporations away from their campuses and found that the money used to bribe their administrators was sucked out of sweatshop labour in the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and China the one-dollar-a-day impoverished billions of the Third World. Seattle put it all together. As Manning Marable said: "The demonstrations in Seattle showed that growing numbers of Americans are recognising that all of these issues Third World sweatshops, the destruction of unions, deteriorating living standards, the dismantling of social programs inside the US are actually interconnected." But the campus campaigns in the USA were only one strand of the emerging anti-globalisation movement. The Zapatista uprising on New Years Day 1995 in the Chiapas region of Mexico was a rebellion against land hunger and violent autocracy and for indigenous rights and the end of the countrys enslavement to
Tens of thousands of new and old activists rallied to their call to support them and to open up many fronts of struggle against imperialism . A Zapatista internationalism
US companies, exploitation and foreign debt. was born in the Laconda rainforests and quickly formed cross-currents with the North American and then European anti-capitalists. Another strand that emerged in the 1990s was the radicalisation of some NGOs. In Britain, 1997 and 98 saw Jubilee 2000 mobilise 70,000 and 50,000 respectively to demand the G7 cancel the debts of the Third World. In the South, many of the smaller, more independent,1 NGOs who were closer to the suffering caused by government and business alike signed up to the anti-globalisation movement. Paradoxically, the "privatisation" of healthcare and famine relief removed the shackles of apolitical humanitarianism and allowed a generation of NGO workers to become overtly radical. But by far the biggest component of the emerging world anti-globalisation movement has been the millions of workers who have taken to the streets and gone on strike to resist the many attacks on them which originated in IMF "structural adjustment programmes" during the 1980s and 1990s. The IMF has engineered cuts in health and education programmes, let rip state controlled prices for foodstuffs and fuel and downsized the public
tens of millions have fought back time and again in South Asia, West Africa and Latin America. Sometimes they have won concessions. But often they have been betrayed by reformist and nationalist leaders. All too often they have not received active solidarity from trade unionists and leftists in the North. Yet, until the mid-1990s, we were in an era of rearguard actions against the sweeping tide of globalisation and neo-liberalism. US imperialism swept all before it in the wake of its victory in the Cold War. As Walden Bello noted, this era peaked with the founding of the World Trade Organization in 1994-95, the apogee of capitalism in the era of globalization. But it spawned a movement against itself and this connected with other movements. Success in stalling the Multilateral
sector workforce. But Agreement on Investment (MAI) gave it confidence. Then came the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which Bello has called the Stalingrad of the IMF when it became clear that the IMF itself, with its prescription for capital account liberalization, helped create the crisis, and with its cure of tight money and tight budgets, converted a financial crisis into economic collapse in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. Across the WTO, IMF and finally th e World Bank a complete crisis of legitimacy set in during the closing years of the 20th century. Their defensiveness and confusion only emboldened the movement against them, leading to the turning point that was Seattle. then
The broadening of the anti-globalisation movement has been accompanied since by its ideological deepening, in particular a growing sense of practical internationalism and conscious anti-capitalism. The phenomenon of summit-hopping is one expression of this, as is the proliferation of counter-conferences
and teach-ins with representatives from all over the world. The massive anti-Davos summit in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, gathered toghether all wings of
The movement of one no and many yeses intensified the debate around alternative visions and programmes for a world free from exploitation and oppression and what alliances and tactics are necessary to get there . That is welcome. But the course of the
the anti-globalisation movement.
movement itself has posed the question of which way forward? far more directly than any forum could. The buzz of success is giving way to a sharp debate over goals, strategy and tactics. After the Gothenburg violence we are hearing loud pleas for moderation and compromise from a self-appointed layer of go-betweens in the movement. All they ever wanted was a place at the negotiating table - and their support for protests that put them there has to be understood in the light of that. Susan George, an early icon of the movement who praised it last year for "doing more in one year than all her books have down in the last 25 years" was quick to condemn plainly and clearly the protestors action on the streets of Gothenburg because violence is invariably the game of our adve rsary.even in the case of provocation, even when the police is responsible for having opened hostilities Even those that proclaim to be revolutionary buckle under the p ressure of bourgeois denuciation of street violence. The Socialist Party in Sweden a so-called Trotskyist group - denounced those responsible for attacking police and property for scar[ing] the life out of the population in Gothenburg. They criticise several so called left organisations that still refuse to resolutely distance them selves from a direction which is totally stillborn . . Instead of total repudiation and contempt these organisations try to fish in the swamps of political street vio lence, said the Swedish section of the Fourth international. The Swedish SP counterposes work in mass movements to street violence. The fact is, effective mass protest has always been met with police violence. The fact is that those who denounce violence do not share our goal or that of hundreds of thousands of youth today: to smash the apparatus of capitalist repression that keeps our movement down and guarantees the continued rule of the big corporations. Christophe Aguiton, leader of ATTAC, anxious also to distance himself from the violence at Gothenburg, claims that the coalition of peaceful forces inside the anti-globalisation movement has meant that the question is no more, as in the 1970s, in the great majority of cases, to conquer the Power via revolutionary organisations, but to find other ways for radic al protest. We draw the opposite conclusion. The ferocity of the state shown in Gothenburg and Barcelona in June 2001, the removal or restriction of our democratic rights under way as we prepare for
this movement needs to raise its game. If we dont, we risk falling back to the isolated and fragmented protests over debt, pollution etc that characterised the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, that is where some of the
Genoa, show that
NVDA activists are headed as if frightened by the power of the mass movement they helped create that is shaking capitalism to its foundations. Today, this minute, we have the best chance since the 1970s to build revolutionary organisations that have a mass base among young people and org anised workers. Today the spectre" of anti-capitalism stalks the worlds rulers literally it is just yards away from their pampered international gatherings. So it is time the movement outlined its goals clearly. Anti-capitalism means expropriation of all the MNCs, banks, and the other large companies and landowners too, so that economic power is put in the hands of the workers and peasants without which rational economic planning will prove impossible. It means fighting for the overthrow of the bosses and bureaucrats in G7 and G77 countries alike. It means workers and peasants taking power into their own hands by means of general strikes and armed militias. It means working class people running their own lives - through the forums of elected and recallable delegates in councils. Lets grasp the opportunity to build a revolutionary inte rnational movement. Globalisation has sounded an alarm call to the youth and activists at the base of the worlds workers' movement. The dramatic surge in the concentration and centralisation of capital, the size and velocity of capital movements, the power of the G8 dominated "world economic institutions", the downsizing or privatisation of social welfare all threaten workers and small farmers and a substantial proportion of the lower middle classes. But enormous new opportunities also lie ahead. The greater unification of the world economy the higher levels of education and literacy called for by the introduction of new information and communications technology means that workers can spread the struggles and the lessons of struggles at the speed of thought, to use Bill Gates phrase. One no and many yes-es
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A revolutionary fight that links the anti-capitalist movement with the multimillioned organised working class will destroy capitalism . This pamphlet is an action guide for building that movement.
will not destroy capitalism.
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This justice that is to come, this equality as an aporetic destination, resides in discourse. The production of provisional truths and knowledge requires that the voice(s) of alterity emerge to construct new visions of relational and positional equality and justice. Thus, the undecidability of interactionthe inclusion of minority discourse with majoritarian discourse as differance represents a radically democratic in-road producing multilingual, multicultural, and multiracial effects for equality . This is what Caputo (1997) refers to as a highly miscegenated polymorphism (p. 107). For Derrida (1991, 1997), a radical democracy is constituted by preparedness for the incoming of the other . Derrida (1997) advocates highly a receptacle for difference that receives the provisional truths, positional knowledge, and supplemental processes of meaning making is necessary in the struggle for (im)possible equality.
short,
heterogenous, porous, selfdifferentiating quasi-identities, [and] unstable identities . . . that . . . do not close over and form a seamless web of the selfsame (p. 107). In
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If we cannot confidently assert that the earth is round or that evolution occurred, because those with a different epistemology present a counterargument that is valid in their world even if not in ours, then the same must be true of other scientific or historical statements. It is only the tools of the Enlightenment tradition that allow us to refute such unsupported claims as that virtually all of what we now consider the accomplishments of
Western civilization was stolen from black Africans, n160 or that the tragic bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building was the work of agents of the United States government.
It is only the acceptance of reason and empiricism as the epistemological standard that allows us to reject such pseudoscientific theories , currently fashionable in some quarters, as that melanin is "one of the strongest electromagnetic field forces in the universe" with the power to make its possessors intellectually superior, n161 or that Jewish doctors are injecting black babies with the AIDS virus. n162 Nor is it a defense that the modern alternative epistemologies advocated by radical and religious scholars do not always lead to such absurdity. n163 The point is that antirational epistemologies, unlike the principles of the Enlightenment, offer no weapons against a variety of intellectual and political atrocities. As Marvin Frankel points out, "for most of Judaism's 5700-plus years, . . . the great
Western religions neither caused democracy to happen nor exhibited discomfort about its absence." n164 [*483] Even today, the religious epistemologies that mandate discrimination against gays and lesbians are indistinguishable from those in the not too distant past that mandated discrimination against blacks. n165 And if the melanin or AIDS myths are not sufficiently silly or frightening,
there is a more horrific example of the beliefs that become acceptable when reason and empiricism are demoted as socially constructed epistemologies. Deborah Lipstadt notes that postmodern doctrines have allowed Holocaust denial theories to flourish and to be treated as "the other side," another "point of view," or a "different perspective": n166 [The postmodern doctrines of Fish and Rorty] fostered an atmosphere in which it became harder to say that an idea was beyond the pale of rational thought. At its most radical it contended that there was no bedrock thing such as experience. . . . Because deconstructionism argued that experience was relative and nothing was fixed, it created an atmosphere of permissiveness toward questioning the meaning of historical events and made it hard for its proponents to assert that there was anything "off limits" for this skeptical approach. n167 Thus, those who deny that the Holocaust occurred are, in an epistemologically plural world, as entitled to demand public recognition of their beliefs as are the creationists, the Afrocentrists, and all the others who reject the epistemology of the Enlightenment. They can demand -- and Lipstadt sees Holocaust denial as "a threat to all those who believe in the ultimate power of reason," n168 but the converse is also true: the denial of the ultimate power of reason is a threat to those who would keep the memory of the Holocaust alive.
university funds student speech on historical topics generally it must also fund a group dedicated to denying the Holocaust.
many defenders of epistemological pluralism, if not current case law, would support such demands from other groups -- that textbooks should reflect the existence and potential soundness of denial theories; that if the public schools teach the Holocaust as a historical event, they must also teach that it may not have happened; that if parents object to their children being taught what they consider a historical fabrication, the [*484] children should be excused from history class; that if a state
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This article conceptually explores the problem of democratic justice in the form of legislated equal rights for minority citizen groups. Following Derridas critique of Western logic and thought, at issue is the (im)possibility of justice for under- and nonrepresented constituencies. Derridas socioethical treatment of justice , law, hospitality, and community suggests that the majority bestows a gift (ostensible sociopolitical empowerment); however, the ruse of this gift is that the giver affirms an economy of narcissism and reifies the hegemony and power of the majority. This article concludes by speculating on the possibility of justice and equality informed by an affirmative postmodern framework. A cultural politics of difference, contingent universalities, undecidability, dialogical pedagogy, border crossings, and constitutive thought would underscore this transformative and deconstructive agenda.
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postmodern views of power that overemphasize hegemony and local politics provide a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing that such efforts are doomed. Hegemonic power appears as ever expanding and invading. It may even attempt to annex the counterdiscourses that have
thus participate in relations of ruling. In this sense, developed, oppositional discourses such as Afrocentrism, postmodernism, feminism, and Black feminist thought. This is a very important insight. However, there is a difference between being aware of the power of ones enemy and arguing that such power is so pervasive that resistance will, at best, provide a brief respite and, at
This emphasis on power as being hegemonic and seemingly absolute, coupled with a belief in local resistance as the best that people can do, flies in the face of actual, historical successes. African-Americans, women, poor people, and others have achieved results through social movements, revolts, revolutions, and other collective social action against government, corporate, and academic structures. As James Scott queries, What remains to be explained is why
worst, prove ultimately futile. theories of hegemonyhaveretained an enormous intellectual appeal to social scientists and historians (1990, 86). Perhaps f or colonizers who refuse, individualized, local resistance is the best that they can envision. Over
emphasizing hegemony and stressing nihilism not only does not resist injustice but participates in its manufacture. Views of power grounded exclusively in notions of hegemony and nihilism are not only pessimistic, they can be dangerous for members of historically marginalized groups. Moreover, the emphasis on local versus structural institutions makes it difficult to examine major structures such as racism, sexism, and other structural forms of oppression.7 Social theories that reduce hierarchical power relations to the level of representation, performance, or constructed phenomena not only emphasize the likelihood that resistance will fail in the face of a pervasive hegemonic presence, they also reinforce perceptions
that local, individualized micropolitics constitutes the most effective terrain of struggle. This emphasis on the local
If politics becomes reduced to the personal, decentering relations of ruling in academia and other bureaucratic structures seems increasingly unlikely. As Rey Chow opines, What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand (1993, 13). Viewing decentering as a strategy situated within a larger process of
dovetails nicely with increasing emphasis on the personal as a source of power and with parallel attention to subjectivity. resistance to oppression is dramatically different from perceiving decentering as an academic theory of how scholars should view all truth. When weapons of resistance are theorized away in this fashion, one might ask, who really benefits? Versions of decentering as presented by postmodernism in the American academy may have limited utility for African-American women and other similarly situated groups. Decentering provides little legitimation for centers of power for Black women other than those of preexisting marginality in actual power relations. Thus,
the way to be legitimate within postmodernism is to claim marginality, yet this same marginality renders Black women as a group powerless in the real world of academic politics. Because the logic of decentering opposes constructing new centers of any kind, in effect the stance of critique of decentering provides yet another piece of the new politics of containment. A depoliticized decentering disempowers Black women as a group while providing the illusion of empowerment. Although
individual African-American women intellectuals may benefit from being able to broker the language and experiences of marginality in a commodified American
groups already privileged under hierarchical power relations suffer little from embracing the language of decentering denuded of any actions to decenter actual hierarchical power relations in academia or elsewhere. Ironically, their privilege may actually increase.
academic marketplace, this in no way substitutes for sustained improvement of Black women as a group in these same settings. In contrast,
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More broadly, postcolonial theorists focus on recovering the voices of subjects silenced by patriarchy and colonial rule (The Empire Writes Back is the title of one popular collection); they assume that all contemporary racial, ethnic, and cultural oppressions can all be attributed to Western colonialisms. American appropriations of postcolonial theory have created a unitary discourse of the postcolonial that refers to highly variable situations and conditions throughout the world; thus, Gayatri Spivak is able to talk about the paradigmatic subaltern woman, as well as New World Asians (the old migrants) and New Immigrant Asians (often model minorities) being disciplinarized together? Other postcolonial feminists also have been eager to seek structural similarities, continuities, conjunctures, and alliances between the postcolonial oppressions experienced by peoples on the bases of race, ethnicity, and gender both in formerly colonized populations in the third world and among immigrant populations in the United States, Australia, and England. Seldom is there any attempt to link these assertions of unitary postcolonial situations among diasporan subjects in the West to the historical structures of colonization, decolonization, and contemporary developments in particular non-Western countries. Indeed, the term postcolonial has been used to indiscriminately describe different regimes of economic, political, and cultural domination in the Americas, India, Africa, and other third-world countries where the actual historical experiences of colonialism have been very varied in terms of local culture, conquest, settlement, racial exploitation, administrative regime, political resistance, and articulation with global capitalism. In careless hands, postcolonial theory can represent a kind of theoretical imperialism whereby scholars based in the West, without seriously engaging the scholarship of faraway places, can project or speak for postcolonial situations elsewhere. Stuart Hall has warned against approaches that universalize racial, ethnic, and gender oppressions without locating the actual integument of powerin concrete institutions. A more fruitful strand of postcolonial studies is represented by subaltern scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, who has criticized the Indian national projects, which are based on Western models of modernity and bypass many possibilities of authentic, creative, and plural development of social identities, including the marginalized communities in Indian society. He suggests that an alternative imagination that draws on narratives of community would be a formidable challenge to narratives of capital. This brilliant work, however, is based on the assumption that both modernity and capitalism are universal forms, against which non-Western societies such as India can only mobilize preexisting cultural solidarities such as locality, caste, tribe, religious community, or ethnic identity. This analytical opposition between a universal modernity and non-Western culture is rather old-fashioned it is as if Chatterjee believes the West is not present in Indian elites who champion narratives of the indigenous community. Furthermore, the concept of a universal modernity must be rethought when, as Arif Dirlik observes, the narrative of capitalism is no longer the narrative of the history of Europe; non-European capitalist societies now make their own claims on the history of capitalism. The loose use of the term the postcolonial, then, has had the bizarre effect of contributing to a Western tradition of othering the Rest; it suggests a postwar scheme whereby the third world was followed by the developing countries, which are now being succeeded by the postcolonial. This continuum seems to suggest that the further we move in time, the more beholden nonWestern countries are to the forms and practices of their colonial past. By and large, anthropologists have been careful to discuss how formerly colonized societies have developed differently in relation to global economic and political dominations and have repositioned themselves differently vis-a-vis capitalism and late modernity. By specifying differences in history, politics, and culture, anthropologists are able to say how the postcolonial formation of Indonesia is quite different from that of India, Nicaragua, or Zaire.
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One may also begin to see how local and global levels or arenas each acts as restraints, parameters and motivations that both condition and inspire, constrain and enable the revitalization of Carib identification. Globalized terms, images, motifs and practices of indigeneity act as fund of materials which are engaged and sifted through by Caribbean Amerindians to define who they were, are, and who they are to be (see Robertson 1992). Mere association with and invocation of the names of large international indigenous bodies can serve as symbolic capital for these groups. To a certain extent, the material for a reformulated and revived indigenous identity comes from and is negotiated out of a globalized aboriginality and a globally organized political economy of tradition where even the most seemingly inane or trivial traditional practices take on large, global significance as an alternative to the evils of modernization. I see these trends as adding, paradoxically, to the Caribs own authenticity claims paradoxical because they emphasize the icons and language of local continuity (despite the various global indigenous elements drafted into the process of recreating the meaning of those elements said to be locally continuous), and yet, in the "public eye" in Trinidad their indigenous qualities may be enforced insofar as they are endorsed by "foreign" trends and institutions, thus rendering them more serious, more "real." I see the Caribs self-understanding of indigeneity as very much a "work-in-progress," an indigenous "site under (re)construction," within a growing global network. We might even tentatively begin to posit that this global network is the indigene, that is, adaptable to and derivative of a variety of local platforms. A central process in the reconstruction of Carib indigeneity is the organization, reproduction and display of "Carib culture" for a national audience and for the tourist market (for a similar case, see Friedman 1990). Presentation itself thus becomes an instrument in the constitution of selfhood. Processes of globalization help to "lift" the discourse of local aboriginal issues and struggles to a global plane. Aboriginal global organization helps in itself to further define aboriginality. International organizations, whether inter-statal or indigenous, assist in the creation of an "international personality" of indigenous peoples. The Caribs increasingly come to define themselves, in part, within and through the international network of indigenous organizations.
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I also do not accept any rigid dichotomy between local (or regional) and global phenomena, according to which every characterization of the social sphere must either take on strictly local attributes or eliminate them altogether in the wake of the effects of globalization. As long as the local/global axis is dichotomized in such a rigid and asymmetric manner, the theoretical and empirical dilemma will be that the political, social and economic processes have to be categorized under the heading either of global attributes or of authentic local circumstances that bear at best only a superficial resemblance to phenomena alleged to be global in scope. As a result, a prohibition against a synchronism the incommensurable' (Max Frisch) or the 'non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous' (Wilhelm Finder) must be strictly observed (see Mannheim, (1928; 1993: 358). To follow such prohibitions is to miss out on significant societal processes that result from struggles between local and global phenomena, or that constitute emerging social structures, cultural processes of political developments that succeed in joining these forces in novel ways. Cultural manifestations are never created ex nihilo and strictly in accordance with either local or global reference (Tomlinson, 1999). But it is also unrealistic to expect that forms of knowledge disappear altogether in the wake of the effects of globalization without leaving any trace (see Stehr, 1991), or that wellestablished patterns of social conduct vanish without signs of lasting influence. With globalization and fragmentation proceeding concurrently, global as well as particularistic political developments generate and heighten conflicts (see Schmidt, 1995), for
My own perspective on the effects of globalization, however, is not a post-modern one.
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example between claims of universal human rights and particularistic identities based on language, religion, nationality, race and ethnicity (see Benhatib, 1999). Indeed, images of
political opportunities that result from extending the boundaries of governance beyond the nation-state and ominous threats that issue from the same developments for the nation-state appear to co-exist side-byside in many of the accounts of the political implications of globalization.
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Rejection Bad
THE CRITIQUE PARALYZES. CRITICISM MUST COME FROM WITHIN STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL POWER
Arun Agrawal, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, Peace & Change, Oct
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A2 Localism
THERES GOOD GLOBALISM AND BAD GLOBALISM. WE MUST SUPPORT THE GOOD TO OVERCOME THE BAD.
Norman Solomon, executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy, 2/20/2003, http://www.fair.org/media-beat/030220.html, accessed 2/23/03 One of the big media buzzwords to emerge in recent years is "globalization." By now, we're likely to know what it means. That's unfortunate -- because at this point the word is so ambiguous that it doesn't really mean much of anything. News outlets have reported that key international pacts like NAFTA and the World Trade Organization gained U.S. approval during the 1990s because most politicians in Washington favor "globalization." According to conventional media wisdom, those globalizers want to promote unfettered communication and joint endeavors across national boundaries. Well, not quite. These days, at the White House and on Capitol Hill, the same boosters of "globalization" are upset about certain types of global action -- such as the current grassroots movement against a war on Iraq. For the most part, the same elected officials and media commentators who have applauded moneydriven globalization are now appalled by the sight of anti-war globalization. The recent spectacle of millions of people demonstrating against war on the same day around the world was enough to cause apoplexy at the White House. That's consistent with a recurring pattern: "Pro-globalization" forces are unhappy to see the globalizing of solidarity for labor rights, economic justice, the environment and alternatives to war. A similar contradiction belies the media image of "anti-globalization" activists as foes of internationalism who want to rigidify national boundaries, reinforce isolation and prevent worldwide interactions. On the contrary, advocates for human rights, environmental protection and peace -- while largely opposing global superstructures like NAFTA and the WTO -- have been busily creating ways to work with like-minded people all over the planet. The form of "globalization" deemed worthy of the name by media is corporate globalization, which gives massive capital even more momentum to flatten borders and run roughshod over national laws. Deluging every country with Nikes, Burger Kings and ATMs is presumptively indicative of progress, no matter how bad the working conditions, how unhealthy the products or how unjust the economic consequences. Meanwhile, fans of "globalization" routinely contend that protection of labor rights or the environment amounts to unfair restraint of trade, retrograde protectionism and antiquated resistance to "reforms." By itself, "globalization" is much too simplistic a word to tell us anything. The term is so murky that we may need to discard it, or at least develop some new phrases to bring realities into focus. Today, the war-crazed Bush administration and the bipartisan majority of enablers in Congress are fervent proponents of what might be called "isolationist intervention." Sure, the present-day American leaders proclaim their global vision and declare that they want to engage with the world, but on their own terms -- with the U.S. government reserving the right to determine its policies in isolation from any nation that fails to offer subservient support. With hefty corporate backing, they insist that the United States has the right to intervene militarily overseas. Why? Because they say so. The gist of this approach to "globalization" was well expressed by the glib pundit Thomas Friedman, whose 1999 book "The Lexus and the Olive Tree" lauded the tandem roles of corporate capitalism and American militarism. "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist," he wrote. "McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the U.S. Air Force F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps." This veiled hand-and-fist stance is being actively rejected by millions of people marching through cities in many parts of the world. And the leaders of numerous countries are giving voice to that rejection. Speaking to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 18, Malaysia's prime minister Mahathir Mohamed -- the incoming chair of the Non-Aligned Movement -- combined realism with idealism. "We have no military or financial strength," he said, "but we can join the world movement to oppose war on moral grounds." The globalization of that movement is something to behold. And nurture.
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Permutation
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ARE SUCCESSFULLY REDEPLOYED FOR LOCAL ENDS
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France 19751976,2003, p. 6 So I would say: for the last ten or fifteen years, the immense and proliferating criticizability of things, institutions, practices, and discourses; a sort of general feeling that the ground was crumbling beneath our feet, especially in places where it seemed most familiar, most solid, and closest [nearest] to us, to our bodies, to our everyday gestures. But alongside this crumbling and the astonishing efficacy of discontinuous, particular, and local critiques, the facts were also revealing something that could not, perhaps, have been foreseen from the outset: what might be called the inhibiting effect specific to totalitarian theories, or at least what I mean isall-encompassing and global theories. Not that all-encompassing and global theories havent, in fairly constant fashion, providedand dont continue to provide tools that can be used at the local level; Marxism and psychoanalysis are living proof that they can. But they have, I think, provided tools that can be used at the local level only when, and this is the real point, the theoretical unity of their discourse is, so to speak, suspended, or at least cut up, ripped up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured, dramatized, theatricalized, and so on. Or at least that the totalizing approach always has the effect of putting the brakes on. So that, if you like, is my first point, the first characteristic of what has been happening over the last fifteen years or so: the local character of the critique; this does not, I think, mean soft eclecticism, opportunism, or openness to any old theoretical undertaking, nor does it mean a sort of deliberate asceticism that boils down to losing as much theoretical weight as possible. I think that the essentially local character of the critique in fact indicates something resembling a sort of autonomous and noncentralized theoretical production, or in other words a theoretical production that does not need a visa from some common regime to establish its validity.
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the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray,
Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more
. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the
generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. "
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from
psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered.
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect
that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
THIRD, SPECIFIC SOLVENCY TRUMPS - PLAN SOLVES WORSE INJUSTICE BY GUARANTEEING DUE PROCESS TO ENEMY COMBATANTS AND ENDING INDEFINITE DETAINMENT AND TORTURE UNDER MILLIGAN. CROSSAPPLY TRIBE AND KATYAL FOURTH, THEIR LINK EV IS TERRIBLE IT JUST SAYS THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF HABEAS WITHOUT SHOWING WHY WE USE ONE OR THE OTHER OR GIVING A REASON THAT THATS BAD
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SIXTH, THE STATUS QUO IS WORSE COMBATANTS HAVE NO RIGHTS. PLAN AT LEAST GIVES THEM TO SOME PEOPLE SEVENTH, THEIR BRIGHT EV INDICTS THE ALTERNATIVE ACTION IS THE ONLY REMEDY TO INDIFFERENCE. PLAN IS KEY TO TAKING A SIDE AND DOING SOMETHING EIGHTH, TURN- UPHOLDING LEGAL PRINCIPLES PROVES THE LAWS FRAUDULENCE AND HOLDS IT ACCOUNTABLE
Vclav Havel, playwright, political prisoner, and president elect of Czechoslovakia, 1986 (Living in Truth, p. 137-38) appeal to the laws not just to the laws concerning human rights, but to all laws does not mean at all that those who do so have succumbed to the illusion that in our system the law is anything other than what it is. They are well aware of the role it plays. But precisely because they know how desperately the system depends on it on the noble version
A persistent and never-ending of the law, that is they also know how enormously significant such appeals are. Because the system cannot do without the law, because it is hopelessly tied down by
Demanding that the laws be upheld is an act of living within the truth that threatens the whole mendacious structure at its point of maximum mendacity. Over and over again, such appeals make the purely ritualistic nature of the law clear to society and to those who inhabit its power structures. They draw attention to its real material substance and thus, indirectly, compel all those who take refuge behind the law to affirm and make credible this agency of excuses, this means of communication, this reinforcement of the social arteries outside of which their will could not be made to circulate through society. They
the necessity of pretending the laws are observed, it is compelled to react in some way to such appeals. thus are compelled to do so for the sake of their own consciences, for the impression they make on outsiders, to maintain themselv es in power (as part of the systems own mechanism of self-preservation and its principles of cohesion), or simply out of fear that they will be reproached for being clumsy in handli ng the ritual. They have no other choice: because they cannot discard the rules of their own game, they can only attend more carefully to those rules. Not to react to challenges means to undermine their own excuse and lose control of their mutual communications system.
To assume that the laws are a mere facade, that they have no validity and that therefore it is pointless to appeal to them would mean to go on reinforcing those aspects of the law that create the facade and the ritual. It would mean confirming the law as an aspect of the world of appearances and enabling those who exploit it to rest easy with the cheapest (and therefore the most mendacious) form of their excuse. I have frequently witnessed policemen, prosecutors or
judges if they were dealing with an experienced Chartist or a courageous lawyer, and if they were exposed to public attention (as individuals with a name, no longer protected by the anonymity of the apparatus) suddenly and anxiously begin to take particular care that no cracks appear in the ritual. This does not alter the fact
the very existence of the officials anxiety necessarily regulates, limits and slows down the operation of that despotism.
that a despotic power is hiding behind that ritual, but
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jargonistic postmodernisms that now dot the landscape. They are worse are neither capable of understanding and analyzing the power structure of this country nor are they capable of understanding the particular aesthetic merit of an individual work of art. Whether you call it deconstruction or postmodernism or poststructuralism or post-anything, they all represent a sort of spectacle of giving back
SAID: One would have to pretty much scuttle all the jaw-shattering than useless. They tickets that the entrance and saying, were really out of it. We want to check into our private resort and be left alone. [31 7]
Reengagement with intellectual processes has very little to do with being politically correct, or citing fashionable names, or striking acceptable poses, but rather having to do with a return in a way to a kind of old-fashioned historical, literary, and above all, intellectual scholarship based upon the premise that human beings, men and women, make their own history. And just as things are made, they can be unmade and re-re-remade. That
sense of intellectual and political and citizenry empowerment is what I think the intellectual class needs. Theres only one way to anchor oneself, and that is by affiliation with a cause, with a political movement. There has to be some identification, not with the
; there has to be an affiliation with matters involving justice, principle, truth, conviction. Those dont occur in a laboratory or a library. For the American intellectual, that simply means, at bottom, in a globalized environment , that there is today one superpower, and the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world, based upon profit and power, has to be altered from an imperial one to one of coexistence among human communities that can make and remake their own histories together. This seems to me to be the number-one priority---theres nothing else.
powers that be, with the Secretary of State or the great leading philosopher of the time or sage An American has a particular role. If youre an anthropologist in America, its not the same thing as being an anthropologist in India or France; its a qualitatively different thing. HARLOW: Were both professors in English departments, despite the fact that the humanities have been quite irresponsible, unanswerable SAID: Not the humanities. The professors of humanities. HARLOW: Well, OK, the professors, but there is this question SAID: I take the general view that, for all its inequity, for all its glaring faults and follies, the university in this society remains a relatively utopian place, a place of great privilege
. There needs to be some sense of the university as a place in which these issues are not, because it is that kind of place, trivialized. Universities cannot afford to become just a platform for a certain kind of narcissistic specialization and jargon. What you need is a regard for the product of the human mind. And thats why Ive been very dispirited, I must tell you, but aspects of the great
Western canon debate, which really suggest that the oppressed of the world, in wishing to be heard, in wishing their work to be recognized, really wish to do dirt on everything else. Thats not the spirit of resistance. We come [318] back to Aime Cesaires line, There is room for all that at the rendezvous of victory. Its not that some have to be pushed off and demeaned and denigrated. The question is not whether we should read more black literature or less literature by white men. The issue is excellence---we need everything, as much as possible, for understanding the human adventure in its fullest, without resorting to enormous abstractions and generalizations, without replacing Euro-centrism with other varieties of ethnocentrism, or say, Islamo-centrism or Afro-centrism or gyno-centrism. Is it a game of substitutions? Thats where intellectuals have to clarify themselves. HARLOW: I agree, but at least within certain university contexts there have been lately two major issues: the Gulf War and multiculturalism. I have not seen any linkage between the two. SAID: The epistemology and the ethic of specialization have been accepted by all. If youre a literature professor, thats what you talk about. And if youre an education specialist, thats what you talk about. The whole idea of being in the university means not only respect for what others do, but respect for what you do. And the sense that they all are part of a community. The main point is that we ascribe a utopian function to the intellectual. Even inside the university, the prevalence of norms based upon domination and coercion is so strong because the idea of authority is so strong---whether its authority derived from the nation-state, from religion, from the ethnos, from tradition---is so powerful that its gone relatively unchallenged, even in the very disciplines and studies that we are engaged in. Part of intellectual work is
And if you can understand that, they your work is conducted in such a way as to be able to provide alternatives to authoritative and coercive norms that dominate so much of our intellectual life, our national and political life, and our international life above all.
understanding how authority is formed. Like everything else, authority is not God-given. Its secular.
HARLOW: What can alternative publications do to interrupt that particular way of presenting authority? SAID: One is to remind readers that there are always other ways of looking at the issue---whatever it happens to be---than those that are officially credentialed. Second, one of the things that one needs to do in intellectual enterprises is to---Whitehead says somewhere---always try to write about an author keeping in mind what he or she might say of what youre writing. To adapt from that: some sense in which your constituency might be getting signals about what youre doing. The agenda isnt set only by you; its set by others. You cant represent the others, but you can take them into account by soliciting their attention. Let such a publication be a place in which its pages that which is occluded or suppressed or has disappeared from the consciousness of the West, of the intellectual, can be allowed to appear. Third, some awareness of the methodological issues involved, and the gathering of information, the production of scholarship, the relationship between scholarship and knowledge. The great virtue of these journals is that they are not guided by professional norms. Nobody is going to get tenure out of writing for these journals. And nobody is trying to advance in a career by what he or she does there. So that means therefore that one can stand back and look at these things and take questions
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having to do with how people know things. In other words, a certain emphasis on novelty is important and somewhat lacking. You dont want to feel too v irtuous in what you are doing: that Im the only person doing this, therefore, I must continue doing it. Wit is not such a bad thin g.
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McClean
01
I cannot find in Habermas's lengthy narratives very much more than I have found in the Federalist Papers, or in Paine's Common Sense, or in Emerson's Self Reliance or Circles. I simply don't find the concept of uncoerced and fully informed communication between peers in a democratic polity all that difficult to understand, and I don't much see the need to theorize to death such a simple concept, particularly where the only persons that are apt to take such narratives seriously are already sold, at least in a general sense. Of course, when you are trying to justify yourself in the face of the other members of your chosen club (in Habermas's case, the Frankfurt School) the intricacy of your explication may have less to do with simple concepts than it has to do with parrying for respectability in the eyes of your intellectual brethren. But I don't see why the rest of us need to partake in an insular debate that has little to do with anyone that is not very much interested in the work of early critical theorists such as Horkheimer or Adorno, and who might see their insights as only modestly relevant at best. Not many self-respecting engaged political scientists in this country actually still take these thinkers seriously, if they ever did at all.
Take Habermas, whose writings are admittedly the most relevant of the group. regarding communicative action, discourse ethics, democracy and ideal speech situations
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The primary Levinasian struggle with philosophical discourse is conducted within Heideggerian language because the philosophical depth of Levinas's ethics of infinite responsibility to alterity is revealed in both his debts to and departures from Heidegger. Prepositions are crucial here for while Levinas accepts Heidegger's notion of the individual's intimate connection with alterity, he rejects the Heideggerian grammar of the self-other relationship. The rejection takes the form of two grammatical shifts enacted in Levinas's writing, beginning with the change from "with" to "in front of." Whereas for Heidegger the relationship to the other "appears in the essential situation of Miteinandersein, reciprocally being with another, Levinas expresses resistance to the "association of side-by-side" that Heidegger's Mit suggests: "[I]t is not the preposition mitthut should describe the original relationship with the other." It is instead the in front of, the face-to-face that locates the ethical relation to the other. This grammatical shift to the face-to-face acknowledges the fundamental separation of the self from the Other. To maintain an ethical bond with the Other, to maintain the infinity of the Other, is to see the self in its relation to something "it cannot absorb.
The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill. I can wish. " And yet this power is quite the contrary of power. The triumph of this power is its defeat as power. At the very moment when my power to kill realizes itself, the other (autrui) has escaped me. I can, for sure, in killing attain a goal; I can kill as I hunt or slaughter animals, or as I fell trees. But when I have grasped the other (autrui) in the opening of being in general, as an element of the world where I stand, where I have seen him on the horizon, I have not looked at him in the face, I have not encountered his face. The temptation of total negation, measuring the infinity of this attempt and its impossibility - this is the presence of the face. To be in relation with the other (autrui) face to face is to be unable to kill. It is also the situation of discourse. If things are only things, this is because the
horizon of being in general and possessing him. The Other (Autrui) is the sole being whose negation can only announce itself as total: as murder. (Autrui)
relation with them is established as comprehension. As beings, they let themselves be overtaken from the perspective of being and of a totality that lends them a signification. The immediate is not an object of comprehension. An immediate given of con- sciousness is a contradiction in terms. To be given is to be exposed to the ruse of the understanding, to be seized by the mediation of a concept, by the light of being in general, by way of a detour, "in a roundabout way." To be given is to signify on the basis of what one is not. The relation with the face, speech, an event of collectivity, is a relation with beings as such, as pure beings. That the relation with a being is the invocation of a face and already speech, a relation with a certain depth rather than with a horizon - a breach in the horizon - that my neighbor is the being par excellence, can indeed appear somewhat surprising when one is accustomed to the conception of a being that is by itself insignificant, a profile against a
. The face signifies otherwise. In it the infinite resistance of a being to our power affirms itself precisely against the murderous will that it defies; because, completely naked (and the nakedness of the face is not a figure of style), the face signifies itself. We cannot even say that the face is an opening, for this would be to make it relative to an environing plenitude. Can things take on a face? Is not art an
luminous horizon and only acquiring signification in virtue of its presence within this horizon
activity that lends faces to things? Does not the facade of a house regard us? The analysis thus far does not suffice for an answer. We ask ourselves all the same if the impersonal but fascinating and magical march of rhythm does not, in art, substitute itself for sociality, for the face, for speech. To comprehension and signification grasped within a horizon, we oppose the signifyingness of the face. Will the brief indications by which we have introduced this notion allow us to catch sight of its role in comprehension itself and of all the conditions which delineate a sphere of relations barely suspected? In any case, that which we catch sight of seems suggested by
the encounter with the face - that is, moral consciousness - can be described as the condition of consciousness tout court and of disclosure; how consciousness is affirmed as the impossibility of killing; what are the conditions of the appearance of the face as the temptation and the impossibility of murder; how I can appear to myself as a face; in what manner, finally, the relation with the other (autrui) or the collectivity is our relation, irreducible to comprehension, with the infinite - these are the themes that proceed from this first
the practical philosophy of Kant, to which we feel particularly close. In what way the vision of the face is no longer vision but audition and speech; how
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contestation of the primacy of ontology. Philosophical research, in any case, cannot be content with a mere reflection on the self or on existence. Reflection offers only the tale of a personal adventure, of a private soul, which returns incessantly to itself, even when it seems to flee itself. The human only lends itself to a relation that is not a power.
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project in spite of his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it; this engagement was not beneath his philosophical level on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Hegelese: speculative identity) between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate ontic Nazi political engagement.
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THE SEARCH FOR AN AUTHENTIC MOVEMENT, FREE OF TECHNOLOGY REQUIRES NAZISM BECAUSE EVERY CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS IS INFECTED WITH ONTIC REASONING Zizek 99
[Slavoj, Unapologetic Self-Plagierist, The Ticklish Subject: The absent centre of political ontology, NYC: Verso, 1999, 12-3//uwyo-ajl]
Here, however, complications arise: on closer inspection, it soon becomes clear that Heideggers argumentative strategy is twofold. On the one hand, he rejects every concern for democracy and human rights as a purely ontic affair unworthy of proper philosophical ontological questioning democracy, Fascism, Communism, they all amount ot the same with regard to the epochal destiny of the West; on the other hand, his insistence that he is not convinced that democracy is the political form which best suits the essence of technology none the less suggests that there is another political form which suits this ontological essence better - for some time Heidegger thought he had found it in the Fascist total mobilization (but, significantly, never in Communism, which always remains for him epochally the same as Americanism). Heidegger, of course, emphasizes again and again how the ontological dimension of Nazism is not to be quated with Nazism as an ontic
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ideologico-political order; in the well-known passage from An Introduction to Metaphysics, for example, he repudiates the Nazi biologist race ideology as something that totally misses the inner greatness of the Nazi movement, which lies in the encounter between modern man and technology. None the less, the fact remains that Heidegger never speaks of the inner greatness of, say, liberal democracy as if liberal democracy is just that, a superficial world-view with no underlying dimension of assuming ones own epochal destiny.
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one instance, flirting with the regimes racial-biological doctrines. Equally disturbing is the fact that Heidegger suggests one might reconcile Nazisms racial precepts (the
concepts of blood and racial descent) with his own pet existential themes and ideals
(mood, work, historicity): Blood, racial descent (das Geblt) can only be [reconciled] with the foundationa mood of man when it is determined by temperament and mood [das Gemt]. The contribution of blood comes from the foundational mood of man and belongs to the determination of our Dasein through work. Work = the historical present. The present (die Gegenwart) is not merely the now; instead it is the present insofar as it transposes our Being in the emancipation of existence that is accomplished through work. As someone who works man is transported into the publicness o
existence. Such being-transported belongs to the essence of our Being: that is, to our being-transported amid things in the world. . . . As something original,
existence never reveals itself to us via the scientific cognition of objects, but32 instead in the essential moods of that flourish in work and in the historical vocation of a Volk that predetermines all else.
One of the Nazis major domestic political concerns in the regimes initial years was whether they would be successful in integrating the German working classes
traditionally, staunch supporters of the political left -- within the National Socialist
Volksgemeinschaft. To that end they established the German Labor Front to assure German workers that their role in the new state was an indispensable one. Both the strength through joy and beautification of labor programs discussed earlier were an offshoot of the same effort.47 In his vigorous celebration of the joy of work (Arbeitsfreudigkeit), Heidegger once again demonstrates the elective affinities between Existenzphilosophie and the National Socialist worldview: The question of the joy of work is important. As a foundational mood, joy is the
basis of the possibility of authentic work. In work as something present, the making present of Being occurs. Work is
presencing in the original sense to the extent that we insert ourselves in the preponderance of Being; through work we attain the whole of Being in all its greatness, on the basis of the great moods of wonder and reverence, and thereby enhance it in its greatness (102).
HEIDEGGERS CRITICISM OF WESTERN RATIONALISM OPENS UP THE SPACE FOR NATIONAL SOCIALISM BECAUSE OF THEIR PERCEIVED INAUTHENTICITY Wolin 2000
[Richard, Department of History at City University of New York, Arbeit Macht Frei: Heidegger as the Philosopher of the German Way, Nietzshe, Heidegger, and the Future of Democracy, Winter Quarter, January 24, 2000, olincenter.uchicago.edu/pdf/wolin.pdf, Acc. 10-12-04//uwyo-ajl]
Needless to say, a rejection of universal concepts by no means entails a commitment to Nazism. Yet, with this radical philosophical maneuver, Heidegger left himself vulnerable to political movements whose major selling point in opposition to the presumed decrepitude of Western liberalism -- was an unabashed celebration of volkish particularism. The same normative criticisms Heidegger had brought to bear against Western rationalism were also used by him as arguments against their corresponding political forms: cosmopolitanism, rights of man, constitutionalism. Search as one may through Heideggers voluminous philosophical corpus, one is extremely hard pressed to find a positive word concerning the virtues of political liberalism. His
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philosophical and political predilections were related to one another necessarily rather than contingently.
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In the massive secondary literature on Being and Time, the concept of historicity has suffered from relative neglected. Perhaps this is because it represents the aspect of Heideggers treatise where the philosopher stands in the greatest proximity to contemporary politics and, hence, the moment where the ideological aspects of his thought are most exposed. The reasons for this neglect are in part comprehensible. To
date Being and Time has primarily been interpreted in a Kierkegaardian/existential vein. It portrays a highly individualized Dasein wrestling with a series of basic ontological questions: the struggle for authenticity, the meaning of death, the nature of care. Yet, 7 the discussion of historicity, which in many respects represents a culmination of the books narrative, emphasizes a set of concerns -- destiny, fate, the nature of authentic historical community (Gemeinschaft) -- that are difficult to reconcile with the Kierkegaardian interpretation of the work as basically concerned with Dasein as an isolated individual Self. To be sure, were this Heideggers standpoint, it would be very difficult to reconcile the idea of historical political commitment with his intentions, and one would have to view Heideggers later political commitment as standing in contradiction with Being and Times basic ideals. It has often been argued in the
philosophers defense that since Heideggers actions on behalf of Nazism demanded a surrender of individuality to the ends of the historical community, his political choice stood at cross-purposes with his philosophy. According to this reading, therefore, Heideggers political involvement represented an instance of inauthenticity. However, this interpretation forfeits its cogency once the concept of historicity -- in which Heidegger unambiguously declares the centrality of collective historical commitment -- is taken seriously.
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As Lwith understood, it is but a short step from the facticity and particularism of individual Existenz to a celebration of volkish parochialism in collective-historical terms. For Heidegger the mediating link between these two aspects of Dasein -- the individual and the collective -- was the conservative revolutionary critique of modernity. This
strident lament concerning the world-historical decadence of bourgeois existence was first articulated in the work of Nietzsche, Spengler as well as countless lesser Zivilisationskritiker. In Thomas Manns Confessions of an Unpolitical Man, for example, the antinomy between Kultur and Zivilisation occurs over one hundred times.
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Both Heidegger and Foucault maintain that there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism , Heidegger states, consists merely in an addiction to doubt. 9 The skeptical nature of political philosophical thought, in contrast, is grounded in the imperative of endless inquiry. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-political costs of any knowledge that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skeptical inquiry degenerates into a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideologies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side, and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm, on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their
Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs. 8
corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a tool kit whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's hyperactive tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system, Foucault stipulates. Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject. 10 One might worry whether action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, Heidegger
obviously stumbled off it. In the 19305, Heidegger enclosed himself within an authoritarian system of thought grounded in ontological reifications of a folk and its history. Heidegger's historicization of metaphysics led him to believe that a new philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly called for a philosophical Fuehrer who could put an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting. 11 The temptation for Heidegger to identify himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and political movement capable of sustaining cultural renewal proved irresistible. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosophizing was wholly undermined by his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational gods, and political authority. 12
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Heidegger Irrelevent
HEIDEGGERS PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT APPLY AND IS DANGEROUS IN THE POLITICAL REALM BECAUSE METAPHYSICAL RESULTS WILL NOT RESULT FROM POLITICS Wolin, Prof of Modern European Intellectual History @ Rice, 90 (Richard, The Politics of Being,
P. 117-118)
Moreover, as Harries indicates, Heidegger's theory of the state as a "work" is modeled upon his theory of the work of art. Thus, as we have seen, in Heidegger's view, both works of art and the state are examples of the "setting-to-work of truth." In essence, the state becomes a giant work of art: like the work of art, it participates in the revelation of truth, yet on a much more grandiose and fundamental scale, since it is the Gesamtkunstwerk within which all the other sub-works enact their preassigned roles. However, the idea of basing political
Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art reveal the truth or essence of beings ("The
judgments on analogy with aesthetic judgments is an extremely tenuous proposition. work [of art] ... is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be present at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's general essence"),66
we must question the attempt to transpose aesthetico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, institutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense dangerous to expect "metaphysical results" from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of human plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a subordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of totalitarian constraint on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? And even if Heidegger's own conception of truth (which we shall turn to shortly) is sufficiently tolerant and pluralistic to allay such fears, shouldn't the main category of political life be justice instead of truth? Undoubtedly, Heidegger's long-standing prejudices against "value-philosophy prevented him from seriously entertaining this proposition; and thus, as a category of political judgment, justice would not stand in sufficiently close proximity to Being. In all of the aforementioned instances, we see that Heideggers political philosophy is overburdened with ontological considerations that end up stifling the inner logic of politics as an independent sphere of human action.
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Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond, Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)
the lessons Heidegger would have us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive nihilism of emptiness that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our background practices and for cultivating an affirmative attitude toward life that he and other neo-Nietzscheans think may be our only chance to keep from extinguishing life on earth altogether. 68
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Heidegger and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-political dead-ends. They are criticized for their unwillingness or inability to supply the grounds for sound moral and political judgment. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism, in particular, is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anything, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charge is that his highly abstract form of philosophizing, empyrean ontological vantage point, and depreciation of das Man undermines moral principle and political responsibility. From his philosophical heights, it is suggested, Heidegger remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and political practicalities. He immunized himself against the moral sensitivity, compassion, and prudence that might have dissuaded him from endorsing and identifying with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophy, critics warn, court similar dangers. In like fashion, it is held that Foucault dug himself into an
equally deep, though ideologically relocated, moral and political hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The sticky, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a hermen eutics of suspicion quashed any hope of gaining the ethical and political high ground. 2 As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of panoptic power that shapes wants, needs, and selves, critics worry, one would have no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for. 3 In sum, Heidegger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and the greatest social and political theorist of the twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced from political responsibility.
Critics argue that Heidegger's statements and actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism, as displayed in his discussions of popular justice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is capable of supplying us with the resources for sound moral and political judgment.
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Heidegger viewed modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' (Gefallen) from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled, remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with the Gods, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by
counts for everything.'22 As
focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for nothing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state
a member of the Nazi party, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, his antihumanism reached strident, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, he readily adopted the Fuehrer-principle of German fascism and preferred the title Rektor-Fuhrer, hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.28 His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of
view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology,
as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger
context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice
weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of interpretive effort we must forgo for the present in the
it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when techne is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spiritually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is not being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power. Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things be and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and technological [continues]
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rape of Muslim women, the dismembering of Bosnian men, the degrading of a sophisticated society to subsistence and barbarous banditry: these things do not become fictions simply because we cannot speak of them adequately or because composing abstractions is safer than responding to the heinous reality of criminal acts. No response to the Holocaust and its murderous wake or to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia could possibly be adequate to the atrocities alphabetized in file folders of perpetrators or to the unspeakable experiences burned into brains and bodies of survivors. But no response at all breeds new catastrophe. Saul Bellow
warned about the "humanistic civilized moral imagination" that, seized with despair, "declines into lethargy and sleep." n15 Imagine the plight of human creatures if it were to be silenced altogether, extinguished or forgotten. " Humanism did not produce the Holocaust, and the Holocaust, knowing its enemies, was bent on the extermination of humanism. It is an odd consequence of an all-or-nothing mentality to repudiate humanist values because they are inadequate as an antidote to evil."
n16 Basic human rights asserted in words cannot be restored in reality unless they are matched to practices in all the spheres of influence we occupy.
We feel revulsion at the repudiation of humanist values so visible in the savagery of the battlefield and the councils of war. Yet we seem inoculated against seeing the brutalities of daily human interactions, the devaluing of values in our own intellectual spheres, the moral and ethical debunking formally incorporated into scholarly exegesis in literature, philosophy, the social sciences, and linguistics, the very disciplines that cradled humanist values. Remembering for the future by rehearsing the record, then, is not enough, as the most eloquent witnesses to Holocaust history have sorrowfully attested. We must also respond to the record with strategies that challenge humanist reductionism in places where we tend to overlook it or think it harmless. Our moral outrage should be intensified, not subdued, [*50] by what we know. We must search out alternatives to the anomie that seizes us when the linguistic distance between words and reality seems unbridgeably vast, and reflections upon historical events ill matched to the dark complexities of the human experience we would illumine.
ANTI-HUMANISM DESTROYS HUMAN DIGNITY Campbell, Prof of International Politics @ U of Newcastle, 99 (David, The
Deterritorialization of Responsibility, Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell) Liberalism is thus insufficient for human dignity because the election that justifies man "comes from a god or Godwho beholds him in the face of the other man, his neighbor, the original 'site' of the Revelation."34 Similarly, humanism is insufficient, and "modern antihuman-ism ... is true over and beyond the reasons it gives itself." What Levinas finds laudable in antihumanism is that it "abandoned the idea of person, goal and origin of itself, in which the ego is still a thing because it is still a being." As such, antihumanism does not eradicate the human, but "clears the place for subjectivity positing itself in abnegation, in sacrifice, in a substitution which precedes the will." It would therefore be a grave error to conclude in haste that Levinas's antihumanism is either inhuman or inhumane. To the contrary. Levinas declares that "humanism has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human,"3'' because it is insufficiently attuned to alterity. If one understood "humanism" to mean a "humanism of the Other," then there would be no greater humanist than Levinas.36
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The initial appeal of communism and romanticized Third World leaders--Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Sekou Toure, and Daniel Ortega--who would redefine human well-being and productivity (well, they certainly redefined something) reflected the Western pathology whereby intellectuals delude themselves systematically about the non-West, about that "Other" standing against and apart from the society that does not appreciate those intellectuals' moral and
West as empire and the rest of the world as victim. practical authority and status. However, when an enemy arose that truly hated Western intellectuals--namely, fascism--and whose defeat depended upon the West's self-belief, Western intellectuals quickly became masters of judgments of absolute superiority and had no difficulty in defining a contest between good and evil. Cognitive dissonance is an astonishing phenomenon, and in academic circles, it prevents three essential historical truths from being told. First,
the most murderous regime in all of human history, the Bolsheviks in power, has fallen: its agents were guilty of irredeemable crimes against humanity, and its apologists should do penance for the remainder of their lives. Anticommunists within the law were warriors for human freedom; communists and antianticommunists, whatever their intentions, were warriors for human misery and slavery. The most that can be said in communism's favor is that it was capable of building, by means of, slave labor and terror, a simulacrum of Gary, Indiana, once only, without ongoing maintenance, and minus the good stuff. Secondly, voluntary exchange among individuals held morally responsible under the rule of law has demonstrably created the means of both prosperity and diverse social options. Such a model has been a precondition of individuation and freedom, whereas regimes of central planning have created poverty, and (as Hayek foresaw) ineluctable developments toward totalitarianism and the worst abuses of power. Dynamic free-market societies, grounded in rights-based individualism, have altered the entire human
conception of freedom and dignity for formerly marginalized groups. The entire "socialist experiment," by contrast, ended in stasis, ethnic hatreds, the absence of even the minimal preconditions of economic, social, and political renewal, and categorical contempt for both
Thirdly, the willingness to contain communism, to fight its expansion overtly and covertly, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts at extension--in Europe, Vietnam, Central Asia, Central America, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and, indeed, Grenada--was, with the struggle against Nazism over a much briefer period, the great gift of American taxpayers and the American people to planet earth. As Britain under Churchill was "the West" in 1940, so was the United States from 1945 to 1989, drawing
individuation and minority rights.
from its values to stand against what was simultaneously its mutant offspring and its antithesis. In the twentieth century, the West met and survived its greatest trial. On the whole, however, Western intellectuals do not revel in these triumphs, to say the least. Where is the celebration? Just as important, where is the accounting? On the Left, to have either would be to implicate one's own thought and will in the largest crime and folly in the history of mankind. We have seen myriad documentaries on the collective and individual suffering of the victims of Nazism, but where is the Shoah, or the Night and Fog, let alone the Nuremberg trails of the postcommunist
the countless victims who froze to death or were maimed in the Arctic death camps would go unremembered; the officers and guards who broke their bodies and often their souls would live out their lives on pensions, unmolested; and
present? As Solzhenitsyn predicted repeatedly in The Gulag Archipelago,
those who gave the orders would die peacefully and unpunished. Our documentary makers and moral intellectuals do not let us forget any victim of the Holocaust. We hunt down ninety-year-old guards so that the bones of the dead might have justice, and properly so .
The bones of Lenin's and Stalin's and Brezhnev's camps cry out for justice, as do the bones of North Vietnam's exterminations, and those of Poi Pot's millions, and Mao's tens of millions.
In those cases, however, the same intellectuals cry out against--what is their phrase?--"witch-hunts," and ask us to let the past be the past. We celebrated the millennium with jubilation; we have not yet celebrated the triumph of the West. Ask American high school or even college students to number Hitler's victims and Columbus's victims, and they will answer, for both, in the tens of millions. Ask them to number Stalin's victims and, if my experience is typical, they will answer in the thousands. Such is their education, even now. The absence of celebration, of teaching the lessons learned, and of demands for accountability is perhaps easily
Convinced that the West above all has been the source of artificial relationships of dominance and subservience, the commodification of human life, and ecocide, leftist intellectuals have little interest in objectively analyzing the manifest data about societies of voluntary exchange, or in coming to terms with the slowly and newly released data about the conditions of life and death under the Bolsheviks and their heirs, or in
understood on the Left. confirming or refuting various theories on the outcome of the Cold War (let alone, given their contemporary concerns, in analyzing ecological or gender politics under
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communist or Third World regimes). Less obvious, but equally striking in some ways, has been the absence of celebration on so much of the intellectual Right, because it is not at all certain something worth calling Western civilization did in fact survive the twentieth century.
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political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." n1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with
thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we
only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. n2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep
must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," n3 we
alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience. "Heirs of the ancient
seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content ," n4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. n5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," n6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." n7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be
expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. n8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! n9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnelhouse, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." n10 A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence
We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity." n12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.
revisited. n11
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Despite his grave concerns about technology, he was never simply an opponent of it nor did he seek its abolition or destruction. The problem, Heidegger believed, was not technology per se, but the hegemony that technology had come to exercise over human action. Techne as a form of uncovering reveals the world as a process of production. Everything within the world is thus merely the equipment with which this productive enterprise is carried out. Modern man imagines that technology produces goods to satisfy his wants and desires, providing a nice lifestyle. Technology, however, can only serve human beings if they live according to something other than technical and economic imperatives. Only if distinctively human action is placed at the center of our concern will technology serve our ends. We can only become active, as opposed to productive, beings if we are guided by phronesis. Phronetic insight, however, is only possible if we resolutely face the possibility of our own death and accept the destiny that is revealed in the moment of vision. Thus, we must resolve ourselves to face the question of Being. Without resolve to do this, we will lose the capacity for action and become mere cogs in the equipment that constitutes the world uncovered by techne.
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PERM DO BOTH SPANOS ALONE ISNT EMANCIPATORY COMBINING THE CRITICISM WITH PROBLEM SOLVING IS OPTIMAL Lewandowski 94
[John, Prof @ SUNY Binghamton, Philosophy and Social Criticism 20, 119] Spanos rightly rejects the textuality route in Heidegger and Criticism precisely because of its totalizing and hypostatizing tendencies. Nevertheless, he holds on to a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure. But as I have already intimated, disclosure alone cannot support a critical theory oriented towards emancipation. I think a critical theory needs a less totalizing account of language, one that articulates both the emphatic linguistic capacity to communicate, solve problems in and criticize the world. The essential task of the social critic and any literary theory that wants to be critical is to couple world disclosure with problem-solving, to mediate between the extra-ordinary world of textuality and the everyday world of texts. In this alternative route, literary theory may become the kind of emancipatory oriented critical theory it can and should be.
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. Most significant and dangerous is the assumption by relativists that a culture is monolithic. Their reliance on stereotypes of entire races, ethnicities, and religions stems from that assumption. n65 The result is an argument which must fail because of its oversimplification. No culture can be viewed as a homogeneous grouping of people; nor can religion alone characterize a culture. Relativists like to refer to the "Islamic culture," thereby obliterating significant cultural differences which exist among peoples from Morocco to Indonesia (passing through some sub-Saharan African
The cultural relativist position fails in several ways nations, such as Nigeria). n66 These cultural differences, due to the diversity of race, and ethnicity, as well as historical experience, all give insight into the way these
A simplistic scholarly argument which conveniently overlooks intricacies and complexities necessarily raises suspicions and destroys itself.
different states may behave.
The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms. That the
feminism. tactic can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist subordination to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their discrete, sequential coexistence along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of originality and derivativeness. Ind eed, the field of power structured in part by the imperializing gesture of dialectical appropriation exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual difference, offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any o ther canddidate for the position of primary condition of oppression.
Rather than an exclusive tactic of masculinist signifying economies, dialectical appropriation and suppression of the Other is one tactic among many deployed centrally but not exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the masculinist domain.
FOURTH, NO ALTERNATIVE CROSS-CULTURAL EXCHANGE IS INEVITABLE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD, PREVENTING CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY
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This unsettling possible alignment of radical constructivism with the worst totalitarian regime of this century should also - upon reflection - seem less than shocking. n147 The core of the radical constructivist
paradigm is a rejection of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on rationality and scientific explanation. n148 Instead, radical constructivists seek to explain the world solely as the result - deliberate or unconscious - of ideology and the pursuit of dominance. But that standard leaves little room for shared concepts of merit, morality, or anything else. n149 As other scholars have noted, radical constructivism "leaves no ground whatsoever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition."
it can readily slide into moral relativism n151 - only one step away from relying on raw power to determine truth. For if ideas are mere reflections of the exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for criticizing social arrangements. And if raw power is the test of truth, totalitarians are merely the most unabashed constructors of reality. Much as radical constructivists may dislike this conclusion, its potential is
n150 As a feminist philosopher who sympathizes with what we have called radical constructivism has warned, present in their conceptual apparatus.
SIXTH, TURN PLAN SOLVES THE WORSE IMPERIALISM OF FORCIBLY DETAINING ENEMY COMBATANTS FOR LIFE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS SEVENTH, TURN: THEIR PATRONIZING RESPECT FOR OTHERS IS RACISM UNDER ANOTHER GUISE AND SMOOTHES THE PATH FOR CAPITAL-DRIVEN DESTRUCTION Zizek '99
[Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political ontology , New York: Verso, 1999, 215-6
How, then, does the universe of Capital relate to the form of nation-state in our era of global capitalism? Perhaps this relationship is best designated as 'autocolonization': with the direct multinational functioning of Capital, we are no longer dealing with the standard opposition between metropolis and colonized countries; a global company, as it were, cuts its umbilical cord with its mother-nation and treats its country of origin as simply another territory to be colonized. This is what is so disturbing to patriotically orientated right-wing populists, from Le Pen to Buchanan: the fact that the new multinationals have exactly the same attitude towards the French or American local population as towards the population of Mexico, Brazil or Taiwan. Is there not a kind of poetic justice in this self-referential turn of today's global capitalism, which functions as a kind of 'negation of negation', after national capitalism and its internationalist! colonialist phase? At the beginning (ideally, of course), there is capitalism within the confines of a nation-state, and with the accompanying international trade (exchange between sovereign nationstates); what follows is the relationship of colonization, in which the colonizing country subordinates and exploits (economically, politically, culturally) the colonized
the final moment of this process is the paradox of colonization, in which there are only colonies, no colonizing countries - the colonizing power is no longer a nation-state but the global company itself. In the long term, we shall all not only wear Banana Republic shirts but also live in banana republics. And, of course, the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats each local culture as the colonizer treats colonized people - as 'natives' whose mores are to be carefully studied and 'respected'. That is to say: the
country; relationship between traditional imperialist colonialism and global capitalist self-colonization is exactly the same as the relationship between Western cultural imperialism and multiculturalism - just as global capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing nation-state metropolis,
multiculturalism involves a patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one's own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a 'racism with a distance' - it 'respects' the Other's identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed 'authentic' community towards which the multiculturalist maintains a distance made possible by his/her privileged universal position. Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of
all positive content' (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist; he or she does not oppose the the Other the particular values of his or her own culture); none the less he or she retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) other particular cultures properly -
multiculturalist respect for the Other's specificity is the very form of asserting one's own superiority. Pursuing multiple perspectives legitimizes racism and disables us from solving ecological and social disasters
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For some repressive regimes, the lure of relativism undoubtedly lies in its potential for deflecting international scrutiny. Universalists' deep suspicion regarding the motives of many of these government's espoused claims of cultural or [*414] religious imperative are nothing more than cynical manipulations meant to undermine the effectiveness of rights. Yet the appeal of relativism is hardly limited to repressive governments. Especially among non-Westerners, arguments about relativism are a reflection of something far more profound than the misleading, "either/or" dichotomy of universal versus relative rights. For many, the appeal of a seemingly relativist
of basic human dignity. n63 Only a true Pollyanna would fail to suspect that
those who champion relativism seems well founded. Indeed, prominent among states promoting relativism at the World Conference in Vienna were those on the short list of the World's most egregious violators - measured on virtually any scale -
perspective is simply a means to advocate genuine concern over the cultural, social, and political domination of Western values. n64 It similarly reflects an understandable desire to preserve local traditions and values - a desire that on some level clearly conflicts with progressive human rights development and may serve as the unwitting ally of oppression. n65 Finally, the relativist perspective may be used to promote self-governance and autonomy - the prerogative to develop the specific meaning of human rights, in accordance with local terms of reference. n66 To a significant extent, genuine concerns for diversity, pluralism and local autonomy have been obscured by the West's legitimate fear that "relativism" could serve as the "last refuge for oppression." n67 The "relativist" label has thus become, in the [*415] words of Makau Wa Mutua, a bit like "human rights namecalling." n68 In this sense
, the fears and corresponding rhetoric of the West have created a misleading oppositional narrative that obscures the real and difficult issues that genuine diversity poses for the international human rights system. n69 As is often true in
political debates, the competing motivations of universalist and relativist governments have been manifested in arguments imprecisely cast in "either/or" terms; that is, all rights are, in all of their manifestations, either universal or relative. Yet one plausible reading of the compromise language of the Vienna Declaration suggests that Rather, it may be that the Vienna Declaration reflects the notion that
: the notion that all values are culturally relative, the belief in "the equal dignity and worth of all cultures," or "the equal right of all peoples to participate in the formation of international law" are themselves culturally shaped value judgments, which would be void under the cultural relativist's own theory. There is no reason for cultural relativists to
Strict cultural relativism has been criticized as self-contradictory accept these starting points as universal in order to support a doctrine which denies the legitimacy of [*43] universals. n37 From a normative human rights perspective, strict cultural relativism is also questionable because it has little to no support in human rights conventions. The only treatment of strict cultural relativism in a human rights convention is article 63(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which says that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall be applied in [colonial territories] with due regard, however, to local requirements." n38 A strict cultural relativist reading of this provision has been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, where the local custom of corporal punishment was at issue. n39 Thus, because of the logical self-contradiction inherent in strict cultural relativism, and because of the virtual complete lack of support for strict cultural relativism in the human rights discourse, strict cultural relativism fails as a paradigm to conceptualize the universality discourse.
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Against Butler, one is thus tempted to emphasize that Hegel was well aware of the retroactive process by means of which oppressive power itself generates the form of resistance is not this very paradox contained in Hegel's notion of positing the presuppositions, that is, of how the activity of positing-mediating does not merely elaborate the presupposed immediate-natural Ground, but thoroughly transforms the very core of its identity? The very In-itself to which Chechens endeavour to return is already mediated-posited by the process of modernization, which deprived them of their ethnic roots. This argumentation may appear Eurocentrist, condemning the colonized to repeat the European imperialist pattern by means of the very gesture of resisting it however, it is also possible to give it precisely the opposite reading. That is to say: if we ground our resistance to imperialist Eurocentrism in the reference to some kernel of previous ethnic identity, we automatically adopt the position of a victim resisting modernization, of a passive object on which imperialist procedures work. If, however, we conceive our resistance as an excess that results from the way brutal imperialist intervention disturbed our previous self-enclosed identity, our position becomes much stronger, since we can claim that our resistance is grounded in the inherent dynamics of the imperialist system that the imperialist system itself, through its inherent antagonism, activates the forces that will bring about its demise. (The situation here is strictly homologous to that of how to ground feminine resistance: if woman is 'a symptom of man', the locus at which the inherent antagonisms of the patriarchal symbolic order emerge, this in no way constrains the scope of feminine resistance but provides it with an even stronger detonating force.) Or to put it in yet another way the premise according to which resistance to power is inherent and immanent to the power edifice (in the sense that it is generated by the inherent dynamic of the power edifice) in no way obliges us to draw the conclusion that every resistance is co-opted in advance, including in the eternal game Power plays with itself the key point is that through the effect of proliferation, of producing an excess of resistance, the very inherent antagonism of a system may well set in motion a process which leads to its own ultimate downfall. It seems that such a notion of antagonism is what Foucault lacks: from the fact that every resistance is generated ('posited') by the Power edifice itself, from this absolute inherence of resistance to Power, he seems to draw the conclusion that resistance is co-opted in advance, that it cannot seriously undermine the system that is, he precludes the possibility that the system itself, on account of its inherent inconsistency, may give birth to a force whose excess it is no longer able to master and which thus detonates its unity, its capacity to reproduce itself. In short, Foucault does not consider the possibility of an effect escaping, outgrowing its cause, so that although it emerges as a form of resistance to power and is as such absolutely inherent to it, it can outgrow and explode it. (the philosophical point to be made here is that this is the fundamental feature of the dialectical-materialist notion of 'effect': the effect can 'outdo' its cause; it can be ontologically 'higher' than its cause.) One is thus tempted to reverse the Foucauldian notion of an all-encompassing power edifice which always-already
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contains its transgression, that which allegedly eludes it: what if the price to be paid is that the power mechanism cannot even control itself, but has to rely on an obscene protuberance at its very heart? In other words: what effectively eludes the controlling grasp of Power is not so much the external In-itself it tries to dominate but, rather, the obscene supplement which sustains its own operation.
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ETHICAL UNIVERSALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND IS NECESSARY TO FIGHT ETHNOCENTRISM Tilley 2000
[John J., Assoc. Prof of Philosophy at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Cultural Relativism, Human Rights Quarterly, 22.2, The John Hopkins University Press, 539//uwyo-ajl]
The trouble with the ethnocentrism argument is quite simple: to grant universalism is not to be ethnocentric. In fact, it's consistent with universalism to advance the following as universally valid: "Ethnocentrism is immoral." So the ethnocentrism argument fails. The same goes for arguments that substitute "imperialistic," "authoritarian," or "antipluralistic" for "ethnocentric." For example, although universalism implies that some moral requirements are the same for everyone, it does not imply that we all have a moral requirement to be the same, nor that we have any moral requirement that discourages cultural diversity. Most likely, one of our main requirements is to respect such diversity (and hence to respect cultural integrity). 67 Therefore, universalism is compatible with cultural pluralism.
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infamous "military-industrial complex" will be able to gorge themselves on contracts for the development of everything from infrastructure to urban police forces.
continued
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No Link
OTHERS ADOPT US CULTURE BECAUSE IT REFLECTS THE DIVERSITY OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND, NATIONS REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO US IDEOLOGY
Victor Davis Hanson, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial? National Review Online, November 27, 2002, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html, UK:Fisher
In that regard, America is also a revolutionary, rather than a stuffy imperial society. Its crass culture abroad rap music, Big Macs, Star Wars, Pepsi, and Beverly Hillbillies reruns does not reflect the tastes and values of either an Oxbridge elite or a landed Roman aristocracy. That explains why Le Monde or a Spanish deputy minister may libel us, even as millions of semi-literate Mexicans, unfree Arabs, and oppressed southeast Asians are dying to get here. It is one thing to mobilize against grasping, wealthy white people who want your copper, bananas, or rubber quite another when your own youth want what black, brown, yellow, and white middle-class Americans alike have to offer. We so-called imperialists don't wear pith helmets, but rather baggy jeans and backwards baseball caps. Thus far the rest of the globe whether Islamic fundamentalists, European socialists, or Chinese Communists has not yet formulated an ideology antithetical to the kinetic American strain of Western culture.
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Relativism Is Self-Refuting
RELATIVISM REFUTES ITSELF Schick and Vaughn 2002
[Theodore, Jr., Muhlenberg College & Lewis, How to Think about Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age, Third ed., Boston: McGraw Hill, 87//uwyo-ajl]
According to the relativist whether a subjectivist, a social constructivist, or a conceptual relativist everything is relative. To say that everything is relative is to say that no unrestricted universal generalizations are true (an unrestricted generalization is a statement to the effect that something holds for all individuals, societies, or conceptual schems). But the statement No unrestricted universal generalizations are true is itself an unrestricted universal generalization. So if relativism in any of its forms is true, its false. As a result, it cannot possibly be true. To avoid such self-contradiction, the relativist may try to claim that the statement Everything is relative is only relatively true. But this claim wont help, because it just says that relatavists (or their society or their conceptual scheme) take relativism to be true. Such a claim should not give the nonrelativist pause, for the fact that relativists take relativism to be true is not in question. The question is whether a non-relativist should take relativism to be true. Only if relativists can provide objective evidence that relatvisim is true should a nonrelativist believe that its true. But this evidence is precisely the kind that relatvists cant provide, for, in their view, there is no objective evidence. Relativists, then, face a dilemma: If they interpret their theory objectively, they defeat themselves by providing evidence against it. If they interpret their theory relativistically, they defeat themselves by failing to provide any evidence for it. Either way, relativists defeat themselves.
RELATIVISM PRESUPPOSES THAT CULTURAL HEGEMONY IS UNIVERSALLY NEGATIVE, DISPROVING ITSELF Tilley 2000
[John J., Assoc. Prof of Philosophy at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Cultural Relativism, Human Rights Quarterly, 22.2, The John Hopkins University Press, 528-9//uwyo-ajl]
Perhaps relativists will complain that the effectiveness of the examples stems from act-descriptions that refer to motives. This calls for two replies. First, there is nothing underhanded about such descriptions. They are a common way of producing highly definite moral judgments. Second, relativists should be wary about granting "effectiveness" to the examples. If [End Page 529] they mean that the examples are indeed universally valid, they have abandoned their thesis, for they have admitted that some moral judgments are valid for everyone. This admission contradicts relativism no matter what act-descriptions appear in the judgments. Also, it implies that there is nothing about moral predicates that prevents the judgments in which they occur from being valid for all cultures. So it's likely that many such judgments are universally valid, including many that say nothing about motives. Some relativists (though not the diehard ones) are likely to make a second complaint. They will exclaim: "But we don't deny that such judgments are universally valid! The whole point of our thesis is that cruelty and oppression are universally wrong, that respect and tolerance are universally right!" But if this is indeed their "whole point," they have nothing to contribute to moral theory. If relativism is not an alternative to universalism, if it is merely a set of commonplace remarks that most any brand of universalism can accommodate, it lacks the philosophical
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importance its defenders claim for it. 52 To the extent that it has that importance, it conflicts with universalism, which means that it does deny, implicitly at least, that the example judgments are universally valid.
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EVEN IF RIGHTS ARE CULTURAL, THEYRE PRAGMATICALLY DESIRABLE BECAUSE THEY ENSURE FAIRNESS Binder 99
[Guyora, Prof. of Law @ SUNY Buffalo, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 1999, LN//uwyo-ajl]
At the same time, and for the same reasons, the admission that support for international protection of civil and political rights rests on culturally specific value judgments does not refute those value judgments. Advocates sought a foundation for international human rights law in the natural liberty of individuals only in order to overcome the foundationalist arguments of defenders of the absolute autonomy of sovereign states. But arguments for and against international human rights law or state autonomy need no foundations. We can always assess international legal institutions and doctrines in pragmatic terms, as contributing to human betterment, or as embodying broadly participatory decisions emerging from acceptably fair processes, or as tolerably useful and superior to available alternatives, or to the costs of pursuing change. n11 This is how we commonly assess domestic political institutions. Why should we treat international legal institutions any differently?
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A2 Foundationalism Bad
EVEN IF WE HAVE NO CERTAIN FOUNDATIONS, WE CAN USE CHAINS OF INFERENCE TO CREATE PRAGMATIC ETHICAL CODES THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS THE REJECTION OF ALL KNOWLEDGE INCLUDING THE K Tilley 2000
[John J., Assoc. Prof of Philosophy at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Cultural Relativism, Human Rights Quarterly, 22.2, The John Hopkins University Press, 537//uwyo-ajl]
Second (and at the price of some repetition), fallibilism, as it pertains to moral beliefs, implies merely that such beliefs are "tentative" or "provisional" in the special sense fallibilists give those terms. It implies that moral beliefs are corrigible, or in principle revisable, and as such are in the same boat with the following beliefs (all of which, according to fallibilism, are in principle revisable): "1=1;" "I exist;" "others besides myself exist;" "my birth preceded my reading of Folkways;" "there is more than one culture in the world;" "relativists and universalists use language when defending their views." Does anyone, including any relativist, lack confidence in these beliefs? Of course not. Nor is there any need to, even if we reject foundationalism. Foundationalism is neither the only plausible account of justification, nor the only one at home with the commonsense view that some beliefs warrant considerable confidence. 64 So the rejection of foundationalism does not put "substantial limits" on the confidence we can place in our beliefs. If it be said that special difficulties attend confidence in moral beliefs, my reply is that this needs to be shown; it does not follow from fallibilism. If it is shown, it will apply to all moral beliefs, including the ones relativists are eager to vindicate--namely, those that aspire to merely "local," or culturally specific, validity. Hence it will advance the relativist's cause not a whit.
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K = Imperialist
THE CRITICISM IS ITSELF THE RESULT OF WESTERN CULTURAL NORMS, IMPOSING THEM UPON THE WORLD Morgan-Foster 2003
[Jason, JD Cand at U. of Michigan School of Law, A New Perspective on the Universality DebA2 Reverse Moderate Relativism in the Islamic Context, ILSA Journal of Intl and Comparative Law, Fall, LN//uwyo-ajl]
Strict cultural relativism has been criticized as self-contradictory: the notion that all values are culturally relative, the belief in "the equal dignity and worth of all cultures," or "the equal right of all peoples to participate in the formation of international law" are themselves culturally shaped value judgments, which would be void under the cultural relativist's own theory. There is no reason for cultural relativists to accept these starting points as universal in order to support a doctrine which denies the legitimacy of [*43] universals. n37 From a normative human rights perspective, strict cultural relativism is also questionable because it has little to no support in human rights conventions. The only treatment of strict cultural relativism in a human rights convention is article 63(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which says that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall be applied in [colonial territories] with due regard, however, to local requirements." n38 A strict cultural relativist reading of this provision has been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, where the local custom of corporal punishment was at issue. n39 Thus, because of the logical self-contradiction inherent in strict cultural relativism, and because of the virtual complete lack of support for strict cultural relativism in the human rights discourse, strict cultural relativism fails as a paradigm to conceptualize the universality discourse.
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personal behavior is no alternative to political action; there is no question of either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behavior which we consider normal but which betray our own will to violence- the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to political issues or to personal behavior, the question of the politics of personal behavior has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique.
FOURTH, WE SOLVE PLAN TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLENCE DONE IN OUR NAME BY CHALLENGING UNILATERAL DETAINMENT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. CROSS-APPLY TRIBE AND SANYAL FIFTH, KAPPELERS CRITICISM COLLAPSES REAL AND VIRTUAL VIOLENCE, PREVENTING MOBILIZATION AGAINST ATROCITY Bronfen 86
[Elisabeth, U. of Munich, Disavowal and Insight, Art History 11:1, March, ASP//uwyo-ajl] There is undoubtedly a heuristic value in focusing on structural similarities and in denying that a fictional representation is fundamentally different from a documentary one when seen from the point of view of the function of this image. This allows Kappeler to reveal how violation can take place on more than just the literal level. Yet it seems necessary to me to see that there is also a fundamental difference between a depiction based on or involving the real violence done to a physical body (Thomas Kasire, snuff movies) and the imagined one, representing this violence on paper, canvas or celluloid, without any concretely violated body as its ultimate signified. Not because the latter can then be absolved from any responsibility toward the material of its depiction, but because to collapse the two levels on which signification works might also mean not doing justice to the uniquely horrible violence that occurs when a body is used quite literally as the site for an inscription by the other.
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harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identifiction with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it, but is simultaneously obfuscated by it
and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what
'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here,
have faith in a Truth-Event;
Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou: God not only is but always-already was dead - that is to say, after Freud, one cannot directly
every such Event ultimately remains a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination
of the exact status of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan, Badiou delineates the contours of a domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection: the 'death drive' is not the outcome of the morbid
confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law. For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain 'between the two deaths', the pre-ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the immortality of participating in Truth, but in the sense of what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
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[Elisabeth, U. of Munich, Disavowal and Insight, Art History 11:1, March, ASP//uwyo-ajl] to use another as object for self-expression always involves a shift non-identity between self and self-reflecting image. As Lacan points out, to see oneself in an image is recognition as misrecognition. The interesting thing is that a third term/body is needed for this to occur, even if it involves the reduction
What she ignores in her argument, however, is that of a subject to an object, from the gazing subjects point of view. That is to say, narcissistic self-recognition occurs only through the introduction of difference, even if
, the subjectivity of the objectified other is always latently possible, present, and potentially signifiable, even if not signified. That is to say, the attempt to efface the others voice is a strategy that can unwittingly turn upon itself and expose its own limitations.
an attempt is made to efface this difference again in the process. Due to this Thus the process by which the gazing man recognizes himself in the look of the gazed-at woman always also implies an element of duplicity. For since she is sexually different from him he both can and cannot see himself in her. His objectifying gaze depends on the transformation of the otherness of the other into an image of similarity yet it is precisely this otherness that seems to make the reduction so satisfying. Even if the ultimate goal is homophobic bonding, it occu rs over a body which will always give back the sought-for look of self-recognition only imperfectly. As such, the woman/object is always double, both confirming and not confirming the male gaze, similar but not the same. Thus I would argue that her text (voice) is always also inscribed in the male text, even if we are asked to be blind to it, even if it is that which marks where the dominant structure of representation is staged in this scenario falters. The dynamics involved in violating the body of a woman by transforming it into a Woman/victim as figure for something alterior to herself seems to me to be more complicated. What, for example, remains unexplained by Kappelers formula is why the representation of another is needed to bring about self-expression, why a straightforward self-portrait will not suffice or, to put it another way, why patriarchy needs to designate certain memb ers of society as other, in order to stabilize its own power. Clearly what this suggests is that the violent creation of similarity out of difference is more satisfying than a static homogeneous space. Clearly also, the charm of reducing another to a silent object which will not respond in word or gaze allows an unlimited plethora of inscriptions and semantizations by the gazing subject that remain unchallenged. But if the object of the representation is always only a silent victim, the question remains, why is it possible that the victim can mirror the master? In part as a response to Barthess discussion of de Sades writings, Kappeler distinguishes further between two forms of vict imization. The first form is a straightforward act of objectification, annihilating the womans subjectivity, with the victim objecting to the vexation and crying out in pain. The second form involv es a complicit victim: faking subjectivity, she chooses (in Barthess terminology) to ejaculate or discharge, to transform herse lf into a libertine, and enjoy herself in her vexation. Yet Kappelers point is that while the subject of this situation desires the womans complicity and pleasure, wants her to want to be a victim masquerading as subject, it is ultimately the subjects feeling of pleasure that is at stake. She sees this analogous to Barthess notion of the authors search for his readers pleasur e as a way to guarantee his own pleasure as supreme writing object. The point of her comparative reading is to show that where the question of complicity and collaboration is involved, the object (the willing woman libertine) and the reader (the willing co-player of the authors game) are in similar positions, serving similar functions,
What this collaboration is blind to, is the possibility of identifying with some position other than that of the speaking subject, for example that of the victim/object. For her this second form of violence, the collaboration with the master-plot, is doubly perfidious because it not only denies the subjectivity of another but pretends to deny its own elision of the other. Astute as her analysis is, it does raise the question of what Kappeler is willing to ignore in her will to expose the literal content of figural language. For one could also say that by pretending to deny the others victimization, by faking an objectified others subjectivity, a space is opened that ironically (and critically) questions these strategies at exactly the same moment that it stages them.
namely to confirm the speaking male subject.
NINTH, POWER IS ZERO SUM THE ALTERNATIVE ONLY SHIFTS POWER ELSEWHERE
John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics p. 34)
Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the
balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of meanseconomic, diplomatic, and militaryto shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one states gain in power is another states loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other
states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.
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. Kappeler goes over much old ground in insisting that sexuality is fundamentally gender-specific and cannot be democratised. If she believes this, it is hard to see why she would bother about politics in the first place. Any attempt to claim sexual subjectivity or an active desire is interpreted as part of a will to power and hence an act of violence. Dworkin, Mackinnon, Pateman and Jeffries are quoted approvingly. If anything, Kappeler outdoes them in her insistence that sexuality may have to be given up in order to eradicate violence: if experience shows that sex indeed means violence and sexual excitement the pleasure of power--that sex minus the violence does not leave us with non-violent sex but simply 'no sex' at all--it does not follow that we therefore must accept violence; it follows that 'sex' as such is unacceptable. (p. 181)
connect at all with her critique of sexuality and desire, with a politics that seems to take so little account of subjectivity
The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms. That the
tactic can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist subordination to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their discrete, sequential coexistence along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of originality and derivativeness. Indeed, the field of power structured in part by the imperializing gesture of dialectical appropriation exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual difference, offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any other canddidate for the position of primary condition of oppression.
Rather than an exclusive tactic of masculinist signifying economies, dialectical appropriation and suppression of the Other is one tactic among many deployed centrally but not exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the masculinist domain.
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. Violence increases as the result not of a deterioration in social behaviour but of a lowering in the cultural threshold beyond which action appears as violence. In such a context Rameau's disintegration, his
objective) culture, a last manifestation of individual volition, and a point of resistance to what BaudriUard calls the 'triumph' of simulation 'epigrammatic' existence and his cultivation of violence represent the final recourse of a disfranchised and alienated subjectivity faced with an apparently sewn up, indifferent world. In postmodernity this threshold between action and violence is lower, perhaps, than ever before. Political correctism, 'Queer' theory, Communitarianism, the liberation discourse of the Internet, calls for homogenization of the private and public lives of politicians, the new discipline of 'postmodern ethics', all are varying
of a fetishization of objective culture. To find intolerable the violence of linguistic oppression, of 'inauthentic' sexual identity (the product of Freud's 'family romance', etc.), of
instances of a collective endeavour to put a freeze on reason as risk, the consequence political antagonism, of the formalization of truth in its dissemination, of the compart mentalization of public and private life, of the indeterminacy of moral options,
is in every case to subscribe to a peculiar literalism, to evince a profound discomfort with the signifying relation, to take the signifier persistently for the thing itself, in such a way that political activity is replaced with a series of cosmetic adjustments to objective culture.
Rameau's cynicism therefore represents a commitment to subjective culture, to reality, to the referent and to the signified, to the truth of the world and of the individual. Cynicism constitutes a certain necessary indifference to objective culture, a certain subjective wager, a projection of the self beyond objective culture and
In a climate in which 'authenticity' is at a premium, where all action has been proscribed as intolerably violent, and where self consciousness is therefore only a disabling mechanism to be discad, cynicism appears as a spirit in disintegration, the monopoly broker of disinvestment in the present, the sole locus of reason and of faith in anything other than the phenomenal here and now, the disposition which alone embodies both energy and depth .
beyond its own limits.
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Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor -- the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true. Acknowledging alternative models of human behaviour and
analyses of the social causes of violence, Kappeler dismisses these as outside her subject matter and exhorts her readers not to ignore the agent's decision to act as he [sic] did, but to explore the personal decision in favour of violence. Having established this framework, she goes on to explore various aspects of personal decisions to commit violence. Ensuing chapters cover topics such as love of the other, psychotherapy, ego -philosophy and the legitimation of dominance. However, it is the introduction which is most interesting. Already on the third page,
Kappeler is dismissive of social or structural analyses of the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence. For example, some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as a result of racist oppression. She continues, The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it. Kappeler goes on to argue that, although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life
context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, i.e. the perpetrator h as decided to violate. Kappeler's aim of course was to establish a framework for her particular project: a focus on the individual and the psychological to find a cause for violence. However,
her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis extremely narrowly. Her argument suffers from both her inability, or unwillingness, to discuss the bigger picture and a wilful distortion of what she sees as her opponents' views. The result is less than satisfactory. Kappeler's book reads more as a passionate plea than a coherent argument . Her overwhelming focus on the individual, rather than providing a means with which to combat violence, in the end leaves the reader feeling disempowered. After all, there must be huge numbers of screwed up and vengeful people in the world to have chosen to litter history with war, environmental destruction and rape. Where do we go from here? Those lucky enough to have read Kappeler's book are supposed to decide not to use violence ourselves. A worthy endeavour, but hardly sufficient to change the world.
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#7 Negation: 1AR
EXTEND THE 2AC#1 ZIZEK 99 CARD. THERES NO SUCH THING AS A PURE AFFIRMATION OF LIFE. EVERY TIME YOU SAY THAT SOMETHINGS GOOD, BETWEEN THE LINES YOURE SAYING THAT SOMETHING ELSE, LIKE DEATH AND VIOLENCE, ARE BAD. THEIR YES TO LIFE IS AN IMPLICIT NO TO THE SAME DEATH AND VIOLENCE THAT WERE SAYING IS BAD. FEAR OF APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE IS STILL CONTAINED IN ALL OF THEIR ARGUMENTS, REPRESSED BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THEIR WORDS. THIS MEANS WELL WIN THE UNIQUENESS FOR OUR TURNS BECAUSE SOME FORM OF VIOLENT REPRESENTATION IS INEVITABLE IN ALL POLITICAL DISCOURSE, THE ONLY QUESTION IS OF WHETHER THOSE REPRESENTATIONS INTERROGATE THE FUNDAMENTAL FANTASY OF POLITICAL REALITY BY ACKNOWLEDING OUR INEVITABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRAUMA OF DEATH AND VIOLENCE THATS INHERENTLY REPRESSED BY THE SYMOBLIC CONCEIVING OF VIOLENCE AS AN UNDESCRIBABLE HORROR IS A FANTASY THAT ALLOWS US TO AVOID THE TRAUMATIC ANTAGONISM THAT CONSTITUTES REALITY ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF ITS OBSCENE UNDERSIDE ALLOWS US TO INTERROGATE ITS IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDING Zizek 2001
[Slavoj, Megalomaniacal mercy killer, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, New York: Verso, 30-2//uwyo] the passion for the Real is this identification with this heroic gesture of fully assuming the dirty obscene underside of Power: the heroic attitude of Somebody has to do the dirty work, so lets do it!, a
The very core of kind of mirror-reversal of the Beautiful Soul which refuses to recognize itself in its result. We find this stance also in the properly Rightist admiration for the celebration of heroes who are ready to do the necessary dirty work: it is easy to do a noble thing for ones country, up to sacrificing ones life fo r it it is much more difficult to commit a crime for ones countryHitler knew very well how to play this double game apropos of the Holocaust, using Himmler ot spell out the dirty secret. In his speech to the SS leaders in Posenon October 4 1943, Himmler spoke quite openly about the mass killing of the Jews as a glorious page in our history, and one that has never been written and never can be written; he explicitly included the killing of women and chilrden: We faced the question: what should we do with the women and children? I decided here too to find a completely clear solution. I did not regard myself as justified in exterminating the men that is ot say, to kill them or have them killed and to allow the avengers in the shape of chilrden to grow up for our sons and grandchildren. The difficult decision had to be taken to have this people disappear from the earth. The very next day, the SS leaders were ordered to attend a meeting where Hitler himself gave an account of the state of the war; here, Hitler did not have to mention the Final Solution directly oblique references to the SS leaders knowledge and to their shared complicity, were enough: The entire German people know that it is a
it is along these lines that we can oppose the reactionary and the progressive passion for the Real: while the reactionary one is the endorsement of the obscene underside of the Law, the progressive one is confrontation with the Real of the antagonism denied by the passion for purification, which in both its
matter of whether they exist or do not exist. The bridges have been destroyed behind them. Only the way forward remains. And, ideally,
versions, the Rightist and the Leftist assumes that the Real is touched in and through the destruction of the excessive elemtn which introduces antagonism. Here, we should abandon the standard metaphorics of the Real as the terrifying Thing that is impossible to confront face to face, as the ultimate Real concealed beteath the layers of imaginary and/or symbolic Veils: the very idea that, beneath the deceptive appearances, ther elies hidden some ultimate Real Thing too horrible for us to look at directly is the ultimate appearance this Real Thing is a fantasmic spectre whose presence guarantees the consistency of our symbolic edifice, thus enabling us to avoid confronting its constitutive inconsistency (antagonism). Take Nazi ideology: the Jew as its Real is a spectre evoked in order to conceal social antagonism that is, the figure of the Jew enables us to perceive social totality as an organic Whole. And does not the same go for the figure of Woman Thing inaccessible to the male grasp? Is she also not the ultimate Spectre enabling men to avoid the constitutive deadlock of the sexual relationship?
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#8 Subversion: 1AR
THEY MISUNDERSTAND COGNITION - IDENTIFICATION WITH IMAGES OF DOMINATION UNDERMINES RELATIONSHIPS OF SUBORDINATION Krips '99
[Henry, Professor of Communication at the Pitt, Fetish: an erotics of culture, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999, 5-6//uwyo-ajl] Arguments against linking the cultural and psychic realms also seem apposite in criticizing MacKinnon's claim that there exists a direct causal connection between pornography and a psychic characteristic of its male consumers, namely sexual aggression. At a theoretical level, her argument fails to take into account Freud's point that identification with a phantasy figure flows readily across gender lines. For example, in the Dora case, Freud argues
that Dora's behavior manifests an unconscious desire for Frau K., her father's lover and suitor's wife. For Freud her desire does not indicate any sexual instability. Instead, through an identification with her father's desire, it signals an unconscious paternal identification. In other words, for Freud the
significant aspect of Dora's phantasy is not the sexual content of the desire but rather the paternal position from which she engages with it. By parity of reasoning, it follows that quite "normal" male readers of porn may identify with the position of woman victim rather than male aggressor, in which case their aggressive tendencies cannot be reinforced in the simplistic way that MacKinnon suggests.3 In short, as Laura Kipnis points out, neither the biology nor gender of readers of Hustler magazine determines the form of their identification with its pornographic materials, let alone forces them into a common psychic response (Kipnis 1996, 196). In the same way, one may argue, gender-swapping phantasy games
played by Net users do not indicate their gender instability. On the contrary. one might turn the argument around and conclude that the preponderance of biological males among Net users suggests that even when playing at being a woman, they are engaging in a "boys' game."
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nothing of the sort - is instead weighed down by necessity, in the form of what Marshall Berman calls German-Christian interiority - by its preoccupation with authenticity, that is to say, and true political 'identity'. Auschwitz is a corollary not of reason, understood as risk, but of the fear of reason, which paradoxically is a fear of violence. The stench of burning bodies is haunted always by the sickly aroma of cheap metaphysics.
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By representing the possible extinction as the single most important problematic' of nuclear catastrophe (posing it as either a threat or a symbolic void), nuclear' criticism disqualifies the entire history of nuclear violence, the "real" of nuclear catastrophe as a continuous and repetitive process. The "real" of nuclear war is designated by nuclear critics as a "rehearsal' (Derrik De Kerkhove) or "preparation" (Firth) for what they reserve as the authentic catastrophes' The history of nuclear violence offers, at best, a reality effect to the imagery of "extinction." Schell summarized the discursive position of nuclear critics very
succinctly, by stating that nuclear catastrophe should not be conceptualized "in the context of direct slaughter of hundreds of millions people by the local effects: "8 Thus the elimination of the history of nuclear violence by nuclear critics stems from the process of discursive "delocalization" of nuclear violence. Their primary focus is not local catastrophe, but delocalized, unlocatable, "global" catastrophe
FOURTH, EXTINCTION OF THE SPECIES IS THE MOST HORRIBLE IMPACT IMAGINEABLE, PUTTING RIGHTS FIRST IS PUTTING A PART OF SOCIETY BEFORE THE WHOLE Schell 1982
(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)
Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and
world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill
the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common
someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives
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, there are nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
each other down-has thankfully retreated into history
destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize the importance of its arsenal of nuclear weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching actual aggressions.
the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future. I came to this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever "uninventing" or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I
I personally see believe that the words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain convincing on this point: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands."
the majority of the nations who have now acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would never surrender them. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in reaffirming the
Similarly, it is my sincere view that unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that
nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring role in preserving the peace and preventing world wars for the foreseeable future. These are my purposes in writing this paper.
SIXTH, IMAGINING NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION IS A PROJECT OF SURVIVAL THEIR ALTERNATIVE CREATES REPRESSION AND DENIAL WHICH MAKES NUCLEAR WAR MORE LIKELY Lenz, Science and Policy Professor at SUNY, 90 (Nuclear Age Literature For Youth, p. 9-10)
A summary of Franks thought in Psychological Determinants of the Nuclear Arms Race notes how all
people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of the threat of nuclear arms and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have actually experienced can have true emotional
in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched, we
impact. Since Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and nuclear weapons poised for ann ihilation
find it easy to imagine ourselves immune to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay Neither Victims nor Executioners of the
inability of most people really to imagine other peoples death (he might have added or their own). Commenting on Camus, David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that this
distancing from deaths reality is yet another aspect of our insulation from lifes most basic realities. We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding. If we are to heed Camuss call to refuse to be either the victims of violence like the Jews of the Holocaust, or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners of the death camps, we must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails. It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because letting [the
instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of anxiety or other painful emotions. In most lifethreatening situations, an organisms adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, adapting psychic toll.
ourselves to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our doom more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a
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This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida
the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray,
usually replies that Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more
. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the
generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. "
metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from
psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect
which the Enlightenment offered. that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
EIGHTH, PLAN SOLVES WORSE IMPERIALISM BY ENDING THE UNILATERAL AND INDEFINITE DETAINMENT AND TORTURE OF ENEMY COMBATANTS BY THE EXECUTIVE NINTH, APPROPRIATING THE OTHER VIOLENTLY SEIZES THE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR SELFISH ENDS Routledge 96
[Antipode]
The issue of representation is a vexed one which has received much attention within the social sciences. For example, in discussing the academic strategy of polyphony, Crang (1992) raises issues of how the voices of others are (re)presented; the extent to which these voices are interwoven with persona of narrator the degree of authorial power regarding who initiates research, who decides on textual arrangements, and who decides which voices are heard; and the power relations involved in the cultural capital conferred by specialist knowledge. Moreover, Harrison (quoted in McLaren 1995 240) argues that polyphony can end up being aform of romantic ventroloquism creating the magical notion of the Others coming to voice. These questions have important political implications for research which must be negotiated according to the specific circumstances of a particular project. It is all too easy for academics to claim solidarity with the oppressed and act as relays for their voices within social scientific discourse. This raises the danger of an uncritical alignment with resisters on the assumption that they know all there is to know without the intervention of intellectuals; and hence an academics role becomes that of helping them seize the right to speak.
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it is precisely the image of Indians as doomed victims that some white people identify with: she calls this the "I'm a victim too complex. Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche conceived, something like this complex as the very core of Christian culture, underlining the link between pity and contempt. Thinking of someone else as a victim is a way of displacing one's own pain: in reactive Christian thinking, I am less of a victim than you because you are more of a victim than me. White hippies do tend to recognize some of the oppressive aspects of industrial, consumerist society but manifest this by focusing on and identifying with people who seem to be even more oppressed, thus reproducing the 1970s movie version of Natives as defeated victims who exist only in the past. Western culture is permeated with the duplicitous, Christian notion of victimization, which on the one hand implies a moral or spiritual superiority and on the other a kind of weakness that is to be overcome. Martyred saints are represented as suffering physical torment with a heroic steadfastness of faith. Yet the body, whether sinful or suffering, is thought to be inherently abject. Thus, to be a victim is to be both heroic and abject. White representations (both "sympathetic" and explicitly racist) of colonial wars tend to maintain this definition and underline the view that Native heroism derives from and is the consequence of defeat. The white fascination with the romantic, abstract heroism of Native people is thus able to function as another means of colonial pracification because it presupposes the inevitable defeat and disappearance of the nations. Colonialism adds a new twist to the Christian view that people are victims by their very nature or essence, and here the relation between aggressor and victim becomes wholly static and cannot shift. Every-one is frozen into his or her position and role. And, of course, conceiving of an enemy nation as heroic also makes the oppressors look good because they have defeated a truly worthy and valiant enemy. This, too, is nothing new in Western culture. Recall the famous Roman
sculpture of the dying Gaul, an image of a heroic, yet defeated enemy. Here we approach what it was we all forgot in our eagerness to embrace the representation of
if Native nations are portrayed as inherently abject and doomed to defeat, white viewers will not feel any connection to colonialism, either in the past or in the present. This is why the phony Native culture of movies, Edward Curtis photographs, and television is so appealing to white people: if, as Hollywood and capitalism would have it, the nations are foreordained to assimilate and vanish, then white viewers need not question racism or face the discomfort of interrogating our continuing position as members of a colonizing nation. We will not feel connected to ongoing struggles in James Bay, Chiapas, Kanesatake, and elsewhere and to the different relation to the land that these struggles express. Any sense of connection to events occurring on the ground is lost, and "Native" becomes another empty category that can be mined for its trappings and images. And the "love" of Indians professed by counterculture old and new continues to have nothing to do with Native people and certainly nothing to do with supporting contemporary Native struggles. Westerns and other colonial narratives are in the business of producing binarisms which have had effects on all of us. As white people, we need to rethink and recover the histories erased by popular culture and school textbooks. There were always alternatives
Inidans as heroic victims: to John Wayne. We also need to think through the nature of power and its relation to culture. John Trudell said somewhere that there is a difference between being oppressed and being powerless: Native people may be oppressed, but the traditions have power; white people may be "in charge" within a colonial context, but our culture has lost its heart, soul, and life-its power.
It is up to us to look into how our traditions were taken over and distorted by a destructive, soulless ethos and find ways to heal our cultural diseases. This is where
Karma's approach breaks down: he thinks he has to turn himself into a "white-skinned Indian" because he cannot find a way to transform and locate power in his own tradition. Because of the elided histories, he is unable to identify with the white people who have resisted oppression over the centuries. He, too, is rendered passive by the romantic discourse of inevitable defeat and disappearance. And because Karma thinks white culture is one thing-the dead, shopping-mall culture of our timeappropriation becomes his only escape, and it becomes impossible for him to imagine standing side by side with Native people as equals.
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Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim; not the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must a rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's point of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the rapist in his own language - one which has treated her as less than human? Must a concentration camp survivor address her former captor in the language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We might wonder whether this is what justice really requires, especially if the injustice we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to recognize us as a person, refused to speak in our language,
and declined to consider our uniqueness and authenticity.
VOTE TO SAVE LIVESTHE EXISTENCE OF ENDANGERED 3RD PARTIES MAKES RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
David Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, 1999, p. 35-36
Levinas's thought is appealing for rethinking the question of responsibility, especially with respect to situations like the Balkan crisis, because it maintains that
there is no circumstance under which we could declare that it was not our concern. As Levinas notes, people can (and obviously do) conduct their relationship to the Other in terms of exploitation, oppression, and violence. But no matter how allergic to the other is the self, "the relation to the other, as a relation of responsibility, cannot be totally suppressed, even when it takes the form of politics or warfare." In consequence, no self can ever opt out of a relationship with the other: "[I]t is impossible to free myself by saying, 'It's not my concern.' There is no choice, for it is always and
inescapably my concern. This is a unique 'no choice,' one that is not slavery." This unique lack of choice comes about because in Levinas's thought ethics has been transformed from something independent of subjectivitythat is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by pregiven, autonomous agentsto something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity. Accordingly, ethics can be understood as something not ancillary to the existence of a subject; instead, ethics can be appreciated for its indispensability to the very being of the subject. This argument leads us to the recognition that "we" are always already ethically situated, so making judgments about conduct depends less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulations and more on how the interdependencies of our relations with others are appreciated. To repeat one of Levinas's key points: "Ethics redefines subjectivity as this heteronomous responsibility, in contrast to autonomous freedom." Suggestive though it is for the domain of international relations where the bulk of the work on ethics can be located within a conventional perspective on responsibility
Levinas's formulation of responsibility, subjectivity, and ethics nonetheless possesses some problems when it comes to the implications of this thought for politics. What requires particular attention is the means by which the elemental and omnipresent status of responsibility, which is founded in the one-to-one or face-to-face relationship, can function in circumstances marked by a multiplicity of others. Although the reading of Levinas here agrees that "the ethical exigency to be
responsible to the other undermines the ontological primacy of the meaning of being," and embraces the idea that this demand "unsettles the natural and political positions we have taken up in the world and predisposes us to a meaning that is other than being, that is otherwise than being:" how those disturbances are negotiated so as to foster the maximum responsibility in a world populated by others in struggle remains to be argued. To examine what is a problem of considerable import
I want to consider Levinas's discussion of "the third person," the distinction he makes andof particular importance in a consideration of the politics of international actionthe role of the state in Levinas's thought.
given the context of this essay, between the ethical and the moral,
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'persecution', and so on.30 Of course, the limited creatures that we are can apprehend the Altogether-Other only if this otherness appears in some sense 'on our own level', that is, in the appearing of our 'neighbour' (of our neighbour's face): there is only 'responsibility and a Self because the trace
in my 'nonrelation' with the Other, 'the Other remains absolute and absolves itself from the relation which it enters into'.32 The relation with the other is first and foremost a 'relation' with the transcendent.beyond as
such. Levinasian ethics, in short, is a form of what Badiou criticizes as anti-philosophy, that is, the reservation of pure or absolute value to a realm beyond all conceptual distinction
LEVINAS ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON THE THEOLOGICAL INFINITY OF GOD. SECULAR APPROPRIATION LAPSES INTO FINITUDE, BLOCKING RESPONSIBILITY Badiou 2001
[Alain, Number muncher, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Trans. Peter Hallward, New York: Verso, 2001, 21-3//uwyo-ajl] : the ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the experience of alterity be ontologically 'guaranteed' as the experience of a distance, or of an essential non-identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience itself. But nothing in the simple phenomenon of the other contains such a guarantee. And this simply because the finitude of the other's appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus
The difficulty, which also defines the point of application for these axioms, can be explained as follows lead back to the logic of the Same. The other always resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true. The phenomenon of the other (his face) must then attest to a radical alterity which he nevertheless does not contain by himself. The Other, as he appears to me in the order of the finite, must be the epiphany of a properly infinite distance to the other, the traversal of which is the originary ethical experience.
n order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the Other be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. Levinas calls this principle the 'Altogether-Other', and it is quite obviously the ethical name for God. There can be no Other if he is not the immediate phenomenon of the AltogetherOther. There can be no finite devotion to the nonidentical if it is not sustained by the infinite devotion of the principle to that which subsists outside it . There can be no ethics without God the ineffable. In Levinas's enterprise, the ethical dominance of the Other over the theoretical ontology of the same is entirely bound up with a religious axiom; to believe that we can separate what Levinas's thought unites is to betray the intimate movement of this thought, its subjective rigour. In truth, Levinas has no philosophy - not even philosophy
This means that i as the 'servant' of theology. Rather, this is philosophy (in the Greek sense of the word) annulled by theology, itself no longer a theology (the terminology is still too Greek, and presumes proximity to the divine via the identity and predicates of God) but, precisely, an ethics.
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To make of ethics the ultimate name of the religious as such (i.e. of that which relates [re-lie] to the Other under the ineffable authority of the Altogether-Other) is to distance it still more completely from all that can be gathered under the name of 'philosophy'.
every effort to turn ethics into the principle of thought and action is essentially religious. We might say that Levinas is the coherent
To put it crudely: Levinas's enterprise serves to remind us, with extraordinary insistence, that and inventive thinker of an assumption that no academic exercise of veiling or abstraction can obscure: distanced from its Greek usage (according to which it is clearly subordinated to the theoretical), and taken in general, ethics is a category of pious discourse.
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The responsible decision must concern not only the notknown, it must evade conceptualization altogether. 'In order for [absolute responsibility] to be what it must be it must
remain inconceivable, indeed unthinkable.'40 The decision becomes precisely what is impossible for the subject as such. If, then, a response or a decision does take place, it can only have been 'the decision of the other in me'. 41 Like Abraham responding to God's instruction to sacrifice his son, I must respond without trying to interpret (and thus appropriate) the other's meaning. I must respond simply because radical otherness demands it; only then do I become the unknowing vehicle for this other's decision. Hence the mysterium tremendum whose 'trembling' quivers throughout Donner la mort : 'we fear and
tremble before the inaccessible secret of a God who decides for us although we remain responsible' .42 Hence, too, the irreducibly 'tragic' and 'guilty' quality of Derrida's ethical responsibility (54-5/51), the impasse of a responsibility to impossibly
overwhelming (and impossibly incommensurable) obligations. This impasse, moreover, is only exacerbated by any attempt to justify an ethical decision. Since every such decision must be made by a fully solitary or 'irreplaceable' subject, so then its justification according to the necessarily general or universal criteria of collective ethics threatens 'to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept', to betray my secret within the publicity of language - in short, to threaten me with replacement.43 If it is to be a genuine decision, it seems, the decision must take place as a pure leap of faith, one that resists any location in the situation, any justification by its subject, and any 'conceptualization' by philosophy.
Badiou's emphasis on the material topology of a truthprocedure, by contrast, is designed precisely to situate every such leap and to justify every apparently 'unjustifiable' commitment in terms of its eternal and universal address. The decision is no less 'incalculable', no less extra-ordinary or extra-legal. But for Badiou, an ordinary (replaceable) individual becomes irreplaceable, becomes a (singular) subject, only through this very commitment itself; it is only the commitment to a truth-
process that 'induces a subject'.44 Whereas Derrida maintains that responsibility to 'the absolute singularity of the other. . . calls for a betrayal of everything that manifests itself within the order of universal generality' ,45 Badiou declares that we can access the realm of singularity only through adherence to strictly universal criteria - that is, to the universality produced by a truth-procedure. Derrida's responsibility keeps itself 'apart and secret', it 'holds to what is apart and secret' (33/26tm); whereas Badiou's commitment, inspired by Lacan's logic of the matheme the literal basis for an 'integral transmission' of truth46 - pursues clarity for all. Derrida's tension between (singular) subject and (collective) justification disappears here without trace, as does every hint of pathos roused by a responsibllity deemed impossible a priori. A true statement, as Badiou conceives it, is precisely one that can be made by anyone, anyone at all.47 Again, with Badiou, impossibility is invariably thought in terms of a particular situation, that is, as the Real of that situation, the void around which it is structured in its systematic entirety - and thus the point from which, through a process of eminently' logical revolt' ,48 it becomes possible to transform the situation as a whole. And whereas both Badiou and Derrida orientate their ethics around the advent of something 'to come' that escapes incorporation within any logic of anticipation or figuration, Badiou's event remains situated vis-a-vis the state of the' situation (the elements of the 'symptomal' or 'evental' site [site evenementiel] are perfectly accessible 'in their own right'; they are inaccessible only from within the perspective adopted by the state of the situation), whereas
Derrida's messianic event is simply 'monstrous' in the strong sense, consigned to a general 'formlessness'.
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Bakhtins dialogism, a theory of knowledge and language that tries to avoid the excluding accepts the existence of multiple meanings, draws connections between differences, and searches for possibilities to establish conceptual and linguistic dialogues among competing ideas,
values, speech forms, texts, and validity claims, and the like. Jurgen Habermas attempts to theorize the preconditions for ideal speech situations. Communication, in this case, should be as unrestrained as possible, such that claims to truth and rightness can be discursively redeemed, albeit, one should add, though a rationalism and universalism that it violently anti-Bakhtinian and anti-Adornian. Closer to the familiar terrain of IR we find Christine Sylvesters feminist method of
empathetic cooperation, which aims at opening up questions of gender by a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears, and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to heeding when building social theory. But how does one conceptualize such attempts if
concepts can ever do justice to the objects they are trying to capture? The daring task is, as we know from Adorno, to open with concepts what does not fit into concepts, to resist the distorting power of reification and return the conceptual to the nonconceptual. This disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of critical philosophy. It impedes the concept from developing its own dynamics and from becoming an absolute in itself. The first step toward disenchanting the concept is simply refusing to define it monologically. Concepts should achieve meaning only gradually in relation to each other. Adorno even intentionally uses the same concept in different way in order to liberate it from the harrow definition that language itself had already imposed on it. That contradictions could arise out of this practice does not bother Adorno. Indeed, he considers them essential
. One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary, and the discontinuous. Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior universal standard of reference. What is different appears as divergent, dissonant, and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalizing standpoint, which we must avoid if we are to escape the reifying and excluding dangers of identity thinking. Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity then is not to be found be evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be referred over artificially constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus, Adorno advocates writing in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, and place. He adheres to Nietzsches advice that one should approach deep problems like taking a cold bath, quickly into them and quickly out again. The belief that one does not
reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those who fear cold water. But Nietzsches bath has alre ady catapulted us into the vortex of the next linguistic terrain of resistance the question of style.
THIRD, NO LINK WE DONT ASSERT DEVOTION TO A TRANSCENDENT LAW. PLAN IS ONLY A CONTINGENT CONTESTATION OF NEGATIVITY
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does not already posit a 'new harmony', a new TruthEvent; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identifiction with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification - that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it, but is simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here, Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou: God not only is but always-already was dead - that is to say, after Freud, one cannot directly have faith in a Truth-Event; every such Event ultimately remains a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination of the exact status of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan,
St Paul or Badiou: psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it Badiou delineates the contours of a domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection
: the 'death drive' is not the outcome of the morbid confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law. For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain 'between the two deaths', the pre-ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the immortality of participating in Truth, but in the sense of
what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
FIFTH, THE ALT DOESNT SOLVE WITHOUT PLAN, UNILATERAL DETAINMENT WILL CONTINUE, LOCKING IN THE SLAVE MORALITY OF THE STATUS QUO
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[Saul, Sociology @ Macquarie University, Philosophy & Social Criticism 27: 3, pp. 46//uwyo] Derrida does not simply want to invert the terms of these binaries so that the subordinated term becomes the privileged term. He does not want to put writing in the place of speech, for instance. Inversion in this way leaves intact the hierarchical, authoritarian structure of the binary division. Such a strategy only re- affirms the place of power in the very attempt to overthrow it. One could argue that Marxism fell victim to this logic by replacing the bour- geois state with the equally authoritarian workers state. This is a logic that haunts our radical political imaginary. Revolutionary political theories have often succeeded only in reinventing power and authority in their own image. However, Derrida also recognizes the dangers of subversion that is, the radical strategy of overthrowing the hierarchy altogether,
rather than inverting its terms. For instance, the classical anarchists critique of Marxism went along the lines that Marxis m neglected political power in particular the power of the state for economic power, and this would mean a restoration of political power in a Marxist revolution. Rather, for anarchists, the state and all forms of political power must be abolished as the first revolutionary act. However,
Derrida believes that subversion and inversion both culminate in the same thing the reinvention of authority, in different guises. Thus, the
anarchist critique is based on the Enlightenment idea of a rational and moral human essence that power denies, and yet we know from Derrida that any essential identity involves a radical exclusion or sup- pression of other identities. Thus
, anarchism substituted political and economic authority for a rational authority founded on an Enlighten- ment-humanist subjectivity. Both radical politico-theoretical strategies then the strategy of inversion, as exemplified by Marxism, and the strategy of subversion, as exemplified by anarchism are two sides of the same logic of logic of place. So for Derrida:
What must occur then is not merely a suppression of all hierarchy, for an- archy only consolidates just as surely the established order of a metaphys- ical hierarchy; nor is it a simple change or reversal in the terms of any given hierarchy. Rather the Umdrehung must be a transformation of the hierar- chical structure itself.
to avoid the lure of authority one must go beyond both the anarchic desire to destroy hierarchy, and the mere reversal of terms. Rather, as Derrida suggests, if one wants to avoid this trap the hierar- chical structure itself must be transformed. Political action must invoke a rethinking of revolution and authority in a way that traces a path between these two terms, so that it does not merely reinvent the place of power. It could be argued that Derrida propounds an anarchism of his own, if by anarchism one means a questioning of all authority, including
In other words, textual and philosophical authority, as well as a desire to avoid the trap of reproducing authority and hierarchy in ones attempt to destroy it. This deconstructive attempt to transform the very structure of hier- archy and authority, to go beyond the binary opposition, is also found in Nietzsche. Nietzsche believes that one cannot merely oppose auth- ority by affirming its opposite: this is only to react to and, thus, affirm the domination one is supposedly resisting.
One must, he argues, tran- scend oppositional thinking altogether go beyond truth and error, beyond being and becoming, beyond good and evil. For Nietzsche it is simply a moral prejudice to privilege truth over error. However, he does not try to counter this by privileging error over truth, because this leaves the opposition intact. Rather, he refuses to confine his view of the world to this opposition: Indeed what compels us to
assume that there exists any essential antithesis between true and false? Is it not enough to suppose grades of apparentness and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of appearance? Nietzsche displaces, rather than replaces, these oppositional and authoritarian structures of thought he displaces place. This strategy of displacement, similarly adopted by Derrida, provides certain clues to developing a non-essentialist theory of resist- ance to power and authority
. Rather than reversing the terms of the binary opposition, one should perhaps question, and try to make prob- lematic, its very structure.
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with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic safety net against cruelty, especially if one judges oneself to be a 'higher' type of person with life-enhancing pursuits and, to this extent, his philosophy licenses the atrocities of a Hitler even though, by his personal table of values, he excoriates anti-Semitism and virulent nationalism. Indeed, to that extent it is irrelevant whether or not Nietzsche himself advocates violence and bloodshed or whether he is the gentle person described by his contemporaries. The reality is that the supreme value he places on individual life-enhancement and self-legislation leaves room for, and in some cases explicitly justifies, unfettered brutality. In sum: the point here is not to rebut Nietzsche's claim that 'everything evil,
be overridden by our duty, as rational agents, to respect just such universalized maxims. To this apologist one would reply that major ethical undertaking in its own right.
terrible, tyrannical in man' serves his enhancement 'as much as its opposite does' (BGE, 44 my emphasis)for such a rebuttal would be a
It is rather to suggest that the necessary balance between danger and safety which Nietzsche himself regards as a condition for flourishing (for example, in this quote from BGE, 44) is not vouchsafed by his extreme individualism. Indeed, such individualism seems not only self-defeating, but also quite unnecessary: for safeguards against those who have pretensions to sovereignty but lack nobility could be accepted on Nietzsche's theory of value as just another 'condition for the preservation' of 'higher' types. Since the overriding aim of his attack on morality is to liberate people from the repressiveness of the 'herd' instinct, this unrelieved potential danger to the 'higher' individual must count decisively against the successand the possibility of successof his project.
EIGHTH, THE SURFACE/DEPTH MODELS SEARCH FOR SUBJECTIVE INTEGRITY RELIES ON ASSUMPTIONS OF METAPHYSICAL INNOCENCE, FETISHIZING AN AUTHENTICITY THAT NEVER EXISTED Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997, 195-6//uwyo-ajl] postmodernism has actually become something. Its principal characteristic is the retreat from and disavowal of the violence of representation - both political and semiotic.
Despite the diligence and the sterling efforts of its best theoreti-cians, then, it seems that There are three further aspects to this essentially ignominious cultural operation: (i) a cultivation of stupidity (what I have called Kelvinism, or 'metaphysical innocence') as a means of circumventing the ideational 'brutality' of the political life; (ii)
a recourse to the idea of an internal or subjective 'truth of the soul' which transcends political reality, along with the contingencies of representation. Both of these signal an attachment to a surface/ depth model of subjectivity which in each case amounts to a fetishization of authenticity, whether by opting to 'remain' on the surface, or by retreating 'inwards'; (iii) a collapse of faith by individuals and even politicians themselves, not only in the political
infrastructure but in the very' concept of political engagement - here it becomes apparent that Tony Blair, for example, is more 'postodern' than any theoretician. .
these three responses stand in an approximately analogous relationship to the archetypal forms in which consciousness, in a state of anxiety, shrinks from the violence of determinate negation and 'strives to hold on to what it is
It should be clear that in danger of losing'. 59 At various points throughout the present work I have used the terms 'decadence', 'irony' and 'relativism' to refer to these instances of an epistemological loss of nerve, this ; it may be as well here to remind ourselves of the terms in which Hegel describes these manifestations of a retreat from truth. Consciousness, he says, at the decisive moment in which it is required to go beyond its own limits, (i) 'wishes to remain in a state' of unthinking inertia'; (ii) gloats over its own understanding, 'which knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego instead of any content'; (iii) 'entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be good in its kind'. 60 Postmodernism, an empirical social condition - by which I mean that a series of critical-theoretical strategies has attained a certain concrete form - legitimizes these symptoms of cultural anxiety; postmodernism becomes synonymous, therefore, with deceleration, with a sense of cultural and political conclusivity; postmodernism is the principal vehicle of what Baudrillard calls 'the illusion of the end'.
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TENTH, TURN THE SEARCH FOR HIDDEN MOTIVES ENGAGES IN A HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION, RISKING SPIRAL INTO PROFOUND SKEPTICISM Berman 2001
[Paul Schiff, Assoc. Prof. Law @ U. of Connecticut, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, LN]
Ricoeur contrasts two different "poles" among hermeneutic styles. At one pole, "hermeneutics is understood as the manifestation and restoration of ... meaning." 23 At the other pole, hermeneutics is "understood as a demystification, as a reduction of illusion." 24 It is not entirely clear to me precisely
a hermeneutics of faith to be one that treats the object of study as possessing inherent meaning on its own terms. In contrast, the hermeneutics of suspicion seeks to expose societal practices as illusory edifices that mask underlying contradictions or failures of meaning. I will return to the first pole in Part Four of this
what Ricoeur means by these two categories. Nevertheless, I understand Essay, but for now I wish to focus on the hermeneutics of demystification and suspicion.
t each of these thinkers makes "the decision to look upon the whole of consciousness primarily as "false' consciousness." 25 Ricoeur sees this perspective as an extension of Descartes' fundamental position of doubt at the dawn of the
Ricoeur locates in the work of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud the central hallmarks of this suspicious approach. He argues tha Enlightenment. According to Ricoeur, "The philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not such as they appear; but he does not doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself; in consciousness, meaning and consciousness of meaning coincide." 26
The hermeneutics of suspicion takes doubt one step farther, by distrusting even our perceptions.
This suspicious position questions the so-called "correspondence [*104] theory" of truth. As we go through our lives, most of us generally assume that our mental perceptions accord with reality because we believe we have direct access to reality through our senses or through reason. This is the legacy of the Enlightenment, the "answer" to the fundamental Cartesian doubt. But the hermeneutics of suspicion maintains that human beings create false truths for themselves.
Such false truths cannot be "objective" because they always serve some interest or purpose.
By discovering and revealing those interests or purposes, suspicious analysis seeks to expose so-called "false consciousness" generated through social ideology or self-deception. False consciousness may arise in many different ways. Nietzsche looked to people's self-deceit in the service of the "will to power." Marx focused on the social being and the false consciousness that arises from ideology and economic alienation. Freud approached the problem of false consciousness by examining dreams and neurotic symptoms in order to reveal hidden motivations and desires. Thus, "the Genealogy of Morals in Nietzsche's sense, the theory of ideologies in the Marxist sense, and the theory of ideas and illusions in Freud's sense represent three convergent procedures of demystification." 27
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, one might view this as a positive development. One might think people should stop being lulled into a false sense of believing that the rhetoric of public life really matters. If people began to view such rhetoric as a construction of entrenched power, so the argument might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly revolutionary political movement. I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to occur. Moreover, I am not sure that a culture of suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek political (or personal) change anyway.
Of course Suspicious analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity, but there are dangers that arise from relentless disenchantment as well. As [*123] Richard K. Sherwin has observed,
Without the means of experiencing more profound enchantments, without communal rituals those beliefs ultimately lose their meaning and die... . Forms of enchantment in the service of deceit, illicit desire, and self-gratification alone must be separated out from forms of enchantment in the service of feelings, beliefs, and values that we aspire to affirm in light of the self, social, and legal realities they help to
and social dramas through which the culture's deepest beliefs and values may be brought to life and collectively reenacted, construct and maintain. 112
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Nietzsche = Nihilism
NIETSZCHES DENIAL OF BEING LEADS TO NIHILISM REMOVING ALL MEANING IN LIFE THIS LEADS TO AN ENDLESS SEARCH FOR POWER WHICH NEVER IS SUCCESSFUL Hicks, Prof and Chair of Philosophy @ Queens College of the CUNY, 2K3 (Steven V.,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond, Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, P. 109, Questia)
Here again, one might raise objections to Heidegger's equating of Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power with the metaphysics of subjectivity. After all, Nietzsche often attacked Descartes's ego cogito as a logical or linguistic fiction (cf. BGE, 16, 54). Yet according to Heidegger,
Nietzsche still follows Descartes's lead in making human beings the subject or foundation of things. Unlike Descartes, however,
Nietzsche's subject is not a fixed mental substance, but the body interpreted as a center of instincts, drives, affects, and sublimations, i.e., as will to power.
Heidegger claims that this body as given idea still involves Nietzsche in a fixity that brings him into the philosophy of presence: Nietzsche argues that being is as fixated, as permanent (N, 2:200). And this forced sense of presence, Heidegger thinks, leads to the dangers of radical objectifiability and to the disposability of beings, i.e., treating beings as nothing but objects of use, control, and management. 32 Moreover, like its Cartesian counterpart, the Nietzschean subject reins supreme over the whole of beings and posits the measure
for the beingness of every being (N, 4:121). 33 In claiming that truths are illusions and that Being is an empty fiction, Nietzsche fashions for the subject an absolute power to enjoin what is true and what is false and hence to define what it means to be or not to be a being (N, 4:145). According to Nietzsche, what is truewhat has beingis that which serves the interest of the subject whose essence is will to power (in the mode of existence of eternal recurrence; cf. N, 2:203).
Being is thus reduced to the status of a value or a condition of the preservation and enhancement of the will to power (N, 4:176). This is why Heidegger considers Nietzsche the consummation, and not the overcoming, of Western metaphysics: by reducing Being to a value, the doctrine of will to power makes the nihilism of the metaphysical tradition (the assumption that Being itself is nothing and the human will everything) a matter of philosophical principle. 34 Thus Nietzsche's counter-ideals of will to power and eternal recurrence, far from overcoming nihilism, actually express or exemplify the loss of any sense of Being, or the withdrawal of Being itself, in favor of beings (i.e., products of human will). As Heidegger reads him, Nietzsche understands Being in terms of value (or what is useful for enhancing the human will) because Being itself has totally withdrawn in default. And this brings to completion traditional metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger, is the history of Being in its withdrawal. As Heidegger sees it, Nietzsche's metaphysics of will to power is the most extreme withdrawal of Being and thus the fulfillment of nihilism proper (N, 4:204, 232). So Nietzsche brings to completion, in his denial of Being, the very nihilism he wanted to overcome. Far from twisting free of the ascetic ideal, Heidegger claims, Nietzsche 's doctrine of will to power actually provides the basis for its most complete expression in the modern secularized ascetic will-tocontrol everything. In other words, instead of seeking salvation in a transcendent world by means of ascetic self-denialthe aspect of metaphysics that Nietzsche most obviously rejectssalvation is now, Heidegger claims, sought exclusively in the free self-development of all the creative powers of man (N, 4:89). This unlimited expanding of power for power's sake parallels in many ways what Nietzsche characterized as the most terrifying aspect of the ascetic ideal: the pursuit of truth for truth's sake. It is, according to Heidegger, the hidden thorn in the side of modern humanity (cf. N, 4:99). This hidden thorn expresses itself variously in
the Protestant work ethic and in the iron cage of bureaucratic-technological rationality (discussed in the works of Max Weber); it also expresses itself in the various power aims of modern scientific/technological culture as well as in the frenzied impulse to produce and consume things at ever faster rates. Heidegger even suggests
Nietzsche's own figure of the Overman (Ubermensch) foreshadows the calculating, technological attitude of modern secularized asceticism: His Overman [stands] for the technological worker-soldier who would disclose all entities as standingreserve necessary for enhancing the ultimately aimless quest for power for its own sake.35 This emerging technological human, grounded in a control-oriented anthropocentrism, compels entities to reveal only those one-dimensional aspects of themselves that are consistent with the power aims of a technological/productionist culture. Instead of dwelling and thinking in a world unified by what Heidegger
that metaphorically terms the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals, impoverished modern technocrats occupy a world bereft of gods in which thinking becomes calculating, and dwelling becomes tantamount to the technological domination of nature and what Nietzsche calls the common economic management of the earth in which mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy (WP, 866). Thus citizens come to be viewed primarily as consumers, wilderness is looked upon in terms of wildlife management areas, and genuine human freedom is replaced by the organized global conquest of the earth, and the thrust into outer space (N, 4:248). As Heidegger sees it, our era entertains the illusion that man, having become free for his humanity, ha s freely taken the universe into his power and disposition (N, 4:248). In summary, Nietzsche tried to combat the nihilism of the a scetic ideal (e.g., the collapse of the Christian table
instead of overcoming nihilism, Nietzsche simply reinforced it. By characterizing Being as an empty fiction and the last smoke of a vaporized reality (TI, 2:2, 481), and by degrading it to the status of a value for enhancing the subject's will to power, Nietzsche loses any sense of Being as such. For him it is a mere nothing, a nihil. And this brings to completion the fundamental movement of history in the West, which is nihilism: the withdrawal of Being itself and the consequent focus on beings as objects for consolidating the power of Will and for expanding it out beyond itself in an everof values) by bringing forth new nonascetic values that would enhance rather than devalue humanity's will to power. According to Heidegger, however,
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increasing spiral. 36 As Heidegger sees it, this eternally recurring will to power, or will to will, is a will-to-control that only reinforces the nihilism Nietzsche feared: the loss of meaning or direction, the devaluation of the highest values, the constructs of domination, and the devotion to frenzied consumption and production .
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Nietzsche's emphasis on the triumph of the will over emotion gave the Nazis the mental strength to accomplish the horrors of the Holocaust. n35 The choice of self-definition through hardness was seen as central to the establishment and assertion of a new national identity, and such emphasis led to a devaluation of human compassion and other emotions. n36 With a set ideology of hatred founded upon angry anti-Semitism, a belief in "scientific" racial superiority, and a will immune from emotional influence, the Nazis embarked on a catastrophic mission targeting a clearly defined enemy. After taking control of the government, they quickly built a wall of legal repression around the Jews, which culminated in the Nuremberg Laws and Kristallnacht decrees and left the Jews vulnerable to the violence that lay ahead. n37
NIETZSCHES PHILOSOPHIES LEGITIMIZED THE HOLOCAUST HIS NOTIONS OF MASTER MORALITY FUELED THE FIRE BEHIND GENOCIDES OF THE WEAK AND IMPERFECT FRAMING THEM AS MANS GREATEST DANGER Aschheim, Prof of German Cultural and Intellectual History @ Hebrew U, Jersulem, 97 (Steven E., Nietzsche, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, Nietzsche and Jewish
Culture, Ed. Jacob Golomb, P. 13-16)
At any rate, what I am proposing here is that both in its overall bio-eugenic political and medical vision, its programmatic obsession with degeneration and regeneration, whether in parodistic form or not, there are clear informing parallels with key Nietzschean categories and goals. From one perspective, as Robert Jay Lifton has recently persuasively argued, Nazism
is about the "medicalisation of killing". Its genocidal impulses were implicit within a bio-medical vision and its vast, selfproclaimed programmatic task of racial and eugenic-hygiene. On an unprecedented scale it would assume control of the human biological future, assuring health to positive racial stock and purging humanity of its sick, degenerative elements. Its vision of "violent cure", of murder and genocide as a "therapeutic imperative", Lifton argues, resonates with such Nietzschean themes.40 While every generation may emphasize their particular Nietzsche, there can be little doubt that in the first half of this century various European political circles came to regard him as the deepest diagnostician of sickness and degeneration and its most thoroughgoing regenerative therapist. "The sick", he wrote, "are man's greatest danger; not the evil, not the 'beasts of prey'."41 To be sure, as was his wont, he employed these notions in multiple, shifting ways, as
metaphor and irony (he even has a section on "ennoblement through degeneration"42) but most often, most crucially, it was represented (and understood) as a substantial literal danger whose overcoming through drastic measures was the precondition for the urgent recreation of a "naturalized", non-decadent humankind.
Although he was not alone in the wider nineteenthcentury quasi-bio-medical, moral, discourse of "degeneration"43 - that highly flexible, politically adjustable tool that cut across the ideological spectrum, able simultaneously to locate, diagnose and resolve a prevalent, though inchoate, sense of social and cultural crisis through an exercise of eugenic labeling and a language of bio-social pathology and potential renewal44 - he formed an integral part in defining and radicalizing it. He certainly constituted its most important conduit into the emerging radical right. What else was Nietzsche's Lebensphilosophie, his reassertion of instinct and his proposed transvaluation whereby the healthy naturalistic ethic replaced the sickly moral one (a central theme conveniently ignored or elided by the current post-structuralist champions of Nietzsche). "Tell me, my
that "The species requires that the ill-constituted, weak, degenerate, perish".46 The
brothers", Zarathustra asks, "what do we consider bad and worst of all? Is it not degeneration}'"15 In this world, the reassertion of all that is natural and healthy is dependent upon the ruthless extirpation of those anti-natural ressentiment sources of degeneration who have thoroughly weakened and falsified the natural and aristocratic bases of life. Over and over again, and in different ways, Nietzsche declared
Nazi bio-political understanding of, and solution to "degeneration", as I have tried to show here and elsewhere, was in multilayered ways explicitly Nietzsche-inspired. From the World War I through its Nazi
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implementation, Nietzschean exhortations to prevent procreation of "anti-life" elements and his advocacy of euthanasia, of what he called "holy cruelty" - "The Biblical
contiued
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translation of traditional anti-Jewish impulses into genocide and the murderous policies adopted in different degrees to other labeled outsiders (Gypsies, physically and mentally handicapped, homosexuals, criminals, inferior Eastern peoples and Communist political enemies) occurred within the distinct context of this medico-bio-eugenic vision. There were, to be sure, many building-blocks that went into conceiving and implementing genocide and mass murder but I would argue that this Nietzschean framework of thinking provided a crucial conceptual precondition and his radical sensibility a partial trigger for its implementation. Related to but also
going beyond these programmatic parallels and links we must raise another highly speculative, though necessary, issue: the vexed question of enabling preconditions and psychological motivations. Clearly, for events as thick and complex as these no single theoretical or methodological approach or methodology will suffice. Yet, given the extraordinary nature of the events, more conventional modes of historical analysis soon reach their limits and demand novel answers (the study of Nazism has provided them in abundance, some more, some less convincing49). I am not thus claiming exclusiveness for the Nietzschean element at this level of explanation, but rather arguing for his continued and important relevance. To be sure, of late, many accounts of the ideas behind, and the psychological wellsprings enabling, mass murder have been, if anything, anti-Nietzschean in content. For Christopher Browning it was hardly Nietzschean intoxication, the nihilistic belief that "all is permitted", that motivated the "ordinary killers" - but rather prosaic inuring psychological mechanisms such as group conformity, deference to authority, the dulling powers of alcohol and simple (but powerful) processes of routinization.50 For George L. Mosse, far from indicating a dynamic anti-bourgeois Nietzschean revolt, the mass murders represented a defense of bourgeois morality, the attempt to preserve a clean, orderly middle-class world against all those outsider and deviant groups that threatened it.51 These contain important insights but, in my view, leave out crucial experiential ingredients, closely related to the Nietzschean dimension, which must form at least part of the picture. At some point or another, the realization must have dawned on the conceivers and perpetrators of this event that something quite extraordinary, unprecedented, was occurring and that ordinary and middleclass men were committing radically transgressive, taboo-breaking, quite "un-bourgeois" acts.52 Even if we grant the problematic proposition that such acts were done in order to defend bourgeois interests and values, we would want to know about the galvanizing, radicalizing trigger that allowed decision-makers and perpetrators alike to set out in this direction and do the deed. To argue that it was "racism" merely pushes the argument a step backward, for "racism" on its own -while always pernicious - has to be made genocidal. We
are left with the issue of the radicalizing, triggering forces. These may be many in number but it seems to me that Nietzsche's determined anti-humanism (an atheism that, as George Lichtheim has noted, differs from the Feuerbachian attempt to replace theism with humanism33), apocalyptic imaginings and exhortatory visions, rendered such a possibility, such an act, conceivable in the first place (or, at the very least, once thought of and given the correct selective readings easily able to provide the appropriate ideological cover). This Nietzschean kind of thought, vocabulary and sensibility constitutes an important (if not the only) long-term enabling precondition of such radical elements in Nazism. With all its affinities to an older conservatism, it was the radically experimental, morality-challenging, tradition-shattering Nietzschean sensibility that made the vast transformative scale of the Nazi project thinkable. Nietzsche, as one contemporary commentator has pointed out, "prepared a consciousness that excluded nothing that anyone might think, feel, or do, including unimaginable atrocities carried out on a gigantic order".54 Of course, Nazism was a manifold historical phenomenon and its revolutionary thrust sat side by side with petit-bourgeois, provincial, traditional and conservative impulses.55 But surely, beyond its doctrinal emphases on destruction and violent regeneration, health and disease, the moral and historical significance of Nazism lies precisely in its unprecedented transvaluations and boundarybreaking extremities, its transgressive acts and shattering of previously intact taboos. It is here - however parodistic, selectively mediated or debased - that the sense of Nazism, its informing project and experiential dynamic, as a kind of Nietzschean Great Politics continues to haunt us.
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While the logic of unspecified prejudice calls for the higher/lower distinction without committing itself to any particulars to fill those categories, Nietzsche has made it quite clear what groups by "nature" or "destiny" are higher and what lower. Here are two statements regarding women and workers, two groups Nietzsche has condemned to the "low." Reversing Goethe's statement that "the eternal feminine draws us higher," the author of
we are defending what I shall call "the politics of unspecified prejudice." Beyond Good and Evil wrote: "I do not doubt that every nobler woman will resist this faith, for she believes the same about the EternalMasculine."62 The criterion of a woman's "nobility," then, is her "faith" that the male, as male, is more noble than herself .
This insidious rhetoric is also applied to the slave, who is urged to believe that his exploitation is justified because the master/aristocrat is more noble than he. When one unmasks the realities of this rhetoric, one sees that the practical advantages do not go to "superior" personseven assuming there were so pure a typebut simply to the privileged classes of the established society. Nietzsche himself points this out in Twilight of the Idols: The labor question. The stupidityat bottom,
the degeneration of instinct, which is today the cause of all stupidities is that there is a labor question at all. Certain things one does not question: that is the first imperative of instinct. . . . But what was done? . . . The instincts by virtue of which the worker becomes possible as a class, possible in his own eyes, have been destroyed through and through with the most irresponsible thoughtlessness. The worker was qualified for military service, granted the right to organize and to vote: is it any wonder that the worker today experiences his own existence as distressingmorally speaking, as an injustice? But what is wanted? ... If one wants an end, one must also want the means: if one wants slaves, one is a fool if one educates them to be masters.63 The
theme of the "strength" of not questioning the structure of power that serves the interests of a privileged class is not simply anti-liberal to the point of malice (as Nietzsche suggests in the aphorism that precedes this one). It is anti-critical to the point of malice. These statements on women, the working class, and the need of the privileged class for thoughtless and obedient "slaves" are not simply isolated opinions on Nietzsche's part, as sometimes they tend to be read. They are logically tied to other notions that Nietzsche is commended for holdingsuch as the distinction between the "superior" person and the "herd," the belief in a "strong" culture, and even the love of one's fate. The fact that we ignore the
concrete side of the issue while holding on to the more abstract side shows that in this case we are much less logical than Nietzsche, for we are the ones caught in a logical dilemma, while Nietzsche is not. Nietzsche, however, is caught in a much larger type of contradiction even though his logic is tight with respect to the connection between elitism and oppression. This is the contradiction between his intended affirmation of life and his reactionary and nihilistic politics. Still, the political implications of Nietzsche's thought can be turned around to some extent if we ask: was not Nietzsche correct in insisting upon a logical connection between a "strong" masculine ideal, a "strong" culture, and a blind system of political exploitation and psychological repression? Is it not true that if the goal of one's values is to implement a "strong" patriarchal system where a few will command and the rest will obey, it is then foolish to allow moral codes which favor the notions of the universal brotherhood and sisterhood of human beings? Does not the morality of universal human dignity entail in theory, if not also in practice, the elimination of all forms of elitism, domination, and oppression? In Nietzsche's idea of "greatness" one
thanks to his uninhibited articulation of the extreme he has exposed the logic of patriarchal domination in its essence. While Nietzsche has
finds the logic of the extremeof this he was well aware. But domination under the banner of overcoming the "evils" of "effeminacy" and "decadence,"
outlined various incentives for overturning the democratic influences of modern times and for instituting a "purer" system of patriarchal
it is up to us, not him, to make the choice as to what we want our political future and our moral values to be. His appeals to destiny, intolerance, and the suspension of critical questioning of authoritarian political institutions are not convincing.
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Heidegger argues that modern metaphysics is defined precisely by the fact that man becomes the measure and center of beings, and this, in turn, results in the modern technological understanding of beings as objects for use and control, or as Heidegger says, entities wholly present as standingreserve (Bestand) (QT, 17). 26 This extends even to human beings themselves, who are increasingly transformed by the human sciences (and their technological systems) into resources for objectification and control (cf. N, 4:23445). Here, Heidegger anticipates Foucault's claim that modern technological systems attempt to make human beings wholly present as bio-power, or subjects completely present for surveillance and control via the disciplinary practices of institutions (psychological, juridical, carceral) whose aim is to normalize human life. 27 Thus from Heidegger's perspective, the actual nihilism Nietzsche feared annihilation, spreading violence , and so forthis evoked by the preponderance, in the modern world, of this productionist, technological objectification of being, and by the complete ordering of all beings in the sense of a systematic securing of stockpiles for further technological usage, control, and domination (N, 4:22934). The relentlessness of [this] usage extends so far that the abode of Beingthat is, the essence of man is omitted; man is threatened with the annihilation of his essence, and Being itself is endangered (N, 4:245). Ironically, Heidegger argues, it was precisely Nietzsche's proposing of Being as a value posited by the will to power that led to this final [nihilistic] step of modern metaphysics, in which Being comes to appear as will to power (N, 4:234). Simply put, Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power succeeds in reducing the whole question of Being to the status of a value; and this completes the metaphysics of subjectivity initiated by Descartes, which in turn results in a blindness to the whole question as to what Being itself is. This blindness to Being, Heidegger argues, is at the root of all nihilism and is connected to the modern technological/productionist attitude toward the world (cf. N, 4:23132). Why does Heidegger make this claim?
coterminous with metaphysics . [it] lies grounded in the very essence of modern metaphysics (N, 4:2, 8). Heidegger believes that metaphysics is essentially the history of Being, a history in which Being discloses itself as withdra wn in default or concealed (cf. N, 4:23032). He basically reads the whole history of Western philosophy as the history of Being and its gradual selfconcealment. In this context, Heidegger praises Nietzsche for his insight into the basic development of that history: In h is [Nietzsche's] view it is nihilism . The phrase 'God Is Dead' is not an atheistic proclamation; it is a formula for the fundamental experie nce of an event in Occidental history (N, 1:156). Heidegger opaquely)
even suggests that Nietzsche came close to recognizing (albeit that the fundamental question of Being had been omitted, forgotten, or suppressed within the metaphysical tradition of previous philosophy, and that this omission of the default of Being in its unconcealment is the very essence of nihilism (cf. N, 4:23032). For example, when Nietzsche denies truth or refers to Being as an empty fiction (see TI, 481), Heidegger claims that he is actually experiencing and expressing the nothing or omission of Being itself in the history of Western philosophy, which is tantamount to nihilism:
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Nihilism Fails
NIHILISM IS AN INEFFECTIVE MEANS OF RESISTANCE THAT REPLICATES EVERYTHING BAD ABOUT THE STATUS QUO Mann, Prof of English @ Pomona, 95 (Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3,
Project Muse)
One might find it amusing to assume the pose of someone who states problems with brutal simplicity. As in this little nugget: Every historical form of cultural and political revolt, transgression, opposition, and escape has turned out to be nothing more than a systemic function. The notion of recuperation has encountered a thousand alibis and counter-tropes but still constitutes the closest thing cultural study has to a natural law. Collage, antimelodic high-decibel music, antimasterpieces, romantic primitivism, drunkenness and drugs, renegade sexuality, criticism itself: it is amazing that a single radical claim can still be made for any of this, and entirely characteristic that
Every conceivable form of negation has been dialectically coordinated into the mechanism of progress. The future of the anti has not yet been reconceived. That is why it is
it is. being nihilistic:
ridiculous to accuse some poor kid with a bad attitude or some putative grownup with a critique but no "positive program for change" of
strictly speaking, nihilism doesn't exist. What was once called nihilism has long since revealed itself as a general, integral function of a culture that, in all its glorious positivism, is far more destructive than the most vehement no. Nothing could be more destructive, more cancerous, than the positive proliferation of civilization (now there's a critical clich), and all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. As for the ethos of "resistance": just because something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective. It is merely ressentiment in one or another ideological drag. And how can anyone still be deluded by youth, by
its tedious shrugs of revolt? Even the young no longer believe their myth, although they are quite willing to promote it when convenient. Punk nihilism was never more than the nihilism of the commodity itself. You should not credit Malcolm McLaren with having realized this just because he was once pro-situ. All he wanted was to sell more trousers without boring himself to death; indeed he is proof that the guy with the flashiest ressentiment sells the most rags. And if he wasn't bored, can he be said to have advanced the same favor to us?
NIHILISM ENTRENCHES IDEAS THAT PROMOTE ARROGANCE AND VICTIMIZATION Dyson, Assist Prof of Law @ SMU, 05 (Maurice R., Awakening an Empire of Liberty: Exploring
the Root of Socratic Inquiry and Political Nihilism in American Democracy, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism, Vol. 83 No. 2, Wash Univ Law Quarterly) for West, these three entrenched dogmas are in turn driven by three forms of "political nihilism." These are evangelical nihilism, paternalistic nihilism, and sentimental nihilism. "Evangelical nihilism" is a notion of arrogant superiority that justifies might as right, or in other words, the belief that the U.S. would not be so powerful if we were not right. West
Furthermore,
terms it "evangelical" because of its perceived militant intolerance for dissension as well as blind faith to the belief that the exercise of power is a predicate to ensuring security and prosperity. For West, the quintessential evangelical nihilist is derived from Plato's Republic
Paternal nihilism, on the other treats American citizens as victims of deception by government actors who in turn attempt to superficially appease the masses. These governmental leaders fundamentally accept corrupt regimes and policies rather than question them. He finds in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The
in the form of Thrasymachus who debates with Socrates the moral superiority of might.(FN1) hand, in condemning infidels to death sentences because he believes the corrupted church is the best that mankind can hope for.(FN2)
Brothers Karamazov the literary metaphor for paternal nihilism in the form of the Grand Inquisitor. As West points out, this character knows full well the atrocities of the Inquisition represent a gross distortion of the Christian gospel, but nonetheless, personally takes part
The political nihilist is faulted here not just for his failure of imagination to envison a truer democracy, but for his lack of conviction to battle corrupt elites even when history has shown these battles can be vigorously waged.(FN3) Sentimental nihilism refers to West's belief that the news media's oversimplification and sensationalized reporting of global events sacrifices truth for distraction. Sentimental nihilism pacifies the American people by blunting the critical aspects of news events that implicate corruption in government.
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three distinct ways--the tragic, the cynical, and the fanatical--in which nihilism can come to dominate both a terrorist campaign and a war on terror. The first might be called tragic because it occurs despite the political intentions of all concerned, when terrorists and counterterrorists become trapped in a downward spiral of reprisal and counterreprisal. One side kills to avenge its last victim; the other side replies to avenge its last victim. Both sides start with an ethic of restraint and end up in a struggle without end. Here shedding of blood creates two communities--the terrorists and the counterterrorists--in which loyalty to the group prevails over institutional accountability or individual principle. Both sides are bonded to their own because both have blood on their hands or blood to avenge. Their bonds to the group are stronger than any they have to the institutions that could possibly restrain their behavior. Violence creates belonging and belonging produces closure. Terrorists listen only to themselves and no longer to restraining messages from the communities their violence is supposed to serve. Counterterrorist agencies, having suffered losses, bond with each other, view their civilian superiors as spineless libertarians, chafe under operational restrictions on their use of force, seek to evade these wherever possible, covering up as they do so, and seek to fight the terrorists on their own terms. At the bottom of this downward spiral, constitutional police forces and counterterror units can end up behaving no better than the terrorist cells they are trying to extirpate. Their moral conduct becomes dependent on the increasingly repellent conduct of the other side. This is the unintentional path to nihilism, taken by constitutional forces to defend the fallen and to revenge their losses. In the process, torture and extrajudicial killing may become routine. Gillo Pontecorvo's masterful film The Battle of Algiers (I965) portrays the Algerian war for independence, between i955 and 196Z, as a
review. I can see tragic duel in which two sides, conscientiously believing in the rightness of their course, become trapped in just such a downward spiral as we have been considering. The film may be fictional, but it is drawn from extensive documentary research into the actual history of the Algerian struggle. While clearly siding with the Algerian revolution, Pontecorvo takes care to avoid any moral caricature of the French, and shows why torture could be seen as a rational and effective way to break up the terrorist cells working in the Algiers Casbah. Nor does the filmmaker conceal the bloody reality of the liberation struggle, showing the full horror of an attack on a caf that leaves the street strewn with mangled bodies and traumatized survivors. The film maintains an extraordinarily subtle moral balance, supporting the Algerian struggle for freedom without mitigating the crimes committed in its name, condemning the French use of torture without failing to do justice to the reality that it was committed not by brutes but by people with dedicated convictions. The Battle of Algiers thus becomes a testament to the tragedy of terrorist war. Calling this path
In the tragic path, violence, once used as a means, becomes an end in itself, to the horror of those who are trapped by the conduct of the other side. In the second path, violence doesn't begin as a means to noble ends. It is used, from the beginning, in the service of cynical or self-serving ones. On both the terrorist and counterterrorist sides, there are bound to be individuals who actually enjoy violence for its own sake. Violence and weapons exert a fascination all their own, and their possession and use satisfy deep psychological needs. It isn't necessary to delve into the question of why human beings love violence and seek to use
tragic is not to excuse it, merely to distinguish it from a second path, which is altogether more cynical. weapons as instruments of power and even of sexual gratification. The fact that violence attracts as well as repels is a recurring challenge to the ethics of a lesser evil, since it explains why the appetite for violence can become insatiable, seeking ever more spectacular effects even though these fail to produce any discernible political result. Many terrorist groups use political language to mask the absence of any genuine commitment to the cause they defend. In their cynicism, they can become uncontrollable, because once violence is severed from the pursuit of determinate political ends, violence will not cease even if these goals are achieved. What is true of terrorists can also characterize counterterrorists. The type of personnel attracted to police and antiterrorist squads may be recruited because they are drawn to violent means. These means confer power, boost sexual confidence, and enable them to swagger and intimidate others. The type of personality attracted into a counterterror campaign may not have any intrinsic or reflective commitment to democratic values of restraint. Rules of engagement for the use of deadly force need be obeyed only when superiors are watching and can be disregarded at any other time. There may always be a gap, therefore, between the values of a liberal democracy when it is under attack and
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There are other groups whose political purposes are genuine, but who nonetheless end up turning violence into a way of life. These are the groups that have the characteristics, not of criminal gangs, but of fanatic sects. Here nihilism takes the form, not of believing in nothing, but of believing in too much. What I mean is a form of conviction so intense, a devotion so blind, that it becomes impossible to see that violence necessarily betrays the ends that conviction seeks to achieve. Here the delusion is not tragic, as in the first case, because believers are not trapped into violence by the conduct of the other side. Nor is it cynical: for these are true believers. They initiate violence as a sacred and redemptive duty. This is the third path to nihilism, the fanatical use of high principle to justify atrocity. What is nihilistic is the belief that such goals license all possible means, indeed obviate any consideration of the human costs. Nihilism here is willed indifference to the human agents sacrificed on the altar of principle. Here nihilism is not a belief in nothing at all; it is, rather, the belief that nothing about particular groups of human beings matters enough to require minimizing harm to them. The high principles commonly used to justify
straightforwardly violent ends.
terrorism were once predominantly secular--varieties of conspiratorial Marxism--but today most of the justifying ideologies are religious. To call religious justifications of violence nihilistic is, of course, to make a certain kind of value judgment, to assert that there cannot be, in principle, any metaphysical or God-commanded justification for the slaughter of civilians. From a human rights standpoint, the claim that such inhumanity can be divinely inspired is a piece of nihilism, an inhuman devaluation of the respect owed to all persons, and moreover a piece of hubris, since, by definition, human beings have no access to divine intentions, whatever they may be. The hubris is not confined to vocalizing divine intention. It also consists in hijacking scriptural tradition. The devil can always quote scripture to his use, and there is never a shortage in any faith of texts justifying the use of force. Equally, all religions contain sacred texts urging believers to treat human beings decently. Some may be more universalistic in these claims than others. Some may confine the duties of benevolence to fellow believers, while others may extend these duties to the whole of humankind. But whatever the ambit of their moral concern, all religious teaching offers some resistance to the idea that it is justifiable to kill or abuse other human beings. This resistance may range from outright
nihilist use of religious doctrine is one that perverts the doctrine into a justification for inhuman deeds and ignores any part of the doctrine which is resistant to its violent purposes. The nihilism here engages in a characteristic inversion: adjusting religious doctrine to rationalize the terrorist goal, rather than subjecting it to the genuine interrogation of true faith. It is unnecessary here to document the extent to which Al Qaeda has
condemnation to qualified justification as a last resort. A exploited and distorted the true faith of Islam. To take but one example, the tradition of jihad, which refers to the obligation of the believer to struggle against inner weakness and corruption, has been distorted into an obligation to wage war against Jews and Americans. In the hands of Osama bin Laden, the specifically religious and inner-directed content of jihad has been emptied out and replaced by a doctrine justifying acts of terror. This type of religious justification dramatically amplifies the political impact of terrorist actions. When Al Qaeda strikes, it can claim that it acts on behalf of a billion Muslims. This may be a lie, but it is an influential one nonetheless. Appropriating religious doctrine in this way also enables the group to offer potential recruits the promise of martyrdom. Immortality complicates the relationship between violent means and political ends, for the promise of eternal life has the effect of making it a secondary matter to the suicide bomber whether or not the act achieves anything political at all. What matters most is securing entry into Paradise. Here political
Once violent means cease to serve determinate political ends, they take on a life of their own. When personal immortality becomes the goal, the terrorists cease to think like political actors, susceptible to rational calculation of effect, and begin to act like fanatics. It is not easy to turn human beings into fanatics. In order to
violence becomes subservient not to a political end but to a personal one.
do so, terrorist groups that use suicide bombers have to create a cult of death and sacrifice, anchored in powerful languages of belief. Osama bin Laden used an interview with an American journalist in May I998 in Afghanistan to justify terrorism in the language of faith: The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation.What
is noticeable here is the use of religion not just to justify killing the infidel but to override the much more serious taboo against killing fellow believers. The function of nihilism here is to recast real, living members of the Islamic faith as traitors deserving death. Nihilism takes the form of nullifying the human reality of people and turning them into targets.
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terrorists respond by tightening their screws on their base of support, replacing a political relation to their own side with one of unvarnished tyranny, killing or intimidating anyone who questions whether the costs of the campaign are outweighing the gains. Populations that once supported armed struggle for reasons of conviction become trapped either in fanaticism or in complicit silence. In the process, political regulation of terrorist groups by their community at large becomes impossible. Moderate voices who might persuade a community to withdraw their support from terror are silenced. In place of a properly political culture, in which groups and interests compete for leadership, a people represented by suicide bombers ceases to be a political community at all and becomes a cult, with all the attendant hysteria, intimidation, and fear. This is the process by which nihilism leads to a war without end. In such a terrorist cult, many praiseworthy moral virtues are inverted, so that they serve not life but death. Terrorist groups typically expropriate the virtues of the young--their courage, their headstrong disregard for consequences, their burning desire to establish their own significance--and use these to create an army of the doomed. In this way, violence becomes a career, a way of life that leads only to death. Once
violence becomes part of a community death cult, the only rational response by a state under attack must be to eliminate the enemy one by one, either by capture and lifelong imprisonment or by execution. Those for whom violence has become the driving rationale of conduct cannot be convinced to desist. They are in a deathly embrace with what they do, and argument cannot reach them. Nor can failure. It counts for nothing that violence fails to achieve their political objective because such achievement has long since ceased to be the test of their effectiveness. It is redemption they are after, and they seek death sure that they have attained it. They have nothing to negotiate for, and we have nothing to gain by negotiating with them. They will take gestures of
suicide bombers in general is to say that political dialogue is at an end. We have nothing to say to them nor they to us. Either
conciliation as weakness and our desire to replace violence with dialogue as contemptible na"ivet. To say we are at war with Al Qaeda and
we
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nihilism, whether real or imagined, leads [*357] inexorably to authoritarian responses and to the rise of ideology. The second phenomenon
which gave rise to our particular predicament thus emerged from the conversion of subjective moral judgment into ideology. Whether derived from the twentieth century revolutions based on socialism or Marxism, on the human rights movement, or on a resurgence of neo-conservatism, the intellectual roots of such movements are well described in European and Latin American literatures. Symbolic of that literature, and
resulting in the negation of law and value, are Neitzche's moral and ethical superiority, Dostoyevski's novels and short stories and the works of the phenomenologists, existentialists and
structuralists. All ask similar questions. Post-Marxist thinkers -- Habermas, Foucault and Berger and other non-legal critical scholars -- have gained influence in legal scholarship which finds them to be useful analytic tools.
If there is no common basis for law or morality other than through a subjective or ideological construct, then the question is not what values underpin a particular legal system, but how one's subjective preferences may be infused with power, strategy and tactics throughout the general community or imposed by coercion. The lawyer-advocate has long used various techniques based on pragmatic ideas of progress, the
frontier and change. These have been associated with the romanticism of the defender of the poor and downtrodden, the fighter for civil rights, the human-rights warrior and the social reformer, who use courts and law as instruments of social change. In this construct, law as a secular system has no normative content that is not ultimately subjective. If God is dead, all things are morally possible. The main claim to legitimacy or validity rests in process; namely that the advocates who represent a particular morality or a particular social philosophy fight and prevail as warriors and advocates in an existing decisionmaking process, akin to chivalry, aimed at changing official behavior or custom by fighting injustice, admittedly a subjective construct. Once, however, the subjective advocacy model of changing the social structure is an accepted way of life, the natural reaction is that sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the objective validity of the normative system tacitly is rejected by those who seek to change it, then radicals holding an opposite belief might just as well produce a similar claim by an activism with subjective preferences even more firmly rooted within the vices of common life. The dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis that seemed to move outward from the subjective to an objective world-view could work for the radical right just as well as for the Marxist left!
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THIRD, PLAN IS NECESSARY FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY IN THE SQUO PEOPLE WILL STILL BE VIOLENTLY DETAINED. THIS MAKES A DOUBLE BLIND EITHER THE
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Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation, but there is no escaping it unless the states that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, however, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics.
21, the various Arab-Israeli wars, and the han-Iraq War of 1980-88. This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium.
SIXTH, THEIR AUTHORS MISUNDERSTAND IR, WHICH IS A SELF HELP SYSTEM. RATIONAL ACTORS ARE DETERRED BY VIOLENCE, CREATING WORLD PEACE
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Violence may be unavoidable in the face of totalitarian savagery. Still, it must remain a means of last resort. Repeatedly, he warns that violence breeds violence. Havel is not, however, a pacifist, as that term applies to Quakers or others who organize peace movements. n40 Although
the regime Havel and his fellow dissidents resisted for more than thirty years accused them of terrorist tactics and plots, they conscientiously sought legal justification for their resistance, using the letter even of unjust laws to manifest support for the principle of legality. Their attitude was "fundamentally hostile to the notion of violent change--simply because it places its faith in violence," Havel writes in one place. He immediately restates the point, however, in a powerfully
"the 'dissident' attitude can only accept violence as a necessary evil in extreme situations, when direct violence can only be met by violence and where remaining passive would in effect mean supporting violence." n41 He recalls us to the tragic blindness of European pacifism that helped to prepare the ground for World War II. He points to the fact that the Czechs sent troops to the Persian Gulf and stood willing to contribute to a U.N. force in the former Yugoslavia. But he is at pains to condemn violence used as a quick fix to change political systems--the sacrifice of human beings here and now for "abstract
significant parenthesis: political visions of the future." The problems in human society "lie far too deep to be settled through [*55] mere systemic changes, either governmental or technological." n42 Havel writes and thinks out of a unique humanist tradition that has been continuous in Czech history. He has specifically identified with the humanism of the founder of the Czech state, Tomas Masaryk, who regarded "ethical, aesthetic and scientific categories" as "no less real than bread and butter." Masaryk felt the need for a social revolution "more moral and less materialistic than that envisaged by the Marxists." Like Havel, he hoped to avoid violence, but he does not rule it out altogether. His language is as circumspect as Havel's: We must consistently reject every act of violence; otherwise we shall never be able to
We may, should, must protect, defend ourselves. In extreme cases with the sword. But even in self-defense we must restrain ourselves from new, active acts of violence. n43 In an address prepared for delivery at a 1985 peace conference, Havel explains the reticence of Europeans to join Western peace movements as rooted in the skepticism of those who have already been burned by succumbing to other forms of utopianism, specifically the Stalin-Leninist variety, which grotesquely deformed its utopian principles as soon as it got power. The very word "peace" has been drained of all content by the European experience of "peace in our time." n44 The Western version of peace sounds far too much like appeasement.
disentangle ourselves from violence. Havel speculates whether World War II, with its millions of corpses, could have been avoided if the Western democracies had stood up to Hitler forcefully and in time.
the inability to risk, in extremis, even life itself to save what gives it meaning and a human dimension leads not only to the loss of meaning but finally and inevitably to the loss of life as well--and not one life only but thousands and millions of lives. n45
He ascribes to the Czech people as a whole the firmly rooted idea that
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nuclear warfare will he inadequate as an incentive to renounce all types of violence. An appeal to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, or to the Saigon government, or to both, to abandon violence in order to avoid the possibility of nuclear war would be fruitless.
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flames of swadeshi signified a rather violent act of self-definition that seemed to be an ominous sign of things to come: the obliteration of the Other by nationalist passions set ablaze. Indeed, the first indication that Gandhi was incapable of controlling the nationalist passions of the masses set free during the noncooperation campaign came as early as April 1921, when a sub-inspector of police and four constables were killed in an act of mob violence provoked by the trial of Khilafat workers in the city of Malegaon. Gandhi chided the perpetrators for having "put
back the hands of the clock of progress," and reminded them that, "Non-violence is the rock on which the whole structure of non-cooperation is built."63 Yet
another incident took place in Bombay on November 17, 1921, the day the Prince of Wales arrived there for an official visit. Violent attacks were launched by Hindu and Muslim noncoop-erators upon Parsi and Christian Indians who had voluntarily taken part in the Prince's welcome. The violence escalated as many non-cooperators looted shops and burned clothes. Soon these actions expanded to the torching of entire buildings and the beating of government officials, ultimately leading to the deaths of several policemen and demonstrators. When, after three days of violence, the passions had finally cooled down, fifty-eight Bombay citizens had been killed and nearly four hundred had been injured.64
EVERY AFFIRMATIVE ETHICAL STANCE REQUIRES A REPRESSED ELEMENT OF NEGATION, MEANING THAT THE ALTERNATIVE OCCURS AGAINS THE BACKGROUND OF COVERT VIOLENCE Zizek '99
[Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 153-4//uwyo-ajl]
It would therefore be tempting to risk a Badiouian-Pauline reading of the end of psychoanalysis, determining it as a New Beginning, a symbolic 'rebirth' - the radical restructuring of the analysand's subjectivity in such a way that the vicious cycle of the superego is suspended, left behind. Does not Lacan himself provide a number of hints that the end of analysis opens up the domain of Love beyond Law, using the very Pauline terms to which Badiou refers? Nevertheless, Lacan's way is not that of
psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it does not already posit a 'new harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identifiction with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification - that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it, but is simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained
St Paul or Badiou: by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here, Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou: God not only is but always-already was dead - that is to say, after Freud, one cannot directly have faith in a Truth-Event;
every such Event ultimately remains a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination of the exact status
of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan, Badiou delineates the contours of a domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection:
the 'death drive' is not the outcome of the morbid confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law. For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain 'between the two deaths', the pre-
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ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the
immortality of participating in Truth, but in the sense of what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
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. Violence increases as the result not of a deterioration in social behaviour but of a lowering in the cultural threshold beyond which action appears as violence. In such a context Rameau's disintegration, his
objective) culture, a last manifestation of individual volition, and a point of resistance to what BaudriUard calls the 'triumph' of simulation 'epigrammatic' existence and his cultivation of violence represent the final recourse of a disfranchised and alienated subjectivity faced with an apparently sewn up, indifferent world. In postmodernity this threshold between action and violence is lower, perhaps, than ever before. Political correctism, 'Queer' theory, Communitarianism, the liberation discourse of the Internet, calls for homogenization of the private and public lives of politicians, the new discipline of 'postmodern ethics', all are varying
of a fetishization of objective culture. To find intolerable the violence of linguistic oppression, of 'inauthentic' sexual identity (the product of Freud's 'family romance', etc.), of
instances of a collective endeavour to put a freeze on reason as risk, the consequence political antagonism, of the formalization of truth in its dissemination, of the compart mentalization of public and private life, of the indeterminacy of moral options,
is in every case to subscribe to a peculiar literalism, to evince a profound discomfort with the signifying relation, to take the signifier persistently for the thing itself, in such a way that political activity is replaced with a series of cosmetic adjustments to objective culture.
Rameau's cynicism therefore represents a commitment to subjective culture, to reality, to the referent and to the signified, to the truth of the world and of the individual. Cynicism constitutes a certain necessary indifference to objective culture, a certain subjective wager, a projection of the self beyond objective culture and beyond its own limits.
In a climate in which 'authenticity' is at a premium, where all action has been proscribed as intolerably violent, and where self consciousness is therefore only a disabling mechanism to be discad, cynicism appears as a spirit in disintegration, the monopoly broker of disinvestment in the present, the sole locus of reason and of faith in anything other than the phenomenal here and now, the disposition which alone embodies both energy and depth.
, there are nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
each other down-has thankfully retreated into history
destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize the importance of its arsenal of nuclear weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching actual aggressions.
the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future. I came to this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever "uninventing" or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I
I personally see believe that the words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain convincing on this point: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands."
the majority of the nations who have now acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would never surrender them. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in reaffirming the
Similarly, it is my sincere view that
unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that
nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring role in preserving the peace and preventing world wars for the foreseeable future. These are my purposes in writing this paper.
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MUST BACK UP NON-VIOLENCE WITH THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE ACTION OF MLK AND MALCOLM X PROVE THIS SOLVES BEST
J. A. H. Futterman, Ph.D. from UT-Austin and Physicist at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb, 1990-94, http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html, UK: Fisher Even when non-violence does succeed, it does so by rallying the majority of the population toward whom it is directed to stop the direct perpetrators of injustice by force -- the force of law in the form of the police, the prisons, and the polls -- force that necessarily includes the threat of violence. In other words, non-violent resistance harnesses (or co-opts), rather than eliminates violence. In fact, non-violence is sometimes even helped by the threat of violence to achieve its objectives. The non-violence of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was complemented by the willingness to use "any means necessary" of Malcolm X. These two men were sending white America the same message concerning justice and racial equality. If whites failed to respond to the message stated gently, whites would be given the opportunity to respond to it stated violently. It took both statements to achieve the progress made thus far.
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This perception of pacifism as a self-justifying ideological preemption of proper praxical consideration, subliminally intended to perpetuate the privileged status of a given progressive elite, is helpful in determining what is necessary to arrive at a true liberatory praxis within advanced capitalist contexts. The all but unquestioned legitimacy accruing to the principles of pacifist practice must be continuously and comprehensively subjected to the test of whether they, in themselves, are capable of delivering the bottom-line transformation of state-dominated social relations which alone constitutes the revolutionary/liberatory process. Where they are found to be incapable of such delivery, the principles must be broadened or transcended altogether as a means of achieving an adequate praxis. By this, it is not being suggested that nonviolent forms of struggle are or should be abandoned, nor that armed struggle should be the normative standard of revolutionary performance, either practically or conceptually. Rather, it is to follow the line of thinking recently articulated by Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael) when he noted: If we are to consider ourselves as revolutionaries, we must acknowledge that we have an obligation to succeed in pursuing revolution. Here, we must acknowledge not only the power of our enemies, but our own power as well. Realizing the nature of our power, we must not deny ourselves the exercise of the options available to us; we must utilize surprise, cunning and flexibility; we must use the strength of our enemy to undo him, keeping him confused and off-balance. We must organize with perfect clarity to be utterly unpredictable. When our enemies expect us to respond to provocation with violence, we must react calmly and peacefully; just as they anticipate our passivity, we must throw a grenade. What is at issue is not therefore the replacement of hegemonic pacifism with some cult of terror. Instead, it is the realization that, in order to be effective and ultimately successful, any revolutionary movement within advanced capitalist nations must develop the broadest possible range of thinking/action by which to confront the state. This should be conceived not as an array of component forms of struggle but as a continuum of activity stretching from petitions/letter writing and so forth through mass mobilization/demonstrations, onward into the arena of armed self-defense, and still onward through the realm of offensive military operations (e.g., elimination of critical state facilities, targeting of key individuals within the governmental/corporate apparatus, etc.). All of this must be apprehended as a holism, as an internally consistent liberatory process applicable at this generally-formulated level to the late capitalist context no less than to the Third World. From the basis of this fundamental understanding and, it may be asserted, only from this basis can a viable liberatory praxis for North America emerge. It should by now be self-evident that, while a substantial even preponderant measure of nonviolent activity is encompassed within any revolutionary praxis, there is no place for the profession of principled pacifism to preclude much less condemn the utilization of violence as a legitimate and necessary method of achieving liberation. 167 The dismantling of the false consciousness inherent in the ideology of nonviolent revolution is therefore of primary importance in attaining an ad equate liberatory praxis.
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accommodation and is bound to fail. The question is not whether to use violence in the global class struggle to end the rule of international imperialism, but only when to use it.
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balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of meanseconomic, diplomatic, and militaryto shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one states gain in power is another states loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other
states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.
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politics or even revolutionary practice. This is as opposed to the active and effective confrontation of state power.
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principles prevents any effective conversion to armed self-defense once adherents are targeted for systematic elimination by the state.
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in some exceptional conflict situations, the only resolution possible or desirable may be through conquest: a test of strength and the unambiguous violent defeat of the other side-as of Hitler's Germany. To believe that conflict should always be resolved through negotiation, mediation, and compromise invites an aggressor to assume that what is his is his, but what is yours is negotiable. Resisting aggression forces a test of interests, capabilities, and will--if the aggressor so wants it. And this may be a faster, ultimately less conflictful, less violent way of resolving conflict than conciliation or appeasement. In resisting aggression, gauge different power responses. Do not automatically respond to aggression in kind. The most effective response is one which shifts power to bases which can be employed more effectively, while lessening the risk of violent escalation. And respond proportionally. To meet aggression in equal measure is legitimate, while overreaction risks escalation to a more extended and intense conflict, and underreaction appears weak and risks defeat and repeated aggression.
YOU CANT IMAGINE THE WORLD AS PEACEFUL THIS SELF DECEPTION BEGETS MORE VIOLENCE Laren 2K1 (Carter, Pacificism Empowers Terrorism, Capitalism Magazine, October 4,
http://www.CapMag.com/article.asp?ID= 1128)
Pacifists would argue that they are idealists, as if
being an idealist meant being excused from having to defend those ideals. Consider an individual engaged in the following line of reasoning: "It would be ideal if all people knew how to perform open- heart surgery, so I am going to behave as if everyone is a heart surgeon. I am an idealist." Although this may be idealism, it is also idiocy (and self-destructive). Pacifists think that by pretending that violence doesn't exist, eventually it won't. This is not just silly; it is a vicious, deadly lie. Aggression cannot be defeated by rewarding it. Organizers of "Don't turn tradgedy [sic] into a war" rallies across the
country would have Americans believe that the proper response to the murder of thousands of innocent lives is a candlelight vigil and impromptu poetry readings. This
is mass suicide. It is an invitation to the Hitlers, the Stalins, the Attilas, and the Bin Ladens of the world to slaughter the American people and to gut their corpses. Implicit in the pacifist's drivel is the implication: "may the worst man win." Only two types of people can accept a philosophy like this: a fiend or a fool. A fiend hates everyone, including himself, and so doesn't care if the "worst man" wins. A fool believes that if he smiles sheepishly at Adolf Hitler, Hitler will suddenly change his mind and decide to take-up knitting. They are both wrong, and they are both evil, [because in both cases such a policy can only lead to the destruction of the good. To promote this evil in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks, pacifists have added a few extra deceptions to their arsenal. One of these
is the equation of war and racism. "War and Racism are Not the Answer," reads an anti-war poster at a San Francisco university. This statement blatantly implies that those who support war against terrorist-harboring nations are racist. It relies on the insecurity of the reader by convincing him to oppose war for fear of being (unjustly) labeled "racist."
A war against the Afghan, Iranian, and other terrorist-supporting governments does not constitute racism. It constitutes selfdefense. Racism is clearly wrong, but pacifism doesn't hold a monopoly on that idea.
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peacemaking is not necessarily the best and most immediate response to conflict. Doubtlessly, some conflicts are unnecessary, some needlessly intense and long-lasting. But some also are a
real and unavoidable clash, the only means through which one, as a partisan, can protect or further vital interests and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious just peace. For example,
war against Hitlers Germany from 1939 to 1945 cost millions lives, but it prevented the greater misery, the terror, the executions, the cold-blooded murders which probably would have occurred had Hitler consolidated his control of Europe and subjugated the Soviet Union. We always can end a conflict when we want by surrender. But some ideas are more important than peace: Dignity. Freedom. Security. That is, peace with justice--a just peace. There is another relevant qualification. The term "peacemaking" is well
established, and I used it accordingly. Unfortunately, the verb "make" can imply that peace is designed and constructed, as a house is planned and erected brick by brick or a road engineered and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is seen as manmade (rather than having evolved),9 and many believe that communities should be centrally planned and managed. But peace is not constructed like a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What the leaders of a group or nation honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, are really capable of achieving are unknown to others--and perhaps only partially to themselves. Nonetheless only they can best utilize the information available to them to justly satisfy their interests. For a third party to try to construct and enforce an abstract peace imposed on others is foolhardy. Such a peace would be uncertain, forestall the necessary trial-and-error balancing of the parties themselves, and perhaps even create greater conflict later. The best peace is an outcome of reciprocal adjustments among those involved. At most, peacemaking should ease the process. A final qualification. Pacifists
believe that violence and war cannot occur if people laid down their arms and refused to fight. But this ignores unilateral violence. Under threat, a state or government may try to avoid violence by submission. The result may be enslavement, systematic execution, and elimination of leaders and "undesirables." The resulting genocide and mass murder may ultimately end in more deaths than would have occurred had people fought to defend themselves. I agree that in some situations nonviolence may be an effective strategy for waging conflict,10 as in the successful Black civil rights
demonstrations of the 1960s in America; or the successful nonviolent, civil disobedience movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. In some situations refusal to use violence may avoid unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However,
there are also conflicts, especially involving actual or potential tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which nonviolence cannot buy freedom from violence by others or a just resolution of a dispute. Then a down payment on such a peace requires public display of one's capability and a resolve to meet violent aggression in kind.
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One may assume for the moment that such a gross distortion of reality is hardly the intent of even the hardiest pacifist polemicists, although it may well be an intrinsic
nazi policy toward the Jews, from 1941 onward, was bound up in the notion that extermination would proceed until such time as the entire Jewish population within German occupied territory was liquidated?~ There is no indication whatsoever that nonviolent intervention/mediation from any quarter held the least prospect of halting, or even delaying, the genocidal process. To the contrary there is evidence that efforts by neutral parties such as the Red Cross had the effect of speeding up the slaughter. That the Final Solution was halted at a point short of its full realization was due solely to the massive application of armed force against Germany (albeit for reasons other than the salvation of the Jews). Left to a pacifist prescription
for the altering of offensive state policies, and the effecting of positive social change, World Jewry at least in its Eurasian variants would have offered total
. Even the highly symbolic trial of SS Colonel Adolph Eichmann could not be accomplished by nonviolent means, but required armed action by an Israeli paramilitary
extermination by mid-1946 at the latest
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unit fifteen years after the last death camp was closed by Russian tanks. There is every indication that adherence to pacifist principles would have resulted in
Eichmanns permanent avoidance of justice, living out his life in reasonable comfort until to paraphrase his own assessment he leapt into the grave laughing at
With reference to the Jewish experience, nonviolence was a catastrophic failure, and only the most extremely violent intervention by others saved Europes Jews at the last moment from slipping over the brink of utter extinction. Small wonder that the survivors insist, Never again!
the thought of having killed six million Jews.
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Nonviolent change is temporary. The 1989 prodemocracy movement in China was crushed in the Beijing massacre. In El Salvador 1944, the nonviolent insurrection against the Martnez dictatorship didnt lead to long term improvement. Iranian non-violent revolutions have been ultimately unsuccessful, as was Jewish pacifism. Ghandis non-violence was only successful in the context of global armed resistance to British colonialism. For every Martin Luther King, there is a counter-example
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of the pacifist who objects to all wars does not threaten the particular policies of any state. In condemning them all equally, pacifism exempts itself from political reality: What is needed, then, is not a general pacifism but a discriminating conscientious refusal to engage in war in certain circumstances. States have not been loath to recognize pacifism and to grant it a special status. The refusal to take part in all war under any conditions is an unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine. It no more challenges the states authority than the celibacy of priests challenges the sanctity of marriage. By exempting pacifists from its prescriptions the state may even seem to display a certain magnanimity. But conscientious refusal based upon the principles of justice as they apply to particular conflicts is another matter. For such refusal is an affront to the governments pretensions, and when it becomes widespread, the continuation of an unjust war may prove impossible.
[I]nsistence on non-violence and deference to all established institutions in a global system with many injustices can be tantamount to confirmation and reinforcement of those injustices. In certain circumstances, violence may be the last appeal or the first expression of demand of a
group or unorganized stratum for some measure of human dignity. Of course, such an injunction can also have particular relev ance concerning the question of revolutionary social violence. Here, as elsewhere
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Many members of the peace movement also hold tightly to a loosely defined utopianism. They believe that the human race (save conservative Republicans) is evolving toward a higher and more noble plane of social existence. The activists themselves are, of course, at the forefront of the evolutionary curve; while the Cro-Magnon in the White House and his Cabinet of Neanderthals stubbornly resist progress. Although the Left has largely declared the concepts of "good" and "evil" to be pass, the peace activist believes that the heart of man is intrinsically "good," and that it would be "evil" if we do not give Saddam Hussein every chance to let his goodness shine through. Utopianism is dead in the minds of most people, because as veterans of the 20th century, which was the bloodiest century ever, we cannot deny that "good" and "evil" are entangled within the hearts of men and many of his ideologies, and that peace is little more than a welcome respite between wars. We also know that unless the Saddam Hussein's and Kim Jong-il's of the world are Utopians too, then to champion utopianism in America or Europe is useless. Utopianism is folly; unilateral utopianism is suicidal . But rather than adjust their policy to reflect reality, the peace activists will march in circles, carry their signs, and wait for reality to reflect their policy.
PACIFISM THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS CAUSES MILLIONS OF DEATHS, APPEASEMENT OF ENEMIES, AND THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE
Alex Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, Peacenik Warmongers, Ayn Rand Institute, December 9, 2002, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7458, UK: Fisher Pacifism necessarily invites escalating acts of war against anyone who practices it. There is an increasingly vocal movement that seeks to engage America in ever longer, wider, and more costly wars--leading to thousands and perhaps millions of unnecessary deaths. This movement calls itself the "anti-war" movement. Across America and throughout the world, "anti-war" groups are staging "peace rallies" that attract tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of participants, who gather to voice their opposition to an invasion of Iraq and to any other U.S. military action in the War on Terrorism. The goal of these rallies, the protesters proclaim, is to promote peace. "You can bomb the world to pieces," they chant, "but you can't bomb it into peace." If dropping bombs won't work, what should the United States do to obtain a peaceful relationship with the numerous hostile regimes, including Iraq, that seek to harm us with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? The "peace advocates" offer no answer. The most one can coax out of them are vague platitudes (we should "make common cause with the people of the world," says the prominent "anti-war" group Not in Our Name) and agonized soul-searching ("Why do they hate us?"). The absence of a peacenik peace plan is no accident. Pacifism is inherently a negative doctrine--it merely says that military action is always bad. As one San Francisco protestor put the point: "I don't think it's right for our government to kill people." In practice, this leaves the government only two means of dealing with our enemies: to ignore their acts of aggression, or to appease them by capitulating to the aggressor's demands.
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Peace activists may be well intentioned; but at their worst, they are more helpful to America's enemies than to America. The best we can say is that they are clinically nave. They are as insufferable as a college freshman who believes he and his political-science professor can end poverty if only people would listen. It is as if the peace activists believe they have discovered for the first time those self-evident and thus ancient truths that human life is sacred, and war is tragic. Little do they know that a majority of the Iraqis who stroll past their peace marches in Baghdad support an American invasion. Many would eagerly fight and risk death in an armed revolution if they could obtain the resources and momentum to launch one for themselves. Navet allows the peace movement to thrive, but it is animated by arrogance. THE ARROGANCE While campaigning for the presidency, candidate Bush said that his administration would conduct its foreign policy with less arrogance than past administrations had displayed. He is now widely accused of forsaking the less-arrogant approach and of choosing, instead, to rattle his saber at any dictator he thinks he can rattle. But is it really arrogant for the president to insist that a violent and unpredictable dictator with ambitions to control the world's oil supply who is also a friend of al Qaeda should be denied a secret nuclear, chemical- and biological-weapons program? Is it arrogant to suggest that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power if he continues to defy and deceive the international community? Likewise, is it arrogant to expect the North Koreans to abide by the Agreed Framework, under which the U.S. promised to inject millions of U.S. tax dollars into the faltering North Korean economy? Perhaps it is slightly arrogant, but the peace movement is fantastically more arrogant. The peace movement is founded upon a subtle ethnocentrism that escapes detection even by the multicultural Left where most peace activists are bred. The group that most openly celebrates the diversity of mankind does not understand that many people in the world hold diverse beliefs and subscribe to ideologies that are entirely independent of American influence. In the mind of the peace activist, America is not just the sole superpower, it is the center of gravity for all world events; and so every world event is simply an equal (and sometimes opposite) reaction to a prior American action. Peace activists believe that America's economy and culture are such dominant forces in the lives of people throughout the world that the actions and policies of other nations can be interpreted only as mere reactions to the actions and policies of the United States government. Therefore, they believe America has the unbounded ability to manipulate foreign governments through economic and cultural means. Peacenik foreign policy is really very simple: Without an action by the United States, there will be no reaction by others. If America does not start a war, there will be no war. This is the arrogant ethnocentrism of the peace movement. Under this view, it is unthinkable that quaint little dictators such as Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-il might deign to manipulate America as much or more than America tries to manipulate them. It is unthinkable that a nation would resort to building nuclear weapons if they did not first feel threatened by the world's only super-bully. It is inconceivable that Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-il might have diabolical plans and evil aspirations that were not created by, and are not controlled by, the U.S. State Department. The peace activist then reaches the conclusion that the United States can make a unilateral decision for peace, simply by choosing to lay down its arms. If the United States would ignore open and notorious breaches of U.N. directives and treaties, and simply refuse to disturb the current state of peace, then peace would prevail by default.
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Of course, the choice between war and peace is not ours alone. There could be war and likely will be war regardless of our course of action. The only questions are: on whose terms, and on whose turf?
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the pacifist platitudes of the 1930s that contributed so much to bringing on World War II. A former ambassador from the weak-kneed Carter administration says that we should look at the root causes behind the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We should understand the alienation and sense of grievance against us by various people in the Middle East. It is
to know better, who are still repeating Moreover, these soaring crime rates came right after a period when crime rates were lower than they had been in decades. On
astonishing to see the 1960s phrase root causes resurrected at this late date and in this context. It was precisely this ki nd of thinking. which sought the root causes of crime during that decade, creating soft policies toward criminals, which led to skyrocketing crime rates.
the international scene, trying to assuage aggressors feelings and look at the world from their point of view has had an even more catastrophic track record. A typical sample of this kind of thinking can Chamberlain sought to remove the causes of strife or war. He wanted a general settlement of the grievances of the world without war. In other words, the
our former ambassador from the Carter era, British prime minister approached Hitler with the attitude of someone negotiating a labor contract, where each side gives a little and everything gets worked out in the end.
be found in a speech to the British Parliament by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938: It has always seemed to me that in dealing with foreign countries we do not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not always the same as our own, and it really is astonishing to contemplate how the identically s ame facts are regarded from two different angles. Like
What Chamberlain did not understand was that all his concessions simply led to new demands from Hitler -- and contempt for him by Hitler. What
Winston Churchill understood at the time, and Chamberlain did not, was that Hitler was driven by what Churchill called curre nts of hatred so intense as to sear the souls of those who swim upon them. That was also what drove the men who drove the planes into the World Trade Center.
Pacifists of the 20th century had a lot of blood on their hands for weakening the Western democracies in the face of rising belligerence and military might in aggressor nations like Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. In Britain during the 1930s, Labor Party members of Parliament
universities signed pledges to refuse to fight in the event of war. All
voted repeatedly against military spending, while Hitler built up the most powerful military machine in Europe. Students at leading British
of this encouraged the Nazis and the Japanese toward war against countries that they knew had greater military potential than their own. Military potential only counts when there is the will to develop it and use it, and the fortitude to continue with a bloody war when it comes. This is what they did not believe the West had. And it was Western pacifists who led them to that belief. Then as now, pacifism was a statement about ones ideals that paid little attention to actual consequences. At a Labor Party rally where Britain was being urged to disarm [!!!]as an example to others, economist Roy Harrod asked one of the pacifists: You think our example will cause Hitler and Mussolini to disarm? The reply was: Oh, Roy, have you lost all your idealism? In other
words, the issue was about making a statement --that is, posturing on the edge of a volcano, with World War II threatening to erupt at any time. When disarmament advocate George Bemard Shaw was asked what Britons should do if the Nazis crossed the channel into
What a shame our schools and college neglect history, which could save us from continuing to repeat the idiocies of the past, which are even more dangerous now in a nuclear age.
Britain, the playwright replied, Welcome them as tourists.
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Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent,
and in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics [*1951] could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is
in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found. Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice.
Work is, in Hegel's view, desire held in check, fleetingness staved off... work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent... This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now... acquires an element of permanence. n317
By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential," n318 but, more to the point, they make themselves more resilient, more "existential." n319 Work on law can increase freedom - the positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety" - fear of disappearance into the Real. n320 When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out - like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on." n321 But far more important , the self gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or "narcissistic loss" n322 - the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis. n323 Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge." n324 In this state, we precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist. n325 In Hegel's inspirational words:
Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish."
Each individual consciousness raises itself out of its allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its work in this particular sphere, but grasps itself as the Notion of will, grasps all spheres as [*1952] the essence of this will, and therefore can only realize itself in a work which is a work of the whole. n326
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I make no special claim that legal academic work is worthy of extra-special respect. It is a craft, like any other. As such, it is at least worthy of its share of respect. If spirit unfolds and manifests itself in the phenomenal world of culture, n327 why should it not also manifest itself in the law reviews?
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SIXTH, NO LINK WE DONT CLAIM THAT LAW ACHIEVES FINAL JUSTICE, JUST THAT PLAN IS PERCEIVED IN A CONSEQUENTIALLY BENEFICIAL WAY
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these three responses stand in an approximately analogous relationship to the archetypal forms in which consciousness, in a state of anxiety, shrinks from the violence of determinate negation and 'strives to hold on to what it is in danger
of losing'. 59 At various points throughout the present work I have used the terms 'decadence', 'irony' and 'relativism' to refer to these instances of an epistemological loss of nerve, this ; it may be as well here to remind ourselves of the terms in which Hegel describes these manifestations of a retreat from truth. Consciousness, he says, at the decisive moment in which it is required to go beyond its own limits, (i) 'wishes to remain in a state' of unthinking inertia'; (ii) gloats over its own understanding, 'which knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego instead of any content'; (iii) 'entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be good in its kind'. 60 condition - by which I mean that a series of critical-theoretical strategies has attained a certain concrete form -
cultural anxiety; postmodernism becomes synonymous, therefore, with deceleration, with a sense of cultural and political conclusivity; postmodernism is the principal vehicle of what Baudrillard calls 'the illusion of the end'.
AND, AUTHENTICITY FETISHIZATION AND ITS FEAR OF REASON AND VIOLENCE ALLOW US TO SPEND HOURS DEBATING THE FINE POINTS OF BAUDRILLARIAN ETHICS WHILE GAS CHAMBERS ARE BUILT Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997,146-7//uwyo-ajl] If it is unreasonable to suppose that the Final Solution was potentiated or even necessarily facilitated by Schmitt's theories, it is certainly the case that this metaphysical structure of domination in the Third Reich, whereby the status of public citizens is reduced to a level determined entirely in the 'natural' or biological realm of necessity, is foreshadowed in his 1927 essay. In an abstract and insidious way Schmitt introduces the idea that the 'transcendent' realm of the political, as a matter of course, will not accommodate a people with insufficient strength to ensure its own participation, and that such a fact is ipso facto justification for its exclusion. 'If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'130 Schmitt's concept of the 'political', quite simply, is nothing of the sort - is instead weighed down by necessity, in the form of what Marshall Berman calls German-Christian interiority - by its preoccupation with authenticity, that is to say, and true political 'identity'. Auschwitz is a corollary not of reason, understood as risk, but of the fear of reason, which paradoxically is a fear of violence. The stench of burning bodies is haunted always by the sickly aroma of cheap metaphysics.
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performativity is not about normative distinctions. We bring normativity to our By unearthing the contingency of the "selfevident," performative resistance enables politics. Thus, the question is not should we resist (since resistance is always, already present), but rather what and how we should resist. This notion of performativity is also important for understanding the possibilities for innovation in Habermasian deliberative participation. Just as a protestor exposes the contingency of concepts like justice, a dialogue exposes the limits and contingency of rational argumentation. Once we are sensitive to the performative nature of speech, language and discourse, then we can see that deliberative politics cannot be confined to the rational statement of validity claims. Deliberation must be theatrical: it is in the performance of deliberation that that which cannot be argued for finds expression. Indeed it is precisely the non-rational aspects of deliberation that carry the potential for innovation. In his description of the poignant reminders of demonstration Chaloupka
performances as ethical principles that are themselves subject to resistance. recognizes that it is at the margins that the actual force of the demonstration resides, no matter what happens at the microphone. The oral histories of demonstrations (the next day over coffee) linger over the jokes and funny signs and slogans, the outrages and improprieties, more than the speeches and carefully coherent position papers.(68)
Any convincing account of the politics of deliberation must take account of the creative potential that resides in the performance of debate.
ELEVENTH, THE ALTERNATIVE COLLAPSES BACK INTO NORMATIVITY, REINSCRIBING LEGAL VIOLENCE
Annelise Riles, Ford Fellow in Public International Law, Harvard Law School, 1993 94, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 597, *650
If Geertz's argument signals a loss of faith in the interdisciplinary scholar's ability to combine the theories of each discipline, is there hope for the current effort to break law and society into myriad component parts and relate these anew, as Geertz sought to do with his turn to fact and law? In this respect, I think, the two disciplines share a moment of theoretical impasse, for
in manipulating one dichotomy after another, the scholar has the sinking sense that all the possible positions are prefigured. As noted at the outset, practitioners of legal anthropology now
pessimistically perceive the possibilities of their discipline. Likewise, although it is now increasingly fashionable for lawyers to turn outside their discipline for grand
, the totally new insight, the epistemology, never seems fulfilled. Every combination and recombination, every construction and deconstruction seems already prefigured. Just as the "whole" of culture now has ceased to do the work of organizing our arguments, the "whole" of the discipline certainly no longer seems worth supporting or opposing. But neither do its parts . The effect of this change is that there no longer is much rhetorical force in claiming dangerous or creative spaces in-between. How can Leach's
insights, they do so with increasing wariness. The image of what anthropology might have to offer bursting perspective disciplinary terrorism be maverick if the opposition he bridges is no longer real for us? How can Geertz's shuttling between fragmented points of relation feel innovative if the parameters within which these points lie are entirely familiar from the start? To claim that there is nothing new to combine, or that relation no longer works, is to relinquish the identity of the productive scholar -- who is productive because he or she makes new forms. B. Normative and Reflexive Knowledge As noted at the opening of this part, one must stand for something in an article such as this one; reflecting on the arguments of others in itself is not enough. If the task of relationship building in interdisciplinary scholarship has lost its force, therefore, I now must argue for an alternative. This understanding pervades the works we have considered from Henry Maine to the present day. The imperative to harness observations, as here about the state of interdisciplinary scholarship, into a claim, as here for a future direction of interdisciplinarity, and the difficulty experienced in doing so, characterizes much contemporary interdisciplinary work. Indeed, one of the enduring characteristics of the tradition we have considered is precisely this transformation from what we might call a reflexive mode of knowledge into a normative mode and back again. Every work we have considered in the preceding pages has made its contribution to legal knowledge by approaching its subject reflexively. By
insight always is produced by observing a topic in European or American law from another, wider vantage point. Maine, for example, reflects upon legal positivism from the *644 point of view of the history of European civilization. Leach
this, I mean that
takes the problem of an international response to terrorism and recasts it in terms of violence in primitive societies. This reflexivity involves a broadening of perspective, and it often is achieved by a kind of movement beyond one's starting position to another position and back again, as when Geertz takes us on a tour of the world's legal systems or when Maine moves through successive stages of historical development. When contemporary interdisciplinary scholars argue for attention to the "outside," to "context," or to a "wider reality" beyond the law, I think they are conflating the metaphors we use to describe this reflexive mode of knowledge --
. Yet every author also understands him or herself to be staking out a normative claim. Maine is for a more academic tradition of legal scholarship, and he is against the democratization of legal
metaphors of expansion and movement -- with an "actual" outside institutions. Leach, likewise, has a political motive in treating the terrorist bombings of the 1970s and the atom bombing of Hiroshima as commensurates. This kind of normative claim, in contrast to reflexive knowledge, is achieved precisely by holding things constant, by refusing to move to another perspective even if one understands such movement as possible, and
continued
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normative and reflexive knowledge. It is worth noting at the outset, are not logically contradictory.
. One of the defining aspects of the interplay between reflexive and normative modes of engagement is that each slips effortlessly, almost uncontrollably, into the other. There is no resting point at which one is reflexive or
normative: we "know" that every relativism is actually an argument for something or other. Indeed, this knowledge gives rise to one of the classic modes of critique in the repertoire of both lawyers and anthropologists, as we expose the "position" or "argument" behind a certain reflexive exposition. The same is true of normative
: we can always understand a normative claim such as a call for the universal protection of rights of expression, for to be the expression of a particular point of view, and indeed, as soon as such a normative claim is made, it seems to engender a reflexive turn. It is not just that a normative argument produces a reflexive one. Rather, the very same knowledge, effectuated in a reflexive mode, invariably becomes normative. Maine's historicization of
argument example,
Bentham's positivism, for example, in turn becomes an argument against the universal application of positivism. Leach's reconsideration of the cultural construction of terrorism becomes a normative claim for the importance of attention to cultural difference itself. One of the defining aspects of the interplay between reflexive and normative knowledge in interdisciplinary scholarship, then, is the way in which each relativism in turn becomes its own position, which then is open to relativization again. A reflexive observation becomes an argument to stand by, and that argument then can be reconsidered in a reflexive way. By way of example, we might consider a prominent article by lawyer and anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What to Say to Africans About Running "Their Own" Native Courts. Building on a career-long investigation into the British colonial legal system, its assumptions about African society, and the response it generated among the Chagga, Moore takes as her point of departure a 1957 British directive concerning the organization of customary courts among the natives of Tanganyika. The theme of the piece is the conflict between the British administrators and the village courts over British legal notions, such as res judicata and the Rule of Law as a rule of the written word, and the intended audience of the piece includes both lawyers and anthropologists. The contribution of the piece is a reflexive reconsideration of what Moore takes as the Anglo-American faith in the rule of law. She writes in the article abstract: This article is presented at two levels throughout. On the surface it is a straightforward historical analysis of a directive to British officers . . . . On a deeper level the article uses the British colonial occasion to explore widely held cultural assumptions in Anglo-American law about the definability of "justice," the concept of time and timing in legal affairs, and the complex place of the idea of legitimate, authoritative, and permanent "knowledge" in legal institutions. *646 Moore's ultimate target is the colonial government's obsession with rule making, with cataloguing African practices into a codifiable form. In a classic relativizing spirit, she is concerned that we understand that notions of a "rule-governed judiciary" of the kind she finds in the texts of H.L.A. Hart, and the obsession with written precedent on which it depends, are culturally specific ways of resolving conflicts, not -- as she quotes her colonial directive to claim -- natural law. This reflexive turn engenders many of the patterns we have observed in other contemporary works of Legal Anthropology: Moore emphasizes the rationality of African legal systems on their own terms and in so doing discovers a social reality outside the law. She argues that the architects of the British colonial legal regime failed to understand that "[t]he Africa of reality had its own social and legal logic." This African reality, moreover, is the realm of expertise of the anthropologist: "The colonials had to cope with the consequences of this 'localism' but did not understand the nature of local rural communities," she notes, owing partly to the fact that (unlike anthropologists) "most of them did not speak any of the many local languages." She explains that "[t]he colonials did not picture these villages as they were . . . . Had they known what we now know about the internal political life of African neighborhoods and villages, they might have had a very different understanding of what was going on." She even notes concerning the 1950s writing of a Restatement of African Law, that the law professor in charge saw the insights of anthropologists as too imprecise to be useful to courts engaged in modernization and nation building. This reconsideration of law from a wider perspective is also its own normative argument, a kind of lecture to lawyers about the cultural particularity of their world view. The ultimate point Moore hammers home to her legal audience is the classic plea for attention to context. As she puts it, "[t]his circumstance raises a question in relation to the colonial instance that has far wider application: Is it possible to 'know' much about a legal system without knowing the character of the casegenerating milieu?" The answer for Moore clearly is no. Text is meaningless without context. This rhetoric in turn is organized around a severe and confident break between the legal and social spheres -- both of the subject, the colonial administrator and the Chagga, and the subtext, the lawyer and the anthropologist. "Certainly the difference between the designed judicial institution and the 'event-evolved' set of neighborhood institutions is very great." The effort of looking at the world of law from a broader perspective now has become the subject of an argument to Moore's legal colleagues. Yet Moore does not stop with the lessons of anthropology for law. In a fascinating passage, she attacks the "fashion" of anthropological critiques of colonial practices that show the ignorance of colonial administrators about local practices: "As the colonial period has been safely over for more than thirty years, showing colonial flaws coupled with colonial arrogance is not only politically risk free, it is a rather conventional version of history for our time." Claiming for herself a more "experimental" territory, she asserts an interest in "the cumulative historical production of institutions" that lies beyond such simple assertions of colonial failure. Given the symbolic association of the legal academic and the colonial administrator in her text, one is left to wonder what this might mean for those who, like the vulgar critics of colonialism, engage in vulgar lectures to legal academics about the weaknesses of legal formalism and rule- based adjudication. The paper cannot come to a close, in other words, until Moore's normative claims on behalf of anthropological methods engender their own reflexive reconsideration. The transformation of reflexive into normative modes and back again spawns a parallel transformation in the knowledge it produces. For example, we saw that anthropologists first reflected on law from a wider point of view and discovered relationships by doing so. These relationships soon became a position in themselves, outside the law. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before that position itself would become the subject of reflexive interpretation, as I have done in the pages above. Yet if reflexive modes of knowledge engender normative knowledge and vice versa, these modes are not alternatives in the lexicon of *648 lawyers and anthropologists, nor are they opposites. One cannot simply choose to relativize or to argue for something, as one would choose a Law and Economics approach or a Law and Anthropology approach to a legal problem, because each is understood to negate the possibility of the other. Likewise, it would be nonsensical to try to devise an approach that would combine normative and reflexive knowledge: one cannot be a relativist and stand for something, it is often said. Each mode engulfs the entire enterprise of representation, so that if I write in one genre, I cannot invoke the other. This is because unlike disciplines or cultures, normative and reflexive modes of knowledge are not of the same order. They are not contained in a single frame, as law and anthropology are contained in the frame of disciplinarity, or as Barotse legal systems and Anglo-American law are contained in the frame of cultural difference. Taking a position and looking at things from a relativizing point of view will not create a relationship even if we want it to. Reflexive and normative knowledge were not always incommensurable in this way. Henry Maine's peers would not have interpreted his appeal to a wider historical perspective as negating the possibility of normative argument about legal positivism or practical engagement with contemporary legal problems. Maine's failure to treat his argument and his reflexive analysis as incommensurable, I think, contributes to the contemporary view of Ancient Law as uninteresting scholarship at best and embarrassingly naive scholarship at worst. Leach might exemplify an epistemological change, vis-aea-vis Maine, then. Although we saw that Leach quite consciously stakes out claims about the rationality of the terrorist even as he treats his own arguments about terrorism as objects of reflexive inquiry, there is a marked tension between these two modes of engagement, and the tension is resolved only by the irony in his assertion that savages are not "dog-headed cannibals" that acknowledges the possibility of relativizing the normative claim even as it seeks to hold that claim constant. It has become necessary for Leach, as it was not for Maine, to appeal to a rhetorical device such as irony to keep what have become two incommensurable modes of engagement in view. This incommensurability, still implicit in Leach's case, now itself has become a problem, a topic of furious debate. One hardly can have a conversation about law these days without arguing about relativism. *649 The transformation of normativity into reflexivity and back again has become its own topic of normative engagement, in other words. We might consider this a key aspect of the contemporary epistemological moment for both disciplines. The effect of this development is that being in favor of an interdisciplinary method of legal studies today means having faith in this transformation of one mode of knowledge into another. Or to rephrase the claim in more normative terms, what is best about contemporary interdisciplinary scholarship is the transformation of knowledge it engenders. Although this movement is not "real" in the sense of a reality outside the law, I am suggesting that it is worth taking seriously in its own right. In this sense, Maine's appeal to movement and change, in which structure appears as reflection after the fact on the path of such movement, can be as much a model to us as Leach's more contemporary arguments in which structure is prefigured as an organizing frame. Yet this transformation of modes of knowledge differs from the movement both Maine and Geertz advocate in that normativity and reflexivity are not positions, places of the same order that occupy a single plane. At least at this juncture, no linear connection can be drawn between them nor can any descriptive thesis summarize the transformation of one into the other. I do not mean to imply that this kind of transformation is unique to anthropological approaches to law. On the contrary, lawyers know that slippage from normativity to reflexivity and back again pervades legal thinking as well. Yet perhaps the tension between disciplines provides an apt metaphor for describing what we do not yet have other language to describe. Perhaps this incommensurablity becomes concretized, or institutionalized in the gulf between disciplines that both lawyers and anthropologists celebrate, so that interdisciplinary engagement between law, as the metaphorical province of normativity and politics, and anthropology as the metaphorical province of reflection and difference, provides a technology for experiencing and elaborating the incommensurability of reflexive and normative thought. In the pages above, I have endeavored to trace a path through a series of claims for an anthropological, ethnological, or interdisciplinary study of the law. A consideration of this tradition leaves us with a number of possible observations. First, it leads to an appreciation of the extent to which contemporary anthropological appeals to reality outside the law, discovered through empirical observation of context, and through emphasis on real people rather than the theoretical structures of law, is predicated on shared notions among lawyers and anthropologists about the salience of the disciplinary divide. Ironically, *650 however, if the success of the
arguing for attention to context against the legal text, for example -- can never offer an escape from the theoretical impasse created by the dichotomy precisely because the move is prefigured in the very structure of the dichotomy itself. Such an earnest -- even in some cases strategically self-righteous -- plea on behalf of the outside, whether it be the new methodological innovation or the "real world out there," may find itself welcome in both legal and anthropological circles but hardly seems poised to make ground-breaking contributions to either. We need
rhetoric is predicated on a shared epistemology, then simply defending one side or another of a shared dichotomy --
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an alternative to a move to the periphery that always prefigures a return to the center. Second, in
tracing the emergence of the project of discovering and elaborating relationships as the modern project of interdisciplinary work, we come to appreciate why this project also now fails to satisfy. This elaboration of relationships between disciplines, between law and society, or between ever smaller fragments of each seems predictable because it is. In order to work, the entities to be combined must already exist in a prefigured frame -- disciplinary or cultural difference, for example -- so that we know at the outset the parameters within which the new mix will take its form. The recent attempt to show scholarly productivity by finding ever more intricate, indeterminate, or subtle connections only heightens the sense of a project that now is spent.
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#3 Permutation: 1AR
SCHLAGS CRITICISM ONLY GETS IT HALF RIGHT- THE BUREAUCRACY CERTAINLY OPERATES ON A FIELD OF PAIN AND DEATH, BUT WE SHOULD NOT BREAK FROM THE LAW, BUT INSTEAD EMBRACE IT CARLSON & SCHROEDER IN 2003
(JEANNE AND DAVID, CARDOZO LAW PROFESSORS, 57 U MIAMI L. REV 767) Beyond laying down the law, another normative program emerges from Schlag's work: "What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death." 18 The suggestion is that we should come to realize that law itself is the very ground for the field of pain and death. When this is realized, the normative program to lay down the law becomes a high moral imperative. It appears from Schlag's work that the proper project for legal scholarship is to expose law's responsibility for pain and death. This is what we should do. When legal scholarship has achieved this task, presumably pain and death will have been eliminated. Turning the tables on law and economics, Pierre implies that it would be efficient (i.e., useful to human utility) if law would abolish itself . But, stranded on a field exfoliated of pain and death, what next ? The implicit program seems to be that, once the distortions of law are removed, the subject simply does not have to be told to do anything. Whatever the subject does will be authentic. This is the free, liberated subject that Schlag's normativity implies--a natural subject from whom completeness and authenticity has been unfairly denied by the legal bureaucracy. If we are right, then underlying Schlag's polemic against law is an uncritical romantic psychology. This would in turn mean that Schlag is not so much a critical scholar as a romantic one. This implicit psychology means that Schlag has something in common with the political liberals he attacks. Both Schlag and liberals believe in the autonomy of the human subject--and the possibility that the subject can achieve this desired state of freedom. Furthermore, they
both believe in the existence of subjectivity in a state of nature on which positive law or social engineering cannot possibly improve. Law, then, has become a tool for oppressing the bureaucratic society that legal academia unwittingly serves. Legal subjects, subjected to the law, are alienated from themselves by the law. The corollary to this [*771] is that there must be at least the possibility that subjectivity could be other than it is now--distorted by law. Lest we be misunderstood, we emphasize that we agree with much of the above account. We agree with Schlag's suggestion that normativity cannot succeed. Virtually every observation that Schlag makes about law and policy scholarship (normativity) is correct. Where we disagree is that there is a subject left standing once legal normativity is abolished. Unfortunately, although Schlag ostensibly bases much of his analysis on the post-modern critique of the liberal conception of the autonomous self-identical subject, he, in fact, falls back on a liberal conception of a natural self. Romanticism implies that the self-identical individual of liberalism is real--but disfigured by law and hence on a field of pain and death. The post-modern position is quite different. It denies the pre-legality of personality and suggests that personality is itself a legal idea. On this view, the
Lacanian psychoanalysis agrees with half of Schlag's proposition. The subject is on a field of pain and death, where it is not self-identical, but severely wounded by law. It is precisely law (broadly understood as the symbolic order) that castrates the subject, as Schlag maintains. Breaking the chains of the law, however, would not free but would obliterate the subject. Subjectivity is nothing but the split, the gap, the rift in the natural subject torn by law. If law is removed, the rift that creates subjectivity is obliterated. What was Lacan's name for a person who successfully follows Schlag's normative program and slips the chains of law? His term for such a person was "psychotic." 19 For Lacan, the normative program is precisely not to let go of the symbolic order, for that would be the death of subjectivity, not its liberation.
self-identical subject of liberalism cannot exist as a theoretical matter.
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#3 Permutation: Ext
DISCOURSE RELIES ON INFORMATION FROM THE OUTSIDE; WITHOUT ENGAGING IN THE REAL WORLD, CHANGE IS IMPOSSIBLE. Habermas, Prof @ Goethe U in Frankfurt, 90 (Jurgen, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program
of Philosophical Justification, The Communicative Ethics Controversy, Ed. Benhabib and Dallmayr, P. 100-101)
The principle of discourse ethics makes reference to a procedure, namely, the discursive redemption of normative claims to validity. To that extent, discourse
ethics can properly be characterized as formal, for it provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical discourse. Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption. This means that practical discourses depend on content brought to them from outside. It would be utterly pointless to engage in a practical discourse without a horizon provided by the life-world of a specific social group and without real conflicts in a concrete situation in which the actors considered it incumbent upon them to reach a consensual means of regulating some controversial social matter. Practical discourses are always related to the concrete point of departure of a disturbed normative
agreement. These antecedent disruptions determine the topics that are "up" for discussion. This procedure, then, is not formal in the sense
practical discourse is dependent upon contingent content being "fed" into it from outside. In discourse this content is subjected to a process in which
that it abstracts from content. Quite the contrary is true. In its openness, particular values are ultimately discarded as being not susceptible to consensus. The question now arises whether this very selectivity might not make the procedure unsuitable for resolving practical questions.
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Law exists, and so it animates the judge who pronounces judgment. It bears not a circular but a linear relation to the judge. Law animates when the judge's free will suppresses the judge's pathological criteria and lets the judge be the law's oracle. n164 True, the empirical judge is capable of bad faith. Perhaps what the judge had for breakfast rather than the law caused a judicial decision to be pronounced. But law's possibility, at least, is affirmed by license of free will. n165 Consequence, Schlag maintains, cannot prove that law exists. n166 But quite the opposite is true. Law's consequence (which Schlag concedes) n167 proves law's existence and its suitability for scientific study. n168 Schlag is prepared to concede that the law causes human beings to act, as when they execute or incarcerate a prisoner. It then
grammar of law doesn't make it purely subjective, however. n163
follows that either (a) the law has a mechanical effect on human beings - an absurdity n169 - [*1932] or (b) human beings have the capacity to choose to obey law. The second possibility is the only plausible one, because Schlag effectively admits the existence of free will and moral capacity. Thanks to this concession, we can affirm that law exists and that human beings can choose to follow the law. n170 Admittedly, we can never confirm legal effect directly, because it must be mediated by
We can, however, confirm its possibility and rule out its impossibility. If thoughts (such as law) induce free human beings to act, then thoughts are things - and powerful things at that. To the extent we indulge in a belief in free will, law is potentially effective. When it is, when human beings execute the law, law's effects are rendered "tangible" and "visible" - the very attributes of the super-realist metaphysics that seem to underwrite Schlag's work. Although law cannot be felt directly, its indirect effects are sensual indeed.
free will, which can only be postulated. n171
LEGAL THOUGHT EMBRACES THE NEGATIVITY OF ETHICS, CREATING SUBJECTIVE FREEDOM Carlson 99
[David Gray, Prof Law @ Cardozo, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, November, LN//uwyo-ajl] Schlag criticizes legal academics for unwitting indulgence in a contradiction. The self is supposed to be sovereign. Yet the self bows down [*1943] to the rule of law. n244 The choice to be bound is supposed to be a contradiction in terms. n245 From what has been said, it should be clear that there is no contradiction here. The self that stands against the natural world, and the animal inclinations that afflict its body, is a negative entity. At heart, the subject is nothing at all. n246 Yet, if it is to "exist," it must have externally observable properties. It must do something, and the things it does become an attribute of the self. We are what we do. n247 The subject that lawfully follows its passion achieves existence and so perpetuates itself. n248 This is the positive freedom of the self. Any self choosing to conform to the law has put forth its moral character in the world. It was the free choice of the self to do this. n249 Hence, the free self can choose to be bound, without contradiction. n250 This concrete subject is likewise free to violate the law and to perpetuate itself by crime. This is the negative freedom of the concrete subject. It is not properly freedom at all, but slavery to inclination. Crime constitutes inclination speaking in defiance of the moral side, thereby committing a crime on the subject's own self. The particularity of the criminal is therefore not freedom but slavery. n251 In fact, tied into the very idea of following the law is the idea of a free will that might choose not to follow the law. The free will that aspires to follow the law never truly binds itself. A subject that puts itself forward as lawful could give into impulse tomorrow and is therefore "free" (in the negative sense) to violate the law. Lawfulness is therefore a constant struggle the ongoing achievement of the concrete self. Furthermore, it is a struggle in which the subject must fail: Freedom realizes itself through a series of failures: every particular attempt to realize freedom may fail; from its point of view, freedom remains an empty possibility; but the very continuous [*1944] striving of freedom to realize itself bears witness to its "actuality." n252
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Freedom is thus "powerful." It exhibits the "primacy of possibility over actuality." n253 Forever potential, it is nevertheless a possibility that transforms the world.
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THE ALTERNATIVE IS A FANTASMIC ATTEMPT TO RESTORE A UNITARY SUBJECT, SHORING UP ENJOYMENT STOLEN BY THE LAW Carlson 99
[David Gray, Prof Law @ Cardozo, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, November, LN//uwyo-ajl] In his disenchantment with reason, Schlag has written that, just because lawyers pursue their profession "does not establish whether liberal categories such as 'individual rights' are on the order of rocks, trees, dollar bills, rubles, words, advertising images, or angels." n69 Within the gross and scope of this ontic spectrum, rocks and trees are trenchantly existential. They can be felt. Dollars are perhaps less so, on most measures of the money supply, but rubles, words, advertising images, angels and liberal category drift into the realm of "ontological entities" n70 - mere figments of the imagination. These latter items do not "exist." Perception mediated by thought is not to be trusted. Law's defect, then, is that, like Macbeth's dagger, it is insensible to feeling. Law is nothing but thought. Thought (mediation) does not exist, and neither does law. n71 Tangibility immediacy of intuition - is, I infer, Schlag's criterion of epistemic certainty. What is tangible does not rely on language for its integrity. n72 Tangibility transcends the legal order. It is quite alegal and for this very reason valid. n73 Such a criterion of reality means that, in the end, Schlag's program is a romantic one. Law has deprived the subject of its jouissance. If law would kindly step aside, the subject could enjoy an immediate restitution of its lost parts - a unity that would be certified by feeling. Therefore, justice supposedly demands that law abolish itself so that the concrete subject in its negative freedom can be guided by its natural, uncomplicated [*1921] dimension - by feeling - towards wholeness. n74 But for law, the subject could enjoy itself all the time. n75
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one might find another tool for rebuilding normative discourse. It is to relinquish any normative [*2347] claims for leftist inclinations. n92 Left legal scholarship would be exclusively critical, deconstructing the normative claims made elsewhere in legal scholarship but offering nothing at all in their place. This project, too, seems difficult to sustain. Left legal academics walk into classrooms every day in which students demand that we say what our views are on controverted
issues. A stance of unremitting critique will not satisfy them. To face such dissatisfaction routinely is simply uncomfortable. Thus, even a leftist teacher committed to "only critique" is likely to succumb in the classroom. n93 Because the classroom is where we try out many of our ideas, it seems likely that the normativity to which this teacher is pushed in the classroom will come to infect his or her scholarship.
There is, of course, an alternative. Perhaps the critique of normativity goes all the way down, in which case the "only critique" stance is the only one an intellectually honest legal academic can take. But perhaps the critique of normativity is wrong. Legal academics might then remain committed to the project of comprehensive normative rationality, and their modest normative gestures would be promissory notes to be cashed in elsewhere, in the development of a comprehensive normative theory. n94
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INFORMAL PARTICIPATION REDUCES OUR ROLES AS CONSUMING CITIZENS, INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT WE WONT BE PASSIVE TO THE REGIMENTING PROCESSES OF THE BUREAUCRACY.
KULYNYCH IN 1997
(JESSICA, Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation Polity, Winter 1997 v30 n2) When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the out come of the policy debate and experienced a
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considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.
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SCHLAGS CRITIQUE IS BOUND BY THE RHETORIC HE CRITICIZESHE FAILS TO BREAK FROM THE NARROWNESS OF THE LAW Conaghan, Prof @ Kent Law School, 2K3 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason:
Pierre Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlag in Wonderland, Miami Law Review, April, Lexis)
A final concern emerging from the confines of Schlag's selective mimicry of the mainstream lies in its resolutely legal character. American legal scholars do not, by and large, like to stray too far beyond the boundaries of what is acceptably "legal" n65 and interestingly, neither does Schlag. He/they prefers the snug confines of traditional legal discourse and its discontents, modestly professing ignorance and lack of expertise beyond the terrain of law, narrowly understood as judicial decisions and the doctrines and theories legal scholars derive from them. Schlag
bemoans this narrowness repeatedly but seems in no great hurry to escape it. Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether or not his insistence on so limited an enquiry masks a fear of
his moving beyond what he has experienced as safe and steady ground. By his own admission, this is the critique of "an insider," n66 but does it simultaneously affirm the attractions of remaining "inside"? This dogged determination to steer clear of the complexities that an extra-legal dimension
might introduce is also manifest in Schlag's exclusive preoccupation with reason's aesthetic appeal. While I applaud his efforts to draw attention to the coercive power of particular aesthetic forms--in
the context of law, the compelling effects of grid-like manifestations of reason--his neglect of, indeed total silence in relation to, other features of law's coerciveness puts him at risk of overstating his case. This is particularly so when what is neglected is so closely bound up with what he addresses at such length. Here, I am thinking in particular of the ideological context within which law operates and upon which reason seeks to make her mark. In my view, there is an ideological dimension to the effective deployment of reason that is not, or is only secondarily, dependent upon its aesthetic form. There
is a detectable distinction (not always but sometimes) between invocations of reason that are dependent upon the political and ideological landscape for their validity and deployments of reason that [*557] draw upon (or seek to develop) our aesthetic inclinations, particularly our attraction to order and coherence. n67 Often, what seems reasonable is inextricably related to our understanding of what is possible, and yet, it is not always the case that what is possible is determined by the boundaries of reason. The ideological landscape abounds with all of the "sources of belief" making an appearance in Schlag's critique. The point is that reason as a particular aesthetic does not always work to disqualify reason as a repository for widely held ideological beliefs. Although the former may contribute to understandings of the latter, it may not wholly determine (or be determined by) them. A failure to acknowledge this explicitly arguably serves to weaken the power of Schlag's critique. There are times when he invokes a primarily ideological concept of reason--one that relies on notions of truth, self-evidence, and righteousness--and then proceeds to critique it for its failure to adhere to an aesthetic form. Sometimes, this is effective,
do with its correspondence to the ideological status quo. Put bluntly, if
and it is almost always amusing. n68 At other times, one has a sense that the boot does not fit, that he is over-emphasizing the importance of the schematic structure of the argument in circumstances where its success has little to do with its schematic structure and everything to
reason's appeal to self-evidence (Sunstein) or virtue (Nussbaum) is dependent upon factors beyond its internal logic, it is not thereby significantly diminished by demonstrating that that logic has reached its limits. Schlag's account of the wonderland of American legal scholarship is undoubtedly perceptive; his dissection of the stances adopted by those who typify it both masterly and liberating, and his representation of his own alienation intensely resonant of the experiences of many who occupy the margins of the legal academy.
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It fails adequately to guard against the dangers of importation, co-option, domestication, and reproduction. It constitutes even as it deconstructs. In Schlagean terms, the power of his critique is diminished by neglect of aspects of the "rhetorical economy" with which he is engaging. n69 In simpler terms, there appear to be dimensions to his enchantment of which he is unaware.
Indeed, therein lies its appeal. But by the same token, it is at times injudicious in its forays into "hostile" terrain.
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Schlag bifurcates the operation of the legal system from the discourse of its participants, arguing that the normative claims made by those attempting to describe what the rule of law entails is superfluous to the reality of law. By doing so, he openly places in question whether discourse can describe, not to mention influence, practice. n38 Admittedly, much of the "fancy" scholarship of the academy is removed from the
ongoing effort to describe what it means for a society to be governed by the rule of law.
everyday language of legal practice, but the assertion that every theoretical invocation of the rule of law is detached from some deeper, hidden, nonlinguistic realm of legal reality greatly overstates the case. The extent of critical detachment presumed by Schlag's total rejection of the usefulness of discussing the rule of law is quite fantastic. An individual who truly could achieve this detachment would be exhibiting the paranoid style. n39 I [*885] wholeheartedly share Schlag's assessment that the justificatory efforts of judges and scholars alike to define the rule of law has been framed by the unhelpful polarity of justify and redeem and constrain and control strategies. n40 Yet
the recognition that past formulations no longer suffice leads me to attempt to articulate a new conception of the rule of law that accords with our experience. n41 It is possible to destroy rigid conceptions of the rule of law without embracing endless deconstruction that renders further discussion moot. Schlag is correct that the traditional accounts of the rule of law often are caricatures that arrest thought and discussion, n42 but I argue that we should resume a vital discussion rather than conclude that all discussion inherently is vacuous. The criticism that rule of law talk doesn't capture reality reveals a wistfulness
for the foundationalist hope of discovering a political truth that is not subject to a contingent, ongoing dialogue among members of society.
By claiming that everyone else is trapped in a meaningless maze, Schlag conveniently avoids placing himself at risk in normative dialogue. By asserting that normative legal dialogue is irrelevant, Schlag eliminates the possibility that he might have to change his mind in light of the force of a better argument, and he avoids an obligation to rescue the hoi polloi from the maze. In sum, Schlag's approach insulates him from the contingent and provisional language of social discourse. Such an insulating move runs contrary to antifoundational accounts of the rule of law, which emphasize that the law never operates outside the context of wider social struggles to define the terms of sociopolitical organization. Traditional normative legal thought ordinarily is criticized as being unhelpful because it offers a constricted and artificial conception of legal norms, not because normative legal thought is by nature irrelevant to legal practice. Quite the opposite seems true: every assertion of legal power is predicated on a normative conception of politics that always is subject to attack and reassessment. Escape from the maze of normative legal thinking is the [*886] familiar dream of
empiricists and rationalists alike, but it simply is not possible. Talking about the reality of law as distinct from our representation of this reality in normative legal dialogue constitutes a performative contradiction. n43 This is not to say that reality is wholly linguistic, but rather that our experience and understanding of reality is always linguistically mediated in a shared realm of normative public dialogue. n44
NORMATIVE THOUGHT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DESTROYEDWE SHOULD FOCUS ON CLEARING A WAY THROUGH THE MAZE INSTEAD OF REJECTING IT Mootz, Assoc Prof of Law @ Western New England College School of Law, 94 (Francis J., The
Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, Houston Law Review, Fall, Lexis)
As Hilary Putnam concisely states, "the
elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide." n49 I Schlag writes powerfully, invariably capturing my interest and leading me to important new insights. However, his effort to distance himself from the normative legal language that is our heritage falls short, as it must . I congratulate Schlag for his skill in destroying some of the most cherished talismans in our legal vocabulary, including the rule of law. But destruction is never total. In the wake of destruction we inevitably chart new paths in the maze. Legal theory properly is viewed not as an attempt to escape the maze of normative legal thought,
would refine Putnam's observation by including paranoid distanciation within the scope of mental suicide. Professor
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but as an effort to develop shared strategies for navigating through the maze. Forging a path, rather than finding an exit, is the goal. That is enough for me.
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Schlag's effort to analyze legal scholarship from outside the maze is extremely problematic. Schlag believes that most scholars reside within a maze characterized by "dreariness," but that a select few have found a way out, gained perspective [*879] on the maze, and now engage in a fruitful questioning that reveals rather than obscures the law. n20 In sharp contrast, I reject the idea that such a dramatic escape can take place. Just when a scholar believes that she has scaled the last wall of the maze, she will be confronted by a boundless horizon of paths endlessly circling within the ambit of the same maze. Hope for escape must always be dashed in the end, but this does not mean that an individual's comportment within the maze is without ethical or political significance. The central problem for contemporary jurisprudence is not the maze of normative legal discourse, but the failure to recognize the maze as an unavoidable condition that is productive of knowledge. Postmodern thought is a stimulating
force, but it has been overused and abused by more than one scholar in search of a truly radical break from the politics of normalcy. The questions raised by the maze are much more subtle and complex than Schlag allows. Schlag's
confusion over what the maze represents, how it operates, and the consequential function of critical theory, exemplifies the postmodern crisis in legal theory. Put differently, Schlag's characterization of the maze, offered
with a sly wink and a conspiratorial nod to others in the know, comes off sounding just a bit paranoid.
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Alternative Fails
SCHLAGS REFUSAL TO DELINEATE A PRECISE OBJECT OF HIS CRITIQUE CAUSES HIS KRITIK TO BE CO-OPTED INTO THE VERY NORMATIVE SYSTEM HE CHALLENGES WHILE HE IGNORES KEY NORMATIVE STRUCTURES WE NEED TO CRITICIZE Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2K3 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre
Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlag in Wonderland, Miami Law Review, April, Lexis) Schlag's refusal to delineate with any precision the object of his critique is not a risk-free strategy. One difficulty arising is that reason remains deliciously ephemeral throughout, assuming a [*550] dream-like, shadowy quality that at times heightens its allure and triggers a desire to capture and contain it. This is of course a reflection of Schlag's own ambivalence towards reason, signalled in particular by his use of the word "enchantment" n29 to denote our (his?) affinity to it. Schlag's portrayal of reason is that of a siren, a femme fatale, who simultaneously entices and deceives. And, while he urges us endlessly to recognize her pathological tendencies, we remain suspicious that he is still in her thrall. More importantly, however, the nebulous quality of Schlag's invocations of reason is misleading and belies the prescriptive content of the notion(s) he deploys. Reason, for Schlag's purposes, is bounded in ways he does not openly acknowledge. Woven within the fabric of his critique is a particular perspective from which reason's purposes are derived and its shortcomings identified and assessed.
Nevertheless,
ALT CANT SOLVE THE NORMS YOU TRY AND CHANGE WONT TRANSFER TO THE PUBLIC SPHERE YOU CAN ONLY CHANGE ONE INSTANCE OF BAD DISCOURSE Habermas, Prof @ Goethe U in Frankfurt, 90 (Jurgen, Discourse Ethics: Notes
on a Program of Philosophical Justification, The Communicative Ethics Controversy, Ed. Benhabib and Dallmayr, P. 82-83)
Admittedly, a second objection can be raised against such arguments, one that is not so easily refuted. True
as it may be that freedom of opinion in the sense of freedom from external interference in the process of opinion formation is one of the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of every argumentation, the fact remains that what the skeptic is now forced to accept is no more than a the notion that as a participant in a process of argumentation he has implicitly recognized a principle of freedom of opinion'. This argument does not go far enough to convince him in his capacity
as an actor as well. The validity of a norm of action, as for example a publicly guar- anteed constitutional right to freedom of expression, cannot be justified in this fashion. It
is by no means self-evident that rules which are unavoidable within discourses can also claim to be valid for regulating, action outside of discourses. Even if participants in an argumentation are forced to make substantive normative presuppositions
(e.g., to respect one another as Competent subjects; to treat one another as equal partners; to assume one another's truthfulness; and to cooperate with one another),34 they
could still shake off this transcendental pragmatic compulsion when they leave the field of argumentation. The necessity of making such presuppositions is not transferred directly from discourse to action. In any case, a separate justification would be required to explain why the normative content discovered in the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation should have the power to regulate action.
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Pragmatism Good
PRAGMATICALLY COMBINING THE INSIGHTS OF THE CRITICISM WITH THE AFF SOLVES BEST RADIN AND MICHELMAN IN 1991
( MARGARET JANE AND FRANK, STANFORD AND HARVARD LAW PROFESSORS, 139 U PA. L. REV 1019, APRIL) The poststructuralist moment in critical practice is conceptual, diagnostic, and global. It fastens on intellectual structures and denies their analytic probity. It indicts whole discourses and all their works by showing their conceptual, categorical frameworks in a state of collapse. In the poststructuralist frame of mind, we search for dialectical fault lines implanted in discursive frameworks. We deflate argumentative paradigms built around a characteristic set (one for each target jurisprudence) of categories, distinctions, and oppositions. We show their failures of closure -- perhaps by exposing addiction to a "fundamental contradiction," n51 perhaps by exposing tactics of recursion and deferral. n52 The pragmatist moment in critical practice is, by contrast, empirical, epidemiological, and local. It notices characteristic kinds of errors or biases that recur when target discourses are deployed by nonideal -- incompletely committed and assiduous -- practitioners caught in specific cultural environments. n53 The pragmatically minded critic does not deny or ignore conceptual instability. Neither does she hold that conceptual instability per se discredits a framework. Indeed, she does not especially care to discredit any discourse intrinsically or holistically. She rather seeks to evaluate the discourse in use (given its conceptual instabilities) by ordinarily complacent, culturally bound practitioners. She asks, for example, about the tendency of the discourse, in its cultural setting, to focus [*1032] on some problems and blur others. Pragmatically successful critique does not necessarily mean that practitioners give up use of the framework. It may mean, rather, that they watch out and correct for biases to which the culturally situated framework is prone.
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[Robert Jay & Richard, Prof. Psychiatry * Prof Intl Affairs, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism, New York: Basic Books, 133] . The entrenched forces that stand behind nuclearism are powerful and wily, and, if necessary, ruthless. Popular movements are notoriously easy to coopt, divert, infiltrate, bore, and outlast. For the antinuclear movement to succeed, it desperately needs a politics, that is, a clear understanding of what must be changed and how to do it. This understanding of what must be changed and ho w to do it. This
understanding must also include an alternative idea of security. The antinuclear ranks are not composed of idealists who believe that peace on earth, goodwill to men and women is an idea whose time has come. Overwhelmingly they are acting out of fear of the nuclear menace, increasingly deciding that this fear takes precedence over their more traditional concerns about national defense and preserving a way of life. But
in the end this movement will not succeed unless it combines a negation of nuclearism with the persuasive creation of new ways to protect independence and territorial integrity of the states that make up world society. At this time, then, it is crucial to initiate discussions of the politics of antinuclearism. My hope is that this book is read primarily as a contribution to this
work.
SECOND, THEY HAVENT DISPROVED OUR TRUTH CLAIMS IN THE STATUS QUO THERE REALLY IS A THREAT OF NUCLEAR DISASTER. UNLESS THEY TAKE OUT THE IMPACT, VOTE AFF. THIRD, REALISM SOLVES THEIR ARGUMENT NUMBING IS IRRELEVENT IF DETERRENCE AND SELF-INTEREST PREVENT AGENTS FROM USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CROSS-APPLY KHALILZAD FOURTH, NUCLEARISM IS INEVITABLE MAINTENANCE AND DETERRENCE ARE NECESSARY FOR WORLD PEACE Robinson 2001
[C. Paul, Sandi National Laboraties, A White Paper:Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century, March 22, www.mindfully.org/Nucs/Nuclear-Weapons-Policy-21stC.htm, 9-2306//uwyo-ajl]
I served as an arms negotiator on the last two agreements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have spent most of my career enmeshed in the complexity of nuclear weapons issues on the government side of the table. It is abundantly clear (to me) that formulating a new nuclear weapons policy for the start of the 21st Century will be a most difficult undertaking. While the often over-simplified picture of deterrence during the Cold War-two behemoths armed to the teeth, staring
, there are nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
each other down-has thankfully retreated into history
destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize the importance of its arsenal of nuclear weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching actual aggressions.
the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future. I came to this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever "uninventing" or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I
I personally see believe that the words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain convincing on this point: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands."
the majority of the nations who have now acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would never
Similarly, it is my sincere view that
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surrender them. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in reaffirming the
unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that
nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring role in preserving the peace and preventing world wars for the foreseeable future. These are my purposes in writing this paper.
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people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of the threat of nuclear arms and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have actually experienced can have true emotional
in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched, we
impact. Since Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and nuclear weapons poised for annihilation
find it easy to imagine ourselves immune to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay Neither Victims nor Executioners of the
inability of most people really to imagine other peoples death (he might have added or their own). Commenting on Camus, Da vid P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that this
distancing from deaths reality is yet another aspect of our insulation from lifes most basic realities. We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding. If we are to heed Camuss call to refuse to be either the victims of violence like the Jews of the Holocaust, or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners of the death camps, we must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails. It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because letting [the
instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of anxiety or other painful emotions. In mos t lifethreatening situations, an organisms adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, adapting psychic toll.
ourselves to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our doom more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a
SIXTH, WE DO NOT REALLY KNOW THE IMPACT TO NUCLEAR WAR- DENYING THAT DESTRUCTION CAN OCCUR THROUGH THE CRITICISM FURTHERS NUMBING Lifton and Markusen, Prof of International Relations @ Princeton U and Assist Researcher @ U of New York, 90 (Robert Jay and Eric, The Genocidal Mentality, P. 203)
Dissociation is called forth to cover over and deny ignorance. Not
only are we much more ignorant about what we call nuclear war than we care to admit, but "we don't know how much we do or do not know about it." Since, as the Israeli philosopher Avner Cohen points out, "we do not really know how to conceive of nuclear
warfare as a concrete actuality, how it could be properly kept under control and how it might be brought to termination," it is less than responsible to claim how such an event could be "managed, controlled or concluded." But
all evidence suggests that "no matter what nuclear war might be, it would not be the kind of rule-governed practice" often assumed on the basis of past wars. And while the principle of deterrence has a long history in political and military
practice going back to the time of the Greek city-states, the consequences, should deterrence fail and the deterrer act on his threat, were always limited: after the war and destruction, there would be recovery and resumption of life. Precisely
the present absence of those limits "should deterrence fail," the uncertainty or unlikelihood of any significant amount of human life remaining, radically distinguishes nuclear deterrence from that tradition. Dissociation, especially in the form of psychic numbing, helps blur that distinction by denying not only our ignorance but also what we can be expected to know.
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the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray,
Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more
. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the
generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. "
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from
psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered.
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect
that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
EIGHTH, MEDIA IMAGES PLAY THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REVEALING THEIR OWN ILLUSIONS
Jean Baudrillard, professor of philosophy of culture and media at Univ. or Paris, 1994, Illusion of the End, pg. 60-61 And yet there will, nonetheless, have been a kind of verdict in this Romanian affair, and the artificial heaps of corpses will have been of some use, all the same. One might ask whether the Romanians, by the very excessiveness of this staged event and the simulacrum of their revolution, have not served as demystifiers of news and its guiding principle. For, if the media image has put an end to the credibility of the event, the event will, in its turn, have put an end to the credibility of the image. Never again shall we be able to look at a television picture in good faith, and this is the finest collective demystification we have ever known. The finest revenge over this new arrogant power, this power to blackmail by events. Who can say what responsibility attaches to the televisual production of a false massacre (Timisoara), as compared with the perpetrating of a true massacre? This is another kind of crime against humanity, a hijacking of fantasies, affects and the credulity of hundreds of millions of people by means of television a crime of blackmail and simulation. What penalty is laid down for such a hijacking? There is no way to rectify this situation and we must have no illusions: there is no perverse effect, nor even anything scandalous in the Timisoara syndrome. It is simply the (immoral) truth of news, the secret purpose [destination] of which is to deceive us about the real, but also to undeceive us about the real. There is no worse mistake than taking the real for the real and, in that sense, the very excess of media illusion plays a vital disillusioning role. In this way, news could be said to undo its own spell by its effects and the violence of information to be avenged by the repudiation and indifference it engenders. Just as we should be unreservedly thankful for the existence of politicians, who take on themselves the responsibility for that wearisome function, so we should be grateful to the media for existing and taking on themselves the triumphant illusionism of the world of communications, the whole ambiguity of mass culture, the confusion of ideologies, the stereotypes, the spectacle, the banality soaking up all these things in their operation. While, at the same time, constituting a permanent test of intelligence, for where better than on television can one learn to question every picture, every word, every commentary? Television inculcates indifference distance, scepticism and unconditional apathy. Through the worlds becoming-image, it anaesthetizes the
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imagination, provokes a sickened abreaction, together with a surge of adrenalin which induces total disillusionment. Television and the media would render reality [le reel] dissuasive, were it not already so. And this represents an absolute advance in the consciousness or the cynical unconscious of our age.
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#1 Permutation: 1AR
THE PERMUTATION TO DO THE PLAN WHILE RETHINKING SOLVES BEST THEIR OWN AUTHOR SAYS THAT THERE IS NO SINGLE TRUTH ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTION AND RECOGNIZING THE POWER OF THE HUMAN RACE ALLOWS US TO RESIST NUCLEAR AGGRESSION Lifton and Markusen, Prof of International Relations @ Princeton U and Assist Researcher @ U of New York, 90 (Robert Jay and Eric, The Genocidal Mentality, P. 278-279)
Species awareness means awareness of human choice: "This is not the End of Timeunless we choose to make it so. We need not accept the death sentence . . . .We are not powerless."
the millennial transition of the year 2000. Whatever the millennial imagery, we By choosing instead a human future, we arein the words of the Polish Solidarity leader Adam Michnik"defending hope." And "hope is important. Perhaps more important than anything else." Hope is greatly enhanced as is the acceptance of individual mortalityby the sense of reasserting the immortality of the species. The task is intensified by the psychological upheavals we can expect in connection with
must recognize that the hopeful future is not an apocalyptic heavenly peace but rather expanded awareness on behalf of human continuity. This adaptation will not eliminate peoples need to define themselves in relation to otherness, but it can begin to subsume that otherness to larger human commonality. It must include struggles against widespread oppression and drastic human inequities by invoking the kind of originality in political action that has taken place in the Solidarity movement
in Polandand in related movements in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria and was so cruelly frustrated in the student movement in China: Political action that enlarges, rather than blights or destroys, human possibilities.
This speciesoriented approach would defy the given models of defiance. No one can claim knowledge of a single, correct path. Rather, there must be endless combinations of reflection and action and, above all, the kind of larger collective adaptation we have been discussing. At the same time, we must remain aware of persisting genocidal arrangements and expressions of genocidal mentality. We cannot afford to stop thinking. Nor can we wait for a new Gandhi or Saint Joan to deliver us. Rather, each of us must join in a vast projectpolitical, ethical, psychologicalon behalf of perpetuating and nurturing our humanity. We are then people getting up from their knees to resist nuclear oppression. We clear away the thick glass that has blurred our moral and political vision. We become healers, not killers, of our species.
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Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.
on nuclear
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1971, and Dr. JoAnn M. Valenti, a founding member of SEJ and elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Scared stiff or scared into action, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 1986, pp. 1216, Winner of the 1986/1987 Olive Branch Award for Outstanding Coverage of the Nuclear Arms Issue, given by New York Universitys Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm, UK: Fisher Numerous testimonials indicate that the shock therapy of a fear appeal may sometimes cut through paralysis. But such testimonials are usually from activists who were neither paralyzed nor numb in the first place, whose fear was maintained at reasonable levels by their own activism, and who derived new energy and reinforcement from what people in the adjacent seats may well have found intolerable. Our wager is that the fear speeches revitalize the committed into renewed action, startle the apathetic into fresh attention, and torment the terrorized and the numb into starker terror and deeper numbness. In a set of guidelines for Helping People Deal With Terrifying Films, Frances Peavey advised readers in 1981: Do not stand up after the film is over and try to scare people with further horrifying facts. This is a violent act and does not encourage peace. When people are subjected to too much fear-provoking material, they tend toward numbing, forgetting or feeling so violated that they are hostile to the overall message.(12) At that time Peavey still saw value in terrifying films, so long as the discussion afterward helped people deal with the feelings they aroused. In 1985, when few are apathetic but many are numbed by terror, the value of the films themselves is much reduced.
FEAR MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE MEANS TO SUSTAIN PEACE AND PREVENT LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHE Lifton, Distinguished Prof of Psychiatry and Psychology @ John Jay College, 2K1 (Robert
Jay, Illusions of the second nuclear age, World Policy Journal, Spring, Vol. 18, Iss. 1, P. 25)
The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-- centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);2 and the
eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves-to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing largescale conflict, a tinge of fear-sometimes more than a tinge- can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readily numb ourselves to
standards as human beings.
know that the weapons are around-and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there" -but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical
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everything nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no danger, or as though they don't exist. To be sure, we have never quite been able to muster an appropriate level of fear with respect to these weapons-one
that would spur us to take constructive steps to remove the threat. We have always been able to numb ourselves in this regard, which must be seen as a basic human response to a threat that is apocalyptic in scope and so technologically distanced as to be unreal. But there were at least brief moments when we would awaken from our nuclear torpor.
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1971, and Dr. JoAnn M. Valenti, a founding member of SEJ and elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Scared stiff or scared into action, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 1986, pp. 1216, Winner of the 1986/1987 Olive Branch Award for Outstanding Coverage of the Nuclear Arms Issue, given by New York Universitys Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm, UK: Fisher The main obstacle to action, writes Frank, is neither apathy nor terror but simply a feeling of helplessness. To combat it, I have perhaps overemphasized the small signs that antinuclear activities are at last beginning to influence the political process.(19) Helplessness, hopelessness, futility, and despair are words one hears even more often than fear from the barely active and the formerly active. And like fear, these emotions can easily lead to psychic numbing. Those who feel powerless to prevent nuclear war try not to think about it; and it serves the needs of those who do not wish to think about nuclear war to feel powerless to prevent it. Messages of hope and empowerment, however, break this vicious circle. The label hope, as we use it, subsumes a wide range of overlapping concepts: for example, optimism, a sense of personal control and efficacy, confidence in methods and solutions, a sense of moral responsibility, and a vision of the world one is aiming for. It is well established (and hardly surprising) that hope is closely associated with willingness to act. Activism appeals most to people who feel positive about both the proposed solution and their personal contribution to its achievement. Over the long term, this means that antinuclear organizers must communicate a credible vision of a nuclear-free world. Meanwhile, they must offer people things to do that seem achievable and worthwhile. The nuclear-weapons-freeze campaign attracted millions of new activists in 1982 because it offered credible hope. By 1985 many of those millions could no longer ground their hope in the freeze; some found other approaches and some returned to inactivity. Most social psychologists today see the relationship between hope and action as independent of fear or other feelings. For example, Kenneth H. Beck and Arthur Frankel conclude that three cognitions (not emotions) determine whether people will do something about a health risk: recognizing the danger as real, believing the recommended plan of action will reduce the danger, and having confidence in their ability to carry out the plan.(20) Similarly, Suttons review of the fear-appeal literature finds inconsistent support for the notion that people can accept higher levels of fear if they feel the proposed solution will remedy the problem, but strong evidence that, regardless of fear, people are more inclined to act on solutions they see as more effective.(21)
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Lester,3 who told me that, although his university colleagues tried to talk him out of believes that it is more ethical to work on nuclear weapons than on less destructive conventional weapons because nuclear weapons are designed to deter wars rather than to fight them. He says that he could never work as a lawyer defending murderers or other criminals but feels mor- ally comfortable with his work as a nuclear warhead designer, and even wonders if it might be morally reprehensible not to work on nuclear weapons because, as he sees it, they make the world more stable. Lester is puzzled by those who cannot see that nuclear weapons make us safer by making war unthink- able. Like most of his colleagues, he is confident that nuclear weapons can be controlled by humans, that technological progress is unavoidable and beneficial, and that nuclear weapons are the embodiment of a transcendent rationality, which alone can discipline the dark impulses leading humans to make war. Everything in his life, where he sees the atom bent to the experimental will of human
working at a nuclear weapons laboratory, their objec- tions did not trouble him? He rationality on a daily basis, confirms those beliefs. Lester does not worry that the United States will misuse the hydrogen bombs he designs, bombs he describes as "no more strange than a vacuum cleaner. You don't feel a fear for them at all." In fact, he sees weapons technology as "beautiful." "How do I explain that?" he asked me. "To me, a spectrometer is a very pretty thing ... and you feel badly that it's going to be destroyed [in a nuclear test]."
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blanket charge that any use of nuclear weapons--and even reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence--would be immoral goes beyond past proclamations, such as
those contained in the 1983 Catholic bishops' pastoral letter which, while calling for general disarmament and condemning the first use of nuclear weapons, left ambiguous the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence. If allowed to stand unchallenged, such a charge could carry substantial weight in the policy debate, especially in a democracy (and perhaps only in a democracy) built upon moral principles. But it does not take a trained ethicist to recognize that such blanket moral assertions are
at best simplistic, and perhaps--in light of what we know about human nature and history--dangerous in themselves. The use, or
even threat of use, of any weapon may contain elements of moral ambiguity. And like other weapons--whether a club in Rwanda or artillery surrounding Sarajevo--nuclear weapons could be used in ways that are clearly immoral. Moreover, the scale of destruction that could result from the employment of even a few nuclear weapons makes imperative the need to consider carefully the full range of moral issues associated with the possession of these weapons. Perhaps for this reason, well-intentioned people have for decades debated where ethical lines should be drawn regarding the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Yet, within this realm of considerable ambiguity,
policymakers during the Cold War were forced to decide where the greater risk lay and make decisions with real consequences. Given the awful consequences of failure, the choice was not simple. On the one hand,
nuclear deterrence could fail. In the aftermath of such failure, it was possible (but by no means certain, insofar as a conscious choice for use would have to be made by political authorities) that nuclear weapons would be unleashed on civilian populations with truly catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, in
the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent, conventional deterrence could fail, as it had so often in the past, twice globally, resulting in another devastating war with casualties perhaps even greater than those in World War II. Looking back, one might even argue that those who condemned nuclear weapons as immoral were simply wrong. The Western alliance's nuclear weapons were in fact the moral weapon of choice. They worked precisely as intended by deterring an immoral totalitarian state from attacsking Western Europe and undermining the peace, values, and freedom which the democracies cherished. Indeed, given the tens of millions of innocent noncombatants killed in two world wars, one can argue that the possession of nuclear weapons to deter yet another outbreak of mass slaughter by conventional weapons, either in Europe or Asia, was squarely in the just war tradition. The argument that the external environment has changed so much with the end of the Cold War that no ethical or moral
basis for nuclear arms remains is likewise unconvincing. American lives and interests remain threatened. In fact, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons have made the likelihood of conflict and the prospect of the use of weapons of mass destruction even greater than in the past in several key regions. But just as before, sound public and defense policy will emerge only from a prudent calculation of risks and benefits, not from sweeping generalizations about the morality or immorality of possession or use of nuclear weapons. The certainty should
"new eliminationists" who wrap themselves in the cloak of moral superiority and be asked to address the consequences of disarming the great democracies in a world in which advanced conventional, chemical, and biological weapons (and in some cases nuclear capabilities) continue to spread among states explicitly hostile to democratic values.
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A2 Proliferation K: 2AC
CRITICISM OF THIRD WORLD NUCLEARPOWERS NOT ETHNOCENTRIC WE THINK ALL NUCLEAR POWERS ARE IRRESPONSIBLE Rao & Vanaik 2002
[Parsa & Achin, All Nuclear Powers are Irresponsible, Gulf News, June 10, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/06/10/53954.html, acc 9-38-06//uwyo-ajl] Does the nuclear belligerence of India and Pakistan confirm Western criticism that Third World countries possessing nuclear weapons cannot be expected to behave responsibly? All nuclear powers, whether they belong to the West or to the Third World, are irresponsible. How else can you explain the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War? It was sheer madness because they did not make hundreds of nuclear warheads for deterrence. They had the capacity to destroy not only each other but the whole world many times over. It was sheer irresponsibility.
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9. THERES NO EVIDENCE THAT GOD WILL TAKE CARE OF THE PROBLEMS OF CASE. ITS EMPIRICALLY DENIED BY THE MANY ECO-CATASTROPHES LIKE THE TSUNAMI THAT SHE OR HE MANAGED TO OVERLOOK
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"living" patterns is that their persistence is due to a feedback with their environment: the information coded in the pattern continually varies, but the variation is constrained to a narrow range by this feedback. Thus life is, as I stated, information preserved by natural selection.
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RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE GIVES WAY TO NIHILISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF SUFFERING AND INEQUALITY Nussbaum 2004
[Martha, Ernst Freund distinguished service prof of law and ethics at U of chicago, Relgious Intolerance, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, 44//uwyo-ajl] The appeal of religious intolerance is easy to understand. From an early age, humans are aware of helplessness toward things of the highest importance, such as food, love, and life itself. Religion helps people cope with loss and the fear of death; it teaches moral principles and motivates people to follow them. But precisely because religions are such powerful sources of morality and community, they all too easily become vehicles for the flight from helplessness, which so often manifests itself in oppression and the imposition of hierarchy. In todays accelerating world, people confront ethnic and religious differences in new and frightening ways. By clinging to a religion they believe to be the right one, surrounding themselves with coreligionists, and then subordinating others who do not accept that religion, people can forget for a time their weakness and mortality.
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ALL DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY ARE BIASED AND LIE Schnook 03 (Charlotte, EVILBIBLE.COM,
http://www.evilbible.com/hitler_was_christian.htm) Considering that Christianity has thus far been incapable of producing an unbiased, educated follower which speaks the truth, (I havent encountered any), I have been forced to dispel the myth by writing this essay.
CHRISTIANITY ENCOURAGES PARENTS TO STARVE THEIR CHILDREN TO DEATH Rice 01 (Fredric, The Skeptic Tank January 17, 2001
http://www.skeptictank.org/clrabuse.htm) Parents who murder their own children by starving them to death or by allowing them to die from easilly treatable diseases and other medical problems are doing so because their religious masters tell them to. As followers, the parents have no cognitive volition of their own when the health and safety of their children come second to obeying the dictates of their religious masters. It is the priesthood which should be held accountable for the murder of children first and foremost; then the parents of the murdered child must be held accountable.
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AND, FOISTING YOUR RELIGION UPON OTHERS THROUGH STATE ACTION IS RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE THAT JUSTIFIES VIOLENCE Nussbaum 2004
[Martha, Ernst Freund distinguished service prof of law and ethics at U of chicago, Relgious Intolerance, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, 44//uwyo -ajl]
Two ideas typically foster religious intolerance and disrespect. The first is that ones own religion is the only true religion and that other religions are false or morally incorrect. But people possessed of this view can also believe that others deserve respect for their committed beliefs, so long as they do no harm. Much more dangerous is the second idea, that the state and private citizens should coerce people into adhering to the correct religious approach. Its an idea that is catching
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on, even in many modern democracies. Frances reluctance to tolerate religious symbols in schools and the Hindu right wings repeated claims that minorities in India must become part of Hindu culture are disturbing recent examples. The resurgence of this kind of thinking poses a profound threat to liberal societies, which are based on ideas of liberty and equality.
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cousins, nephews and nieces, and his grandparents? Did God only bring a couple of every kind of animal and did he leave Adam's relatives out? Why couldn't he marry one of them? What was wrong with one of his distant relatives, or the closer ones?
continued
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"A disturbing fact continues to surface in sex abuse research. The first best predictor of abuse is alcohol or drug addiction in the father. But the second best predictor is conservative religiosity, accompanied by parental belief in traditional male-female roles. This means that if you want to know which children are most likely to be sexually abused by their father, the second most significant clue is whether or not the parents belong to a conservative religious group with traditional role beliefs and rigid sexual attitudes.
ALL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE ONLY MOVE THE ABUSE ELSEWHERE Rice 01 (Fredric, The Skeptic Tank January 17, 2001
http://www.skeptictank.org/clrabuse.htm)
After they go through their period of "therapy," they often get shipped off to yet another church where, since their new congregations are never informed of their master's past, the cycle of abuse continues. (NOTE: "Megan's Law" now makes the location of convicted sex offenders public knowledge. THIS IS A WIN FOR THE GOOD SIDE! Everyone who has worked to get Megan's Law passed has made it tougher for Christian clergy to hide their convicted child moslesters within our communities.) Thus -whether unintentionally or not -- the Christian clergy ends up being a safe dating service for pedophiles. Pedophiles may safely gravitate toward the Christian clergy fairly confident in the knowledge that even if they're ever reported or get caught, they'll simply be moved to yet another location and be provided with new children to abuse.
CHRISTIAN RHETORIC IS A COVER-UP FOR SEX ABUSE Rice 01 (Fredric, The Skeptic Tank January 17, 2001
http://www.skeptictank.org/clrabuse.htm)
The inescapable conclusion is that the Christian clergy screams from the pulpit in an attempt to draw attention away from their own horrid criminal activities and desires. It's also an inescapable conclusion -- due to the epidemic problem they create -- that they are successful.
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Considering the prevalence of sexual abuse, it is quite likely that there are at least a few survivors in any one church congregation. The church has a history of speaking only in generalities regarding sexual sin (Heggen, 1993). The discomfort of the church in dealing with sexual matters can make victims feel very isolated (Heggen, 1993). For victims who have been sexually abused, it is doubly painful to hear that their reality does not have a place within the confines of their church . Many victims are told that such things just do not happen among good Christian peopleparticularly if they identify their perpetrator as someone who is a leader in the church (Heggen, 1993).
PATRIARCHAL ORDER OF CHRISTIANITY MAKES ABUSE ENDEMIC Franz 02 (Thaeda, Liberty University, Power, Patriarchy and Sexual Abuse in the Christian
Church,http://www.fsu.edu/~trauma/v8/Church.pdf)
Additionally, the majority of pedophiles are men (E. Schrader LSW, personal communication, January 2002), and the majority of people holding positions of leadership in the church are men (Neuger, 1993). So, it would make sense that since men are leading the church, and men are more often perpetrators rather than victims, that the topic of sexual abuse has thus far been ignored (Fortune, 1983). However, the gender of church leadership is only the tip of the iceberg in determining why dealing with sexual abuse has taken such a low priority within the church. The church has embraced the notion that women are subject to the dominance of men (Neuger, 1993). There are few stories of women in the Bible (Neuger, 1993). When women are portrayed in the Bible, they are described as either evil and seductive, or as impossible ideals of selfsacrifice and love (Neuger, 1993). It is possible that religious women may be afraid to confront sexism in the church because they fear male protection and approval will be withdrawn from them (Rayburn, 1982). This fear can also carry over to God, and to the withholding of divine blessing and acceptance (Rayburn, 1982).
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THIRD, LIFE ONLY BECOMES VALUELESS WHEN IT IS DECLARED AS SUCH [author is describing specific men who were in Auschwitz with him]
Victor Frankl, Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, Mans Search for Meaning, 1946, p. 90-93
We have stated that that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoners inner self was not so much the enumerated psychophysical causes as it was the
only the men who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to subside eventually fell victim to the camps degenerating influences. The question now arises, what could, or should, have constituted this inner hold? Former prisoners, when writing or relating their experiences,
result of a free decision. Psychological observations of the prisoners have shown that
agree that the most depressing influence of all was that a prisoner could not know how long his term of imprisonment would be. He had been given no date for his release. (In our camp it was pointless even to talk about it.) Actually a prison term was not only uncertain but unlimited. A well-known research psychologist has pointed out that life in a concentration camp could be called a provisional existence. We can add to this by defining it as a provisional existence of unknown limit. New arrivals usually knew nothing about the conditions at a camp. Those who had come back from other camps were obliged to keep silent, and from some camps no one had returned. On entering camp a change took place in the minds of the men. With the end of uncertainty there came the uncertainty of the end. It was impossible
A man who could not see the end of his provisional existence wa s not able to aim at an ultimate goal in life. He ceased living for the future, in contrast to a man in normal life. Therefore the whole structure of his inner life changed; signs of decay set in which we know from other areas of life. The unemployed worker, for example, is in a similar
to foresee whether or when, if at all, this form of existence would end. The latin word finis has two meanings: the end or the finish, and a goal to reach. position. His existence has become provisional and in a certain sense he cannot live for the future or aim at a goal. Research work done on unemployed miners has shown that they suffer from a peculiar sort of deformed timeinner time-which is a result of their unemployed state. Prisoners, too, suffered from this strange timeexperience. In camp, a small time unit, a day, for example, filled with hourly tortures and fatigue, appeared endless. A larger time unit, perhaps a week, seemed to pass very quickly. My comrades agreed when I said that in camp a day lasted longer than a week. How paradoxical was our time-experience! In this connection we are reminded of Thomas Manns The Magic Mountain, which contains some very pointed psychological remarks. Mann studies the spiritual development of people who are in an analogous psychological position, i.e., tuberculosis patients in a sanatorium who also know no date for their release. They experience a similar existence without a future and without a goal. One of the prisoners, who on his arrival marched with a long column of new inmates from the station to the camp, told me later that he had felt as though he were marching at his own funeral. His life had seemed to him absolutely without future. He regarded it as over and done, as if he had already died. This feeling of lifelessness was intensified by other causes: in time, it was the limitlessness of the term of imprisonment which was most acutely felt; in space, the narrow limits of the prison. Anything outside the barbed wire became remoteout of reach and, in a way, unreal. The events and the people outside, all the normal life there, had a ghostly aspect for the prisoner. The outside life, that is, as much as he could see of it, appeared to him almost as it might have to a dead man who looked at it from another world. A man who let himself decline because he could not see any future goal found himself occupied with retrospective thoughts. In a different connection, we have already spoken of the tendency there was to look into the past, to help make the present, with all its horrors, less real. But in robbing the
danger. It became easy to overlook the opportunities to make something positive of camp life, opportunities which really did exist. Regarding our provisional existence as
present of its reality there lay a certain
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unreal was in itself an important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life; everything in a way became pointless. Such people forget that often it is just such an exceptionally difficult external situation which gives man
the opportunity to grow spiritually beyond himself. Instead of taking the camps difficulties as a test of their inner streng th, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in the past.
meaningless.
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Drugs Work That may sound like rather an empty and vulnerable way to face danger, but so what? Should individuals believe in things because they are comforting, or should they face reality no matter how harsh it might be?
In the end, it's a decision for the individual concerned. Most atheists are unable to believe something they would not otherwise believe merely because it makes them feel comfortable. They put truth before comfort, and consider that if searching for truth sometimes makes them feel unhappy, that's just hard luck. Often truth hurts.
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While this article argues strongly that security has no essential ontological integrity, it also argues that if the power and sweep of security are to be understood and challenged, its claims to universality must be taken seriously. They underpin and animate sweeping forms of power, subjectivity, force, and economic circulation and cannot be dismissed out of hand. Nor, in the hands of some humanist writerswho have sought to think human and gender security in radical counterpoint to realist images of national and international securityare such claims always pernicious. They have a valuable moral and political force that undermines, perhaps unwittingly, the logocentric presuppositions of the realist discourses they question. Yet a common assumption that security can be ontologically completed and secured does present a hurdle for the kind of ontopolitical critique that we really need.2 The answer is not to seek to close out these aporias; they call to us and their existence presents an important political opening. Rather than seek to resecure security, to make it conform to a new humanist idealhowever laudablewe need to challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its meaning aside. Instead, we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain waysto see security not as an essential value but as a political technology. This is to move from essence to genealogy: a genealogy that aims, in William Connollys words, to open us up to the play of possibility in the present . . . [to] incite critical responses to unnecessary violences and injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the insistence that prevailing forms are natural, rational, universal or necessary. 3
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We might add also that notions of authority, sovereignty, and political participation are not necessarily constructed on a single intellectual foundation. In the case of Nathan Jim, our introduction to this wide- ranging conflict over authority, as well as in the broader historical development of the relationship of Native American religious traditions and the American constitutional order, there are clear differences over how authority is determined, and by whom and under what circumstances. Native traditions, centered (at least in part) on the cultural orientation toward land, cannot but conflict with the American constitutional order's orientation toward the same land. Not as easily integrated into American culture as Christianity's symbolic emphasis on "The Word" (and its parallel relationship to the Constitution as symbolic of the federal government's authority dependent on territoriality), Native American religious traditions expose the very real and tangible conflict that lies at the heart of the American constitutional order. The strengths behind the Constitution are grounded in the control of the land, and any challenge to that control can be
. Nathan Jim may not see the legal system of the American constitutional order as his law, but he has understood the power it holds over him, and has agreed to abide by it. So, too, in many ways, have Native American religious traditions agreed to abide by the American constitutional order. They may not accept the source of its authority, but in the face of overwhelming power, they may have had no other choice but to accept it.
met with subtle, but immeasurable resistance
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A2 Dillon: 2AC
DILLON DOESNT ADVOCATE REJECTION ENDORSING THE POLITICAL ACT OF PLAN IS CONSISTENT WITH IS CALL FOR ANOTHER FORM OF JUSTICE Dillon 99
[Michael, Prof. IR @ Lancaster, Another Justice, Political Theory 27: 2, April, Sage//uwyo] Inordertobeatall,then,thiswayofbeinghastoposeandrespondtothe questionwhatitistobe.Indoingsoittakesitsbearingcomposureoftransits,plots,courses,andfixesfromtheconnectednessinthemidstofwhich italwaysalreadyfindsitself.Moreoftenthannot,itisonlywhenthosenavigationalaidsaredisrupted,anditsautomaticpilotsbreakdown,thatitfully recognises its radically hermeneutical condition. It is at these points, especially,thatthecallofanotherJusticeresoundsmostloudlythroughoutits hermeneuticism. Here the bearing of a new bearing may be assumed. Each alwayshastobeassumedquestioningly,however,withinagivenworld;and none ever exhausts the task of having to do so. For another Justice always already arises within and alongside is vented through the legislation, execution, and adjudication of existing distributive regimes. This making way for other ways of being to be is a political art. Other justices emerge out of the injustices of regimes of distributive justice in response to the call of another Justice. That is why there is an intimate link between another Justice and politics. Such a politics isneitherasupposedlyhabitual tradition,acontractualnegotiation,noranepistemicallyrealistcomputation ofthecorrelatesofrigorouslyself-interestedbehaviour.It is an irruptive and inventive practice called up by specific historical circumstances. Politics becomes that way of being (politeia) whose composure is an art of intimation,articulation,intervention,andjudgment.It is a practice that responds to the call ofanotherJustice.There is no guarantee that it will be available when required, just as there is no guarantee that it will be successful should it be exercised,orthateverybodyisabletopracticeitondemand.Toooftenrule, managementdecision,andviolenceoccludeit.Recognisablewhenitmakes itsappearance, we have to bear witness to it.
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belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life.
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The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms. That the
tactic can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist subordination to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their discrete, sequential coexistence along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of originality and derivativeness. Ind eed, the field of power structured in part by the imperializing gesture of dialectical appropriation exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual difference, offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any other canddidate for the position of primary condition of oppression.
Rather than an exclusive tactic of masculinist signifying economies, dialectical appropriation and suppression of the Other is one tactic among many deployed centrally but not exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the masculinist domain.
THIRD, TURN RETREAT FROM SPEAKING FOR OTHERS IS ANOTHER FORM OF PRIVILEGE THAT ALLOWS VOICES TO BE TRAMPLED SPEAKING EXCLUSIVELY FOR YOURSELF IS IMPOSSIBLE Alcoff 92
[Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter 91-2, 20//uwyo] This problem is that Trebilcots position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one can retreat into ones discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly based on that location that do not range over others, that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between ones discursive practices and others locations, situations, and practices. (In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory that I am unconnected to other in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others given certain conditions.) But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which ones words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there a way to decisively demarcate a boundary between ones location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of ocurse not neutral since it allow the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce dominance. As my practices are made possible by events spatially far from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I speak only for myself has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects.
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FOURTH, ALCOFF ONLY SAYS THAT CLAIMING TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER IS A BAD THING, NOT THAT MAKING ANY CLAIM ABOUT THEM IS BAD. WE DONT CLAIM TO REPRESENT OR EVEN KNOW WHAT ALL OF __________ THINK.
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EIGHTH, NO SPECIFIC LINK STORY POSITIONALITY UNDERDETERMINES THE EFFECT OF A SPEECH ACT ABSENT SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF HOW WE DISEMPOWER, THEIR ARGUMENT IS REDUCTIONIST AND NOT A REASON TO REJECT Alcoff 92
[Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter 91-2] The first response I will consider is to argue that the formulation of the problem with speaking for others involves a retrograde metaphysically unsupportable essentialism that assumes one can read the truth and meaning of what one says straight
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from the discursive context. This response I will call the charge of reductionism response, because it argues that a sort of reductionist theory of justification (or evlauation) is entailed by premises 1 and 2. Such a reductionist theory might, fo rexample, reduce evaluation to a political assessment of the speakers location where that location is seen as an insurmountable essence that fixes one, as if ones feet are superglued to a spot on the sidewalk.
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#3 Retreat: 1AR
EXTEND THE 2AC #3 ALCOFF 92 EVIDENCE. THIS DOES TWO THINGS FOR US IT PROVES THAT THERES NO ALTERNATIVE TO SPEAKING FOR OTHERS. EVERY DISCURSIVE POSITION PRESUPPOSES ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD, MEANING THAT EVEN IF YOU VOTE NEGATIVE, YOU STILL SPEAK FOR OTHERS INTERESTS, ONLY IN A MORE IMPLICIT WAY, PROVING THAT THE ALTERNATIVE LINKS JUST AS BADLY IT DEMONSTRATES HOW A RETREAT FROM SPEAKING FOR OTHERS CREATES NEW FORMS OF OPPRESSION BY OMMITTING DISCUSSION OF OPPRESSION, ALLOWING ONE TO ESCAPE REAL WORLD VIOLENCE INTO A SELFIMPORTANT YUPPIE LIFESTYLE, ALLOWING STATUS QUO DOMINATION TO OCCUR, UNCHECKED, TURNING THEIR ARGUMENT ALSO, FALLING BACK TO ACADEMIC CRITICISM ALLOWS A RETREAT FROM POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND INCREASED EXPLOITATION OF THE OPPRESSED FOR PERSONAL GAIN Alcoff 92
[Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter 91-2, 13//uwyo\ Neither premise 1 nor premise 2 entail reductionism or essentialism. They argue for the relevance of location, not its singular power of determination. Since they do not specify how we are to understand the concept of location, it can certainly be given a nonessential meaning. While the charge of reductionism response has been popular among academic theorists, a second response which I will call the retreat response has been popular among some sectionso f the US feminist movement. This response is simply to retreat from all practices of speaking for and assert that one can only know ones own narrow individual experience and ones own truth and can enver make claims beyond this. This response is motivated in part by the desire to recognize difference, for example, different priorities, without organizing these differences into hierarchies. Now, sometimes I think this is the proper response ot the problem of speaking for others, depnding on who is making it. We certainly want to encourage a more receptive listening on the part of the discursively privileged and discourage presumptuosu and oppressive practices of speaking for. But a retreat from speaking for will not result in an increase in receptive listening in all cases; it may resul tmerely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no responsibility for her society whatesoever. She may even feel justified in exploiting her priveleged capacity for personal happiness at the expense of others on the grounds that she has no alternative.
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#3 Retreat: Ext
AND RETREAT FROM POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT FOR FEAR OF VIOLENCE IN SEARCH OF AUTHENTICITY ALLOWS US TO SPEND HOURS DEBATING THE FINE POINTS OF ETHICS TOWARDS THE OTHER WHILE GAS CHAMBERS ARE BUILT Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997,146-7//uwyo-ajl] If it is unreasonable to suppose that the Final Solution was potentiated or even necessarily facilitated by Schmitt's theories, it is certainly the case that this metaphysical structure of domination in the Third Reich, whereby the status of public citizens is reduced to a level determined entirely in the 'natural' or biological realm of necessity, is foreshadowed in his 1927 essay. In an abstract and insidious way Schmitt introduces the idea that the 'transcendent' realm of the political, as a matter of course, will not accommodate a people with insufficient strength to ensure its own participation, and that such a fact is ipso facto justification for its exclusion. 'If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'130 Schmitt's concept of the 'political', quite simply, is nothing of the sort - is instead weighed down by necessity, in the form of what Marshall Berman calls German-Christian interiority - by its preoccupation with authenticity, that is to say, and true political 'identity'. Auschwitz is a corollary not of reason, understood as risk, but of the fear of reason, which paradoxically is a fear of violence. The stench of burning bodies is haunted always by the sickly aroma of cheap metaphysics.
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#6 Perm: 1AR
EXTEND THE 2AC #6 JUXTAPOSITION PERM. ENGAGING IN CRITICISM OF SPEAKING FOR OTHERS, BY ITSELF, FAILS BECAUSE IT MERELY FLIPS THE BINARISM AND FAILS TO ACTUALLY ENGAGE THE DISCOURSE THAT IT CRITICIZES, CREATING A NEW FORM OF MONOLITHIC HEGEMONY IN WHICH NOTHING IS CHALLENGED. HOWEVER, COMBINING THE 1AC AND THE CRITICISM ALLOWS FOR CONSTANT CRITICISM, USING THE AFFS REPRESENTATIONS AS A TARGET FOR CRITICAL INTERROGATION, LEADING TO BETTER SOLVENCY THAN THE ALTERNATIVE BY ITSELF. CROSS-APPLY THE ALCOFF 92 SOLVENCY EVIDENCE. ALL OF THEIR PERM THEORY AND LINK ARGUMENTS DONT APPLY BECAUSE THIS ISNT A STANDARD PERM. IT COMBINES THE ENTIRETY OF THE 1AC AND THE CRITICISM AND USES THAT CONTRADICTION TO ALLOW A CONSIDERATION OF BOTH SIDES AND THE ISSUE AND A MORE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SPEAKING FOR, FUNCTIONING AS AN IMPACT TURN TO THEIR ADVOCACY OF ONE-SIDED CRITICISM.
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#9 Reductionism: 1AR
EXTEND THE 2AC #9. THE ARGUMENT THAT POSITIONALITY DETERMINES WHETHER A REPRESENTATION IS GOOD OR NOT IGNORES THE MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE OF HOW OUR SPEECH ACT ACTUALLY OPERATES IN DISCURSIVE SPACE THIS HAS TWO IMPLICATIONS IT DESTROYS THE LINK. WITHOUT AN EXPLANATION OF HOW OUR ACT FUNCTIONS, YOU DONT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THAT AN INTERNAL LINK EXISTS IT LOCKS THEIR CRITICISM INTO SUBJECT ESSENTIALISM THAT RESULTS IN THE VERY OTHERIZATION THAT THEYRE CRITICIZING, TURNING THE ARGUMENT AND, THEIR METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE IS JUST WRONG THERE IS NO STABLY EXISTING OTHER, ATTEMPTING TO FIT ONE INTO A DISCREET LABEL MAGNIFIES OPPRESSION Bewes 97
[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, Cynicism and Postmodernity, New York City: Verso, 1997, 48//uwyo-ajl] In this light, to begin to use again terms and concepts which had seemed to be theoretically proscribed (the author, the subject, reality, sexual and cultural identity, the universal) is not neces-sarily to betray a reactionary or a nostalgic desire for 'presence'; on the contrary, what the critical insights of post-structuralism (more specifically, deconstruction) reveal is not only the possibil-ity but the imperative that such terms continue to be used. There are no others - and if there were, they would by definition not only be liable to but would comprise exactly the same catachrestic abuses
AND HERES THE ALTERNATIVE (OPTIONAL) LACANIAN ETHICS RESISTS ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE SUBJECT TO IDENTITARIANISM BY FOCUSING ON CONSTITUTIVE LACK, NOT WHO IS LACKING Stavrakakis 99
[Yannis, New Age composer, Lacan and the Political, 1999, NY: Routledge, 37//uwyo-ajl] By locating, at the place previously assigned to an essence of the individual psyche, a constitutive lack, Lacanian theory avoids the essentialist reductionism of the social to the individual level and opens the way to the confluence of psychoanalysis and socio-political analysis, since this lack can only be filled by socio-political objects of identification. The point here is that analytic theory is not only concerned with lack but also with what attempts to fill this lack: Psychoanalysis is otherwise directed at the effect of discourse within the subject' (Ill: 135). In that sense, `Lacan.. believed in the priority of social discourses, of language, over the subject' (Copjec, 1994: 53). This is the meaning of the
constitutivity of the symbolic in the emergence of the subject that we have been describing up to now. Michelman is correct then when asserting that `Durkheim and
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Lacan are thus allied in their critiques of various forms of psychological and biological reductionism that deny the existence and efficacy of facts of this order [the symbolic/social order]' (Michelman, 1996: 127). Thus Lacan not only seems aware of the dangers pointed by Durkheim and reiterated by Jameson with which we started this book but avoids them in the most radical way: ~there is no subject according to Lacan which is not always already a social subject' (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1992: 30)27
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WE MUST NOT REJECT THE STATE- LIMITED AND STRATEGIC USE OF THE STATE IS VITAL TO SUCCESSFUL POLITICS Derrida, French philosopher, 2K
(Jacques, Intellectual Courage: An Interview Culture Machine http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j002/articles/art_derr.htm)
Q: Two essential problems of globalisation are the dissolution of the state and the impotence of politics. In your recently published text 'Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!', you develop certain ideas concerning a new right to asylum and a new balance of power between the different places of the political in view of a possible new role of the city. How do you think philosophy could and should react to the problems mentioned with a kind of institutional fantasy? JD: I am not sure I understand what you call 'institutional fantasy'. All political experimentation like the initiative of the 'refugee city', despite its limits and its inevitably preliminary character, has in it a philosophical dimension. It requires us to interrogate the essence and the history of the state. All political innovation touches on philosophy. The 'true' political action always engages with a philosophy.
All action, all political decision making, must invent its norm or rule. Such a gesture traverses or implies philosophy. Meanwhile, at the risk of appearing self-contradictory, I believe that one must fight against that which you call the 'dissolution of the state' (for the state can in turn limit the private forces of appropriation, the concentrations of economic power, it can retard a violent depoliticisation that acts in the name of the 'market'), and above all resist the state where it gives in too easily to the nationalism of the nation state or to the representation of socio-economic hegemony. Each time one must analyse, invent a new rule:
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here to contest the state, there to consolidate it. The realm of politics is not coextensive with the state, contrary to what one believes nowadays. The necessary repoliticisation does not need to serve a new cult of the state. One ought to operate with new dissociations and accept complex and differentiated practices.
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If the observed state policy is to protect human rights, then at least even if individuals within a domestic polity seek a variety of differentiated ends, basic respect for human rights allows individuals to pursue--to some degree at least--those ends as they define them. Liberal
subset of the domestic polity. n100 some subset of the domestic polity must share that preference. Second,
theory thus suggests that individuals within a human rights respecting state tend to support basic human rights provisions. The next step in the social beliefs argument is to recognize that respect for human rights has an inherently universalist tendency. n101 Unlike cultural or national rights, human rights are just that-human. They apply as much [*267] to those individuals within a domestic polity as to those outside the polity. Such cosmopolitan liberalism indicates that "the more people are free, the better off all are." n102 The net result is that individuals within a human rights respecting state tend, on the average, to support the human rights
Given a set of universalist human rights values in states that respect human rights, the policy articulated by the government may be one which respects human rights at home and demands their protection abroad. This belief in a thin set of universal human rights may cause the leadership of the state to frame its security policy around that belief structure and to refrain from aggressive acts that would violate the human rights of citizens at home or abroad. As Peter Katzenstein
of individuals in other states as well. argues, "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors." n103 Acts of international aggression tend to impinge on the human rights of individuals in the target state and, at least temporarily, limit their freedom. After all, bombs, bullets, death and destruction are not consistent with respect for basic human rights. n104 Framed in the liberal international relations theory terms of policy interdependence, international aggression by State A imposes costs on State B, whose citizens' human rights will be infringed upon by the act of aggression. This infringement in turn imposes costs on citizens in State A, whose citizens have a preference for the protection of the human rights of citizens in both states. This shared value of respect for human rights thus may restrain State A from pursuing international aggression. n105 By contrast, a state which commits gross human rights violations against its own people will not be subject to this restraint. Such violations often occur when the government has been "captured" by a select minority that chooses to violate human rights. If the citizens themselves are not in favor of
Where capture occurs, the government is not responsive to the preferences of the domestic polity. In such cases, even if there is a strong preference among citizens to protect human rights at home and abroad, the government is unlikely to respond to those interests and its policies will not be constrained by them.
human rights at home, they are unlikely to be committed to the enforcement of human rights abroad.
CALLS UPON THE STATE ARE THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL PROGRESS THE ALTERNATIVE IS A COMBINATION OF ANARCHY AND NIHILISM WE END UP DITHERING IN THE FACE OF ATTROCITIES Walzer, Professor of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Studies & Former Professor at Harvard, 1983 (Michael, The Politics of Michel Foucault, Dissent, Fall)
Here again a comparison with Hobbes is illuminating. Hobbes thought that political sovereignty was a literal necessity--else life was nasty, brutish, and short. He supported every sort of sovereignty, and so for him tyranny was nothing more than "monarchy misliked." Foucault believes that discipline is necessary for this
for him liberalism is nothing more than discipline concealed. For neither Hobbes nor Foucault does the constitution or the law or even the actual workings of the political system make any difference. In fact, I think, these things make all the difference. One of Foucault's followers, the author of a very intelligent
particular society-capitalist, modern, or whatever; he abhors all its forms, every sort of confinement and control, and so essay on Discipline and Punish, draws from that book and the related interviews the extraordinary conclusion that the Russian Revolution failed because it "left intact
: the Bolsheviks created a new regime that overwhelmed the old hierarchies and enormously expanded and intensified the use of disciplinary techniques. And they did this from the heart of the social system and not from what Foucault likes to cal the capillaries, from the center and not the extremities. Foucault desensitizes his reader to the importance of politics; but politics matters. Power relations, he says, "are both intentional and nonsubjective." I don't know what that sentence means, but I think that the contradictory words are intended (nonsubjectively?) to apply to different levels of power Every disciplinary act is planned and calculated; power is intentional at the tactical level where guard confronts prisoner; doctor,
the social hierarchies and in no way inhibited the functioning of the disciplinary techniques." Exactly wrong patient; lecturer, audience. But the set of power relations, the strategic connections, the deer -functionalism of power has no subject and is the product of no one's plan
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continued
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. Foucault's more recent work is political epistemology. I now want to examine this epistemology, for it is the ultimate source of his anarchism/nihilism. Sometimes Foucault seems to be committed to nothing more than an elaborate pun on
the word "discipline"-which means, on the one hand, a branch of knowledge and on the other a system of correction and control. This is his argument: social life is discipline squared. Discipline makes discipline possible (the order of the two nouns can be reversed). Knowledge derives from and provides the grounds for social control; every particular form of social control rests on and makes possible a particular form of knowledge. It follows that power isn't merely repressive but also creative (even if all it creates is, say, the science of penology); and similarly, knowledge isn't merely ideological but also true. But this doesn't make either power or knowledge terribly attractive. Penology is "constituted" by the prison system in the obvious sense that there could not be a study of prisoners or of the effects of imprisonment if there were no prisons. One form of discipline generates the data that makes the other possible. At the same time, penology provides both the rationale and the intellectual structure of the prison system. There could be no exercise of discipline, at least no sustained and organized exercise, without disciplinary knowledge. It is a nice model, though perhaps a little too easy. In any case, Foucault proceeds to generalize it. "Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power." So for every society, for every historical age, there is a regime of truth, unplanned but functional, generated somehow out of the network of power relations, out of the multiple forms of constraint, and enforced along with them. There are certain types of discourse that the society accepts "and makes . . . true," and there are mechanisms that enable us to distinguish true and false statements-and sanctions, so that we won't make mistakes. Foucault believes that truth is relative to its sanctions and knowledge to the constraints that produce it. There would appear to be no independent standpoint, no possibility for the development of critical principles. Of course, one can ask the obvious questions: what is Foucault's standpoint? to what set of power relations is the genealogical antidiscipline connected'? Foucault is far too intelligent not to have worried about these questions. They are standard for any relativism. He responds in two ways: first by saying, as I have already noted, that his genealogies are fictions waiting for the "political realities" that will make them true. Each present invents its own past, but Foucault has invented a past for some future present. At other times, says more simply that his work is made possible by the events of '68 and by subsequent local revolts here and there along the disciplinary continuum. As the conventional disciplines are generated and validated by the conventional uses of power, so Foucault's antidiscipline is generated by the resistance to those uses. But I don't see, on Foucault's terms, how it can be validated by resistance until the resistance is successful (and it's not clear what success would mean). But perhaps, after all, the demand that Foucault show us the
Foucault
makes no demands on us that we adopt this or that critical principle or replace these disciplinary norms with some other set of norms. He is not an advocate. We are to withdraw our belief in, say, the truth of penology and then support ..- what? Not every prison revolt, for there may be some that we have "good reason" not to support. At this point, it seems to me, Foucault's position is simply incoherent. The powerful evocation of the disciplinary system gives way to an antidisciplinarian politics that is mostly rhetoric and posturing. But there is more that has to be said. In those prison revolts with which we might rightly sympathize, the prisoners don't in fact call into question the line between guilt and innocence or the truth value of jurisprudence or penology. Their "discourse" takes a very different form: they describe the brutality of the prison authorities or the inhumanity of prison conditions, and they complain of punishments that go far beyond those to which they were legally condemned. They denounce official arbitrariness, harassment, favoritism, and so on. They demand the introduction and enforcement of what we might best call the rule of law. And these descriptions, complaints, denunciations, and demands make an important point. Foucault is certainly right to say that the conventional truths of morality, law, medicine, and psychiatry are implicated in the exercise of power; that is a fact too easily forgotten by conventionally detached scientists, social scientists, and even philosophers. But those same truths also regulate the exercise of power. They set limits on what can rightly be done, and they give shape and conviction to the arguments the prisoners make. The limits are important even if they are in some sense arbitrary. They aren't entirely arbitrary, however, insofar as they are intrinsic to the particular disciplines (in both senses of the word). The truths of jurisprudence and
ground on which he stands, display his philosophical warrants, is beside the point. For he penology, for example, distinguish punishment from preventive detention. And the truths of psychiatry distinguish the internment of madmen from the internment of
A liberal state is one that maintains the limits of its constituent disciplines and disciplinary institutions and that enforces their intrinsic principles. Authoritarian and totalitarian states, by contrast, override those limits, turning education into indoctrination, punishment into repression, asylums into prisons, and prisons into concentration camps.
political dissidents. state. For
These are crude definitions; I won't insist upon them; amend them as you will. I only want to suggest the enormous importance of the political regime, the sovereign
it is the state that establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate. It is the state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local resistance. The agents of every disciplinary institution strive, of course, to extend their reach and augment their discretionary power. Ultimately, it is only state power that can stop them. Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention from the center. Consider, for example, the factory revolts of the 1930s that led (in this country) to the establishment of collective bargaining and grievance procedures,
critical restraints on scientific management, which is one of Foucault's disciplines, though one that he alludes to only occasionally. Success required not only the solidarity of the workers but also at least some support from the liberal and democratic state. And success was functional not to any state but to a state of that sort; we can easily imagine other "social wholes" that would require other kinds of factory discipline. A genealogical account of this discipline would be fascinating and valuable, and it would undoubtedly overlap with Foucault's accounts of prisons and hospitals. But if it were complete, it would have to include a genealogy of grievance
Here is a kind of knowledge-political philosophy and philosophical jurisprudence-that regulates disciplinary arrangements across our society. It arises within one set of power relations and extends toward the others; it offers a critical perspective on all the networks of constraint. This suggests that whatever the value of detailed analyses and critiques of local discipline, we still require-I don't mean that society requires, or capitalism or even socialism requires, but you and I require-what Foucault calls "general intellectuals." We need men and women who tell us when state power is corrupted or
procedures too, and this would overlap with an account, which Foucault doesn't provide, of the liberal state and the rule of law.
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systematically misused, who cry out that something is rotten, and who reiterate the regulative principles with which we might set things right. But I don't want to end on this last note. I don't want to ask
Foucault to be uplifting. That is not the task he has set himself. The point is rather that one can't even be downcast, angry, grim, indignant, sullen, or embittered with reason unless one inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively and critically, its codes and categories. Or unless, and this is much harder, one constructs a new setting and proposes new codes and categories. Foucault refuses to do either of these things, and that refusal, which makes his genealogies so powerful and so relentless, is also the catastrophic weakness of his political theory.
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aggression is the institutional constraint that accompanies human rights protections. n97 Institutionalization of human rights norms has at least two powerful effects on state behavior. First, human rights protections govern how broad a spectrum of the community has at least some voice
in the political decisions of the state. Even if the state is not a democratic polyarchy, if it provides basic protections for the human rights of all or most citizens, then a very broad spectrum of the polity is represented in political affairs. Freedom of thought and freedom from extrajudicial bodily harm, for example, allow citizens to develop their own views on political issues and, often, to express those views through public channels. A wider spectrum of
voices, in turn, increases the level of political competition--one of the key structural explanations for the democratic peace--even without the establishment of a democratic form of government. n98 Of course, in a non-democratic, but human rights respecting state, the views of individual interests may not have a direct effect on state policy, but, arguably, they can still increase the level of political competition by facilitating debate and the exchange of ideas. The second effect of institutionalized protections of human rights is to set a minimum floor of treatment for all citizens within the domestic polity. Even in a non-democracy, minimum human rights protections ensure that [*266] rights are accorded to individuals not directly represented by the government. By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights protections prevent the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to fight or be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically represses
its own people, the state will be more able to bear the domestic costs of war. By violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to fight or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war. Even
denial of freedom of thought and expression might well insulate the government from the electoral costs of an aggressive foreign policy. n99
if such a state had fair elections,
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCIOUSNESS AT THE STATE LEVEL CHECKS CONFLICT: (1) FOSTERS HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE; (2) EXPANDS CITIZEN OPPOSITION; (3) UNDERMINES STATE COERCION TOWARDS WAR
William W. Burke-White, Lecturer, Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation, THE HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW v. 17, Spring 2004, p. 271-272.
The institutionalization of human rights protections is not only a means of signaling benign intent, but is also inversely correlated with a state's ability to engage in aggressive conduct. As a state embeds human rights protections in its domestic system--even without democratization--a number of structural changes occur within the society that limit aggressive potential. First, as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink have argued, a culture of human rights may develop within the
population and become institutionalized domestically. n121 Such a human rights culture would reject international aggression as a threat to the human rights of citizens in other states. Second,
institutionalization of human rights protections expands the ability of citizens to voice opposition to aggressive state policy through freedoms of belief, speech, and assembly. Third, institutionalization erodes the ability of the state to coerce its citizens into providing the resources and human capital necessary for aggressive war. n122
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human rights informed should be advocated not just for the traditional human rights reasons of life and human dignity , n115 but also because improved human rights records may enhance national and global security by preventing states from engaging in international aggression in the future. Even for skeptics of the universal duty to promote human rights on grounds of individual dignity, this second argument should have
In dealing with states of concern, improving a given state's human rights policy is almost never a primary goal of U.S. policy. A foreign policy would include far more active advocacy for improvement in some states' human rights records. Such policies persuasive weight in asserting the strategic importance of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
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Everyone is prejudged by their race, gender, sexual or religious affiliation, and socially compartmentalized in some politically correct egg basket. The goal of the anarchist movement is to establish a free, tolerant and cooperative society which
will embrace diversity and celebrate difference. If the means are to be consistent with the ends, then how can such a abrasive and bigoted practice as identity politics
Identifying the "enemy" by birth or predilection, regardless of an individual's actual beliefs or actions, is simple bigotry. Awarding moral virtue on the same grounds is simple stupidity. Similarly, essaying to act as a unwarranted spokesperson for a diverse grouping of individuals who by chance share a single basic characteristic is the most arrogantsort of elitism. Real people, stripped of their individual identities, are thus subsumed in some hypothetical single-dimensional construct that effectively denies them any complexity of character. This isn't an answer to institutionalized racism and bigotry, but rather its mirror image.
possibly achieve that end?
This sort of prejudicial activity has appeal for the simpleminded. It's easy to either attack or adulate a stranger on the grounds of appearance. A similar anxiety powered the old Sumptuary laws which punished anyone who dressed above their social class -- it was too unnerving for the elite to think they might make a mistake and treat an inferior as an equal, thanks to illicit appearances. Political prejudice makes it simple to get through the difficulty of rootless modern life where there are no clear cut exterior indications of what a person might really be like. All white males (unless, perhaps, gay) are dangerous, power-driven and bigoted. All women (unless, perhaps, Republican) are intuitive, nurturing and empathetic with Nature. Members of minorities (take your pick) are morally superior to members of majorities. Classifications and labels which assist us in making such decisions are more real (and more important) than the people they describe. Et cetera. Bullshit.
The goal of a tolerant and cooperative society of free individuals can only be achieved by those very means -- by being tolerant, cooperative and free. We must be better companions to our fellow mortals, whatever their outward characteristics. Civility, which facilitates cooperation, is imperative if anarchy is to really work. Pigheaded and self-important aggressiveness, hypercriticism and easy intolerance is a recipe for the status quo. We don't mean to suggest some sort of all accepting, "turn-the-other-cheek" bourgeois crap, either. Once you get beyond the labels,
there are still unfortunately plenty of folks that it makes sense to despise. Arrogant, violent, intolerant, fanatical, bigoted, manipulative, rapacious... individuals with these characteristics must be guarded against, but they are not all found in one easily recognized group identity. These adjectives equally describe individual men, women, blacks, whites, handicapped people -- the whole gamut of the human race. Nor is anyone as morally pure as some of our new puritan idealists would insist that they be. A person is the sum of their character traits, not a distillation of the most pronounced ones. Radicals are just as prone to frailties of character as industrialists. It is by their actual effect on their community and environment that we should evaluate our fellow beings, not by some dominant virtue or fault which particularly excites us. It would be far preferable to tolerate a insensitive verbal bigot who in practice actually helped people than a pious hypocrite who mouthed politically correct platitudes and then went home and beat his lover.
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. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.
of organized violence, states also remain the preeminent actors
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. Corporations are now in a position of usurping individual rights essentially becoming a private government equally or more insidious than any undemocratic form of government.
are granted specific rights under the Constitution
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concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.
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we have to move beyond the myopic view--often endemic among anarchists--that the most 'important' activism only or mainly happens in the streets, enmeshed in police confrontations." In other words, spheres of traditional 'radical action'
are limited and limiting. And though I don't believe that sasha fundamentally disagrees with this criticism, he refuses to accept its broader consequences. For instance, where I question the bounds of 'radicalism' with examples of struggles like opposing prison construction and establishing community and cultural centers, he conclusively points to "a set of demands and goals of which none suggest any serious critique of capitalism and the state in their totality." There is much more to the "totality" that we all confront than capitalism and the state. That's unequivocal. Furthermore, a "totality" has an undeniable physical presence, and people do in fact contest and resist it every day through a variety of struggles using a variety of means--not all containing the "serious critique" necessary to satisfy sasha. J. Kellstadt nicely observes this, noting that an 'activist' perspective (not unlike sasha's) overlooks a whole layer of more "everyday" forms of resistance - from slacking off, absenteeism, and sabotage, to shopfloor "counter-planning" and other forms of autonomous and "unofficial" organizing - which conventional activists and leftists (including most anarchists) have a bad track record of acknowledging. And this still leaves out all of those modes of struggle which take place beyond the shopfloor, such as various forms of cultural and sexual revolution. Unfortunately, sasha doesn't deign to discuss these all-too-pedestrian realities, many of which potentially embrace the very anarchist ethics he touts. They certainly have bearing on the lives of many folks and speak to a breadth of social struggle, but they apparently don't constitute a sufficient "critique." Even if sasha were to acknowledge their importance, my sense is that he would erect a rationalized theoretical division between Kellstadt's "everyday forms of resistance" and 'reformism.' No doubt, he would use a rhetorical sleight of hand on par with the "simple fact of language that those who want to reform the present system are called reformists." A seemingly irrefutable, self-apparent statement, this actually glosses over legitimate questions: Are 'reformists' so easily discernable and cleanly categorized? Are all 'reforms' equal? Can they be part of a long-term revolutionary strategy? So let's talk plainly about reformism. No matter how much some might wish otherwise, it simply isn't a cut-and-dry issue. And while it actually deserves a book-length examination, here I'll sketch some general considerations. Principally, I ask, assuming that we share the goal of dismantling systems of power and restructuring our entire society in nonhierarchical ways, what role does reform play? Must we eschew it, unconditionally embrace it, or is there another approach? sasha steadfastly represents one rather limited 'radical' view. To bolster his critique of 'reformism,' for instance, he critically cites one of the examples in my essay: demanding authentic public oversight of police. "[This] might be a small step for social change in some general sense," he argues, "but ultimately it is a step backwards as it strengthens the legitimacy of the police and of imposed decision." I respect the intent of this critique; it makes sense if one is privileged enough to engage with the police on terms of
in real life, it's both simplistic and insulated. Look at it this way: accepting sasha's argument, are we to wait until the coming insurrectionary upheaval before enjoying an end to police brutality? More specifically, are African- American men to patiently endure the continued targeting of "driving while Black"? Should they hold off their demands for police accountability so as to avoid strengthening "the legitimacy of the police and of imposed decision"? And if they don't, are they 'reformists'? Many folks who experience daily police occupation understand that ending the "imposed decision" (often epitomized by police) will require radical change , and they work toward it. At the same time, they demand authentic public oversight of police forces. The two don't have to be mutually exclusive . I'll even suggest that they can be complementary, especially if we acknowledge the legacies of white supremacy and class stratification embedded in policing. Ultimately, we need a lucid conception of social change that articulates this kind of complementarity . That is, we need revolutionary strategy that links diverse, everyday struggles and demands to longterm radical objectives, without sacrificing either. Of course, this isn't to say that every so-called 'progressive' ballot initiative or organizing campaign is necessarily radical or strategic. Reforms are not all created equal. But some can fundamentally shake systems of power, leading to enlarged gains and greater space for further advances . Andre Gorz, in
one's own choosing. Yet his seminal book Strategy for Labor, refers to these as "non-reformist" or "structural" reforms. He contends, "a struggle for non-reformist reforms--for anti-capitalist reforms--is one which does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria, and rationales. A non-reformist reform is determined not in terms of what can be, but what should be." Look to history for examples:
the end of slavery, the eight-hour workday, desegregation. All were born from long, hard struggles, and none were endpoints. Yet they all struck at the foundations of power (in these cases, the state, white supremacy, and capitalism), and in the process, they created new prospects for revolutionary change. Now consider contemporary struggles: amnesty for undocumented immigrants, socialized health care, expansive environmental protections, indigenous sovereignty. These and many more are arguably non-reformist reforms as well. None will single-handedly dismantle capitalism or other systems of power, but each has the potential to escalate struggles and sharpen social contradictions. And we shouldn't misinterpret these efforts as simply meliorative incrementalism, making 'adjustments' to a fundamentally flawed system. Certainly that tendency exists, but there are plenty of other folks working very consciously within a far more radical strategy, pushing for a qualitative shift in struggle. "To fight for alternative solutions," Gorz writes, "and for structural reforms (that is to say, for intermediate objectives) is not to fight for improvements in the capitalist system; it is rather to break it up, to restrict it, to create counterpowers which, instead of creating a new equilibrium, undermine its very foundations."
Thankfully, this is one approach among a diverse array of strategies, all of which encompass a breadth of struggles and movements. Altogether, they give me hope.
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The triumph of professional or scientific norms over legal rights and of local discipline over constitutional law is a fairly common theme of contemporary social criticism. It has given rise to a series of campaigns in defense of the rights of the mentally ill, of prisoners, hospital patients, children (in schools and also in
free agents who invent their own standards, who, in the language of rights, "give the law to themselves." families). Foucault himself has been deeply involved in prison reform or--1 had better be careful--in a political practice with regard to prisons that might give rise to
And indeed there have been reforms (in this country at least, but I suspect in Europe too): new laws about consent, confidentiality, access to records; judicial interventions in the administration of prisons and schools. Foucault has little to say about this sort of thing and is obviously skeptical about its effectiveness. Despite his emphasis on local struggles, he is largely uninterested in local victories. But what other victories can he think possible, given his strategic knowledge'? Consider (1) that discipline-inreforms.
detail, the precise control of behavior, is necessary to the (unspecified) large-scale features of contemporary social and economic life; (2) that this kind of control requires the microsetting, the finely meshed network, the local power relation, represented in ideal-typical fashion by the cellular structure of the prison, the daily timetable of prison events, the extralegal penalties inflicted by prison authorities, the face-to-face encounters of guard and prisoner; (3) that the prison is only one small part of a highly articulated, mutually reinforcing carceral continuum extending across society, in which all of us are implicated, and not only as captives or victims; (4) and finally, that the complex of disciplinary mechanisms and institutions constitutes and is constituted by the contemporary human sciences-an argument that runs through all of Foucault's work, to which I will return. Physical disciplines and intellectual disciplines are radically entangled; the carceral continuum is validated by the knowledge of human subjects that it makes possible. Given all this-leave aside for the moment whether it adds up to a fully satisfactory account of our social life-
disciplinary rigor, , if no less effective, ? What else is possible? And yet sometimes, not in his books but in the interviews-and especially in a series of interviews of the early 1970s, which still reflect the impact of May '68-Foucault seems to see a grand alternative: the dismantling of the whole thing, the fall of the carceral city, not revolution but abolition. It's for this reason that Foucault's politics are commonly called anarchist, and anarchism certainly has its moments in his thought. Not that he imagines a social system different from our own, beyond discipline and sovereignty alike: "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system." It is precisely the idea of society as a system, a set of institutions, that must give way to something else-what else, we can't imagine. Perhaps human freedom requires a nonfunctionalist society whose arrangements, whatever they are, serve no larger purpose and have no redeeming social value. The nearest thing to an account of such arrangements comes in an interview first published in November 1971. "It is possible," says Foucault, "that the rough outline of a future society is supplied by the recent experiences with drugs, sex, communes, other forms of consciousness, and other forms of individuality." In that same interview, with some such vision in mind, he repudiates the likely reformist results of his own prison work: "The ultimate goal of [our] interventions was not to extend the visiting rights of prisoners to 30 minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, but to question the social and moral distinction between the innocent and the guilty." As this last passage suggests, when Foucault is an anarchist, he is a moral as well as a political
how can Foucault expect anything more than a small reform here or there, an casing of the introduction of more humane methods'
To abolish power systems is to abolish both moral and scientific categories: away with them all! But what will be
anarchist. For him morality and politics go together. Guilt and innocence are the products of law just as normality and abnormality are the products of discipline. left'? Foucault does not believe, as earlier anarchists did, that the free human subject is a subject of a certain sort, naturally good, warmly sociable, kind and loving. Rather, there is for him no such thing as a free human subject, no natural man or woman. Men and women are always social creations, the products of codes and
Foucault's radical abolitionism, if it is serious, is not anarchist so much as nihilist. For on his own arguments, either there will be nothing left at all, nothing visibly human; or new codes and disciplines will be produced, and Foucault gives us no reason to expect that these will be any better than the ones we now live with. Nor, for that matter, does he give us any way of knowing what "better" might mean.
disciplines. And so
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No Link
PROPOSING REFORMS DOESNT LEGITIMIZE THE STATE Frost, University of Kent, Mervyn, 96, Ethics in International Relations, p. 90-1)
A first objection which seems inherent in Donelans approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the
by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus, for example any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot
system. This objection is not well founded, through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.
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No Alternative
THE NEGATIVES PROBLEMATIZING OF STATE IDENTITY HAS NO ALTERNATIVE Cole, professor of History @ Univ of Michigan, 95
(Juan R. I. Feature Review: Power, Knowledge, and Orientalism Diplomatic History Vol. 19 No. 3 Summer) In short, Campbells imaginative and innovative approach places the politics of identity at the very core of U.S. Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, this reviewer must express a few doubts about his inflection of poststructuralist principles and Possibilities. Even if the struggle over identity formed the core of contemporary politics on the national and international levels, the crisis of politics could not be reduced to the crisis of representation. As much as we learn from Writing Security about the production of identity, as little do we learn about the reconstitution of politics. Diplomats, policymakers, industrialists, intellectuals, and social activists, to name but a few, enter the arena of identity politics under conditions that are uneven and change over time. Campbell, however, treats identity struggles, and the strategies of otherness and particular forms of representation that go along with them, as having neither origins nor agency and as being unaccountable to multiple patterns of causality and specific historical moments. Some might argue that the omissions of the question of agency and of conventional causal explanations are the very trademarks of poststructuralism The lack of attention to historical details and peculiarities, and to the nonprogressive movement of history through time, however, is certainly not an inevitable price of poststructuralist analysis . Campbells alternative to the realist notion of an essentialist and universalist search for power is a universal and ahistorical search for identity and differentiation from the Other. Images of the American frontier, for instance, have no doubt a different purpose and significance in an emerging as opposed to a late capitalist order. Furthermore, Campbells critique of state- and nation-centered politics is curiously at odds with his focus on the American identity.20 Such a systemic approach toward the history of identity struggles is perhaps natural to political science, but not to poststructuralism. By claiming that an only vaguely specified2l poststructuralist attitude sees theory w practice (emphasis in original) (p. i), Campbell takes a shortcut and tends to deny any meaningful understanding of the mediation between theory and practice, or between the discursive and the non-discursive.
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A2 Borders: 2AC
SOVEREIGNTY IS NECESSARY FOR COALITIONS OF RESISTANCE Gupta 92
[Akhil, Prof. Anthro @ Stanford, Cultural Anthropology 7(1), JSTOR//uwyo-ajl] Second, just as formal equality of citizens in the nation-state often constitutionally enshrined (Andersons deep horizontal comradeship), so the equality of nation -states in the world system is given concrete expression the charter and functioning of international organizations such as the United Nations. The independence of third world countries, dependent as it is on the international order of the United Nations, thus redirects spatial identity from the nation at the same time that it produces it. Last, independence from colonial rule made it imperative for postcolonial third world nation-states to examine the nature and meaning of sovereignty. They soon realized that the independence they had fought so hard to obtain could not be sustained under the pressure exerted by the superpowers to incorporate them into clientistic relationships. The only way to resist this pressure was to band together and form a common front and to use this union strategically to prevent absorption into either bloc. Sovereignty not only depends on the protection of spatial borders, but it is above all the ability of state elites to regulate activities that flow across those borders, such as the crossing of commodities and surpluses, the passage of people in the form of labor, tourists, et cetera, and the movement of cultural products and ideas. It is significant that the agenda of successive meetings of nonaligned nations moved from an initial emphasis on the Cold War and colonialism to questions of imperialism, unequal trading relationships, and the new information order. It was realized that economic dependence, indebtedness, and cultural imperialism were as great, if not greater, dangers to sovereignty as was military invasion. The Nonaligned Movement thus represented an effort on the part of economically and militarily weaker nations to use the interstate system to consolidate the nation-state.
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reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it. Rand
Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language.
Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation.
Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts.
This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless
exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.
Terrorist and terrorism entered ordinary language to designate a specific phenomenon: killing directed against all ideological enemies indiscriminately and outside the context of a war between combatants. According to the logic of terrorism, enemies can legitimately be killed no matter what they are doing, where they are, or how old they are. The word terror first entered the political vocabulary of
their "objective enemy," no matter what those people may or may not have done. the West during the French Revolution. Those who guillotined thousands in the Place de la Concorde in Paris were pleased to speak of revolutionary terror as a form of justice. Since the era of the French Revolution,
a complex, subtle, and generally accepted international language has emerged to make critical distinctions between different kinds of violent acts. Combatants are distinguished from noncombatants. A massacre is different from a battle. An ambush is different from a firefight. When Americans look back with sadness and even shame at the Vietnam War, it is horrors like the My Lai massacre they have in mind. Those who called the slaughter of more than 400 unarmed men,
women, and children a battle were regarded as having taken leave of their senses, perhaps because they were so determined to justify anything that Americans did in the Vietnam War that they had lost their moral moorings.2 A terrorist is one who sows terror.
Terror subjects its victims or would-be victims to paralyzing fear. In the words of the political theorist Michael Walzer, terrorisms "purpose is to destroy the morale of a nation or a class, to undercut its
solidarity; [terrorisms] method is the random murder of innocent people. Randomness is the crucial feature of terrorist acti vity. If one wishes fear to spread and intensify over time, it is not desirable to kill specific people identified in some particular way with a regime, a party, or a policy. Death must come by chance."3 Terrorism is "the random murder of innocent people."
that way, take a trip, shop, or ride a bus. In other words, civilians are not combatants. The designation of terrorism becomes contested because terrorists and their apologists would prefer not to be depicted accurately. It is important to distinguish between two cases here. In some hotly contested political situations, it may be in the interest of one side to try to label its opponents as "terrorists" rather than "combatants" or "soldiers" or "fighters." We must ask who such men (and women) are attacking. Do they target soldiers at outposts or in the field? Do they try to disable military equipment, killing soldiers in the process? As they carry out such operations, are they open to negotiation and diplomacy? If so, it seems reasonable to resist a blanket label of "terrorism" for what they are up to. In a situation in which noncombatants are
The reference is not to moral innocence, for none among us are innocent in but to our inability to defend ourselves from murderous attacks as we go to work,
using terms like "fighter" or "soldier" or collapses the distance between those who plant bombs in cafs or fly civilian aircraft into office buildings and those who fight other combatants, taking the risks attendant upon military forms of fighting. There is a nihilistic edge to terrorism: It aims to destroy, most often in the service of
deliberately targeted and the murder of the maximum number of noncombatants is the explicit aim, "noble warrior" is not only beside the point but pernicious. Such language wild and utopian goals that make no sense at all in the usual political ways. The distinction between terrorism, domestic criminality, and what we might call "normal" or "legitimate" war is vital to observe. It helps us to assess what is happening when force is used. This distinction, marked in historic, moral, and political discourses about war and in the norms of international law, seems lost on those who call the attacks of September 11 acts of "mass murder" rather than terrorism and an act of war under international law. It is thus both strange and disheartening to read the words of those distinction-obliterators for whom, crudely, a dead body is a dead body and never mind how it got that way. Many of these same individuals would, of course, protest vehemently, and correctly, were commentators, critics, and
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political actors to fail to distinguish between the great world religion that is Islam and the terrorists who perpetrated the events of September 11. One cannot have it both ways, however, by insisting on the distinctions one likes and heaping scorn on those who put pressure on ones own ideo logical and political commitments. If we
if we cannot distinguish the killing of combatants from the intended targeting of peaceable civilians and the deliberate and indiscriminate sowing of terror among civilians, we live in a world of moral nihilism. In such a world, everything reduces to the same shade of gray and we cannot make distinctions that help us take our
could not distinguish between a death resulting from a car accident and an intentional murder, our criminal justice system would fall apart. And political and moral bearings. The victims of September 11 deserve more from us.
the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found
usually replies that labeled ` presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately
represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we
to describe intellectual progress. have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky .
offered.
SIXTH, CRITICISM OF TERROR RHETORIC RENATURALIZES ITS CAUSES, INSTILLING POWERLESSNESS Rodwell 2005
[Jonathan, PhD Cand. @ Manchester Metropolitan University, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, 49th Parallel, Spring, www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm, 9-23-06//uwyo-ajl] The larger problem is that without clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment within the argument actually becomes nonsensical. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that Kings argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than
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the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I dont personally believe global terrorism is the worlds primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real facts about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing.
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identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the
manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions
relatively unarticulated and . We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Dont mourn, moralize.
, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain unaddressed
EIGHTH, REJECTING DISCOURSE DOES NOTHING AND LEAVES ATTITUDES UNCHANGED. Kelly, 12/98
not to pass judgment.
Peace Review
One might ask, in "listening" to violent language and to the people who use it, whether we are actually condoning such language. This is far from the case. To listen is
When I listen to a person who, for example, uses sexist language, I am not lending my approval to sexist language. Instead, what I am saying is that the person behind the language, and my desire to make a connection with that person, are more important than the sexist language. If I refuse to listen to the person who uses sexist language, then I might prevent one particular case where sexist language is used. But I do nothing to overcome the person's sexist attitudes. She will continue to use sexist language long after I am out of sight. But if I give her a voice, if I show her respect, if I try
to take her seriously as a person, then In the future pershapes she will be more apt to take what I say about sexism seriously. If she knows that sexist language bothers me, then perhaps she will be less likely to use it around me.
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Does not the same go for the gradual replacement of (sexually, racially...) aggressive with more 'correct' expressions, like the chain nigger - Negro - black - African American or crippled - disabled - bodily challenged? This replacement functions as a metaphorical substitution which potentially proliferate and enhances the very (racist, etc.) effect it tries to banish, adding insult to injury. In analogy to Delumeau, one should therefore claim that the only way actually to abolish the hatred-effect is, paradoxically, to create the circumstances in which one can return to the first link in the chain and use it in a nonaggressive way -like following the patterns of 'life as usual' the second time in the case of plague. That is to say: as long as the expression 'crippled' contains a surplus, an indelible mark, of aggressivity this surplus will not only be more or less automatically transferred on to any of its 'correct' metaphorical substitutes, it will even be enhanced by dint of this substitution. The strategy of returning to the first link, of course, is risky; however, the moment it is fully accepted by the group targeted by it, it definitely can work. When radical African-Americans call each other 'niggers', it is wrong to dismiss this strategy as a mere ironic identification with the aggressor; rather, the point is that it functions as an autonomous act of dismissing the aggressive sting.
reality of plague, but, rather its exact opposite: resigned acceptance of it . . . .
TENTH, SPEAKING ERRORS ARE INEVITABLE AND GOOD BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE A LOCUS FOR CONSTANT CRITICISM, SOMETHING THE NEG BY ITSELF PRECLUDES Alcoff 92
But surely
[Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter 91-2, 22//uwyo] it is both morally and politically objectionable to structure ones actions around the desire to avoid criticism, especially if this outweighs other questions of effectivity. In some cases perhaps the motivation is not so much to avoid criticism as to avoid errors, and the person believes that the only way to avoid errors is to avoid all speaking for others. However, errors are unavoidable in the theoretical inquiry as well as political struggle, and moreover they often make contributions. The desire to find an absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive posotion wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged and thus is master of the situation. From such a position ones own location and positionality would not require constant interrogation and critial reflection; one would not hae to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome endeavor and would be immune from the interrogaton of others. Such a desire of rmastery and immunity must be resisted.
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TWELFTH, THE CRITICISM ASSUMES STABLE SPEECH ACTS, PREVENTING US FROM TAKING BACK HURTFUL WORDS AND COLLAPSING INTO A JURIDICAL MODEL OF STABLE SUBJECTIVITY THAT KILLS ACTIVISM
Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 204
That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. How is the analysis of the discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of departure for such an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the performative act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the name itself is generative.
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Moral denunciations of terrorism are appropriate and mandatory. Terrorist acts are profoundly immoral and, in addition, tend not to be the short cut which their practitioners advertise. One has only to look at the areas of the world where terror has held sway to see that violence is typically prolonged, sometimes indefinitely. The reason for this is not difficult to discern. Each side comes to perceive the other as 'criminal' and thus as beyond the pale of civilized negotiation.
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THIRD, MULTILAT SOLVES BY ALLOWING US TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, SOLVING BAD FORMS OF VIOLENCE. CROSS-APPLY NYE FOURTH, HISTORY IS ON OUR SIDE. WE CONSTRUCTED THE USSR AS AN ENEMY FOR OVER HALF A CENTURY, BUT DETERRENCE AND SELF-INTEREST PREVENTED CONFLICT FIFTH, WAR AND VIOLENCE ARE ENDEMIC TO IR POLITICS, MOVING AWAY WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN GREAT POWER WARS MEARSHEIMER 2001
[John, Co-Director of IR Policy at University of Chicago and Former research fellow at the Brookings institute, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg xi-xii. ) The twentieth century was a period of great international violence .In World
War I (1914-18), roughly nine million people died on European battlefields. About fifty million people were killed duringWorld War 11(1939-45), well over half of them civilians. Soon after the end of World War II, the Cold War engulfed the globe. During this con-frontation, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies never directly fought the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies,but many millions died in proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Millions also died in the century's lesser, yet still fierce, wars, including the Russo-Japanese con-flicts of 1904-5 and 1939, the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1920, the Russo-Polish War of 1920-
Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest
21, the various Arab-Israeli wars, and the han-Iraq War of 1980-88. This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium.
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strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation, but there is no escaping it unless the states that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, however, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics.
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the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found
usually replies that labeled ` presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self-contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately
represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way
Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we
to describe intellectual progress. have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment
We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
offered.
SEVENTH, OUR ENGAGEMENT IN SCENARISM OVERCOMES THE TRAP OF THREAT CONSTRUCTION WE AVOID THE ILLUSION OF CERTAINTY IN IDENTIFYING FUTURE THREATS, AND INSTEAD USE SCENARIOS TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES TO DETERMINE THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. THE OTHER TEAMS REFUSAL TO ENGAGE IN THIS PROCESS ONLY REINFORCES THE PRACTICE OF SHALLOW RISK ANALYSIS.
P.H. Liotta, Jerome E. Levy Cahir, Economic Geography and National Security, Naval War College
and Timothy E. Somes, Professor Emeritus, The Art of Perceiving Scenarios and the Future, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 56 n. 4, Autumn 2003,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm.
, the scenarios we are talking about are not the limited threat-based planning scenarios common in defense planning. Threat-based scenarios, generally based on assessments of current or postulated threats or enemy capabilities, determine only the amount and types of force needed to defeat an adversary. (Similarly, capabilities-based planning seeks to avoid the perceived limits of threat-derived scenarios.)6 In contrast, the scenarios we want to consider should look well beyond current evaluations of threats. If future military force capabilities are derived from the kind of scenarios we are discussing, they must encompass the full range of possibilities, with a commensurate weighing of benefits, costs, and risks. Accomplishing this is a difficult but essential challenge, if decision makers are to come to any informed, perceptive conclusions for the future. In Wacks words, Scenarios serve two purposes. The first is protective
Finally anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurialdiscovering strategic options of which one was previously unaware.7 Often, and probably
, decision makers prefer the illusion of certainty to understanding risk and realities. But the scenario builder and analyst should strive to shatter the decision makers confidence in
naturally
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his or her ability to look ahead with certainty at the future. Scenarios should allow a decision maker to say, I am prepared for whatever happens, because we have thought through complex choices with a knowledgeable sense of risk and reward.8
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reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it. Rand
defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language.
Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation.
Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of
This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless
symbols denoting the same concepts. exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.
NINTH, PREFER OUR EV THEIR K IS UTOPIAN THEORY WITH ZERO GROUNDING IN PRAXIS OR CONSEQUENCE Mearsheimer 95
[John, Prof. Poli Sci @ Chicago, International Security, Winter, 38//uwyo] , critical theory per se has little to say about the future shape of international politics. In fact, critical theory emphasizes that, It is impossible to predict the future. Robert Cox explains this point: Critical awareness of potentiality for change must be distinguished from utopian planning, i.e. the laying out of the design of a future society that is to be the end goal of change. Critical understanding focuses on the process of change rather than on its ends; it concentrates on the possibilities of launching a social movement rather than on what that movement might achieve. Neverth eless, international relations scholars who use critical theory to challenge and subvert realism certainly expect to create a more harmonious and peaceful international system. But the theory itself says little about either the desirability or feasibility of achieving that particular end.
Very significantly, however
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WORLD WAR II PROVES ITS BETTER TO BELIEVE IN THREATS THAN IGNORE THEM AND RISK WAR Thompson 85
[Kenneth, Prof. poli sci @ Virginia, Moralism and morality in politics and diplomacy, 1985, 130//uwyo]
We need also to recall that the failures leading up to World War II were not alone failures of military preparation and military action. They were also political failures, as Arnold Wolfers and Hans J. Morgenthau pointed out, of the allies and of France and Britain in particular, to concert their foreign policies and present any kind of united, consistent and coherent opposition which carried weight with Hitler, rather than tempting him with the disunity of the West.
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balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of meanseconomic, diplomatic, and militaryto shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one states gain in power is another states loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other
states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.
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and Timothy E. Somes, Professor Emeritus, The Art of Perceiving Scenarios and the Future, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 56 n. 4, Autumn 2003,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm.
Scenarios structure the future into both predetermined and uncertain elements. Any good scenario reading explores and seeks to comprehend these elements. Often, events that are already in the pipeline, such as demographic shifts or energy dependency, bring consequences that have yet to unfold, and these consequences may have immense impact. Schwartz provides one example to illustrate the shortcomings of conventional forecasting and trend analysis: [Consider] the U.S. birthrate. In the early 1970s it hovered around 3 million births per year; forecasters at the U.S. Census Bureau projected that this trend would continue forever. Schools, which had been rushed into construction during the baby boom of the fifties and early sixties, were now closed down and sold. Policymakers did not consider that the birthrate might rise again suddenly. But a scenario might have considered the likelihood that original baby boom children, reaching their late thirties, would suddenly have children of their own. In 1979, the U.S. birthrate began to rise . . . in 1990 [it was] almost back to the 4 million of the fifties. Demographers also failed to anticipate that immigration would accelerate. To keep up with demand, the state of California (which had been closing schools in the late 1970s) . . . [had to] build a classroom every day for the next seven years.16 Assessing and developing the two fundamentalspredetermined elements and critical uncertaintieswhen building a scenario may be among the more valuable aspects of this process, or at least on what strategic planners spend much of their time. Yet experience tells us that many of our war college students, initially introduced to this art of scenario reading, find of particular value the process of deciding what are predetermined elements, as opposed to critical uncertainties. When we examine geostrategic regions, for example, we may strive to recognize which elements of each region are predetermined, such as geography, and which may be critical but uncertain identities, such as how the predetermined importance of geography can be made less important, or even irrelevant, by the uncertainty and influence of technology.
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and Timothy E. Somes, Professor Emeritus, The Art of Perceiving Scenarios and the Future, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 56 n. 4, Autumn 2003,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm.
The challenge for strategic planners is to help decision makers understand what the future security environment might look like, to affect their perceptions, in essence, to help them reperceive. Wack, who gained some fame as a strategic planner during the oil crises of the 1970s with his ability to get the senior executives in Shell Oil to understand what might happen in the energy business, wrote in the Harvard Business Review some years later: Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions. They explore the facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivialmore often than not it does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt Aha! from you . . . [decision makers] and leads to strategic insights beyond the minds previous reach.3 In short, to think and act effectively in an uncertain world, people need to learn to reperceiveto question their assumptions and their understanding about the way the world works. By questioning those assumptions and rethinking the correct way to operate under uncertainty, we often see the world more clearly than we otherwise would. Wack summarized his goals as a strategic planner and developer of scenarios by stating: I have found that getting to that [decision makers] Aha! is the real challenge of scenario analysis. It does not simply leap at you when youve been presented all the possible alternatives . . . . It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of decision makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their . . . world works, and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.
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and Timothy E. Somes, Professor Emeritus, The Art of Perceiving Scenarios and the Future, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 56 n. 4, Autumn 2003,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm.
The relationship between driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties is complex, but important to understand, as we learn to read the flow of what is occurring in useful scenarios. As Schwartz points out, I sometimes think of the relationship between predetermined elements and critical uncertainties as a choreographed dance. You cannot experience the dance just by knowing the sequence of steps. Each dancer will interpret them differently, and add his or her unpredictable decisions.19 In terms of national security and defense, one cannot anticipate the nature of a war merely by looking at the military orders of battle, even if you know your plans and those of the enemy. In the same fashion, by developing scenarios oriented to a more distant future, the interrelationship between that which is predetermined and that which is uncertain may be equally open to interpretation and changing factors. Pierre Wack offers several thoughts with respect to the use of scenarios as tools: I have found that scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly unrelated economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal information and translate it into a framework for judgmentin a way that no model could do. . . . Decision scenarios describe different worlds, not just different outcomes in the same world. . . . You can test the value of scenarios by asking two questions: (1) What do they leave out? In five to ten years . . . [decision makers] must not be able to say that the scenarios did not warn of important events that subsequently happened. (2) Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past experience, they are nothing more than interesting speculations.20 We are experiencing a world of dynamic change where even the most mind-numbing, dramatic events do not impress us for long. Yet any good strategist and planner must be able to help the nations leaders see more clearly the different futures that may occur. To operate in an uncertain world, we need to reperceiveto question our assumptions about how the world works, so that we see the world more clearly. The purpose of this is to help us make better decisions about the future. Perhaps one way to think about this is to obvert George Santayanas famous saying about learning from history by changing our perception of things that are yet to come, by suggesting that those who do not learn from the future are destined to make mistakes in it. To be able to understand that future, we have to have a mental map flexible enough to consider plausible alternatives and possibilities we might not otherwise consider.
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MORE EVIDENCE:
David Smith, Economics Editor of the Times of London, THE EDGE, March 2003, http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCContent/downloaddocs/EdgeMarch.pdf.
Buttressed by ESRC research projects on terrorism, commissioned in the wake of September 11, Gardner also calls into question Britains state of readiness. One researcher, Professor Michael Dillon of the University of Lancaster, suggests the government machine is locked into the 50-year old mentality of dealing with the ColdWar, rather than the new and more diverse risks from terrorism. A government that has been criticized for too much centralization appears unwilling to centralize enough when it comes to its civil contingency strategy. Terrorism, by its nature, succeeds partly by action but mainly by fear.
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All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable. Thus, iek claims that de Gaulle's "Act"
succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully33.
THE CRITICISM IS PREMISED ON ORIGINARY LACK, DESTROYING ANY HOPE OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION Robinson, PhD @ U of Nottingham, 2K5 (Andy, The Political Theory of
Constitutive Lack: A Critique, Theory and Event 8.1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Project Muse)
The idea of "constitutive lack" is supposed to entail a rejection of neutral and universal standpoints, and it is this rejection which constructs it as an "anti-essentialist" position
. In practice, however, Lacanians restore the idea of a universal framework through the backdoor. Beneath the idea that "there is no neutral universality" lurks a claim to know precisely such a "neutral universality" and to claim a privileged position on this basis. A consistent belief in contingency and "anti-essentialism" entails scepticism about the idea of constitutive lack. After all, how does one know that the appearance that 'experience' shows lack to be constitutive reflects an underlying universality, as
opposed to the contingent or even simulated effects of a particular discourse or episteme? Alongside its opponents, shouldn't Lacanian theory also be haunted by its own fallibility and incompletion? There is a paradox in the idea of radical choice, for it is unclear whether Lacanians believe this should be applied reflexively. Is the choice of Lacanian theory itself an ungrounded Decision? If so, the theory loses the universalist status it implicitly claims. If not, it would seem to be the kind of structural theory it attacks. A complete structural theory would seem to assume an extra-contingent standpoint, even if the structure includes a reference to constitutive lack. Such a theory would seem to be a radical negation of the incompletion of "I don't know".
The myth of constitutive lack, like all myths, has a closing role: it limits what can be said through an "order not to think". On the other hand, the idea that creativity is motivated by a stance that "I-don't-know" has an opening effect. As Callinicos puts
#
it, 'what Badiou and i ek calls the "void" in a situation is rather the set of determinate possibilities it contains, including that of transformation'122. If there is no irreducible "Real" beneath each blockage or lack, these can be overcome by creative action, as with the creative role of anomalies in paradigm-change in the sciences,
. The imperative in Lacanian theory is to "accept" lack, whereas the logic of a non-mythical idea of contingency is to use opportunities for openness as a basis for creativity. # Furthermore, Lacanian theories involve a strong commitment to slave morality, as exemplified by Laclau's
and the creative role of "psychotic" philosophies such as those of Deleuze and Nietzsche insistence that every chain of equivalence involve a unity against an external threat123, Norval's advocacy of the use of "apartheid" as a bogeyman in South African
Zizek's "revolutionary" insistence on the need for masochistic self-degradation, 'subjective destitution' and identification with a Master and a Cause126, not to mention his directly reactive insistence that self-awareness amounts to awareness of the negative, of death and trauma, prior to any active identification or articulation127. This is a reterritorializing "contingency" which fits closely with the operation of capitalist ideology, where 'under conditions we recognize as desperate, we are told to alter ourselves', not the conditions, because the self is conceived as a decisionist founder128. The alternative is a difference which is not
politics124 and Mouffe's demand for submission to rules125, and also in reified into a "positive" negativity. According to Deleuze, there are two models of contingency: the creative power of the poet, and the politician's denial of difference so as to prolong an established order. It is for the latter that negation (lack) is primary, 'as if it were necessary to pass through the misfortunes of rift and division in order to be able to say yes'. For the poet, on the other hand, difference is 'light, aerial and affirmative'. 'There is a false profundity in conflict, but underneath conflict, the play of differences', differences which should be affirmed as positive and not overcoded by negativity
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beneath officially-sanctioned discourse. This however : as shown above, a radical rejection of anti-"crime" rhetoric turns into an endorsement of punishment, and a radical critique of neo-liberalism turns into a pragmatist endorsement of structural adjustment. It is as if there is a magical barrier between theory and politics which insulates the latter from the former. One should recall a
, Lacanian theory can be very "radical", unscrupulously exposing the underlying relations and assumptions concealed radicalism, , never translates into political conclusions
Lacanians have a "radical" theory oriented towards happiness, but politically, their primary concern is security. As long as they are engaged in politically ineffectual critique, Lacanians will denounce and criticize the social system, but once it comes to practical problems, the "order not to think" becomes operative.
remark once made by Wilhelm Reich: 'You plead for happiness in life, but security means more to you'133. # This "magic" barrier is the alibi function of myth. The short-circuit between specific instances and high-level abstractions is politically consequential. A present evil can be denounced and overthrown if located in an analysis with a "middle level", but Lacanian theory tends in practice to add an "always" which prevents change. At the very most, such change cannot affect the basic matrix posited by Lacanian theory, because this is assumed to operate above history. In this way
, Lacanian theory operates as an alibi: it offers a little bit of theoretical radicalism to inoculate the system against the threat posed by a lot of politicized radicalism134. In Laclau and Mouffe's version, this takes the
classic Barthesian form: "yes, liberal democracy involves violent exclusions, but what is this compared to the desert of the real outside it?" The i ekian version is
"yes, there can be a revolution, but after the revolution, one must return to the pragmatic tasks of the present". A good example is provided in one of iek's texts. The author presents an excellent analysis of a
more complex: consent. He then ruins the impact of this example by insisting that there is always such a moment of "forced choice", and that preclude critique by encoding the present as myth.
Kafkaesque incident in the former Yugoslavia where the state gives a soldier a direct, compulsory order to take a voluntary oath - in other words, attempts to compel
one should not attempt to escape it lest one end up in psychosis or totalitarianism135. The political function of Lacanian theory is to
#
There is a danger of a stultifying conservatism arising from within Lacanian political theory, echoing the 'terrifying conservatism' Deleuze suggests is active in any reduction of history to negativity136. The addition of an "always" to contemporary evils amounts to a "pessimism of the will", or a "repressive reduction of thought to the present". Stavrakakis, for instance, claims that attempts to find causes and thereby to solve problems are always fantasmatic137, while iek states that
an object which is perceived as blocking something does nothing but materialize the already-operative constitutive lack138. While this does not strictly entail the
it creates a danger of discursive slippage and hostility to "utopianism" which could have conservative consequences. Even if Lacanians believe in
necessity of a conservative attitude to the possibility of any specific reform,
surplus/contingent as well as constitutive lack, there are no standards for distinguishing the two. If one cannot tell which social blockages result from constitutive lack and which are contingent, how can one know they are not all of the latter type? And even if constitutive lack exists, Lacanian theory runs a risk of "misdiagnoses" which have a neophobe or even reactionary effect. To take an imagined example, a Lacanian living in France in 1788 would probably conclude that democracy is a utopian fantasmatic ideal and would settle for a pragmatic reinterpretation of the anci n regime. Laclau and Mouffe's hostility to workers' councils and i ek's
The pervasive negativity and cynicism of Lacanian theory offers little basis for constructive activity. Instead of radical transformation, one is left with a pragmatics of "containment" which involves a conservative de-problematization of the worst aspects of the status quo. The inactivity it counsels would make its claims a self-fulfilling prophecy by acting as a barrier to transformative activity.
insistence on the need for a state and a Party139 exemplify this neophobe tendency.
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Lacan = Oppression
PSYCHOANALYSIS FORCES SEXUALITY INTO THE JURIDICAL MODEL OF THE FAMILY, ALLOWING DISCIPLINE OF OTHERNESS May 93
[Todd, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 48-9//wfi-ajl]
The intrusion of the deployment of sexuality upon the traditional sexual arrangement of the family and its bonds (kinship structures, codes of name and material transmission, and so on) forced it to change its shape in order to accommodate this new, powerful set of practices. Although a more complete analysis of the changes produced by this intrusion is given by Foucault's colleague Jacques Donzelot (1979), Foucault points out that the deployment of sexuality entails a set of power relationships that differ from those of the family alliance. For the family alliance, power was realized on a juridical model of law, right, and possession. For the new sexuality, however, power is a matter of local and dispersed tactics that run through such nonfamilial domains as the school and the clinic. What binds these local and dispersed tactics into a uniform sexuality is both their convergence upon an expanded set of behaviors that are considered to be sexually relevant and the development of the normality/abnormality axis to which all sexuality is now referred. At this intersection psychoanalysis finds its place, structuring the new deployment of sexuality and grafting it onto the traditional familial alliance. Indeed, the great genius of psychoanalysis lies in this: that it was able to integrate the dispersed and mobile relations of sexuality into the rigid codes of familial alliance without causing the breakdown of that alliance. Because psychoanalysis presented the deployment of sexuality as a matter of juridical power, of law-specifically the law that prohibits incest-the family, while becoming infused with sexual strategies, was able to retain a sense of itself as the focal point of those strategies and as their juridical protector. Thus sexuality, which threatened to burst the bonds of familial alliance by introducing into it new matrices of power, is coordinated with the familial scheme. Children have strange desires, it is true; nevertheless, in the end it is their parents they desire, just as their parents desire one another and their own parents. What was being constituted in this new sexuality, which psychoanalysis sponsored and to which it owes such a great debt? Essentially, sexuality itself was being constituted, a modern sexuality that is often heralded as the deepest truth or, better, as the essence of the modern soul. As the soul was being created by disciplinary techniques, so its essence was being fashioned by sexual techniques. And in both strategies psychological thinking, psychological discourse, and psychotherapeutic intervention were drawing their nourishment and contributing their effects. In both strategies, moreover, certain social figures were being created, figures that correspond to contemporary networks of power and that invite contemporary modes of intervention--often psychological intervention. In prisons, the figure of the delinquent emerged, a criminal not in the mere authorship of a crime but in an existence that was itself deviant. The delinquent "is not only the author of his acts. . . but is linked to his offense by a whole bundle of complex threads (instincts, drives, tendencies, character)" (Foucault 1977a, p. 253). As such, the delinquent requires observation, intervention, and rehabilitation--or, if these things fail, at least surveillance and usefulness for intervening with other delinquents.
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A2 Stavrakakis: 2AC
ENDORSING THE AFFIRMATIVE AS AN ACT OF HOPE, NOT UTOPIA, IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE POLITICS WITHOUT UTOPIA Stavrakakis, Teaching Fellow in Government @ U of Essex, 99 (
Yannis, Lacan and the Political, P. 111-112) What should not be neglected however in Ricoeurs standpoint is the centrality of the element of hope. No doubt, a society without hope is a dead society. Yet, in reality, to eliminate the element of hope is a dead society. Yet, in reality, to eliminate the element of hope from human life is not only undesirable but also impossible. As Jacques Derrida has put it: There is no language without the performative dimension of the promise, the minute I open my mouth I am in the promise. Even if I say I dont believe in truth or whatever, the minute I open my mouth there is a believe me at work. Even when I lie,
and perhaps especially when I lie, there is a believe me in play. And this I promise you that I am speaking the truth is a messianic a priori, a promise which, even if it is not kept, even if one knows it cannot be kept, takes place and qua promise is messianic. (Derrida, 1996:82-3) In addition, for Derrida, this element of hope is not necessarily utopian: I would not call this attitude utopian. The messianic experience of which I spoke takes place here and now that is the fact of promising and speaking is an event th at takes place here and now and is not utopian (ibid.). Is
it then possible to retain this element of hope without incorporating it into a utopian vision? Can we have passion in politics without holocausts? Furthermore, is it possible to have a politics of hope, a politics of change without utopia? The experience of the democratic revolution permits a certain optimism. Democratization is certainly a political project of hope. But democratic discourse is not (or should not be) based on the vision of a utopian harmonious society. It is based on the recognition of the impossibility and the catastrophic consequences of such a dream. What differentiates democracy from other political forms of society is legitimization of conflict and the refusal to eliminate it through the establishment of an authoritarian harmonious order. Within this framework the antagonistic diversity between different conceptions of good is not seen as
something negative that should be eliminated, but as something to be valued and celebrated. This requires the presence of institutions that establish a specific dynamic between consensus and dissent This is why democratic politics cannot aim towards harmony and reconciliation. To believe that a final resolution of conflict is eventually possible, even when it is envisaged as asymptotic approaching to the regulative idea of a free unconstrained communication, as in Habermas, is to put the pluralist democratic project at risk.(Mouffe, 1996b:8)14
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Brown, Professor, Political Science and Womens Studies, University of California-Berkeley, Resisting Left Melancholia, LOSS: THE 02, p. 460-463.
Now our challenge would be to figure out who or what is this substitutive object. What do we hate that we might preserve the idealization of that romantic Left promise? What do we [460] punish that we might save the old guarantees of the Left from our wrathful disappointment? Two familiar answers emerge from recent quarrels and reproaches on the Left. The first is a set of social and political formations variously known as cultural politics or identity politics. Here the conventional charge from one portion of the Left is that political movements rooted in cultural identity racial, sexual, ethnic, or gendered not only elide the fundamental structure of modernity, capitalism, and its fundamental formation, class, but also fragment Left political energies and interests such that coalition building is impossible. The second culprit also has various names poststructuralism, discourse analysis, postmodernism, trendy literary theory got up as political analysis. The murder charges here are also familiar: postfoundational theories of the subject, truth, and social processes undermine the possibility of a
Together or separately, these two phenomena are held responsible for the weak, fragmented, and disoriented character of the contemporary Left. This much is old news. But if read through the prism of Left
theoretically coherent and factually true account of the world and also challenge the putatively objective grounds of Left norms.
melancholia, the element of displacement in both sets of charges may appear more starkly, since we would be forced to ask: What aspects of Left analysis or orthodoxy have wilted on the vine for its adherents, but are safeguarded from this recognition through the scornful attention heaped on identity politics and poststructuralism? Indeed, what narcissistic identification with that orthodoxy is preserved in the lament over the loss of its hold on young Leftists and the loss of its potency in the political field? What love for the promises and guarantees that a Left analysis once held is preserved, as responsibility for the tattered condition of those promises and guarantees is distributed onto debased others? And do we here also see a certain thingness of the Left take shape, its reification as somethin g that is, the fantastical memory that it once was, at the very moment that it so clearly is not/ one? . . . . . Now let us bring these speculations about a melancholic Left back to Stuart Halls more forthrightly political considerations about the troubles of the contemporary
If Hall understands our failure as a Left in the last quarter century as a failure within the Left to apprehend this time, this is a failure that is only reiterated and not redressed by our complaints against those who are succeeding (liberal centrists, neoconservatives, the Right) or by our complaints against one another (antiracists, feminists, queer activists, postmodernists, or unreconstructed Marxists). In Halls understanding, this failure is not simply the consequence of adherence to a particular [461] analytic orthodoxy the determinism of capital, the primacy of class although it is certainly that. Rather, this failure results as well from a particular intellectual straitjacket an insistence on a materialism that refuses the importance of the subject and the subjective, the question of style, the problematic of language. And it is the combination of these two that is deadly: Our sectarianism, Hall argues in the conclusion of The Hard Road to Renewal, consists not only of a defensiveness toward the agendas fixed by now anachronistic political-economic formations (those of the 1930s and 1945), but is also due to a certain notion of politics, inhabited not so much as a theory, more as a habit of mind. We go on thinking a unilinear and irreversible political logic, driven by some abstract entity we call the economic or capital, unfolding to its preordained end. Whereas, as Thatcherism clearly shows, politics actually works more like the logic of language: you can always put it another way if you try hard enough. 9 Certainly the course of capital shapes the conditions of possibility in politics, but politics itself is either conducted ideologically, or not at all. 10 Or, in another of Halls pithy formulas, politics does not reflect majorities, it constructs them. 11
Left.
It is important to be clear here. Hall never claims that ideology determines the course of globalization but claims that it harnesses it for one political purpose or another, and when it is successful, the political and economic strategies represented by a particular ideology will also themselves bring into being certain politicaleconomic formations within global capitalist developments. Now we are beginning . . . to move into a post-Fordist society what some theorists call disorganized capitalism, the era of flexible specialisation. One way of reading present developments is that privatization is Thatcherisms way of harnessing and appropriating this underlying movement within a specific economic and political strategy and constructing it within the terms of a specific philosophy. It has succeeded, to some degree, in aligning its historical, political, cultural and sexual logics with some of the most powerful tendencies in the cont emporary logics of capitalist development. And this, in part, is what gives it its supreme confidence, its air of ideological compl acency: what makes it appear to have history on its side, to be coterminous with the inevitable course of the future. The left, however, instead of rethinking its economic, pol itical, and cultural strategies in the light of this deeper, underlying logic of dispersal and diversification (which after all, need not necessarily be an enemy of greater democratization) simply resists it. If Thatcherism can lay claim to it, then we must have nothing to do with it. Is there any more certain way of rendering yourself historically anachronistic? 12
If the contemporary Left often clings to the formations and formulations of another epoch, one in which the notions of unified movements, social [462] totalities, and class-based politics were viable categories of political and theoretical analysis, this means that it literally renders itself a conservative force in history one that not only misreads the present but also installs traditionalism in the very heart of its praxis, in the place where commitment to risk and upheaval belongs. Walter Benjamin sketches this phenomenon in his attack on Eric Kastner, the Left-wing Weimer Republic poet, who is the subject of his Left-Wing Melancholy essay: This poet is dissatisfied, indeed heavy-hearted. But this heaviness of heart derives from routine. For to be in a routine means to have sacrificed ones idiosyncracies, to have forfeited the gift of distaste. And that makes one heavy-hearted. 13 In a different tonality, Stuart Hall sketches
this problem in the Lefts response to Thatcherism: I remember the moment in the 1979 election when Mr. Callaghan, on his last political legs, so to speak, said with real astonishment about the offensive of Mrs. Thatcher that She means to tear society up by the roots. This was an unthinkabl e idea in the social-democratic vocabulary: a radical attack on the status quo
. The
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truth is that traditionalist ideas, the ideas of social and moral respectability, have penetrated so deep inside socialist consciousness that it is quite common to find people committed to a radical political programme underpinned by wholly traditional feelings and sentiments. 14
? I want to develop just one thread of this problem through a consideration of the phenomenon named Left melancholia by Walter Benjamin more than half a century ago. What did Benjamin mean by
and with this pejorative appellation for a certain intellectual and political bearing? As most readers will know, Benjamin was neither categorically nor characterologically opposed to the value and valence of sadness as such, nor to the potential insights gleaned from brooding over ones losses. Indeed, he had a well-developed appreciation of the productive value of acedia, sadness, and mourning for political and cultural work, and in his study of Baudelaire
, Benjamin treated melancholia itself as something of a creative wellspring. But Left melancholia is Benjamins unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, finally, more attached to a particular political analysis or ideal even to the failure of that ideal than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present. In Benjamins enigmatic insistence on the political value of a dialectical historical grasp of the time of the Now, Left [458] melancholia represents not only a refusal to come to terms with the particular character of the present, that is, a failure to understand history in terms other than empty time or progress. It signifies as well a certain narcissism with regard to ones past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance, or transformation. 1 The irony of melancholia, of course, is that attachment to the object of ones sorrowful loss supersedes any desire to recover from this loss, to live free of it in the present, to be unburdened by it. This is what renders melancholia a persistent condition, a state, indeed, a structure of desire, rather than a transient response to death or loss. In Freuds 1917 meditation on melancholia, he reminds us of a second singular feature of melancholy: It entails a loss of a more ideal kind [than mourning]. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love. 2 Moreover, Freud suggests, the melancholic will often not know precisely what about the object has been loved and lost: This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious. 3 The loss precipitating melancholy is more often than not unavowed and unavowable. Finally, Freud suggests that the melancholic subject
low in self-regard, despairing, even suicidal has shifted the reproach of the once-loved object (a reproach waged for not living up to the idealization by the beloved) onto itself, thus preserving the love or idealization of the object even as the loss of this love is experienced in the suffering of the melancholic. Now why would Benjamin use this term, and the emotional economy it represents, to talk about a particular formation on and of the Left? Benjamin never offers a precise formulation of Left melancholia. Rather, he deploys it as a term of opprobrium for those more beholden to certain long-held sentiments and objects than to the possibilities of political transformation in the present. Benjamin is particularly attuned to the melancholics investment in things. In the Trauerspiel, he argues that melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge, here suggesting that the loyalty of the melancholic converts its truth (every loyal vow or memory) about its beloved into a thing, indeed, imbues knowledge itself with a thinglike quality. 4
In its tenacious self-absorption [melancholy] embraces dead objects in its contemplation. 5 More simply, melancholia is loyal to the world of things, 6 suggesting a certain logic of fetishism with all the conservatism and withdrawal from human relations that fetishistic desire implies contained within the melancholic logic. In the critique of Kastners poems in which Benjamin first coins Left melancholia, Benjamin
Another version of this formulation: suggests that sentiments themselves become things for the Left melancholic who takes as much pride in the [459] traces of fo rmer spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods. 7
We come to love our Left passions and reasons, our Left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them. Left melancholia, in short, is Benjamins name for a mournful, conservative, backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen in the heart of the putative Leftist. If Freud is helpful here, then this condition presumably issues from some unaccountable loss, some unavowably
crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms Left, Socialism, Marx, or the Movement. Certainly the losses, accountable and unaccountable, of the Left are many in our own time. The literal disintegration of socialist regimes and the legitimacy of Marxism may well be the least of it. We are awash in the loss of a unified analysis and unified movement, in the loss of labor and class as inviolable predicates of political analysis and mobilization, in the loss of an inexorable and scientific forward movement of history, and in the loss of a viable alternative to the political economy of capitalism. And on the backs of these losses are still others: we are without a sense of international, and often even local, Left community; we are without conviction about the Truth of the social order; we are without a rich moral-political vision of the Good to guide and sustain political work
. Thus we suffer with the sense of not only a lost movement but also a lost historical moment, not only a lost theoretical and empirical coherence but also a lost way of life and a lost course of pursuits.
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in the hollow core of all these losses, perhaps in the place of our political unconscious, is there also an unavowed loss the promise that Left analysis and Left commitment would supply its adherents a clear and certain path toward the good, the right, and the true? Is it not this promise that formed the basis for much of our pleasure in being on the Left, indeed, for our self-love as Leftists and our fellow feeling toward other Leftists? And if this love cannot be given up without demanding a radical transformation in the very foundation of our love, in our very capacity for political love or attachment, are we not doomed to Left melancholia, a melancholia that is certain to have effects that are not only sorrowful but also self-destructive? Freud again: If the love for the object a love which cannot be given up
This much many on the Left can forthrightly admit, even if we do not know what to do about it. But though the object itself is given up takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. 8
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MUSIC AND ART HAVE LIMITS IN SPACE AND TIME WHICH ALLOW THEM TO BE EASILY COMMODIFIED AND USED TO AFFIRM BOURGEOIS CULTURE
John Beverley, The Ideology of Postmodern Music and Left Politics, 1990 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v001/1.1beverley.html) The antidote to Muzak would seem to be something like Punk. By way of a preface to a discussion of Punk and extending the considerations above on the relation between music and commodification, I want to refer first to Jackson Pollock's great paintingAutumn Rhythm in the Met, a picture that--like Pollock's work in general--is particularly admired by Free Jazz musicians. It's a vast painting with splotches of black, brown and rust against the raw tan of unprimed canvas, with an incredible dancing, swirling, clustering, dispersing energy. As you look at it, you become aware that while the ambition of the painting seems to be to explode or expand the pictorial space of the canvas altogether, it is finally only the limits of the canvas which make the painting possible as an art object. The limit of the canvas is its aesthetic autonomy, its separation from the life world, but also its commodity status as something that can be bought, traded, exhibited. The commodity is implicated in the very form of the "piece;" as in the jazz record in Nausea, "The music ends." (The 78 RPM record--the commodity form of recorded music in the 20s and 30s-- imposed a three minute limit per side on performances and this in turn shaped the way songs were arranged in jazz or pop recording: cf. the 45 and the idea today of the "single.")
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Such a situation might indicate one limit of Jameson's cultural hermeneutic. If the strategy in Jameson is to uncover the emancipatory utopian- communist potential locked up in the artifacts of the cultural heritage, this is also in a sense to leave everything as it is, as in Wittgenstein's analytic (because that which is desired is already there; it only has to be "seen" correctly), whereas the problem of the relation of art and social liberation is also clearly the need to transgress the limits imposed by existing artistic forms and practices and to produce new ones. To the extent, however, such transgressions can be recontained within the sphere of the aesthetic-- in a new series of "works" which may also be available as commodities--, they will produce paradoxically an affirmation of bourgeois culture: in a certain sense they are bourgeois high culture.
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A2 Art (2/2)
ART AS RESISTANCE CAN GIVE AN AESTHETIC GRATIFICATION WHICH STOPS FURTHER STRUGGLE
John Beverley, The Ideology of Postmodern Music and Left Politics, 1990 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v001/1.1beverley.html) Adorno and the Frankfurt School make of the Kantian notion of the aesthetic as a purposiveness without purpose precisely the locus of the radicalizing and redemptive power of art, the sense in which by alienating practical aims it sides with the repressed and challenges domination and exploitation, particularly the rationality of capitalist institutions. By contrast, there is Lenin's famous remark--it's in Gorki'sReminiscences--that he had to give up listening to Beethoven'sAppasionata sonata: he enjoyed it too much, it made him feel soft, happy, at one with all humanity. His point would seem to be the need to resist a narcotic and pacifying aesthetic gratification in the name of the very difficult struggle--and the corresponding ideological rigor--necessary to at least setting in motion the process of building a classless society. But one senses in Lenin too the displacement or sublation of an aesthetic sensibility onto the field of revolutionary activism. And in both Adorno and Lenin there is a sense that music is somehow in excess of ideology.
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A2 Love
LOVE DOESNT BRING PEACEFUL RECONCILIATIONIT RECREATES DIVISION AND OTHERNESS
Michael Dillon, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the Univ. of Lancaster,
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A2 Poetry
LITERATURE FAILS TO UNDERMINE THE HEGEMONIC MODES OF REPRESENTATION
John Beverley, Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies at Pitt, Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Critical Theory, 1999, p.4 Our hypothesis in Literature and Politics was that the dominant forms of modern Central American literaturepoetry in particularhad become a material forcean ideological practice, in the sense Louis Althusser gives the termin the construction of the revolutionary movements that were vying for power in the region. However, as Marc and I struggled to finish the book we were struck with a growing sense of the limitations of literature as a form of popular empowerment and agencylimitations revealed dramatically for us in the debates around the poetry workshop experiment in Nicaragua and in the question of testimonio as a narrative form that resisted in some ways being treated simply as a new kind of literature. We ended Literoture and Politics with these words: "We return, therefore, in closing to the paradox that has been with us from the beginning of this book: literature has been a means of national-popular mobilization in the Central American revolutionary process, but that process also elaborates or points to forms of cultural democratization that will necessarily question or displace the role of literature as a hegemonic cultural institution" (207).
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A2 Silence
SILENCE IS CONSENT. SPEAKING RESTORES DIGNITY
Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope, 1971, quoted in: In A Dark Time, ed. Robert Lifton, 1986 When a bull is being led to the slaughter, it still hopes to break loose and trample its butchers. Other bulls have not been able to pass on the knowledge that this never happens and that from the slaughterhouse there is no way back to the herd. But in human society there is a continuous exchange of experience. I have never heard of a [hu]man who broke away and fled while being led to his execution. It is even thought to be a special form of courage if a man about to be executed refuses to be blindfolded and dies with his eyes open. But I would rather have the bull with his blind rage, the stubborn beast who doesnt weigh his chances of survival with the prudent dull-wittedness of man, and doesnt know the despicable feeling of despair. Later I often wondered whether it is right to scream when you are being beaten and trampled underfoot. Isnt it better to face ones tormentors in a stance of satanic pride, answering them with contemptuous silence? I decided that it is better to scream. This pitiful sound, which sometimes, goodness knows how, reaches into the remotest prison cell, is a concentrated expression of the last vestige of human dignity. It is a mans way of leaving a trace, of telling people how he lived and died. By his screams [one] he asserts [the] his right to live, sends a message to the outside world demanding help and calling for resistance. If nothing else is left, one must scream. Silence is the real crime against humanity.
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One must take care to draw distinctions within this broad zone of global poverty. The environmental problems and prospects of Mexico, for example, are as different from those of Mali as they are from those of Germany. Still, terms such as the Third World or the South provide convenient labels for the earths relatively poor countries. In this chapter Third World will be employed to designate both the relatively nonindustrialized and the recently industrializing areas of the globe. The term admittedly obscures almost as much as it reveals, but such imprecision is necessary if we are to avoid using stiflingly cumbersome forms of expression.
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