The demographic challenge in Europe

by Karoly Lorant Economist, Hungary

E-mail: lorantkaroly@gmail.com

Brussels, April 2005

2 Contents

Preface Summary 1. Introduction 2. Demographic trends in the European Union 3. The ac!ground of decreasing tota" ferti"ity rate $. %igration $.1 '"o a" migration $.2 (istory of migration into the EU $.3 Position and acceptance of immigrants $.$ De ates on immigration $.) *ie+s re"ated to %us"im popu"ation $.6 Immigration and po"itica" parties $.7 The common immigration po"icy of the EU $.# Immigration po"icy of mem er states ). Demographic forecast ).1 United -ation pro.ections ).2 The forecasting mode" /iterature Sources of figures and ta "es '"ossary 0igures 1. 1or"d popu"ation 2from the ancient ages3 2. The 1or"d popu"ation and its increase 2the "ast 2)& years3 3. Popu"ation gro+th rate in the European Union $. Tota" ferti"ity rate 21or"d3 ). Tota" ferti"ity rate 2US4 and EU3 6. Tota" ferti"ity rate as function of age at first irth and 'DP5cap 7. Di6orces per marriages #. -atura" increase in popu"ation and net immigration Ta "es 1. The change of age specific irth rate in -or+ay 2. Popu"ation7 tota" ferti"ity rate and ara "e "and per capita in some countries 3. Popu"ation of the ma.or areas 2&&&823&& 2U- pro.ection3 $. The 9nai6e9 scenario ). %us"im:s tota" ferti"ity rate increases to 2.1 6. ;asic scenario 7. 1.6 mi""ion year"y net immigrants #. &.3 mi""ion year"y net immigrants ,. &.3 mi""ion year"y net immigrants < higher participation rate

2 3 6 7 # 1& 1& 11 12 13 1) 1# 1, 2& 21 21 23 3& 31 31 6 6 7 7 # , 1& 11 # 17 22 2$ 2) 26 27 2# 2,

Preface

The European =ommission .ust recent"y re"eased a 'reen Paper addressing the demographic situation in the European Union >=?%22&&)3 ,$ fina"@ and ca""s for a discussion on the topic. This study A +hich is ui"t on a simp"e demographica" mode" for the EU82) A is a contri ution to the forthcoming de ate7 ut in the same time its intention is to gi6e the possi i"ity to e6eryone A +ho +ants to do so A to ma!e o+n ca"cu"ation on the European demography according to his5her preferred assumptions. The demographic mode"7 that is actua""y an EBce" ta "e7 simp"e enough to hand"e y e6ery ody +ho has some eBperience in such !ind of ca"cu"ations. The mode" tries to address the impact of immigration y di6iding the mode" into t+o parts. ?ne7 +hich descri es the demographic tendencies of the non8immigrant and an another one7 +hich address the demographic feature of the immigrant popu"ation. The fina" resu"t is the sum of the t+o ca"cu"ations. 0rom the point of 6ie+ of ca"cu"ations 9immigrants9 might mean a"" those peop"e +ho arri6e outside the EU82). Unfortunate"y statistica" data can hard"y e found for the demographic characteristic 2age distri ution7 tota" ferti"ity rate7 death rate7 "onge6ity3 of the immigrants as a +ho"e 2for those +ho are a"ready here and for those +ho +i"" come3. There are on"y sporadic estimations and first of a"" for the %us"im popu"ation. 0or this reason and a"so ecause in the future +e can recei6e immigrants first of a"" from the neigh ouring -orth 4frican and %idd"e Eastern Is"am countries7 moreo6er ecause the demographic characteristic of the %us"im popu"ation can e estimated on the asis of statistics for the countries of origin7 the mode" ca"cu"ates +ith the %us"im immigrants. ;y this +ay the mode" can gi6e a"so an ans+er ho+ these t+o cu"tures7 the European and the %us"im can sur6i6e and sta i"iCe. The resu"t of such !ind of ca"cu"ations natura""y depends on the initia" assumptions7 especia""y on the pro.ected tota" ferti"ity rate7 and immigration. E6ery ody might ha6e one:s o+n opinion on these Duestions. 0or this reason +e do not state that our forecast +i"" e the future7 .ust as +e do not state that +e o6er6ie+ed a"" the possi "e a"ternati6es. 4s regards the data used7 the mode" +as ui"t first of a"" on the United -ation demographic data ase7 ut Eurostat data and different pu "ications of the =ommission +ere a"so used. In some there +ere no officia" figures 2i.e. the ones pu "ished y U-7 EU7 ?E=D or nationa" statistics offices3. In these cases data +ere co""ected from any pu "ication +hich addressed the pro "em7 ut in such cases uncertainties are indicated. The mode" uses a +ide range of assumptions to test the sensiti6ity of these parameters 2usua""y estimates for tota" ferti"ity rate or immigration3 y this +ay the igger mista!es originating from the uncertain data ase can e a6oided. This study does not attempt to say anything ne+7 ut it tries to summarise the asic facts and possi "e future scenarios of the European demographica" situation hoping that it might assist %em ers of the European Par"iament in their duties.

Summary
This study on the demographic de6e"opments in the European Union aims to gi6e an o6er6ie+ of the g"o a" demographic situation sho+ing the reasons for the acce"eration and s"o+ do+n of the gro+th of the +or"d popu"ation7 and ho+ the +eights of the different regions changed as a conseDuence of the une6en gro+th rate of popu"ation. 4"so7 it tries to un6ei" the reasons ehind the 6ery "o+ tota" ferti"ity rate in the de6e"oped industria" countries7 and7 particu"ar"y in the European Union. 1ith the he"p of a simp"e demographic mode" this study tries to asses the gro+th and age distri ution of the EU82) popu"ation gi6ing some a"ternati6e ans+ers on ho+ the o"d age dependency ratio may change7 +hich today seems to e one of the most pressing demographic pro "ems and7 esides7 some ca"cu"ations are made on the impact of different immigration patterns and the economic impact of the ageing popu"ation. The resu"t of such !ind of ca"cu"ations natura""y depends on the initia" assumptions7 especia""y on the pro.ected tota" ferti"ity rate7 and immigration. The negati6e demographica" tendencies are present in the +ho"e of Europe and their symptoms are rather simi"ar. 0rom the second ha"f of the 1,th century7 since +hen the demographic tendencies can e fo""o+ed from officia" statistics7 the year"y gro+th rate of popu"ation in the present European Union osci""ated et+een &7) and 1E. (o+e6er7 this trend changed dramatica""y in the 1,6&Fs and +ithin one generation the gro+th rate s"o+ed do+n to Cero ecause of the steadi"y deteriorating tota" ferti"ity rate. 2Tota" ferti"ity rate 9T0G9 is the a6erage num er of chi"dren that a +oman7 in a"" her "ifetime7 +i"" gi6e irth to.3 This ratio +as around 2766 in the eginning of the 1,6&Fs and fe"" ac! to 17$6 y the end of the 1,,&Fs. The decrease in tota" ferti"ity rate is a g"o a" phenomenon. (o+e6er +hi"e in the de6e"oping countries A against a su stantia" fa"" A it remained +e"" a o6e the critica" 271 "e6e" +hich is reDuired for the simp"e reproduction of the popu"ationH in the de6e"oped +or"d7 and especia""y in the EU82) the rate of 17$6 is not enough to maintain the society. 1ide internationa" comparisons sho+ that there is a c"ose connection et+een the age of first irth and the tota" ferti"ity rate. 0rom a detai"ed dataset for -or+ay it can e seen that in a $& year time frame the tota" ferti"ity rate decreased in a"" age groups ut the u"! of decrease came from the 2&82$ and 2)82, year o"ds. ?ne of the main reasons ehind is the gro+ing "e6e" of education. 4s more and more young men and7 especia""y +omen acDuire higher education the possi "e date to get married is postponed and +ith it a"so the age of first irth. ?n the other hand7 higher youth unemp"oyment rates a"so contri ute to oth "onger schoo" years and the postponing of marriages and5or first irths. ?ne may thin! it "ogica" that the irth rate increases in the higher age groups. ;ut as the data for -or+ay pro6e7 it ne6er happens. The chi"dren +ho +ere not orn +hen +omen +ere in their t+enties +i"" ne6er e orn. Europe has een a "e to upho"d the num er of its popu"ation on"y y the he"p of immigration. 1est8 European countries egan to 9import9 guest +or!ers in the ear"y 1,6&Fs to fi"" .o s Europeans +ou"d not consider. These guest +or!ers came main"y from the %editerranean 2to 0rance3 and from Tur!ey 2to 'ermany3. 0o""o+ing the first 4ra oi" em argo and the su seDuent economic do+nturn in the 1,7&s7 most European countries c"osed their doors to "a our immigration7 yet some )&&7&&& immigrants A primari"y fami"y reunification cases A and $&&7&&& asy"um see!ers arri6e into +estern Europe each year. Since the 1,#&Fs the prospects for immigrants deteriorated. 4 su stantia" portion of the .o s the immigrants origina""y came for A "arge"y in manufacturing A has gone. 4s a resu"t unemp"oyment rates

5
among immigrants tend to e 6ery high. ;esides7 there is a gro+ing concern among the +est8European popu"ation o6er the fast8gro+ing %us"im communities. (igh profi"e authorities argue for immigration. 4 report y the United -ations says that to !eep the popu"ation at its present "e6e" unti" 2&)&7 Europe +ou"d need 176 mi""ion ne+ immigrants e6ery year7 that is to say #& mi""ion peop"e in the +ho"e time period. The European =ommission 2E=3 has a"so argued strong"y in fa6our of immigration. In a communication of 2&&3 the =ommission pointed out that the EU popu"ation7 due to decreased ferti"ity rates and "onger "ife eBpectancy7 is ageing7 "eading to a "i!e"y fa"" in the +or!ing popu"ation in the 2) states from 3&3 mi""ion to 2,7 mi""ion y 2&2&. 4 sma""er "a our force means "ess economic gro+thI economic migration is therefore necessary for sustained economic gro+th. %ode" ca"cu"ation gi6e a more detai"ed and a "itt"e it modified picture. 1hen it is supposed that tendencies characterising the present +i"" pre6ai" "ong in the future +hich means that the tota" ferti"ity rate of the non8%us"im popu"ation +i"" e at 1.$# and "i!e+ise the %us"im popu"ation +i"" remain at the present 2estimated3 2.7 "e6e"7 the tota" popu"ation of the EU82) +i"" not change significant"y 2there +i"" e on"y a $ mi""ion increase3 ut this a"most unchanged popu"ation is the outcome of a 71 mi""ion decrease in the non8 %us"im popu"ation and a"most the same 27) mi""ion3 increase in the %us"im popu"ation. 4s a resu"t the share of %us"im popu"ation in the EU82) y 2&)& +i"" e around 2&E against the current 3.7E. 4t the same time7 the o"d age dependency ratio 2the ratio of popu"ation a o6e 6$ to that et+een 1)86$3 +i"" gro+ up to $1.7E against the current 2$73E. 1ith the "a our force +hat is the resu"t of the assumptions made a o6e and supposing a year"y "a our producti6ity gro+th of 2E7 the annua" 'DP gro+th rate can e estimated at 17#E as an a6erage for the coming ha"f century. If these tendencies pre6ai" on "ong run in the future7 y the end of the 22nd century7 the origina" European popu"ation +i"" decrease to one8fifth of the no+adays "e6e"7 amounting to a mere 1&E of the tota". ;ut this scenario7 +hi"e it can not e entire"y ru"ed out7 seems rather unrea"istic. The ferti"ity rates are fa""ing a"" o6er the +or"d7 e6en in %us"im countries7 so it may e a rea"istic assumption that +ithin one generation the tota" ferti"ity rate of the European %us"ims +i"" decrease to the constant8popu"ation "e6e" of 2.1. 4"so A in accordance +ith the United -ations forecast A +e may assume that after 2&)& there +i"" e no net immigration. In this case the %us"im popu"ation in Europe +i"" sta i"ise at around #& mi""ion +hi"e7 ecause of the unchanged 217$#3 tota" ferti"ity rate the non8%us"ims +i"" e continuous"y decreasing +ith a year"y rate of 1E. If Europeans +ant to sur6i6e7 irrespecti6e"y +hether there is net immigration or not7 they ha6e to increase their tota" ferti"ity rate up to 2.1. /et us suppose that the nati6e Europeans +i"" someho+ find the means to increase their tota" ferti"ity rate up to the constant8popu"ation "e6e" of 2.1 +ithin a generation. In this case A +ith the pre6ious assumptions for immigration 2172 mi""ion in a year3 and %us"im ferti"ity rate 2decreasing to 2.13 A the European 2EU82)3 popu"ation +i"" e sta i"ised at the present day "e6e" and the ratio of %us"im popu"ation +i"" a"so e sta i"ised at 16E of the tota". 0rom an economic point of 6ie+ the strongest argument for immigration is that +ithout immigrants the o"d age dependency ratio +i"" increase su stantia""y7 p"acing un eara "e "oads on the pension and heath care system. The United -ation forecast and Jofi 4nnan himse"f strong"y suggest a massi6e net immigration to a6oid the foreseea "e trou "es. In the pre6ious"y mentioned asic scenario 2+hen +ithin one generation the ferti"ity rate of oth the non8 %us"im and the %us"im popu"ation +i"" e sta i"ised at the constant8popu"ation rate of 2.13 the "ong term

6
o"d age dependency ratio +i"" sta i"ise at around 3$E 2against the current 2$73E3 and the young8age dependency ratio around 31E7 against the current 2)E. These rates can e ta!en as natura" +hen a popu"ation is sta "e in its num er. 0rom this comes that the current dependency ratios are eBceptiona" originating from a transition phenomenon +hen a gro+ing popu"ation turns into a decreasing popu"ation. 0or a sta "e popu"ation the dependency ratio is around 6)E +hich is more or "ess di6ided eDua""y et+een the young and o"d age. 0or testing the impact of immigration t+o specia" cases +ere considered. In the first case a 176 mi""ion year"y net immigration +as supposed as it +as suggested y U- forecasts. In this case the o"d age and tota" dependency ratio +ou"d impro6e y on"y one percentage point to the asic scenario. In an opposite case7 supposing that there +i"" practica""y e no net immigration 2on"y &.3 mi""ion a year coming from fami"y unification and asy"um see!ers3 the o"d age dependency ratio in 2&)& +i"" e higher y 3 percentage point against the asic scenario. So the difference et+een the t+o eBtreme cases is $ percentage point. In the high immigration scenario the economic gro+th 2ca"cu"ated on the +or!ing8age popu"ation and participation rate7 +ith the assumption that the producti6ity of "a our increases y a year"y 2E a6erage in the "ong run3 +ou"d reach 2E year"y7 +hi"e in the no8immigration 6ersion the gro+th rate +as on"y 1.6E. ;ut if in the "atest case the participation rate of the +or!ing8age popu"ation increased to 7&E from the current 63E7 as assumed in the /is on process7 economic gro+th +ou"d reach the 1.,E "e6e". 0rom this it resu"ts that immigration can easi"y e compensated y the gro+ing participation rate. Summing up7 from the economic point of 6ie+ mass immigration cannot e .ustified. Ta!ing into account a"" the possi "e scenarios7 the rea" so"ution for Europe is to increase the tota" ferti"ity rate up to the constant8popu"ation "e6e"7 integrating the immigrants and increasing the participation rate to the /is on target. The "argest cha""enge is to find the suita "e means to reach these goa"s.

;russe"s7 4pri" 2&&)

* 1 !ntroduction
The estimated +or"d popu"ation in =hrist:s time +as around 2&& mi""ion and it hard"y changed during the centuries that fo""o+ed. 1hen =o"um us disco6ered the -e+ 1or"d there +ere on"y $)& mi""ion peop"e7 the a6erage year"y gro+th rate in the first 1) centuries of our /ord +as &71E +hich meant sta i"ity for the contemporary societies. The popu"ation egan to acce"erate in 0igure 1 "orld population #million$ the 1#th century7 +hen7 part"y as a resu"t of impro6ed nutrition and the impact of ne+ disco6eries in medica" 1&&&& science7 "i!e sma""poB 6accination7 #&&& the defeat of cho"era 2Kohn Sno+37 germ theory of disease 2/ouis 6&&& Pasteur37 the disco6ery of the pathogen of tu ercu"osis 2Go ert $&&& Joch3 and so on7 there +as a 2&&& decrease in the crude death rate of the popu"ation7 +hi"e the irth rate & remained re"ati6e"y high. This +as the time +hen Thomas %a"thus +rote his famous Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects Lear 2non "inear sca"e3 the Future Improvement of Society. The popu"ation reached one i""ion in the turn of the 1,th =entury7 and the year"y gro+th rate remained a"most unchanged in the neBt 13& years ho6ering around &76E. The rea" popu"ation "o+8up came in the midd"e of the 2& th =entury7 +hen the resu"ts in medica" science egan to spread in the 4sian7 4frican and /atin 4merican countries 2in the former co"onies3 pressing do+n the crude death rate +hi"e A +ith the sur6i6ing of socia" traditions A the irth rate remained at its high historica" "e6e". The a6erage gro+th rate reached the year"y a6erage of 2E +hich A in a generation:s time A dou "ed the +or"d popu"ation.
1 +500 500 1000 1*50 1,50 2000 2050 +10000 +5000 2100 1250 1500 1,00

The %orld population and its increase

1&& increase in popu"ation7 year"y a6erage7 mi""ion .
increase in popu"ation7 sca"e

0igure 2

1&7& popu"ation7 i""ion

year"y a6erage7 mi""ion7 "eft

#& 6& $& 2& &

popu"ation 2rigt sca"e3

#7& 67& $7& 27& &7&

Lear

4s a resu"t the pattern of the +or"d popu"ation changed thorough"y7 especia""y from a European point of 6ie+. In the midd"e of the 2&th =entury the European popu"ation +as c"ose to one Duarter that of the +or"d7 +hich share p"ummeted to one8 tenth y the first decade of the ne+ mi""ennium. This change +as o+ing to the differences in the a6erage year"y popu"ation gro+th in the second ha"f of the 2&th century7 +hich +as &76 per cent in the case of Europe and 271 per cent in the case of the Third 1or"d.

1*50

1-50

1,00

2000

1-00

1,50

(o+e6er the demographic situation is +orse for Europe than it "oo!s from these data since the &76 per cent year"y popu"ation gro+th +as on"y an a6erage of 1 per cent in the 1,)&Fs and Cero per cent in the 1,,&Fs. 4ccording to a United -ation forecast71 in the neBt fifty years Europe +i"" "ose 1&& mi""ions from its current popu"ation7 and those +ho remain +i"" e much o"der.
1

World Population in 2300, Expert meeting on &$$air' (arc) 2004

orld population in 2300 !" #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial

2050

2 &emographic tendencies in the European 'nion

The negati6e demographica" tendencies are present in the +ho"e of Europe inc"uding its eastern part +ith the states of the former So6iet Union and the symptoms are rather simi"ar. (o+e6er7 in the fo""o+ing +e +ant to concentrate on the en"arged European Union 2EU82)3. 0rom the second ha"f of the 1,th century7 since +hen +e can fo""o+ the demographic tendencies from officia" statistics7 the year"y gro+th rate of 27& popu"ation in the present European Union osci""ated 17& et+een &7) and 1E. (o+e6er7 this trend changed dramatica""y in &7& the 1,6&Fs and +ithin one 817& generation the gro+th rate s"o+ed do+n to Cero. E6en the 827& natura" gro+th 2the difference et+een death and irth num er3 837& turned into negati6e and on"y the net immigration made the popu"ation gro+. /oo!ing for the reasons +e +i"" disco6er that against the fact that there +as some impro6ement in the death rate +hi"e the a6erage "ife span ecame "onger too7 these tendencies +ere una "e to a"ance the steadi"y deteriorating tota" ferti"ity rate. Tota" ferti"ity rate 2T0G3 is the a6erage num er of chi"dren that a +oman7 in a"" her "ifetime7 +i"" gi6e irth to. This ratio +as around 2766 in the eginning of the 1,6&Fs and fe"" ac! to 17$6 y the end of the 1,,&Fs.
Population gro%th rate in the European 'nion #($
0igure 3 'ro+ th rate 1#7& 1,&& 1,3& 1,$& 1,)& 1,7& 1#6& 1##& 1#,& 1,1& 1,2& 1,6& 1,#& 1,,&

The decrease in tota" ferti"ity rate is a g"o a" phenomenon. (o+e6er +hi"e the tota" ferti"ity rate in the 77& de6e"oping countries A against a 67& su stantia" fa"" A remained +e"" EU82) )7& a o6e the critica" 271 "e6e" +hich is reDuired for the simp"e $7& De6e"oped reproduction of the popu"ation7 in countries 37& the de6e"oped +or"d7 and De6e"oping especia""y in the EU82) the rate of 27& countries 17$6 is not enough to maintain the 17& current society. This rate7 in the &7& "ong run +hen its impact +i"" fu""y pre6ai"7 produces a year"y decrease of 1E in the popu"ation. Para""e" to this7 the so ca""ed o"d age dependency rate 2the ratio of the popu"ation o6er 6) years to the popu"ation aged et+een 1)86$ years3 +i"" reach $7E against the current 2$E +hich means that the urden on the +or!ing age popu"ation to !eep the pensioners +i"" e dou "ed. 0igure $ sho+s that the tota" ferti"ity rate for the EU82) countries is 6ery c"ose to that of the de6e"oped countries. It comes from the fact that the EU82) countries constitute a great part of the de6e"oping countries. ;ut if +e go into the detai"s it +i"" turn out that7 for instance7 there is a significant difference et+een the European Union and the United States. In the United States the tota" ferti"ity rate decreased para""e" to that of the EU82) in the 1,6&Fs and 1,7&Fs e6en going e"o+ the EU82) "e6e" in the mid8se6enties7 ut "ater on it impro6ed and7 remaining unchanged in the 1,,&Fs7 it reached the "e6e" of 27& +hich is 6ery c"ose to the constant8popu"ation "e6e" 22713. (o+e6er there are significant differences et+een races. Peop"e of (ispanic origin 2main"y %eBicans3 ha6e much a higher rate 2 et+een 27) and
1,6)56, 1,7&57$ 1,7)57, 1,,)5,, 1,6&56$ 1,#&5#$ 1,#)5#, 1,,&5,$

Total fertility rate

0igure $

2&&&

,
37&37 +hi"e the non (ispanic +hite popu"ation has a tota" ferti"ity rate of 17#7 +hich is significant"y higher than the EU82) "e6e"7 ut is under the constant8popu"ation rate. The rate for the US "ac!7 non (ispanic peop"e 24frican84mericans37 after a strong decrease in the 1,,&Fs7 is .ust a o6e the +hite popu"ation and reaches the constant8popu"ation "e6e" of 271. These t+o races7 each 0igure ) Tota" ferti"ity rate amounting to some 12E of the tota" US popu"ation7 are the ones that increased the tota" ferti"ity rate of $7&& the United States c"ose to the US 37)& constant8popu"ation "e6e". (o+e6er7 the "arge differences especia""y EU82) 37&& et+een the (ispanic and 1hite non (ispanic races7 and the strong 27)& US a"" (ispanic immigration7 "ega" or i""ega"7 from %eBico causes a su stantia" shift in 27&& the race pattern of the United US + hite 2non 17)& States. Samue" P. (untington7 +ho (ispanic3 in his ne+ oo! M1ho are +eNM US "ac! 2non8 17&& addresses this phenomenon7 says (ispanic3 that the United States +i"" e di6ided into t+o peop"es7 t+o cu"tures7 and t+o "anguages. %a!ing a comparison +ith =anada and ;e"gium he statesI OThe transformation of the United States into a country "i!e these +ou"d not necessari"y e the end of the +or"dH it +ou"d ho+e6er7 e the end of the 4merica +e ha6e !no+n for more than three centuries. 4mericans shou"d not "et that change happen un"ess they are con6inced that this ne+ nation +ou"d e a etter one.M
1,6& 1,6) 1,7) 1,#& 1,#) 1,,)

There is pro a "y one more thing +hich is +orth mentioning in connection +ith the US statistics. It +as hard"y four centuries ago that Peter %inuit the Dutch merchants purchased %anhattan Is"and from -ati6e 4mericans for P2$ +orth of trin!ets7 eads and !ni6es7 and the "ast att"e et+een the nati6es and +hite immigrants occurred in 1#,& at 1ounded Jnee. Today the ratio of the nati6e Indians in the US popu"ation is around &7# per cent and their tota" ferti"ity rate 21773 is +e"" under the constant8popu"ation "e6e".

) The *ac+ground of decreasing total fertility rate

1ide internationa" comparisons sho+ that there is a c"ose connection et+een the age of first irth and the tota" ferti"ity rate 2T0G3. 0rom a detai"ed dataset for -or+ay +here the change in the so ca""ed age specific irth rates 2the num er of annua" irths to 1&&& +omen of a specific age group3 and the tota" ferti"ity rate are gi6en for a forty8year period et+een 1,6&86$ and 1,,682&&&7 +e can get an eBp"anation. Table 1 The change of age specific *irth rate in ,or%ay Data in thousands
Period 1,6186) 1,6687& 1,7187) 1,768#& 1,#18#) 1,#68,& 1,,18,) 1,,68&& 1,618&& T0G 2,2& 272, 22$7 1776 16#1 1#2) 1#,$ 1#62 T0G change 81,2 8$#2 8$71 8,6 1$) 6, 832 81&), 1)81, 2, 1 871 8$7 81$ 813 81$ 812# =omposition of T0G changes y age groups 2-or+ay3 2&82$ 2)82, 3&83$ 3)83, $&8$$ 81) 8117 81#2 8#1 831 8)3 86& 8)37 86$ 812& 81&& , 72 $ 83$ 8232 871 812$ 8)7 2$ ,& 7) 3# 82) 8$7 8#7 8$6 1 2) )& 32 873 823 833 816 83 3 6 7 8), $)8$, 82 83 81 & & & & 86

2&&)

1,7&

1,,&

2&&&

10
4s can e seen 2from Ta "e 13 in -or+ay7 in a $& year time frame the tota" ferti"ity rate 2T0G3 decreased y 1&), thousands simi"ar to the EU82) a6erage. There +as a decrease in a"" age groups ut the u"! of decrease came from the 2&82$ and 2)82, year o"ds. The reasons ehind it in a"" pro a i"ity can e found first of a"" in the gro+ing "e6e" of education. 4s more and more young men and7 especia""y +omen acDuire higher education the possi "e date to get married is postponed and +ith it a"so the age of first irth. /i era" education po"icies gi6e the possi i"ity to attend high schoo"s and uni6ersities for more years. ?n the other hand7 higher youth unemp"oyment rates a"so contri ute to oth "onger schoo" years and the postponing of marriages and5or first irths.

Tota" ferti"ity rate as function of age at first irth and 'DP5cap 2"o+7 medium7 high3
, # 7 Tota" ferti"ity rate 6 ) $ 3 2 1 & %edium (igh /o+

0igure 6

?ne may thin! it "ogica" that the irth rate increases in the higher age groups. ;ut as the data for -or+ay pro6e7 it ne6er happens. The chi"dren +ho +ere not orn +hen +omen +ere in their t+enties +i"" ne6er e orn. -atura""y7 -or+ay is on"y one eBamp"e7 ut an internationa" comparison for 117 countries of higher popu"ation than 1 mi""ion sho+s that there is a c"ose corre"ation et+een first irth and tota" ferti"ity rate.

In 0igure 6 +e di6ided the countries into three groups 1# 2& 22 2$ 26 2# 3& according to their de6e"opment 46erage age of + omen at first irth "e6e" measured in 'DP5capita. In the "o+est group one finds those countries +here the 'DP5capita7 eBpressed in 2&&2 US do""ar and on PPP 2Purchasing Po+er Parity3 asis7 is "o+er than P3&&&. The medium group stretches et+een P3&&& and P13&&& and the high income group consists of a"" the countries +ith higher than P13&&& 'DP5capita. 4s can e seen from 0igure 6 in the "o+ income countries the age of first irth is at the ages et+een 1# and 2& years and the tota" ferti"ity rate spreads et+een $ and 7. The medium income countries sho+ a 6ery different picture. In these countries the a6erage age of first irth shifted to the 2282$ year Cone7 and para""e" to this the tota" ferti"ity rate decreased to the 183 and +ith an a6erage a o6e 2717 +hich means that the popu"ation in these countries increases7 ut +ith a moderate rate. 0ina""y in the 2# high income countries +here the a6erage age of first irth mo6es et+een 2683& years the tota" ferti"ity rate is et+een 1 and 2 +ith an a6erage of around 17)7 +hich means that +ithin approBimate"y t+o generation 26&87& years3 the popu"ation +i"" e ha"6ed. To etter understand this phenomenon it is usefu" to ha6e a c"oser "oo! at those countries +ho are eBceptions from the genera" ru"e. Such a country is7 for instance7 Egypt7 +hich is a medium8income country7 ut the a6erage age of first irth is much higher 227 years3 than itsF group a6erage7 and7 at the same time the ferti"ity rate is as high as 373. It means that in Egypt7 +hich is a modern Is"amic country7 the education "e6e" of +omen is re"ati6e"y high7 ut at the same time they fo""o+ a traditiona" fami"y pattern +ith a high num er of chi"dren. 4nother eBception is Israe"7 +hich a"though it is a de6e"oped country7 the age of first irth is "o+ 2around 21822 years3 and the tota" ferti"ity rate is 277. Presuma "y the ear"y marriages and high ferti"ity rate are connected to the Israe"isF determination to !eep pace +ith the Pa"estinian popu"ation. 4 further eBception is 4ustria7 +here the age of first marriage is re"ati6e"y "o+ 2around 23 years3 ut at the same time the tota" ferti"ity rate is a"so "o+7 indicating a rich country +here some feature of the traditiona" fami"y pattern 2the ear"y marriage3 sur6i6ed7 ut other+ise it fo""o+s the characteristic "ifesty"e and 6a"ue system of the rich countries. To sum up7 according to +ide internationa" comparisons 2117 countries37 a great ma.ority 2#&8,&E3 of the countries fo""o+ a +e"" esta "ished tendency and the fe+ eBceptions can e eBp"ained y specia" po"itica"

11
or socia" conditions. ;ut these eBceptions 2+here the difference goes in the direction of higher ferti"ity3 can e used as a compass if Europe +ants to "oo! for some so"ution for its decreasing popu"ation. Some statistics sho+ that in the high income countries the 9fami"y crisis9 can e found ehind the decreasing ferti"ity rate. 0rom the second ha"f of )& the 1,6&Fs the asic indicators for $& fami"y "ife deteriorated +ith a rather fast rate. 0or instance7 in the 1,6&Fs 3& there +ere eight marriages for 1&&& popu"ation. This rate is no+ around 2& fi6e. 1hat is more stri!ing is that one in e6ery second or third marriage 1& ends in di6orce7 +hi"e a generation & ear"ier this rate +as on"y one8tenth. The irth rate outside marriage is no+ 3& per 1&& irths7 +hich +as on"y fi6e a generation ago. 4"" these indicators sho+ that the fami"y has ecome unsta "eH traditiona" fami"y 6a"ues "ost their attracti6eness resu"ting in "imited space for chi"d earing and chi"d raising.
Di6orces per marriages 2E37 EU2) 0igure 7 1,6& 1,6) 1,7& 1,7) 1,#) 1,,& 1,,) 2&&&

- .igration
- 1 /lo*al migration2 ?6er the past 1) years7 the num er of peop"e crossing orders in search of a etter "ife has een rising steadi"y. 4t the start of the 21st =entury7 one in e6ery 3) peop"e is an internationa" migrant. '"o a""y the stoc! of migrating peop"e increased from 7) mi""ion in 1,6) to 17) mi""ion in 2&&2. (o+e6er7 compared to the +or"d popu"ation the ratio remains constant. It means that gro+ing g"o a"iCation does not modify the migration tendency. '"o a" migration affects a"most e6ery country A they are a"" either p"aces of origin7 transit and5or destination for migrants. 1hi"e the ma.or countries of emigration are in the de6e"oping +or"d7 +estern industria"ised countries a sor ed on"y a out $&E of the +or"d:s migrants7 the remaining part sett"ing a"so in de6e"oping countries or the former So6iet Union. 0or instance an estimated 1.2 mi""ion refugees are e"ie6ed to "i6e in Pa!istan7 1.3 mi""ion in Iran7 a out t+o mi""ion in TanCania7 and so on. %ost of those +ho ha6e "eft their countries are moti6ated y a desire for etter opportunities. ;ut there are a"so mi""ions of peop"e +ho ha6e een forced to migrate for fear of persecution. The current +a6es of immigrants and asy"um see!ers from the %idd"e East and -orth 4frica are "in!ed much more to the +orsening conditions in these countries7 than +ith "a our shortages in Europe. 4t the end of 2&&27 1&.$ mi""ion peop"e around the +or"d had refugee status7 according to the U- (igh =ommission for Gefugees. 4 further one mi""ion app"ied for asy"um that year or had their app"ications sti"" pending. These figures do not inc"ude the $.1 mi""ion Pa"estinian refugees assisted y the U- Ge"ief and 1or!s 4gency. In the European Union 'ermany has the "argest refugee popu"ation +ith c"ose to one mi""ion. %ost are from the former Lugos"a6ia7 Tur!ey7 IraD and Iran.

(ain 'ource. )ttp.//ne '.00c.co.uk/2/')ared/'pl/)i/ orld/04/migration/)tml/migration10oom.'tm

2&&)

1,#&

12
- 2 0istory of migration into the E'3 During the 1,)&s7 most 1estern European countries sti"" registered a negati6e migration a"ance. Some countries 2for instance 'reece7 Ire"and7 Ita"y7 Portuga" and Spain3 "ost a su stantia" num er of their citiCens emigrating for economic reasons o6erseas as +e"" as to other European countries.
-atura" increase in popu"ation and net immigration 2thousands37 EU2) $ &&& 3 &&& 2 &&& 1 &&& & 81 &&& 82 &&& 1,6& 1,6) 1,7& 1,7) 1,#& 1,#) 1,,) 2&&& 1,,& 2&&) -atura" increase -et migration
0igure #

1estern European countries egan to 9import9 guest +or!ers in the ear"y 1,6&Fs to fi"" .o s Europeans +ou"d not consider. These guest +or!ers came main"y from the %editerranean 2to 0rance3 and from Tur!ey 2to 'ermany3. The 0rench %us"im communities no+ in eBistence trace their origins to a +a6e of hea6y immigration in the t+e"6e years et+een 1,61 and 1,73. 4fter 0ranceFs +ithdra+a" from 4"geria more than a mi""ion 0rench citiCens7 =hristians and Ke+s7 migrated to 0rance.

%ost European countries c"osed their doors to "a our immigration in the 1,7&s7 fo""o+ing the first 4ra oi" em argo and the su seDuent economic do+nturn7 yet some )&&7&&& immigrants A primari"y fami"y reunification cases A and $&&7&&& asy"um see!ers arri6e in +estern Europe each year. 4sy"um see!ers come main"y from "ac! 4frica and the %idd"e East 2inc"uding north 4frica3. ?6er the period 1,#,8,#7 four mi""ion peop"e app"ied for asy"um in Europe. In the forty years et+een 1,6& and 2&&&7 1estern EuropeFs popu"ation increased y $.3 per cent through a net inf"o+ of some 16.7 mi""ion peop"e. In a so"ute terms7 the main recei6ing countries +ere 'ermany 2net migration a"ance 1,6&82&&&I <#.) mi""ion37 0rance 2<3., mi""ion37 the -ether"ands 2<1.& mi""ion37 the UJ 2<&., mi""ion3 and S+itCer"and 2<&.# mi""ion3.$ 4s regards intra8European mo i"ity7 ho+e6er7 despite the progress made in remo6ing o stac"es to the free mo6ement of peop"e in the EU7 the "e6e"s of intra8EU mo i"ity are 6ery "o+. Today7 annua" mo i"ity et+een %em er States amounts to et+een &.1 and &.2 E of the popu"ation. The most important arriers are the "ac! of "anguage s!i""s and the pro "ems +ith finding a .o for oth spouses. In =entra" and Eastern Europe7 the Oiron curtainM restricted the num er of emigrants. Emigration +as high on"y in years of po"itica" crises7 in Onorma"M years on"y mem ers of ethnic or ethnore"igious minorities +ith strong support from a +estern nation +ere a "e to "ea6e. The situation changed in 1,#,8,&7 +hen the Oiron curtainM fe"". The tra6e" restrictions ended and ci6i" +ars and ethnic c"eansing "ed to massi6e emigration to neigh ouring countries and 1estern Europe. 4s a resu"t of economica""y7 po"itica""y and ethnica""y moti6ated emigration7 most countries of =entra" and Eastern Europe recorded a negati6e migration a"ance. ;et+een 1,6& and 2&&&7 the +ho"e region "ost at "east $.7 mi""ion peop"e 2a"most 3 per cent of its tota" popu"ation3 through migration.

3 4

%ource. World (igration 2003 !" 23)apter 134 World (igration 2003 !" 23)apter 134

13
- ) Position and acceptance of immigrants5, 6 There are no comprehensi6e data on the num er and socia" positions of the immigrants. It is !no+n ho+e6er that immigrants are geographica""y c"ustered particu"ar"y in industria"iCed7 ur an areas +ithin poorer neigh ourhoods. Since the 1,#&Fs +ith g"o a"isation the prospects for immigrants deteriorated. 4 su stantia" portion of the .o s the immigrants origina""y came for A "arge"y in manufacturing A has gone7 rep"aced y higher8end ser6ice sector positions in fie"ds "i!e hea"th care7 finance and high techno"ogy. ;ut "ac! of education7 and often e6en "anguage s!i""s7 put these ne+ opportunities eyond the reach of many immigrants and their chi"dren. 4s a resu"t unemp"oyment rates among immigrants tend to e 6ery high. The Tur!ish community in 'ermany7 for instance7 has a .o "ess rate of 2$ percent7 a"most t+o and8a8ha"f times the nationa" a6erage.7 In 0rance7 the unemp"oyment rate for -orth 4fricans ho6ers around 3& percent7 or more than three times the countryFs o6er a"" rate7 according to the %ontaigne Institute7 a Paris8 ased thin! tan!. ;esides the pro "ems mentioned a o6e7 there is a gro+ing concern among the +est8European popu"ation o6er the fast8gro+ing %us"im communities. The siCe of the European %us"im communities has trip"ed in the "ast 3& years. This rapid gro+th is caused oth y immigration and high %us"im irth rates. ?ne8tenth of the 0rench popu"ation is no+ %us"im7 as is fi6e percent of 'ermany and siB percent of the -ether"ands. 1hi"e the UJFs %us"im popu"ation is on"y 2.) percent7 %us"ims ha6e ecome "arge minorities in some sma"" ;ritish to+ns. %any European cities a"ready ha6e siCea "e %us"im minorities. =urrent"y7 they ma!e up at "east 2) percent of the popu"ations of %arsei""e and Gotterdam7 2& percent of %a"moFs 2in S+eden37 1) percent of ;russe"sF and ;irminghamFs7 and 1& percent or more /ondonFs7 ParisF and =openhagenFs. 4 ma.ority of these immigrants are from -orth 4frica7 Tur!ey and other Is"amic countries. %us"ims a"so ma!e up a "arge share of the continentFs i""ega" immigrants A a group that is estimated to num er up to ha"f a mi""ion per year.# In centra" and eastern Europe7 %us"im popu"ations remain 6irtua""y noneBistent.
Attitudes of Europeans towards minorities actively tolerant (2 !": t)ey are not di'tur0ed 0y minoritie', t)ey $a9our t)e accommodation o$ minority culture' 0y t)e )o't 'ociety, t)ey 'upport policie' in $a9our o$ minoritie' passively tolerant (#$!": t)ey do not in'i't on t)e complete a0andonment o$ minority culture', 0ut are le'' 'upporti9e o$ po'iti9e action' to ard' t)e'e group' ambivalent (2%@4. t)ey are not di'tur0ed, 0ut t)ey are in $a9our o$ complete a''imilation into t)e maAority culture rat)er t)an o$ cultural di9er'ity intolerant ( &!": t)ey )a9e 'trong negati9e attitude', t)ey $eel di'tur0ed 0y minoritie', t)ey $a9our complete a''imilation into t)e maAor culture and/or repatriation %ource. 'ee 5iterature 234

%any Europeans ha6e the fee"ing that the fast8 gro+ing %us"im popu"ation +i"" cause socia" conf"icts. %us"ims right"y demand po"itica" recognition7 greater entit"ements7 and preser6ation of their Is"amic identity. %any European citiCens see crime as something +hich is connected main"y to immigrants. 0or most +ithin the midd"e and upper c"asses in Europe the idea of mu"ticu"tura"ism is rather a"ien. 1hate6er the rea"ity7 there is a +ide"y he"d 6ie+ among Europeans that %us"ims are not integrating into the mainstream.

E6en the most open Europeans consider that mu"ticu"tura"ism shou"d not ecome a threat to the fundamenta" 6a"ues of the European mode" of democracy. This imp"ies that immigrants shou"d gi6e up that part of their cu"ture and re"igions +hich may e in conf"ict +ith those 6a"ues. This perception is eBpressed in the opinion o6er the Tur!ish EU mem ership. The "atest po"" conducted for /e 0igaro sho+s 67 percent of the 0rench and )) percent of 'ermans are opposed to Tur!ey:s admission.

5 6

%ource. 'ee literature 214 and 224 (ain 'ource. 'ee 5iterature 244 * 6igure' cited in (att %urman, 78urk' &rri9ed #ecade' &go in :ermany and (ade 8)em'el9e' at ;ome, #e'pite <ut'ider %tatu',= 8)e &''ociated Pre'', <ct. *, 2004. 6igure' cited in 8imot)y (. %a9age, 7Europe and >'lam. 3re'cent Waxing, 3ulture' 3la')ing,= 8)e Wa')ington ?uarterly, %ummer 2004, p. 25.

14
In ;ritain more than #&E of the +ho"e popu"ation 2and ),E of ;"ac! and 4sian ;ritons3 sa+ immigration as out of contro"., - - &e*ates on immigration Arguments for immigration 4 report y the United -ations1& ma!es the strongest argument for the free f"o+ of immigration. The reason is that popu"ation gro+th is crashing throughout the industria"iCed +or"d. This +i"" either impose an into"era "e taB urden on future +or!ers or force more of those o6er 6) to remain in the "a our force. The report says that to !eep the popu"ation at its present "e6e" unti" 2&)&7 Europe +ou"d need 176 mi""ion ne+ immigrants e6ery year7 that is to say #& mi""ion peop"e. 9?pening Europe:s orders +ou"d e more than a gesture of good+i"" A it +ou"d a"so e an act of se"f8 interest. Europe:s economies are in dire need of eBtra manpo+er. Immigrants can pro6ide Europe +ith 6a"ua "e resources as it enters the ne+ economy7 y fi""ing the "o+8+age .o s that Europeans do not +ant7 and in.ecting the technica" eBpertise that Europeans do not possess.9 11 9Emp"oyers +ant more "a our at a "o+ price and peop"e +ith money +ant more ser6icesQand it:s difficu"t to see ho+ that can come a out +ith a dec"ining popu"ation79 says Koseph =hamie7 director of the U.-.:s popu"ation di6ision. 9The sooner European go6ernments "oo! at migration as a so"ution7 the easier it +i"" e to ad.ust. Secretary8'enera" Jofi 4nnan made a speech to the European Par"iament on 2, Kanuary 2&&$. In his speech he emphasiCed that a"" countries ha6e the right to decide +hether to admit migrants7 ut Europeans +ou"d e un+ise to c"ose their doors. That +ou"d not on"y harm their "ong8term economic and socia" prospects. It +ou"d a"so dri6e more and more peop"e to try and come in through the ac! door A y as!ing for po"itica" asy"um or y see!ing the he"p of smugg"ers. 94 c"osed Europe +ou"d e a meaner7 poorer7 +ea!er7 o"der Europe7 an open Europe +i"" e a fairer7 richer7 stronger7 younger Europe9 A the U'enera" Secretary said. The European =ommission 2E=3 has a"so argued strong"y in fa6our of immigration. In a communication of 2&&3 the =ommission pointed out that the EU popu"ation7 due to decreased ferti"ity rates and "onger "ife eBpectancy7 is ageing7 "eading to a "i!e"y fa"" in the +or!ing popu"ation in the 2) states from 3&3 mi""ion to 2,7 mi""ion y 2&2&. 4 sma""er "a our force means "ess economic gro+thI economic migration is therefore necessary for sustained economic gro+th. 12 'ermanyFs Independent =ommission on %igration13 stands a"so for immigration. In a report in 2&&1 they conc"udedI O1e need immigration to 'ermany ecause the popu"ation here is getting o"derI "ife eBpectancy is increasing +hi"e the num er of chi"dren orn per fami"y remains "o+ and the num er of irths is decreasingM

EuropeB' immigration 0reakdo n (andato da 9ette6*'tinger CenerdD, 1* dicem0re 2004, 00.34. Ey 3laude %al)ani 2)ttp.// .legno'torto.com/node.p)pFidG233264 10 !nited "ation Population #i9i'ion. 220004. Heplacement (igration. >' it a %olution to declining and &geing Population'F. "e Iork, "I. !nited "ation' 11 Jnocking on EuropeB' #oor' #e'pite e$$ort' to keep t)em out, an in$lux o$ immigrant' i' reca'ting t)e 3ontinentB' identity. European economie' need more o$ t)em' Ey Home') Hatne'ar 5ondon 8>(E E!H<PE Kuly 03, 2000 C<5. 155 "<. 25 12 3ommunication $rom t)e 3ommi''ion to t)e 3ouncil, t)e European parliament, t)e European Economic and %ocial 3ommittee and t)e 3ommittee o$ t)e Hegion' on immigration, integration and employment. Eru''el', 3.6.2003 3<( 220034 336 $inal 13 >ndependent 3ommi''ion on (igration to :ermany, 2001.11 28)e 'o+called %L''mut) 3ommi''ion, named a$ter it' Pre'ident Hita %L''mut).4.

15
Emp"oyers +ho are eBperiencing s!i""ed8"a our shortages ha6e a"so een ca""ing on go6ernments to open up ne+ "a our migration channe"s for foreign +or!ers. OImmigration restriction shou"d a"so e remo6ed for peop"e +ith re"e6ant s!i""M A says the European Gound Ta "e of Industria"ists in their message to the 2&&3 Spring European =ounci".1$ Arguments against immigration Europe is o6erpopu"ated The current EU 2) popu"ation is too high for "ong8term sustaina i"ity. Europe is one of the most cro+ded regions on Earth. Gecent +or"d gro+th has put 6ery hea6y pressure on the en6ironment. It has dri6en up the natura" car on7 nitrogen and phosphate "oad in the iosphere7 generating fundamenta" changes the +or"d eco"ogy. 4 sma""er European popu"ation +i"" e good for Europe and for the +or"d7 and the transitiona" pro "ems are difficu"t ut not o6er+he"ming. 1ith Cero net migration7 the Gising 0erti"ity scenario 2of the U- study3 +ou"d "ead e6entua""y to a popu"ation sta i"iCed at a out $&E of the present "e6e"7 +hich is not much different from the popu"ation at the eginning of the 2&th =entury. It creates a rief pea! in the dependency ratio7 ut after 2&)& the dependency ratio +ou"d egin to impro6e. 15 /a our mar!et does not .ustify immigration The high "e6e" of unemp"oyment in most European countries sho+s that there is no genera" shortage in "a our force. Shortages in some sectors are on"y due to "o+ +ages. If the +ages +ere higher7 the Duantity of +or! shou"d increase. =onseDuent"y7 it is fa"se to say that the migrants do the "o+ paid .o s that the nati6es re.ect. In fact7 the "o+ paid .o s .ust eBist ecause the migrants are present and ready to accept "o+ +ages. 1ithout immigration7 and according to the cur6e7 the +ages +ou"d increase and sure"y the nati6es +ou"d accept these .o s. The "o+ participation rate A especia""y among immigrants a"ready present A a"so contradicts an inf"uB of further immigration. 0or instance in Ita"y on"y )2E of the O+or!ing ageM popu"ation 21)A6$ years o"d3 are present"y emp"oyed7 ecause of chronic unemp"oyment coup"ed +ith "i era" +e"fare and retirement enefits. 0or young migrants under 2$7 the unemp"oyment rate often pea!s to $)E. In some su ur s7 many young migrants are constant"y id"e and on"y recei6e handouts for their "i6ing.16 0ree f"o+ of "a our is a fa"se idea 0ree trade acti6ists c"aim that the freedom of mo i"ity of +or!ers must e eBact"y the same as for goods and ser6ices. (o+e6er +e cannot compare a human eing +ith a good7 a ser6ice or a capita" stoc!. 4 good is consumed. 4 good has no fami"y. 4 good does not need education and hea"th ser6ice. =onseDuent"y7 it is a so"ute"y fruit"ess to posit that since +e are for free trade of goods and capita"7 +e ha6e to support un"imited mo i"ity of peop"e and the a o"ishment of a"" orders. Immigration +i"" increase the urden on +e"fare system The +e"fare system is not in accordance +ith the Standard 0ree Trade Theory. If hea"th and education +ere paid y the consumers "i!e any other goods7 the pro "em +ou"d not eBist. ;ut in most European countries socia" ser6ices are part"y free for consumers7 yet in rea"ity7 these ser6ices are paid far y the taBpayers. =heap8+age immigrants may ring some enefits for entrepreneurs ut at the same time they urden the udget. Immigration cannot counter a"ance ageing The =ommission7 +ho in genera" stands for immigration7 in a report of 2&&2 a"so states that immigration a"one can ne6er counter a"ance the effects of an ageing popu"ation and cannot so"6e the EU:s "a our mar!et pro "ems 2Socia" Situation in the European Union 2&&23. 4s former =ommissioner for Emp"oyment7 4nna Diamantopou"ou7 saidI 9Immigration +i"" he"p fi"" some gaps in our "a our mar!et ut it has no impact on our asic emp"oyment po"icy messageI +e sti"" need radica" reform7 +ith a focus on
14

8)e European 3)allenge M (e''age $rom t)e European Hound 8a0le o$ >ndu'triali't' to t)e %pring European 3ouncil, (arc) 2003 15 5ind'ey :rant . 7Heplacement (igration=. 8)e !" Population #i9i'ion on European Population #ecline. Population and En9ironment. & Kournal o$ >nterdi'ciplinary %tudie' Colume 22, "um0er 4, (arc) 2001 16 >0id 25ind'ey :rant4

16
increased participation rates for +omen and o"der +or!ers7 if +e are to achie6e sustaina "e "a our mar!ets and pensions systems.9 - 5 1ie%s related to the .uslim population12 4 important issue of disagreement is connected to the presence of a gro+ing %us"im popu"ation in 1estern Europe. Those +ho are against the perception that a gro+ing %us"im minority +ou"d cause socia" tensions say the fo""o+ing. (1) Immigration ill not change !ramatically the ratio among races Immigration +i"" not change the ratio among races. 0or instance if 0ranceFs 7E %us"im minority gre+ for the neBt )& years at a rate of 2E per annum 2a high rate7 and one that doesnFt seem to e supported y signs of an ongoing demographic transition37 +hi"e the remainder of the popu"ation shrun! at a rate of &.)E per annum 2a"so a high rate of decrease3 at the end of this )& year period the tota" 0rench popu"ation +ou"d ha6e shrun! y ,E7 and 0ranceFs %us"im popu"ation +ou"d amount to not more than one8fifth of the tota". (") #uslim fertility is !ecreasing The assumption of a high %us"im ferti"ity rate is unrea"istic. 1e ha6e to rea"ise that ferti"ity rate is dec"ining in the countries of origin "i!e 4"geria and %orocco7 Tur!ey and Tunisia. %ore6er7 in Tunisia the ferti"ity rate has fa""en e"o+ the "e6e" of sustenance7 and there is no reason to assume that European %us"im ferti"ity rates +i"" eha6e in another +ay. Societies +ith a certain minima" "e6e" of fema"e autonomy7 fair"y "o+ "i6ing standards7 and access to contracepti6e techno"ogies can ha6e rather "o+ irth rates despite eing genera""y conser6ati6e. ?nce the immigrants ha6e sett"ed in Europe7 their ferti"ity rate7 +here6er measurement is possi "e7 tends to :fa"" in para""e": +ith the indigenous popu"ation:s ferti"ity rate. ($) #uslims ill not !evelop a culture of their o n The assumption of a homogeneity among %us"ims is a fa"se idea7 ecause %us"im immigrants hard"y came from a sing"e cu"tura" ac!ground. ;esides7 the intermarriage rate is estimated rough"y at $&E. If peop"e form re"ationships and marry across different "ines A c"an or tri a"7 ethnic or "inguistic7 nationa" or re"igious A it +i"" e decided"y difficu"t to reproduce ancestra" cu"tures. ;ui"ding a cu"ture from scratch is a"+ays more cost"y than assimi"ating into a cu"ture that a"ready eBists. This assumption can e underpinned y the fact that on"y 1& to 2& percent of %us"ims practice their re"igion. (%)The main issue is integration EuropeFs pro "em +ith its %us"im minority in the ear"y 21st century isnFt a ci6i"iCationa" c"ash. The pro "em is ho+ a "arge immigrant popu"ation7 concentrated in certain geographica" districts can e integrated into the European society. The rea" issue to e de ated is ho+ this integration can e carried out in the est +ay. Those +ho are +orrying a out the gro+ing %us"im popu"ation usua""y emphasiCe the fo""o+ing arguments. (1) &atio of #uslim population ill gro stea!ily 1' =onser6ati6e pro.ections estimate that7 compared to todayFs ) percent7 %us"ims +i"" comprise at "east 2& percent of EuropeFs popu"ation y 2&)&. %us"ims cou"d outnum er
1* 1-

6rance, it' (u'lim', and t)e 6uture. )ttp.// .li9eAournal.com/u'er'/r$mcdpei/40-410.)tml 8imot)y (. %a9age. Europe and >'lam. 3re'cent Waxing, 3ulture' 3la')ing. 8)e 3enter $or %trategic and >nternational %tudie' and t)e (a''ac)u'ett' >n'titute o$ 8ec)nology. 8)e Wa')ington ?uarterly N 2*.3 pp. 25M50. )ttp.// .t O.com/04'ummer/doc'/04'ummer1'a9age.pd$

1*
non8%us"ims in 0rance and perhaps in a"" of +estern Europe y mid8century. 1aiting to fi"" the demographica" gap in Europe there are an estimated 3&& mi""ion %us"ims under the age of 2& +ho are "i6ing a"ong the %editerraneanFs Osouthern rimM A -orth 4frica and the %idd"e East. (") #uslim fertility ill remain high1( %us"im crude irth rate in Europe is current"y more than three times that of non8%us"ims. 0or instance in 0rance the ferti"ity rate of the foreigners remains higher 227#3 than those of nati6es 21773. 4s a comparison7 the ferti"ity rate is on"y 2.3 in Tur!ey and 2., in 4"geria. 4t the ;eginning of their sett"ement7 and since they en.oy hea"th and free ser6ices such as education and nursery7 the migrants tend to ha6e more chi"dren in Europe than in their home countries. ($) #uslim i!entity is strengthening") European %us"ims are not a mono"ithic group7 ho+e6er7 EuropeFs %us"ims are not so di6erse as to entire"y eBc"ude commona"ities. The most important is Is"am. This ne+ interest in faith is especia""y !een among %us"ims orn in Europe7 most"y the chi"dren and grandchi"dren of the immigrants +ho arri6ed in the 1,6&s and F7&s. Indeed7 sur6eys sho+ that many %us"ims in Europe7 especia""y the young7 no+ identify +ith Is"am more than the country either of their heritage or irth A fee"ing accepted in neither p"ace. The %us"im +or"d is o6er+he"ming"y tota"itarianH it does not share 1estern idea"s on +omen or on asic freedoms such as free speech7 a free press7 and freedom to +orship as one sees fit. (%) #uslims !o not integrate"1 Studies in 0rance and 'ermany find that second8 and particu"ar"y third8generation %us"ims are "ess integrated into European societies than their parents or grandparents +ere. The recent headscarf affairs in 0rance and 'ermany underscore and further eBacer ate this asic c"ash. The inf"uentia" 'erman nation+ide dai"y 0ran!furter 4""gemeine Reitung depicts the situation as Ofrightening7M Duestions the prospects of integrating 'ermanyFs gro+ing %us"im popu"ation into society7 and maintains that at "east 1& percent of 'ermanyFs %us"im popu"ationQ$&&7&&& indi6idua"sQare fo""o+ers and supporters of radica" Is"am7 +hose aim is the esta "ishment of an Is"amic state.

1,

>0id 28imot)y (. %a9age4 &n !ncertain Hoad (u'lim' and t)e 6uture o$ Europe. 8)e PEW 6<H!( on religion and pu0lic li$e. 8)e 6orum i' a ProAect o$ t)e PEW He'earc) 3enter #ecem0er 2004. )ttp.//pe $orum.org/doc'/index.p)pF#oc>#G60 21 >0id 28imot)y (. %a9age4
20

1-

Ta "e 2 (opulation, total fertility rate and arable land per capita in some selected countries
Country Population 2004 E)-2% &u'tria Eelgium 3Qec) Hepu0lic #enmark 6inland 6rance :ermany :reece ;ungary >reland >taly "et)erland' Poland Portugal %lo9akia %pain % eden !nited Jingdom Eulgaria Homania 8urkey Hu''ian 6ederation !kraine -.HE/ 0E1EL-(E0 !nited %tate' o$ &merica Kapan A2/34A &%*,+ -,1 10,3 10,2 5,4 5,2 60,4 -2,5 11,0 ,,4,0 5*,3 16,2 3-,6 10,1 5,4 41,1 -,, 5,,4 *,22,3 *2 142,4 4-,2 2,* 12:#P/cap 2002 PPPP 22$++ 2-240 2*350 14500 2,450 25440 261-0 26220 1-240 12-10 2-040 25320 2*4*0 10130 1*350 121,0 20460 250-0 25-*0 6-40 62,0 6120 *-20 4650 35060 260*0 $,+ 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*1 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*2 1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 1,*1,*0 1,*0 1,*0 2,22 2,3 2,3 1,, 2,0 1,2,5 2,0 2,4 2,0 3,, 2,4 2,6 2,3 3,0 2,4 2,, 1,, 2,2 2,2 2,, 5,* 2,0 2,1 2,5 2,1 2+++ 2001 1,,5 2001 2001 2001 1,,, 2000 1,,, 2001 2001 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2000 2001 1,,2000 2000 ,&* 1,3 1,5 1,1 1,* 1,* 1,1,4 1,3 1,3 2,0 1,2 1,* 1,3 1,5 1,2 1,2 1,6 1,6 1,2 1,3 2,5 1,3 1,2 2,1 1,3 Year TFR Year TFR Per capita cropland, 2)a4 2000 +,2* 0,10,0* 0,32 0,40,4* 0,33 0,15 0,3* 0,53 0,25 0,21 0,06 0,30,32 0,51 0,32 0,11 0,51 0,45 0,42

0,6* 0,04 0,25 0,04 0,22 0,25 0,33 0,14 0,23 0,46 0,00,1* 0,10 0,16 0,0* 0,00,11 0,24 0,30,04 0,35

6,3 5,1 "igeria 12* *-0 1,-0 1,,* 5,4 3,6 Egypt *3 3*10 1,*0 1,,, 6,5,, Et)iopia *2 *20 1,-1 1,,*,4 3,1 &lgeria 32 5330 1,** 1,,6 5,, 3,0 (orocco 31 36,0 1,** 1,,, 4,5 :)ana 21 2000 1,6*,1 1,,6 *,4 5,1 3Rte dB>9oire 1* 1430 1,*1,,* 6,4 5,2 3ameroon 16 1640 1,*6 1,,6 A53A 5,* 1,4 3)ina 1313 43,0 1,*0 2001 4,, 3,3 >ndia 10-1 25*0 1,-1 1,,* 5,6 2,6 >ndone'ia 223 2,,0 1,6, 2003 6,0 4,Paki'tan 15* 1,40 1,*0 1,,, 6,1 3,4 Eanglade') 150 1*20 1,*3 1,,* 4,2,* Ciet "am -3 2240 1,** 1,,4 6,0 3,P)ilippine' -1 42-0 1,*1 1,,6 6,4 2,2 >ran 2>'lamic Hepu0lic o$4 *0 6340 1,*5 2000 6,2 2,0 8)ailand 64 66-0 1,6* 1,,5 4,3 1,5 Hepu0lic o$ Jorea 4164-0 1,*0 2000 *,* 4,* %yrian &ra0 Hepu0lic 13250 1,*0 1,,1 %ource. World 6ertility Heport 2003. !" #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial &$$air'. 12 (arc) 2004

1,

- 3 !mmigration and political parties Pu "ic support for immigration Pu "ic opinion po""s suggest there is "itt"e pu "ic support for further immigration. 0or eBamp"e7 a po"" pu "ished in the 'erman ne+spaper *ie +oche in Ku"y 2&&& sho+ed that 63 per cent of those inter6ie+ed thought that 'ermany did not need any more immigrants.22 9The idea that immigrants might e part of the army of "a our that +i"" !eep the industria" economy going hasn:t caught on yet79 says =hristopher (us ands7 a socio"ogist at the /ondon Schoo" of Economics. 23 Po"itica" shift to the right"%7 "5 In the "ast decade7 the gro+th and 6isi i"ity of EuropeFs %us"im popu"ation ha6e a"so gi6en ne+ "ife to radica" right8+ing parties. 0or instance in 2&&27 0ranceFs anti8immigrant po"itician Kean %arie /e Pen eat President KacDues =hiracFs main opponent7 then Socia"ist Prime %inister /ione" Kospin7 in the first round of presidentia" 6oting. In Ita"y7 the anti8immigration -orthern /eague and -ationa"ist 4""iance performed +e"" in the 2&&1 e"ections and remain important partners of Prime %inister Si"6io ;er"usconiFs center8right go6erning coa"ition. Pim 0ortuyn7 a socio"ogist from the Dutch city of Gotterdam argued that immigration shou"d e ha"ted ecause much of Is"am is O ac!+ardM or incompati "e +ith modern7 1estern 6a"ues7 "i!e to"erance. (o""andFs core 6a"ues +ou"d e radica""y a"tered if it a""o+ed the %us"im popu"ation to continue to gro+ unchec!ed7 he +arned. %r 0ortuyn +anted to integrate immigrants a"ready in the -ether"ands7 rather than eBpe" them. This right+ard shift has een most e6ident in actions to restrict immigration and an increased emphasis on nationa" interests in EU po"icy de ates7 ut it is a"so ref"ected in recent mo6es such as those in 0rance and 'ermany to an the +earing of the %us"im headscarf in pu "ic schoo"s7 and y the -ether"ands to eBpe" up to 267&&& asy"um see!ers. The !ind of impact that a fast8gro+ing %us"im citiCenry +i"" ha6e on nationa" po"itics in European states remains to e seen. To date7 EuropeFs %us"ims ha6e not engaged road"y in European party po"itics. %ainstream po"iticians on immigration",7 "Union "eaders as a +ho"e are for immigration7 ut many of them emphasiCe the need of higher integration. In ;ritain7 former (ome Secretary Da6id ;"un!ett proposed a 9-ationa"ity7 Immigration and 4sy"um ;i""9 +hich +ou"d impose stricter measures against peop"e coming into the country see!ing asy"um. (e +ants to etter integrate ;ritain:s ethnic communities and says that immigrants shou"d adopt ;ritish customs. ;ut at the same time he a"so p"ans to a""o+ easier "ega" immigration for +or!ers +hose s!i""s are needed. In (o""and as a conseDuence of the *an 'ogh assassination many commentators and officia"s ha6e ca""ed on %us"ims to accept (o""andFs "i era" 6a"ues A either 6o"untari"y or y go6ernment coercion. 4nd this 6ie+ is supported y a su stantia" ma.ority7 +ith one recent sur6ey sho+ing that #& percent of the popu"ation fa6ours harsher measures to force integration.

22

6orld 7igration 2++#: 7anaging 7igration - 48allenges and /esponses for (eople on t8e 7ove' 3-79 3nternational -rganisation for 7igration :eneve' 48apter #: >nternational 5a0our (igration and #emograp)ic 3)ange in Europe 23 Home') Hatne'ar 5ondon. Jnocking on EuropeB' #oor. #e'pite e$$ort' to keep t)em out, an in$lux o$ immigrant' i' reca'ting t)e 3ontinentB' identity. European economie' need more o$ t)em. 8>(E E!H<PE, Kuly 03, 2000 C<5. 155 "<. 25 24 >0id 28imot)y (. %a9age4 25 >0id 2&n !ncertain Hoad (u'lim' and t)e 6uture o$ Europe.4 26 Europe and >mmigration. <n t)e EE3 e0+'ite )ttp.//ne '.00c.co.uk/)i/engli')/'tatic/in1dept)/ orld/2002/europe1and1immigration/$rance.'tm 2* >0id 2&n !ncertain Hoad (u'lim' and t)e 6uture o$ Europe.4

20
;e"gian Interior %inister Patric! De+ae" condemned cu"tures O+here +omen are put in a position of inferiority ecause they ha6e to co6er up their odiesM A a direct reference to Is"amic practice. Ita"ian Prime %inister Si"6io ;er"usconi +as more open +hen he contro6ersia""y dec"ared that Is"amic ci6i"iCation is inferior to that of the 1est. Spanish Interior %inister7 %ariano Ga.oy7 has saidI 9The hope must e that peop"e integrate. If an immigrant +ants to "i6e here and c"aim his rights7 he +i"" ha6e o "igations "i!e "earning to spea! the "anguage +e a"" spea! here.9 Edmund Stoi er7 ;a6arian go6ernor7 +as more determined on the issueI O1e can:t afford to eBpand immigration +hen7 in terms of integration7 +e can:t cope +ith the eBisting immigrationM he said. 4nd former socia"8democratic chance""or (e"mut Schmidt a"so has the opinion that Otoo many foreigners had een admitted as a resu"t of idea"istic thin!ing9. - 2 The common immigration policy of the E' 1ith the adoption of the 4msterdam Treaty in 1,,,7 immigration came +ithin the competence of the EU and since then efforts ha6e een under+ay to formu"ate common EU ru"es. The right of each mem er state to regu"ate the "e6e" of immigration continues to e recognised y the EU and it is emphasiCed in 4rtic"e III8267 of the ne+ EU =onstitution. The =ommission in its Kanuary 2&&) 'reen Paper accepts this pro6ision ut states that there is a need for a harmonised set of procedures and criteria for admission +hich +ou"d sti"" "ea6e mem er states: discretion on the num er of migrants to admit. The main steps of the common immigration po"icy are the fo""o+ing.

1,,* 8)e &m'terdam 8reaty

The first step for a common po"icy +as the Treaty of 4msterdam 21,,73 +hich ca""ed for a common asy"um and immigration po"icy to e dra+n up y 2&&$. ?cto er 1,,, Tampere summit 4t the Tampere Summit of ?cto er 1,,,7 EU %em er States agreed on four !ey areas +here common po"icy +i"" e esta "ishedI A partnership +ith the countries of originH A a common European asy"um systemH A fair treatment of third country nationa"sH A more efficient management of migration f"o+s. Septem er 2&&1 =ommission directi6e In 2&&17 the =ommission came up +ith a proposed directi6e 2=?% 22&&13 3#63 +hich sought to "ay do+n common criteria for admission and pro6ide a sing"e nationa" app"ication procedure. (o+e6er7 the proposa" did not meet +ith appro6a" from the =ounci". Kune 2&&2 Se6i""e summit =oncern o6er immigration has increased in Europe since the 11 Septem er terrorist attac!s7 as +e"" as7 e"ections in se6era" EU countries +hich ha6e rought anti8immigration forces to po+er. These +ere the main reasons that the Kune 2&&2 Se6i""e =ounci" made the common immigration po"icy a priority issue emphasiCing the need for a comprehensi6e p"an to manage migration f"o+s and com at i""ega" immigration. The summit ca""ed on the =ounci" and the =ommission to gi6e asy"um and immigration po"icy top priority and to speed up the "egis"ati6e +or! in this area. 2Se6i""e =ounci" +e 8siteI httpI55europa.eu.int5comm5se6i""eScounci"5indeBSen.htm"3 Kune 2&&3 =ommission communication In Kune 2&&37 the =ommission adopted a po"icy paper on immigration 2=?%22&&33 336 fina"37 integration and emp"oyment in +hich it ca""s on the EU %em er States to step up their efforts to integrate immigrants.

21
Septem er 2&&3 EU interior ministers are setting Duotas Immigration Duotas ha6e "ong een a ta oo issue ut in Septem er 2&&3 EU interior ministers ha6e decided to study an Ita"ian p"an to introduce Duotas for immigration into the European Union7 designed to contro" the f"o+ of i""ega" immigrants. These Duotas +ou"d e indicati6e targets saying ho+ many peop"e are needed in certain +or! sectors. They +ou"d not e "in!ed to nationa"ities. -ationa" go6ernments and emp"oyers: federations +ou"d determine these Duotas together. -o6em er 2&&$ the (ague Programme In -o6em er 2&&$7 the =ommission adopted the (ague Programme7 +hich p"edged to pro6ide an area of freedom7 security and .ustice to citiCens of the EU. 4mong others the program saysI MInternationa" migration +i"" continue. 4 comprehensi6e approach7 in6o"6ing a"" stages of migration7 +ith respect to the root causes of migration7 entry and admission po"icies and integration and return po"icies is needed. 2Presidency =onc"usions A ;russe"s7 $5) -o6em er 2&&$ 4--ET I.3 -o6em er 2&&$ European =ounci" EU "eaders meeting at the European counci" from the $ th8)th -o6em er agreed a ne+ fi6e8year 22&&)8 2&1&3 Program 29Tampere II93 for c"oser cooperation in asy"um7 .ustice and home affairs. Kanuary 2&&) 'reen Paper ?n 11 Kan 2&&) the =ommission adopted a 'reen Paper7 9?n an EU approach to managing economic migration9. The aim is to stimu"ate a de ate on ho+ est to regu"ate the entry and residence of third8 country nationa"s +ho are see!ing emp"oyment in the EU. The 'reen Paper see!s to open a +ide discussion on the scope of entry permission +hich shou"d e granted at EU "e6e". The possi i"ity is raised of the introduction of a US8sty"e :green card: +hich +ou"d gi6e an indi6idua" the right to +or! throughout the EU. - 4 !mmigration policy of mem*er states "' Since the 7&s7 "ega" immigration into the EU has een restricted to cases of fami"y reunification and cases +here +or! 2inc"uding 6ocationa" training and 6o"unteering3 or study permits ha6e een granted. The de"ay in formu"ating a common po"icy stems from conf"icting 6ie+s throughout the "oc. There is particu"ar contro6ersy in 'ermany +here the Socia" Democrat go6ernment and conser6ati6e opposition ha6e negotiated their o+n immigration "a+. The European =ommission +ou"d reDuire mem er states to ta!e on more immigrants than the current 'erman i"" a""o+s. EU mem er statesF migration po"icy is inf"uenced y a fear of ageing popu"ations and s!i""s shortages on the one hand7 and +idespread opposition from Europeans to increased migration on the other hand. 0or this reason the practice of the indi6idua" mem er states is scattering in a +ide range. .ermany 'ermany is a popu"ar destination for migrants7 ut immigration is ecoming increasing"y contro6ersia". 4 "a+ designed to tighten up asy"um ru"es and encourage integration +as passed. It pro6ides for 'erman "essons for immigrants a"ready in 'ermany and aims to gi6e preference to professiona" +or!ers in future. The "a+ +i"" grant 2&7&&& green cards to foreign technica" persons o6er the neBt three years. France Kean %arie /e Pen:s re"ati6e success in the 0rench presidentia" e"ection +as a sign that in many parts of 0rance there is resentment against immigrants7 especia""y those from -orth and 1est 4frica. ;ut for many 0rench8spea!ing immigrants 0rance is a magnet. *isa "a+s are app"ied on"y "oose"y and many find it easy
2-

(ain 'ource. Europe and >mmigration. <n t)e EE3 e0+'ite )ttp.//ne '.00c.co.uk/)i/engli')/'tatic/in1dept)/ orld/2002/europe1and1immigration/'pain.'tm

22
to stay. The ne+ right8+ing go6ernment +i"" try to change thatI asy"um see!ers must +ait 12 months for a +or! permit. /i!e other European countries7 0rance faces the di"emma of mu"ti8cu"tura"ism 6ersus integration. In the past7 the 6a"ue of communities retaining their identities has een stressed. These days7 the pendu"um has s+ung7 and etter integration is the aim. /nite! 0ing!om 0ormer (ome Secretary Da6id ;"un!ett:s 9-ationa"ity7 Immigration and 4sy"um ;i""9 +ou"d impose stricter measures against peop"e coming into the country see!ing asy"um. %r ;"un!ett a"so +ants to etter integrate ;ritain:s ethnic communities7 for instance immigrants shou"d adopt ;ritish customs. (e a"so p"ans to a""o+ easier "ega" immigration for +or!ers +hose s!i""s are needed. Today the ma.ority of sett"ements are for fami"y reasons7 typica""y +hen someone marries a foreigner. The neBt "argest category of sett"ement is +or!8re"ated. Peop"e +ho ha6e een "ega""y resident and +or!ing in the UJ for fi6e years can as! for permanent residentia" status. Some 1)E of sett"ements are peop"e +ho ha6e een accepted as refugees. Italy The "o+er house of the Ita"ian par"iament has passed a series of anti8immigration measures s+ift"y condemned y opposition groups as 9un.ust and racist9. Jno+n as the ;ossi80ini "a+ after its creators7 it must a"so e appro6ed y the upper house efore it can ecome "a+. If it passes this second hurd"e7 non8 EU foreigners +i"" on"y e a "e to "i6e in the country if they ha6e arranged +or! efore entering7 and they +i"" recei6e a residency permit on"y for the duration of their emp"oyment contracts 8 up to a maBimum of t+o years. The i"" a"so ma!es fami"y reunions more difficu"t 8 immigrants +i"" on"y e a""o+ed to ring their chi"dren to .oin them if they are under 1#. Spain Spain is considering ending its po"icy of a""o+ing i""ega" immigrants to acDuire "ega" status after fi6e years. It is ca""ing its po"icy 9hospita"ity +ith responsi i"ity9 8 acceptance of those +ho ha6e a right to e thereH re.ection of those +ho do not. 4 %ay 2&&2 opinion po"" found that 6&E of Spaniards "in! immigrants to increased crime. T+o thirds of those said they e"ie6ed Spaniards +ere ecoming "ess to"erant of immigrants. *enmar1 Denmar!7 traditiona""y "i era" in its immigration po"icies7 has recent"y adopted a more Duestioning stance on the issue. -e+ "a+s designed to ma!e "ife tougher for immigrants and dissuade others from e6en thin!ing of going there +ere recent"y appro6ed. Immigrants +i"" ha6e to +ait se6en years instead of three efore they Dua"ify for fu"" +e"fare enefits. This is supposed to ma!e them see! +or!. To reduce the num er of arranged marriages7 the age at +hich someone can marry a foreigner and ring him or her in is raised from 1# to 2$. Irelan! Some go6ernments ha6e ta!en modest steps for immigrationI Ire"and is +eighing proposa"s for an infusion of 2&&7&&& s!i""ed +or!ers o6er the neBt se6en years.

5 &emographic forecast
5 1 'nited ,ation5s pro6ections United -ations Popu"ation Di6ision carried out a research +hether the migration +ou"d e a so"ution to the dec"ining and ageing popu"ation of the de6e"oped countries. 2, 4ccording to the pro.ections 2medium 6ariant37 Kapan and 6irtua""y a"" the countries of Europe are eBpected to decrease in popu"ation siCe o6er the neBt )& years. In addition these countries are undergoing a re"ati6e"y rapid ageing process. To maintain the popu"ation at the present "e6e" the European Union 2EU81)3 needs some $7 mi""ion net
2,

!nited "ation Population #i9i'ion. Heplacement (igration. >' it a %olution to declining and &geing Population'F (arc) 2000.

23
immigrants in the period of 2&&&82&)&. If the goa" +as to !eep the num er of the +or!ing8age popu"ation 21) to 6$ years3 at the present "e6e" the European Union 2EU81)3 +ou"d need #& mi""ion net immigrants. The same goa"s for the en"arged Union 2EU82)3 +ou"d reDuire additiona" 1& and 17 mi""ion net immigrants respecti6e"y. 0rom the unchanged +or!ing age popu"ation scenario 2#& mi""ion net immigrants3 comes the often mentioned 176 mi""ion year"y net immigrants Europe is ad6ised to recei6e. The Popu"ation Di6ision prepared se6era" scenarios a"so for a "onger time8period up to 23&&. These pro.ections +ere ui"t on the resu"ts pu "ished in 1or"d Popu"ation ProspectsI The 2&&2 Ge6ision7 +hich co6ers the period 2&&&82&)& 4"" pro.ection scenarios share the assumption that morta"ity +i"" dec"ine steadi"y after 2&)&. In addition7 in a"" scenarios net internationa" migration is assumed to e Cero after 2&)&. 2;et+een 2&&)82&)& it is assumed that the tendencies characterised at the eginning of the 21st century +i"" continue +ith some 2 mi""ion migrants in a year7 approBimate"y ha"f of them to the European Union.3 In the 23&& pro.ection the rea" differences among scenarios are in the ferti"ity rates. The medium scenario assumes that the tota" ferti"ity of each country +i"" reach e"o+ rep"acement 2constant8popu"ation3 "e6e" and remain at those "e6e"s for a out 1&& years7 after +hich it +i"" return to rep"acement "e6e" and remain there unti" 23&&. In the high scenario tota" ferti"ity after 2&)& is assumed to e a Duarter of a chi"d higher than in the medium scenario and to remain constant at 2.3) chi"dren per +oman +hen the medium scenario sta i"iCes at rep"acement "e6e". Simi"ar"y7 in the "o+ scenario tota" ferti"ity is assumed to e &.2) of a chi"d "o+er than in the medium scenario7 and to remain constant at 1.#) chi"dren per +oman +hen the medium scenario sett"es at rep"acement "e6e". 4ccording to the medium scenario7 +or"d popu"ation rises from 6.1 i""ion persons in 2&&& to a maBimum of ,.2 i""ion persons in 2&7)7 dec"ining thereafter to reach #.3 i""ion in 217). /ater on7 in the 23rd century it sta i"ises to around #8, i""ion. 0uture popu"ation siCe is high"y sensiti6e to sma"" ut sustained de6iations of ferti"ity from the rep"acement 2constant8popu"ation3 "e6e". Thus7 the "o+ scenario resu"ts in a dec"ining popu"ation that reaches 2.3 i""ion in 23&& and the high scenario "eads to a gro+ing popu"ation that rises to 36.$ i""ion y 23&& 2ta "e 33. 4"" scenarios resu"t in significant shifts in the geographica" distri ution of the +or"d popu"ation. 4ccording to the medium scenario7 the share of 4frica +ou"d dou "e 2passing from 13 per cent of the +or"d popu"ation in 2&&& to 2$ per cent in 23&&37 +hereas that of 4sia +ou"d drop y a out ten per cent 2from 61 per cent in 2&&& to )) per cent in 23&&3 and that of Europe y a out ha"f 2from 12 per cent in 2&&& to 7 per cent in 23&&3. Ta "e 3 Population of the ma6or areas according to different scenarios 200072)00 2mi""ion3 %a.or area 4frica 4sia /atin 4m. -orthern 4m. Europe ?ceania 1or"d 2&&& 7,6 36#& )2& 316 72# 31 6&71 /o+ 2&)& 1)16 $27$ 623 3,1 )6) $& 7$&, %edium 2&)& 21&& 1#&3 22)$ )222 )&1, 76# 733 $$# 632 $6 #,1, $7$ )3# $6 ,&6$ (igh 2&)& 2122 631# ,2$ )12 7&) )2 1&633

21&& 1)&# 2#6$ $&7 31# 362 31 )$,&

23&& 62& 11$3 163 16# 2&& 16 231&

23&& 2113 $,$3 723 )3$ 611 $# #,72

21&& 323) #&6& 1171 6,) 7,& 67 1$&1#

23&& 7,62 2&,,$ 311$ 1,,# 22&$ 172 36$$$

SourceI United -ation Department of Economic and Socia" 4ffairs7 Popu"ation Di6isionI 1or"d popu"ation in 23&& United -ation -L. 2&&$

24
5 2 The forecasting model The United -ation:s pro.ections do not co6er a"" the possi "e scenarios. ;esides7 there are issues A important for the European Union A that are not inc"uded in the U- papers. This +as the reason +hy +e +or!ed out an o+n demographic mode" and made se6era" scenario +ith it. ?ur mode" ra!es do+n the popu"ation into 2& fi6e8year age cohort &8$7 )8,7 1&81$ years and so on up to ,)81&& for oth seBes. Unfortunate"y +e suppose that e6ery ody +i"" die y the age of 1&&7 ut +e +ish good hea"th to a"" +ho in rea"ty don:t. 0rom the age8specific death and irth rate p"us the net migration the mode" ca"cu"ates the popu"ation for the fo""o+ing )8year period. The asic data +ere ta!en from different Eurostat and United -ations pu "ications. To present arguments for the current de ates regarding the ratio of the %us"im popu"ation the mode" consists of t+o partsI one7 +hich ca"cu"ates the de6e"opments in the %us"im popu"ation7 and the other7 +hich does the same for the non8%us"im popu"ation. The data for the %us"im popu"ation come from Eurostat data for immigrants and U- data for north84frican and midd"e8 East countries7 and this is supp"emented y information from ne+spaper artic"es7 internet sources and o+n ca"cu"ations. The physica" representation of the mode" is an EBce" ta "e +here one sheet represents the so8ca""ed contro" pane" from +here the input parameters can e changed 2see ta "e $3. In the same contro" pane" there are a"so the resu"ts 2output parameters3 of the pro.ection. The changea "e parameters are the death and irth rates7 the num er of immigrants7 the ratio of %us"ims from the immigrants and the +or!force participation rate. In the case of death and irth rate the changes sha"" e gi6en as a difference from the asic data. The parameter of 1 on the contro" pane" represents that A in the gi6en time8period A the asic parameters are used. If these parameters are changed7 for instance7 to 171 it means that the death or irth rate +i"" increase y 1&E "inear"y a"ong a"" the age cohorts. ;ecause the input and output parameters are in the same sheet and +indo+7 the resu"ts can e seen immediate"y. In this +ay7 for instance7 +ith the parameters for the irth rate7 the tota" ferti"ity rate can e set to the desired "e6e". The output is ca"cu"ated for each fifth year et+een 2&&) and 2&)& and7 using the unchanged input parameters of 2&$)82&)&7 for the year of 21&&. The mode" a"so ca"cu"ates the a6erage 'DP gro+th rate for the period of 2&&)82&)&. In this case +e assume that the gro+th of the 'DP5capita +i"" e constant"y 2E in the +ho"e 2&&)82&)& period 22E is the a6erage secu"ar trend for de6e"oped countries3 and the 'DP gro+th is determined y the +or!ing age 21)8 6$ years3 popu"ation and the participation rate 2the ratio of emp"oyed and unemp"oyed to the +or!ing age popu"ation3.

25
Ta "e $

;<A31E; 54E<A/33)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+meter (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' >mmigrant' Hate o$ yearly (u'lim', a9erage @ 2million4 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* 1,,, 16,2 46,-

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 36-,6 +*1,0 235,4 16,* ,1,6 *4,, 20*,2 456,2 460,2 3,, 442,6

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 41,* 1*,5 35,4 8otal 4,,2 66,6 1*,4 65,2

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,+0,, 1,41,41,411,3 1*,1,,0

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 2,3 1,4 2,* 2,* 2,* 4,0 5,,,0

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 63 1,**

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 200 5 *6,* 205 0 **,-

26
Ta "e )

7uslim=s total fertility rate decreases to 2, > no immigration after 2+&%

3)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+meter (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' >mmigrant' Hate o$ yearly (u'lim', a9erage @ 2million4 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 0,0 *5

1 1 1 1 1 0,, 1 1 0,1 1 0,*6 1 1 0,*6 1 1 0,*6 1 1 0,*6 1 1 0,*6 1 1 0,*6 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* 1*,2 13,6 26,3

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 36*,1 +*2,5 215,3 16,* *6,5 5,,*6,456,2 443,5 +12,* 2,2,1

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 43,2 1,,0 45,2 8otal 4,,2 66,4 1*,2 6,,2

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,, +1,1 1,41,41,411,3 1*,1,,,

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 0,+0,2 2,* 2,1 2,1 4,0 6,4 15,0

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 63 1,6,

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 2005 2050 *6,*0 **,-5 Ta "e 6

?A534 54E<A/3-

2*
3)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+meter (u'lim population #eat) para+ meter 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' >mmigrant' Hate o$ yearly (u'lim', a9erage @ 2million4 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 1,20 *5 0,0 *5

1 1 1 1,1 1 0,, 1,2 1 0,1,3 1 0,*6 1,4 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* 15,4 11,16,3

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 41-,+20,* 3,5,6 16,* *6,5 5,,*6,456,2 4,5,3 3,,0 4*2,4

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 3,,4 15,1 33,6 8otal 4,,2 6,,4 20,2 65,0

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,4 0,1 1,42,10 2,10 11,3 16,1 13,3

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 0,+0,2 2,* 2,1 2,1 4,0 6,4 15,0

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 63 1,,0

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 2005 2050 *6,*0 **,61 Ta "e 7

,* million yearly net immigrants

3)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population (u'lim population >mmigrant'

2#eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' yearly a9erage 2million4 1,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 0,0 Hate o$ (u'lim', @ *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5

6ertility para+meter

#eat) para+ meter

1 1 1 1,1 1 0,, 1,2 1 0,1,3 1 0,*6 1,4 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* 1-,0 14,3 1-,,

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 424,4 +15,2 401,3 16,* ,3,2 *6,5 ,3,4 456,2 51*,6 61,3 4,4,6

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 3-,3 14,0 33,6 8otal 4,,2 6-,2 1,,0 65,0

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,3 0,0 1,42,10 2,10 11,3 16,0 13,3

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 0,+0,2 2,* 2,1 2,1 4,0 6,1 15,1

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 63 2,01

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 2005 2050 *6,*0 **,40 Ta "e #

+,# million yearly net immigrants

3)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population (u'lim population >mmigrant'

2,
#eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' yearly a9erage 2million4 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,0 Hate o$ (u'lim', @ *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5

6ertility para+meter

#eat) para+ meter

1 1 1 1,1 1 0,, 1,2 1 0,1,3 1 0,*6 1,4 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* -,* 5,1 ,,4

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 406,3 +33,2 3-2,, 16,* 3-,22,1 3,,6 456,2 445,1 +11,1 422,5

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 42,4 1-,1 33,5 8otal 4,,2 *2,* 23,5 65,1

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,4 0,1 1,42,10 2,10 11,3 16,5 13,2

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 0,6 +0,1 2,* 2,1 2,1 4,0 -,0 14,4

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 63 1,61

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 2005 2050 *6,*0 *-,11 Ta "e ,

+,# million yearly net immigrants@8ig8er participation rate

3)angea0le parameter' "on (u'lim population (u'lim population >mmigrant'

30
#eat) para+ meter 2005+10 2010+15 2015+20 2020+25 2025+30 2030+35 2035+40 2040+45 2045+50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6ertility para+ meter >mmigrant' yearly a9erage 2million4 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,0 Hate o$ (u'lim', @ *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5 *5

6ertility para+meter

#eat) para+ meter

1 1 1 1,1 1 0,, 1,2 1 0,1,3 1 0,*6 1,4 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 1,42 1 0,*6 2050+2100 >#E"8>3&5 W>8; 2045+2050 Hatio o$ (u'lim' @ 3,* -,* 5,1 ,,4

Population 2million4 "on+ (u'lim 8otal (u'lim 2005 2050 #i$$ 05+50 2100 43,,5 406,3 +33,2 3-2,, 16,* 3-,22,1 3,,6 456,2 445,1 +11,1 422,5

#ependency ratio@ <ld age 24,3 42,4 1-,1 33,5 8otal 4,,2 *2,* 23,5 65,1

"on+(u'lim' population &9erage 8otal 3rude yearly $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 2005+10 2045+50 20,5+00 0,1 +0,4 0,1 1,42,10 2,10 11,3 16,5 13,2

(u'lim population Iearly 8otal 3rude a9erage $ertility deat) rate gro t) rate @ rate @ 6,5 0,6 +0,1 2,* 2,1 2,1 4,0 -,0 14,4

Participation rate, @ 2005 63 2050 &9erage yearly :#P gro t) rate 2005+2050 2@4 *0 1,-5

5i$e expectancy at 0irt) 2year4 2005 2050 *6,*0 *-,11

31

Literature
214 &n !ncertain Hoad (u'lim' and t)e 6uture o$ Europe. 8)e PEW 6<H!( on religion and pu0lic li$e. 8)e 6orum i' a ProAect o$ t)e PEW He'earc) 3enter #ecem0er 2004. )ttp.//pe $orum.org/doc'/index.p)pF#oc>#G60 224 8)e #emi'e <$ We'tern Europe #ecem0er 13, 2004 Ey Erian W. Peter'on )ttp.// .con'er9ati9etrut).org/article.p)pFidG2666 234 &naly'i' 0y t)e European (onitoring centre on Haci'm and xenop)o0ia 220014 on 0a'i' o$ t)e data o$ t)e Euro0arometer 53. &ttitude' to ard' minority group' in t)e European union. >n. 8)e 'ocial 'ituation in t)e European !nion 2002 Euro'tat 244 8imot)y (. %a9age. Europe and >'lam. 3re'cent Waxing, 3ulture' 3la')ing. 8)e 3enter $or %trategic and >nternational %tudie' and t)e (a''ac)u'ett' >n'titute o$ 8ec)nology. 8)e Wa')ington ?uarterly N 2*.3 pp. 25M50. )ttp.// .t O.com/04'ummer/doc'/04'ummer1'a9age.pd$ 254 3ommunication $rom t)e 3ommi''ion to t)e 3ouncil, t)e European parliament, t)e European Economic and %ocial 3ommittee and t)e 3ommittee o$ t)e Hegion' on immigration, integration and employment. Eru''el', 3.6.2003 3<( 220034 336 $inal 264 EE3 "e ' e0+'ite. 6act $ile. :lo0al migration )ttp.//ne '.00c.co.uk/2/')ared/'pl/)i/ orld/04/migration/)tml/migration10oom.'tm 2*4 Europe and >mmigration. <n t)e EE3 e0+'ite )ttp.//ne '.00c.co.uk/)i/engli')/'tatic/in1dept)/ orld/2002/europe1and1immigration/$rance.'tm 2-4 EuropeB' immigration 0reakdo n (andato da 9ette6*'tinger CenerdD, 1* dicem0re 2004, 00.34. Ey 3laude %al)ani )ttp.// .legno'torto.com/node.p)pFidG23326 2,4 Euro'tat. 8)e %ocial %ituation in t)e European !nion 2002, p 4* 2He$. to. Palinda %. and al., 1,,,, 7de9iant 0e)a9iour and t)e criminali'ation o$ immigrant'=, in (>:H>"6 re'earc) proAect $ounded 0y t)e European 3ommi''ion+%<E1+38,5+30054 2104 5ind'ey :rant . 7Heplacement (igration=. 8)e !" Population #i9i'ion on European Population #ecline. Population and En9ironment. & Kournal o$ >nterdi'ciplinary %tudie' Colume 22, "um0er 4, (arc) 2001 2114 (att %urman, 78urk' &rri9ed #ecade' &go in :ermany and (ade 8)em'el9e' at ;ome, #e'pite <ut'ider %tatu',= 8)e &''ociated Pre'', <ct. *, 2004. 2124 Home') Hatne'ar 5ondon. Jnocking on EuropeB' #oor. #e'pite e$$ort' to keep t)em out, an in$lux o$ immigrant' i' reca'ting t)e 3ontinentB' identity. European economie' need more o$ t)em. 8>(E E!H<PE, Kuly 03, 2000 C<5. 155 "<. 25 2134 8)e European 3)allenge M (e''age $rom t)e European Hound 8a0le o$ >ndu'triali't' to t)e %pring European 3ouncil, (arc) 2003 2144 !nited "ation Population #i9i'ion. 220004. Heplacement (igration. >' it a %olution to declining and &geing Population'F. "e Iork, "I. !nited "ation' 2154 !nited "ation #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial &$$air', Population #i9i'ion. World population in 2300 !nited "ation "I. 2004 2164 World 6ertility Heport 2003. !" #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial &$$air'. 12 (arc) 2004 21*4 World (igration 2003. (anaging (igration + 3)allenge' and He'pon'e' $or People on t)e (o9e. ><(M >nternational <rgani'ation $or (igration :ene9e. 3)apter 13. >nternational 5a0our (igration and #emograp)ic 3)ange in Europe

32 5ources of figures and tables

2igure and 2igure 2 214 Eira0en, Kean+"oel, 1,-0, &n E''ay 3oncerning (ankindB' E9olution, Population, %elected Paper', #ecem0er, ta0le 2. 224 #urand, Ko)n #., 1,*4, S;i'torical E'timate' o$ World Population. &n E9aluation,S !ni9er'ity o$ Penn'yl9ania, Population 3enter, &nalytical and 8ec)nical Heport', "um0er 10, ta0le 2. 234 ;au0, 3arl, 1,,5, S;o (any People ;a9e E9er 5i9ed on Eart)FS Population 8oday, 6e0ruary, p. 5. 244 (cE9edy, 3olin and Hic)ard Kone', 1,*-, S&tla' o$ World Population ;i'tory,S 6act' on 6ile, "e Iork, pp. 342+351. 254 8)omlin'on, Halp), 1,*5, S#emograp)ic Pro0lem', 3ontro9er'y <9er Population 3ontrol,S %econd Edition, 8a0le 1. 264 !nited "ation' 2!"4, 1,*3, 8)e #eterminant' and 3on'eOuence' o$ Population 8rend', Population %tudie', "o. 50., p.10. 2*4 !nited "ation', 1,,,, 8)e World at %ix Eillion, 8a0le 1, SWorld Population 6rom Iear 0 to %ta0iliQationS, p. 5, 2-4 )ttp.// .un.org/e'a/population/pu0lication'/'ix0illion/'ix0ilpart1.pd$ 2,4 !.%. Eureau o$ t)e 3en'u' 2!%E34, 2002, S8otal (idyear Population $or t)e World. 1,50+2050S, #ata updated 10+10+2002, 2104 )ttp.// .cen'u'.go9/ipc/ / orldpop.)tml 2114 !nited "ation. World population in 2300. !nited "ation 2004 2igure # 214 CilaggaQda'agi idT'orok 1-60+1,60 J%; 1,65 23entral %tati'tical <$$ice o$ ;ungary4 224 World #e9elopment >ndicator', 2001 8)e World Eank 2igure & 214 !nited "ation' + World Population Pro'pect' 28)e 1,,- He9i'ion4 224 !.%. Eureau o$ t)e 3en'u' + >nternational #ata Ea'e 234 Population %tati'tic' Euro'tat 2004 2igure % 214 European 'ocial 'tati'tic', #emograp)y 2002 edition, Euro'tat 224 Heproduction rate' $or 1,,0+2002 and >ntri'tic Hate' $or 2000+2001. !nited %tate' 0y Erady E. ;amilton, P).#., #i9i'ion o$ Cital %tati'tic' "ational Cital %tati'tic' Heport, Colume 52, "um0er 1* 2(arc) 1-, 20044 !.%. #epartment o$ ;ealt) and ;uman %er9ice', "ational center $or )ealt) 'tati'tic' 2igure * 214 !nited "ation. World 6ertility Heport 2003. )ttp.// .un.org/e'a/population/pu0lication'/ orld$ertility/World16ertility1Heport.)tm 224 !"6P& %tate o$ World population 2004, !" Population 6und 2igure , 214 Population %tati'tic', Euro'tat 2004 .able 214 %tati'tic' "or ay, )ttp.// .''0.no/engli')/'u0Aect'/02/02/10/$odte1en/arki9/ta0+2001+05+2,+05+en.)tml

.able 2 214 World 6ertility Heport 2003. !" #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial &$$air'. 12 (arc) 2004 .able # !nited "ation #epartment o$ Economic and %ocial &$$air', Population #i9i'ion. World population in 2300 !nited "ation "I. 2004

33

:lossary
Asylum-seeAer M a per'on )o i' 'eeking a'ylum. !ntil a determination i' made, it i' impo''i0le to 'ay )et)er t)e a'ylum+'eeker i' a re$ugee or not. Economic migrant M a per'on )o mo9e' countrie' in order to take up a Ao0 or 'eek a 0etter economic $uture. 3mmigrant M a per'on )o )a' 'ettled permanently in anot)er country. >mmigrant' c)oo'e to mo9e, )erea' re$ugee' are $orced to $lee. 7igrant M a per'on )o i' out'ide t)eir country o$ origin. /efugee M a per'on )o i' $orced to $lee $rom per'ecution.