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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Eastern Region

Type of event: Interview with John McCartney
Date: Wednesday, December 17,2003
Special Access Issues: ID Check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: 1 Aviation Plaza, Jamaica, NY 11434
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary McCartney. McCarthy (Office of Regional
Counsel, Eastern Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P
718-553-3259, F 718-995-5699)
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Farmer, John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown

Note: Please refer to the interview recording for further details.

Background:

McCartney started with the FAA in December of 1981 with Los Angeles TRACON. In
1987he became a supervisor at Coast TRACON. He was there until 1991. He worked as
a project manager consolidating southern Californian TRACONs after that. In 1995 he
became Assistant Air Traffic Manager at John Wayne Tower. In September of 1998 he
-became Operations Branch Manager Eastern Region for the Air Traffic Division. He is
currently Assistant Air Traffic Manager for the Eastern Region.

The operations branch of the Eastern Region FAA handles procedures between different
facilities. They coordinate the sequencing and flow of air traffic. They also deal with
military operations coordination. Further, the operations branch is responsible for
coordination between facilities and branches. In this capacity, they focus on applying new
procedures and changes to the use of air traffic flows to accommodate new priorities.

Chain of Command on 9/11:

McCartney reported to Rick DuCharme and, above DuCharme, Frank Hatfield. On 9/11
Hatfield was the Air Traffic Division Manager. The Centers were under DuCharme's
responsibility, as well as Kennedy and LaGuardia Towers. Hatfield's direct report would
have been to AA T2 (Deputy Director of Air Traffic Services), who may have been Jeff
Griffith, according to McCartney. The AAT (Director of Air Traffic Services) on 9111
may have been Ron Morgan or Bill Peacock, according to McCartney. They would report
up to ATS 1 and ATS2, and they would report to the Administrator of the FAA.

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The Eastern Region security representative may have been Marcus Aurora, Division
Manager for Security or Dominic Festa, who reported to Aurora.

Umbrella of the Eastern Region: Eastern Region includes New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and West Virginia. This also includes
Washington, D.C. The airspace itself overlays state boundaries, dictated by radar
coverage.

Procedures in the case of an air event:

The Regional office's main conference room becomes a Crisis Command Center in the
case of an air emergency. There are communication lines and television feeds in this
room.

McCartney would be notified through the operations center. They have an on call air
traffic Quality Assurance (QA) specialist at all times. That person starts a chain of
contacts. Certain incidents require a fact finding process beforehand, but in the case of a
hijack the chain would begin immediately.

There is an Operations Center within the Eastern Region offices that is notified through
the QA officer at the facilities.

Operationally, in the case of 9111, the operations center notifies their in-building
management chain. That management chain notifies the Operations Center of the Eastern
Region, and then the Operations Center notifies the appropriate people in the Region
offices. The Operations Center is basically a notification center.

Pre 9/11 procedure for requesting military assistance:

McCartney noted he was not very familiar with the proper procedures to request military
assistance in the case of a hij ack. His role as a branch manager would be to locate
interpretations of the handbook's set procedures.

This would be handled real time on the tactical side of the FAA operations floors.
McCartney described his role in this process as "support to the field".

9/11:

McCartney was preparing for a staff meeting, and took a phone call from Mike
McCormack. McCartney's first reaction was puzzled as to how an aircraft on a clear day
could hit the World Trade Center (WTC). He immediately was told there were other
possible in air hijacks from the phone call from McCormack. McCormack gave
McCartney follow up information that the first aircraft may not have beenAA 11 because
they were tracking another hij acked aircraft. McCormack was attempting to confirm
which aircraft had initially struck the WTC. The sequence of understanding that

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McCartney had was initially a General Aviation (GA) aircraft, then realized that the
events were caused by two commercial airliners. McCartney recalled sharing all the
information he was given by McCormack to Hatfield, and that this passing of information
happened sometime between AA 11 and UAL 175's collisions into the WTC.

Rick DtrCharme, according to McCartney, brought the Regional Administrator, Arlene

Feldman, into the Crisis Center, which, as noted before, is mobilized in the case of an air
emergency.

Air traffic, flight standards, airways facilities, flight surgeons and the security division
were all present. When it was determined that someone had no role to play, that person
was asked to leave. There was no military liaison out of the Regional Offices. McCartney
noted to Commission staff that he does not know if a log exists of who was present in this
Crisis Room. He did note that there was a running log for the air traffic division, which
he believed was already provided to the Commission.

McCartney had the responsibility for bringing appropriate parties into the Crisis Room to
help facilitate DuCharme and Hatfield's efforts.

Sikorski helicopter:

McCartney "noted that he originally believed that it might have been a GA small aircraft
that struck the north tower, but that the understanding that it was a commercial airliner,
probably a 767, developed before UAL 175 impacted the Trade Center. McCartney noted
that McCormack's call helped validate this, despite the initial uncertainty.

Phantom AA 11:

McCartney noted to Commission staff that he never heard that AA 11 was still airborne
after 8:46 AM on 9/11, and that he only heard confirmation that it was AA 11 that struck
the north tower.

Tactical net and primary net:

McCartney noted that the telecom in the Crisis Center he participated in was an air traffic
telecom with headquarters and the command center at Herndon; Frank Hatfield and Rick
DuCharme participated in this call. McCartney noted that they also took questions from
other telecoms and attempted to inform those questions from the information being
passed through the air traffic telecom. As the hij acking unfolded, this telecom was
established to maintain focus. New England Region would be on this telecom.
McCartney noted that he believes Herndon was on this line as well. McCartney noted as
well that he believes the Crisis Center Headquarters telecom that Hatfield and DuCharme
were manning might have had David Cannoles on it.

McCartney commented that it was unclear to him if this conference call was referred to
as the FAA Tactical Net. After reviewing the Position 14 Transcript presented to him by

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Commission staff, McCartney noted that since the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
is noted on that Net, it was most likely not the Headquarters telecom established in the
Eastern Region Crisis Center. McCartney also noted that the Tactical Net may have been
dialed into from the Crisis Center.

Afterthat telecom was established there was an Eastern Region conference telecom set
up in a separate conference room that established an air traffic bridge for all the facilities.
This bridge was used to give clear directions during the shut down of the air traffic
system (ATC Zero, the national ground stop). Information on individual flight status was
passed on this call. McCartney noted that this was the route for real time information. He
noted this was established after the Pentagon was struck. New York Center was on this
call, and was also on the telecom in the crisis room.

McCartney noted that there were telecoms for security and airways facilities. All the
telecoms were eventually narrowed down to two or three, according to McCartney.

McCartney noted at some point in this sequence Pittsburg Tower was evacuated.

McCartney noted that after the second night they cut the telecoms down to two lines in
the same room.

Recorded lines:

McCartney noted that Tom Trebiano, the Operations Center Manager, may be able to tell
Commission staff which lines were recorded on 9/11.

After-action report:

A continuity of operations lessons-learned assessment was done by the Crisis Center

operators post the 9/11 attacks. This focused on an assessment of communications, and
an evaluation of how the actual equipment functioned.

McCartney noted to Commission staff that the investment in the DEN line most likely
came from FAA lessons-learned conversations; though he did not believe that these
discussions were held at the Regional level; and commented that they were probably
decisions made at Headquarters.

The need to have certain frequencies and communications established to the military was
recognized after 9/11. This led to establishing lines like the direct lines at the centers to
Northeastern Aerospace Defense Sector (NEADS).

Radar at region:

The Region has a Traffic Situational Display with an update rate of once "every two or
three" minutes. This is used as a traffic flow tool, not as a real time tool. It is fed·
information from Herndon Command Center.

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Advisories:

McCartney has responsibility for security briefings. McCartney also noted that he
remembered being at New York Center on the midnight shift at the Millennium. He
described this experience as more focused on the security aspects of and preparation for
possible computer failures as opposed to terrorist threats. He did not recall any briefings
out of the ordinary that urged more awareness regarding terrorism in the months
preceding the 9/11 attacks.

Aftermath:

McCartney noted that involvement with the military operations and special operations
has developed a more active, cooperative and better relationship. McCartney also noted
that there is a greater understanding on the FAA side of the importance of the military
mission domestically.

McCartney commented that in bargaining over airspace, there is now much more
cooperation to allow a solution that accommodates the Department of Defense (DoD).
McCartney noted that they have had briefings on the development of the F-22, so the
FAA can anticipate accommodating the need for airspace testing this aircraft involves.
McCartney noted there are also declassified briefings on the air defense missions of
NORAD.

Assessments are made after exercises and training missions on both the FAA and the
military side. These efforts are meant to continually refine their relationship and their
ability to communicate.

He also noted as an example that there is a relationship now with the NYPD to help
secure the airspace over the United Nations.

McCartney noted that the relationship between the Region and the Centers is roughly the
same as it Was prior to 9111. He commented that there is an increased awareness of their
mission to be more cooperative over airspace.

Regarding hijack response, McCartney noted that at the controller level there has been a
refinement of what the level of suspicion is, as well as a more clear set of notifications
established to the proper authorities.

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