ABDUL HAQ AND AN ANTI-TALIBAN PUSHTUN FIELD FORCE

A MORE EFFECTIVE POST 9/11 REACTION ?

A personal account by RAM Seeger

ABDUL HAQ AND AN ANTI-TALIBAN PUSHTUN FIELD FORCE Shortly after September 11, Ken Guest, Sir John Gunston and I began lobbying for a satisfactory solution in Afghanistan. We were all involved with Afghanistan during its resistance to the Soviet occupation but while my trips inside (a total of nine over 5 years) were limited and controlled, Ken and John as free lance photojournalists did many more trips and over a more extended period of time. They also accompanied the mujahideen on many operations and witnessed serious fighting against the Soviets. In order to survive they learnt to view the situation through Afghan eyes, something the average Westerner finds very hard to do and got to know mujahideen commanders who have since become major players in the present unhappy situation. Ken Guest and I were ex-Royal Marines whilst John was ex-Rhodesian forces and the Irish Guards. John continued to cover Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, developed a deep understanding and knowledge of the country and became a close personal friend of one of the foremost Pushtun resistance leaders - the late Haji Abdul Haq. Initially our lobbying aim was to make available our considerable knowledge of the country and its peoples, warn against the consequences of a blunt and over heavy approach and point out the complexities of Afghanistan. Then as soon as we became aware of Abdul Haqs intention (on 25 September) and the opportunity that this offered for a quick and effective solution, we focussed on trying to obtain support for his cause. Once this had failed (and Haq had been killed), our efforts reduced to giving what help and support we could to Haqs brother Haji Qadir former Governor of Jalalabad (until ousted by the Taliban in 1996) but now reelected to this position by the eastern Shura. During the course of our lobbying, John visited Rome twice, where he spoke with the ex-King and his ministers as well as senior mujahideen commanders and on his first visit met with Abdul Haq who had been running a meeting of Afghan commanders. John and I also visited Peshawar (1-9 October) where we assessed Abdul Haqs plan for overthrowing the Taliban with a Pushtun field force and witnessed Taliban leaders secretly visiting his house at night to pledge their support.. Before leaving (and the start of the bombing on 7 October) we submitted a modest

list of requirements to the British Embassy (at their request). After Haqs tragic death (26 October), John returned to Peshawar and spoke at length with his brothers and other supporters. John, myself and another friend Alex Gardiner then went out to Jalalabad 12-22 December. The people of influence we spoke with and/or were assisted by were:Paddy Ashdown (with access to Tony Blair), Ming Campbell, Charles Guthrie, Robert Cranborne, Ian Duncan-Smith, Michael Ancram, Bernard Jenkin and Christopher Langton (IISS central Asia desk). We also talked with staff from the MOD and Foreign Office, Frederick Forsythe and two selected journalists (Raymond Whitaker of the Independent and Jon Swain of the Sunday Times). The main points that we tried without much success to make were as follows. A SOLUTION FROM WITHIN NOT WITHOUT Assuming the aim of our operations in Afghanistan was/is to establish a terrorist free Afghanistan (as a first step in a world wide anti-terrorist campaign), we maintained that the quickest, least damaging, least controversial and most long lasting solution for achieving this could be achieved from within by Afghans. In contrast any attempt to impose a solution on Afghanistan from without - especially if by military force, carried a real risk of failure. Instead of widening the divisions amongst the different Afghan factions, it was likely to unite them against this foreign intervention and prolong the problem. Governments imposed by outside powers have usually been unpopular, a failure and bloodily resisted. Apart from achieving the main aim and providing a better solution for Afghanistan, an inside solution would be more acceptable to the rest of the Moslem world and less likely to destabilise Pakistan. AFGHANISTAN IS NOT A CONVENTIONAL NATION STATE It had to be remembered that Afghanistan was not a nation state as we understood it. Its outlook and life-style was medieval and its concepts and values very different from Western ones. It had suffered the ravages of war for over twenty years, had no infrastructure worth talking about, was desperately poor and currently facing draught and famine.

Nor was it a single entity. There were five overlapping components to consider, each with their own agenda and set of interests - The Taliban (mainly Pushtun), AlQaeda (mainly Arab), the United front aka Northern Alliance (mainly Tajik), the countrys overall Pushtun majority and the Afghan peasant struggling to survive. THE TALIBAN The Taliban should not be confused with the people of Afghanistan or the type of government they preferred. The Taliban were a Pushtun force created and put into power by Pakistan with the connivance of the West. They were accepted by many of the more influential commanders and tribal leaders because they thought they would bring peace. This turned out not to be the case while the fundamentalist brand of Islam enforced by the Taliban hierarchy proved to be irksome and repressive. They were therefore no longer a popular regime and could be induced to collapse relatively easily to an anti-Taliban field force. (NB. For a full understanding of the Taliban phenomenon see an excellent book by Ahmed Rashid called Taliban; Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia.) WESTERN INVOLVEMENT In determining a solution for Afghanistan, we should not forget our role in the creation of the problem. Apart from conniving in the Taliban, we also sowed the seeds of the present conflict during the Soviet occupation (encouragement of Arab involvement, backing of wrong leaders (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), supply of weapons etc) in order to achieve our ends (punishment of Soviet aggression). Then as soon as the Soviets withdrew, we abandoned Afghanistan to her fate. AL'QAEDA The real problem in Afghanistan was not the Taliban but Al'Qaeda. This was estimated to be a 10,000 man private army of Arabs and Pakistanis, some 3-4,000 of which were known to be the most aggressive troops in Afghanistan and had been used as the Talibans shock troops in their war against the Northern Alliance. Even if the Taliban had wanted to give up

Bin Laden, it is highly unlikely that they would have been able to do so whilst at the same time fighting the Northern Alliance. Al'Qaedas stateless foreign Arabs were fervent fundamentalists (in contrast to the Afghans who had a much more laid back attitude to Islam), had nothing to lose and nowhere to go and would not be easy for anyone to defeat. Given the ground over which they would have to operate, it would be much easier for the West to defeat Al'Qaeda with Afghan help. NB. Al'Qaeda are not much liked by the Afghans who apart from differing in their interpretation of Islam, are inherently racist. If there was one thing an Afghan disliked more than being told what to do by another Afghan, it was being told what to do by a foreigner. Even better than defeating Al'Qaeda with Afghan help however would be for the Afghans to defeat Al'Qaeda with Western help. This would make the solution much more acceptable both in Afghanistan and world wide. However if the Afghans were not involved at all (or only one faction used eg the Northern Alliance), an already difficult problem would be compounded as the Pushtuns (or worse still the Afghans as a whole) might close ranks against the Western invader and fight with Al'Qaeda instead of against them. The most certain way of defeating Al'Qaeda therefore was to depose the Taliban, establish a pro-western or neutral government in Kabul and then work with them to achieve a common aim for each others mutual benefit. THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE An inside solution however should not be attempted by the mainly Tajik Northern Alliance alone. This would be resisted by the citizens of Kabul, surrounding Pushtun tribes and the Hazaras - all of whom had suffered badly at the hands of the Northern Alliance. The leaders of an inside solution must be Pushtuns (the largest ethnic group - approximately 43% of the population in contrast to the Tajiks, the next largest group, who are about 25%). While the Taliban could easily fragment (for reasons given earlier) they would be most unwilling to surrender or defect to the Northern Alliance or Western invaders. An adequately backed Pushtun field force would be a different matter. This could trigger large scale defections, build an alliance with the Northern tribes and facilitate the building of a widely accepted broad based government. PAKISTAN

It was important also that Pakistans role in any solution - Pushtun or otherwise, was kept to the minimum and/or was strictly controlled. While she had a valid interest in what happened in Afghanistan her track record there had not been good (manipulation of supplies intended for the Mujahideen, Lebonisation of Afghanistan post Soviet, creation and support of the Taliban, recruits for Al'Qaeda etc). As a consequence she was distrusted and disliked by many Afghan players. It also had to be remembered that up until 11 September, Pakistans ISI had been supporting the Taliban so only limited trust could be placed in their field agents (main US source of Humint?) SELECTING THE PUSHTUN LEADERS Given the need for a Pushtun dominated inside solution, the immediate problem for early solving was who should the new Pushtun leaders be? While the ex-King might have made an acceptable figurehead he had to be backed up by some kind of Pushtun military field force, both as a counterweight to the Northern Alliance forces and against intransigent members of the Taliban. The leader or leaders had to be acceptable to the commanders inside Afghanistan and have a sufficiently trans-ethnic outlook to bridge tribal differences. Because they would find themselves involved in military operations they also had to be proven and effective field commanders. Unfortunately few if any of the ex-Kings close supporters met these criteria as neither did some of the other Pushtun leaders who attracted early media attention. Wrong Pushtun leaders could be as bad as no Pushtun leaders. The civil war would continue and/or both sides would combine against the Americans and the British. ABDUL HAQ Based on our knowledge of the man and the Pushtuns we maintained that the most suitable Pushtun leader was Abdul Haq and if discrete support was given to him, a successful inside solution could be obtained. Haq was known and accepted as a proven operational leader and a man of principle with a trans-ethnic outlook. He would have welcomed the return of the King (but not his Ruritanian supporters) and had the support of old Mujahideen commanders, current Taliban commanders and tribal leaders. His brother Haji Qadir was already with the Northern alliance as their

commander in Kunar and would have helped Haq build relationships with other commanders. Another brother Haji Din Mohammed was widely respected as a devout but non-fundamentalist Moslem. Since 11 September Haq had been steadily consolidating his support and while staying in his house in Peshawar, we were much impressed by the number, variety and status of the people who came to see him. Haq had a workable plan for defeating the Taliban and hoped to achieve it through defections and by capturing Jalalabad, Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar (the spinal cord of the Taliban). We estimated the cost of support for the plan as some 10 million US dollars. This would have provided the basic requirements for a 10,000 man force over a 60 day campaign (half of this force would have come from defections and because of their ready availability only token quantities of weapons and ammunition were included in the list). Before the air strikes began, Haq saw his campaign as having a high chance of success and being completed within about 3-4 weeks. Once the bombing started, these chances steadily eroded and his task became a much harder one. WHY NO ATTENTION GIVEN TO HAQ? Despite his offering of a possible early solution, Haq never received any serious Western attention. We lobbied hard on his behalf but to no avail. It seemed that Haq was distrusted or thought incapable of the task and/or other Pushtun leaders were preferred. Rumours were spread about his business interests, his involvement with Russian tarts and his penchant for insubstantial showmanship (Hollywood Haq). To anyone who knew him or had operated with him, these were absurd. He did have the backing, interest and moral support of two US businessmen (Joe and James Ritchie) but he was never in any sort of business partnership with them and their practical support was limited. Another reason might have been that Haq was always his own man. As a consequence he was never a favourite of the Pakistanis and perhaps for the same reason therefore of the Americans also. Yet it is precisely because of this that he had such widespread trust and pledges of support from Afghans. His one real failing was that he did not like to ask for anything that he thought might be refused.

Even worse than this disparaging of and reluctance to work with Haq was the possibility that an inside Pushtun solution was not wanted at all or thought to be unnecessary (ie a solution could/should be obtained by American arms and the Northern Alliance alone) - see Ahmed Rashid Daily Telegraph article 19 October. Or perhaps it was just a failure of the Coalition leaders to understand the complexities of the situation and the need for speed. Early backing of Haq and/or a Pushtun field force could have overthrown the Taliban without recourse to bombing. Once the bombing started it became a race against time. A strong convincing antiTaliban Pushtun field force had to be in place before Pushtun feelings inside Afghanistan had hardened irrevocably against the Coalition and/or the arrival of Northern Alliance troops at Kabul and the inevitable heightening of tensions that this would bring. THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH FAVOURITE It eventually became clear that the American and British favourite was Hamid Karzai, chief of the Popalzai tribe which inhabits the Kandahar region. Although essentially a good man (who Haq might also have wanted/backed as premier) he was not a proven field commander with the potential to act as a counterweight to the Northern alliance. This was subsequently shown by his failure to capture Kandahar (despite US SF support) which was eventually done by Mullah Naqibullah and Gul Agha Shirozi. But even if he had been able to capture Kandahar, this was hardly enough to balance the Northern Alliance. The key was Kabul and a Pushtun leader had to take this. In this respect Karzai never stood a chance, while Haq of course did. DEATH OF HAQ Meanwhile no support had been given to Haq although a derisory offer of four satcom telephones had been made by the British. (Haq had already bought a large number of these in Dubai and what he really needed (and as made clear by us in our submission) was proper secure military radios). Realising that no serious help was forthcoming, Haq opted for a quixotic gesture and entered Afghanistan on Oct 21st from Parachinar to work with the tribal leaders and village headmen in the Azrow/Hisarak area. He felt

obliged to go in himself as he had nothing else to support the people with but his presence and their anger was growing as a result of the bombing. His trip was totally overt and when challenged by the Taliban border guards at Terrimangul he told them who he was. The Taliban then put in large forces led by Arabs to converge on Azrow. Haq ran into these on the night of Thursday 25 October. There was some confused firing and then Haq tried talking to a small deputation. This was joined by an arab who on hearing who Haq was, cocked his rifle and arrested him. Haq and his chief of staff Sayed Hamid were led away and shot the next day Friday 26 October in Rischoor barracks Kabul by Arabs and Pakistanis. His nephew Izatullah, a bright young man of 23 who had been a great help to us in Peshawar and who had recently married into the Chitral Royal family, was captured and shot the following Tuesday in Azrow and had his body thrown into a well. CHANGE IN MOOD Haqs death and Karzais limited success showed two things. Not only had there been a change of mood in the Pushtun populace following the start of the bombing but (as in any rebellion) any Pushtun force deployment had to large enough to defend itself and have enough equipment and money to demonstrate strong support and buy loyalty. Some encouragement however could still be drawn from the pledges of support by mujahideen commanders and tribal leaders to Haqs brothers for continuing Haq's work and avenging his death. WHAT WILL HAPPEN NOW So much for what we tried and failed to do. The fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance on 13 November, the collapse of the Taliban, the eventual driving out of AlQaeda and the establishment of the interim government have been extensively covered by the world press and lie outside the point of this personal summary. What we have now ended up with may still work. There is so much money and aid at stake that this may be enough to drown the inter-ethnic disquiet. Lets hope so. But Karzai is in a weak and isolated position and will not have an easy task. The problem is his governments dominance by the Northern Alliance in general and the Panshir valley in particular. The three

key positions are in the hands of Panshiris (Abdullah Abdullah - Foreign Affairs; Mohammed Qassem Fahim - Defence; Yunis Qanuni -Home Affairs/Internal Security) so it is not just the Pushtuns who are unhappy. The much vaunted Loya Jirga will only work if it is genuinely representative and it may be difficult to ensure this. After leaving Jalalabad on 22 December I had a chance meeting with Abdul Haqs brother Baryalai (or Nasrullah) in Peshawer. He had just sold his hotel in Germany and was returning to help his family and country. When asked for the one piece of advice he would urge on Western leaders, he chose Dont repeat the mistakes of the past. His other points for America and Britain were: Dont try to solve the problem with money paid through your own agents Tell us (the Afghans) what the plan is Listen to the traditional four elements of influence - mullahs, tribal elders, intellectuals and military commanders. He then went on to stress that however much an Afghan might want help, he would resist it if it was imposed. MISTAKES OF THE WEST So where and why did the West go wrong? Our politicians are probably reluctant to admit that anything went wrong and are content (with some reason) to claim victory and justification of their policies (a remarkable coalition of support was put together very quickly, the Taliban have been broken and the bombing was relatively precise and effective). However, a great opportunity to achieve a less destructive and less controversial solution was lost and we could have been in a much more stable position than we are at present. In our opinion the main mistakes made were:* Not appreciating or supporting the strong possibility that the Taliban could have been toppled from within by anti-Taliban Pushtuns and starting instead on a premature bombing campaign, with no clear idea of how it was

to end or what it would be followed by. Not appreciating how much more difficult this would make it for Pushtun anti-Taliban forces. * Not appreciating that there had to be a strong Pushtun anti-Taliban field force - to attract/encourage Taliban defection, fill the vacuum in Kabul when the Taliban withdrew/were defeated, be the means for establishing a broad based government and to act as a counterweight and check to the Northern Alliance. * Not appreciating the dangers of allowing the Northern Alliance to take Kabul or taking any action to forestall or counter this. To anyone familiar with Afghanistan, most of the above was apparent from the start. That it was not apparent to those involved and/or was ignored (for political or cynical reasons), is a great misfortune we may come to regret.