Beiser Frederick Neo Kantianism Normativity

This article was downloaded by: [Universitaetsbibliothek Marburg - Collections Parent Account] On: 7 May 2011 Access details:
Access Details: [subscription number 934180984] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685587
Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall

Frederick C. Beisera a Syracuse University, USA
To cite this Article Beiser, Frederick C.(2009) 'Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall', International Journal of
Philosophical Studies, 17: 1, 9 27 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09672550802610941 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550802610941
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 17(1), 927
Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall

Frederick C. Beiser
International 10.1080/09672550802610941 RIPH_A_361262.sgm 0967-2559 Original Taylor 2008 0 1 17 FBeiser@syr.edu FrederickBeiser 000002008 and & Article Francis (print)/1466-4542 Francis Journal of Philosophical (online) Studies
Downloaded By: [Universitaetsbibliothek Marburg - Collections Parent Account] At: 15:43 7 May 2011
Abstract
This article discusses the historical background to the concept of normativity which has a wide use in contemporary philosophy. It locates the origin of that concept in the Southwestern Neo-Kantian school, the writings of Windelband, Rickert and Lask. The Southwestern school made the concept of normativity central to epistemology, ethics and the interpretation of German idealism. It was their solution to the threats of psycologism and historicism. However, Windelband, Rickert and Lask found difficulties with the concept which eventually forced them to abandon it. These difficulties might be of interest to contemporary philosophers who find the concept of normativity appealing. Keywords: Normativity; Southwestern Neo-Kantianism; Rickert; Lask; Windelbcand
1 Of Scholars and Refrigerators In his charming Kindergeschichten Peter Bichsel tells the story of an inventor who goes to live in isolation in the mountains so that he can devote himself entirely to his own genius. After many years alone, he finally rejoins humanity to bestow upon it the gift of his labours. He has indeed been very ingenious, and he has indeed created something of great value for humanity. What has he invented? The refrigerator! It is a primitive refrigerator, to be sure, but a working one all the same. The only problem is that, during his seclusion, other people have invented refrigerators, and they have been working on improving the design for decades. Alas, the refrigerator of our seclusive genius can scarcely compete with all the improved designs. It seems to me that Bichsels story applies very well to so much contemporary Anglophone scholarship in the history of philosophy. Because so many Anglophone scholars work in cultural isolation, limiting themselves to English sources or translations, and because so many of them are ignorant of past scholarship, especially that from non-English sources, they just keep inventing primitive refrigerators. Their works are often ingenious; but they are seldom a match for what has already been done and discussed for
International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2009 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/09672550802610941
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
generations. Rather than building on the past, they start from scratch, as if they were the prophets of new truths. Nowhere is this more evident, I believe, than in contemporary Anglophone scholarship about German idealism. The many champions of the normative interpretation of German idealism Henry Allison, Robert Brandom, Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Charles Larmore, to name a few do not seem to realize that this interpretation is very old, and that it has been worked out before with greater sophistication and subtlety. What is even more troubling, however, is that past labourers in the vineyards of normativity discovered serious problems with this interpretation problems so deep that they, in good conscience, abandoned it. This leaves us with some unsettling questions: Have contemporary partisans of normativity seen these problems? Have they solved them? Or have they, blissfully ignorant of the past, blundered into a minefield? The mighty dead whose tales I now wish to tell are three neo-Kantian philosophers: Wilhelm Windelband (18481915), Heinrich Rickert (1863 1936) and Emil Lask (18751915). They were luminaries in their day, but they are now almost completely forgotten, at least in the Anglophone world. Although Lask still has not received the recognition he deserves, Windelband and Ricket have a respectable place in the history of philosophy. Windelband is famous as the founder of Southwestern or Heidelberg neo-Kantianism, while Rickert is renowned as the chief spokesman for the philosophy of value, once a respectable position in the early-twentiethcentury German intellectual landscape. What is especially interesting about Windelband and Rickert for us today is that they were the founders of the normative conception of philosophy, and indeed the normative interpretation of German idealism. The concept of normativity was for them the key to understanding Kant, and indeed philosophy in general. If normativity is a buzz word today, it was a mantra in the 1880s. By the 1920s, however, normativity had lost its resonance and had ceased to excite philosophers. What I would like to do now is to place the normative conception of philosophy and German idealism in a little historical perspective by examining its origins in Windelband, Rickert and Lask. I want to explain not only why this conception was so attractive to them, but also the problems they found with it, their attempts to solve them, and what went so terribly wrong in the end. My method here will be narrative rather than discursive. I am not really going to make arguments; I am only going to tell stories, one each of Windelband, Lask and Rickert. But my stories are rich in philosophical morals. They are dialectical dramas, a very Hegelian genre, where the protagonist ends by passionately affirming, through torturous self-examination, a position he once passionately denied. But just how these philosophical morals apply to any contemporary scholar is a complicated matter that I will not pursue here and will have to leave to your 10
NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL
better judgement. If I have placed contemporary discussions about normativity in some historical perspective, I will have achieved my end. 2 Windelband and the Normative Conception of Philosophy
Today, now that Kant scholarship has become just another academic subject, it is difficult to understand its urgency and importance in the late nineteenth century. Then, much was at stake in the proper interpretation of Kant. It was not only an historical, but also a philosophical, even cultural, issue. For many philosophers, Kant seemed to provide the path out of the crisis of philosophy, and indeed of all modern culture.1 Kant was for them the philosopher, and the Kritik der reinen Vernunft their Bible. Having the right interpretation of Kant was therefore one and the same as having the right conception of philosophy itself. To understand why this is so, we have to go back in history and understand the predicament of German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. In those days philosophy in Germany suffered from a severe identity crisis. Its very purpose and legitimacy as a discipline seemed threatened by the rapidly advancing sciences. Whatever legitimate intellectual work could be done, it seemed, was better done by psychology or physics. Philosophers faced the grim prospect of obsolescence. The source of this crisis, oddly enough, was the very thinker many thought would lead them out of it: Immanuel Kant. It was one of the most troubling lessons of Kants philosophy that the only legitimate knowledge is limited to experience, and that philosophy can no longer be metaphysics in the classical sense of the term, i.e., a rational or demonstrative knowledge of the unconditioned or absolute. This meant that philosophy would have to forfeit its traditional role of providing answers to the fundamental questions of life, such as the existence of God and immortality. Kants negative teaching seemed confirmed by two developments around the 1850s: the increasing growth of the empirical sciences, and the collapse of Hegels and Schellings absolute idealism. Such developments seemed to drive home the lesson that all knowledge has to be acquired from experiment and observation. The truly scientific philosopher, it seemed, would have to become a psychologist or physicist. If this were not bad enough, there was another danger facing philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century, one so grave that it threatened even the critical philosophy itself. All scholars agree that one of the most remarkable, indeed revolutionary, developments in the nineteenth century is the rise of the stature of history. Prior to the late eighteenth century, history was seen more as an art than a science. History dealt with particular and contingent facts from the past, while the paradigm of science, which came from mathematics, demanded nothing less than universal and necessary truths. The new critical history of Niebuhr and Ranke, however, seemed to show that history too could be a science, and that, through the 11
careful examination of primary sources and documents, it could provide results no less certain than those of physics and chemistry. It is certainly a telling sign of the new prestige of history that neo-Kantian philosophers would place Ranke and Niebuhr on the same footing as Liebig and Helmholtz. There was, however, something deeply troubling for philosophers about the growth of this new historical science. The more history advanced, the more it seemed that it could explain everything within the human world all the arts, sciences, laws, religions as the product of history, as the effect of a specific time and place. But that, of course, held for philosophy too. The new history seemed to show, but now through scientific means, what Hegel had already proclaimed in the 1820s: that philosophy is nothing more than the self-consciousness of its own age. In short, the new history posed the problem of relativism, or, to use the nineteenth-century term for it, historicism. Armed with their historical sense, the new critical historians began to undermine sometimes deliberately, sometimes unwittingly the possibility of even the critical philosophy. All its claims to possess the universal standards of criticism, to speak for the tribunal of an eternal reason, were now thrown into question. The new historians loved to condemn the historiography of the Enlightenment, because it judged the past by the standards of the present, and because its apparently universal and cosmopolitan standpoint was only a disguise for the values of its own culture and age. But that raised a troubling question for the critical philosopher: Was not his critical tribunal too solely the conscience of his age? Such was the predicament faced by the young Wilhelm Windelband in the early 1880s. In his remarkable essay Was ist Philosophie?,2 first published in 1882, Windelband sketched his strategy for solving the identity crisis of philosophy. He begins his essay by giving a vivid portrait of that crisis. The decline of traditional metaphysics, combined with the rise of history and the natural sciences, he noted, has left philosophers bereft. All the special sciences had grown out of philosophy, but now philosophy had nothing to do. Philosophy, he wrote, is like King Lear, who has bequethed all his goods to his children, and who must now resign himself to be thrown into the street like a beggar (I, 19). How could philosophy avoid such a dire fate? The only remedy, Windelband believed, was to return to Kant. The very man who had brought on the crisis would also be its redeemer. Philosophy could retain its identity as a distinct discipline, and it could still be a science, Windelband argued, if it only became what Kant had originally conceived it to be: namely, a critical philosophy, i.e., an investigation into the conditions and limits of the first principles of knowledge. All the special sciences, morality and the arts, presuppose first principles that they cannot investigate; and the defining task of philosophy should be to investigate just such principles. If philosophy only limits itself to this task, Windelband proposed, it could still be a science; but it would be a specific kind of science: namely, a second-order science whose peculiar task is to investigate the logic 12
of the first-order sciences. The danger of obsolescence arises because people continue to see philosophy as some kind of first-order discipline that studies the most general features of man and the world. But all first-order investigation should be the task of the special sciences; the specific task of philosophy is strictly second-order: to determine the logic of such first-order investigations. It is of the utmost importance to see, however, that Windelband did not rest his argument here. He knew all too well that philosophy could not resolve its identity crisis simply through becoming epistemology or Erkenntnistheorie.3 This was a necessary, not a sufficient condition of solving the problem. Everything hinged on exactly how one conceived epistemology or Erkenntnistheorie. In denying that epistemology alone is sufficient, Windelband was tacitly taking issue with another neo-Kantian philosopher, Eduard Zeller.4 In his famous 1862 lecture ber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Philosophie.5 Zeller had already sketched the classical neo-Kantian argument for why philosophy should become epistemology. It was only as epistemology, Zeller argued, that philosophy could uphold its claim to be science. But Zeller went on to insist that the method of philosophy should be the same as the methods of the empirical sciences.6 He contended that the philosopher could not reliably establish anything about reality from a priori construction, by beginning from general principles and attempting to derive particular conclusions from them; instead, he had to proceed inductively, beginning from particular observations and ascending to general principles. The philosophers starting point is self-consciousness, just as Kant had taught, but self-consciousness comes from introspection and observation, from reflection on inner experience and the analysis of the facts of consciousness. Accordingly, Zeller saw epistemology in essentially psychological terms, as the investigation into the origins and genesis of our representations. The laws of sensibility, understanding and reason were for him essentially psychological necessities about how people happen to think.7 Windelband was alarmed, indeed horrified, by Zellers argument, because it made philosophy collapse into psychology. To be a science in its own right, Windelband believed, philosophy must follow a specific method, one differing toto caelo from that of the empirical sciences. What is that method? Windelband explains by making a clear and sharp distinction between two methods: the genetic method of psychology and history, and the critical method of epistemology or philosophy. The task of the genetic method is to investigate the causes of knowledge, how it originates from experience and the innate activity of the mind, whereas the task of the critical method is to determine the reasons for knowledge, the evidence for its validity. The main question behind the genetic method is quid facti?, i.e., the question of which facts explain the origin of my representations, whereas the chief question behind the critical method is quid 13
juris?, i.e., the question of what right I have for my belief. This distinction goes right back to Kant, of course, and Windelband stressed that it was nothing less than his Grundgedanke (I, 24, 29). If philosophy is to be a distinctive science, Windelband advised, it must follow the critical method alone. It must limit itself to determining the reasons or justifications for our fundamental principles, and it must forgo any attempt to determine their natural or historical causes, which is the proper task of psychology or history. Armed with this distinction, Windelband now believed that he had all the tools he needed to keep historicism at bay. The source of historicism was its confusion of the quid facti? with the quid juris?, the causes with the reasons for knowledge. Since the historicist confounds the conditions of validity of a belief with its causal or genetic conditions, he assumes that a principle is valid only under the conditions under which it arose. But this is a non sequitur: the fact that a belief arose only under certain circumstances does not mean that it is valid only under those circumstances.8 Hence historicists were guilty of, though Windelband does not use the term, the genetic fallacy. The general conception of philosophy that emerges from Windelbands Was ist Philosophie? is that philosophy is a normative discipline. Philosophy differs from the sciences precisely because its chief concerns are to determine the fundamental norms governing our beliefs, and to assess whether particular beliefs conform to them. Its task is not to know what is the case, as with the other sciences, but to judge what ought to be the case according to norms, where norms are essentially rules of judgement (Regeln der Beurteilung).9 Hence Windelband defined philosophy as a system of norms (ein System von Normen), or as the science of the necessary and universally valid determinations of value (Wertbestimmungen) (I, 26). On the basis of his normative conception of philosophy, Windelband then proceeds to provide an interpretation of Kant that is thoroughly normative. The unity of apperception, or consciousness in general, turns out to be not a noumenal entity but an ideal or norm to measure the validity of empirical knowledge (I, 4445). Similarly, the thing-in-itself is not a mysterious entity lying beneath or beyond appearances, but only a regulative goal, the ideal of complete knowledge of appearances.10 Finally, Kants dualism between noumena and phenomena is not a distinction between kinds of entity but a distinction between kinds of discourse, namely, the normative and the natural, or the critical and genetic. Windelband pushed this point so far that he wanted to eliminate the noumenal realm entirely, and he believed that the distinction between normative and natural discourse is sufficient to preserve moral responsibility, even if all moral actions are completely determined.11 Windelband realized that Kant himself did not always formulate his own philosophy in these precise terms, and he complains that Kant often 14
slid back into older, more metaphysical or psychological language. But the spirit of Kants philosophy, its ultimate intent and Grundgedanke, Windelband believed, rested with its grasp of the normative, its recognition of how questions about values are fundamentally different in kind from questions about facts. A genuine understanding of Kant would be one that kept true to this insight and interpreted the entire critical philosophy in its light. Kant verstehen, he wrote in some famous lines, heit ber ihn hinausgehen.12
Windelbands Retreat and Defeat
Such, in sum, was Windelbands conception of philosophy, and his interpretation of Kant, which he first outlined in 1882. Over the years he would continue to refine this conception and interpretation. To his great credit, he did not shirk difficult issues, and struggled constantly to resolve them. One of these problems concerned the nature of the normative itself. What, precisely, do we mean by a norm? And how does it differ from the merely factual? On various occasions and in different essays Windelband made several distinctions between the normative and natural. (1) The most basic distinction is between two forms of necessity: natural necessity is about what must be the case, normative necessity is about what ought to be the case (I, 42). (2) Another distinction is between two kinds of principles or laws: those that explain facts and those that evaluate them. There are laws that determine causal regularities, and laws that judge performances. Norms are essentially rules of judgement (Regeln der Beurteilung).13 (3) Yet another distinction is between two forms of consciousness: empirical consciousness of a specific individual and consciousness in general, which represents the ideal for all individuals.14 (4) Finally, there are two methods of justification of fundamental axioms: the factual method, which shows how they are actually involved in how we know, value and taste; and the teleological method, which shows how they are necessary means to achieve the end of a discipline.15 Although Windelband does not sustain this last distinction, which runs counter to his view that factual methods cannot justify axioms, its interest lies in the idea of teleological justification as the essence of normative justification. Normative justification is teleological for Windelband in the sense that it shows how assuming an axiom is a necessary means to achieve an end, where this end is nothing more than the increase of knowledge. It does not hypostasize this end, as if it were something actually existing in nature or history, but treats it solely as a rule that prescribes what we ought to do (II, 10910). Windelband stopped short, however, of calling teleological justification pragmatic.16 Besides the problem of defining normativity, there was another issue that troubled Windelband, one that eventually proved so disturbing that it made him reconsider his whole position. The problem is very simple to 15
understand but very difficult to solve: What is the connection between the normative and the natural? After making so many sharp distinctions between the normative and the natural, Windelband is now faced with the problem of connecting them. It is necessary to assume that there is some connection between them, because the whole purpose of norms is for people to act according to them. Ought implies can, so that if people cannot act on norms they lose all their validity. This problem first became apparent to Windelband in the context of his discussion of freedom. Morality cannot be fully explained by norms alone, Windelband realized, for the very simple reason that people have to act on them. The problem of freedom arises precisely regarding the interconnection between the normative and the natural; the issue is whether we can do what we ought to do. Attempting to respond to this problem in his 1882 essay Normen und Naturgesetze, Windelband attempted to bridge the gap between the normative and natural by making norms not only reasons for but also causes of actions and beliefs. We have an awareness of norms, and we feel a constraint to follow them, so that they enter into our very being. Through this awareness and feeling of constraint, the norm becomes a part of the process of mechanical necessity by which we act in the real world (Vol II. 87). It is obvious, however, that, in making norms causes as well as reasons, Windelband was blurring his original distinction between the normative and natural. There is indeed a real paradox here, because as soon as the norm becomes realized it acquires factual status and loses normative status. Somehow, it joins the kingdom of is and leaves behind, for ever, the kingdom of ought. There is not a gradual continuous transition from the normative to the natural, but a sudden miraculous transformation, something on a par with the transformation of the wine and bread into the blood and body of Christ. It should be obvious here that we have a new and strange version of Kants problem of explaining the connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Whether the original dualism is between kinds of entity or kinds of discourse makes little difference to the basic mystery of accounting for the connection between them. In struggling with this problem over the years, Windelband began to make concessions and confessions, indeed so much so that he virtually abandons his earlier conception of philosophy as a strictly normative discipline. Let me describe here, briefly, two of the main concessions. The first appears in a series of lectures on freedom of will, ber Willensfreiheit, which Windelband published in 1905.17 Here Windelband qualifies his earlier purely methodological distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal in Normen und Naturgesetze. Since he realizes that norms obligate the will only if it can act on them, he has to attribute some ontological status to the will itself. Since, furthermore, this will has to be held responsible for its actions, and since we attribute responsibility only to those causes that are not the effect of other causes, we must assume that the moral 16
will has an independent being above the phenomenal world. The will now has a kind of twilight existence in Windelbands ontology; it is a Zwitterding that stands between the realm of norms and nature. The second concession is more remarkable, and amounts to a virtual reversal of his earlier position. It appears in his essay Nach hundert Jahre, a lecture he delivered in 1903 on the occasion of the centenary of Kants death.18 Here Windelband finally has a concrete proposal for linking the normative and the natural, for joining together in holy matrimony what he had once so sacrilegiously sundered. What joins the normative and the natural, he now suggests, is the concept of historical development. The concept of development seems to link the normative and the natural because it is directed toward goals or ends, which represent norms. The normative does not transcend the activity but is somehow immanent within it, serving as both explanation and justification. In proposing such a solution Windelband is following Kants precedent in the third Kritik. There is, however, an important difference between Windelband and Kant: contrary to Kants regulative strictures, Windelband assumes that the concept of historical development needs to be given constitutive rather than just regulative status; in other words, it is not enough simply proceeding as if there is historical development; it is necessary to assume that there is such development. Windelband now begins to advocate the great value of the concept of teleology, which he thinks should be revived not only in the historical but also in the natural sciences. The irony is that Windelband now begins to embrace the very philosopher neo-Kantianism had once made a virtue of spurning: Hegel. For Windelband, the great value of Hegel is not that he discovers the realm of normativity that was Kants Verdienst but that he discovers the connecting link between normativity and nature through the concept of teleology. And so, in the older but wiser Windelband, neo-Kantianism comes full circle. The philosopher it had once loved to hate it now hates to love. So much time and energy were spent on burying Hegel, and now that it sees the point of his teleological metaphysics, he must be solemnly resurrected. Confession and contrition now became a virtual ritual for Windelband, which give him credit for it he enacts in public. The most remarkable of these mea culpas is his 1910 lecture Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus.19 Windelband takes note of the revival of Hegelianism taking place,20 and he now wants to join the club. He is a bit embarrassed about it all. For was not Hegel the thinker who re-established what Kant destroyed speculative metaphysics and who destroyed what Kant established critical philosophy? Windelband tries to save face by saying that he wants to place some limits on this revival. The limits are that admitting the role of the historical in philosophy should not be made an excuse for historicism. But in placing these limits Windelband is not really taking issue with Hegel himself, because he is at pains to stress that Hegel 17
was never an historicist, and that the great merit of his philosophy is that, though he thinks values are realized in history, he never surrenders to the relativism of historicism. Given his new appreciation of Hegel, it is not surprising to find that Windelbands interests now turn toward the philosophy of history. It is now the philosophy of history that will provide a new foundation for value. Norms will now not transcend history but become the general laws of historical development itself. Windelband began to explore this line of argument in his final lectures just weeks before his death.21 4 Emil Lask and the Crisis of Normativity
While Windelband was wrestling with all his problems in the early 1900s, another challenge arose for the neo-Kantian conception of normativity. This challenge was even more daunting than the normnature dualism, and it came from unexpected quarters: the publication in 1900 of Edmund Husserls Logische Untersuchungen. On many points Husserl and the neoKantians were close allies: Husserl too was intent on upholding the scientific status of philosophy; he too opposed psychologism and historicism; and he too wanted to distinguish questions of validity from empirical fact. But in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl had subjected the neo-Kantian normative conception of validity to profound criticism.22 While Husserl never explicitly targeted the neo-Kantians, no one could fail to see that his criticisms applied to them. Husserls criticisms were simple and brief, but also telling. Considered in themselves, he argued, logical laws are not normative propositions that tell us how we ought to judge. Rather, they are theoretical truths that tell us that something is the case, even though they are not about empirical matters of fact. A syllogism of the form All A is B; S is A; therefore, S is B has no normative element, because it does not prescribe how we ought to think but describes what must be the case. To be sure, we can base a norm upon such a syllogism; but that does not amount to the content of the syllogism itself. We must distinguish between the content of a logical law what it actually explicitly states and the norms that derive from it. After insisting on this fundamental point, Husserl went on to criticize the lingering elements of psychologism in the neo-Kantian conception of norms.23 We cannot identify logical laws with norms, he argued, because norms make sense only with respect to the psychological activities that they regulate; but logical laws are valid even if no one ever thinks of them. Although the neo-Kantians were critics of psychologism, Husserl complained, they would still resort to psychological language themselves; hence they would talk about concepts of understanding, principles of reason, and so on. Sometime in the early 1900s Emil Lask, the gifted student of Windelband and Rickert, read Husserls Untersuchungen.24 Quick to see the point of 18
Husserls criticism, Lask was immediately thrown into a crisis. In his earlier work he had formulated a legal philosophy based on the neo-Kantian conception of normativity; and he had sketched a philosophy of history following neo-Kantian principles.25 After reading Husserl, though, Lask could see that there were fundamental, indeed insuperable, problems with the neo-Kantian conception of normativity. Normativity was now exposed as too psychologistic, and at best a derivative conception; it simply could not account for the basic fact that logical validity is independent of all thinking. There was no gainsaying the basic Husserlian point: syllogisms are valid even if no one ever existed, even if no one thought according to them, and, indeed, even if people thought contrary to them. The fundamental challenge Husserl posed for Lask was how to square this basic point with his allegiance to Kants Copernican Revolution. The Husserlian point means that truth is essentially objective, independent of all thinking; but the Copernican Revolution means that truth is basically subjective, because it consists in the conformity of objects with concepts rather than concepts with objects. The task of Lasks mature thought was to reconcile the Kantian Copernican Revolution with Husserls theory of logical validity. His most sustained effort in this direction was his 1912 Lehre vom Urteil. Here Lask attempts to explain the thought-independence of validity by interpreting it along quasiPlatonic lines in terms of a realm of prototypes or archetypes. Lask revives something of a correspondence theory, according to which the truth of judgements has to be measured by their conformity to these prototypes. He criticizes traditional correspondence theories on the grounds that they cannot explain validity (II, 386). They cannot answer the question: Why should the concept correspond with an object? We cannot derive the value of correspondence from the simple fact of correspondence itself. We can avoid these problems, Lask argues, only when we see that value already lies in the object itself (II, 387). Otherwise, correspondence with the object would have no point or value. But how does Lask square his new transcendent theory of validity with his allegiance to the Copernican Revolution? Lasks answer to this question in the Urteilslehre is somewhat astonishing: The insertion of logicity into objects also makes possible the injection of validity and value into them (II, 387). All correspondence theories are justified by the Copernican Revolution, he argues, because it alone permits us to introduce values into them (II, 389). Rather than the Copernican Revolution, this seems to be the exact opposite, a Leibnizian counter-revolution: concepts seem to revolve around objects again, in the classical rationalist manner. Rather than placing value in the rules for judging objects, Lask had now placed it in the object itself. Not surprisingly, Rickert accused his old student of lapsing into hypostasis, of making the object of knowledge into a transcendent entity to which our cognitions had to correspond.26 That Lask knew that he was taking his Kantianism to the breaking point here is apparent 19
from his last letter to Husserl, written on 24 December 1911, when he noted with some humour that his former teacher now accused him of surrendering Kant and of a reactionary return to antiquity.27 Nevertheless, Lask was unrepentent and persistent, refusing to abandon his old loyalties. He continued to see himself as a Kantian because he saw the object as having a logical form and value and not as being beyond logic. He continued to adhere to the older view, which he attributed to the rationalist tradition, that the object is meta-logical, i.e., completely without a logical form (II, 419). So Lask sees the fundamental thought behind the Copernican Revolution as the thesis that objectivity is logical rather than a-logical. We must see objectivity as transcendent as something existing beyond subjectivity but there are two ways of viewing it: as either logically or a-logically transcendent. According to Lask, the Kantian view is that the object is logically transcendent, whereas the traditional non-Kantian view is that it is a-logically transcendent. It takes only a little reflection to see, however, that Lasks Kantianism at this point was little more than a pious gesture, a desperate measure to secure the appearance of consistency to his older neo-Kantian views. We can quarrel with Lasks account of the rationalist tradition, because the rationalists did see truth as a Platonic realm that is logically transcendent. It is hard to see the difference between Lask and the older rationalism. More importantly, Lasks transcendent conception of truth, his reinstatement of a dualism between concept and object and a correspondence theory, made little sense of Kants transcendental idealism, which was intended as the negation of such a conception of truth. A Copernican Revolution without transcendental idealism seems a contradictio in adjecto. It is not surprising to find that in his final 1912 lectures in Heidelberg Lask virtually broke with his neo-Kantian heritage.28 He now argued that truth is radically transcendent, and that it is a fundamental mistake to think of it as dependent on the concepts we have of it. Where Lask was taking this radically objectivist conception of truth, however, will for ever remain lost to us. After these lectures, he left behind little more than scattered notes.29 When war was declared in 1914, he immediately volunteered; he was killed in May 1915, scarcely 40 years old, at the very height of his powers. 5 Rickert and the Philosophy of Value
The problems of the normative conception of philosophy that troubled Windelband and Lask fell upon the shoulders of Windelbands student and Lasks teacher, Heinrich Rickert. It was Rickerts mission to rescue the Kantian conception of normativity in the face of the challenges posed by Windelbands dualism and Lasks demand for objectivity. Rickert was thoroughly trained in, and deeply committed to, the neo-Kantian conception of philosophy developed by his teacher, Windelband. The main impetus 20
behind Rickerts work, what he spent most of his life exploring and unravelling, came from Windelbands doctrine of normativity. Rickert developed Windelbands doctrine into a systematic philosophy of value in two central works, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (1892) and System der Philosophie (1921). It was also Windelband who provided Rickert with the guiding theme for his interpretation of Kant. Thanks to Windelband, Rickert saw Kants philosophy primarily as a critical doctrine of norms. Rickerts Gegenstand der Erkenntnis is really the locus classicus for the normative interpretation of the critical philosophy.30 This work was immensely successful in its day, going through no fewer than six editions; it is all the more astonishing, therefore, that it should be so forgotten today. It is really the unacknowledged ancestor of Henry Allisons interpretation of Kant, and it is all the more a pity it is so unknown because it has all the strengths of Allisons interpretation and none of its weaknesses. Almost a century before Allison, Rickert attempts to find a via media between metaphysical and psychologistic interpretations of Kant. That via media lies for Rickert in the concept of normativity, a richer and more resonant concept than Allisons own vague and problematic epistemic condition. Rickerts work is not a commentary on Kants philosophy, but, as its title suggests, an investigation into the concept of objectivity. Rickerts central thesis, which he takes to represent the heart of Kants teaching in the transcendental deduction of the first Kritik, is that the concept of objectivity is essentially normative. Truth consists not in the correspondence of representations with objects outside them, but in their conformity to norms. Rickert comes to this conclusion essentially through an analysis of the act of judgement. When we judge something to be true or false, he argues, what we are essentially doing is appraising its value (pp. 1868). We are determining whether the representation conforms to a norm. The concept of objectivity is then dissolved into that of an obligation or ought (Sollen) (p. 213). Rickert describes his Copernican standpoint as follows: the subject does not revolve around reality, so that it attains theoretical value, but the subject revolves around theoretical value, so that it knows reality (p. 205). In other words, value is not the consequence but the condition of cognition (p. 205). Such, very crudely, was the concept of truth that Rickert had worked out by 1904 in the second edition of Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. After reading Husserl and conversing with Lask, however, Rickert too began to lose confidence in his theory. His first attempt to respond to the problems raised by Husserl and Lask is his 1909 Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie.31 Rickert now admits that there was something wrong with his first formulation of the concept of objectivity in the second edition of Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. There he attempted to derive normativity from the analysis of acts of judgement, a method he calls the transcendental-psychological approach in epistemology. But he now realizes that, as it stands, that method is too psychologistic. There is indeed a terrible circularity in that method: 21
since acts of judgement are psychological events, we can give them normative status only by reading norms into them, an obviously circular proceeding. To escape the circle, Rickert now proposes another method, what he calls the transcendental-logical approach. This approach by-passes acts of judgement and derives norms directly from their transcendental-logical validity. This, he says, is the path favoured by Husserl and Lask, which avoids psychologism and the circularity of the transcendental-psychological approach. But Rickert then takes issue with Husserl and Lask by pointing out that the transcendental-logical approach does not really work either. The problem is now the converse one: moving from the realm of value back into the world of fact. The transcendental-logical approach treats value as if it has no relation whatsoever to actual acts of cognition; it examines the object of knowledge for its own sake regardless of any actual attempt to know it. But Rickert finds this an arbitrary and artificial abstraction: I cannnot know what the object of knowledge is if I do not also know how I know this object. The concept of the object of knowledge loses all sense without the concept of the knowledge of this object (p. 217). How, then, are we to hurdle the divide between values and facts? In Zwei Wege Rickert recommends a combination of both approaches. The problem of the transcendental-psychological approach surreptitiously reading values into acts of judgement can be rectified through the transcendentallogical approach, which demonstrates that there are transcendent values and so justifies reading them into psychological acts of judgement. The hypostasis of the transcendental-logical approach can be cured if only, following the transcendental-psychological approach, one understands values as norms or rules that regulate acts of judging. Here, then, the concept of normativity shows its abiding use and value. Although Rickert thinks that the two methods are complementary, the thrust of his argument in Zwei Wege is that the transcendental-logical approach of Husserl and Lask has to be complemented by the transcendental-psychological approach. On its own, the prevalent transcendental-logical approach is an extreme that leads to the hypostasis of value, and that fails to see how values have their point only with respect to the attempts of knowers to realize them. Once we see that values have meaning only with respect to actual attempts of subjects to know them, we also see the purpose of the concept of normativity, which regulates or guides these subjects. Transcendental psychology still has much to offer, Rickert contends, because it shows us how the realm of values applies to actual knowers; this realm should not be seen as utterly self-sufficient and transcendent because it has to supply norms or standards for actual attempts to know. Against Husserl and Lask Rickert warns: without respect to actual knowledge transcendental logic will be in part quite empty (p. 226). So far it appears as if Rickert thinks that his problem solved. With a little brotherly co-operation between the two approaches to epistemology, it 22
seems, the dualism between value and fact can be overcome. But it is one of the most interesting and indeed astonishing results of Rickerts Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie that he admits that the problem is really unsolvable. It turns out that both methods, even if they co-operate, cannot explain the connection between the realm of values and the realm of facts. The transcendental-logical approach leaves values in a transcendent realm apparently having no application to actual human thinking, whereas the transcendental-psychological approach cannot derive norms from psychic acts taken strictly as facts. There seems to be, Rickert acknowledged, nothing less than an unbridgeable chasm between the realms of value and fact, between what ought to be and what really is. What could be the bridge between such apparently heterogeneous realms? Rickert admits that he has no answer. Rather than proposing solutions, he attempts to make us see and feel the difficulty. He notes how intentional states or epistemic attitudes connect the psychological and the normative, but he admits that he has no explanation for how this can happen. When we judge something to be true or false, the psychological act of judging takes place in time, but it does so according to timeless transcendent standards. When we prove a geometric theorem, we are thinking in time but about an eternal structure. As objects of intentional states and attitudes, these transcendent norms or eternal standards somehow become immanent within our consciousness. The realm of pure norms enters into the realm of existence through our thinking about them. So there is something remarkable and strange about epistemic attitudes and intentional states: they have the power to straddle two ontological realms. But here, Rickert confesses, we stand before a mystery. The unity of norm and fact in the act of cognition is a fact; but there cannot be any concept or explanation for it. It is impossible to explain how a transcendent value appears in actual consciousness, Rickert argues, because explanation works only within the realm of being, which is only one of the realms that is to be connected (p. 219). Since it is the basis of all conception and explanation, the unity of value and fact cannot be conceived or explained itself. Before such a mystery, Rickert, after writing many pages, could advise only silence. After coming to this startling conclusion in 1909, Rickert did not abandon hope but resolved to put more effort into resolving the problem. His next important essay is his 1911 article, Vom Begriff der Philosophie, the very first article in the new journal Logos.32 Here Rickert sets the agenda for the rest of his philosophical career. The thrust of his essay is that the chief problem of philosophy is not how to explain the whole of reality, but how to explain the connection between values and reality. It now turns out that the debate between idealism and materialism about the ultimate nature of the whole of reality is of little consequence compared to the deeper problem of the connection between norms and existence. Hence the difficulty Windelband tried to resolve since the 1880s has now become the chief problem of philosophy itself. 23
Rickerts main attempt to solve this problem is his massive but incomplete System der Philosophie.33 In this work he sketches a systematic philosophy of value, investigating in detail the nature of value and its connection with reality. He now develops a proposal suggested in his earlier essay: that there is a third realm of intentionality that mediates between values and existence. This is not the place, of course, to go into an examination of Rickerts proposal. Suffice it to say that some 500 painstaking pages later he never resolves the earlier doubts that he had in 1909 in Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. The main problem is that intentionality does not really connect the realms of value and fact after all. Although intentional attitudes are indeed very odd kinds of facts, which cannot be objectified and explained by normal psychology, they are still facts and therefore have no normative status. This becomes evident as soon as we consider that an intentional state can be true or false, good or evil, and still be the same state; it is not normative itself, but that which has to comply with a norm. Of course, there is a close connection between the acts and the values in the mind of the speaker or agent; the speaker thinks that his sentence is true, the agent believes that his action is right; but these are still facts and do not permit any inference that the sentence really is true or that the agents intention is really good. So Rickerts third realm connects facts and values only by begging the question: it assumes that what the speaker thinks is true or good is really true or good. Apart from its inherent difficulties, Rickerts attempt to solve his problem loses all credibility when he again admits that he is at a loss to explain it. In his System der Philosophie he confesses, just as he did in Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie, that the connection between value and fact is a mystery, and that it transcends all conceptual formulation. Rickert advances several arguments all of them familiar from the idealist tradition for why the unity of value and fact transcends conceptual formulation. First, this unity is prior to all conceiving, explaining or demonstrating, because it is a necessary condition for these activities; because any attempt to conceive, explain or demonstrate it presupposes it, it eludes conception, explanation and demonstration itself. Second, our intellect is essentially analytical, understanding things by taking them apart into independent terms; it therefore grasps the indivisible only by dividing it, i.e., it cannot understand the indivisible at all. Third, the intellect also proceeds heterologically, as Rickert puts it, so that it grasps one concept only through another contrasting concept. It would understand a concept like value, therefore, only by its opposite, reality, so that it becomes impossible to explain their unity. Once we distinguish fact and value through theory, Rickert argues, we cannot reunite them through theory (pp. 249, 293). It would seem, then, that if we are to know the unity of fact and value, we should quit the realm of theory entirely. Rather than thinking the unity of value and reality, it appears that we should content ourselves with intuiting 24
or feeling it instead. Though this is the proper conclusion of Rickerts argument, he is not happy to admit it. The source of his reluctance is not that such a position is close to that of Lebensphilosophen, whose irrationalism he had condemned all his life.34 In the end, then, Rickerts philosophy of value, by his own admission, collapses in the face of the problem of how to connect the normative with the natural. No less than Windelband, Rickert finds it impossible to solve this problem without retracting his earlier disavowal of metaphysics.35 There are no embarrassing public mea culpas in his case, because his retractions are never explained as such, and they appear in obscure articles and books rather than in public lectures.36 There is also no resurrection of Hegel, whom Rickert could not abide.37 He does, however, begin to see the necessity of a metaphysics to solve the fundamental problem facing him. Only a new metaphysics, he admits in a later essay, would be able to explain how the realms of value and fact, which are so different from one another, still form one world.38 But the older and wiser Rickert was too tired, too frail, too weary, to embark upon such a new intellectual adventure. He would leave that to his most talented student: Martin Heidegger.39 Such are my tales from the realm of normativity. From them it should be clear that normativity is not a new kingdom where all is simple and sweet. Rather, it is an old kingdom, filled with shipwreck and sorrow. All the central thinkers of Southwestern or Heidelberg neo-Kantianism came to grief in it. The morals of these stories are threefold. First, it is difficult to square the concept of normativity with the objective status of logical truth. Second, it is also not easy to explain the connection between value and fact. Third, dealing with each of these problems requires engaging in a discipline most normativity theorists love to hate: metaphysics. Hence Windelband returned to Hegel; Lask to the pre-Kantian theory of truth; and Rickert to the intuition of Lebensphilosophie. They show us, once again, that embarrassing old truth: that philosophers who spurn metaphysics often have to return to her later for favours. Just how and whether these lessons will benefit contemporary normativity theorists I will have to leave to your judgement. My job as an historian is now at an end. Syracuse University, USA Notes
1 This is the main theme of Rickerts Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur (Tbingen: Mohr, 1924). 2 See Prludien: Aufstze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, siebente und achte Auflage (Tbingen: Mohr, 1921, 2 volumes), I, 154. All references in parentheses above are to this edition.
25
3 Richard Rorty confuses matters by attributing to Zeller the view that philosophy is an autonomous enterprise independent of empirical science and metaphysics. See his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 134. This was not really Zellers view because he believed that epistemology should become psychology. The neo-Kantian position that Rorty discusses appears first in Windelband, whom he never mentions. 4 Windelband made his differences with the earlier neo-Kantian conception clear only much later, in his Philosophie im deutschen Geistesleben des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tbingen: Mohr, 1909), pp. 807. Although it is not so explicit, much of Was ist Philosophie? should be read as a critique of Zeller and Lange. 5 Vortrge und Abhandlungen, Zweite Sammlung (Leipzig: Fues, 1887, 2 volumes), II, 47996. 6 See Zeller, ber die Aufgabe der Philosophie und ihre Stellung zu den brigen Wissenschaften, Vortrge und Abhandlungen II, 464. Cf. ber die gegenwrtige Stellung und Aufgabe der deutschen Philosophie, Vortrge und Abhandlungen II, 474: Unsere Philosophie soll sich, soweit es die Natur ihrer Gegenstnde erlaubt, das genaue Verfahren der Naturwissenschaften zum Muster nehmen. 7 See the Zusatz to ber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Philosophie, Vortrge und Abhandlungen II, 502. 8 As Windelband put it in his Einleitung in die Philosophie (Tbingen: Mohr, 1920): So mu man sich deutlich machen, da die Art der Entstehung kein Kriterium fr die Wahrheit der Vorstellung ist (p. 210). 9 See Normen und Naturgesetze, Prludien II, 67; Kulturphilosophie und transzendentaler Idealismus, Prludien II, 283; and Was ist Philosophie?, Prludien I, 47. 10 See Windelbands Prinzipien der Logik (Tbingen: Mohr, 1913), pp. 5860. 11 This was the argument of his early 1882 essay Normen und Naturgesetze, Prludien II, 5998. 12 These much-cited lines are from the foreword to the 1883 edition of Prludien, I, iv. 13 See Normen und Naturgesetze, Prludien II, 67. 14 See Was ist Philosophie?, Prludien I, 44 and Kulturphilosophie und transzendentaler Idealismus, Prludien II, 2823. 15 See Kritische oder Genetische Method?, Prludien II, 10910. 16 Windelband was highly critical of pragmatism. He believed that the ends of enquiry should be ends in themselves, and that truth is a value independent of utility. See his critique of pragmatism in Einleitung in die Philosophie, pp. 2023, and his 1909 lecture Der Wille zur Wahrheit (Heidelberg: Winter, 1909). In the lecture Windelband explicitly mentions Royce (p. 6), who had visited Heidelberg. Though he does not mention James by name, he refers to his work (p. 16). In Rickert the neo-Kantian critique of pragmatism would reach its heights and depths. 17 ber Willensfreiheit: Zwlf Vorlesungen (Tbingen: Mohr, 1903). 18 Nach hundert Jahre, Prludien I, 14767. 19 Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus, Prludien I, 27389. 20 On that revival, see Paul Hnigsheim, Zur Hegelrenaissance im VorkriegsHeidelberg, Hegel-Studien, 2 (1963), pp. 291301. 21 See his Geschichtsphilosophie. Eine Kriegsvorlesung. Fragment aus dem Nachlass. Kant-Studien Ergnzungsheft 38 (1916). 22 See Logische Untersuchungen (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928, 2 volumes), I, 1578, 1645. 23 Ibid., I, 5960, 124.
26
24 In his letter of 25 December 1910, Lask wrote Husserl that he had been introducing his conception of validity into his lectures for the past five years. See Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, 10 volumes), V, 31. This would place his reading of Husserl sometime before 1905. 25 See Lasks Rechtsphilosophie, in Emil Lask, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eugen Herrigel (Tbingen: Mohr, 1923), I, 275331. Lasks philosophy of history is his Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte, Gesammelte Schriften, I, 1274, 3 volumes. All references to Lask in parentheses are to this edition, abbreviated as GS. 26 This criticism appears in the third edition of Rickerts Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Tbingen: Mohr, 1918), p. 284. Rickert had already taken issue with Lask and Husserl in his Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie, Kant-Studien, 14 (1909), pp. 169228, esp. 21328. Rickert was responding to Lasks earlier 1908 lecture Gibt es ein Primat der praktischen Vernunft in der Logik?, GS I, 34756, which is already critical of the subjectivity inherent in the Kantian conception of normativity. Lask responded to Rickerts criticism in Die Lehre vom Urteil, GS II, 230, 447. 27 Husserl, Briefwechsel, V, 34. 28 Lask, Zum System der Logik, GS III, 57170. 29 Lask, Zum System der Philosophie, GS III, 171236; and System der Wissenschaften, GS III, 23793. 30 All references to this work, in parentheses above, are to the sixth edition, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Tbingen: Mohr, 1928). 31 Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie, Kant-Studien, 14 (1909), pp. 169228. This article was published separately in the same year by C. A. Kaemmerer in Halle. It has been reprinted by Knigshausen & Neumann, Wrzburg, 2002. All references in parentheses are to the original article. 32 Vom Begriff der Philosophie, Logos, 1 (1911/12), pp. 134. 33 System der Philosophie (Tbingen: Mohr, 1921). All references in parentheses are to this, the only, edition. Rickert intended this to be one volume of a much larger, multivolume, work; but he abandoned the project after the first volume. 34 See his polemic Die Philosophie des Lebens (Tbingen: Mohr, 1920). 35 See the introduction to the second edition of Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Tbingen: Mohr, 1913), pp. 911. Here Rickert does not maintain that metaphysics is impossible, but he is sceptical whether it can validate its speculations. Prudence advises him to stick with epistemology: Erkenntnistheorie ist fr uns Sache des guten Gewissens geworden (p. 11). 36 Note, for example, how metaphysics reappears, without fanfare, in System der Philosophie, p. 138. Also see the passages in the essay cited below, note 38. 37 See his comments on Hegel in System der Philosophie, pp. 2467. 38 See his 1927/9 essay Das Erkenntnis der intelligibeln Welt und das Problem der Metaphysik, Logos, 16 (1927), pp. 162203 and Logos, 18 (1929), pp. 3682. Here Rickert admits that only a new metaphysics will bring together the world of value and fact (16, pp. 182 and 18, pp. 82). However, he does not develop that metaphysics. He promised a third part of this long essay, which would explain it; but he never published it. 39 The story of their relationship is best told by their correspondence. See Martin Heidegger/Heinrich Rickert, Briefe 19121933, ed. Alfred Denker (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1902).
27

Beiser Frederick Neo Kantianism Normativity

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Beiser Frederick Neo Kantianism Normativity

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [Universitaetsbibliothek Marburg - Collections Parent Account] On: 7 May 2011 Access details:

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 17(1), 927

Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

Windelbands Retreat and Defeat

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

NORMATIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM: ITS RISE AND FALL

You might also like