THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES WILLIE A. DENATE and MYRNA LO DENATE, respondents.

G.R. No. 114928 January 21, 1997 Facts: Petitioner, The Andresons Group, Inc., questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied private respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground of lis pendens. Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits (wines and liquors) in Davao City, three Davao provinces and North Cotabato. Private respondents filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against petitioner. In the complaint, private respondent Willie Denate alleged that he was entitled to the amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions from petitioner but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused to pay the same. In response, petitioner likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondent at the RTC in Kalookan City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao City. Petitioner petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it. The RTC of Kalookan City issued the questioned order which states: "The Court finds the instant motion without merit. Admittedly, the Davao case involves the same parties, and involves substantial identity in the case of action and reliefs sought, as in the instant case. Perusal of the record in this case, however, shows that jurisdiction over the parties has already been acquired by this Court, as herein defendants received their summons as early as January 8, 1992, and the plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment has been set for hearing last January 21, 1992, but which hearing was cancelled until further notice because of the filing of the instant motion to dismiss by the defendants herein on February 17, 1992, after asking for extension of time to file their responsive pleading. Clearly, the instant case has been in progress as early as January of this year. On the other hand, the summons in the Davao case has not yet been served as of April 21, 1992, the date of the hearing of the instant motion, so much so that the said Davao Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties." On May 29, 1992, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set aside the order of the trial court.

Issue: Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens (pendentia litis)?

Held: Yes. Ratio: Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the case on hand. All these requisites are present in the instant case. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary. The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts only upon the filing of a complaint in court. The rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens should apply. Syllabus: REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; LIS PENDENS; REQUISITES . Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata the case on hand. REQUISITES PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in Davao and Caloocan cases are the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. A SANCTION AGAINST MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS . In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious. PRIOR PENDING ACTION OR SERVICE OF SUMMONS, NOT REQUIRED . A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action pending between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens should apply.

CRITERIA IN DETERMINING WHICH CASE SHOULD BE ABATED . It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is which is the more appropriate action or which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice." Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area.

SPOUSES DR. FIDEL CALALANG and DRA. MARIA GENER CALALANG , and FERDINAND CALALANG, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), and HEIRS OF ERLINDA GRUTA, respondents. G.R. No. 74613 February 27, 1991 Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse, nullify and set aside the decision of the IAC setting aside the decision of the trial court in between the same parties. The trial court had dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action but the Court of Appeals ordered the case to be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings; and the following resolution denying the motion for reconsideration As gathered from the records, the facts of the case are as follows: Erlinda Gruta, 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as househelper in the household of petitioners spouses Calalang. She died of malathion poisoning. The Calalangs first brought her to their clinic then to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where she died. Ferdinand Calalang was charged with murder for allegedly poisoning her. The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Then the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation Complainant Juanita Gruta, mother of the deceased, presented the sworn statement of Dolores Ayuste, the aunt of the deceased maid. Respondent Ferdinand Calalang never appeared nor presented his counter affidavit, instead his mother Maria Gener Calalang presented a counter affidavit and two affidavits of her maids who saw the deceased take a lethal dose of malathion. After clarificatory questioning, the parties submitted their memoranda and later the Investigating Fiscal Liberato Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged. No motion for reconsideration was filed. Nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand Calalang impleading the spouses Calalang for actual and compensatory damages. Petitioners filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. As the issues were joined, petitioners submitted a Request for Admission, under Rule 26. Private respondents, however, filed an Opposition to the Motion for Admission which was not resolved by the trial court. The case was later dismissed. However, on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the order of the RTC. This was, again, appealed. Issue: Does the dismissal of the criminal complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action also dismiss the subsequent civil case?

Held: No. Under Section 5, Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." The preliminary hearing should be conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be allowed to present evidence and the evidence recorded, except when the affirmative defense is based on par. g., Section 1, Rule 16 "that the complaint states no cause of action." In determining sufficiency of cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon by way of affirmative defenses state other matters. Thus the trial court, in the case at bar, did not commit any error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of herein petitioners. The finding of IAC that there was no preliminary hearing has no basis that can be verified from the records. IAC relied solely on the statement of the Clerk of Court that "this case was decided on the basis of pleadings, memorandum, motion for reconsideration and opposition. No oral or documentary evidence was presented" without going to the records of the case. A close scrutiny of the Order of Dismissal of the Regional Trial Court indicates that the present case was not dismissed solely on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, but also on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang, upon considering the "pleadings, memorandum, motion for reconsideration and opposition" therein. Thus, "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the Court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." Similarly, "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." The dismissal of this criminal case as found by IAC is only by resolution of the provincial fiscal and does not proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist, so that said case may be refiled anytime without the effect of double jeopardy. The dismissal of the information or the criminal action (upon motion of the fiscal) does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal or extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties and different rules of competency and evidence is used in both trials. Finally, the trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against him. This is not a ground for dismissal of action under Rule 16; but the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The pleadings, memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition, thereto, might show that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang; still, the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."

BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE PABLO D. ATIENZA , in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Nasugbu, Batangas and LEONIDA UMANDAL-BAUSAS, respondents. G.R. No. 110480 June 29, 2001 Facts: Private respondent Leonida Umandal-Bausas was a depositor of petitioner Bangko Silangan Development Banko (BSDB) since 1985. As of 1990, she had Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) deposited in her savings account. She attempted to withdraw Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) from that savings account but, to her surprise, the bank teller told her that her brother had already withdrawn the amount allegedly with her written authorization and that her remaining balance was only Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00).

Respondent Bausas then inquired about the withdrawal slip and found that the signatures appearing thereon were not hers and neither that of her brother. Dismayed by the turn of events, she sought the assistance of a family friend, Edmundo Villadolid. Villadolid sent petitioner BSDB a letter, together with an affidavit executed by respondent Bausas. In substance, Villadolid, in his letter informed petitioner BSDB of the "sad experience" of respondent Bausas. Also through a letter, petitioner BSDB informed respondent Bausas that the investigation it had conducted on the matter revealed that her brother bearing her passbook and the withdrawal slip to which her signature was affixed, withdrew the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). The petitioner bank asserted that it observed the usual procedure in banktransaction. As a result of that information, respondent Bausas sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation. After an investigation, a case was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and docketed therein. It appeared that respondent Bausas sought another venue for airing her complaint the press. Aggrieved with the developments, petitioner BSDB filed a complaint for damages against respondent Bausas, Villadolid, the Philippine Journalists, Inc., and its officers and employees. The complaint alleged that the "series of publications" were "clearly defamatory and libelous," and caused damage to the "goodwill, integrity and good reputation" of the 21-year old bank. Respondents filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim. While the civil case was pending in RTC-Manila, respondent Bausas, joined by her husband Ricardo, filed a complaint for a sum of money, with damages, against petitioner BSDB before the RTC of Batangas. Instead of filing a responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioner BSDB filed a motion to dismiss, alleging among others, that there was another pending action between the same parties for the same cause, and that the filing of the complaint constituted forum-shopping. The RTC of Batangas denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner BSDB then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied. Petitioner BSDB elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and upholding the denial of its motion to dismiss. The appellate court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Besides, the principle of litis pendentia invoked by petitioner BSDB is not applicable to the case at bar.

Issue: Was the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss? Held: No. According to the Supreme Court, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss. The resolution and order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to dismiss were merely interlocutory. The Court also ruled that the filing of the latter case was not barred by litis pendentia. What is essential in litis pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. Clearly, there was no similarity of issues involved in the case at bar. Basically, that second case was a collection suit founded on a contract of bank deposit, while the issue in the first case was whether or not the alleged publications of the incident made by respondent Bausas and Villadolid were defamatory so as to warrant petitioner's entitlement to damages. The petitioner's contention that private respondent was guilty of forum shopping must likewise fail inasmuch as the cause of action in the two civil cases were separate and distinct from each other. The instant petition was denied for lack of merit. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed and the Regional Trial Court of Batangas was directed to proceed with dispatch to resolve the case filed before it. Syllabus: ORDER; ALWAYS UNDER CONTROL OF THE COURT AND MAY BE MODIFIED OR RESCINDED UPON SUFFICIENT GROUNDS SHOWN AT ANY TIME BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT; BASIS; LIMITATION. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 221. The Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to dismiss are merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby. These limitations were not transgressed by the trial court in the case at bar when it denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss. The alleged "chaos and confusion" arising from conflicting decisions that petitioner purportedly seeks to avert by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 221 are actually far-fetched and contrived considering that any adverse decision of the CTA can be made the subject of a proper appeal. MOTION TO DISMISS; LITIS PENDENTIA; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; CONSTRUED; REQUISITES; WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IN LITIS PENDENTIA IS THE IDENTITY AND SIMILARITY OF ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION . Moreover, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. More particularly, it must conform to the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. What is essential in litis pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. There being no similarity of issues in Civil Cases No. 91-56185 and 221, the filing of the latter case was not barred by litis pendentia.

TEST TO DETERMINE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION . The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the form or nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has been considered the most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible. ACTIONS; FORUM SHOPPING; CONSTRUED. Forum-shopping is "the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party. Where the elements of litis pendentia are not present or where a final judgment in one case will not amount to res judicata in the other, there is no forum-shopping. In the case at bar, there is no forum shopping, inasmuch as earlier discussed, the cause of action in Civil Case No. 91-56185 is separate and distinct from the cause of action in Civil Case No. 221.

G.R. No. L-104033

December 27, 1993

NOE S. ANDAYA, petitioner, vs.LISANDRO C. ABADIA, RENE R. CRUZ, VICTOR M. PUNZALAN, LYSIAS C. CABUSAO, JOSE O. BARNUEVO, JOSE M. FORONDA, LAMBERTO TORRES, EDGAR C. GALVANTE, EMERSON C. TANGAN, PRIMITIVO A. SOMERA, and BENJAMIN N. SANTOS, SR., respondents. FACTS: 1. Maintaining that the RTC and not SEC has jurisdiction over his complaint, petitioner argues that the court should not have dismissed the civil case filed by him against herein respondents. He asserts that "actually, the complaint is based not so much on plaintiff's attempted removal but rather on the manner of his removal and the consequent effects thereof. 2. Specifically he alleges in his petition that in action denominated "Injunction and Damages with Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction". He alleges that : a. the defendants as directors of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc., (AFPSLAI) . . . acting in concerts and pursuant to an illegal and nefarious scheme to oust petitioner from his then positions as President and General Manager of the AFPSLAI, with grave abuse of authority and in gross and deliberate violation of the norms of human relations and of petitioner's right to due process, illegally, maliciously and with evident bad faith , convened a meeting of the AFPSLAI Board of Directors and illegally reorganized the management of AFPSLAI by ousting and removing, without just and lawful cause, petitioner from his position. b. Causing petitioner moral and exemplary damages, and praying . . . for the issuance of a temporary restraining order . . . and . . . a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining respondents from implementing the result of the irregularity convened and illegally conducted reorganization of the management of AFPSLAI, as well as respondents Punzalan and Tangan from assuming and taking over from petitioner the offices of President and General Manager of said AFPSLAI and from performing and exercising the functions and powers thereof pending final determination of the case. 3 3. TC- granted the prayer of petition for temporary restraining order and set the hearing on the injunctive relief 4. Respondents filed an urgent motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint raised intra-corporate controversies over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, and not the court a quo, has exclusive original jurisdiction. They also filed an an Urgent Motion to Lift Restraining Order and Opposition to Preliminary Injunction a. Petitioner filed a Consolidated Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Restraining Order with Reply to Opposition to Preliminary Injunction and Reiteration of Motions for Contempt (for violation of the Temporary Restraining Order), arguing that "the case is mainly based not on petitioner's attempted removal per se but rather on the manner of his removal and the effect thereof, which was done anti-socially, oppressively, in gross violation of the norms of human relations and without giving petitioner his due 5. Petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading as additional defendants then Central bank Governor Jose L. Cuisia, Jr., Central Bank SRDC Managing Director Ricardo P. Lirio and Central Bank SES Acting Director Candon B. Guerrero. 6. RTC- dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction . While the order mentioned the amended complaint, it made no express disposition thereon.

a. Evidently, the prayers for damages and injunction are predicated on corporate matters. It should be stressed at this point that the subject causes of action stated in the complaint, from the alleged illegal notices of meetings to the election and tenure of officers, are matters covered by the AFPSLAI By-Laws. Specifically, on the allegation that the plaintiff was ousted and removed in a votation by the AFPSLAI Board of Directors, whether rightly or without just cause, this is covered by the AFPSLAI By-Laws, Sec. 3, that: " All executive officers shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board, and all other officers, agents and employees shall hold office for such time as it is provided for in their contract of employment and if none is provided, at the pleasure of the Board (emphasis supplied). b. The specific law, P.D. No. 902-A, defines and vests jurisdiction over corporate matter in the Securities and Exchange Commission in no uncertain terms, Section 3, to be "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations." In the case at bar, AFPSLAI is a corporation and the alleged causes of action in the complaint are clearly corporate matters. c. The damages sought as a consequence of the alleged corporate wrongs committed by the defendants becomes merely incidental. The other relief for injunction prayed for is also within the jurisdictional power of the SEC 7. Petitioner moved to reconsider arguing that "since the case under Amended Complaints impleads parties-defendant not in any way connected with the AFPSLAI, any apparent corporate element in the case is swept away. a. RTC- denied MR. the fact remains that the substance and essence of the complaint against the original 11 defendants in both the first and the amended complaint are the same that the said defendants are being held civilly liable for their corporate acts in the AFPSLAI. b. Consequently, the Court finds no reason to change its lack of resolution dismissing the instant complaint FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION insofar as the original defendants c. Thus, where the defendants Abadia, et al., were dismissed from the case, it does not necessarily follow that the whole case, specifically the amended complaint, is also dismissed as the allegations therein insofar as the defendants Cuisia, et al. . . . . are concerned, are within the context of the jurisdiction of this Court. The matter does not only present a case of splitting the causes of action, which is frowned upon, but a matter of jurisdiction. This Court has no jurisdiction on corporate matters as in the case of defendants Abadia, et al. . . . . but no so, however, in the case of defendants Cuisia, et al . . . . where their alleged acts stated in the amended complaint fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION HELD: YES A. The allegations against herein respondents in the amended complaint unquestionably reveal intra-corporate controversies cleverly concealed, although unsuccessfully, by use of civil law terms and phrases . a. The amended complaint impleads herein respondents who, in their capacity as directors of AFPSLAI, allegedly convened an illegal meeting and voted for the reorganization of management resulting in petitioner's ouster as corporate officer. b. While it may be said that the same corporate acts also give rise to civil liability for damages, it does not follow that the case is necessarily taken out of the jurisdiction of the SEC as it may award damages which can be considered consequential in the exercise of its adjudicative powers. Besides, incidental issues that properly fall within the authority of a tribunal may also be considered by it to avoid multiplicity of actions. Consequently, in intracorporate matters such as those affecting the corporation, its directors, trustees,

officers, shareholders, the issue of consequential damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC. B. The determination of the rights of petitioner arising from the alleged illegal convening of the meeting of AFPSLAI Board of Directors and his subsequent ouster from corporate offices as a result of the voting for the reorganization of management are obviously intra-corporate controversies subject to the jurisdiction of SEC as provided in P.D. No. 902-A which states:Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations . . . it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving . . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate . . . relations . . . . (c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations . . . . C. The same may also be said of petitioner's prayer for damages, considering that his right thereto either depends on, or is inextricably linked with, the resolution of the corporate controversies. For instance, the prayer for moral damages is grounded on "defendants' gross and evident bad faith, insidious machinations and conspirational acts, false and derogatory misinterpretations and imputations against plaintiff and other malevolent and illegal acts calculated to realize and accomplish the threatened illegal removal of plaintiff from his positions aforesaid . . . .;" 14while the prayer for exemplary damages is dependent on alleged respondents' "concerted illegal effort to maliciously set him up for, and fraudulently consummate, his illegal ouster from his positions in the AFPSLAI . . . ." 15 D. Even the supposed allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, as in par. 7 of the Complaint which states that "certain parties, including defendant SANTOS, "masterminded a plot to degrade plaintiff and to denigrate his accomplishments in the AFPSLAI by spreading false and derogatory rumors against plaintiff," are all treated in the complaint as mere components of the general scheme allegedly perpetrated by respondents as directors to oust him from his corporate offices, and not as causes of action independent of intra-corporate matters. Moreover, the injunction prayed for in the complaint is within the jurisdiction of SEC pursuant to Sec. 6, par. (a), of P.D. 902-A which states: "(i)n order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers . . . . (t)o issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction . E. In sum, what petitioner filed against respondents before the court a quo was an intra-corporate case under the guise of an action for injunction and damages. ISSUE 2 WHETHER THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED on the alleged procedural infirmity that "despite the filing of an Amended Complaint before a responsive pleading has been filed, which superseded the original complaint and rendered respondents' Motion to Dismiss the original complaint functus oficio, the Court a quo without first admitting the Amended Complaint and merely upon respondents' Omnibus Motion . . . dismissed the case as against respondents." A. First of all, under Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court, the filing of an amended complaint before answer is an undisputed right of plaintiff, hence, there is no need for the court to allow its admission. 18 Quite obviously, any statement admitting such amended complaint may reasonably be considered a superfluity. Considered in this light, the court a quo could not be faulted for not making any statement admitting the amended complaint. B. Also. The foregoing notwithstanding, remedial rights and privileges under the Rules of Court are utterly useless in a forum that has no jurisdiction over the case. It should be noted that the court a quo dismissed the case against respondents on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof which mainly involves intra-corporate controversies.

C. Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. It is elementary that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action." D. We note that Sec. 2, Rule 9 uses the word "shall," leaving the court no choice under the given situation but to dismiss the case. The same Rule also uses the phrase "whenever it appears," which means at anytime after the complaint or amended complaint is filed, because the lack of jurisdiction may be apparent from the allegations therein. Hence, from the foregoing, even if no answer or motion to dismiss is filed the court may dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. In this sense, dismissal for lack jurisdiction may be ordered by the court motu propio. Applying this notion to the case at bar, with the dismissal of the case against respondents for lack of jurisdiction, it then becomes inconsequential whether the court acted on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the requisite notice as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The determination of lack of jurisdiction over respondents being apparent from the face of the amended complaint, the defect of want of prior notice and hearing of the Omnibus Motion could not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo. E. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the court a quo, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of 14 November 1991 and 10 February 1992 are AFFIRMED.

LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO, respondents. Doctrines: JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, LACK OF; EFFECTS THEREOF. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. Facts: Respondent Yao, owner of a commercial building which is leased to petitioner under a contract of lease executed. But later the petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental rate, their disagreement were submitted to arbitration, respondent Yao appointed Domingo Alamarez, Jr. as his arbitrator, while petitioner chose Atty. Casiano Sabile as its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of Aurelio Tupang, as third arbitrator, was held in abeyance because petitioner instructed Atty. Sabile to defer the same until its Board of Directors could convene and approve Tupang's appointment. Respondent Yao prayed that after summary hearing to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and the applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it. The respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso as the third arbitrator. And ordered the parties to submit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. But the respondent court was not persuaded by petitioner's submission. It denied the motion for reconsideration. While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the courta quo.

Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter Held: Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue.

BENEDICTO RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ELVIRO L. PERALTA, Roman Facts: Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez. The original lease for a term of five (5) years from January 1, 1964 to January 1, 1990, was renewed several times, the last renewal being on June 28, 1974 under a "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa" for a period of three (3) years starting January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1977. Unknown to petitioner, title 1 to said property was in the name of Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co. Respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from petitioner the advance rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the amount of P30,000.00. On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila the aforesaid complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 103647, 3 against private respondents Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the fishpond in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 respectively due on March 15, 1976 and June 15, 1976, which he had previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses Ortanez and Pablo Roman. P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted by P.R. Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet its title over the Salgado fishpond. CFI of Manila issued an order 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 103647, stating in part: Without discussing in detail the grounds mentioned above, the Court really sees that this case should be dismissed not only insofar as against P. R. Roman, Inc. but also as against the other defendants mentioned above for the reason, principally, that there is already a case pending between the same parties and for the same cause in Civil Case No. 4102 of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R. Roman, Inc. vs. Benedicto Roman, which is precisely for the ownership of the subject matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff Hence this petition anchored on the following ascribed errors of law: o The respondent court erred in holding that the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before the Court of First Instance of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 103647 before it. Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title Civil Case No. 4102 cannot serve as a bar to his Manila consignation Civil Case No. 103647 because they involve different issues. Civil Case No. 4102 deals with the question of ownership while the only issue involved in his consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment. Private respondents counter that the view taken by petitioner of the Manila consignation case is quite limited and bookish, because while it may be true that theoretically, the main

issue involved in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment, in the consignation case brought by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner himself, such as the validity and binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of the supposed obligor-obligee relationship. Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the case given that there is already a case pending between the same parties and for the same cause. Held: Nope. CA was correct. Ratio: Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: 1. Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; 2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3. The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his basic petition for review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the respondent court erred in not holding that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as the parties in Civil Case No. 103647. However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission of the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No. 103647, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance. Anent the second element, we agree with private respondents' observation that petitioner's approach to his consignation case is quite constricted. His contention that the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment is true only where there is no controversy with respect to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in Civil Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the lease contract. That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102 would constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so. Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No. 4102 and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.