In what ways does Irregular Warfare differ from conventional Warfare?

Key characteristics unique to irregular warfare distinguish it from conventional warfare. The New Zealand Defence Force describes Irregular Activity as the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.1 Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereign states have claimed the monopoly on the legitimate use of force2, relegating non-state actors to rely on asymmetric tactics. While any war in its most fundamental form is a struggle for personal or political survival,3 irregular warfare is less land centric in its strategy and is critically population centric in application. Although the inspiration for an irregular group to engage in hostilities can differ from conflict to conflict, there is one theme that endures through each irregular warfares asymmetric nature. While the tactics, disparity, and criminal activity, are enduring components of irregular warfare, the essential difference from conventional warfare is the human terrain. There is more depth to irregular warfare than wars of liberation carried out by ambush instead of by combat4 as portrayed by John F Kennedy. In the early stages of an irregular war, it is carried out by non-state actors who are generally at an immediate disadvantage at the tactical level. Mao Tse-tungs key to success was for insurgents to offset their enemys tangible assets by exploiting the intangible factors of space, time and will.5 Kilcullen elaborates further, describing the Maoist protracted warfare strategy as the establishment of a guerrilla counter-state, shadowing and competing with the legitimate system of control over time. As guerrilla influence spreads across the country, the increased strength of the guerrilla state allows its irregulars to pursue defeat of the legitimate government by out manoeuvring its conventional forces.6 In 2008, similar tactics were in use by the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan. Thirteen guerrilla shadow judiciaries were operating in an attempt to expand

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence 2008, Swindon, UK. 2 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, New Zealand Defence Doctrine, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force 2012, Defence House 2-12 Aitken St, Wellington, NZ. 3 RD Hooker Jr, "Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War," (DTIC Document, 2005). 4 John F. Kennedy: "Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy," June 6, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, the American Presidency Project. 5 Robin Corbett, Guerrilla Warfare: from 1938 to the Present Day, ed. Dr Francis Toase (Greater London House, Hampstead Road, London NW1 7QX: Orbish Book Publishing Cororation Ltd 1986, 1986). 6 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (189 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford University Press, 2009).

Taliban influence, using Islamic sharia law.7 Rather than haphazardly carrying out ambushes and various acts of sabotage, irregular warfare may use these tactics to harass conventional forces. The overarching strategy of these tactics is the undermining of established Governments, and in extension their doctrinally conventional armed forces, to effect or to prevent change. An enduring aspect that differs irregular warfare from conventional warfare is the disparity between opposing forces with regards to military hardware and technology, troop strength, and contemporary military training. Irregular warfare campaigns have been fought prior to the Old Testament, when Judas Maccabeus waged a guerrilla war against the Syrians in Palestine in 164 BCE. These campaigns were fought by populations either under occupation of foreign forces or faced with a stronger or more sophisticated opponent than themselves.8 Necessarily, local knowledge and support are used to frustrate and out manoeuvre a conventionally postured force. The French Army in Algeria, between 1830 and 1847, found themselves bogged down due to the Arab local knowledge of the deep gorges, narrow passes, and mountain peaks, which make up the terrain of the Northern Tell Atlas of North Africa.9 As the Arab defenders could not compete force on force, they resorted to what they knew best the land. An irregular force may not have the finances or resources of a sovereign state which puts these groups at an immediate disadvantage against a regular force. Because of this, ODriscoll argues, non-state actors tend to turn to alternative tactics such as skirmishing, guerrilla campaigns, and occasionally terrorism.10 Criminality may arise as a means to finance the enhancement of equipment and to establish legitimacy of the irregular groups actions. The Taliban actively encouraged the Afghan farming population to grow and harvest opium poppies and implied they would protect them from the counter narcotics efforts of the Government of Afghanistan.11 Although the Taliban had previously taken a hard stance on the growing and trafficking of narcotics, in 2006 the Taliban made attempts to legitimise criminal activity - harvesting opium paste for drug trafficking by incorporating such activity into political propaganda: Our economy, the

7 8

Ibid. Corbett, Guerrilla Warfare: from 1938 to the Present Day. 9 Martin Evans, Algeria: France's Undecleared War (Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012). 10 Cian ODriscoll, "A fighting chance or fighting dirty? Irregular warfare, Michael Gross and the Spartans," European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 2 (2012). 11 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One .

poppy.12 It also suggests that the substantial improvement in equipment of the Taliban, which occurred during the period, can be attributed to this tactic of criminality. This view is supported by Rashid, who links the Talibans major summer offensive of 2006 to the enormous income cultivated from Opium.13 This sets the Taliban tactics apart from the International Security Assistance Force which complies with the Laws of Armed Conflict and actively enforces its men not subscribe to criminal activity. Where conventional warfare involves violent struggle, often land centric in application, irregular warfare is for the most part centred on the dominance of human terrain. A key focus of conventional warfare is the seizure and retention of land and it presumes that the indigenous people of the land will accept the political rule of the victor.14 However, irregular warfares centre of gravity is in the support of the population. This support may be attributed to nationalism, political ideology, religious beliefs, or in some cases it may be coerced through intimidation. Regardless of the motivation sustaining popular support, or lack of it, to have it is more important than holding strategically important land. As demonstrated by the Malayan emergency (1948 54), popular support plays an important role in determining the duration and overall outcome of an irregular conflict. Communist guerrillas attempted to implement a communist dictatorship in replacement of British rule. Because the guerrilla groups only support was drawn from the minority Chinese communist community, there was little support to sustain and arm the group. British forces recognised this as an ideological conflict and encouraged Malay nationalism, winning the hearts and minds of the populace, and alienating the Chinese community through careful police measures.15 In Algeria, during the 19th century, French resistance was not as much a case of nationalism as it was due to religion.16 French regulars championing Napoleonic military doctrine could never hope to win in the long term, as the Arab irregulars were endeared to the population through their devoutly Islamic faith. Rather than concentrate on conventional military concerns, encouraging and maintaining the best interests of the population are a key factor in irregular warfare, and far outweighs any perceived advantage of holding ground.

12 13

Ibid. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R oRL, England: Penguin Books, 2009). 14 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, New Zealand Defence Doctrine. 15 Geoffrey Parker, ed. The Cambridge illustrated history of warfare: The triumph of the west. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press., 2012). 16 Evans, Algeria: France's Undecleared War.

It is evident that the principal difference between irregular warfare and conventional warfare lies in the contrasting methodology in which each is conducted. A conventional force is prepared to engage in warfare through frontal battles, often to seize ground, while an irregular force finds this untenable. In place of this, irregular warfare favours an indirect approach as it seeks to exploit the conventional forces weaknesses and simultaneously establish a guerrilla state in waiting. The irregular tactics of war by ambush instead of combat has been preferred at least since biblical times and results from the overall disparity between the regular and irregular force. Unlike conventional warfare, an irregular force may resort to criminality as a way to bridge the disparity gap and finance the group, or to coerce the local population into supporting their cause through violence and intimidation. Support of the indigenous population is the key component at the centre of irregular warfare, and to lose this support can potentially lose the war. Although there is asymmetry in military hardware, financial resources, and legitimacy in the use of force, both irregular and regular warfare share hearts and minds as a less tangible equivalency. Contrarily, this common ground is the defining characteristic which separates irregular warfare form conventional warfare the human terrain.

Bibliography Books Corbett, Robin. Guerrilla Warfare: From 1938 to the Present Day. Edited by Dr Francis Toase Greater London House, Hampstead Road, London: Orbish Book Publishing Cororation Ltd 1986, 1986.

Evans, Martin. Algeria: France's Undecleared War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West. New York: Cambridge University Press., 2012. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. London: Penguin Books, 2009. Articles Hooker Jr, RD. "Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War." DTIC Document, 2005. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence 2008, Swindon, UK. New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, New Zealand Defence Doctrine, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force 2012, Defence House 2-12 Aitken St, Wellington, NZ. ODriscoll, Cian. "A Fighting Chance or Fighting Dirty? Irregular Warfare, Michael Gross and the Spartans." European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 2 (2012): 112. Websites John F. Kennedy: "Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy." June 6, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695.