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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword................................................... 1 1 Scope .................................................. 1 2 References .......................................... 1 3 Definitions............................................ 3 4 Functional Requirements..................... 3 5 Interface Requirements ....................... 7 6 Implementation Requirements............ 26 7 Contract Specific Requirements ......... 26 Appendix A: Interconnection Diagrams ... 27 Appendix B: Acceptable Integration Options .................................................... 39
The contents of National Grid engineering documents are based on the needs of National Grid and the conditions under which it operates. It should not therefore be assumed that the specifications and requirements stated therein necessarily meet the particular circumstances and requirements of other organisations. The principles set out in this document are for information only and therefore National Grid is not liable to customers/suppliers for any loss or damage resulting from reliance on the contents. It is the responsibility of such external organisations to check that the document is the latest version and is appropriate for their purposes.
This is a Bay Level Specification which is part of a suite of specifications that describe requirements for light current equipment on National Grids transmission system.
SCOPE
This specification, in conjunction with related functional specifications details the protection, control and measurements functions and the associated interconnectivity which are required within light current systems on series reactor bays at double busbar or other substations on National Grids 400, 275 and 132 kV transmission systems. It also describes interfaces with other substation functions.
REFERENCES
This Specification makes reference to, or should be read in conjunction with the following documents: NGTS 3.24.65 Overall Protection NGTS 3.24.38 Overcurrent Protection NGTS 3.24.39 CB Fail Protection NGTS 3.24.34 Busbar Protection NGTS 3.24.60 Synchronising NGTS 3.24.43 Interlocking NGTS 3.2.1 NGTS 3.24.3 Switchgear Control Substation Facilities and Functions Common to all Bays
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Other related specs 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.8, 2.12, 3.24.66, 3.12.3, 2.19
Interlocking 3.24.43
Synchronising 3.24.60
Key A
The generic requirements of A are extended by B to be more specific B and C provide greater detail of the requirements covered by A. A and B are functionally linked
B
Bay Level Specification
B
Station Function Specification
C B
Bay Function Specification
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Series Reactor circuit High voltage connections consisting of conductors, circuit breakers, disconnectors and a reactor connected between two busbars. Refer to Appendix A, sheet 2 for drawing. Series Reactor Bay The equipment at a substation that is dedicated to a Series Reactor circuit. DTT Direct Transfer Trip. DAR Delayed Auto-Reclose.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Informative: This section describes all of the functions that might be needed on a series reactor bay, and gives circumstances where functions may not be required. The section also describes the functional requirements for a series reactor connected in a feeder. Main Protection
4.1
Duplicate overall unit protection driven from separate current transformers shall be provided at 400 and 275 kV if non-numerical relays are offered. Informative: An example of an acceptable scheme is two high impedance circulating current relays providing the first and second overall unit protection.
4.2 4.3
Each protection shall be responsive to both phase faults and earth faults on the series reactor and associated connections. A single numerical relay is acceptable for providing the main protection. The relay shall provide an overall unit protection function which is responsive to both phase faults and earth faults on the series reactor and associated connections, and a unit protection function, as a minimum, responsive to earth faults on the series reactor and associated connections. Informative: An example of an acceptable scheme is a single overall biased differential relay providing the first overall unit protection with a restricted earth fault protection function providing the second unit protection.
At 132 kV only a single overall unit protection is required. The protection shall be responsive to both phase faults and earth faults on the series reactor and associated connections. If a biased differential principle is used, the protection shall comply with the requirements of IEC 255-13. The primary operating current of the protection shall be between 10% and 30% of minimum fault current available for a fault at the reactor terminals if a high impedance scheme is offered. The protection shall not give an unwanted operation under all normal operating conditions and all external fault conditions up to the maximum through-fault current limited only by the impedance of the series reactor itself. Operation of a main protection function shall: Trip bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers. Initiate bay 1 and bay 2 CB fail protection where appropriate. Initiate disconnector sequential isolation where required. Initiate trip relay reset where required.
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NGTS 3.24.10 Issue 1 April 2001 4.9 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Where a series reactor is installed in a feeder, operation of a main protection function shall: Trip the feeder bay circuit breaker. Initiate feeder CB fail protection where appropriate. Initiate DTT functions. Block DAR. Initiate disconnector sequential isolation where required. Initiate trip relay reset where required. Back Up Protection
Back up protection shall be provided in accordance with NGTS 3.24.38 and shall consist of two IDMT earth-fault protections, one on each side of the reactor. Operation of either backup protection shall: Trip bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers. Initiate bay 1 and bay 2 CB fail protection where appropriate. Initiate disconnector sequential isolation where required. Initiate trip relay reset where required. Where a series reactor is installed in a feeder circuit, account shall be taken of the back-up protection already provided for the feeder circuit. Mechanical Protection
4.13 4.14
Gas and oil actuated relays specified in NGTS 2.3 shall be provided to protect each separate oil filled tank associated with the series reactor against loss of oil and oil surge. The gas and oil actuated relay surge contact shall only be connected to trip where the supplier demonstrates that it is immune to operation on through faults and start of pumps. Where this is not demonstrated the surge contact is only required to be connected in parallel with the alarm contact. Winding temperature instruments specified in NGTS 2.3 shall be provided to protect the series reactor from winding over temperature. Operation of the mechanical protection shall: Trip bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers. Initiate bay 1 and bay 2 CB fail protection where appropriate. Initiate disconnector sequential isolation where required. Initiate trip relay reset where required. Where a series reactor is installed in a feeder, operation of the mechanical protection shall: Trip the feeder bay circuit breaker. Initiate feeder CB fail protection where appropriate. Initiate DTT functions. Block DAR.
4.15 4.16 (a) (b) (c) (d) 4.17 (a) (b) (c) (d)
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At 400 and 275 kV, the tripping system shall be arranged as follows if two high impedance circulating current relays are offered for the main 1 and main 2 protection: Tripping system 1 of bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers:
First overall unit protection Earth fault protection 1 Gas and oil actuated protection Tripping system 2 of bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers:
Second overall protection Earth fault protection 2 Winding temperature protection At 400 and 275 kV, the tripping system shall be arranged as follows if a single numerical relay is offered for the overall biased differential protection and REF protection: Tripping system 1 of bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers:
(a) (b)
Overall biased differential protection and REF protection Earth fault protection 1 Tripping system 2 of bay 1 and bay 2 circuit breakers:
Overall biased differential protection and REF protection Earth fault protection 2 Winding temperature protection Gas and oil actuated protection The auxiliary supply for the single numerical relay shall be from the battery system that supplies the tripping system 1. At 132 kV all series reactor protection shall operate into a single tripping system. Circuit Breaker Fail Protection
4.22 4.23
Circuit Breaker Fail (CBF) protection (see NGTS 3.24.39) shall be provided for the bay 1 CB and bay 2 CB at 400 and 275 kV. Operation of the CB fail protection shall initiate tripping of all CBs capable of providing fault infeed to the busbar including the CB connected to the remote side of the reactor. Busbar Protection
4.24 4.25
The series reactor bay 1 and bay 2 shall interface with the substation Busbar (BB) protection systems (see NGTS 3.24.34). Operation of the busbar protection shall initiate tripping of both bay 1 and bay 2 CBs and, if appropriate, initiate circuit breaker fail protection of bay 1 and bay 2 CBs. Page 5
Where a series reactor is installed in a feeder, refer to feeder bay specification (NGTS 3.24.7) for the busbar protection requirements. Phase Unbalanced detector
4.27
A phase unbalance detector function shall be provided that initiates an alarm for a sustained unbalanced load current where required. The contract will state when this is required. Instrument Transformer Supervision
CTs shall be supervised. The CT supervision functions shall be capable of being selected to: Inhibit operation of the function on CT failure and alarming the inhibited condition. Giving an alarm on CT failure. Operational Metering
4.30
Operational metering functions shall be provided to give indication to the substation control system of phase current. Manual Control for Series Reactors: Switchgear Functions Informative: The available control points are local, substation and remote. Local is at the plant being controlled. Substation is at some central point in the substation. Remote is at the National Control Centre (NCC) or National Operations Centre (NOC)
The circuit breaker and disconnectors of series reactor bays shall provide indications of position to all control points. Earth switches shall provide open and closed indication to local and standby control points. The reactors main and reserve busbar disconnectors shall be provided with open and close controls that can be initiated from any control point. The reactor bay circuit breaker shall be provided with open and close controls that can be initiated from any control point. Close controls of the CB from substation and remote control positions shall allow closure: If the reactor is dead. If there is synchronism between the reactor and the Busbar voltages. If electrically separate systems are to be connected and the slip frequency between the reactor and the Busbar voltages is within the limits set in the synchronising function. If the control engineer decides to close the CB regardless of conditions. Informative: the check of synchronism between reactor and Busbar voltages is carried out by the synchronising function (see section 4.39).
4.36 4.37
Close controls of the CB from the local control positions need not be conditioned by the requirements in section 4.35 (a), (b) and (c). In some cases bay earth switches may be motor operated. The open and close controls shall be available from local and substation control points. Informative: This depends on the type of switchgear provided. The contract will state when this is required.
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Series Reactor Bay shall be provided with disconnector sequential isolation where required. The contract will state if this is required. Synchronising
4.39
Series Reactor Bay shall be provided with check synchronising and system synchronising functions (see NGTS 3.24.60). Voltage Selection
Where a dedicated bay VT is installed, it shall provide a voltage input (incoming voltage) to the Synchronising functions for the incoming voltage signal. Where a bay VT is not available, the voltage selection scheme shall provide a voltage reference for the incoming voltage signal. The substation voltage selection function shall provide a voltage reference input (running voltage) that represents the voltage of the busbar to which the bay is selected to the Synchronising functions mentioned in section 4.39. Interlocking
4.43 4.44
An Interlocking function shall be provided to ensure safe operation of bay switchgear see NGTS 3.24.43. The bay shall provide outputs to the substation interlock system to ensure safe operation of other substation switchgear.
INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
Informative: The required interconnections between reactor bay functions and between the reactor bay and the rest of the substation for a typical reactor bay are shown in the series of diagrams in Appendix A. General
5.1
Each function shall provide alarms and indications as appropriate to the substation control system (SCS). Informative: The alarms and indications that are to be provided are described in the individual functional specifications and the Hardware Specification (NGTS 3.24.4).
5.2
Informative interface: each function shall provide information that can be accessed via a communications port. Informative: The information that is to be provided is described in the individual functional specifications and the Hardware Specification (NGTS 3.24.4).
5.3 5.4
Each function shall be provided with a substation time reference. Instrument transformers shall usually be conventional electromagnetic devices as specified in NGTS 3.2.4 and NGTS 3.2.5. However National Grid will consider using other technologies. Protection
5.5
The main overall protection functions shall be connected to class X type A current transformers, or to protection/measurements class current transformers (class 5P20) where it can be demonstrated that the protection offered will work satisfactorily with this class of CT for all system conditions.
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Each high impedance busbar protection function shall be connected to class X type B current transformers. Where on new installations, each low impedance busbar protection function shall be connected to protection class current transformers such as class 5P20 (See NGTS 3.2.4) where it can be demonstrated that the protection offered will work satisfactorily with this class of CT for all system conditions. Backup protection functions shall be connected to protection class current transformers such as class 5P20 (See NGTS 3.2.4). Operational Metering
5.7
5.8 5.9
CT inputs shall be derived from the Measurement/Protection class current transformers such as class 5P20. (See NGTS 3.2.4). Outputs shall be provided to the SCS of analogue indication and alarms. Interconnection Detail Tables Informative: The following tables should be read in conjunction with the diagrams shown in Appendix A. Each table entry refers to a connection on the drawing to which it relates. Eg the table headed Sheet 3 Overall Protection OAP refers to drawing OAP-Sheet 3. On that drawing there is a connection numbered OAP 1 and labelled CB1 Trip 1 which is the tripping signal to the bay 1 circuit breakers first trip system (shown on sheet CB1) and is initiated by the OAP1 operated output. In the table this is described in line Spec Ref which shows both the connection number (sheet ref) and label. It also shows, under Other Sheet Ref, the connection number when it arrives at sheet CB1.
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5.13
OAP 4
BB2 14
Start CB2F
TRIP output to the bay 1 circuit breaker second tripping system. TRIP output to the bay 2 circuit breaker second tripping system. Input from 3 phase class X type A bay 1 current transformers. Input from 3 phase class X type A bay 2 current transformers. The alarms and indications are described in NGTS 3.24.65. The alarms and indications are described in NGTS 3.24.65.
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Spec Ref 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 5.25 5.26 5.27
This Sheet Ref BU1 1 BU1 2 BU1 3 BU1 4 BU1 6 BU1 A1 BU1 A2 BU1 A3
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Spec Ref 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.34 5.35
This Sheet Ref BU2 1 BU2 2 BU2 3 BU2 4 BU2 6 BU2 A1 BU2 A2 BU2 A3
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Spec Ref 5.36 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.40 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.45 5.46 5.47
This Sheet Ref BB1 A1 BB1 2 BB1 3 BB1 4 BB1 5 BB1 6 BB1 7 BB1 8 BB1 9 BB1 11 BB1 12 BB1 13
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5.49
BB1 15
BB2 14
START CB2F
Page 13
Spec Ref 5.50 5.51 5.52 5.53 5.54 5.55 5.56 5.57 5.58 5.59 5.60 5.61
This Sheet Ref BB2 A1 BB2 2 BB2 3 BB2 4 BB2 5 BB2 6 BB2 7 BB2 8 BB2 9 BB2 11 BB2 12 BB2 13
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5.63
BB2 15
BB1 14
START CB1F
Page 15
5.67
CB1 2
CB1 Trip 2
CB Trips via TC 2
CB close control from SCS via Sync. Check relay. See NGTS 3.24.60 CB close control from local control cubicle Indication to SCS of open, closed and neither open nor closed.
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Spec Ref 5.71 5.72 5.73 5.74 5.75 5.76 5.77 5.78 5.79 5.80 5.81 5.82 5.83 5.84 5.85
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Spec Ref 5.86 5.87 5.88 5.89 5.90 5.91 5.92 5.93 5.94
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5.98
CB2 2
CB2 Trip 2
CB Trips via TC 2
CB close control from SCS via Synch. Check relay. See NGTS 3.24.60 CB close control from local control cubicle Indication to SCS of open, closed and neither open nor closed.
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Spec Ref 5.102 5.103 5.104 5.105 5.106 5.107 5.108 5.109 5.110 5.111 5.112 5.113 5.114 5.115 5.116
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Spec Ref 5.117 5.118 5.119 5.120 5.121 5.122 5.123 5.124 5.125
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Spec Ref 5.126 5.127 5.128 5.129 5.130 5.131 5.132 5.133 5.134 5.135
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Page 23
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Spec Ref 5.153 5.154 5.155 5.156 5.157 5.158 5.159 5.160 5.161
This Sheet Ref SCS2 A5 SCS2 4 SCS2 5 SCS2 6 SCS2 7 SCS2 8 SCS2 9 SCS2 10 SCS2 11
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IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
Integration
6.1
Combination of functions within a hardware platform shall comply with the acceptable integration options shown in Appendix B. Isolation and Test Facilities
6.2
Adequate isolation and test facilities shall be provided within the protection and control systems, to enable the manufacturers recommended commissioning and maintenance procedures to be carried out safely.
7
7.1 7.2 7.3
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Index Sheet 1: Sheet 2: Sheet 3: Sheet 4: Sheet 5: Sheet 6: Sheet 7: Sheet 8: Sheet 9: Sheet 10: Sheet 11: Legend Circuit Configuration OAP:- Overall Protection. BU1:- Back Up Protection and Operational Metering for Bay 1. BU2:- Back Up Protection and Operational Metering for Bay 2. BB1:- Busbar Protection and CB Fail for Bay 1 BB2:- Busbar Protection and CB Fail for Bay 2 CB1:- Circuit Breaker, Disconnectors and Instrument Transformers for Bay 1 CB2:- Circuit Breaker, Disconnectors and Instrument Transformers for Bay 2 SCS1:- Substation Control System and Interlocking for Bay 1 SCS2:- Substation Control System and Interlocking for Bay 2
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WVT
BB
Page 28
Busbar 2 (BB2) Reserve Busbar RB Disc Reactor CB1 CT CT CB2 MB Disc Main Busbar
Page 29
Bay 1
Bay 2
RB Disc
MB Disc
CB1
CT
[OAP 8]
CB2
CT
[OAP 9]
OAP1 Operated
Start CB1F
[OAP 3]
BB1
BB2
Start CB1F
LAN
Start CB2F
Protection Operated
Start CB1F
Protection Operated
Note:
The above tripping arrangement is shown for two high impedance circulating current relays providing the first and second main protection.
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SCS1
Events/Alarms/Indications [OAP A 2]
CB2
CB1
CB2
CB1
SCS1
Events/Alarms/Indications [OAP A 1]
CB1
CT
BB1 BB2
Start CB2F
[BU1 4]
LAN Informative SCS1 Operational Metering Data [BU1 A2] Events/Alarms/Indications [BU1 A3]
CB2
[BU1 6]
CB1
CB1 Trip 1
[BU1 1]
Page 31
CB2
CT
[BU2 3]
BB1
Start CB2F
[BU2 4]
BB2
Informative
Page 32
SCS2
LAN
CB2
[BU2 6]
CB1
NGTS3.24.34
LAN
Events/Alarm/ Indication
CB1
CB1
Back Trip
BB2
CB1 Trip 2
OAP
BU1
[BB1 14]
CB Fail Operated
BU2
Informative
LAN
SCS1
Events/Alarm/ Indication
[BB1 A1]
Page 33
CB2
Start CBF
BB2
Start CB2F
[BB1 15]
SCS1
Informative
Busbar Protection
[BB1 A1]
LAN
Events/Alarm/ Indication
[BB2 A1]
CB2
CB1
Back Trip
BB1
CBF
OAP
CB1 Trip 2
BU1
[BB2 14]
CB Fail Operated
BU2
Page 34
Informative
LAN
SCS2
Events/Alarm/ Indication
[BB2 A1]
CB2
Start CBF
BB1
Start CB1F
[BB2 15]
SCS2
Informative
Busbar Protection
Circuit Breaker, Disconnectors and Instrument Transformers for Bay 1 (CB1) Sheet 8
CB1
[CB1 C1] Open Local [CB1 C1a] TC1 [CB1 1]
CB Position
Events/Alarm
[CB1 A1]
BB1
BB2
Close CB
OAP Local [CB1 C2] Close [CB1 C2a] Close
NGTS3.24.Voltage Selection
Close CB
SCS1
Enable Sync
[CB1 C15]
>1
SCS1
BB1
[CB1 10]
Close
>1
Open
Closed
[CB1 11]
CT
BB1
BU1
OAP
SCS1
Page 35
Circuit Breaker, Disconnectors and Instrument Transformers for Bay 2 (CB 2) Sheet 9
SCS2
Events/Alarm
[CB2 A1]
BB1
BB2
Close CB
OAP Local
Close CB
SCS2
Enable Sync
[CB2 C15]
>1
SCS2
BB2
[CB2 10]
Close
>1
Open
Closed
[CB2 11]
CT
BB2
BU2
OAP
Page 36
SCS2
Informative
NGTS 3.24.43 Interlocks NGTS3.24.44 NGTS3.24.45 NGTS3.24.50 NGTS3.24.51 NGTS3.24.55 NGTS3.24.58 NGTS3.24.59 SCS
Indications Control Outputs
Interlock satisfied
CB1
Events/Alarms
BB1
[SCS1 A3] [SCS1 A4] [SCS1 A5] [SCS1 A6] [SCS1 A7] Events/ Alarms/ Indications
Analog signals
LAN
Informative
LAN
Page 37
Informative
NGTS 3.24.43 Interlocks NGTS3.24.44 NGTS3.24.45 NGTS3.24.50 NGTS3.24.51 NGTS3.24.55 NGTS3.24.58 NGTS3.24.59 SCS
Indications Control Outputs
Interlock satisfied
RB Disc. Close [SCS2 5] RB Disc.Open [SCS2 6] CB2 MB Disc. Close [SCS2 7] MB Disc.Open [SCS2 8] CB Open [SCS2 9] Close CB [SCS2 10] [SCS2 11] CB2 Enable Sync See Note LAN Informative
CB2
BB2
[SCS2 A2]
BU2
[SCS2 A3]
[SCS2 A4]
Analog signals
Note: A Time Signal shall be made available to all functions in the bay.
Page 38
LAN
5b *
BC2$
2$@ 1 1 1 1 1
RP Reactor Protection, BP- Busbar protection, CB Circuit Breaker Unit, BC Bay Control Unit. Notes: * Units 3a & 3b and 5a & 5b may be combined into two single hardware units 3 and 5. ( ) Alternative positions when separate CB/BC units are provided for each bay. $ BC1 and BC2 may be combined into a single BC unit for the whole Series Reactor Bay, in which case functions marked $ should not be provided by the BC unit and note * above will not apply. & Function to be duplicated and provided in all units marked. @ Option only if BC units are intelligent RTU allowing function to be implemented within the bay.
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