FLORES VS. DRILON AND GORDON GR No. 104732; June 22, 1993 FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec.

13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution and that Congress encroached upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint. ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. RULING: Yes, the court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice. SANLAKAS VS. REYES G.R. No. 159085; Feb. 3, 2004 FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional. RULING: The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is granted a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.