270

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 62: OLIGARCHY
271
outlined in this way, the alternatives
anarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy, and de-
racy seem to raise issues only of expediency
fficiency rather than of justice. Whether
rchy is intrinsically a good or bad form of
rnment tends to become a question only
n other factors are considered; when, for
pIe, the distinction between aristocracy
oligarchy is made to turn on \vhether the
are men of virtue or men of property, or
n, in the comparison of oligarchy with de-
racy, the emphasis is not upon numbers but
he principles of wealth and liberty.
evertheless, the numerical criterion does
seem to be totally irrelevant to the com-
CHAPTER 62 : OLIGARCHY
GARCHY IS NOT always defined asthe rule of parisan. "Oligarchy and democracy," Aristotle
I 0 1 0 d th wrltes, "are not sufficiently distinguished mere'" wealthy, nor is It a ways conceIve ase
anent of democracy on constitutional ques'" ly by these two characteristics of wealth and
s. In the Statesman, for example, Plato first freedom." Though the "real difference be...
ides the forms of government into "mon- tween democracy and oligarchy is poverty and
fiy, the rule of the few, and the rule of wealth," and though "wherever men rule by
d h do d "h 1 f th ew In reason of their wealth, whether they be few or ny," an t en 1Vi es t e ru e 0 e ...-
aristocracy, which has an auspiCIOUS name, many, that is an oligarchy," Aristotle does not
oligarchy." Here aristocracy and oligarchy seem to think we can neglect the political sig...
b d d Ot tl n a nificance of what he calls the "accidental fact m to e regar e as oppas! es, le 0 e
ernment in which the few rule according to that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor
laws, the other lawless government by the numerous."
. In both, the few are the wealthy; hence With regard to aristocracy and oligarchy, the
lth is no more characteristic of oligarchy chief question does not seem to be one of prin-
n of aristocracy. ciple, but of fact. Plato in the Republic and
me political theorists make no reference to Aristotle in the Politics define aristocracy as gov-
lth at all in the discussion of oligarchy. ernment by the few best men, or the most
hbes divides the forms of government ac'" virtuous. They also place it next to what is for
ding to whether the sovereign power is in them the ideal government by the supremely
fiandsof one or more; and if in the hands of wise man-the rule of the philosopher king, or
e than one, then whether it is held by some what Aristotle calls "the divine sort ofgovern-
11. He calls the several forms of government ment." In this context, oligarchy represents a
narchy (one), aristocracy (some), and de- perversion of aristocracy, as tyranny represents
cracy (all). l'here are "other names of gov- a corruption of monarchy.
ment in the histories and books of policy," Plato describes oligarchy as arising. when
adds, such as "tyranny and oligarchy. But "riches and rich men are honored in the State"
f h f and when the law "fixes a sum of money as the yare not the names 0 ot er. orms 0 govern-
t but of the same forms misliked. For they qualification for citizenship" and allows "no
discontented under monarchy call it one whose property falls below the amount
nny, and they that are displeased with arts-:- fixed to have any share in the government."
'acy call it oligarchy." Like Hobbes, both But according to Socrates, wealth does not
ke and Rousseau use no criterion except qualify men to rule, as virtue and wisdom do.
bers to distinguish the forms ofgovern-"Just think what would happen," he says, "if
t, Locke calling government by the few pilots were to be chosen according to their
archy" and Rousseau calling it "aristoc- property, and a poor man were refused per'"
mission to steer, even though he were a better
pilot." To which Adeimantus agrees that in
government, as in navigation, the probable re-
sult would be shipwreck.
But though there may be no question of the
superiority of aristocracy over oligarchy 0 in
principle, the critics of aristocracy question
whether any historic state in which the few hold
political power is not in fact an oligarchy. It
may not always be the case that the of
the few rests directly on wealth. The pnvdeged
class may be a military clique or an hereditary
nobility. Yet these distinctions are seldom un-
accompanied by the control of land or other
forms of wealth, so that indirectly at least the
oligarchical factor is thought to be operative.
tional government oligarchical and. democ
pri?cipoles are the of policy
legIslatIon. In modern as ni ancient repu
the division of men into political parties t
to follow the lines of the ciivision of men
ecoonomic factions. The ancient meaning
ohgarchy and democracy, especially for
observers like Thucydides and Aristotle
see the rich and the poor as the major riva
constitutional po,ver, indicate the fusi
political and economic issues.
The difference bet\veen oligarchy and
mocracy.,; says Aristotle, .is not well..;define
reference to the fe\vand the many, unles
understood that the few are also the rich
the many the poor. T'he issue is notwh
the few are wiser than many, or whet
is more efficient to have the governmenti
hands of the few rather than the many.
issues have been debated in the history
litical thought, but they are more app
t
9
to the alternatives ofaristocracy andd
racy than to the conflict between oligarch
democracy.
The historic struggle between oligarch
democrats-whether described as a struggI
tween rich and poor, nobility and bourge
landed gentry and agrarian peons, owners
workers, classes and masses-is a struggl
the political privileges of wealth, the rig'
property, the protection of special interes
the tradition of the great books, Mar
Engels may be the first to call this struggl
class war," but they are only the most rec
a long line of poli tical and economic writ
recognize that the economic antagonism
and poor generates the basic political con
any state. "Any city, hovvever small,'
Socrates, "is in fact divided into two, on
city of the poor, the other of the rich: the
at war with one another."
I
N the great books of palit.ical theory the word
"oligarchy" is usually listed along with "Inon-
archy" and "democracy" among the traditional
names for the forms of government. According
to the meaning of their Greek roots, "oli-
garchy" signifies the rule of the few as "mon-
archy" signifies the rule of one and "democ-
racy" the rule of the people-or the many.
These verbal meanings are somewhat
however, when we consider the actual conflict
between oligarchy and democracy in Greek po-
Ii tical life. It involved an opposition, not simply
between the few and the many, but between
the weal thy a,nd the working classes. The con-
test between these factions for political power
dominated more than a . century of Greet<
tory around the Periclean age; 'and that fact
justifies Aristotle's remark that >.oligarchyand
democracy are the two principal conflicting
forms
We would not so deseri be the political strug-
gle of our time. We would not speak' of oli-
garchyas one of the principal forms of govern..
ment in the world today. 'Instead we tend to
think in terms of the conflict between democ-
racy and dictatorship or despotism. Even when
we lookto the background of present issues, it
is the age-old struggle between absolute and
constitutional between mon-
archies and to supply
the parallels for the contem-
porary conflict between the principles of arbi-
trary and legal government. Thettaditional
terms of political theory,with the
oligarchy, thus appear to.have a certain liveli-
ness in the consideration of current problems.
But though it does not frequency in
our speech or familiarity inaur thought, oli-
garchy may be much more relevant to the real
issues of our day than appears on the surface.
Certainly within the frame\vork of eonstitu-
THE GREA IDE..
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY 272
THE CRITICISM OF aristocracies as masked oli-
garchies is discussed in the chapter on .ARIS-
TOCRACY. The critical point seems to be that
nothing except superior virtue or talent justi-
fies apolitical inequality between the few and
the many. The meaning of oligarchy is general-
ized in consequence to include any government
in which the special privileges or powers held
by the few cannot be justified, whether it is
wealth or sonie other title to pre-eminence
that is substituted for superiority in virtue or
talent. When it is so understood, the word "oli-
garchical" tends to become like "tyrannical," a
term of reproach.
In describing different forms of democracv
Aristotle observes that their
is to give a share in the government to all who
meet whatever minimum qualification is set by
law. "The absolute exclusion of any class," he
says, "would be a step towards oligarchy." To
the same effect is Mill's comment on the steps
away from oligarchy accomplished by English
constitutional reforms in the 19th century.
"In times not long gone by," Mill writes,
"the higher and richer classes were in complete
possession of the government A vote given
in opposition to those influences was almost
sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote against
the monster evil, the over-ruling influence of
oligarchy." But now that the higher classes are
no longer masters of the country, now that the
franchise has been extended to the middle
classes, a dilllinished form of oliglrchy still
mains. "The electors themselves are becoming
the oligarchy"-in a population where many
are still disfranchised. "The present electors,"
Mill continues, "and the bulk of those whom
any probable Reform Bill would add to the
number, are the middle class; and have as much
a class interest, distinct from the \vorking
classes, as landlords or great manufacturers.
Were the suffrage extended to all skilled la-
borers, even those would, or might, still have a
class interest distinct from. the unskilled. "
Oligarchy remains, according to Mill, so long
as there is any unjustifiablediscriminationamong
classes in the population. It is not in his view
limited to discrimination based on the extremes
of \vealth and poverty, as he plainly indicates
by his remarks on the special interests of differ-
ent parts of the working class, or their relation
as a whole to the lower middle classes. He ma
this even plainer by what he has to say
poli tical discrimination as bet\veen the sex
Suppose the suffrage tp be extended to all m
h
. " G
e wntes, suppose that what was forme
called by the nlisapplied name of universal s
frage, and now by the silly title of manho
suffrage, became the law; the voters wouldsti
have a class interest, as distinguished fro111 'W
men."
The oligarchical defect in representative go
ernment which Mill is here criticizing seems
have little or no basis in economic class di
sions. The exclusion of any class in the popnl
tion from a voice in government renders tha
government oligarchical with respect to the
The excluded class may even be a nlinority.
conceived, oligarchy no longer means the r
of either the rich or the few.
When the meaning of oligarchy is gene
ized in this way, the discussion of oligar
seems to presuppose the typically modernc
ception of democracy. As indicated in the ch
ter on DEMOCRACY, the distinguishing feat
of the modern democratic constitution is u
versal suffrage. By this criterion, the conH
between the democrats and the oligarchs of t
ancient world appears to be a conflict
tween two forms of the oligarchical constit
tion-one in which the wealthier few and
in which the poorer many have political rig
but in neither of which melnbership in
political community includes all, normal a
human beings in the population.
Where ancient political theory could
ceive of a mixed constitution-somehow c
bining oligarchical and democratic principl
the modern conception of democracy seem
make any compromise with oligarchy im
sible. Certain modern writers, notably Mo
Michels, and Pareto, seem to insist, on the c
trary, that oligarchy is present in all form
government, and is especially prevalent in
resentative democracies where the actual
duct of government-the effective
the hands of a bureaucracy or an elite, whe
popularly chosen or self-appointed. But
contradiction may be more verbal than r
on one side the word "oligarchy" means
degree of restriction in the franchise or citi
ship, and, on the other, it applies to any si
on in which the whole people are not directly
tive in all the affairs of government and, con-
uently, a small number of men administers
e state. Understood in the latter sense, the
garchical principle does not seem to be in-
mpatible with representative democracy.
ose who use the word in this sense merely
llattention to an inevitable characteristic of
presentative government. A representative
emocracy may also have an aristocratic aspect
.en it follows the principle that the men best
alified by virtue or talent for public office
ould be chosen by the suffrage of all their
low-citizens.
LLER DISCUSSION of these aspects ofoligarchy
found in the chapters on ARISTOCRACY and
<MOCRACY. Here weare primarily concerned
th poIi tical issues which have their source in
e opposition of economic classes in the state,
rimarily that extreme division of men into
ose who live by their labor and those who live
their property and the labor of others. It is
terms of this extreme division between men
leisure and working men that the conflict
t\tveen oligarchy and democracy takes place
the ancient world.
a time when citizenship meant a much
re active and frequent. participation in,gov-
ment than it does under the modern insti-
ions of the ballot box and the representative
mbly, the ancieht defenders of oligarchy
Id argue that only men of wealth had the
ure requisite for citizenship. Oligarchy could
further defended on the ground that, in
ny of the Greek city-states, public officials
re either not compensated at all or at least
substantially. Only men ofsizeable proper-
could afford to hold public office.
ristotle weighs the arguments for and against
archy. On the point of leisure, for example,
holds that "nothing is more absolutely nec-
ry than to provide that the highest class,
only when in office, but when out of office,
uld have leisure." Yet "even if you must
e regard to wealth in order to secure leisure,"
s "surely a bad thing," he thinks, "that the
atest offices, such as those of kings and gen-
s, should be bought. The law which allo\vs
abuse makes wealth of more account than
ue."
273
Aristotle seems to regard democratic and oli-
garchical claims as complementary half-truths.
"Both parties to the argument," he says, "are
speaking of a limited and partial justice, but
imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute
justice." According to an adequate conception
of political justice, itis as unjust to treat equals
unequally as it is to treat unequals equally. The
oligarch violates the first of these principles, the
democrat the second. "Democracy arises out of
the notion that those who are equal in any
respect are.equal in all respects; because men are
equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal.
Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who
are unequal in one respect are in all respects
unequal; being unequal, that is, in property)
they suppose themselves to be unequal abso-
lutely."
Both forms of government have "a kind of
justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they
are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, when-
ever their share in the government does not
accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up
revolution..... In oligarchies the masses make
revolution under the idea that they are unjustly
treated, because ... they are equals and have
not an equal share; and in democracies, the
notables revolt, because they are not equal, and
yet have only an equal share."
What can cure this situation in which perpet-
ual revolution seems to be inevitable, as democ-
racy succeeds oligarchy, or oligarchy democ-
racy, in the government of the Greek cities?
Aristotle describes many forms of oligarchy and
democracy, but none seems to remove the cause
of revolution. When, in an attempt to preserve
their position, the weal thier families turn to the
more extreme forms of oligarchical constitu-
tion, that tendency eventually leads to a kind
of despotic government which Aristotle calls
"dynasty," or the lawless rule of powerful fam-
ilies.
To establish a stable government which shall
be less subject to revolution in favor of a con-
trary principle of government, and which shall
resist the tendency toward lawless rule, by
either the masses or the powerful few, Aristotle
proposes the mixed constitution, which shall
combine the elements of both democratic and
oligarchical justice. But this will not work in ac-
tual practice, he thinks, unless the middle class
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTE'R: 62: OLIGARCHY
274
"is large, and stronger if possible than both the
other classes...... Great then is the good for-
tune of a state in which the citizens have a
moderate and sufficient property; for where
some possess much, and the others nothing,
there may arise an extreme democracy, or a
pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of
either extreme. . . . . These considerations will
help us to understand why most governments
are either democratical or oligarchical. The rea-
son is that the middle class is seldom numerous
in them, and whichever party, whether the rich
or the common people,. transgresses the mean
and predominates, draws the constitution its
own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or
democracy."
From the point of view which sees no justice
in granting any special privileges to property,
Aristotle's position on oligarchy seems open to
question. For one thing, in admitting a partial
justice in the principle that those who are un-
equal in wealth should be treated unequally in
the distribution of political power, Aristotle ap-
pears to affirm that the possessors of wealth de-
serve a special political status. For another thing,
in his own formulation of an ideal polity, Aris-
totle advocates the exclusion of the working
classes from citizenship. "The citizens must not
lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such
a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither
must they be husbandmen, since leisure is nec-
essary both for the development of virtue and
the performance of political duties." All these
classes of men are necessary for the existence of
the state, but they are to be no part of it in the
sense of political membership. "The best form
of state \vill not. admit them to citizenship,"
though it will include as necessary "the slaves
who minister to the wants of individuals, or
mechanics and laborers who are the servants of
the community."
Some of the great speeches in Thucydides'
History, which deal with domestic issues as ,veIl
as the issues of war and peace, eloquently argue
the opposite side of the case. Debating with
Hermocrates before the Syracusan assembly,
Athenagoras ansvvers those\vho say that "de-
mocracy is neither wise nor equitable, but that
the holders of property are the best fi tted to
rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word
demos, or people, includes the whole state, oli-
garchyonly a part; next, that if the best gu
ians of property are the rich, and the best c
sellors the wise, none can hear and deci
\vell as the many, that all these tal
severally and collectively, have their just
in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives
many their share of the danger, and not co
with the largest part, takes and keeps the
of the profit."
IN MODERN POLITICAL thought, the discussi
oligarchy seems to occur on two levels.
is a controversy on the level of constituti
principles with regard to suffrage and re
sentation and the qualifications for public 0
I-Iere the issues concern the justice of the fu
mental laws of republican or popular go
ment. There is also a consideration of the
in which men of property or corporate'con
trations of wealth are able to exert influe
upon the actual course of government.
the problem becomes,rtot so much the.ju
of the constitution or of the laws, but
weight which wealth seems able to throw.
the scales of justice.
The great modern defense of the oligarc
constitution does not seem to be as plainl
forcefully made in any of the great books
the speeches of Edmund Burke, especially t
in opposition to the suffrage reform' meas
proposed by Charles James Fox, whereinB
argues for the principle ofvirtual representa
It is unnecessary, he claitTIs,' for the francht
be extended to the working classes if their
nomic betters'-whoalsohappen to be theirs
riors in talent and education-deliberate
what is for the common good of all.
The ,Federalists seem to take an opf>
view. Reflecting on the system of British re
sentation in their day, they observe that,
the eight lllillions of people in the kingdo
England and Scotland, "the represent
.. in the House of Commons amount t
hundred and fifty-eight." But, they goon
this number one ninth are elected byt
hundred and sixty-four persons and anehal
five thousand seven hundred and twenty-t
persons. It cannot be supposed," theya.v
"that the half thus elected and who do not
reside among the people at large, can add
thing ei ther to the securi ty of the p
l1st the government, or to the knowledge
eir circumstances and interests in the legis-
'e councils. On the contrary, it IS notorious
they are more frequently the representa-
and instrumentsof the .executive
than the guardians and advocates of the
lar rights." Nevertheless, they do not
emn such an oligarchical system of repre--
don as entirely inimical to the virtues of
iamentary government. "It is very certain,"
declare, "not only that a valuable portion
edom has been preserved under all these
mstances, but that the defects in the
h code are chargeable, in a very small
rtion, on the ignorance of the legislature
ruing the circumstances of the people.' ,
e of the American constitutionalists may
uenced by Burke's defenseofoligarchy in
of the virtues of an aristocracy, but they
their own posi tion in terms which are
plainly oligarchical. They argue for poll
lauses and property qualifications for puh-
ce on the ground. that the country should
rrby the people\vho own it. Furthermore,
who are not economically' independent
ot in a position to exercise poli ticalliber-
Po'wer over a man's subsistence," Hamil-
eclares, "amounts to power over his "viI!."
ing the issue ,vhich ha.d been raisedon
of the constitutional convention, Madison
rks that "the most common and durable
e of factions has been the various and un-
distribution of property. Those\vho hold
hose who are without property have ever
d distinct interests in society." I-Ie pro-
a representative-or what he calls a "re-
can"-system of government to avoid the
ive factionalism of the pure or direct de-
cies of Greek city-states.
eoretic politicians, who have patronized
pecies of government," Madison \vrites,
erroneously supposed that by reducing
nd to perfect equality in their political
, they would, at the same time, be per-
equalized and assirnilated in their pos-
11S, their opinions, and their passions." By
hted system of representation, the power
er flumbers maybe counter- balanced by
,ver given to other factors, thus pre-
g the "accomplishment of the secret
of an unjust and interested majority.
275
.... A rage for paper money, for an abolition of
debts, for an equal division of property, orior
any other improper or wicked project, will be
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union
than a.particular member of it."
In another paper, the Federalists ans,verthe
charge that the constitution is oligarchical,bc..
cause "the House of Representatives ..... ,vill
be taken fromthat class of citizens which will
have least sympathy with the mass of the people
and be most likely to aim at an ambitiolls sacri-
fice of the manytbthe aggrandizement of the
few." This objection, they say, while "leveled
against a pretended oligarchy,H in principle
"strikes at the very root ofrepublican govern-
ment."
The method of election provided for by the
Constitution aims "to obtain for rulers men
who' possess most wisdom' to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the soci-
ety..... \Vhoare to be the electors of the fed..
eral representatives ? Not the rich, more than
the poor; not the learned, more" than the igno-
rant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished
names, more than the humble sons of obscurity
and unpropitious ,; .. Who are to be
the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the es-
teem and confidence of the country. No quali-
fication of ,vealth, of birth, of religious fai th, or
of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the
judgment or disappoint the inclination of the
people."
WHETHER THE AMERICAN Constitution in its
original formulation is an oligarchical docu-
ment has long been a matter of dispute. Wheth-
er the Federalists favor devices for protecting
the rights of property or repudiate oligarchical
restrictions in favor of the rights ofman has also
been the subject of controversy. That this is so
may indicate at least a certain ambiguity in
their position. But on the question of the oli-
garchical influences on government-the polit-
ical pressures exerted by propertied classes to
serve their special interests-the opinion of the
modern authors of the great books seems much
clearer.
The most extreme statement of this opinion
is, ofcourse, to be found in the Communist M ani-
festo. There government, in fact the state it-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
6. Historical observations of oligarchy: the rise and fall of oligarchies
I. The oligarchical constitution: the principles and types of oligarchy
2. The relation of oligarchy to monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy
277
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH X, SECT 132
55a-b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 52c-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 419b
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK III, 165c-166c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73b
42 KANT: Science of Right, 450c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER
77, 228d
43 MILL: Representative Government, 363b-364d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART II, 277c-d;
PART III, 293c-294a
2. The relation of oligarchy to monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-108c
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK VI,
BK VIII, 575d-576b; 577b-c;
58Gc; 587a-b
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 402b-d; 405c-406a
/ Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b
9 AR,ISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 3 [I 13Ia24-29]
378d; BK VIII, CH 10 [II60
b
II-16] 412d; [1160
b
32-116Ia3] 413a- b / Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1265b
27-39] 461b; CH 10 [1272a27-bIO] 468c-469a;
CH II [I273a2-b7] 469c-470a; BK III, CH 5
[I278aIS-341 475b-c; CH 6 [1278bg-I4] 475d;
CH 7-13 476c-483a; CH IS [I286
b
g-21]
48Sa; BK IV, ClI 2-9 488b-494d passim, esp
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, \vhich are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II the
number 4 is the number ofthe volume in the set; the number 12'dindicates that the
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For"example, in53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the
hand side ofthe page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sOlnetimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in ti'tle of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a \vhole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
e oligarchical constitution: the principles
and types of oligarchy
HERODOTUS: [listory, BK III, 107d-108b
lHUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d;
BK v, 502d; 503d-504b; BK VIII,
PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 405c-408a / States-
an, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b
RISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [II60
b
II-
6] 412d / Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1266
a
S"-24]
61c-d; CH 10 [1272a27-bIO] CH II
I273a2-b7] 469c-470a; BK III, CH 6 [1278b9-
14] 475d; ClI 7-13 476c-483a; BK IV, ClI 2-9
488b-494d passim, esp CH 3 [1290aI3]-CH 4
[I290b20] 489b-d, CH 5 [1292a39_bIO]
492a, CH 6 [I293aII-34] CH 12
[I296bI7-34] 496d-497a; CH 14-16 498b-
502a,c passitn; BK V, CH I [130la30-3S] 502b;
H12 [I316a39-bIS] 519c;'BKVI, CH 6-8 524b-
26d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6
55e; Cll 29 566b-d; CH 33-34 568b-569a /
hetoric, BK I, CH 8 [I36Sb32-1366aS] 608a-b
ACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c
QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95,
4, ANS 229b-230c
ACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH v, 8a-b; CH IX, 14c-
a
OBBES: Let/athan, PART II, 104d-105a; PART
V,273a-b
the \vages of labor above their actual rate.
1\1asters too sometimes enter into particu
combinations to sink the wages of labor
below this rate."Furthermore,_ the parties
the conflict do not h-ave equal access to Ie
lative protection. "Whenever the legislature
tempts to regulate the differences between
ters and their workmen, its counsellors are
\vavs the masters."
Almost a century later, Mill writes in a si
lar vein concerning "the persevering attem
so long made to keep down wages by law ..
Does Parliament," he asks, "ever for an inst
look at any question with the eyes of a war
man? .... On the question of strikes, for
stance, it is doubtful if there is so Il1uch as
among the leading tuembers of either H
who is not firmly convinced that the reas
the matter is unqualifiedly on the side 0
masters, and that the men's vie\v of it is si
absurd." The remedy for this inequity, ace
ing to Mill, is not communism, but canst
tional reforms in. the direction of universa
frage which will no longer leavethewo
classes "excluded from all direct particip
in the government."
THE GREAT IDEA.S
276
3. The instahili ty of oligarchical government
3
a
. The revolutionary changes to \vhich oligarchy is subject: the change to despotism
or delTIocracy
3
b
. The preservation of oligarchies against revolution
4. The defense of oligarchy: the political rights and privileges of property
S. l;he attack on oligarchy and on the political power of wealth
sa. The objection to property as a basis for privilege \vith regard to citizenship or
public office
Sh. The character of the oligarch: the man of property; the capitalist
se. Econolnic status and power as a political instrument: oligarchy in relation to
the class war
self, is regarded as an instrument which the
economic oppressors wieldagainst the oppressed.
The final step in the bourgeois revolution, ac-
cording to Marx and Engels, occurred \vhen the
bourgeoisie "conquered for itself, in the modern
representative State, exclusive political sway."
In the bourgeois state, legislation is nothing but
the \vill of this one class made into a law for all.
One aim of the communist revolution, beyond
the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, is
the\vitheringaway of that historic formation of
the state in which "political power... is
merely the organized power of one .class for
oppressing another."
Though much less radical in intention than
Marx, Smith and Mill make statements which
seem to be no less radical in their criticism of
the oligarchical influences on lTIodern parlia-
mentary government. It has been said, Smith
observes, that "we rarely hear ... of combina-
tions of masters, though frequently of those
of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this
account, that masters rarely combine, is as ig-
norant of the world as of the subject. Masters
are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but
constant and uniform combination, not to raise
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCI-IY 278
(2. The relation oj oligarchy to nlonarchy, aristoc-
racy, and de1nocracy.)
CH 3 [I29oaI31-CH 4 [I290b20] 489b-d, CH 5
491d-492a, CH 6 [I293aII-34] 492d-493a; CH
II [I295b35]-CH 12 [I297aI2] 496a-497b; CH
14-16 498b-502a,c; BK v, CH 7 [I306b22-26]
CH 8-'-9 509d-512d; CH 12 [I316aI-b28]
518d-519d; BK VI, CH 6-8 524b-526d /
Rhetoric, BK I,CH 8 608a-c
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-37b; 47a-48a
15 TACITUS: Annals; BK VI, 97b-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95,
A 4, ANS229b-230c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 104d-l05a; PART
IV, 273a-b
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132
55a-b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK VIII, 52c-d;
BK xx, 151c-152a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BKIII, 419b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165c-166c;
BK V, 309c-310d
42 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER
58, 181b-c; NUMBER 60, 185a-187a passim;
NUMBER 63, 194b-195b; NUMBER 77, 228d-
229a
43 MILL: Re.presentatve Government,363b-364d;
393c-395a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 277c-d;
PART III, 292d-293b
3. The instability of oligarchical. government
;a. The revolutionary changes to whicholi-
garchy is subject: the change to despot-
ism or democracy
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 108b-c
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III,
436d-438b; BK VIII, 568d-569a; 569c-585a
esp 582a-c; 587a-590c
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 408b-409a / Laws,
BK IV, 680a-b / Seventh Letter, 80lc
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 12 [I273b36-
I274a22] 470c-d; BK III, CH 15 [I286b9-2I]
484d-485a; BK IV, CH 5 [I292bII-22] 492a;
CH II [I295b35-1296a2I] 496a-b; BK v, CH I
502a-503b passim, esp [I302a8-I6] 503b; CH
3 [I302b25-28] 504a; [I303
b
4-7] SOSa; CH 6
507b-508c; CH 12 [I316aI-b28] 518d-519d /
Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-SS5c; CH
568a-572a
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 68d-71c; 75c-76d / The-
mistocles, 96b-c / Camillus, 117c-121a,c / Cori-
olanus, 176b-184c / Crassus, 444d-445d /
Pompey, 521c-d / Caesar, 581d-582a / Phocion
604b,d-619d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes,
657a-663c / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c /
Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c / Cicero, 708a-b
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c/ Histories,
BK II, 224d-225a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 149a-b; 1
35 LOCKE: Civil Got
1
ern1Jzent, CH XVIII, SE
71c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of LauIs, BK VII
52a; 52c-53a
43 MILL: Representc!!ive Government, 394a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II,
276a; 278d-279b; PART III, 300a-301c
50 MARX: Capital, 377c-378d
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto,
425b esp 423d-424b, 425b; 429b-c
3b. The preservation of oligarchies a
revolution
6 HEROPOTUS: History, BK VI, 202c-203B
6 THUCYDIDES : Peloponnesian War,
463a-465c; BK v, 482d-483a; S02d-5
VIII, 580b-c; 582a;582d-583d; 587b-
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH II [1273
470b; BK IV, CH 12-13 496d-498b; BK
[I306a9-12] 507d-508a; CH 8-9 S09d-51
VI, CH 6-7 524b-525b
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 3Sc-d / Calnillus,
121a,c /Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Agis
656d / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681
680b-d / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165
BK IV, 239c-240b
50 MARX: Capital,305a [fn 2]
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Mani
432b-d
4. The defense of oligarchy: the political
and privileges of property
6 HERODOTUS : History, UK III, 107d-l08a
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK
575d-576b; 590a-b
7 PLATO: Laws, BK V, 695a-c; BKVI
700b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1
1266a30] 461b-d; eH I I [I 273a22-24]
BK III, CH 5 [I277b33-1278a25] 475a-c
478d-479a; CH 12-13 480c-483a; BK
8-9 493c-494d; CH 11-12 495b-497b
CH I 502a-503b; BK VI, CH 3 521c-52
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Solo
71c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Dion, 8
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 32b-d; 35d
23 ..1ACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH V, 8a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 140d
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Gou
CH VII, SECT 87 44a-b; SECT 94 46a-c;
53c-54d; CH XI, SECT 137-14 56d-58a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK. II,
7b-c; BK V, 25a-c; 32b-c; BK VII, 45c
XI, 71d-72b; BK XXVI, 221c-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 354b-355b /
Economy, 377c-d / Social Contract,

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c-82a; 9
42 KANT: Science of Right, 436d-437c
:aTICLES OF CONFEDERATI9N: IV [I7-36]5b-c
f;VERALIST: NUMBER 10, 50b-d; NUMBER 35,
-l3b-114c; NUMBER 54 170a-172bpassim;
NuMBER 57 176d-179b passim; NUMBER 60,
m86a-c; NUMBER 63,194d-195b; NUMBER 79,
233c
iLL: Government, 366c-d;
3b-387d; 418d-419a
SWELL: ]ohnson, 251a
EGEL:Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 45
c-d; PART III, par 208 69c; par 305-307
2b-c; ADDITIONS, 181 / Philosophy of
istory, PART .II, 275b-276a; 277c-d
attack on oligarchy and on the political
power of wealth
ERODOTUS: History, BK III, 108b-c
HUCYDIDES: ... Peloponnesian . War, BK VI,
9c-520d; BK VIII, 575d-576b
ATO: Republic, BK. IV, 342d-344a; BK VIII,
5c-40Ba I Laws, BK IV, 680a-b; BK V,
Sa-c; BK VIII, 733b-734a / Seventh Letter,
Ob-d
ISTOTLE:-Politics,BK II, CH 10 [T272'a27-
0] 468c-469a; BK III, CH 7 476c-477apassim;
H 13 [I283b27-33] 481d; BK IV,C.H II [I295
b
{i296b21495c-496c; CH 12 [I296b35-1297aI3]
7a-b; .. BK V, .... ell .. I
30Ib26-I302a8]503a-b; CH 6 [I30Sa36-b2I]
7b-c; CH 9 511.d:512b /
hetoric,BK II, CH 16 638b-c .
LUTARCH:Lycurgus, 34b-37c; /
oriolanus, 180b-d /Lysander, 361a-d, I Agis
b,d-656d / Cleomenes, 657a-663c-
pBBES: Let'iathan, PART II, 140d
HAKESPEARE:Coriolanus,ACT I,SC I [1-89]
51a-3S2b '
ONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, .. BK II,7c; BK
,23a-25a
OUSSEAU: Inequality, 353a-358c passim
IBBON: Decline and Fall, SOlc-d -
ANT: Science of Right, 44Id-443b..;.450c
EDERALIST: NUMBER 57 l76d-179b
EGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 293c-
94a
ARX-ENGELS: C0l111nunist Manifesto 415a-
34d esp 420c-422b? 424d-425a, 42Sd-428a
he objection to property as a basis for
privilege with regard to citizenship or
public o'ffice
HUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian fVar, BK VI,
20b-c; BK VIII, 576d
LATO: Republic, BK VIII, 40Sc-407a / Laws,
BK IV, 682c
ilRISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH II [I273a22-b7]
69d-470a; BK III, CH 9-12 477c-481b passim
LUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a
OUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 412b-c;
lc-d
IBBON: Decline and Fall, 730
KANT: Science of Right, 445a-c
279
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c-126b; NUMBER
52, 165b"c;NUMBER 57 176d..179b; NUMBER
60, 186c
43 MILL: Representative' Government, 345c-346c;
369b-370a; 384a-387d; 394a-395a; 398a-d;
419a-c
46 HEGEL: Phlosophy of ItI, par
310 103b-c /Philosophy of History, Pi:\RT II,
263b-d; PART IV, 356d; 364a:-c
50 MARX:. Capital, 137b-141b esp 138b, 140a-b;
364a-368b esp367c-368b
50 MARX-ENGELS: Com1nunist Mantfesto,
416c-d; 425b-d;428d-429c
Sb. The character. of the oligatch:the man of
property; the capitalist "
5 EURIPIDES : Suppliants [229-245] 260b-c /
Hecuba [I206-I232136.3b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [653-724] S15c-516d
/ Plutus [144-197] 630d-631b
6 HERODOTUS.: ,History, BK VII,. 221c:-222a
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War,BK VI,
S12c-d; BK VIII, 587a-b
7 PLATO: Republic,BK IV,343a-b;BK VIII,
/Laws, BK BK
IX, 751c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH7 [I267a36-h9]
163b;BK IV, CH (>. [1293aI2-341 492d-493a;
BK VI, CH 7 [I32Ia35-b2] S').Sa/Rhetoric,BK
II, CH 16 638b-c
14 PLUTARCH: AemiliusPaulus, 2iBa:-d; 22qc-
224a / Marcus Cato, 287c-d / Aristides-Marcus
Cato,. 292b,/-Lysander, 361a-d .. / Lucullus,
419a-420b /.;Crtj.ssus,439a-c/ Agis 648b,d-
656d
15 57b:-58d; .BK VI,
97h-c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [1-96]
9c-l0c
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 158a-b
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 377d-378a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit .. of Laws, BK I,H, lOa;
BK VII, 45a-b; BK XX, 146b-c
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK I, l09d;110d;
BK III, 177c-d _. . .... .. _.
40 GIBBON: Decline ana Fall, 497c-501b passim
43 MILL: Representative Govern;nevt, ,34Sc-346a
44 BOSWELL: J()hnson, 194c-19Sa
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 292d-
293b
50 MARX: Capiial,72a-c.; 112c; 292d-295d esp
292d-293c
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist lvfantfesto,
420c-d
Se. Economic status and power as a political
instrument: oligarchy. in relation to the
class war
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, I3:18-24-(D) OT
Ecclesiasticus, 13 :24-30
5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [122-226] 630c-631c
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VI, 202c-203b
281
ADDITIONAL READINGS
isted belo\v are \vorks not included in Great Books ofthe Western !'V.
orld
, .but
ariel topics with \vhich this chapter deals. These works are dIVIded lutotwo
I. "Vorks by authors represented inthis collection..
II. Works by authors not represented in this collectIon.
h d t lace and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
;h: of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
BURKE. Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe
1. l\10SCA. The Ruling Class
"of the Three Sorts of Government- MICHELS. Political Parties
Democracy and Oligarchy," in Mo- B. ADAMS. The Theory of Social Revolutions .
BEARD. An Economic Interpretation ofthe Constttu-
tion ofthe United States .
--. Economic Origins ofJeffersontan Democracy
II. PARETO. The Mind and Society, VOL III, CH I I
.. ifG T. VEBLEN. The Theory of Business Enterprise
A Deftnse ofthe 0 overn- __'. The Vested Interests and the State of the In-
United States of AmerIca .
,t__ on the Cause of the Present Dls- dustrial Arts
BRYCE. Modern De1nocracies, PART III, CH 74-75
the Re+onn of the Representation in the TAWNEY. Equality .
'Jl BRINTON. The Anatomy of Revolutton, CH II, VII
of Commons . 'Tl. M h II
Appeal from the New to the Old Whtgs BURNHAM. .1. ne ac lave tans
CHAPTER 62: OLIGi\RCfIY
tyrannical and despotic extremes to which oligarchy can go, see TYRANNY 2b.
revolutions generated by oligarchy, see ARISTOCRACY 3; REVOLUTION 3
C
(2).
ntherdlsCUSSa011S()1 ....... ="T,,(T rights, see DEMOCRACY 4a(2); JUSTICE 8a;LABOR 7
b
; WEALTH 7
a
.
1
. econ'Offil'C and political J' ustice in the conflict between den10cracy and
genera Issues . .' ". if 0-
oligarchy concerning the qualifications for cltlzenshlp and the extenslOll of the su rabe, see
2c-3; CONSTITUTION sa; DEMOCRACY 4a ( I); JUSTICE g
e
;LABOR 7
d
, 7; LIBERTY
2d SLAVERY sa-sb; WEALTH 9
h
. .' .
, discussions of capitalism, and of the class war, see DEMOCRACY 4
a
(2); LABOR 7
C
-7
c
(3) ,
OPPOSITION Sb; REVOLUTION 4a, sa-sc;WAR AND PEACE 2C; \VEALTH 6a, 9
h
.
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist .....A".,I-I-/C_\U
434d esp 41Sb-417a,c, 420b-c,
42Sb-c, 428d-429c, 434a-d
6. Historical observations of
rise and fall <Jf oligarchies
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VI,
VII, 243b-c
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian
BK III, 434c-438b; BK IV,
465c; BK v, S03d-S04b; BK
BK VIII 564a-593a,c esp
577b-d, 579c-583c, 584b-585a,
587a-590e
7 PLATO: Seventh Letter, 800b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH
bIO] 468e-469a; CH II
[I273bI7-26] 470b; BK III, CH
484d-485a; BK v, CH
S06a; cH'S-6 :'\lJl"ln-':lU,l'\C:
518d-519d / Athenian
553a-55Se; CH 32-41 568a-572a
14 PLUTARCH: Lvcurgus,
Solon, 68d-71e; 75e-76d /
121a,e passim, esp
166a-174d / Coriolanus,
354b,d-368a,c / Phocion
648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, UJJ''''lI-'lJl
rius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c /
681b,d-689a,c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 97b-e
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws,
52a; BK XI, 77b-83c
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract,
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK III,
passim; BK IV, 23ge-240b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 501c-d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall,
570d-572d; 574b-582b esp
581a
43
353b;
46 HEGEL: rfu'toslofJl:lV
77c /
276a;
297a; 300a-301c
50 MARX: Capital, 354a-377a
368e-369a, 371e-372c
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist lVltlntjreSIO,
416b; 419b,d-422e esp
passim
THE GREAT IDEAS
(5. The attack on oligarchy and on the political
power of wealth. 5c. Economic statlts and
power as a political instrul11ent:ollgarchy
in relation to the classwar.)
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian fVar, BK III,
428c-d; 434e-438e; BK IV, 463a-465c; 467a-b;
BK V, 482d-483a; 502d-S04b; BK VIII, 57Se-
576e; 577b-d; 57ge-583e; 587a-590e
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 342d;BK VIII, 405c-
406b / Laws, BK IV, 682b-c; BK VIII, 733b-
734a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 7 [I266b24-
1267aI7] 462b-d; BK III, CH 10 [I28IaII-29]
478d-479a;. CH IS [I286
b
8.,..22] 484d-485a; .BK
IV, CH 3 [I289b26--1290S13] 488d-489a; CH 4
[I29oa3o_b20] 489b-d; [I29IbS-I3] 490d; CH
6 [I293aI2-34] 492d-493a; CH 495b-
497b passim; BK V, CH S-6 506b-508e; CH 7
[I30i's-39]509a-c; CH 9 [I3IOa22-2S]. 512c;
BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a / Athenian Constitution,
CH 2-6 553a-555e; CH 32-41 568a-572a
14 PLUTARCH:. Solon, 68d-71e / Poplicola-Solon,
87a / Agis 648b,d;.656d / Tiberius Gracchus,
674e-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d.:.689a,c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 97b / Histories, BK
II, 224d-225a
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd llenry VI, ACT IV 56a-64d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT I, SC 1 [1-167]
351a-353a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 77b-
83c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 352a-358c passim /
Social Contract, BK IV, 42ge-430a
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 28a-d; 53b-
56a;61c-d; 109d-110d; BK IV, 239c-240a;
287d-288e; BK V, 309a-311c; 346c-347d
40 (-;IBBON: Decline and Fall, 127a-c; 144a-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 49c-51b; NUMBER
54, 171b-172a
43 MILL: Representative Government, 345b-346e
passim; 366d-367a; 368b-370a passim; 393e-
395a; 398a-d
44 BOS\VELL: Johnson, 251a; 255d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART II, 263b-d;
275b-276a; PART III, 287d-288b; 295b-297a;
300a-301c; PART IV, 364a-e
50 MARX: Capital, 63b-e; 137b-143a passim, esp
138b-e, 140a-b; 241a-244b esp 243d-244a;
283d-285e; 317b-e; 364a-368b esp 367c-368b;
372e-383d esp 382e-383d
280
For: The general discussion of constitutional government, see CONSTITUTION 1-3b;
MONARCHY Ia-Ia(I).
Other considerations of the relation of oligarchy to aristocracy and democracy, see
RACY 2d; DEMOCRACY 2b, 3a-3b; GOVERNMENT 2a, 2C; and for the theory
constitution as a compro111ise bet\veen democracy and oligarchy, see
CONSTITUTION Sb; DEMOCRACY 3a; GOVERNMENT 2b.
CROSS-REF.ERENCES