INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5T METAPHYS..ICS
159
all things." There are other theoretical sciences,
such as physics and mathematics, whichinvesti-
gate causes or deal with principles, but,they do
n.ot reach to the highest causes or first prin-
CIples, n?r do they take all things in their
unIversal aspect as the object of their
InqUIry.
Though "physics also is a kind oWisdom"
says Aristotle, "it is not the first kind" ;
elsewhere hesays that "both physics and mathe;.
matics must be classed as parts of Wisdom."
deals only with material things in mo-
tion; and "the mathematician investigates ab-
stractions"-objects which, except as abstract-
ed, cannot exist apart from matter and motian.
"If there is something which is eternal and im..
movable and separated from matter, clearly the
knovvledge of it belongs to a theoretical science
-not, however, to physicsnor tomathetnatics
but to a science prior to both." It is that
which. is the highest part of wisdom.
Aristotle gives two hames to the supreme
form of human wisdom or the highest of the
theoretical denominates it both
from the position it occupies in relation. to all
other disciplines and also in terms ofthe .kind
ofsupstance whichjt alone investigates. Ifthere
is "no substanceother than those, which are
by nature, natural science. (i.e., physics)
be the first science, but if there is an im-
movable substance, the sci,ence of thismustbe
prior and must be first But this
highest science also deserves to be called "the-
as well as "first philosophy
ArIstotle s.ays, "three theoretical
and what we may call
theology, SInce 1tIS obvious that if the divine
is a.nywhere, it is in things of
thIs sort, z.e., .the .eternal, Immutable imma-
terial. '
THERE 1.S .. STI.LL. name for .. the highest
speculative dISCIpline In the Greek conception
of the order of the sciences.. "Dialectic", is the
name which Plato gives to the search for first
and for the knowledge of the'most
IntelhglbJe realities. As appears in the chapter
on DIALECTIC, Aristotle contrasts the dialecti-
cian and the philosopher as respectively con-
cernedwith opinion and knowledge, but Plato
regards the dialectician as preeminently the
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS
esunderlying all.perceptible qualities,
a fixed order of reality behind the se-
fphenomena in experience. According
, "the wholt;questionof interaction
encebetween things is a metaphysical
, and cannot be discussed at all by
ha are unwilling to ga into matters
I " '1.
.Preface to his Principles of Psychology,
elares his plan to limithis. own in..
what can be known by the empirical
of the natural sciences.. Psychology
must assume certain data. The dis-.
f these assumptions, hesays, ','is called
sics and falls outside the province.. of
. ... . The data assumed bypsychol-
like those assumed by physics and the
tural sciences, must sometime be over-
he effort to overhaul them clearly and
ly is metaphysics; but metaphysics
her task well when distinctly
of Its great ,extent." The implication
be not that metaphysics is impossible
er that metaphysics, as James conceives
not yet exist in any mature or satisfac:-
velopment. "Only a metaphysics alive
eight of her task," he writes, can hope
ccessful. "That will perhaps be centu-
ce."
NOT FULLY explore the issue concerning
ects of metaphysics. without observing
are used, in the tradi tion of
books todesignate thediscipline which,
wrongly, claims to be the highest
SCIence. The Greeks initiated thecon-
ofa disciplinevvhich should be preemi-
cause it deals with first principles and
Ca,uses. It not only searches. for wisdom
ultimate realities; it also la
tlons for all other sciences. But the
do not have one name for this discipline,
"metaphysics" even among. the various
they use.
totle, whose Metaphysics is the first great
o have this word in its title, never uses
rd to refer to the science which he is try-
define and establish. In the opening
speaks ofit underrhe name of wisdom
1men Suppose what is called Wisdom
ith the first causes, and the principles of
posed to empirical, physics is for hi
mathematics in having the superior sta
a priori knowledge. They are both scien
the highest sense of the term because the
sist of valid synthetic judgments a priori.
therefore, does not exclude metaphysic
the ranks of science because he think
"metaphysic, according to its proper aim
sists merely of synthetic propositions a p
Not the method of metaphysics, nor the
of its propositions, but the character of i
jects seelns to be the cause of its frustr
reducing it to what Kant calls an "illuso
lectic" rather than a valid science.
It might be supposed that those who ta
opposite view-that metaphysics is a s
even, perhaps, the highest of the scie
would agree in defining its objects or the
of its inquiry. This does not seem to be th
any more than it seems to be true that all
who criticize metaphysics conceive its s
matter in the same way.
Following what he takes to be the tradi
conception of metaphysics in the med'
schools, which appears to him to be con
in the writings of Descartes, Leibnitz,
Wolff, Kant says that "metaphysic has
proper object of its inquiries only three
ideas: God, Freedom, and Immortality.'
also seems to be at least part of what Hu
in mind \vhen he refers to "school metaph
and associates it with "divinity," by wh'
means theology, natural or sacred. Yet \v
William James saying that "Hume is at b
as much of a metaphysician as Thomas
nas," because he is engaged in speculation
cerning the relation or lack of relation, the
tity or lack of identity, in the discrete ele
of immediate experience. Here the qu
seen1S to be not about God, freedom, an
mortality, but about the existence of end
I
N this chapter, as in MATHEMATICS, we must
distinguish controversies about the science
we are considering from controversies in it. But
here the situation is complicated by many am-
biguities. In the tradition of western thought,
the name of science has never been denied to
mathematics, no matter how its subject matter
has been defined or what conception of science
has prevailed. But controversies about meta-
physics often begin, in modern times at least,
by questioning our right to use the word "sci-
ence" when we speak of metaphysical inquiry
or speculation. The challenge usually implies
that metaphysics cannot be regarded as a body
of valid knowledge because the peculiar objects
it has chosen to investigate are not susceptible
to scientific inquiry.
If experimentation were the sine qua non of
scientific knowledge, it would follow, of course,
that a discipline which could not perform ex-
periments or even less rigorous types of empiri-
cal research could not be called a science. But
by that standard mathematics would also be
ruled out. It does not seem to be the case, how-
ever, that mathematics and metaphysics stand
or fall together.
Hume, for example, admits the one and ex-
cludes the other. If we are persuaded of his
principles concerning science, what havoc, he
says, must we make when we run over our li-
braries. "If we take in our hand any volume; of
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning con-
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain
any experimental reasoning concerning matter of
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the
flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion."
Nor does Kant make experilnentation or em-
pirical research indispensable to valid and cer-
tain kno\vledge. On the contrary, pure, as op-
158
THE GREAT IDEAS
161
cis Bacon divides the sciences "into theoloo-y
and philosophy," he adds that "in the
we do not include natural theology." Natural
theology is the divine part of philosophy, yet
it is clearly distinct from sacred theology or
what Bacon calls "inspired divinity."
This distinction, in whatever language it is
made, raises t,vo problems. The first concerns
the relation of natural to sacred theology, es-
pecially with regard to the scope of natural
theology and the precise nature of its independ-
ence of sacred doctrine. On this question there
seems to be considerable difference between
such wri ters as Augustine and Aquinas, or Bacon
and Descartes. As already noted, the various
issues involved are reserved for discussion in
the chapter on THEOLOGY. The second problem
is directly pertinent to metaphysics alone. The
question is whether metaphysics and natural
theology are identical in subj ect rnatter or scope,
or whether natural theology is only apart of
metaphysics.
Aristotle seems to answer this question when
he suggests that "first philosophy" and "theol-
ogy" are interchangeable designations for the
highest branch of speculative knowledge. To
the extent that he declares this science to bean
inquiry concerning the existence and nature of
immaterial and imperishable substances, his
definition of the object of metaphysics would
seem to justify the ti tie of theology.
Descartes, who also separates metaphysics
from physics by reference to the immateriality
and materiality of the substances which are their
objects, even more explicitly seems to give the
whole of metaphysics a theological character.
In the Preface to his Meditations on the First
Philosophy, he says that he is concerned to treat
of "God and the human soul"; for, as he ex-
plains to the professors of Sacred Theology of
the Sorbonne, "I have always considered that
the two questions respecting God and the soul
were "the chief of those that ought to be dem-
onstrated by philosophical father than theo-
logical argument."
Though he adds the freedom of the human
will to the existence of God and the immortal-
ity of the soul, I(ant's definition of the objects
of metaphysical speculation. similarly makes
metaphysics an inquiry into things. which lie
outside the realm of physics and associates)t.
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS
WISDOM. Another subor-
considered there also,
here as ,vell.. That is the
of metaphysics totheology. Both
and theology may be conceived as
,;uJ-ncll inreasoningandar...
in trying to demonstrate conclu'"
principles. But one is merely a hu-
working with the principles of rea-
the other is vvhat Aquinas calls
" ............ "'," in order to signify that its
are articles of religious faith.
hierarchy of human sciences, i meta-
remains supreme-the first philosophy.
IS only by comparison with theologyin-
sthe latter rests upon divine revelation
tIlCe it enjoys the certainty of faith, es-
t.he insecurity of reason. Though meta-
and theology .differ in their principles
ewhat .in their methods, they do not
ntirely in their subject matter. Both,
mpIe, may treat of God and of the exist-
fi immaterial and imperishable beings.
therefore, must face the objection that
is/no need for any knowledge in addition
taphysics because "everything that is, is
of in philosophical science-even God
If, in that part of philosophy called theol-
(Ilf the divine science, by Aristotle." To
e<replies bygiving two reasons for sacred
()gy.
!$!inecessary, he says, "for the salvation of
certain truths which exceed human
should be made known to him by divine
Hon. Even as regards those truths about
hieh human reason could have .. discov-
was necessary that luan.should. be taught
'Vine revelation; because the truth about
c:h as reason could discover, ,vould only
a fevv, and that after a long time,
admixture of many errors." Fur-
he continues, there is no reason "why
which may be learnt frQmphilo-
so far as they can be known by
may not also be taught us by
so far as they fall wi thin reye-
the theology included in sacred
differs in kind from that theology
a part ofphiJosophy."
two kinds of theology are traditionally
as natural and sacred. When Frail-
THE QUESTION which Plotinus raises-wh
there is a higher science or form of know.
than metaphysics-is naturally consider
the great Christian theologians. In part
answer resembles that of Plotinus;
differs. Where Plotinus speaks ofdialectica
most precious part of philosophy" beca
transcends reasoning and argument and r
the sort of inlnlediate apprehension of/r
which cannot be expressed in words, thed)
recognize the supremacy of n1ystical K.
edge-a foretaste in this life of ,vhat
of God ,vill be like in the life to come.
like Plotinus, they do not think
edge, here or hereafter, is natural w
er it is supernatural knowledge, the
to man of a contemplative wisdom
his nature cannot attain by its own
powers.
The subordination of metaphysical
kno,vledge which is both lL.'-.I. ... ...
scientific (i.e., neither discursive nor
nor demonstrative) is considered in
helps to characterize the nature of metap
as a science.
The word "metaphysics" comes intotJ.
result of the title supposedly given by the
andrian librarians tothe work in which Ari
treats the problems of the first philosophy
word is short for "the books which come
the books on physics." Plotinus uses the
and connects it ,vith the PIatonic meani
"dialectic. "In the training of the metap
cian he says, dialectic is the ultimate stud
Dialectic, according to Plotinus, "is the
od, or discipline, that brings \vith it the
of pronouncing "vith final truth upon then
and relation of things-what each is, how<{
fers from others, what common quality all
to what kind each belongs and in what
each stands in its kind and ,,,hether its bei
real-being, and how many beings there are
hovV" many non-beings to be distinguished
beings." But we must not think of dial
Plotinus declares, "as the mere tool of the
physician." It goes beyond
or contemplative wisdom goes beyondclii
sive reasoning and demonstration. "It lea
another science all that coil of prelnise
conclusions called the art of reasoning."
160
philosopher. Not only does dialectic belong to
the realm of knowledge rather than opinion,
but in the realm of knowledge, mathematics
occupies the lo,ver, dialectic the upper part.
The mathematical sciences build upon hypoth-
eses which they do not and cannot establish.
Dialectic uses "hypotheses only "as steps and
points of departure into a \vorld which is above
hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond
them to the first principle of the whole; and .
by successive steps she descends again without
the aid of any sensible object from ideas,
through ideas, and in ideas she ends."
Despite all the relevant differences between
PIato and Aristotle concerning being and be-
coming, reason and sense, the intelligible and
the sensible, it seems possible to compare the
knowledge \vhich Plato calls "dialectic" with
what Aristotle calls "first philosophy" or "the-
ology." . .
Both, for example, proceed from first pnncl-
pIes and establish the foundations of t?e
rior sciences. On its downward path, dialectic,
according to PIato, brings the light of reason to
bear on the understanding of the hypotheses
which arethe principles ofmathematics. Though
Aristotle thinks that rnathematics rests on ax-
ioms or self-evident truths, he also says that "it
must be the business of first philosophy to ex-
amine the principles of mathematics" because
the rnathematician only uses them in a special
application without investigating their general
trutho .Furthermore, the question concerning
how the objects of mathematics exist is a ques-
tion for the first philosopher, not the mathema-
tician.
In the Sophist, Plato, to illustrate the differ-
ence between the sophist and the dialectician
or philosopher, develops an analysis of 'such
terms as being and non-being, true and false,
same and other, one and many, rest and nlotion.
These, it seems, are the fundamental concepts
in the philosopher's knowledge of the ultimate
reality. But these are also the fundamental con-
cepts in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In the mediae-
val period when "metaphysics" generally
places "dialectic" as the name for the first phi-
losophy, the so-called transcendental terms-
such as being, essence, other, one, true, good-are
treated as the basic metaphysical concepts; and
what is characteristic of them as abstractions
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHARTER 57:METi\PHYSICS 163
and idea.... 1\S \ve have divided natural phi-
losophy into the investigation of causes and the
production of effects, and referred the investi-
of causes to theory, which we again di-
VIde Into physical and metaphysical, it is nec-
essary that .the real. difference of these two be
the of causes they in-
qUIre lnto. PhySICS, accordIng to Bacon in-
quires into efficient and material causes;
physics, into formal and final causes; and as
mechanics is the practical application of physi-
cal theory, so what Bacon calls "magic" is the
practical doctrine that corresponds to the meta-
physical theory of forms.
OR disagreement concerning the
subJect matter and problems of that which
claims to be the highest human science, how'"
ever nalned, does not seem to be uniformly ac-
companied by agreement or disagreement con-
cerning the status and development of the dis"":
cipline in question.
There seems to. be some similarity, for ex..
between Plato's dialectic as an inquiry
Into forms and Bacon's notion of metaphysics
as concerned with formal causes-a sin1ilarity
which Bacon himself observes. But where Plato
seems to think that dialectic exists, to be taught
and learned, Bacon's judgment is that this part
of metaphysics, if not the part dealing with
final causes, has not yet been developed because
the right method has not been employed.
Again, Aristotle's conception of metaphysics
as concerned with the primary axioms, the
universal principles applicable -to all existence,
and the transcendental properties of being,
seems to bear some resemblance to Bacon's
primary philosophy. But Bacon writes as if
Aristotle's Metaphysics had not been written, or
at least as if it had not succeeded, as Aristotle
might have supposed it had, in establishing the
science vvhich Bacon finds for the most part in
a defective or undeveloped condition.
If \ve turn to natural theology, either as a
part of metaphysics (with Aristotle), or as
separate from metaphysics (with Bacon), or
as identical with metaphysics (with Descartes),
we find the same situation. Aside from some
verbal and some real differences concerning the
objects of the inquiry, Aristotle, Bacon, and
Descartes think that -the existence -. of being$
ce capable. of separate .. existerice,
if so why
These latter questions lead to the
books of the .l\tfetaphysics which in-
he existence of the non-sensible,the
the immutable. If Aristotle's the-
's here, then theology is onlya part-
ng part, perhaps-of a larger science
ct is not a special realm of being, but
and Bacon go further than Aristotle
ation of opposing the identification
sics with theology. Where Aristotle
mit theological subject matter as a
he first philosophy, they -. exclude it
does not use the ,vord "metaphysics"
classification of the sciences; he em-
y as a term of derogation to refer to
doctrines which he repudiates.His
ification makes philosophia prima that
natural philosophy which is prior to
rnatical and mechanical sciences. The
I with determinate quantity andmo-
antecedent science deals with "quan-
motion indeterminate." These "being
iplesor first foundation of philos-
he science which deals with them "is
ilosophia Prima."
distinguishes between first philosophy
physics and between metaphysics and
heology. First philosophy, he says, is
mon parent of sciences." It is con-
ith "axioms, not peculiar to any sci-
tcommon to a number of them"and
"the adventitious or transcendental
n of things, such as little, much, like,
, possible, impossible, entity, nonen-
c." Natural theology, whichis the divine
philosophy because it inquires about
ity, goodness, angels, and spirits," is
from the rest of natural philosophy.
o assign the proper office of metaphys-
contra-distinguished from primary phi-
}"and natural theology," Bacon writes,
'tIst note that as physics regards the
hich are wholly immersed in matter
vable, so metaphysics regards what is
stracted and fixed; that physics sup-
ly .existence, motion, and natural ne-
Fwhilst Inetaphysics supposes also mind
THIS BROADER CONCEPTION of the first
phyexplains, as its to natu
ologycould not explain, why the centta
in Aristotle's Metaphysics treat of sensibl
ical substances; their nature as substan
distinction between substance and a
form and matter, potentiality and actu
principles of the composite nature of c
substances; and the properties of su
istences in virtue of their having bein
their unity and divisibility, their same.l1
otherness.
Aristotle does not inquire whether s
stances exist. He seems to take their e
as unquestionable, for he frequently r
physical things as "the readily .. recogni
stances." But-in addition to the questi
sensible substances exist," there aresu
tions as "whether there -are or are not
sides sensible substances... and whethe
enceto investigate; for to physics 0
assign the study of things not qua b
rather qua sharing in moven1ent"; a
ematics is concerned with theattri
things insofar as are "quantita
continuous." These sciences "mark..
particular kind of being, some genus,
quire into this, but not being simply,
being.... Similarly, these sciences
question \vhether the genus with wh
deal exists or does not exist, because it
to the same kind of thinking to show
and that it is."
Only the first philosophy "does no
about particular subjects in so far as
some attribute or other, but speculat
being, in so far as each particular thin
subject matter,then, includes all
things as existing, and involves not
question how anything which exists e
the properties of being), but also the
whether certain things, whose existenc
questioned, do in fact exist. Whateve
hold good for all things qua being-suc
principle that the same thing cannot
and not be in the same respect at the sa
- belong to the first philosophy, even t
as in this case Aristotle points out, the
contradiction may also belong to logic
principle of demonstration.
IF NOTHING IM!vIATERIAL exists, if there are no
beings apart from the changing things of sense-
experience, or if, although such things exist,
they cannot be kno\vn by reason proceeding in
the manner of speculative science, does it follow
that metaphysics must also be denied existence,
at least as a speculative science ?The answer
seems to be clear. If the declared objects of a
science do not exist, or if those obj ects are un-
knowable by the methods which that science
proposes to follow, then it seems difficul t to de-
fend its claims to be a valid science against those
who challenge them. The controversy over the
validity of metaphysics would thus. appear to
turn. on the truth or falsity of the two "ifs"
just mentioned.
But the matter cannot be so resolved. if
natural theology does not exhaust the whole of
metaphysics; that is, if metaphysics considers
objects other than the immaterial, and if it in-
quires into their nature rather than their ex-
istence. definition of the subject
matter of the first philosophy seems to contain
an alternative conception of metaphysics, one
which may be quite consistent with the- con-
ception of it as theology, but which, however,
gives it problems to solve in the realm of physi-
cal things.
"There is a science," Aristotle wri tes, "which
investigates being as being and the attributes
which belong to being in virtue of its own na"
ture." This definition of the first philosophy
seems to differentiate it from-rnathematics and
as sharply as the other definition in
terms of immaterial and imperishable sub-
stances. The other sciences, according to Aris..
totle, do not treat of "being-qua being uni..
versally." The properties of anything which is
"in so far as it has being, and the in
it qua,heing, it is the business
with the traditional subject matter of theology,
at least in the sense that here reason tries to
prove propositions ,vhich are the main tenets of
religious faith. In his Preface to the fitst edition
of the CritiqueofPureReason, Kant remarks that
when reason "finds itself compelled to have re"
course to principles which transcend the region
of experience," it "falls into confusion and con"
tradictions.... The arena of these endless con-
tests is called Metaphysic."
162
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS
cs." The former, he says is "what is c _ h 165
11 d
' om t eory of th ' ,
y ca e Metaphysic in the more limited ld d 4- : of valid kno\vledge)
." Both together "form properly that de- f eLermme m advance of any examina-
ent of knowledge which may be termed, discussion whether the
e truest, sense of the word, philoso h ,rs to be fall \Vithin the ran e of
path whIch it pursues is that of concernmg which the human ;ind
ch, when it has once been discovered, e and validate answers.
er lost, and never Inisleads." , . . thlS SUPposItIon IS untenable in itself- or
If It IS untenable because psycholoay and '.
temo10g h h b eplS-
i y, \v en tey are treated as th fi
P
h'l h h erst
losap y, t elTIselves presuppose
P
h . . a meta-
YSICS or conceal their metaph ' 1
sitians' h . ' YSlca presuppo-
,t en no al ternatlve remains butt . d
metaphysics directly by 't f ' 0 JU ge
lISrUlts.
n t case, the issues surveyed in this cha _
d
t
:
r
req.ulre an examination of the metaph . PI
lSCUSSlons to be found' . h 1 YSlca
G III SUC Clapters as
OD,ANGEL, IDEA SOUL I
W (h' ' ,MMORTALITY
P
w Ich are relevant particularly to
ro ems 0 natural theolo ) . d (
to oth gy ,an. as relevant
h er parts or problems ofmetaphysics) such
c apters as BEING, CAUSE FORM 1\1
ONE AND M . R ' ,ATTER,
ANY, ELATION, SAl\1E AND OTH
ER.
,ROVERSIES ABOUT metaphysics can be dis-
IsHed from Iuetaphvsical co'nt '
. . ) roverSles-
t IS, dIsputes within the field ofm t I ' 1
e ap lYSlca
ught. We have confined our attention to
former throughout this chapt B '
. ere ut It may
be pOSSIble to J' udge illllCh 1 . I
, ,ess to reso ve
Issues about the scope rneth d d l'd'
, 'os, an va I -
of metaphYSICS without engagi '
J:' , ng In, or at
t laCIng, Issues which are the 1
ical. mse ves meta-
only way to escape this would be to
ppose that (as an analysis of the
powers of the mInd) or epistemology (as a
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
II Conceptions of the high t h ' .
1 es uman SCIence dlale t' fi h' PAGE
natura theology, transcendental c IC, rst p rIosophy, metaphysics,
2. The analysis of the highest h ' 166
uman sCIence' the cha t f d' I '
or transcendental knowledge rac er 0 la ectical, luetaphysicaI,
2a. The distinctive objects or problems of the supreme .
16
7
2b. The nature of the c b" SCIence
oncepts, a stractlons, or principles of th h' h .
2C. The method of met, h' h d' e Ig est SCIence
d
ap YSlCS: t e . lstinction b t ' .
ental methods e ween emplf1cal and transcen-
2d. The between a metaphysic of nature an _ .
t!le dIfference bet\veen the speculative tre d a metaphysIc of morals:
tron of the metaphysical problems of God and theyractical resolu-
M h' , ' ree om, and Immortality 168
etap YSICS In relation to other d' . l'
lSClP Ines
3
a
. The relation of metaphysics to theology
3
b
. The relation of metaphysics to mathematics .
psychology, and the empirical sciences ,physIcs or natural philosophy,
3
C
The relation of metaphysics to logic and dialectic
the '"
CntlcIsm and reformation of metaphysics
4
a
. The dismissal or satirization of metaphysics as d'.
16
9
4
b
l R' oglUatlsm or sophIstry
of metaphysics: critical philosophy as d'
P ySICS a propae eutIC to meta-
cal problems from the realm of questions
thinking about, Kant does not reiec
problems but rather offers alternative me
of stating and solving them.. He hopes th
to accomplish a refo/ination rather than
oli tion of metaphysical inquiry.
The existence of God, freedom, an
mortality must be affirmed, Kant thin
the order of practical, not speculative r
They are indispensable "conditions of th
essary object of our will .... that is to say,
ditions of the practical use of pure rea
Yet, he adds, "we cannot affirm that we
and understand, I will not say the actuality,
even the possibility, of them."
Furthermore, by redefining metaphysi
mean "any system of knowledge a priori
consists of pure conceptions," Kant not
gives his fundamental treatises in morals
ethics a metaphysical character, but see
possibility of a genuine metaphysic eme
from the Critique of Pure Reason. Once
dogtnatislu of metaphysic" has been rem
"that is, the presumption that it is possinl
achieve anything in metaphysic without a
vious criticism of pure reason.... it may
be too difficult to leave a bequest to posteri
the shape of a systematical metaphysic, c
out according to the critique of pure rea
Kant's transcendental philosophy, an
pecially what he calls "the architectoni
pure reason," is in a sense that metaphysi
ready begun. In subject matter, if not i
method or conclusions, it resembles the
tional inquiry concerning the universal
ciples and transcendental properties of
The objects of natural theology are, of c
excluded as being beyond the power of r
to know in a speculative manner.
Metaphysics as a possible science is for
"nothing more than the inventory of all t
given us by pure reason, systematicall
ranged.... Such a system of pure specu
reason," he says in his original preface
Critique, "I hope to be able to publish
the title of Metaphysic of Nature." And i
last pages of the Critique, wherein he crit
all speculative efforts in the sphere ofn
theology, Kant reaffirms "the speculativ
the practical use of pure reason" to cons
"a Metaphysic of Nature and a Metaph
164
apart from the sensible world of n1atter and
change can be demonstrated and that some-
thing can be known of their nature-\vhether
they are called immaterial substances, spirits,
and intelligences, or God, angels, and souls.
\Vith some alterations in language and
thought, Plato and. Plotinus, .A.ugustine and
Aquinas, Spinoza and Locke can be added to
this company. They are theologians in that sense
of "theology" which implies a rational knowl-
edge-without religious faith, and either by in-
tuition or demonstration-of beings which re-
ally exist, yet are not sensible or material or
lnutable or finite. Spinoza, for example, does
not use the word "metaphysics," but he holds
that "the human mind possesses an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
God." .A.lthough Locke's use of the word "meta-
physics" is derogatory, and though the pur-
pose of his Essay Concerningliuman Understand-
ing is to prevent human inquiries from extend-
ing beyond man's capacities, he attributes
greater certainty to our knowledge of God and
the soul than to our kno\vledge of bodies, and
finds no greater difficulty in our speculations
about spirits than about particles of matter.
"Experimenting and discovering in ourselves
knowledge, and the power of voluntary mo-
tion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover
in things without us, the cohesion and separa-
tion of solid parts, \vhich is the extension and
motion of bodies," Locke writes, "we have as
much reason to be satisfied with our notion of
immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body,
and the existence of the one as well as the other.
. . . But whichever of these complex ideas be
clearest, that of body, or in1material spirit, this
is evident, that the simple ideas that make them
up are no other than what we have received
fron1 sensation or reflection; and so is it of all
our other ideas of substances, even of God
hilTIself. "
As \ve have already seen, Hume and I(ant
deny metaphysics (so far as it is identified \vith
what is traditionally natural theology) the
status of a valid theoretical science. For them
it is incapable of taking its place beside physics
and mathematics. Hume, in addition, denies
validity to metaphysical speculation concern-
ing causes and substances in the natural order.
Unlike Hume, who simply removes metaphysi-
THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
167
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-272b
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 43a:-46a esp
44e-45a; 60b-e
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV 51b-54b pas-
sim / Objections and Replies, 128d-129a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2-
PROP 4
1
388a-e; PROP 47 390e,-391a; PART V,
PROP 2S-26 458d-459a; PROP 28 459b
35 BERKELEY: HunlanKnowledge, INTRO, SECT
6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 342b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 6c-d; 215d-216d; 245c-
24ge / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
253b-e; 264d; 270e-d / Practical Reason, 330d-
331a; 351b-352e / Pref. Metaphysical Elenlents
of Ethics, 365a / Intro. Metaphysic 0..( Jvlorals,
388a-e / ]udgenlent, 467d-468b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 884b-886a
2c. The method ofmetaphysics: the distinction
between empirical and transcendental
methods
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134a-c; 139d-140b / Re-
public, BK VI-VII, 383d-398e espBK VII, 396d-
398c / Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-d /
Sophist 551a-579d esp 552b-e, 553d-554a,
561b, 570e-571d / Statesman 58Ga-608d esp
S80d, 582d-583e, S86e-58ge, 591a-d, 594d-
596a / Philebus,610d-613a. / Seventh Letter,
80ge-810d
8 ARISTOTLE: lvfetaphysics, BK II, CH 3 513c-d;
BK IV, CH 2 [I004a2S-3I] 523b-e; CH 4 [IooSb
35-I006a28J 525a-e; CH 7 [IOI2aI8-24] 532a-b;
CH 8. [IOI2
b
S-8] 532c; BK VI, CH I [I025bI-I8]
547b,d; BK IX, CH -6 [I048a25-,b9] 573c-574a;
BK XI, CH 5 [I06Ib34-I062aI9] 590a-e; en 7
[I063b36--I064a9] 592b / Soul, BK I, CH I
[402aIO-22] 631b
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q I, A 8,
ANS 7c-8d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 44e-4Sa
31 DESCARTES: Rules, IV 5a-7d / Discourse,
PART II, 46e-47b; PART IV 51b-54b passim /
Meditations, 69a-71a,e passim; I-II 75a-81d
/ Objections and Replies, 11ge; 126a-b; 128a-
129c; POSTULATE I-II 130d-131a;POSTULATE
VII 131e; 167a-e; 206c-207b; 237b-238b;
239a-240a; 242e-244e; 245b-246a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2
388a-b; PROP 44, COROL 2 and DEMONST 390a;
PROP 47 390e-391a; PART v, PROP 25-
2
6
458d-459a; PROP 28 459b; PROP 29, SCHOL
45ge-d; PROP 31 459d-460b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x: II, DIV
I32509a-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 19a; 121a-d; 24ge-2S0a,e
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d;
263d-264d esp 264d; 277d-279d / Practical
Reason, 298d-332d; 349b-351a / Prej: Aleta-
physical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 95a
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS
"ic
e analysis of the highest human science:
the character of dialectical, metaphysi-
cal, or transcendental knowledge
he distinctive objects or problems of the
supreme science
PLATO: Channides, 7d-13d / Republic, BK v,
368e-373e; BK VI-VII, 383d-398e. esp BK VII,
396d-398c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Sophist, 564d-
574e / Philebus, 633a-635a esp 634b-635a
t Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
RISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [I 92a33-b2]
268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [I94b9-I5] 271a; CH 7
[I98a22-3I] 275b-e / Heavens, BKnI, CH I
[29
8b
I3:--24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, HK I-IV
99a-532d; BK VI, CH I-BK VII, eH I 547b,d-
551a; BK XI, CH 1__8 587a-593d;BK XII,
CH I 598a-e / Soul, BK I, CH I [403bIO-I7]
632d
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 7 390a-d
NICOMACHUS:. Arithmetic, DK I, 811a-813a
PTOLEMY: Almagest,PREF, Sa-b
PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III,CH 4-
6
11a-
12b
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q5, A2,
ANS 24b-25a; Q II, A 2, REP 4 47d-48d
HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-272b
13ACON: Advancement of Learning, 42e-46a;
60b-e / Novum Organum, BK II, APR 9 140b-e
DESCARTES: Meditations, 69a-71a,e; I-II 75a-
BId
SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2
88a-b; PROP 47 390c,-39Ia; PART v, PROP 25-
33 458d-460e
flUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
I32509a-d
&ANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 6e-d; 19a; 120b
[En I]; 249a-b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of
Morals, 253a-d / Practical Reason, 351b-352e
/ Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-e/ Judge-
ment, 603d-607e esp 606d-607e
HEGEL: Philosophy o..f History, INTRO, 165a-b
TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 694e-d
JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 89b-gOa; 118b;
I41a; 258b-259b esp 259b; 291a
The nature of the concepts, abstractions,
or principles of the highest science
PLATO: Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398e /
Sophist, 564d-574e / Seventh Letter, 80ge-BIOd
ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 6 [I27a26-40]
176d-177a / Metaphysics, BK IV, ell 2 [
Io0
3a
33-
bI
9J 522b-e; BK V, CH 7537e-538b; BK IX,
CH 6 [I048a31-b81 573e-574a; BK XI, CH 3
589a-d; BK XII, CH 4-5 I Soul,
BK I, CH I [403bIO-I7J 632d
AQUINAS: Sunzma Theologica, PART I, Q I, A8,
ANS 7c-8d; Q II, A I 46d-47d; Q 13, A 5 66b-
67d; Q 16, AA 3-4 96b-97e; Q 48, A 2, REP 2
260e-261b; Q 8S, A I, REP 2 451e-453e
AQUINAS: SUlnnZa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57,
A236a-37b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QI
3b-4a; A8, ANS 7e-8d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II,
A 2 36a-37b; PART II-II, Q 45, A I, ANSS
599d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, ,72a-d; PAR
269b-272b
30 BAGON: Advancement of Learning, 15d;
48d esp 40a-41b, 43a-c, 44e-45a / N
Organum, BK II? APH 9 140b-e
31 DESCARTES: DIscourse, PART IV 51b-54b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCH
388a-b; PROP 47, SCHOL 390e-391a; PA
PROP 25-42 458d-463d .
35 HUME: Human UnderstandIng,
455b passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 19a; 11Sd
120b [fn I]; 172d-174a; esp
248d / Fund. Prin. MetaphYSIC of
253b-d; 264b-d esp 264d / Pref. Metap
Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Intro.
physic of Morals, 387a-388d esp 3
390b,d-391a / Judgement, 551a-552e;
607e esp 606d-607e .
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of HIstory, INTRO, 16
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197b
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; gSa
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874
. h b' h n tvpe which are the volume and page
To find the passages cited, use t e numers 1ll eavr Iliad BK II [
26
5-
28
3] 12d, the
numbers the passagbes refef,rrhed to1For the 12d indicates that the pas-
number 4 IS the num er 0 t e vo ume In ,
sage is in section d of page 12.
h . rinted in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
PAGE SECTIONS: When t e text IS Pl' 53 JAMES' Ps chology 116a-119b, the passage
lower haft of II9. When the text is
the upper hal 0 hPi
g
and b refer to the upper and lower halves of left-
pnnte? III two columhs't t e ettersda
d
to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand Side of
handside ofthe page, t .e etters c m osium 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164-
,.. 0 more of the main divisions of a \:vork (such as BoK, CH,
AU)THOR S DItVlmISeIOsNlonsc'lud:dO[n the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are gIven In cer-
SECT are some
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [26S-283] 12d. .
Th ces are to book chapter, and verse. When the KIng James
BIBLE e books or in the' numbering of chapters or verses, the King
and Douay verSIons Iller In I . "d" d b (D) follows. e.g. OLD TESTA-
James version is cited first and the Douay, In Icate y a, "
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46. .
.. " .s " calls the reader's attention to one or more
SYMBOLS: The abbrevllatIon e p." 0', signifies that the topic is discussed Intermlt-
relevant parts of a who e re paSSIm .
tently rather than continuously In the work or passage CIted.
. 'h 1 f the references see the Explanation of
For additional information t th sty e The Great consult the Preface.
Reference Style; for genera gUI ance In e use
166
1. Conceptions of the highest human
dialectic, first philosophy,
natural theology, transcendental phdos-
ophy
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / . Synzposium,
167a-d t Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398e /
Tinlaeus, 476a-b / Parmenides.486a.. 511d esp
491a-d / Sophist, 561d-574c esp 571a-e /
Statesman, 585e / Philebus, 611d-612b; 633a-
635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 80ge-
BIOd a b]
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192 33- 2
268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [I94b9-15] 271a; CH 7 [1 98:
22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, III, CH I [298
13-24] 390a-b / MetaphySICS, BK I, CH 1-2
499a-501e; BK II, CH I 511b,d-512b; BKaII!,
CH I [995a23-b27] 513b,d-514b; CH 2 [996
997
a
34] 514d-516a; BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-S25a,
BK VI, CH I 547b,d-548e; BK XI, CH 1-4
587a-590a; CH 7 592b-593a / Soul, BK I, CHI
[403bIO-I7] _
9 ARISTOTLE: EthICS, BK VI, CH 7 390a-d
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-813a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12
264b,d-273a
3. Metaphysics in relation to other disciplines
169
4b. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical
philosophy as a propaedeutic to meta-
physics
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-c
31 DESCARTES: DiscourJe, PART II, 46C-48b;
PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations, 72b,d; r 75a-
77c / Objections and 237b-238b pas-
sim; 267a-277a,c passin1
35 BERKELEY: HUi11an Knolvledge, INTRO 40Sa-
412a,c passim, esp SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c;
SECT 13.3 439c-440a
35 I-IUME: !-luman [lnderJtanding. SECT I, DIV
7-
10
453c-455b; SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a
42 KANT: Pure Reaso11, 1a-13d; ISc-16d; 19a-
22a,c; 101d-102b; 133c-134d; 146a--149d;
157d; 196b-197c; 218d-227a; 248d-2.50a,c /
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 270c-d;
273d-274a / Practical Reason, 292d-293b'
296a-d; 307a-d; 331a-332d / Judgement,
568a
e criticisln and reformation of meta-
physics
b CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS
KANT: Pure Reason, 36d-37d / Fund. Print 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 526c-527a
Metaphysic of Morals, 253b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 20b-c; 36a-37d;
HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b; 109b-c; 120c-121c; 129c-130a; 133d; 157d;
182d-183c 187c-188b; 192a-b; 218d-222b esp 221c-222b;
JAMES: Psychology, 671a-672a; 852a; 873a- 229b-c / Practical Rea>'011, 299d; 304d-305a;
874a; 881b-886a esp 881b-882a, 884b-886a; 335b-c / Judgement, 600d-601c; 607d-608c
890a 47 GOETHE: FauJt, PART I [1948-
1
9
6
3J 46a-b;
[4343-43
6
7]107a-b; PART II [7843-78461 191a
48 11ELVILLE: Moby Dick, 115b-117a; 255a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 243b
53 JAMES: PJychology, xiva; 90a; 227b; 235b;
702a-b
S-REFERENCES
The dismissal or sattrtzation of meta-
physics as dogmatism or sophistry
. HOBBES: Lel/iathan, PART I, 49d; 52a-b; 54b-
c; 56b-d; 57c-d; 59a-60a;71a-b; 80b; 84a;
PART II, 163a-b; PART III, 183c-d; PART IV,
247d; 267a-272b; 274a-b; 276c
I\1oNTAIGNE: Essays, 240a-246a; 257d-264a
BACON: Advancement of Learning, 40a-c;
57d-58b; 60a-c / NovumOrganum, HK I,
APH 62-65 113b-114c; APH 71 117a-c
.LOCKE: lluman Understanding, BK III, CH X,
SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-29Sa; BK
IV, CH VIII, SECT 9 347d-348a
ERKELEY: Hunlan Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 97
31d-432a; SECT 143 441c-d
FfUME: Hunlan Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6-7
453h-454a passim; SECT VIII, DIV 62, 478c;
SECT XII, DIV 132, S09d
STERNE: TristrarJ1, Shandy, 329b-336a; 421b-
422b
SMITH: Hlealth ofNations, BK V, 335b-336c
Statements in other contexts concerning the highest human science, see DIALECTIC 2a, 4;
PHILOSOPHY 2b; SCIENCE Ia(2); THEOLOGY 3
a
; WISDOM la.
IDiscussions relevant to the objects, problems, and concepts of metaphysics or the highest
human science, see BEING 2, 3, 4-4a, 7a-7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 8a-8b; CAUSE 5
a
, 5
d
; GOD 2b-2C,
6b; GOOD AND EVIL Ia-Ib; IDEA If; IMMORTALITY 2; KNOWLEDGE 6a(I), 6a(4); LIBERTY
4
a
; MIND lOf; NECESSITYAND CONTINGENCY I, 2a-2b; ONE AND I-.1ANY I-Ib; RELATION3;
SAME AND OTHER I, 2C, 2e; SOUL 4b; T'RUTH lb-IC.
Considerations relevant to the nature of metaphysical concepts or abstractions, see BEING I;
DEFINITION 6a; IDEA rd, 2g, 4
b
(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3
d
.
The method or character of metaphysical thought, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); LOGIC 4
d
; PHILOS-
OPHY 3a-3b; REASONING 6a; I"'RUTH 4
C

rhe relation of metaphysics to theology, Jee KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); THEOLOGY 2, 3

a
, 4
a
;
WISDOM la, IC; and for the relation of metaphysics to mathematics and physics, see
MATHEMATICS Ia; NATURE 4b: PHILOSOPHY 2b; PHYSICS Ia; SCIENCE Ia(2).
rhe problem of principles common to metaphysics and logic, see PRINCIPLE IC; and for the
staten1ent of the law of contradiction, see OPPOSITION 2a.
Criticisms of metaphysics, and for the substitution of psychology or epistemology for meta-
physics as the first philosophy, see DIALECTIC 2C, 3C, 6; KNOWLEDGE 5
d
-5
e
; MAN 2b(4);
PHILOSOPHY 3d, 6b; SOUL sa; THEOLOGY 5.
Considerations relevant to a metaphysic of morals, and for the solution therein of the orob-
lems of God, freedom, and immortality, see GOD 2d; IMMORTALITY 3
a
; NECESSIT; AND
CONTINGENCY 4b; PHILOSOPHY 2a; WILL Sb(4).
THE GREAT IDEl\.S
3he The relation of metaphysics to mathe
ics physics or natural philos
o
ps;chology, and the empitical scie
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI-VII, 386d-398
Philebus, / Seventh Letter,S
810a
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [I92a3
268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [I94
b
9-I S] 271a; c
[I98a22-3I] 275b-c / 1leavens,. BK III, c
[298bI3-24] 390a-b / lvletaphyslcS, BKI,
[g89b29-9goa8] 50Ba; CH 9 [992a24-
b
9J 51
BK II, CH 3 [994
b
3I ]-BK III, eH 2 [99
513c-516a; BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-525a; B
CHI 547b,d-S48c; BK XI, eH t 587a-588a
[Io6Ia29]-CH 4 [I06Ib34]
592b-593a; BK XII, CH I [Io69a.30-b2] 59
CH 8 [I073bI-7] 603d / Soul, BK !, ClI I [
10-17] 632d
11 NICOM1\.CHUS: Arithlnetic, 13K I, 812b-813
16 PTOLEMY: Ahnagest, BK I, 5a-6a
17 PLOTINGS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b
19 l\.QUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q I
ANS 7c-8d; Q 85, A I, REP 2 451c-453c
20 AQUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART 1-
57, A 2 36a-37b; PART II-II, Q 45, A I,
598d-599d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I,72a-d
30 BACON: Advance1nent o.f Learning, 15d;
44c / NOVU1n Organum, BK II, APH 9 1
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 128
39 SMITH: Wealth 0.( Nations, BK v, 335b-
42 KANT: Pure la-13d; 15c-16c; 17d
211c-218d esp 215d-216d; 243c-248d pa
esp 245c-246b / Fund. Prin. Metapl1ys
Morals, 253a-d; 254b-c; 264b-d / Pra
Reason, 292d-293b; 295b-d; 307d-310c;
313d; 330d-332d esp 33Ia-332d; 35lb
43 MILL: Utilitarianis1n, 445b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of [{istory, INTRO, 1
183c
51 '"rOLSTOY: War and DK v, 197b;
LOGUE II, 694c-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 90a;
884b-886a esp 886a
3c. The .relation of metaphysics to logic
dialectic
8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, . C
[I72aI2--22] 237a / Nfetaphysics, BK III,
[995
b
4-10] 513d-514a; CH 2 [996b26-9
515b-d; BK IV, CH 2 [Io04bI8-27] 523
3 524b-525a; BK XI, ClI I [I059a23-26]
ClI 3-4 589a-590a esp CH 3 [Io6Ib9-I2]
ClI 8 [Io64b2J-29] 593a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q
ANS 7c-8d
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d; PA
269b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43
57b-58b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-3
2d. The distinction between a metaphysic of
natu.re and a metaphysic of morals: the
difference between the speculative treat-
ment and the practical resolution of the
tuetaphysical problems ofGod, freedom,
and immortality
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-d; 15c-16c; 33a-d; 120b
[fn I]; 124d-128a; 143a-145c; 152a-153c; 164a-
171a esp 169c-170a, 170c-171a; 177b-192d
esp 177b-179c; 200c-209d; 218d-223d; 234c-
240b esp 239a-c; 241d-242c; 246a-250a,c
/ Fund. Pril1. A1etaphysic of Morals, 253a-d;
263d-264d; 277d-287d esp 277d-279d, 283d-
285a / Practical Reason, 291a-293c esp 292a-
293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-314d; 331a-
337a,c; 340a-342d; 344a-349b esp 344a-c,
348b-349b; 351b-352c; 353a-354d / Intro.
NJetaphysic of Morals, 386b-388d esp 386d-
387a,c, 38Ba-d; 390b,d-39Ia. / Judgelnent,
568c-570a; 588a-613a,c paSSIm, esp 60'7c,
609b-610a
168
(2. The analysis of the highest human science: the
character of dialectical, tnetaphysical, or
transcendental knowledge.)
3a. The relation of metaphysics to theology
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12
264b,d273a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, ClI 40
6SSb-656a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I
3a-l0c esp A I 3b-4a, AA 4-6 5a-7a, A 8 7e-
Bd; Q 2, A 2 esp REP I 11d-12c; Q 12, AA 12--13
60d62b; Q 32, A I 175d-178a; Q 39, AA 7-8
209a-213a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a; Q 84, A 5
446c-447c
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART II-II; Q 2,
AA 3-4 392d-394b; Q 45 598c-603c paSSIm
23 HOBBES: Let1iathan, PART I, 83b; 84a; PART
II, 163a-b; PART III, 165b; PART IV, 247d;
269b-271c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 155a-c
30 BACON: Advance111ent of Learning, 4c; 15d-
16b; 19d-20a; 39d-40c; 41b-d; 44c-45a;
95d-IOld / Not/urn Organum, BK I, APH 65
114b-c .
31 DESCARTES : Discourse, PART I, 43c ! MedIta-
tions, 69a-7Ia,c / Objections and ReplIes, 125b-
126b; 283d-284d
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 543 266a
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b-310a paSSIm,
esp 308b-30ga; 670b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 119a-c; 177b-192d esp
190a-c; 238b-24Gb / Practical Reason, 346b-
347a; 351b-352c / Judgement, 599d-600a;
600d-601c; 604d-606d esp 606a-d; 607d-
60gb
46I-IEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
160b; PART III, 308c-309d
II.
MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART I,
CH 3:3-3
6
.. ..
BONAVENTURA. Itineranum MenUs In Deum (The
Itinerary ofthe Mind to God) ,
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphyslcae, esp, I
MALEBRANCHE. Dialogues on MetaphYSICS and Re-
ligion
LEIBNITZ. Philosophical Works, I I the Reform
of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance)
I.
AQUINAS. On the Trinity of Boethius, QQ 5-6
HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART IV,
SECT III-IV
KANT. De l\lundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation),
SECT v . ..
__. Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphySIC, .par
1-5, 40-60; SCHOLIA ,
__. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural SCIence
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL I, 1
W. JAMES. Some Problems of Plulosophy, CH 2-3
\vhat is here discussed and the matters con-
sidered in the chapters on SOUL, SENSE, MEM-
ORY AND 11tIAGINATION,remain the same as they
\vould be if"reason" or "intellect" "vere used in
place of "mind." Different formulations of
these relationships are not affected by the
words used, but by different theories of what
the mind is, ho\vever it is named.
Before "ve consider the diverse conceptions
of the human n1ind which are enumerated un-
der the seven main divisions ofthe first section
in the Outline of Topics, it may be usefulto
examine the eleluents of meaning more or less
COffilnon to the. connotation of all the\vords
which "mind" here represents. Even here\ve
must avoid begging the question whether mind
is a peculiarly human possession. Other animals
may have luinds. Mind may be, as it is on one
theory, a universal property of matter.Ac-
cording to another theory, there may be super-
human minds or intelligences, or a single abso-
lute mind, a transcendent intelligence.
What, then, does the universe contain be-
cause there is mind in it, \vhich would be lack-
ing if everything else could remain the same
with mind removed? The facts we are compelled
to mention in answering this question should
give us some indication of the elements of
meaning common to "mind" and all its syno-
nyms.
FIRST IS THE FACT of thought or thinking. If
there were no evidence of thought in the world,
mind \vould have little or no meaning. The
recognition of this fact throughout the tradi...
tion accounts for the development of diverse
theories of mind. None of the great writers
denies the phenomenon of thought, however
differently each may describe or explain it;
none, therefore, is \vithout some conception of
mind.
171
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 58: MIND
e tradi tion.of the great books, the \vord
ind" is used less frequently than "rea-
"intellect," "understanding," or "soul."
are still other words, like "intelligence,"
iousness," and even "spirit"or "psyche,"
often carry some part' of the connotation
ord "mind."Certainauthors use "mind"
nym for one or another of these words,
e it the meaning '\Thich other writers ex-
xclusively in tern1S of "reason" or "un-
ding." Some discuss mind vvithout
to soul, some identify; mind with soul or
nd some conceive mind as only a parr of
r spirit.
the purpose of assembling 'in a single
r references to all discussions which fall
the area of meaning common to aU these
it was necessary to. adopt some single
ng word. Our choice ()f "mind" is partly
It of its present currency, partly the
f the fac t that it is somewhat more neu'"
an the others and therefore less prej udi-
the conflicting theories which are juxta-
'n this chapter.
ds like "reason" 'or "intellect" usually
a sharper distinction between' the func-
r faculties of sensation and thought than
e word "mind." Imagination and mem-
r example, are attributed to the un-
ding in the writings of Locke and
,whereas, in the analytical vocabulary of
Ie and Aquinas, imagination and mem-
long to sense, not to reason or intellect.
dy, words like "soul" or "spirit" usually
te a substantial as well as an immaterial
of being, whereas "lnind" can have the
ng of a faculty or a po\ver to be found in
rganisms.
adoption of the "vord "mind" is purely
er of convenience. It begs no questions
cides no issues. The relations benveen
THE GREi\T IDEl\S
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are 'Narks not included in Great Books ofthe Western .lV.6rld, .but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These \vorks are dIvIded Into two groups:
1. \Vorks by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts the publication of the cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional ReadIngs WhlCh follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
VOLTAIRE. "Metaphysics," in A Philosophica
tionary
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea,
SUP, CH 17
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO
LOTZE. Metaphysics, INTRO
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, par 31
A. E. TAYLOR. Elements of }vfetaphysics
BERGSON. The Creative Mind,cH 6
SANTAYANA. Dialogues in Limbo, CH 10
HEIDEGGER..Was ist Aletaphysik?
WHITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART I, CH :3,
PART II, CH 9 (4)
T. WHITTAKER. Prolegomena to a New MetaIA
MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, I
CH 4
--. .A Preface to Metaphysic$, LECT II-III
CARNAP. The Unity of Science
--. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, I
GILSON. The Unity of Philosophical Experience
12
B. RUSSELL. Mysticisnl and Logic, CH 5
--. An lnquiry.into Meaning and Truth, CH
170