ation of the judgment which a court renders-

the judgment which is the decision of a judge

when he applies the law to the particular case.
In the legal sense of a judicial decision, judg...
ment reflects not so much ,. the quality of, the
judge's mind as his duty and authoritYi to dis-
pose of the case and to have his decision exe-
cuted by the appropriate oflicersof the law.
The'legal significance of judgment is not 'pri-
marily psychological or logical; and, just as the
moral consideration of judgment falls under
prudence, the legal consideration is also more
appropriately developed in the context ofother
ideas.
We are left with the meanings which belong
to psychology, logic, and the theory of knowl-
edge. The sense in which "judgment" desig-
nates a faculty or function oJ the mind-a' dis-
tinct sphere of mental operation-is much
more special than the sense in which "judg-
ment" or "proposition" signifies a particular act
ofthe mind in the process of knowing or in the
verbal expression of that ;process. Many au"
thorsdiscuss the kinds of judgment which the
mind makes, and the kinds of propositions ,; it
forms and asserts ,or, denies, but only a, few-
notably Locke and Kant-use tli,eword "judg-
ment" to name a mental faculty.
Locke, for example, says that ','the mind has
two faculties conversant about truth and false-
hood." One is' the faculty of knowing; the
other of judging. "The faculty which God has
given man to supply the want of clearandcer'"
tain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be
had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its
ideas to agree and disagree, or, which is the
same, :any proposition to he true or false, with...
out perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the
proofs." The way in which Locke distinguishes
between knowing and judging and the fact that
he, relates this, distinction to the difference. be-
835
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4I:JUDGMENT
E ,vord "judgment" has a range of mean-
gs .which incluaes, three principal vari-
eferring to ,( I ), a quality ,of the mind,
faculty ,ofthe ,nind"and (3)' an act of the
Of these three meanings" it, is' thetliird
is extensively considered in this chapter;
tis this meaning of "judgment" which
writers use the word "proposition" to ex-
They sometimes substitute the one word
ly for the other; sometimes they use both
not as strict synonyms, ,but to express
t yet closely related aspects of the same
ental phenomenon.
sense in which judgment is a quality oJ
?ui: is the sense in "which we ordinarily
.of a person as having sound judgment or
udgment. "We credit the same people,"
tIe says, "with possessing judgment and
reached years ofreason and with having
alwisdom and understanding/' To be
,ofunderstanding and of good orsympa-
judgment," he continues,is to be "able
e about the things with which practical
is "concerned,.,''
capacity to judge wellconcerl)ing what
done is often connected with,the capac-
eliberate about the advantages and dis'"
rages or other .circumstances, relevant to
tionin question. It mayor may not be
p>anied by a capacity to resolve thought
tion, to carry intoexecution the decision
judgment has formed. These three qual-
mind berateness" judgment, and
conceived by Aristotle and
sas belonging together as parts of the in-
al virtue they call "prudence" or "prac-
isdom."Thequalities may occur
,but the prudent man will possess all three.
smeaningof "judgment"is reserved for
in the chapter on PRUDENCE; and in
pter on LAW will be found the consider-
THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western .W.o;ld, .but relevant to the
'd d . 'th hl'ch'this chapter deals These works are dIvIded Into t\VO groups:
I ea an, topiCS WI W' ' ._
I. Works by authors represented in this co!lection..
II. Works by authors not represented in thIS collection.
'h d, 1 d th':er facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
For teate, p ace, an 0, 'h 1 h f T.n G, f Id
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which followst east c aptero erea". e:
as
.
LEIBNITZ., New Essays Concerning Huma'f1;'
standing, BK II, CH 17
PART I, --. Correspondence with Clarke
VOLTAIRE. "Infinity," in A Philosophical Dict
__. The Ignorant Philosopher, C.H 18
and Infinite BOLZANO. Paradoxien des Unendllchen'
WHEWELL. On the Philosofhy
STALLO. Concepts and Theories of Modern
CH 13
BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, Terminal
VI :
FULLERTON. Conception of the Infinity,
Solution ofthe Mathematical Antinomies
B6sANQUET. Logic, VOLl, CH 4
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, par' I
COUTURAT. De I' infini
CANTOR. Contributions to the Foundtng ofthe
of Transfinite Numbers . .
ROYCE. The World and the Indtvzdual,
plementary Essay (4) ',,'
PEANO. FOr1nulaire de mathemattque
E.W. HOBSON. The "Theory, afFunction,so
Variable and t.he Theory of Fourier's Series
POINCARE. Science and Method, BK II" c,H:
WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia ,Math
PARTIll SECT c; PART V, SECT E
B. Principles ofMathematics, CHI3
37:-43 ,:
-"-': -Our Knowledge of
_-.' Introduction to athematical Phtlosoph
Kosmos (The Expanding Universe)
WEYL. The Open World, LECTnI
II.
PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology! (J)
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. Monologtum
--. PrQslogium ; ,' "
MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the, Perplexed, PART I,.
CH 73 .
DUNS SCOTUS. Opus Oxonlense, BK I, DIST 13
-,-.
CRESCAS. Or Adonat, PROPOSITIONS
N"ICpLAS: OF De Docta
BRuNo.,Del'infinito, e
_c. '_' . _'.' De Immenso et Innumerabtltbus
DONNE. Lovers Infinitenesse '.,
Disputationes Metaphystcae; 'xxx
(2), XXXV (3), XLI (5)
I.
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy,
26-2 7
SPINOZA. Correspondence, XII .
NEWTON. The lvfethod of Fluxtons
Series
The Analyst .
_-. A Defence of Free Thinking in Mathem,attcs
HUME. A Treatise of HU1nan Nature, BK I,PART II,
SECT I-II ' ,,' ."")
KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural
__. Prolegomena to Any Future par
50-54 .
HEGEL. Science of LOglC, VOL I, BK I, SECT I, CH 2
(B,C) ; SECT II, CH 2 (c) .
W. JAMES. Some Problelns of Phtlosophy, CHIO-II
834
TI-IE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 41: JUDGMENT
836
t\veen certainty and probability suggest the
parallel distinction between kno\vledge and
opinion. The faculty of judgment for Locke is
the equivalent of \vhat other \vriters treat as
the fornling of opinions.
Kant also makes judgment a faculty. Along
with understanding and reason, judgment is one
of the three faculties of cognition. It has a dis-
tinct function of its o,vn and is coordinate with
the other two. i\S the laws of nature are the
work of the understanding in the sphere of
speculative reason;, as the rules of the moral law
are the work of the reason in the practical
sphere, ,,,herein it is related to the faculty of
desire; so the purposiveness of nature comes
under the faculty of judgment which operates
in relation to the faculty of pleasure and pain.
Kant divides all the faculties of the' soul, into
"three \vhich cannot be any further derived
from one con1mon ground: thefaculty ofknowl-
edge, the feeling of pleasure and pain and the
faculty ofdesire. " He sees each of the three cog-
nitive functions (of understanding, judgment,
and reason) as standing in a peculiar relation to
these three primary faculties. The faculty of
judgment functions with respect to pleasure
and pain,\vhich is connected with the faculty of
desire. Yet the aesthetic judgment of beauty
and the theological judgment of purposiveness
in nature are of a speculative rather thana
practical character. Because of these two' re-
lated facts, Kant holds that "the judgement
in 'the order of our cognitive faculties, 'forms a
mediating link between Understanding and
Reason."
Kant, perhaps more than any other thinker,
makes judgment-both as a faculty and as an
act-one of the central terms in his philosophy.
It is pivotal in each of the three critiques, but
it is the Critique of Judgement which serves to
connect the Critique of Pure Reason and the
Critique of Practical Reason. "The. Understand-
ing legislates a priori for nature as an object of
sense-for theoretical kno\vledgeof it in a pos-
sible experience. Reason legislates a priori for
freedom and its peculiar causality; as the super-
sensible in the subject, for an unconditioned
practical kno\vledge. Thereahn ,of the natural
concept under one legislation, and ' that of the
concept of freedom under the other, are entire-
ly "removed from aU 'mutual influence' which
they might have upon one another(eet
cording to its fundamental laws) by
gulf that separates the supersensible froth
nomena." It is judgment, accordi
Kant, which "furnishes the n1ediatingco
bet\veen the concept of nature andtlt
freedom."
KANT' S THEORY of the faculties of unders
ing, judgment, and reason is so complex a
trine that it cannot be readily compared
other analyses of the capacities or futlet'
mind. His threefold division bears as\lp
-perhaps only a verbal-resemblance to
nas' division of mental acts into conce
judgment, and reasoning.
i\ccording to Aquinas, judgment
ond of the three acts of a single cognitive
ty variously called "mind" or "intelle
"reason." This faculty, he writes, "first
hends something about a thing, such as
sence, and this is its first and proper objec
then it understands the properties, acci
and various dispositions affecting thee
Thus it necessarily relates one thing ""i
other by composition or division; and fro
composition and division it necessarilypr
to another, and this is reasoning."
The first act of the mind is conceptlojj},
the simple apprehension of the essence
properties of a thing. Judgment, the secotl
unites or separates concepts by affirrn.i
denying one of another. As in the !(antia
ysis, judgment is a kind of mediatingli
after the, judgment is fornled by what A
calls the "composition or division" of co
it in turn serves as the unit of the mind;s
act, "'hich is reasoning. Reasoning is thep
of going from judgn1ent to judgment.
The act of judgment is that actio
mind, and the only act, which can ha
quality of truth or falsity. "Truth," A
\vrites, "resides in the intellect composil1.
dividing"; for when the intellect "judge
a thing corresponds to the form whichil
prehends about that thing, then it firstK
and expresses truth.... In every proposit
the mind "either applies to, or removeS
the thing signified by the subject some
signified by the predicate." 110reove
judgment involves assertion 'or ,denial
does not. Whatever truth there is
in concepts must be explicated in
ents and the truth of the conclusion in
ing depends upon the truth of the judg-
swhich are the premises., The .judgment,
{ore, is the basic unit of knowledge.
'this last point Kant seems tobe'in agree-
with earlier \vriters. It is possible, there-
to compare Kant's classification of judg-
or propositions with the classifications of
tIe, Descartes, or Locke. But it is neces-
first, to consider the relation bet\veen
cnt and proposition. After that \ve can
inc the difference between theoretic and
ieal judgments. With respect to the theo-
judgment (or proposition), we shall be
()state opposite views of the nature of the
ent and diverse views of the formal struc-
f judgments, their material content, their
on to one another and to the whole proc-
kno\ving.
SENTENCE '"all men are" mortal" 'can ",J"e
reted as expressing a judgment or a prop-
n.From certain points of view, the choice
makes no difference; for ex-
,it does not matter whether, in a consid-
nof"all men are mortal" and "some men
t mortal," the comparison is expressed in
of, universal and, particular, affirmative
egative, judgments or propositions, or
er it is said that these are contradictory
ents or contradictory propositions. The
problems of logic seem to be conceived in
me \vay by writers like Aristotle and
e, who tend to use "proposition" in place
Udgment, "and by \vriters like Aquinas,
artes, and Kant, who tend to use both
swith some difference in meaning.
at is the difference? It is sometimes un-
ood as a difference between an act of the
,assertingor denying, and the subject mat-
ing asserted or denied. The proposition.is
hich be either asserted or denied; or
stressed by Descartes,
may suspend judgment and n1erely
the proposition. It may decline to
true or false, and so refuse to assert or
The fact that the proposition is itself
or negative does not signify
or denial by a judgment of the
837
mind, for an affirmative proposition can be de-
niedand a negative can be affirmed.
Judgment adds to. the proposition in ques-
tion the mind's decision with respect to its
truth or falsity. That decision may be right
or\vrong. A, proposition which is in fact true
may be denied. The truth of the proposition
is unaffected by the falsity of the .judgment,
or if the mind suspends judgment on apropo-
sition which is true, the truth of the proposi-
tion has failed to elicit a judgment. This seems
to confirm the separation between the proposi-
tion and the judgment.
Sometimes the difference between thejudg-
ment and the proposition is found in the differ-
ence between the mind's act of "composing" or
"dividing" concepts and the formulation of
that act in words. On this view, the proposi-
tion is related, to the .judgment as the term to
the concept, as the, physical. to' the mental
word, as language to thought. Inconsequence,
there is no separation for either the judgment
or the proposition between thatwhich can be
asserted or denied and the assertion or denial of
it. The affirmative judgment is an assertion,
the negative a denial; and the same holds for
the affirmative and the negative proposition.
But on either theory of the difference, it is
thought necessary to distinguish between the
sentence and the proposition, especially when
the proposition is also regarded as a verbal for-
mulation-a statement of thought in words.
This is particularly important in a logical trea-'-
tise like Aristotle's, which analyzesterms,prQp-
ositions, and syllogisms rather than concepts,
judgments, and reasonings.
In both the Categories, \vhich deals with
terms, and the treatise On Interpretation, which
deals with propositions, Aristotle differentiates
between a grammatical and a logical handling
of the units of language. I-lis distinction, for ex-
ample, between simple and composite expres-
sions (\vords and phrases on the one hand, and
sentences on the other) is related to, but it is
not identical with, his distinction between terms
and propositions. Not every simple expression
can be used as a term. For example, preposi;-
tions and conjunctions cannot be as terms,
as nouns and verbs can be. Nor can every sen-
tence be used as a proposition.
"Asentence is a significant portion ofspeech,"
THE. GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 41: JUDGMENT 839
ginning with Francis Bacon, the distinc The other basic issue lies in the opposition
between the theoretic and the practical between what has corrie to be calIed "subject-
made in terms of the difference between predicate logic" and "relational logic." Here
re sciences and their applications.in tech- one side is fulIy represented by the Organon of
y. Technical judgments, prescribing the Aristotle and by the later books which adopt
o make something or produce a certain the Aristotelian logic of predication. The other
t, are traditionalIy associated, under the logical theory is intimated but not fulIy de-
of the practical, with moral judgments veloped by such writers as Locke, Hume, Kant,
rning the good to be sought and the ways and William James who, though they some-
king it. Both are prescriptive of conduct times employ the subject-predicateformulation,
r than descriptive of existence or nature tend to construct the unit of knowledge:-the
e.manner of theoretical statements. proposition. or judgment-as a relation be-
'inkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, tween ideas or concepts.
ivide science or philosophy into the the- The fact that Kant places substance and .ac-
aldisciplines (e.g., physics, mathematics, cident under the category of relation can be
hysics) and the practical or moral dis- taken as exemplifying this tendency, as can
s (e.g., ethics, economics, politics), place Locke's emphasis on the connection of, and
scussion of the difference between thro- agreement or disagreement between, our ideas.
and practical judgments in the context Nevertheless, these are at most intimations of
r distinctions; as, for example, between the theory that the proposition is, a relation of
eculative and the practical reason, or be- two or more terms, not the. application ora
theoretic and practical knowledge; or predicate to a subject. As in9iatet:l in the chap-
e context of considering the kinds of ter on LOGIC, the relational theory does not re-
appropriate to each, :and the modes of ceive an adequate modern
ce or demonstration in each. These development ofsymbolic ofIpath
e
matica1logie,
distinctions and considerations are beginning with. the wri tings of Boole, Jevons,
in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE, andVenn, and culminating in such works as the
' REASONING, and TRUTH. Principia Mathematica of Russell and White-
the most part, however, the great books head.
tradition of logic itself do not give an In theAristotelian logil;,simplepropositions
'sof practical judgments or reasoning in consist of a subject and is be-
ay comparable to their treatment of the ing talkedahout andwhat is said ofit. The t;pp.
tic forms of thought and statement. The ula "is" is the sign of predication; it also signi-
problems Oncerning propositions or fies an affirmation of the unity of subject and
ents, now to be considered, apply only predicate. Forexample,in "Socrates is a.man"
theoretic forms. , the predicate man is applied tOithe. subject
Socrates, and.. Socrates and
being a man is' affirmed. All the .. terms of.dis-
course can be classified according. to theirchGlr-
acter as subjects and predicates; so, too, can
propositions be classified by reference to the
type of subject-term and the type of predicate-
term which comprise them. The formal struc-
ture not only ofthe proposition, but also of the
syllogism, is determined by the. orderof sub-
jects and predicates.. "Whenone term is predi-
cated of another," AristQtle writes, "any term
which is predicable of the predicate will also he
predicable of its subject." .
According to the. theory of the proposition
as a relation of terms or ofc:lasses, predication
ASIC ISSUES in the theory of propositions
gmentshave their origin in the tradition
great books, but for their explicit and
velopment other works must .be 'con-
thespecial treatises oulogic, of relative-
nt ,date, listed in the.Additional Read-
fie of these two issueshas already been
commented on,bul, for the fullimplica-
f the distinction between propositions
crgments one must go to such writers as
Bradley, Bosanquet, Cook Wilson,W. E.
n, and John Dewey, who make this dis-
n. the crux ofa controversy over the
of formal10gic.
The imperative sentence is not the oni
of practical statement. It is
terse and emphatic. It is also the express!
that type. of judgment whic
action itself, or t
cution 6f a command. There are other
tences which, because they are apparent}
clarative inform, conceal their imper
mood.. Yet upon examination their essen
practical rather than theoretic signincanc
be discovered.
Sentences which contain the words "au
or "should" are of this sort, e.g., "Men 0
seek the truth," "Youshould work for
"I ought to make this clear." .Byo
"should" or "ought," these sentences
changed into the strictly declarative In
theoretic propositions, e.g., "Men dose
truth,"" "You will work for peace/'"
make this clear.' 'They can also be made
imperative, e.g., "Seek the truth,'.' et
chief difference between the blunt form
imperative and its indicative expressio
"ought" or "should" is that the latter in
the person to whom the command is add
The contrast in significance betwee
clarative and an imperative statemen
therefore, convey the distinction bet
theoretic and a practical propositiono
mente Kant's further division of practi
ments into the hypothetical and the ca
simply differentiates commands or'"
which involve no preamble rom thos
propose that action be taken to achieVi
tain end, or which base a direction to
this or that means on the suppositio
certain end is desired or sought.Exa
hypothetical or conditional imperative
be such judgments as "If you want to b
seek the truth" or "Seek the truth in
be happy."
The distinction between theoretic an
tical judgments is currently made int
the contrast between statements of
statements of value or, as in judicial p10
between statements of fact and rules 0
rule of law has the form of a general
statement, usually a conditional rathe
categorical imperative; whereas the de
a court applying the rule to a case is ap
practical judgment.
838
Aristotle writes, "son1e parts of \vhich have an
independent meaning, that is to say, as 'an ut-
terance, though not as the expression of any
positive judgment.... Every sentence has
meaning," he goes on, "by convention. Yet
every sentence is not a proposition; only such
are propositions as have in them truthor falsity.
Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true
nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other
types of sentence but the proposition, for this
last concerns our present inquiry, whereas .the
investigation of the others belongs rather to the
study of rhetoric or of poetry." . ,
It seems possible to relate the two separate
distinctions we have been considering-that
between sentence and proposition and tnat be-
tween proposition and judgment. As the
osition can be.regarded as'a sentence logically
(rather than grammatically) construed, so it
can also be regarded as the linguistic;expression
of a judgment of the mind. The proposition
thus appears to bea kind of middle ground be-
tween language 'ahdthought, for when a
tenceis used for the purpose of stating a prop-
osition it can also express a judgment. When a
judgment is expressed in words, the verbal
statement is also a proposition. The proposition
is thus the logical aspect: ofa sentence and the
verbal aspect of a judgment. Asimilar consider-
ation of terms in relation to words and concepts
occurs in the chapter.on IDEA.
WHAT IS PERHAPS the most fundamental divi-
sion in the sphere
of the practical from the theoretic or specula-
tive-can be initially explained by reference to
the forms of language. Aristotle's remark about
sentences and propositions tends to identify
propositions with declarative sentences.Sen-
tences in the subjunctive mood state prayers or
wishes, not propositions. An interrogative sen-
tence asks a question to which the answers may
be propositions, or they may be hopes and de-
sires.The imperative sentence issues a com-
mand to act in a certain way, whether the com.-
mand is a direction for others or a decision for
one's self. This last type of sentence represents
the practical mood of thought as well as speech
- thought concerned with actions to he done
or not done, rather than ,vith what does ordoes
not exist.
THEGREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 41: JUDGMENT 841
propositions, with their several opposites, further distinctionsintype..The certainty or
gal propositions, and separates the simple probanility \vith \vhich propositions., are as-
re assertion from them as non-modal. In serted or judgments are made is connected by
ast to this, Kant makes a threefold. divi- some .. writers with the distinction between
fjudgmentsunder the head ofmodality: knowledge and opinion, by others with the
'problematical" (i.e., the possible, what differencebet\veen science and dialectic, and
be), the "assertoric" (i.e., the existent, by with t?e difference betweenkno\ving
is), and the "apodictic" (i.e., the neces'" the relatIon of Ideas and knowing matters of
what must be). fact or real existence. Propositions which ex':".
press certain knowledge. are,. di-
vided by some analysts into those which are
axiomatic, self-evident; or immediateand those
which are known only by mediated inference,
reasoning, or demonstration, not by intuition
or induction. The former are also sometimes
called "principles," theJatter "conclusions."
Locke's distinction between "trifling" and
"instructive"propositions, .like Kant's, dis-
tinction between "analytic" and "synthetic"
judgments, is made in the general context of an
examination ofho\v we learn or know.
Trifling propositions, according to Locke,
"are uni:ersal propositions which, though they
be certaInly true, yet they add no light to our
understanding; bring no increase to our knowl-
edge." All "purely identical propositions" are
of this sort-propositions. such as "body is
body" or "a vacuum is a vacuum." Such propo-
sitions "teach nothing but what everyone who
is of discourse knows., without being
told, VIZ., that the same term is the same term
the same idea the same idea." They are all
Instances of the law of identity; or, as Locke ex-
it, they are all "equivalent to this propo-
SItion, viz., what is, is." If the trifling proposi-
tion, the analytical judgment, or what in our
day is called a "tautology," goes beyond the
statement of an identity between subject and
it goes no further than the explica-
tIon of a definition. It predicates, Locke says,
"a part of the definition of the \-vord defined"
as, for example, in the proposition "Lead is' a
metal."
Analytical or explicative judgments, Kant
says in the Prolegomena, "express nothing inthe
but what .has already been actually
thougnt In the concept of the subject ... When
I say, 'all bodies are extended,' 1 have not am-
plified in the least my concept of body, but
have only analyzed it ... On the contrary, this
judgment, 'All bodies have weight,' contains in
<CLASSIFICATION of the types of judgment
'oposi tion is usually preliminary in logical
sis tna consideration of their order and
etion.
e formal pattern of \vhat is. traditionally
"the square of opposition" is determined
pc quality and quantity of the. simple
ositions which are therein related as con-
ctory, contrary, and sub-contrary. Two
?si tions are contradictory. if they are op-
in both quality and quantity (e.g., "All
are is contradicted by. "Some
are not mortal"). Two universal proposi...
are contrary if one is afl1rmative and the
(e.g., "All men are mortal"., is
ttlry to "No men are mortal") ; and an af-
tive and a negative particular proposition
elated as sub-contraries (e.g., "Some men
ortal" and "Some men are not mortal").
significance of these three basic relation...
for the truth and falsity of the opposed
sitions is discussed in the chapter on
SITJON; and in the chapter on NECESSITY
.iONTINGENCY the special problems of op-
Ion among modal propositions are ex-
ed.
than their opposition, the only formal
onship of propositions or judgments oc-
ill.the structure of inference or reasoning.
fdlng to the traditional analysis, the impli-
ll. of one proposition by another-insofar
at is determined by the form of each-is
inference. In contrast, the pattern
diated inference or reasoning. ahvays in-
s at least three propositions, ordered not
with respect to the sequence from premis-
conclusion, but also by the relation of the
ises to one another. These matters are dis-
d in the chapter on REASONING.
it.h respect to their origin, status, or im-
t'ludgmentsor propositions are subject to
are mortal or no men are n10rtal. "Kan
these distinctions under the head ofrelai
calls the proposition which is a "relatio
predicate to the subject,
regards the hypothetical or disj uncti"
ment (based on relations of cause andiefE
of the parts of a whole) as concerned \vitu
ositions "in relation to each other." ..
Aristotle classifies simple propositions
erence to their quantity and quality. InI'
to quantity he distinguishes betweenithe
versal (e.g., "All men are mortal") andth
ticular (e.g., "Some men are mortal"}.TQ
he adds the indefinite proposition which
the quantity (allorsonze) undetermined.
the head of quantity, Kant makes atilt'
division according to unity, plurality,and.
ity. He adds the singular proposition "8
is mortal" to Aristotle's particular andu
sal. The difference between the singular
one hand, and the particular and
on the other, seems to be represented
tle's thought by the distinction between
ositionsabout an individual subject anci
ositions about a universal subject.
The quality of categorical propositio
cording to Aristotle, is either afl1rmativ
positive) or e.g., "All men are 111
and"Some men are not mortal." To the
Kant adds a third type of judgment und
head of infinite judgment
affirms a negative predicate of a subject
"The soul is non-mortal." Though Ari
recognizes the special character of a ter
"non-mortal," since it is both negatiy
indefinite, he does not seem to thinkth
use of such terms affects the quality ofa
osition.
Finally, Aristotle divides propositiQ
cording to whether they are simple asserti
fact or are assertions qualified by the nott
necessity or contingency (i.e., possibility)l
ery proposition, he says, "states that
either is or must be or may be the attrin
something else." The distinction
necessary and contingent modes of
has come to be called a difference in ."J
ity," and statements which have one ora.
modality are called "modal propositions.
It is sometimes thought that the Arist
classification treats only necessary andc
WITHIN THE tradition of Aristotelian logic,
there are divergent. schemes for. classifying
propositions or judgments. So far as the great
books are concerned, this he best illustrated
by mentioning Kant's departures in analysis.
Aristotle distinguishes between simple and
composite propositions, the former consisting
of a single subject and predicate, the' latter
"compounded of several propositions."For ex-
ample, since the two predicates in the proposi-
tion "This man is good and a shoemaker" do
not form aunity,the sentence expresses a con-
junction of two simple propositions: "This man
is good" and "This man is a shoemaker." Other
types of compound propositions are the hypo'-
thetical and the disjunctive, e.g., "If Socrates is
aman, Socrates is mortal," and "Either all men
represents merely one type of relationship-the
membership of an individual in or the
inclusion of one class in another. There are
many other types of relation which, it isheld,
cannot be reduced to class-membership or
class-inclusion; as, for example, the relationship
stated by the proposition "John hit James." or
the proposition "January comes before Febru-
ary." Propositions call be classified according to
the nu:mber of terms involved in a single rela-
tionship, or by reference to the type of relation
which organizes them, whether it is symmetri-
calor asymmetrical, transitive or intransitive,
reflexive or irreflexive. In this theory-it is the
character of the relationship, not the character
of the terms, which is the fundamental element
in logical analysis, and this determines the for-
mal structure of inference as well as of proposi-
tions.
I t has been claimed for each of these logical
theories that it is the more general analysis and
that it is able to reduce the formulations of the
opposite theory to its own terms or subsume
them as a special case. Certainly it is verbally
possible to convert all predications into state!"
ments of relationship, or' aU .relational state"
ments into subject-predicate propositions. But
this by itself does not seem to resolve the. issue
to the satisfaction of either theory; each 'side
contends that such reductions violateits funda-
mental principles. Stated initsffibst drastic'
form, the unresolved question is whether there
is one logic or two.,-or perhaps more.
840
THE <GREAT IDEAS
he truth and falsity of judgments 848
egrees ofassent : certainty andprobability
843
PAGE
CHAPTER 41: JUDGMENT
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
dgment as an act or faculty of the mind: its contrast with the act of conception or
with the faculties of understanding and reason 844
he division of judgments in terms of the distinction bet\veen"the theoretic and the
practical
he analysis of practical Or moral judgments of good and evil, means and
ends; categorical and hypothetical imperatives 845
he distinction between the aesthetic and the teleological judgment
he. nature of theoretic judgments
5a.' The linguisiic'expression of judgments: sentences and propositions
5b.Thejudgment as a the classification ofsubjects and predicates
5c.The judgment as relational: typesof relation 846
he division of theoretic judgments according to formal' criteria
6a. The divisionof judgments according' to quantity: universal,particlilar, singular,
and indefinite proJ?ositi()l1S
6b. The division of judgments according Jo quality : positive, negative, and infinite
propositio
ll
s' ' ,
6c. The division of judgments according to modality: necessary and contingent
propositions; problelnatic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments
6d.The classification of judgments by reference to relatio
ll
: simple alld, composite
propositions; categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments
fie order and connection ofj udgments
7a. The formal opposition of judgments: the square of opposition
7b. The conversion ofpropositions: the problem of immediate inference
7c. Reasoning' as a sequence of judgments: the chain of reasoning
fie differentiation of i
l1
dgments according to origin, ground, or import 847
8a. Self-evidel1tand demonstrable propositions: immediate and mediated, 'intuitive
and, reasoned judgments
8b. Analytic and synthetic judgments: trifling and instructive propositions
8c. A priori and a posteriori, non-existential andexistelltial judgments: the problem
of a priori synthetic judgments
8d. The division of judgments into the determinant and the reflective: judgments
as constitutive or as regulative
pens, I indeed think an' existence' whicn
tain::time 'and from this I
rive analyticalj'udgments. But the con
of a cause lies quite oUtside the above
entirely a
from 'that which happens,' and isconse
ly not contained in that conception.. Hd
am I able to assert concerning thegener
ception-'that vvhich happens'-sometni
tirely different from that conception, a
recognize the conception ofcausealtholl.
contained in it, yet as belonging to it,an
necessarily? What is here the unknown
which the understanding rests vvhen it b
it has found, outside the conception A, a
predicate B, which it .nevertheless consi
be, connected wi th it?" It is the, discove
solution of this problem which Kant beli
be the signal contribution of his transcen
logic of the judgment.
lt may bewondered whether this pr
can be stated in terms other than those pe
toKant's analytical vocabulary. ',Otherw,
admit that propositions which are, parti
and contingent have "existential i
Their truth concerns, real existences,
,vhether they are true or not can and 1n
learned from experience. These are like
synthetic judgments a posteriori. 'Un"
and necessary, propositions, on the, other
are sometimes interpreted as havingn
tential significance. Instead of being ,r
asserting that anything exists, .they are
simply as statements of the' relation be
our own ideas. 'These, for Locke and
are like Kant's a priori analytic judgmen
What remains is to discover a para.ll
Kant's synthetic judgments a priori. Tn
other than Kant's, ,the most likely p
seems' to be the liniversal and necessary
sition conceived asa statement about r
rather than about relations 'in, the realm
own concepts. When universal propositio
so interpreted, two questions arise. HoW
establish that the subjects 'of such propo
really exist? What is the ultimate gro:u
the truth of such propositions, the unl'
universality of which outruns experien
these two questions we find a problemw
at least analogous to Kant's problem
possibility ofsynthetic judgments a priori
842
its predicate something" not: actually, thought
in the general conc.ept .0 body; it
my knowledge, by adding ,something to my
concept, and, lnust therefore be" cnlled syn-
thetical. '1
iFor "Locke not all axioms or ',' self... evident
propositions are trifling or tautological, '., ,for
some go beyond statements of identity or the
explicationo definitions, as, for example, that
the whole is greater than the part. Nor are they
all, useless. "'Some Locke distinglftishes
from the rest by calling them "maxims, ". 'are of
use, he nlaintains, "in the ordinary methods of
teaching sciences as far" as ,they are advanced;
but of littleornone in advancing them. further.
They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of
obstinate', wranglers, ,artd.bringing those, con-
tests to some conclusion."
For Kant there is a further division of'judg-
ments into the a posteriori and the a priori,. ac-
cording as their truth is or is not grounded in
the data of experience. The former are dmpiri-
cal in origin, the latter trans,cenden.tal, that is,
they .have a foundation whichtranscendsex.i
perience.These two types of judgment express
two corresponding types ,of
priori knowledge by which Kant understands
"not such as is independent of this arthat kind
ofexperience, but such as is absolutely so of all
experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowl-
edge, or that which is possible'()nly a posteri@ri,
that is, through experience."
In Kant's view, there is no problem about
the truth of analytic judgments, for these have
an a priori foundation in' the principle of con-
tradiction. (The ,contradictory of 'an analytic
judgment is always .self-contradictory.) Nor do
synthetic judgments which are empirical or a
posteriori raise any special difficulties. The cen"
tral question in the theory of knowledge con-
cerns the possibility and validity of synthetic
judgments a priori.
"If I go out of and beyond the conception A,
in order to recognize another, B, asconnected
with it, what foundation have I to reston,"
Kant asks, "whereby to render the synthesis
possible? I have here no longer the advantage
of looking out in the sphere' of experience for
what I want. Let us take, for example,the
proposition, 'everything that happens has a
cause.' In the conception of something that hap-
THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
1. Judgment as an act or faculty of the mind:
its contrast with the act of conception or
with the faculties of understanding and
reason
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2B4--IO] 6a /
Interpretation, CH I [I6a9-18] 25a-b / Meta-
physics, BK VI, CH 4 [I027bI8-28] 550a,e;
BK IX, CH 10 577e-578a,e / Soul, BK III, CH 6
662d-663e
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 23 50b-e;
BK x, par .10 73d-74a / City of God, BK VIII,
CH 6, 269b-e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, A4,
REP 2 16d-17e; Q 13, A 12, ANS 74e-75b; Q 14,
A 14 88d-89b; Q 16, A 2 95e-96b; Q 17, A 3
102d-103e; Q 58, A 2, ANS 301b--d; A 4, ANS
302d-303e; G 85, A 5, ANS and REP 3 457d-
458d; A 6 458d-45ge
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q I,
A2381a-e
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 66e-67a
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 5ge-61d esp
5ge-60a; 64a-b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 21d-22a / Meditations,
II, 8121; IV 89a-93a esp 8ge-90a / Objections
and Replies, 124b-e; 141a; 215d-216e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 48-49 391a-
394d
845
35 I-IUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 36,
465a-d [fn I]
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 190e-d; 236d-
237a / Fund. Prine Metaphysic ofMorals, 260a-
261d; 266a-267d; 268e-271a; 272a-b / Prac-
tical Reason, 318e-321b esp 320e-321b; 327d-
329a; 357e-360d / Pref. J.\fetaphysical Elements
of Ethics, 367e; 368d; 369b-e; 373d; 377e-d /
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d;387b;
387d-388a; 390b,d-391e; 392b-393a / Science
of Right, 397b-398a; 416b-417b / Judgement,
477b-c; 557d [fn 2]; 586a-b; 595a-d; 596e-
598b; 605d-606b [fn 2]
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER I, 29d
43 MILL: Liberty, 275a-278e passim, esp 276b-
277b; 287b-e / Utilitarianis1n, 446d-447a;
455e-457b passim; 461e-462a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 140
49b-54a; PART III, par 191-192. 66b-e /
Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-166b;
PART IV, 362d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 202b; 794a-798b; 886b-
88Ba
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 792b-e;
801d
4. The distinction between the aesthetic and
the teleological judgment
42 KANT: Judgement, 471b-473a; 476a-483d;
485b-489a; 492b-493b; 513b-516b; 516d-
517e; 528b-e; 548e-549d; 550e-551a,c; 558a-b;
55ge-560e; 562a-564e; 567e-570a; 572b-578a
S. The nature of theoretic judgments
Sa. The expression of judgments:
sentences and propositions
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 85d-86b;109a-b / Sophist,
574d-577b
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 4-5 26a-e /
Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24aI6-bI5] 39a-e /
Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [72a7-14] 98e
19 AQUINAS: Suntma Theologica, PART I, Q 13,
A 12 74e-75b; Q 85, A 2, REP 3 453d-455b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q I,
A2 381a-e
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 60a; PART IV,
270a-e
33 PASCAL: Geometrcal Demonstration, 433a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
XXXIII, SECT 19 251e-d; BK III, CH VII, SECT I
283a-b; BK IV, CH V329a-331b passim;cH VI,
SECT 1-3 331b-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-b
Sh. The judgment as a predication: the classi-
fication of subjects and predicates
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2-3 Sb-d; CH 5
[2aII-3b24] 6a.:.8a / Interpretation, CH 4-8 26a-
28a; CH II 31e-32e / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH
27 [43
a2
5-44] 60e-d / Posterior Analytics, I,
CH 4 100a-101b; CH 18-22 111b-115b / Topics,
CHAPTER 41: JUDGMENT
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57,
A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 90, A I, REP 2 205b-
206b; A 2, REP 3 206b-207a; Q 94, A 4, ANS
223d-224d; PART III, Q I I, A I, REP'3 772b-
773a; Q 13, A I, REP 3 780a-781b
Discourse, PART I,44a-e / Objec-
tions and Replies, 126a-b; 237b-e; 243e-d
LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK I, CH II,
SECT I 103d-104a
KANT: Pure Reason, 190e-191a / Fund. Prine
Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 271a-e /
Practical Reason, 297a-e; 300d [fn I]; 310a-b;
31ge-321b; 329a-330e esp 329a-d; 343a-d /
Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-
475d
MILL: Utlitarianism, 445e-d
HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5e-6a;
PART III, par 227 74b-d
JAMES: Psychology, 186a
analysis ofpractical or moral judgments:
judgments of good and evil, means and
ends; categorical and hypothetical im-
peratives
Topics, BK III, cli 1-4 162a-166b
Metaphysics, BK I, CH I 499a-500b; BK IV,
4 [Io08
b
2-32] 527d-528b
..... .lj. Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; BK
CH 2 [II03b27-II04a9] 349b-e passim;BK
CH 2 [II39a2I-3I] CH 5 [II40b
389b-e; CH 8 [II42aI3-I9] 391b; CH
10-1 I 392b-393b; BK VII, CH 3 396e-398a /
Politics, BK III, CH II 479d-
/ Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7 604e-607d
Third Ennead, TR VI, ClI I 106b-107a
.{).LJ\.J"LI 0.L.LJ.'iJI;.. Confessions, BK III, par 13 16e-d;
VII, par 23 50b-e / City of God, BK VIII,
CH 8 270a-d; BK XIX, CH 1-14 507a-520d /
Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 661d-662a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 59,
A 3, ANS and REP I 308b-309a; Q79, AA 11-13
424d-427a; Q 83, A I, ANS 436d-438a; A 2,
ANS and REP I 438a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 2
438d-43ge; PART I-II, Q 17, A I 686d-687e
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q57,
A6, ANS and REP 2-3 40a-41a
CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a esp
par 7-13 402b-405a, par 17-36 407b-417b,
par 59-78 427a-432a
HOBBES : Leviathan, PART I, 53a-54a; 60d;
61d-62a; 65b-e; 66e-67d; 68b-e; 96a; PART
II, 149b-e
Essays, 51a-55d esp 52e-53e;
136b-139b; 520b-522a
SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II,
sc II 113e-115d
Advancement of Learning, 86e-95b
DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 49a-b / Ob-
and Replies, 126a-b
Pensees, 4 172b; 98 190b; 375-385
237b-239a; 456-457 254a; 505 261a-b
LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CII XXI,
SECT 59-70 193d-197b passim
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK
SECT 5 17ge-d; BK IV, CH V, SECT
330b; CH XIV 364b-365a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16d-19a;
39a-e, 41e-42e; 51d-52b; 5ge-64a
64d-66d; 99a-101b; l08a-112d esp
166e-171a; 193a-200e; 240b-243e
Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-e
ment, 461a-475d esp 465e-467d,
550a-551a,e; 558a; 572b-575b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 178a-179a;
313b; 638a-b; 859a; 861b
2. The division of judgments in
distinction between the
the practical
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK III, CH 7
397b-e / Metaphysics, BK I, CH I
BK IV, CH 4 [1008b2-32] 527d-528b
BK III, CH 7 [43Ib2-I2] 664a-b; CH 9
433
a
9] 665e
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 _"\_"\..,no_"\'fo'I,n:
7 [1098a25-35] 343d; BK II, CH 2
II04a9] 349h-e; BK VI, CH 2
388a; CH 5 [II4obII-I9]
19] 39lb
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART
A 16 90b-91b; Q 79, AA 11-13
PART I-II, Q 13, A 6, REP 2 676e-677b
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which the volume
numbers th; passages referred to. For in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [
26
5-
28
3]
4 IS nurnber of the volume In the set; the number 12d indicates that the
sage IS In sectIon dof page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer
uppera.ndlower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-119b, lue: oa:ss;:){tP
the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When
pnnte? In two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves
hand SIde of the page, letters e and d to the upper and lower naJ,ve:sot:thlenght-hanc:lsidecrW
the page. For exa:uple, In 7 PLATO: Synzpo.sium, 163b-164e, the passage begins
of the left-hand SIde of page 163 and ends In the upper half of the right-hand side of page
AUTHOR'S One o.r more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART,
SE.CT) are Included In the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in
taln cases; e.g., I/tad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE are to. book, chapter, and verse. 'Vhen the King
and Douay. drffer In tItle of books or In the numbering of chapters or verses, the
James verSIon.IS CIted first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD
MENT: NehemIah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more eSf>eCIaHlv
relevant parts of a "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed HIlCrIll1r_
tently rather than contInuously In the work or passage cited.
For additional information the style of the references, see the Explanation
Reference Style; for general gUIdance In the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
844
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 41 : JUDGMENT
846
(5. The nature of theoretic judgments. Sb. The
judgment asa predication: the classifica-
tion of subjects and predicates.)
BK I, CH 4-9 144b-147b / Physics, BK I, CH 3
[I86a22-I87aIO] 261b-262a; CH 6 [I89a28-33]
264d
19 AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I, Q2, A I,
ANS 10d-lld; Q3, A4, REP 2 16d-17C;Q 13, A5
66b-67d; A 12, ANS 74e-7Sb; Q 16, A 2 95e-
96b; A 6, ANS 98b-d; Q 58, A 2 301b-d; A 4
302d-303e; Q 76, A, 3, ANS 391a-393a; Q 85,
A 5, REP 3 457d-458d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 270a.:.e
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies,: DEF IX
130d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 51d-52b; 180c-182b
S3 lAMEs: Psychology, 144a-b; 313a-b;638b;
861b; 870b-873a
Sc. The judgment as relational: types of rela-
tion
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH I,
SECT 1-7 307a-308a; CH XlI, SECT 6-8 360a-e
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20
458a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41e esp40c-d; 51d-
52b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 174b-176a; 302b-304b;
638b; 869a-873a esp 870b-871a,. 872b; 878a-
879b; 889a-b
6. The division of theoretic judgments accord-
ing to formal criteria
6a. The division of judgments according to
quantity: universal, particular, singular,
and indefinite propositions
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 5b-e / Interpreta-
tion, CH 7 [I7a37-bI6] 26d.,.27a / Prior Analytics,
BK I, CH 1 [24aI6-2I] 39a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART t, 55b-56a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V,
SECT 10 331a; CH VI 331b-336d passim; CH IX,
SECT I 349a; CH XI,SECT 13-14 357d-358e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41e esp 39d-40a
6b. The division of judgments according to
quality: positive, negative, and infinite
propositions
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CHIO [I2b6-15] 17d-
18a / Interpretation, CH 5 [I7a8-9] 26b; CH 6
26e-d; CH 10 29d-31e / Prior Analytics, BK I,
CH 3 [25
bI
9-26] 40e; CH 46 70b-71d / Posterior
Analytics, BK I, CH 25 [86b30-38] 118d
19 AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I, Q 13,
A 12, ANS 74e-75b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 33
161b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VII,
SECT 1 283a-b; BK IV, CH Y, SECT 5.....6 329d-
330b passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41c esp
2l0e-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PARTI".f,l
25e-d
6c. The division o( judgments accordi
modality: necessary and Conti
propositions; problematic,asser
and apodictic judgments
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CHI2-1332
/ Prior Analytics,BK I, CH 3 40a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I,
A 13, REP 2 86d-88e; Q 19, A3,ANSI10l)-
A 8, REP I d 116a-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 22a-b; 23a-e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14c-15e; 3ge-41eesp
41c; 17ge-180e; 193a-200c esp 194b-d;2
/ judgement, 491c-495a,e
53 IAMES: Psychology, 851a
6a.;Theclassification of judgments by
ence to relation: simple andcomp
propositions; categorical, hypot:het
and disjunctive judgments
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretaton, CH 5 [Ija
Z
26e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,
A 13, REP 2 86d-88e; Q 19, A 8, REP 1,311
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41c esp 40e-d; 4
110d-llle esp Illh; 194b-e / Fund. Prin.
physic ofMorals, 265e-266d / Practical R.ea
297a-298a / judgement, 483d-491e
53 IAMES: Psychology, 859b
7. The order and connection of judgment
7a. The formal opposition of judgments:
square of opposition
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 10 [I3bI-35]
/ Interpretation, CH 6-7 26e-27d; CHIO
31e; CH 12-14 32d-36d / Posterior Ana
BK I, eH 2 [72aI3] 98e
20 AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I-II,
A 3, REP 3 68b:-69b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 64d-65e;
174b-d
7b. The conversion of propositions: thep
lem of immediate inference
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 7 [I7
b2
27b-e; CH 10 [20
a
I6-37] 30d-31b I Prion
lytics, BK I, CH 2-3 39d-40e; BK II, CH
79b-81b; CH 22 [67b26-68a24] 89b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18a; 109d-l11
109d-ll0a, lIOd-llle
7c. Reasoning as a sequence of judgments
chain of reasoning
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 3 [I
b
IO-I6lS
Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-3 39a-40e;
[40b30-4Ia7] 57e-d / Posterior Ana/ytics,
CH 1-2 97a-99a
AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4,
ANS 302d..303e;Q 79, AA8-9 421e-423d; Q 85,
A 5, ANS 457d-458d
HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-e; 60a
BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a
DESCARTES: Rules, XIV, 28b-e
LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II,
SECT 2-8 309d-311a; CHXV, SECT I 365a-e;
cH XVII, SECT 4, 373a-375a passim; SECT 15-
17378d-37ge
KANT: Pure Reason, 110d-112d; 115d-119a /
Practical Reason, 329a-d
lAMES: Psychology, 313b; 666b-674b esp 667b-
668a, 672b; 868b-879b esp 870b-873a, 878a
he differentiation of judgments according
to origin,.ground, or import
elf-evident and .demonstrable proposi-
tions: immediate and mediated, intuitive
and reasoned judgments
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics,BKT, CH I
97a-d; CH 3 99b-l00a; CH 15 109a-b; CH 19-22
l11e-115b; CH 23 [84bI9-85aI] 115e-116a; eH
31 [88aS-I7] 120b-e; BK II, CH 9 128a-b; CH 19
136a-137a,e
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [II39b25--34]
388e; CH 6 389d; Cli 8 [II42a25-29] 391b.,.e;
CR II [II43a32--b5] 392d-393a / Rhetoric, BK I,
CH 2 [I356b26-27] 596b
AQUINAS: Summa Th.eologica, PART I, Q 2, A
I 10d-lld; Q 14, A I, REP 2 75d-76e; A 7,
ANS 81d-82b; Q 17, A 3, REP 2 l02d-l03e;
Q 79, A 12, ANS 425e-426b; Q 84, A REP 3
443d-444d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 117,
AI 595d-597e; PART I-II, Q I, AA, REP 2 612a-
613a
AQUINAS: Summa 1'heologica, PART I-II, Q57,
A2 36a-37b; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 4,
ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q I, A4,ANS 382c-
383b; Q 8, A I, REP 2 417a-d
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 259d-261a; 272a-d
BACON: Advance111ent of Learning, 59c-d;
97a
1 DESCARTES: Rules, III,4a-d; xII,20d-25a /
Objections and Replies, 123a-b; 125a-b
PASCAL: Pensees, I 171a-172a
5 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I,
SECT 15-16 98d-9ge; SECT 18 99d-l00b; SECT
23 101b-102a;cH II, SECT I l03d-104a; SECT 4
104d-10Sa; CH III, SECT 23 119b-120a; BK IV,
eR I, SECT passim, esp 30gb; CH
II 309b-313a; CH III, SECT 2-4 313a-e; cn VII,
SECT I-II 337a-342d passim;cH IX,SECT 2-3
349a-e; CH xv, SECT I 365a-e; CH XVII, SECT
2-3 371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378e-37ge
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 39a-e; 99a-e; lIOd-1Ile;
211e-218d / judgement, 542d-543a
SFEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-d; NUMBER
83,244b-e
13 Utilitarianisnz, 446a-447a
847
Bh. Analytic and synthetic judgments: trifling
and instructive propositions
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V,
SECT 6,330b; CH VIII 345a-348d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16d-19a;31a-d; 64d-66d;
17ge-182b / Practcal Reason, 339a; 351e /
Science of Right, 405b-e I judgen'lent, 516b-d
53 IAMES: Psychology, 879b-880b [En 2)
Bc. A priori and a posteriori, non-existential and
existential judgments: the problem of
a priori synthetic judgments
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I,
SECT 15-16 98d-9ge; SECT 23 101b-102a; BK
IV, CH I, SECT 1-7 307a-308a; cn III, SECT
7-21 315b-31ge; eH IX, SECT I 349a;cH
XI, SECT 13--14 357d-358e;cH XVII,SECT 2,
371d .
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-
463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a.,.c, DIV 30,
462a; SECT V, DIV 34--38, 464b-466c; SECT X,
DIV 89 490b-c; SECT XII, DIVI31-I32 S08d-
509d passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a.,8b; 14a-l08a,eesp 14a-
.20e, 23a-24a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b,29d-33d,
35b-36a, 41e-42b, 46a-48d, 57d-59b, 64b-
66d, 85d-88a; l08b-d; 110a.:113b; 134e-d;
146a; 179c-182b; 192a.. b; 211c-218d; 224a-
227a / Fund.. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
268b-d; 280a-b; 283b / Practical Reason,
309b-d; 351e I Pref. Metaphysical
Elen1ents of Ethics, 367d-368a / Science of
Right, 405b-407a esp 405b-d I Judgernent,
467a-475d; 570b-572d; 603a-b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-446d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy .0../ History? INTRO, 156d-
ISBa; 182d-183c
53 IAMES: Psychology, 639a-641a esp 640b;
659a-660a; esp 851a-852a, .
861b, 867a-869a, 879b, 880b-881a, 884b-
88Sa, 889b-890a; 897R-b
8a. The division of judgments into the deter-
minant and the reflective: judgments as
constitutive 01- as regulative
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72e-74b; 193a-200e esp
193c-d, 194b-e; 201d-202a; 206a-207b /
judge111ent, 461a-47Sd esp 471b-474b;S50a-
551a,e; 558a; 559a-560e; 562a-d; 564a-c;
567b-568c; 570b-S72e; 577b; 584d-585a;
588e; 597b-599b; 601d
9. Degrees of assent: certainty and probability
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29d I
1'opics, BK V, CH 3 182b-e I
Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 8 {Io74aI4-I6] 604c
9 .ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [I094bII-28]
339d-340a; CR 7 [I098a25-35] 343d; BK II,
CH 2 [I I03b27--'-I I04a9] 349b-c I Rhetoric, BK I,
cH 2 [I.357a23-b24] 596d-597c; BK II, eH 25
[I402bI3-I403ar] 652b-d
849
SIGWART. Logic, PART I-II
JEVONS. Pure Logic, CH 2, 7, 10, 12
--. Studes in Deductive Logic, CH 3-6
LOTZE. Logic, BK I, CH 2
--. Outlines of Logic, I, CH 2
BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, BK I; T'erminal
Essays, II-III, VI
J. N. KEYNES. Studies and Exercises n Fonnal Logic,
PART II
BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL I, CH 1-9
VENN. Symbolic Logic, CH 6-8
--. Principles of Empirical or Inductve Logic,
CH 8-10
J. C. WILSON. Statelnent and Inference, PART II
WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Prncpia Mathematca,
PART I, SECT C, D; PART II, SECT B, C, D, E; PART
IV-V
ROYCE. The Principles of Logic
W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 1-5, 9-10
MARITAIN. An Introduction to Logic, CH 2
\VHITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART II, CH 9
DEWEY et ale Studies in Logcal Theory, I--IV
DEWEY. Essays n Experimental Logc, II-VI, XII-XIV
--. Reconstruction in Phlosophy, CH 6
--. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 6-14
M. R. COHEN. .A. Preface to Logc, n-III
CHAPTER 41: JUDGiVfENT
An Essay in Ad of a Gral1zmar of
I.
De Propositionbus Modalibus
Concerning Body, PART I, CH 3
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, par
theory of predication and the analysis of subjects and predicates, see IDEA sa; UNIVERSAL
AND PARTICULAR sc.
relational theory of propositions, see RELATION 4b.
discussions bearing on the quantity, quality, and modality of propositions, see INFIN-
ITY 2b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4e(I); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR sc-Sd; and for
other considerations of the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical in
judglnent and reasoning, see HYPOTHESIS 5; REASONING 2b.
treatlnent of the square of opposition, see OPPOSITION Id(I)-ld(2).
relation of judgments to one anpther in immediate inference or in reasoning, see REASON-
ING 4a ; RELATION 4b.
distinction between self-evident and demonstrable judgments, see INDUCTION 3; KNOWL-
EDGE 6C(2); PRINCIPLE 2b(2); and for othertreatments of the a priori and the II posteriori,
see EXPERIENCE 2d; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); REASONING Sb(3).
discussion relevant to the distinction between existential and non-existential judgments,
see KNOWLEDGE 6a(3).
problem of the truth and falsity of judgn1ents, or their certainty and probability, see
KNO\VLEDGE 6d(I)-6d(2); OPINION 3a-3b; TRUTH 2e, 3b(2)-3c, 7a.
consideration of the aesthetic judgment, see BEAUTY 5; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed belo\v are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. "Vorks by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place. and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consuit
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Science of Logic, VOL II, SECT I, CH 2
A System of Logic, BK I, CH 4-6
II.
Academics, II (xlvii)
EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians
SALISBURY. Metalogicon
Disputationes AIetaphysieae, VIII-IX
OF SAINT THOMAS. CUl"SUS Philosophieus Tho-
istiet/s, Ars Logca, PART I, QQ 5-7
AULD. Logic or the Art of ThinkJng, PART II
NITZ. New Essays Concerning flun1an Under-
nding, .BK IV, CH 5
EID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of j\1an, VI
........ ,.,L"..........,... '-'"..... Lectures on lyfetaphysies and Logic,
(13-14)
An IntJestigation ofthe Laws of Thought, CH
18] 25a-b; CH 4-14 26a-36d
[I7aI-4] 26b, CH
CH 14 35e-36d
[IOIIb25-29] 531c;
CH 8
550a,c; BK IX, CH 10
/ Soul, BK III, CH 3
662d-663c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II,
352d-353a; BKVI, CH 2
388a; CH 3 [II39bI4-I8]
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK
48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK
269b-c I Christian Doctrine, BK
651d-653b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 13, A 12
A IS, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, A2
ANS and REP 4 99a-d; A8, REP
Q 17, AA 3-4 102d-l04b; Q
302d-303c; A 5 303c-304c; Q
451c-453e; A 5, REP 3 ""t'_"J/fl-'+:-"lj"U'"J'
459c; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
AS, REP 3 39a-40a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b;
60a; 65b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240c-242a;
271b-272c; 292a-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII 18b-25a
Discourse, PART IV, 52a / Meditations,
85c; IV 89a-93a esp 90b-91b /
Replies, 124b-c; 125b-126b; DEF
141a; 156d-158a; 168b-d;
230d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II,
243c-248b passim, esp SECT 1-3
SECT 19-26 247a-248b; BK III, CH
283a-b; BK IV, CH V329a-331b; CH
331e-d; SECT 16 336d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-lOOa;
240b-243c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 460a-469b esp
468b-469a; 508a; 638a-b; 879a-881a
THE GREAT IDEA.S
848
(9. Degrees of assent: certainty and probability.)
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a
19 AQUINAS: Sumn1a Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 13 86d-88e; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a;
Q 58, A 7, REP 3 305e-306b; Q 86, A 4,
ANS 463d-464d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 6, ANS
690b-d
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q51,
A 3 I4b-15a; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART
II-II, Q I, AA 4-5 382e-384b; Q 4, A 8 409a-
d; Q 9, A I, ANS and REP I 423e-424b; A2,
ANS 424b-425a; Q 18, A 4 464e-465a; PART
III, Q7, A 3, REP 3 747b-748a
23 HOBBES: Let/iathan, PART I, 65b-e
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240e-242a; 272a-d;
292a-d; 49ge-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-II la-3b; XII, 23a-e /
Discourse, PART IV, 53e-d; PART VI, 63e-64d
/ Meditations, 74a,c; IV, 92c-93a / Objections
and Replies, I25b-126b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT
2-6 93b-95a; BK IV, CH VI 331b-336d passim,
esp SECT 13 335c-d; CH XI, SECT 3 355a-b;
SECT 8-12 356b-357d; CH XIV-XVI 364b-
37Ic; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 14-17
378c-379c; CH XIX, SECT I 384c-d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VI 469d-
470d; SECT X, DIV 86-91 488d-491c passim,
esp DIV 87 489b-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 194b-c; 228c-d; 240b-
243c / Judgement, 600d-604b passim
43 Liberty, 275a-277b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 636a-638b; 659a-660b
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 463d I Beyond
the Pleasure Principle, 66Ic-662a / New Intro-
ductory Lectures, 8IBe-819b
10. The truth and falsity of judgments
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Cratylus, 85d-
86d; 109a-b I Theaetetus, 54Ia-544a I Sophist,
561d-577b esp 575a-577b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-IO] 6a; CH 5
[4SIO_bI9] 8b-9a I Interpretation, CH I [I6a9-
For: The comparison of judgment with other acts of the mind, see IDEA 2g, sa; .&.:O".I. ...
REASONING I; and for the relation of judgment to other faculties of the mind,
le-Ie(3)
Discussions relevant to the distinction between theoretic and practical
KNOWLEDGE 6e(I); PHILOSOPHY 2a; PRUDENCE 2a; REASONING se-se(I);
TRUTH 2C; \VISDOl\1 lb.
Other considerations of practical or moral judgments, and of judgment in relation
dence, see GOOD AND EVIL Sb-sc; KNO\VLEDGE 6e(2); PRUDENCE sa; and for the
the categorical imperative, see DUTY 5; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY sa(2).
Other treatments of language in relation to thought, see IDEA 4a; LANGUAGE 7.
CROSS-REFERENCES