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The Wang Tieya Lecture in Public International Law The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes
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Abstract
The purpose is to provide a general survey of the practice among States of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The survey reects the variety of instruments for peaceful settlement, including negotiation, conciliation and commissions of inquiry. Care is taken to indicate the quantitative signicance of the inter-State arbitration in relation to the use of standing international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice. The analytical commentary includes discussion of the typology of disputes and the comparative merits of arbitration and the process of adjudication in the International Court.
1. It is logical to begin by asking what purposes international law serves. In a general way, international law provides the practical rounding out of the principles of peaceful co-existence. International law provides the criteria for the identication of States and organizations of States, and of the nationality of individuals and legal entities. International law provides the denition of the political and territorial limits and the jurisdiction of States, and also their immunities from jurisdiction. International law also provides the basis of the civil responsibility of States for breaches of international law, together with the appropriate remedies. And lastly international law provides the principles and modalities governing the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.
Blackstone Chambers, Temple, London (email: clerks@blackstonechambers.com). This is the text of the rst Wang Tieya Lecture delivered on 31 March 2009 at the National Key Research Center, Wuhan University Institute of International Law, China, on the occasion of the rst Wang Tieya Award sponsored by the Center and the Chinese Journal of International Law.
doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmp015
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Chinese Journal of International Law (2009), Vol. 8, No. 2, 267283
2. And before I move into my subject, I would point out the anomaly to be found in a number of academic handbooks, that is to say, the absence of an adequate treatment of the subject of peaceful settlement. This is a pity because, although international law is a relatively weak system and it is often difcult to obtain a peaceful resolution of a dispute, there is in fact a regular pattern of peaceful settlement which is inadequately reported, probably because of the absence of any drama, an absence of casualties. 3. My subject matter is the settlement of disputes. A dispute can be dened as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conict of legal views or of interests between two States. Disputes relate to an alleged breach of one or more legal duties. They may also relate to a question of attribution of title to territory, to maritime zones, to movables or to parts of the cultural heritage of a State. 4. Peaceful settlement is a phrase which covers a considerable variety of processes and outcomes. The following cases are merely examples: (a) settlement according to law resulting from judicial decision or arbitration; (b) settlement involving negotiations between States and political compromise; (c) pre-ordained settlements, such as the reversion of Hong Kong to China, in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong agreed in 1984;1 (d) multilateral settlements implemented with the lawful authority of the international community, including the Peace Treaties with Italy2 and Japan3 after World War Two. 5. The standard type of dispute settlement is based upon the genuine consent of the parties to the dispute and involves the application of law, and in the case of purely factual issues, the application of judicial standards of the assessment of evidence. 6. There are certain limitations placed upon the justiciability of disputes which are dictated by rule of law considerations. In the rst place, there is the distinction between legal and political disputes. The essential point is not the existence of a political element; disputes will always have such an element. The requirement is the existence of a legal dispute which can be segregated from the political elements. There are also more technical bases for non-justiciability, and especially the element of mootness. Thus, in the Northern Cameroons Case, 4 the International Court found that the legal status of the territory in question had already been determined by the General Assembly. 7. In the well-known Nuclear Tests Cases 5 in 1974, the International Court held that the issue raised by Australia and New Zealand was moot as a consequence of French undertakings not to continue the nuclear tests. In the words of the Court:
1 2 3 4 5 23 ILM, 1366. 49 UNTS, 3 (signed 10 February 1947). 136 UNTS, 45 (signed 8 September 1951). ICJ Reports, 1963, 15. Australia v. France, ICJ Reports, 1974, 270 271, para 55.
The Court, as a court of law, is called upon to resolve existing disputes between States. Thus the existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function; it is not sufcient for one party to assert that there is a dispute, since whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination by the Court (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). The dispute brought before it must therefore continue to exist at the time when the Court makes its decision. It must not fail to take cognizance of a situation in which the dispute has disappeared because the object of the claim has been achieved by other means. If the declarations of France concerning the effective cessation of the nuclear tests have the signicance described by the Court, that is to say if they have caused the dispute to disappear, all the necessary consequences must be drawn from this nding. 8. Certain situations involve complex questions of territorial title and allegiance which cannot be resolved within the framework of a bilateral dispute. This was the case in the Western Sahara case,6 on which the International Court gave an Advisory Opinion in 1975.
11 Murphy (ed.), United States Practice in International Law, 1999 2001 (2002), 101. 12 Ibid., 102.
15. After ve rounds of talks, the United States and China, on 16 December 1999, also signed two agreements concerning compensation for damage to the diplomatic properties of both States. In the rst agreement, the United States stated its intent to seek US$ 28 million in funding from Congress for damage to the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In the second agreement, China agreed to pay US$ 2.87 million for damage to US diplomatic and consular properties in China caused by the Chinese demonstrations.13 16. Negotiation has a role in the less dramatic context of maritime delimitation. I refer here to the Agreement between the PRC and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed on 25 December 2000 on delimitation in the Beibu Gulf.14 The rst paragraph of the Agreement provides as follows: 1. The Parties have determined the demarcation line for the territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of the two countries in the Beibu Gulf in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, generally accepted principles of international law and international practice, based on the full consideration of all relevant circumstances of the Beibu Gulf and on the equitable principle, and through friendly consultation.
III. Mediation
17. The next type of procedure is mediation, which is the rst of a series of modes of third-party settlement. Good ofces is a similar mechanism. There is no standard denition of mediation but it is nonetheless normally distinguished from conciliation. In principle, mediation involves the direct conduct of negotiations on the basis of proposals made by the mediator. Modern practice contains an important example of an effective mediation. This was the Papal Mediation in the years 1978 to 1984 between Chile and Argentina.15 The two States formally accepted the mediation of the Holy See in the Agreement signed on 8 January 1978. The mediation lasted ve years and resulted in a denitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on 29 November 1984.16 Other modern examples of mediation exist. They include the mediation of the Soviet Union between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch in 196617 and the mediation of Algeria between Iran and the United States concerning the Hostage Crisis in 1980 1981.18
13 14 15 16 17 Ibid., 99 102. Colson and Smith (eds), International Maritime Boundaries (Vol. V, 2005), 3745. 82 ILR, 671. 24 ILM, 11. Schweisow, in: Luard (ed.), The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (London, 1970), 160 162. 18 Iran U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, Vol. 1, 1981 82 (Cambridge, 1983), 3 36.
18. Mediation is commonly provided for in various multilateral treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The United Nations and, in particular, the SecretaryGeneral, have often either recommended or performed mediation or good ofces, for example in Cyprus from 1984 onwards.19
IV. Conciliation
19. The next type of third-party settlement is conciliation which is similar in purpose to mediation. The emphasis is usually on fact-nding, and conciliation is believed to be more structured than mediation. 20. The institution has been dened as:20 the process of settling a dispute by referring it to a commission of persons whose task it is to elucidate the facts and usually after hearing the parties and endeavouring to bring them to an agreement to make a report containing proposals for a settlement, which is not binding. 21. There have been only a small number of conciliation procedures in recent times, and the procedure tends to emerge as less attractive than arbitration. In 1995, the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations proposed a revised version of the Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States, and this was approved by the Sixth Committee.
V. Commissions of inquiry
22. A device which has proved useful on some occasions is the Commission of Inquiry. This institution originated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Its specic purpose is to elucidate the facts behind a dispute in order to facilitate a settlement. It does not involve the application of rules of law. 23. The purpose of the Commissions of Inquiry is provisional and political. The device is linked to the idea that the resort to an inquiry provides a cooling off period and reduces the risk of counter-measures or breaches of the peace. Moreover, the Report on the facts de facto facilitates the settlement of the dispute. Recent examples of Commissions of Inquiry concerned the Red Crusader incident between Denmark and the United Kingdom (1962),21 and the Letelier and Moftt case between Chile and the United States (1992).22 By way of exception in both these cases, the role of the Commission was not conned to ndings of fact and was essentially judicial.
19 20 21 22 Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, United Nations (1992), 37. Hersch Lauterpacht, Oppenheims International Law (Vol. II, 7th edn, 1952), 12. 35 ILR, 485. 88 ILR, 727.
VI. Arbitration
24. I shall now move to the substantial topic of arbitration. 25. The general concept of arbitration is ancient, but in modern practice it appears in the Jay Treaty of 1794, between the United States and Britain. The institution gained a political prole in Anglo-American practice of the late nineteenth century. The spectacular case was the Alabama Claims Award of 1872,23 by which the United Kingdom was ordered to pay compensation to the United States of 151 2 million dollars for her acts of intervention on the side of the Confederate forces in the Civil War. The Tribunal consisted of an uneven number of members with the power to decide by majority vote. The Tribunal adopted a judicial procedure and produced a reasoned Award. Other nineteenth-century arbitrations included the Behring Sea arbitration (1893),24 the British Guiana arbitration (1897)25 and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration (1910).26
Some arbitration agreements permit further proceedings in the event of a dispute concerning the implementation and interpretation of an Award.
AND WHEREAS OUR Government in the United Kingdom in accordance with the Treaty and after consulting the Parties separately determined the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) which was signed on behalf of Our Said Government and the Parties at London on 22nd July 1971(3); AND WHEREAS for the purpose of fullling their duties as Arbitrator Our Government in the United Kingdom appointed a Court of Arbitration composed of the following members: Mr. Hardy C. Dillard (United States of America) Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom) Gros (France) Mr. Andre Mr. Charles D. Onyeama (Nigeria) and n (Sweden) Mr. Sture Petre AND WHEREAS, the Government of the Argentine Republic having on 11th March 1972 denounced the Treaty with effect from 22nd September 1972, both Parties stated their understanding, which was shared by Our Government in the United Kingdom, that this would in no way affect the arbitration proceedings in the present case and that the Treaty and the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) would continue in force with respect to those proceedings until their nal conclusion. 33. The subject-matter of this arbitration was extremely sensitive and it is to be noted that the composition of the Tribunal did not include arbitrators from the region. 34. In the event, the islands in question were awarded to Chile and the military government in Argentina purported to annul the Award. In spite of this unhappy outcome, the subject-matter of the dispute was subjected to the mediation of His Holiness the Pope and the resulting Treaty of Peace did not disturb the allocation of the islands in the original Award. 35. Several maritime delimitation cases have been dealt with in accordance with Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, namely: The Southern Blue Fin Tuna case (Australia and NZ v. Japan), Award dated 4 August 2000;31 The case of Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award dated 11 April 2006;32 and The case of Guyana and Suriname, Award dated 17 September 2007.33
31 119 ILR, 508. 32 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029), Past Cases (Partial List). 33 47 ILM, 164.
36. The second category of arbitration cases consists of those heard on the basis of ad hoc special agreements or compromis. In the period since 1945, cases of this type were as follows: (1) Rann of Kutch Case (India and Pakistan), Award dated 19 February 1968.34 (2) Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, Award dated 30 June 1977.35 (3) Case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States v. France), Award dated 9 December 1978.36 (4) Guinea-Guinea (Bissau) Maritime Delimitation Case, Award dated 14 February 1985.37 (5) Dispute concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence (Canada/France), Award dated 17 July 1986.38 (6) Taba Case (Boundary Pillars between Egypt and Israel), Award dated 29 September 1988.39 (7) Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v. France), Award dated 30 April 199040 (issues of State responsibility in re ruling of Secretary-General). (8) St Pierre et Miquelon (Maritime Delimitation between Canada and France), Award dated 10 June 1992.41 (9) Determination of Maritime Boundary (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Award dated 31 July 1989.42 The aftermath of this Award involved the resort to the International Court on the part of Guinea-Bissau in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a declaration of nullity: see Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989.43 (10) Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States United Kingdom), Award dated 30 November 1992; Suppl. Decision, 1 November 1993,44 and, nally, (11) Red Sea Islands Case (Eritrea and Yemen), Phase One, Award dated 9 October 199845; Phase Two, Award dated 17 December 1999.46
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
50 ILR, 2. 54 ILR, 5. 54 ILR, 303. 77 ILR, 635. 82 ILR, 591. 80 ILR, 224. 82 ILR, 499. 95 ILR, 645. 83 ILR, 1. ICJ Reports, 1991, 53. 102 ILR, 215. 114 ILR, 1. 119 ILR, 417.
37. Looking back at the accumulation of arbitration cases, it is clear that inter-State arbitration provides a major element in the pattern of methods of peaceful settlement. Consequently, arbitration clearly constitutes a major competitor to both the International Court and the Law of the Sea Tribunal.
2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 42. The incidence of acceptances of jurisdiction in advance under Article 36(2) has varied over the years. At present, out of 193 member States of the United Nations, 66 States have accepted the jurisdiction based upon Article 36(2). The number of acceptances as a proportion of parties to the Statute has steadily decreased but in recent years has been stable. In any event, a good number of States take cases in front of the Court on the basis of special agreements in preference to going to arbitration. Since 1984, the Court has been reasonably busy, usually with some 12 cases on the docket. At present, at least 16 cases are on the docket. From 1946 until the present, the Court has dealt with 110 contentious cases and 24 requests for advisory opinions. 43. What then are the principal purposes of the Court? First, to settle disputes effectively; Second, to remove issues of public order, such as uncertain boundary lines, and thus to reduce the risk of conict. Third, to develop the rules of the law; Fourth, to provide an exemplar for the management of cases by other tribunals. 44. The Court is a collegiate body and it maintains a high standard of independence and professionalism. With rare exceptions, the Court avoids the making of compromise solutions sometimes to be seen in the work of courts of arbitration. There remain a number of problems which are probably inherent in the political context in which the Court exists. Some Governments consider that the Court should deal with cases more expeditiously, while others are put in fear by what can be seen to be too much haste, especially in relation to matters of fact.
45. In general, the prognosis for the Court is good. The ow of cases is broad-based and not conned to one type of jurisdiction or to States of a particular region. 46. Certain cases, such as the Nuclear Tests Cases47 or the Nicaragua Case,48 have attracted forecasts of doom for the Court. But there is no evidence that such decisions had deterrent effects and the business of the Court actually increased in the wake of the Nicaragua case. 47. In any event, the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon consent, and it is always consent which lies behind the main sources of jurisdiction; that is: compulsory jurisdiction by virtue of declarations made under Article 36(2) of the Statute; ad hoc consent for particular cases derived from negotiated special agreements; dispute settlement clauses in pre-existing treaties, as in the ELSI case between the United States and Italy.49 This case was based upon the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1948. 48. I shall now look more closely at the System of Compulsory Jurisdiction. In the context of international relations both in 1920 and in 1945, the conception of compulsory jurisdiction in a standing court of international justice was very radical indeed and remains so. It is conventional to assess the role of the Court almost exclusively in terms of the progress and rate of development of the system of compulsory jurisdiction. Initially at least that will be my angle of approach. 49. In the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the conventional view has been that there is a qualitative deterioration in the system of compulsory jurisdiction: (a) There is the practice of making reservations. It was in fact recognized from the very outset that States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction had a certain power to dene the classes of legal disputes with respect to which the declaration of acceptance was to apply, and to impose conditions ratione personae. But the variety and nature of the reservations was perhaps not fully appreciated. (b) There is the use of the automatic reservation. The U.S. Declaration of 1946, withdrawn in 1985, included the reservation relating to disputes essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the U.S. as determined by the U.S.. (c) There is the reservation of the right to withdraw acceptance at will, and at any moment, by notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 50. Leaving these matters aside, it was supposed that the statistics of the decisions revealed that the performance of the Court was modest:
47 Australia v. France, ICJ Reports, 1974, 253. 48 ICJ Reports, 1986, 14. 49 ICJ Reports, 1989, 15.
PCIJ I.C.J.
51. That is, so to speak, the pessimistic view of the Court. 52. In general, this picture of dilapidation is considerably out of focus. The different sources of the alleged dilapidation may be taken one by one: (a) First, the signicance of the system of compulsory jurisdiction as such. No doubt it has symbolic signicance and this explains the tendency to make the Optional Clause the only measure of the performance of the Court, and to regard it as a criterion of successful operation. But many States are prepared to use the Court on the basis of special agreements, sometimes even when they could have used the Optional Clause jurisdiction. Since 1945, some major disputes have been submitted to the Court by means of special agreements. (b) The second source of dilapidation relates to the signicance of reservations and is perhaps exaggerated. They were always part of the scheme of things and indeed the possibility of making reservations was seen by the League Assembly as a means of encouraging adherence to the Optional Clause. In any case, the Court has placed limitations on the process of exploiting the principle of reciprocity. The signicance of the automatic reservation has been less than expected: (1) After it backred against France in the Norwegian Loans Case,50 it looked less useful. (2) Originally the U.S. example was followed by ve States. Of States presently Parties to the Optional Clause, very few employ the automatic reservation. (3) It may be noted that the automatic reservation was not invoked by the United States in the Nicaragua case. (c) The third source of alleged dilapidation relates to the question of procedural reforms. In the 1978 Rules of Court, various criticisms were taken into account. And in any case, it may be doubted whether internal procedural reform is a major issue. (d) The fourth alleged problem is the supposedly disappointing amount of business the Court gets.
It may be recalled that the Court had 98 contentious cases up to the end of 1999, and at that time this was regarded as a very modest production. But this type of arithmetic is a poor index of the practical signicance of the Court. Other indices and factors should be taken into account. Since 1984, there has been a regular ow of work. The ow of business is broad-based and not conned to one type of jurisdiction or to States of a particular region. This is a signicant element in any assessment of the work of the Court. It is to be emphasized that the cases before the Court have a special character. The true analogy is with public law and the key question is often status and not compensation. A high proportion of decisions concern the status of territory and the allocation of important resources. Such decisions include the following: Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries;51 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases;52 Gulf of Maine case;53 Chad v. Libya;54 Denmark v. Norway;55 Cameroon v. Nigeria.56 53. In sum, these considerations suggest that the picture of dilapidation normally presented is exaggerated to a substantial degree.
involved by going to law: they dislike the loss of control that is entailed over the future of the case, the outcome of which they can no longer inuence politically once it is before a court of law, since this will then depend upon legal considerations with which they do not nd themselves at home. They much prefer a political forum such as the United Nations in which leverage can be exercised through the inuence of majorities. In general, the proliferation of international organisations has proved a disservice to the cause of international adjudication. Fitzmaurice was the British Foreign Ofce Legal Adviser for many years, and expressed this view in 1973 after his retirement. 56. In any event, adjudication has certain inherent limitations. In the rst place, the International Court is to a great extent dependent upon the parties when it comes to matters of fact and the Court is reluctant to ask questions of the parties. And there is no appeal. Second, the International Court sometimes operates in legal elds on the margins of normal areas of justiciable issues. The Gabcikovo case between Slovakia and Hungary is a good example of this experience. With a degree of condence in the survival of the contractual framework (the 1977 Treaty), the Court held by 13 votes to 2: that Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation, and must take all necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 16 September 1977, in accordance with such modalities as they may agree upon . . . .58 57. In cases such as this, the Court is, in effect, transferring the burden of decisionmaking back to the parties. While the intention is to be constructive, the result is contradictory because the parties in the Special Agreement of 1993 had expected the Court to answer the questions formulated in Article 2. 58. By way of conclusion, it is convenient to present a series of propositions: First, the system of peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes is a signicant part of the universe of international relations. Second, the modalities are very varied and adjudication is simply one instrument forming part of an entire orchestra of modes of peaceful settlement. Third, in relation to settlement on the basis of law, the practice of arbitration is as signicant as the work of standing tribunals, such as the International Court. Fourth, the system we have is not attuned to the settlement of purely political disputes. Fifth, the International Court has a successful record of the settlement of disputes concerning territory and delimitation, including maritime delimitation.
58 ICJ Reports, 1997, 7, at 83.
And lastly, resort to both the International Court and to ad hoc arbitration constitutes the general practice of all regions. 59. The general outcome is ironical, to say the least. In the era of decolonization, in the 1960s, western pundits expressed portentous concerns about the aptitude of the new States to participate in what was seen as a western system of international law and dispute settlement. These concerns were both condescending and unfounded. 60. And, before I close, I wish to thank the University and the Awards Committee for their decision to elect me as the rst recipient of the Wang Tieya Award.