Leonardo

On lIe FossiIiIil oJ AeslIelic AlIeisn FIiIosopI and lIe MavIel in Avl

AulIov|s) Bavid Cavviev
Bevieved vovI|s)
Souvce Leonavdo, VoI. 18, No. 1 |1985), pp. 35-38
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On the
Possibility
of Aesthetic Atheism:
Philosophy
and the Market in Art
David Carrier
Abstract-What can we learn about art
by analyzing
the art market? The author offers a
skeptical argument.
Judgements
of aesthetic value
change
with time. Since those
changes
reflect market
value, perhaps
we can
show that aesthetic value is market value. The
critic,
we would then
believe,
seeks to
persuade
us that art has
aesthetic value, for our beliefs about art's value
depend upon
a consensus established in
part by
the critic.
Recently
some critics and
philosophers
have
argued
that the traditions of art are dead. The
prospects
for such
an 'aesthetic atheism' in relation to this
skeptical argument are discussed.
I. ON BECOMING A CYNIC
No other
activity
so
closely
combines
snobbery
and
scholarship
as the art
market.
Dependent
for its existence
upon
the
good
will and dedication of
many,
mostly impecunious, artists,
art dealers
and art
critics,
this market
effectively
functions to
provide masterpieces
to be
purchased by
the
very
rich.
Recently
several
philosophers
have discussed how
objects
like
Duchamp's readymades
are
accepted
as art
[1].
This
paper explores
the related
cynical
view raised
by
critics of
contemporary
art and
society [2]
that
people might
cease to believe that art-
works
possess
the
qualities traditionally
called aesthetic. I term this view 'aesthetic
atheism', drawing
an
analogy
to the
rejection
of traditional
religious
beliefs.
I concentrate
upon contemporary
painting
in the art market and its rela-
tionship
to the theories of art discussed in
commercial art
journals.
Much art-
most of that considered in Leonardo, for
example-falls
outside that
market,
and
many
visual artists
working
with
film,
multiples
or
performance attempt
to
remain outside that commercial arena. If
my analysis
is found
interesting,
it would
be worthwhile
asking
if it
applies
also to
such non-commercial art. That is the task
for another article.
In a recent
paper
I describe the
system
of art
production [3].
Two
points
from
that account are relevant here.
First,
famous art is
extremely expensive.
Second,
the art world suffers from ex-
treme
overproduction.
Few art students
can
hope
to make a
living
from their
work.
Observing
a
nineteenth-century
exhibit,
a
Henry
James character re-
marked: "There are too
many
of
them,
David Carrier
(philosopher), Department
of
History
and
Philosophy, Carnegie-Mellon University,
Schenley Park, Pittsburgh,
PA 15213, U.S.A.
Received 26
January
1984.
poor devils;
so
many
who must make
their
way
... Some of them ... stand on
their heads ... to make
people
notice
them"
[4].
One
way
of
attracting
atten-
tion is
through
a critic's review.
However,
the reviews
published
in commercial art
journals
are difficult to understand; few
people
could
explain
the theories used to
validate the works
they
observe. Dis-
course in
any
technical field is abstruse
for
outsiders,
but there is
something
novel about this situation in which the
influential literature of art is
overly
technical.
An historical
perspective
is valuable.
Few of the nouveau riche Americans who
purchased Raphaels
in the late nineteenth
century
knew about art.
They
desired
prestige,
and the role of the art historian
was to
guarantee
that
they purchased
genuine
works
[5].
The modern museum
director must
be,
in
part,
the
agent
of
those collectors he must
satisfy
in order to
attract donations for the museum's
collection. When Richard Wollheim
speaks
of the devices
"by
which art has
been
segregated
from those for whom it
was made and turned into a
preserve
of
the rich and
arrogant" [6],
we must
recognize
that he is a
utopian.
When has
art been made for
anyone
but the
wealthy?
It would be naive to see
museums as
anything
but the natural
products
of
contemporary capitalism.
Raphael's
works have
always
been
treasured,
and
genuine Raphaels
are rare.
Today
a few
younger artists,
unknown 5
years ago,
achieve substantial
prices,
while the work of some senior
figures
is as
valuable as lesser-known old masters.
The value of these works is not
established
by
the test of time that
validates
Raphael,
but
by
the con-
troversial claims of critics.
Many
commodities are
expensive
because
they
are rare and
highly desired;
no
theory
is
needed to
explain
their worth. For
example,
barbed wire, decoy
ducks and
stamps
can be collector's items. Detached
from their
original use,
as when an
antique
car ceases to be used for
transport, they
become valued for their
rarity [7].
In
contrast,
the value of
contemporary
artworks
depends upon
beliefs about their aesthetic
significance.
And one function of criticism is to
support
such beliefs.
II. IS CYNICISM JUSTIFIED?
My philosophical question
is whether
the
cynic's argument
outlined above is
justified.
I will
proceed
in four
stages.
The
acceptance
of
my
earlier
stages
need not
imply agreement
with the later
ones,
and
only
in the last
stage
will I sketch an
argument
for aesthetic atheism. Like
Descartes in his
Meditations, I want to see
how far a
skeptical argument
can be
taken. I
begin by arguing
that aesthetic
relativism is
true; that
is, judgements
of
aesthetic
value,
of the artistic worth of an
artwork, do
change
with time.
Second,
I
suggest
that this makes
plausible
a
reductionist
theory
of aesthetic value.
Aesthetic
value,
that
theory claims,
is
market value.
Third,
I
argue
that there is
then reason to
critically question
the
belief that critics
identify
aesthetic value.
Finally,
I move from
contemporary
art to
a more
sweeping application
of this
position.
My
aim is not to
argue polemically
for
or
against
these
conclusions,
but to see
what kind of
argument
is
possible.
This
account
might
be introduced
by noting
parallels
in
philosophical
discussions of
knowledge
and ethics. Do we
possess any
knowledge?
Are our actions ever
morally
justified?
These are the
parallel questions
of the
skeptic.
The aim is not to doubt the
existence of the external world or the
validity
of moral
obligations,
but to
explore
how such beliefs are
justified.
Skepticism
about aesthetic value has been
discussed less
frequently.
A
society
genuinely skeptical
about its
knowledge
or
morality
is hard to
imagine,
for a social
Pergamon Press Ltd.
Printed in Great Britain.
0024-094X/85 $3.00+0.00
LEONARDO,
Vol.
18,
No.
1, pp. 35-38,
1985 35
system requires
some such
stability
to
function. A
society similarly skeptical
about the value of art is easier to
imagine.
Many
traditional
religious groups-Jews,
Muslims,
Christian iconoclasts-have
been hostile to
representational
art.
My
conclusion will
suggest
that we
may
for
various reasons become hostile to art. If
neither
sensory errors,
nor the
possibility
that I am
dreaming,
nor the existence of
an evil demon can
deprive
me of
knowledge, then, Descartes
argues, my
knowledge
is secure.
Perhaps
this
analysis
can
similarly justify
our belief in art's
value.
III. CYNICISM AND AESTHETIC
RELATIVISM
Aesthetic relativism has been borne out
by history.
For a
long
time the most
admired artworks in
Europe
were Roman
copies
of Greek
sculpture;
a
century ago,
salon
painting
was
generally preferred
to
work of the
impressionists;
in his
lifetime,
Jackson Pollock was not
widely ap-
preciated. Today
all
thesejudgements
are
rejected by
most authorities
[8].
The
usual
explanation
is that new art is
difficult to
evaluate;
time is needed to
judge
its true value. For reasons I have
given elsewhere,
that
theory
is
question-
able
[9].
How
long
does the test of time
take? Interest in some
early
Renaissance
painting
has
only recently revived,
while
Pollock's work
quickly
became
widely
appreciated. Why
should time allow us to
better
judge
an artwork?
Raphael
aimed
to
satisfy
his
contemporaries,
so
why
does
the test of time show that his
painting
is
great? Today
we need the aid of art
historians to understand his work and
therefore it is unclear
why
we are better
judges
of it than
Raphael's contemporary
audience.
The belief that a work's excellence is a
property
of that
object,
like its
shape
and
color,
seems
implausible.
In societies
where
changes
in beliefs about aesthetic
quality
occur
slowly,
aesthetic relativism
seems a fantastic notion. But our
judgments
about
contemporary
art are
volatile. The critic's claim to
perceive
the
work's actual value is
impossible
to
verify. By
the time I see a
painting,
I have
often read or heard
many
accounts of it.
Even if I
reject
these
views, my judgment
is
socially
conditioned. The reason that
judgments
about
contemporary
art are
more debatable than those about older
work has little to do with the test of time.
Rather,
since
Raphael's
works are in the
museum and he is an established
figure,
nothing
could be more
quixotic
than an
attack on him.
By contrast, praise
or
criticism of a
contemporary
artist can
have real
impact.
In
part, changes
in taste reflect facts
about the art market. In
1910,
Cezanne
was little known and so not
collected;
today
he has almost the status of
Raphael,
and so his work is
very
valuable.
Most collectors
today
cannot afford a
Cezanne,
and therefore turn to other
artists.
Everyone
knows that Pollock's
work was
inexpensive
30
years ago,
so
now collectors of
contemporary
art seek
his successor. The art market
depends
in
part upon
the belief that
major
new work
is
being created; looking
for Pollock's
successors seems more
exciting
than
seeking
out his minor
contemporaries.
But while it took a
long
time to see
Cezanne's
importance,
now that
process
is
speeded up.
For
everyone
has read the
stories of how Cezanne and then Pollock
became famous and their work valuable.
The result is that
ultimately
aesthetic
value is reflected in market value. I
may
admire the work of someone obscure;
once she or he is
widely
written
about,
I
anticipate
that that
person's
art will be
marketable.
It is
unnecessary
to moralize about this
situation. What is more natural than that
the works most
highly regarded
should
become the most valuable? These
observations become
philosophically
interesting only
when
they prompt
a
reductionist
theory
of aesthetic value.
IV. A REDUCTIVE THEORY OF
AESTHETIC VALUE
The
theory
is
easy
to state: aesthetic
value is market value. That Pollock was
once
thought
minor means that once his
works were
cheap;
that Pollock is called
great
means that now his art is
expensive.
Few
people
admired him in
1950,
and so
then the statement "Pollock's work is
excellent" was
only
a
good prediction.
How can aesthetic value be
just
market
value? Consider a parallel, the
materialist's claim that mental states are
brain states
[10].
That conclusion is not
established
by showing
that
every
mental
state coincides with some brain state;
the
materialist wants to show that mental
states are
nothing
over and above brain
states. So he makes two moves. He shows
that mental
states,
when
scientifically
analyzed,
are
simply
brain states. And he
explain why people
once
thought
that
there was
something
more to mental
states. The
cynic
follows the same
procedure, showing
that aesthetic value is
market value and then
explaining why
people
have believed otherwise.
This
parallel
is
doubly problematic.
First,
much recent discussion
questions
materialism's
interpretation. Second, we
might
think that materialism involves a
scientific
discovery,
while the reductionist
theory
of aesthetic value is
merely
a
sociological hypothesis.
Because he states
his case
against
such claims in
detail,
Gombrich's account is worth
study.
He
makes two
key points [11].
Standards are
defined
by
the canon of achievements
"handed down in tradition as a touch-
stone of excellence." So the artist believes
in "values which will
always
transcend his
skill" as an individual.
The
concept
of a canon is
complex,
for
the modern museum
brings together
objects
from
many cultures, taking
work
out of context to make it art. For
Gombrich our canon ends with cubism.
For some critics it includes Pollock but
excludes
Duchamp.
For
others,
Duchamp
is
important. So,
when there
are such serious
disagreements
it is
misleading
to
speak
of 'the canon' as if
everyone
were
talking
about the same
thing.
Certainly
Gombrich is correct to
say
that relativism is difficult to
imagine.
"If
all our reactions are
equally subjective
...
the idea of a canon would
collapse...
I
confess that whenever I
get
involved in
this
argument
I have a curious
feeling
of
unreality."
Were I a
contemporary
of
Pollock,
I
might
be more critical of his
work;
were I a
Muslim, Persian calli-
graphy
would be easier to understand.
Equally,
if I
accepted
the reductionist
theory
of aesthetic
value,
I would
disagree
with Gombrich. That
point
can
be made in an
uninteresting way.
That I
can
imagine myself
a sincere terrorist
doesn't undermine
my present beliefs; as
a terrorist,
I would be a different
person.
The
interesting question
is how
my
beliefs
might change. Showing
how belief in the
canon could
collapse may
undermine
Gombrich's claims.
The
relationship
between
my
ex-
perience
and beliefs is
complex.
A
vegetarian
cannot
enjoy
Beef
Wellington,
nor an admirer of
Ruskin, Palladiar
churches.
They
do not think of these as
attractive
things
that are also
morally
reprehensible.
Such
people
cannot
reconcile the evils of animal
suffering
or
Renaissance
society against
the
pleasures
they
obtain from such evils. Gombrich
thinks that we could admire an artist's
skill even while
disliking
his work. That
may
be
true,
but
only up
to a
point.
Raphael
is admired
by non-Christians,
but a real iconoclast would not care for
his work. I
might
understand an artist's
goals
and dislike her or him all the more
for
promoting
what were for me
unacceptable practices.
So the case
against
relativism remains
incomplete.
Carrier, Possibility of
Aesthetic Atheism 36
V. ON THE ROLE OF ART CRITICS
These
arguments
show
only
that the
reductionist
position
is
possible.
That
alone is of some
interest,
for the trouble
with
many
relativistic
positions
is that
they
are
self-refuting.
No statements are
true;
All moralities are
equally good:
these
appear self-contradictory
claims.
To
explain why anyone
would be
motivated to become a
relativist,
I must
return to
my
discussion of the critic's role.
Were aesthetic relativism
false,
then we
might
think of the critic as someone who
helps
us to see the artwork as it is. Once
we
give up
that view of aesthetic
value,
it
is more natural to think of criticism as an
exercise in
persuasion.
The critic offers
arguments
for his or her
judgments,
and if
we are convinced,
we
accept
those
judgments,
which
today typically
involve
appeal
to some
complex theory
of art.
This does not
imply
that critics 'create'
aesthetic value.
Many, perhaps all,
artworks
may
have some inherent
aesthetic value; they
can be
enjoyed
for
their color, drawing
or
spatial
relation-
ships.
But I am interested in how
today
a
few artists' works are
singled
out as
being
of
major importance.
In our
society
there
is a
sharp
distinction between
expensive
works whose
importance
is validated
by
critical consensus and those
many
other
artworks known and
enjoyed only by
friends of the artist.
The
philistine,
too
ignorant
to under-
stand the art he
detests, may agree
with all
of this,
but I am interested in how such
beliefs arise from within the art world. As
is true for most
institutions, people
in the
art world
may question
some but not all
of the
accepted
beliefs before
they
cease
to be members of that
community.
A
Catholic
may question
some
papal
judgments,
but does not
suggest
that
Mohammed was a true
prophet. Similarly,
someone
may disagree
about the
signifi-
cance of individual
artists,
but
asserting
that
Raphael
was the last
great painter
prevents
one from
being
a member of the
art
community.
One difference between a
religious community
and an artistic
community
is that
religious
beliefs aim to
be true to the
facts,
while beliefs about
aesthetic value are
merely
shared
judg-
ments.
These distinctions must be
developed
in more detail. What is
important
here is
to understand the
relationship
between
the art world consensus and the role of
critics. Once we
give up
the claim that
aesthetic
judgments
are statements of
fact,
then the role of rhetoric in art
criticism is worth
considering.
If the art
community
is bound
together by accept-
ing judgments of
quality, and if those
judgments
are a
product
of critics'
rhetoric,
then the art world consensus is
the
product
of a
general agreement
to
accept
the
arguments put
forward
by
critics. So
described,
that
agreement
seems frail.
Today
almost
everyone
can
see Pollock's
greatness;
it is not as if we
have
just
all
agreed
to admire his art. But
that belief,
which I
share,
is in one sense
less a fact about the work than a
statement of how we all
judge
it.
Certainly many
do not admire his
art,
but
they
are
typically
marked as outsiders to
the art world. A
critique
of Pollock
might
change
our
consensus,
but such an
account would be taken
seriously only
if
presented
from within the art world
[12].
When three decades
ago
a few critics
admired Pollock,
their claims were
considered eccentric. Now their
judg-
ments are
generally accepted
as true in the
only
sense of 'truth'
possible here,
truth
relative to the beliefs of the
community.
If
we think of aesthetic
judgments
as
statements about the
private experiences
of
individuals,
then it
may
seem almost
miraculous that we achieve so much
agreement.
But there is another
way
to
look at this situation. Were such
agreement-including, often,
the
agree-
ment to
accept disagreement-lacking,
then the art world could not exist. Were
there no
general
belief that a few
contemporary
artists are
significant,
then
our art market could not exist. This
analysis may
treat the
relationship
between rhetoric and truth too
simply.
Rhetoric
may
serve the interests of
truth,
as when St
Augustine urged
the
preacher
to master
pagan
rhetoric
[13].
And there
need be no
logical
connection between
how I come to hold
my
beliefs and the
truth of those beliefs. Even when we
recognize
the connection between art
criticism and the art
market,
it doesn't
follow that the claims of critics are
untrue. The claims of the
critic,
I am
urging,
are true relative to the art
community;
the search for some further
sense in which those claims are true in
relation to the artwork itself may
be
futile.
I am
discussing only contemporary
works and
only
those
relatively
few
discussed
by
critics. Much can be learned
by examining
the cases closer at hand. As
my parallels
with
epistemological
and
moral
skepticism indicate,
studies of the
foundations of our
knowledge typically
begin
with a few selected cases. The close
link between art
making
and the art
market;
the introduction of
complex
theories of critics: these are new
phenomena. Raphael
did not
paint
to
exhibit in
galleries,
nor were his works
validated
by
discussion in art journals of
the time. Let us
envisage
a more
sweeping
presentation
of these claims.
VI. AESTHETIC ATHEISM
Imagine
someone who has come to
question
not
just
the claims made about
some
contemporary artists,
but the
way
artworks are handled in our
society.
Just
as someone who lost faith
might
still
enjoy visiting churches,
so this
person
might
still
aesthetically appreciate many
things
outside the museum. But this
aesthetic atheist would be
unwilling
and
unable to
enjoy
art as we have institu-
tionalized it. How could we describe the
inner life of this
person?
My
account draws on Nietzsche's
analysis
of
morality
in On the
Genealogy
of Morals, for he is concerned with the
interests served
by religious beliefs,
and I
with those served
by
belief in art. Just as
Nietzsche wants to undermine those
foundations of
morality by describing
their
genesis,
so I am interested in
understanding
how a
genealogy
of
aesthetic value
might
lead to aesthetic
atheism. But
my
account is in one
way
more modest in its
goals
than
his,
and this
difference
may
make aesthetic atheism
more
acceptable.
Nietzsche's
challenging
claim is that such a
genealogy
undermines
itself,
the search for truth
leading
to
skepticism
about the existence of truth
[14].
After Christian truthfulness has drawn
one inference after
another, it must end
by drawing
its most
striking inference,
its inference
against
itself... it
poses
the
question
"what is the
meaning
of all
will to truth?"
Unlike the critic of traditional
morality,
who
perhaps
will
produce
some
equivalent
for the beliefs he
rejects,
the aesthetic
atheist seeks no substitute for art. The
trouble with
revolutionary
kinds of art is
that
they
become absorbed into the art
market; by now, nothing
is more
traditional than such would-be attacks on
the art world. But the aesthetic atheist
wants us to
stop making
art.
In this
situation, my analysis may
seem
close to the criticism I discuss. Critics use
rhetoric to sustain belief in aesthetic
value,
and
my
criticism of their role is
only
a similar exercise. Aesthetic atheism
would become true for the relativist
only
if such beliefs were
widely accepted.
Since
belief in aesthetic value
depends upon
consensus,
if that
agreement
ceases to
hold,
then aesthetic value (in the
special
way
I describe
it)
will cease to exist.
The aesthetic atheist is interested not in
stepping
outside
contemporary practice,
Carrier, Possibility of
Aesthetic Atheism 37
but in
pointing
to how that
practice
itself
may
break down. Just as Marxists are
interested in
working
out what
they
call
contradictions of
capitalism
and not in
moralizing
about that
system,
so here we
may point
to a
growing
awareness within
the art world of the claims I describe.
A
group
of recent
critics,
identified as
'postmodernists', argue
that the end of
painting
has come
[15].
This new
presentation
of a claim made
by Hegel
in
the
early
nineteenth
century
has
recently
been made in another context
by
the
philosopher
Arthur Danto
[16].
As the
name 'postmodernists' indicates, these
critics believe that the
great
tradition of
twentieth
century
innovation in
painting
-the time of 'modernism'-is now
closed. Some of these critics are interested
in
photography, multiples
or
performance,
and
they
offer varied
positive
recom-
mendations about what an artist
working
in these media
today may constructively
do. These
challenging
claims are worth
further
study.
Here I focus
just
on what
the
postmodernists
have to
say
about the
end of
painting,
for
only
that
portion
of
their claims is
directly
relevant to
my
discussion of aesthetic atheism.
Though
these authors
disagree
about
much, they
agree
that the
ability
of
today's
artists to
continue the traditions of art is in doubt.
They dispute
not
only judgments
about
the
importance
of individual artists-
every
critic does that-but the whole
system
within which such
judgments
are
made. Like
skeptics
about
knowledge
or
morality, they
ask us to consider whether
our collective beliefs are
justified.
These
postmodernists
are
only
a small
group,
relatively
isolated from much
artmaking
that
proceeds
without
knowledge
of or
interest in such
theorizing.
But the
history
of art should teach us that sometimes
movements that start in small
ways
can
have
large
effects.
If,
as the
postmodernists suggest,
aesthetic
experience
itself has been
rendered doubtful, then it is hard to
imagine
that such an end to the tradition
would not affect how we view established
art.
Placing
a Pollock in the museum
along
with a
Raphael
is
justified by
the
belief that both artists are
engaged
in a
common concern. In this
respect they
are
somewhat like two scientists
working
at
different times.
But, just
as the
discovery
that scientific laws were
impossible
to
formulate would affect how we
judge
the
achievements of older
science,
so be-
coming
aesthetic atheists would influence
our view of the whole artistic tradition.
Consider, too,
the
parallel my
title "On
the
Possibility
of Aesthetic Atheism" is
intended to
invoke,
the
history
of attacks
on
religion.
From the
Enlightenment
onward, most
important philosophers
have been
highly
critical to the claims of
Christianity.
As one result such esoteric
debates have influenced
many people
who know
nothing
of
Kant, Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche or Freud. Almost without
exception,
these critics of moral and
religious
institutions
exempted
art from
their criticism.
Perhaps they
came too
early
to see how art as much as
religion
might
be attacked.
Meanwhile,
art has
become, for
many people,
a substitute for
religion.
Such an
activity, my analysis
suggests,
is
possible only
within a
larger
society
which
supports
beliefs in its
general goals.
This account aims neither
to
promote
aesthetic atheism nor to
attack
it,
but to
begin
a discussion toward
understanding
the
very interesting
and
novel situation in which that
position
can
be articulated.
Acknowledgements-For helpful
discussion I
thank artists Sharon
Gold,
Thomas
Nozkowski, Joyce
Robins and Sean
Scully;
the critic
Joseph Masheck; and Arthur Danto,
Alexander
Nehamas, Marianne'Novy
and
Mark Roskill.
Perhaps my largest
debt is to
Clement
Greenberg,
for
everything
I
say
argues
with his work.
REFERENCES
1. G. Dickie,
Art and the Aesthetic
(Ithaca:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1974);
A. Danto,
The
Transfiguration of
the
Commonplace
(Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1981).
2. T. Wolfe, The Painted Word
(New
York:
Bantam, 1976)
is an
unpleasant
and
deeply ignorant,
but influential, account.
C. Ratcliffs "Critical
Thought, Magical
Language",
Art in America, p.
184
(Summer 1980)
offers the
perspective
of a
working
critic.
3. D. Carrier, "Art and Its Market", in R.
Hertz, ed., Theories
of Contemporary
Art
(Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey:
Prentice-
Hall, 1984).
4. H. James, The
Tragic
Muse
(Harmonds-
worth, Middlesex:
Penguin, 1982) p.
14.
5. D. A. Brown, Raphael
and America
(Washington,
D.C.: U.S. National
Gallery, 1983).
6. R. Wollheim, Introduction to The
Image
in Form: Selected
Writings of
Adrian
Stokes
(Harmondsworth,
Middlesex:
Penguin, 1972) p.
31.
7. J.
Alsop,
The Rare Art Traditions
(New
York:
Harper
& Row, 1982)
is a
long
and
thorough
account. See the review
by
E.
H. Gombrich in The New York Review 39
(2
December
1982); also, K. Clark, "The
Ideal Museum", Artnews,
p.
29
(January
1954).
8. F. Haskell, Rediscoveries in Art
(Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1976).
See the
review
reprinted
in C. Rosen and H.
Zerner, Romanticism and Realism
(New
York:
Viking, 1984).
9. D.
Carrier, review of
Anthony
Savile's
The Test
of
Time in The Journal
of
Philosophy, p.
116
(April 1984).
10. J.
O'Connor, ed., Modern Materialism:
Readings
on
Mind-Body Identity (New
York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1969).
11. E. Gombrich, Ideals and Idols
(Oxford:
Phaidon, 1979) pp. 156, 128, 157.
12. See, for
example,
R.
Hennessy,
"The
Man Who
Forgot
How to
Paint",
Art in
America, p.
13
(Summer 1984).
13. See St
Augustine,
De doctrina christianna,
liber
quartvs,
Tr. with
commentary by
Sister Therese Sullivan
(Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic
University
of
America, 1972).
14. Nietzsche,
On the
Genealogy of Morals,
W.
Kaufman, trans.
(New
York:
Random
House, 1967) p.
161.
15. H.
Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic
(Port
Townsend, Washington: Bay Press,
1983)
and T.
Lawson, "Last Exit:
Painting", Artforum, p.
40
(October
1981).
16. A.
Danto, The End
of
Art
(forthcoming);
E.
Wind,
Art and
Anarchy (New
York:
Vintage, 1969)
offers a defense of
Hegel's
views.
17. D.
Carrier,
"Art
Fashion", Journal: A
Contemporary
Art
Magazine, p.
32
(Summer 1982)
discusses these issues
from a related
point
of view.
Carrier, Possibility of
Aesthetic Atheism 38