Simple Algorithms RaFSA Estimation Method Based

on IEC61850
Mike Mekkanen*, Reino Virrankoski*, Mohammed Elmusrati* and Erkki Antila**
* University of Vaasa, Department of Computer Science, Communications and Systems Engineering Group
** University of Vaasa, Department of Electrical Engineering and Energy Technology
P.O. Box 700, FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland
mmekka@student.uwasa.fi, {reino.virrankoski, mohammed.elmusrati, erkki.antila}@uwasa.fi

AbstractReliability estimation of electricity generation,
transmission and distribution plays an important role based on
assessment of past performance and future predictions. There are
two traditional basic approaches to estimate the reliability and
probability of failure, one based on analytical calculation and the
other based on stochastic simulation. This paper discusses about
the estimation of system reliability and the probability of failure
using a novel estimation method, Reliability and probability of
failure simple algorithms (RaFSA). These tasks are exceeding by
estimating the reliability and probability of failure existing in one
protection intelligent electronic device (IED), general protection
function and the breaker failure protection (BFP) function. The
RaFSA estimations are implemented over a practical small
transmission substation T1-1. Different practical configurations
are considered. Stochastic simulation approach is the way that
RaFSA estimations are implemented with. RaFSA provides
specific benefits such as: easy to implement, handle huge amount
of data, different tools and parameters can be used, ability to
analyze different input data without major modifications in the
underlying process.


KeywordsRaFSA; IEC61850; Next-Genration substation;
substation architectures;Reliability; Probability of failure; breaker
failure protection (BFP).
I. INTRODUCTION
The future of distributed automation systems (DAS) faces a
harder demand on their technical solution. These demands are
based on new requirements for the electricity generation,
transmission, distribution, laws, taxes and deregulation. Also
loss of load, unnecessary payment and fees will occur if an
interruption happened. Therefore, one of the most dominating
considerations in the current and future DAS design is
reliability and availability which needs performing the
vulnerability analysis and stating the risk [1]. However,
accuracy measurements for the estimating reliability must be
associated in which that depends on the amount of data
available and the result of observations. Observations and
analysis of available test data related to performance under
either actual or simulated condition are the boundaries that
must be used to assess reliability. The commonly meaning of
the used term reliability indicates the required function can be
performed by the entity based on stated condition for a stated
period successfully [2]. Other parameter where the reliability
can be described with is probability of failure or a meantime to
failure (MTTF). The mathematical representation of the data
can be implemented by one of specific statistical probability
distribution function.

System reliability can be determined by taking the integral
to it, which represents the area under the curve of the
probability density function [3]. In ref [4,5 and 6] reliability
of different system architecture, reliability and probability of
failure for breaker failure protection function (BPF) had been
discussed, these literatures provide reliability block diagram
(RBD) method based on their calculation. Markova state
model had been shown in reference [7] for reliability
investigation for different substation bus configuration.

With this motivation, this paper discusses about the
estimation of system reliability and the probability of failure
using a novel estimation method (RaFSA). These tasks are
exceeding by estimating the reliability and probability of
failure existing in one protection IED, general protection
function and the BFP function. The RaFSA estimations are
implemented over a practical small transmission substation
T1-1. Different practical configurations are considered.
Stochastic simulation approach is the way that RaFSA
estimations are implemented with. RaFSA provides specific
benefits such as; it can be implemented in different PC
software, support different kind of probability distribution
models, not only the exponential one. Also it can handle a
huge amount of input data. Furthermore, other analyzing tools
and parameters such as repairing time, load flow,
reconfiguration, optimization, etc. can be considered. Lastly,
changing input data can easily be applied through RaFSA
without major modifications in the underlying process. This
paper arranges such as in section II BFP function reliability
and probability of failure estimation methods based on
IEC61850 has been presented. Section III shows substation
bus topology types under study. In section IV RaFSA
estimation processes have been presented. Section V
concludes the work.
II. RELAIBILITY AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR BFP
FUNCTION ESTIMATION
Reliability and probability of failure can be estimated based
on two conventional methods direct analytical techniques or
stochastic simulations. Both approaches have advantages and
disadvantages. The analytical technique has a fairly short
solution time and it always gives the same numerical results
for the identical models and identical input data, whereas the
simulation technique has long solution time depends on the
number of iteration in which that gives different output for
each iteration. However, all outputs shear the same
characteristic that they have a tendency towards the true
values. Moreover, the simulation techniques can handle a huge
amount of input data with different kinds of probability
distribution models. Therefore, this paper invents RaFSA
estimation method based on the stochastic simulation
techniques. The estimation using RaFSA for the BFP function
has been carried out considering a typical small transmission
substation under varies configuration architectures. Since the
other functions in substation are mostly a subset from BFP
function with the interlocked paths equal to one (n=1) [6,7].
However, the novel estimation method RaFSA can be
implemented for different kind of systems, functions and
reasons.

According to the BFP function configuration the local bay
is where the BFP function resides, protection unit (PU),
control unit (CU). In case of non-operation of the local circuit
breaker, or unexpected of the measurement values (CTs/VTs),
distributed trip signal from BFP to adjacent n bays must be
reached in order to execute the BFP function. Based on (T1-1)
architecture it consists of four circuit breakers that each
connected with a single bay Ethernet switch as illustrated in
Fig. 1. Within a successful execution of the function current
measurement from MU in the local bay to the PU in the path
(MU-SS-PU), and trip signal to other bays in paths (PU-SS-
(SS-BIED) n) are initiated. Hence the trip signal to initiate the
BFP function might be initiated from different protection
functions within or outside the protection terminal, based on
the concept of distributed functions that assigned by IEC61850
[6].



Figure 1. Small transmission substation
III. SUBSTATION BUS TOPOLOGIES UNDER STUDY
The basic substation bus topology types are star cascaded
and ring. Quite often mixed solutions, such as star-ring
topology, can be implemented to achieve the best
performance. Firstly, in star topology, all substation devices
are connected directly to a common Ethernet switch as
illustrated in Fig. 2 which shown the general bay protection
function. This type of topology easily meets the standard
IEC61850 requirement of transmission delay less than 4ms.
However, since all devices are connected to common switch, a
single failure in the switch may take down the whole system.
This leads to less reliability value compared to ring topology.




Figure 2. General bay protection function IEDs and RBD.

Secondly, cascaded architecture, a typical cascading
configuration illustrated in Fig. 3 that all six bays are
connected in chain based on open loop configuration. It is
simple and less expensive, while it has a high latency and less
reliability since it requires that all switches must work
successfully.




Figure 3. Cascaded architecture and RBD for BFP function.

Lastly, redundant ring architecture, in case of achieving
higher levels of redundancy each IED connected with two
separated redundant ring networks. These rings are connected
with a common HMI which is often used with the protection
function and it is the case already now [8] as illustrated in Fig.
4. Based on this configuration all IEDs have tow paths within
two separated ring-networks. It is complicated and high
expensive. However it has high reliability. The RBD of the ring
architecture based on the rapid spanning tree protocol (RSTP)
that provides automatic pickup paths in case of failure in active
link. Therefore, four switches out of five are required to
execute the BFP function successfully.


Figure 4. Redundant ring and RBD architecture.
IV. RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE SIMPLE
ALGORITHMS (RAFSA)
To better understand the proposed RaFSA estimation
method single IED has been considered firstly and we assume
the failure rate distribution function is based on exponential
distribution (useful life) region II form the bath-tub curve Fig.
5 [2]. The reliability and probability of failure based on
analytical calculations for n identical IEDs within the same
environment are identical. Whereas the behavior patterns for n
identical IEDs in real world will all be different. These
differences can exist in varying functionalities, including the
surviving time, number of failures, the time between failure,
restoration time etc. Therefore, the strongest point of the
proposed RaFSA has been considered since it intended to
examine and predict the actual behavior pattern for each IED
in the system. These examination and prediction features are
provided based on the nature through the process that involved
within the RaFSA is random.



Figure 5. Bath-tube curve
A. Single IED
According to the RaFSA steps, a set of uniform pseudo-
random numbers has been generated based on a deterministic
algorithm. The generated numbers are distributed randomly
over the interval (0,1).

X
+1
= (A - X

+C)(moJ B) (1)

Where A (the multiplier), B (the modulus) and C (the
increment) are all non-negative integer.

After generating the sequence of pseudo-random numbers,
a uniform random number can be found from dividing the
generated numbers over the modulus as follows,

u

=
X
i
B
(2)

The uniform input data can be converted into another
distribution by using one of the converting methods. The main
procedure that used for conversion is inverse transform
method, composition method and acceptance rejection
method. Within the RaFSA estimation method inverse
transform method has been used. It is the most efficient
converting method, however it can be used only if the
distribution can be inverted analytically. This method is
suitable for the exponential distribution that what had been
assumed for the failure rate distribution function for proposed
IEDs model. Therefore, the converted operation time for IEDi
based on the inverse transform method can be achieved from
the formula as follows [2],

I

= -
1
x
i
ln (u

) (3)

Where T is the operation time (times-to-failure) based on
exponential distribution and is the failure rate.

Classical modeling of the system IEDs is based on two state
probability models operate and failed. Transitions
between states are defined based on the probability
distributions of time to fail (TTF) and time to repair (TTR).
The next step, we need to examine the IED unit is in its
operative state or in its failure state. This task can be
performed by comparing the operation time with the assumed
mission time. In order to define the success events we need to
concern the operating time, in which a unit remains in its up or
operating state before it fails. Then if the operating time is
greater or equal to the mission time we sign these events as
successes events (reliable). If the operating time is less than
the mission time, we sign these events as failure events. By
counting the success and failure events we are able to estimate
the value of the reliability and the probability of failure as it
explained in Fig. 1. Fig. 6 shows the flowchart of the RaFSA
estimation process, more practical use of the novel RaFSA
estimation is in ref [6,10]


Figure 6. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process single IED.

B. General bay protection function
In this subsection the general bay protection function in SAS
has been considered. According to IEC61850 standard SAS
functions have been distributed to more than one IED based on
some real time requirements. According to the general bay
protection function architecture, it consist of single Ethernet
switch, breaker protection unit (BPU), breaker control unit
(BCU), merging unit (MU), breaker IED (BIED) and time
synchronization (TS) Fig. 2. Regardless the substation
configuration the general bay protection function is identical in
which that it needs the same set of IEDs for all configurations.
Therefore, the bay protection function always needs IEDs that
interlocked in a bath such as (TS-MU-BPU-ES-BIED) based
on successful implementation of the protection function.
Besides, all IEDs must work successfully. Within this
interlocking paths and successful IEDs working condition, the
underlying network for all these IEDs are connected in series.
The same procedure within RaFSA can be followed as in case
one (single IED). However in this case two failure rates (1,
2) need to be assigned and another check condition (type of
the IEDs connection) need to be considered. By counting the
success and failure events we are able to estimate the value of
the reliability and the probability of failure as it explained in
Fig. 7 which shows the flowchart of the novel RaFSA
estimation process for general bay protection function,


Figure 7. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process general bay protection
function.
C. Cascaded system architecture
In this subsection we consider the RaFSA estimation process
of the BFP function for the cascaded small transmission
substation (T1-1) architecture Fig. 3. We assume that the
system is synchronous. The BFP function based on successful
implementation in cascaded architecture, it needs that all six
bays are connected in a chain upon open loop configuration.
Therefore, it requires that all switches, related PIEDs and
BIEDs are working successfully (series connection). The same
procedure can be followed as in the cases above. However in
cascaded system with different failure rate IEDs more than
two, it needs to assign different (j) failure rates for each IED.
Besides, the IEDs connection needs to be considered. By
counting the success and failure events we are able to estimate
the value of the reliability and the probability of failure as it
explained in Fig. 8 which shows the flowchart of the RaFSA
estimation process for cascaded system architecture,


Figure 8. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process cascaded system
architecture

D. Redundant ring system architecture
Lastly, the RaFSA estimation process for the BFP function
of the redundant ring architecture has been considered. In order
of achieving higher level of redundancy each IED has been
connected within SAS with two separated redundant ring
configuration networks. Based on this configuration all IEDs
have tow paths within two separated ring-networks Fig. 4. The
same procedure can be followed as in the cases above.
However in redundant ring system with different failure rate
IEDs, it needs to assign different (j) failure rates for each IED.
The IEDs connections in each subsystem need to be
considered, since we have a mixed series and parallel IEDs
connection. For instance parallel IEDs a failure in one IED
leads to other IED operates over the fielded one. Moreover, for
any other intermediate situation such as 4-out-of-5 IEDs
subsystem can be modeled as three IEDs in series with two
IEDs in parallel [2]. By counting the success and failure events
we are able to estimate the value of the reliability and the
probability of failure as it explained in Fig. 9 which shows the
flowchart of the RaFSA estimation process for redundant ring
system architecture,

Figure 9. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process ring system architecture

The related results and discussions of using RaFSA for the
above cases had been published in ref [10].
V. CONCLUSION
The performance of electrical generation, transmission and
distribution is directly related to the reliability of its
components mainly IEDs and the protection functions.
Modern IEDs and protection functions can fail for any reason.
As regards, 100% reliable is impossible. Therefore, to assess
the reliability and stability of the system, actual system
behaviour estimation method is required. This can be
implemented by the novel estimation method RaFSA.
RaFSA estimation method attempts to examine and predict
the actual behavior pattern for each IED in the system. These
examination and prediction features are provided based on the
nature through the process that involved within the invented
RaFSA is random. It provides specific benefits such as: easy
to carry out in different PC software such as Matlab, C, C++,
etc. Support different kind of probability distribution models,
not only the exponential one. It can handle a huge amount of
input data. Besides, other analyzing tools and parameters such
as repairing time, load flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc.
can be considered. Lastly, changing input data can easily be
applied through RaFSA without major modifications in the
underlying process.

Acknowledgment
I would like to thank the DEMVE project University of
Vaasa group for their valuable support to complete this work.
VI. REFERANCES
[1] F. Brndstrm, W. Lord, THE FUTURE SUBSTATION-
REFLECTION ABOUT DESIGN, 20
TH
, Con, p 8-1, 2009.J. Clerk
Maxwell, A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism, 3rd ed., vol. 2.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1892, pp.6873.
[2] R. Billinton, N. Allan, Relaibility Evaluation of Engineering Systems,
ISBN 0-306-44063-6.NY, USA.
[3] M. Kezunovic, T. Popovic, DEVELOPING FUTURE SUBSTATION
AUTOMATION STRATECIES: SELECTING APPROPRIATE IEDS
AND DEVELOPING NEW APPLICATIONS, International Energy
journal, Vol.6, No.1, 2005.
[4] M. G. Kanabar and T. S. Sidhu, Relaibility and Availability Analysis of
IEC 61850 Based Substation Communication Architecture, in
Proc.IEEE Power & Energy Sociaty General Meeting, 2009.
[5] P. Zhang, L. Portillo and M. Kezunovic, Reliability and Component
Importance Analysis of All-Digitall Protection Systems, in Proc.IEEE
Power & Energy Sociaty General Meeting, 2006.
[6] Mike Mekkanen, Reino Virrankoski, Mohammed Elmusrati and Erkki
Antila, Reliability and Availability Investigation for Next-Generation
Substation Function Based on IEC 61850, 3rd Workshop on Wireless
Communication and Applications, Vaasa, Finland, (WoWCA 2012).
[7] L. Andersson, K. Peter,C. Brunner, and W. Wimmer, Relaibility
investegatiion for SA communication architectures based on IEC
61850, ABB, Switzerland, 2005
[8] K. P. Brand, C. Brunner and W. Wimmer, DESIGN OF IEC61850
BASED SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM ACCORDING TO
CUSTOMER REQUIREMENTS, CIGRE, Session, Paris, 2004.
[9] M. Kezunovic, C. Guo, Y. Guan and M. Ghavami, New concept and
solution for monitoring and control system for the 21th century
substation, IEEE Co, Power System Technology, 2010.
[10] Mike Mekkanen, Reino Virrankoski, Mohammed Elmusrati and Erkki
Antila, Reliability Evaluation and Comparison for Next-Generation
Substation Function Based on IEC 61850 Using Monte Carlo
Simulation , IEEE Co, ICCSPA, Sharjah, UAE, 2013.