SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 94045. September 13, 1991.]

CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO), Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and
CENECO UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE), Respondents.

Enrique S. Tabino for Petitioner.

Edmundo G. Manlapao for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; MED-ARBITER; SCOPE
OF POWER OVER CERTIFICATION ELECTION. Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to
have a valid certification election at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have
cast their votes. It is apparent that incidental to the power of the med-arbiter to hear and decide
representation cases is the power to determine who the eligible voters are. In so doing, it is
axiomatic that the med-arbiter should determine the legality of the employees membership in
the union.

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES TO SELF-ORGANIZATION; MUST BE ACCORDED
WITH HIGHEST RESPECT. The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling
reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE,
the resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their preference for union
membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to
afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates
that the employees right to form and join unions for purpose of collective bargaining be
accorded the highest consideration.

3. ID.; ID.; DIRECT CERTIFICATION AS A METHOD OF SELECTING THE EXCLUSIVE
BARGAINING AGENT OF THE WORKERS; NO LONGER AVAILABLE UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 111. We rule, that the direct certification ordered by respondent
Secretary is not proper. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March
4, 1987, the direct certification originally allowed under Article 257 of the Labor Code has
apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the
workers. This amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct
certification which is no longer available now under the change in said provision.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT WARRANTED EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION. We
have said that where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no
opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. In said case which has similar features
to that at bar, wherein the respondent Minister directly certified the union, we held that: ". . . As
pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the
assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for
representation cases because: . . . (c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of
majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the
employees to choose their collective bargaining representative. (d) He has in effect imposed
upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority representation is
under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of
the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat
of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has
not been legally established."

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J .:

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(CENECO) seeks to annul the order 1 issued by then Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma on June 6, 1990, declaring the projected certification election unnecessary and
directing petitioner CENECO to continue recognizing private respondent CENECO Union of
Rational Employees (CURE) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank-
and-file employees of petitioners electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining.

It appears from the records that on August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees,
providing for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and extending up to March 31,
1990. On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted
for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CUREs request on the ground that, under applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric
cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. 2

Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA re negotiation, CURE members, in a general
assembly held on December 9, 1989, approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that "all
union members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members membership from Central
Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of the full benefits under the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the
supposed benefits that our union may avail (of) under the renewed CBA." 3 This was ratified by
259 of the 362 union members. CENECO and the Department of Labor and Employment,
Bacolod District, were furnished copies of this resolution.

However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on February 27, 1990
under Resolution No. 90 "for the reason that the basis of withdrawal is not among the grounds
covered by Board Resolution No. 5023, dated November 22, 1989 and that said request is
contrary to Board Resolution No. 5033 dated December 13, 1989, . . . ." 4

By reason of CENECOs refusal to re negotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition for direct
recognition or for certification election, supported by 282 or 72% of the 388 rank-and-file
employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.

CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there are legal constraints to the filing of
the certification election, citing the ruling laid down by this Court in Batangas I Electric
Cooperative Labor Union v. Romeo A. Young, 5 (BATANGAS case) to the effect that
"employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form
or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot
bargain with himself or his co-owners."cralaw virtua1aw library

Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an order, 6 granting the petition for certification
election which, in effect, was a denial of CENECOs motion to dismiss, and directing the
holding of a certification election between CURE and No Union.

CENECO appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which issued the questioned
order modifying the aforestated order of the med-arbiter by directly certifying CURE as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of CURE.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner CENECO argues that respondent Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in
not applying to the present case the doctrine enunciated in the BATANGAS case that employees
of an electric cooperative who at the same time are members of the electric cooperative are
prohibited from forming or joining labor unions for purposes of a collective bargaining
agreement. While CENECO recognizes the employees right to self-organization, it avers that
this is not absolute. Thus, it opines that employees of an electric cooperative who at the same
time are members thereof are not allowed to form or join labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining. However, petitioner does not hesitate to admit that the prohibition does not extend to
employees of an electric cooperative who are not members of the cooperative.

The issue, therefore, actually involves a determination of whether or not the employees of
CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join
CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the
latter.

As culled from the records, it is the submission of CENECO that the withdrawal from
membership in the cooperative and, as a consequence, the employees acquisition of membership
in the union cannot be allowed for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. It was made as a subterfuge or to subvert the ruling in the BATANGAS case:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

2. To allow the withdrawal of the members of CENECO from the cooperative without justifiable
reason would greatly affect the objectives and goals of petitioner as an electric cooperative;

3. The Secretary of Labor, as well as the Med-Arbiter, has no jurisdiction over the issue of the
withdrawal from membership which is vested in the National Electrification Administration
(NEA) which has direct control and supervision over the operations of electric cooperatives; and

4. Assuming that the Secretary has jurisdiction, CURE failed to exhaust administrative remedies
by not referring the matter of membership withdrawal to the NEA.

The petition is destitute of merit; certiorari will not lie.

We first rule on the alleged procedural infirmities affecting the instant case. CENECO avers that
the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of withdrawal from membership of its
employees in the cooperative which, it claims, is properly vested in the NEA which has control
and supervision over all electric cooperatives.

From a perusal of petitioners motion to dismiss filed with the med-arbiter, it becomes readily
apparent that the sole basis for petitioners motion is the illegality of the employees membership
in respondent union despite the fact that they allegedly are still members of the cooperative.
Petitioner itself adopted the aforesaid argument in seeking the dismissal of the petition for
certification election filed with the med-arbiter, and the finding made by the latter was merely in
answer to the arguments advanced by petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have submitted
the issue of membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter
and it is now estopped from questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to
dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon.

Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to have a valid certification election at least a majority of
all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. It is apparent that incidental to the power
of the med-arbiter to hear and decide representation cases is the power to determine who the
eligible voters are. In so doing, it is axiomatic that the med-arbiter should determine the legality
of the employees membership in the union. In the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to
consider first the propriety of the employees membership withdrawal from the cooperative
before a certification election can be had.

Lastly, it is petitioner herein who is actually questioning the propriety of the withdrawal of its
members from the cooperative. Petitioner could have brought the matter before the NEA if it
wanted to and if such remedy had really been available, and there is nothing to prevent it from
doing so. It would be absurd to fault the employees for the neglect or laxity of petitioner in
protecting its own interests.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of this Court in
the BATANGAS case is without merit. The case referred to merely declared that employees who
are at the same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of
collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are
prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.

As discussed by the Solicitor General, Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of CENECO provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon
compliance with such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same
section provides that upon withdrawal, the member is merely required to surrender his
membership certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he
has with the cooperative. There appears to be no other condition or requirement imposed upon a
withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause for petitioners denial of the withdrawal from
membership of its employees who are also members of the union. 7

The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying the withdrawal of the
members concerned were never presented nor their contents disclosed either before the med-
arbiter or the Secretary of Labor if only to prove the ratiocination for said denial. Furthermore,
CENECO never averred noncompliance with the terms and conditions for withdrawal, if any. It
appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal
from membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done at
any time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary
basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an
organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same.

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal
from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member-
employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in
the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote
the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and join
unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during
the annual meeting becomes too trinal and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more
important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice. Besides, the 390
employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of the cooperative, represent
a very small percentage of the cooperatives total membership of 44,000. It is inconceivable how
the withdrawal of a negligible number of members could adversely affect the business concerns
and operations of CENECO.

We rule, however, that the direct certification ordered by respondent Secretary is not proper. By
virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct
certification originally allowed under Article 257 of the Labor Code has apparently been
discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. This
amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which
is no longer available now under the change in said provision. 8

We have said that where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that
no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. 9 In said case which has similar
features to that at bar, wherein the respondent Minister directly certified the union, we held
that:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

". . . As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in
rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for
representation cases because: . . . (c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of
majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the
employees to choose their collective bargaining representative. (d) He has in effect imposed
upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority representation is
under serious question This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of the
Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of
being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not
been legally established."cralaw virtua1aw library

While there may be some factual variances, the rationale therein is applicable to the present case
in the sense that it is not alone sufficient that a union has the support of the majority. What is
equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned.
The most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working
force is by certification election. 10

WHEREFORE, the questioned order for the direct certification of respondent CURE as the
bargaining representative of the employees of petitioner CENECO is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The med-arbiter is hereby ordered to conduct a certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of CENECO with CURE and No Union as the choices therein.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.












THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156292. January 11, 2005]
ME-SHURN CORPORATION AND SAMMY CHOU, petitioners, vs. ME-SHURN
WORKERS UNION-FSM AND ROSALINA- CRUZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To justify the closure of a business and the termination of the services of the concerned
employees, the law requires the employer to prove that it suffered substantial actual losses. The
cessation of a companys operations shortly after the organization of a labor union, as well as the
resumption of business barely a month after, gives credence to the employees claim that the
closure was meant to discourage union membership and to interfere in union activities. These
acts constitute unfair labor practices.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the
November 29, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 69675, the
decretal portion of which reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment must be, as it hereby
is, AFFIRMED, and the present petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs shall be taxed
against petitioners.[3]
The affirmed November 29, 2001 Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Third Division, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and respondent Me-Shurn
Corp. is hereby ordered to pay the complainants who appeared in the proceedings conducted by
the Labor Arbiter their full backwages from the date their wages were withheld from them to the
date of the finality of this decision.[5]
The Facts
On June 7, 1998, the regular rank and file employees of Me-Shurn Corporation organized Me-
Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate of the February Six Movement (FSM).[6] Respondent
union had a pending application for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
through a letter dated June 11, 1998.[7]
Ten days later, or on June 17, 1998, petitioner corporation started placing on forced leave all the
rank and file employees who were members of the unions bargaining unit.[8]
On June 23, 1998, respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No.
3.[9]
Instead of filing an answer to the Petition, the corporation filed on July 27, 1998, a comment
stating that it would temporarily lay off employees and cease operations, on account of its
alleged inability to meet the export quota required by the Board of Investment.[10]
While the Petition was pending, 184 union members allegedly submitted a retraction/withdrawal
thereof on July 14, 1998. As a consequence, the med-arbiter dismissed the Petition. On May 7,
1999, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-
Baldoz granted the unions appeal and ordered the holding of a certification election among the
rank and file employees of the corporation.[11]
Meanwhile, on August 4, 1998, respondent union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner
corporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockout and union busting). This
matter was docketed as Case No. NCMB-RO3-BEZ-NZ-08-42-98.[12]
On August 31, 1998, Chou Fang Kuen (alias Sammy Chou, the other petitioner herein) and
Raquel Lamayra (the Filipino administrative manager of the corporation) imposed a precondition
for the resumption of operation and the rehiring of laid off workers. He allegedly required the
remaining union officers to sign an Agreement containing a guarantee that upon their return to
work, no union or labor organization would be organized. Instead, the union officers were to
serve as mediators between labor and management.[13] After the signing of the Agreement, the
operations of the corporation resumed in September 1998.[14]
On November 5, 1998, the union reorganized and elected a new set of officers. Respondent
Rosalina Cruz was elected president.[15] Thereafter, it filed two Complaints docketed as NLRC
Case Nos. RAB-III-11-9586-98 and RAB-III-09-0322-99. These cases were consolidated and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Henry Isorena for compulsory arbitration. Respondents charged
petitioner corporation with unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and
deficiency in separation pay, for which they prayed for damages and attorneys fees.
The corporation countered that because of economic reversals, it was compelled to close and
cease its operations to prevent serious business losses; that under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
it had the right to do so; that in August 1998, it had paid its 342 laid off employees separation
pay and benefits in the total amount of P1,682,863.88; and that by virtue of these payments, the
cases had already become moot and academic. It also averred that its resumption of operations
in September 1998 had been announced and posted at the Bataan Export Processing Zone, and
that some of the former employees had reapplied.
Petitioner corporation questioned the legality of the representation of respondent union.
Allegedly, it was not the latter, but the Me-Shurn Independent Employees Union -- with
Christopher Malit as president -- that was recognized as the existing exclusive bargaining agent
of the rank and file employees and as the one that had concluded a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with the corporation on May 19, 1999.[16] Hence, the corporation asserted
that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldozs Decision ordering the holding of a certification election
had become moot and academic.
On the other hand, respondents contested the legality of the formation of the Me-Shurn
Independent Employees Union and petitioners recognition of it as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees. Respondents argued that the pendency of the representation issue before
the DOLE had barred the alleged recognition of the aforementioned union.
Labor Arbiter Isorena dismissed the Complaints for lack of merit. He ruled that (1) actual and
expected losses justified the closure of petitioner corporation and its dismissal of its employees;
(2) the voluntary acceptance of separation pay by the workers precluded them from questioning
the validity of their dismissal; and (3) the claim for separation pay lacked factual basis.[17]
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter Isorena. Finding petitioners guilty
of unfair labor practice, the Commission ruled that the closure of the corporation shortly after
respondent union had been organized, as well as the dismissal of the employees, had been
effected under false pretenses. The true reason therefor was allegedly to bar the formation of the
union. Accordingly, the NLRC held that the illegally dismissed employees were entitled to back
wages.[18]
After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[19] petitioners elevated the cases to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.[20] They maintained that the NLRC had committed
grave abuse of discretion and serious errors of fact and law in reversing the Decision of the labor
arbiter and in finding that the corporations cessation of operations in August 1998 had been
tainted with unfair labor practice.
Petitioners added that respondent unions personality to represent the affected employees had
already been repudiated by the workers themselves in the certification election conducted by the
DOLE. Pursuant to the Decision of Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz in Case No. RO3 00 9806
RU 001, a certification election was held on September 7, 2000, at the premises of petitioner
corporation under the supervision of the DOLE. The election had the following results:
Me Shurn Workers Union-FSM 1
No Union 135
Spoiled 2
Challenged 52
Total Votes Cast 190[21]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed the Petition because of the failure of petitioners to submit sufficient proof of
business losses. It found that they had wanted merely to abort or frustrate the formation of
respondent union. The burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid or
authorized cause rested on the employer.
The appellate court further affirmed the unions legal personality to represent the employees. It
held that (1) registration was not a prerequisite to the right of a labor organization to litigate; and
(2) the cases may be treated as representative suits, with respondent union acting for the benefit
of all its members.
Hence, this Petition.[22]
Issues
In their Supplemental Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:
(1) Whether the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn Corporation is for
an authorized cause, and
(2) Whether respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners.[23]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
First Issue:
Validity of the Dismissal
The reason invoked by petitioners to justify the cessation of corporate operations was alleged
business losses. Yet, other than generally referring to the financial crisis in 1998 and to their
supposed difficulty in obtaining an export quota, interestingly, they never presented any report
on the financial operations of the corporation during the period before its shutdown. Neither did
they submit any credible evidence to substantiate their allegation of business losses.
Basic is the rule in termination cases that the employer bears the burden of showing that the
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the dismissal is deemed unjustified.
Apropos this responsibility, petitioner corporation should have presented clear and convincing
evidence[24] of imminent economic or business reversals as a form of affirmative defense in the
proceedings before the labor arbiter or, under justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the
NLRC.
However, as previously stated, in all the proceedings before the two quasi-judicial bodies and
even before the CA, no evidence was submitted to show the corporations alleged business
losses. It is only now that petitioners have belatedly submitted the corporations income tax
returns from 1996 to 1999 as proof of alleged continued losses during those years.
Again, elementary is the principle barring a party from introducing fresh defenses and facts at the
appellate stage.[25] This Court has ruled that matters regarding the financial condition of a
company -- those that justify the closing of its business and show the losses in its operations --
are questions of fact that must be proven below.[26] Petitioners must bear the consequence of
their neglect. Indeed, their unexplained failure to present convincing evidence of losses at the
early stages of the case clearly belies the credibility of their present claim.[27]
Obviously, on the basis of the evidence -- or the lack thereof -- the appellate court cannot be
faulted for ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding that the closure of
petitioner corporation was not due to alleged financial losses.
At any rate, even if we admit these additional pieces of evidence, the circumstances surrounding
the cessation of operations of the corporation reveal the doubtful character of its supposed
financial reason.
First, the claim of petitioners that they were compelled to close down the company to prevent
further losses is belied by their resumption of operations barely a month after the corporation
supposedly folded up.
Moreover, petitioners attribute their loss mainly to their failure to obtain an export quota from
the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB). Yet, as pointed out by respondents, the
corporation resumed its business without first obtaining an export quota from the GTEB.
Besides, these export quotas pertain only to business with companies in the United States and do
not preclude the corporation from exporting its products to other countries. In other words, the
business that petitioner corporation engaged in did not depend entirely on exports to the United
States.
If it were true that these export quotas constituted the determining and immediate cause of the
closure of the corporation, then why did it reopen for business barely a month after the alleged
cessation of its operations?
Second, the Statements of Income and Deficit for the years 1996 and 1997 show that at the
beginning of 1996, the corporation had a deficit of P2,474,505. Yet, the closure was effected
only after more than a year from such year-end deficit; that is, in the middle of 1998, shortly
after the formation of the union.
On the other hand, the Statement of Income and Deficit for the year 1998 does not reflect the
extent of the losses that petitioner corporation allegedly suffered in the months prior to its
closure in July/August 1998. This document is not an adequate and competent proof of the
alleged losses, considering that it resumed operations in the succeeding month of September.
Upon careful study of the evidence, it is clear that the corporation was more profitable in 1997
than in 1996. By the end of 1997, it had a net income of P1,816,397.
If petitioners were seriously desirous of averting losses, why did the corporation not close in
1996 or earlier, when it began incurring deficits? They have not satisfactorily explained why the
workers dismissal was effected only after the formation of respondent union in September 1998.
We also take note of the allegation that after several years of attempting to organize a union, the
employees finally succeeded on June 7, 1998. Ten days later, without any valid notice, all of
them were placed on forced leave, allegedly because of lack of quota.
All these considerations give credence to their claim that the closure of the corporation was a
mere subterfuge, a systematic approach intended to dampen the enthusiasm of the union
members.[28]
Third, as a condition for the rehiring of the employees, the union officers were made to sign an
agreement that they would not form any union upon their return to work. This move was
contrary to law.
Fourth, notwithstanding the Petition for Certification Election filed by respondents and despite
knowledge of the pendency thereof, petitioners recognized a newly formed union and hastily
signed with it an alleged Collective Bargaining Agreement. Their preference for the new union
was at the expense of respondent union. Moncada Bijon Factory v. CIR[29] held that an
employer could be held guilty of discrimination, even if the preferred union was not company-
dominated.
Fifth, petitioners were not able to prove their allegation that some of the employees contracts
had expired even before the cessation of operations. We find this claim inconsistent with their
position that all 342 employees of the corporation were paid their separation pay plus accrued
benefits in August 1998.
Sixth, proper written notices of the closure were not sent to the DOLE and the employees at least
one month before the effectivity date of the termination, as required under the Labor Code.
Notice to the DOLE is mandatory to enable the proper authorities to ascertain whether the
closure and/or dismissals were being done in good faith and not just as a pretext for evading
compliance with the employers just obligations to the affected employees.[30] This requirement
is intended to protect the workers right to security of tenure. The absence of such requirement
taints the dismissal.
All these factors strongly give credence to the contention of respondents that the real reason
behind the shutdown of the corporation was the formation of their union. Note that, to constitute
an unfair labor practice, the dismissal need not entirely and exclusively be motivated by the
unions activities or affiliations. It is enough that the discrimination was a contributing
factor.[31] If the basic inspiration for the act of the employer is derived from the affiliation or
activities of the union, the formers assignment of another reason, no matter how seemingly
valid, is unavailing.[32]
Concededly, the determination to cease operations is a management prerogative that the State
does not usually interfere in. Indeed, no business can be required to continue operating at a loss,
simply to maintain the workers in employment. That would be a taking of property without due
process of law. But where it is manifest that the closure is motivated not by a desire to avoid
further losses, but to discourage the workers from organizing themselves into a union for more
effective negotiations with management, the State is bound to intervene.[33]
Second Issue:
Legal Personality of Respondent Union
Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners argument that respondent union was not
legitimate. It should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it filed a Petition for Certification
Election. While this Petition was initially dismissed by the med-arbiter on the basis of a
supposed retraction, note that the appeal was granted and that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz
ordered the holding of a certification election.
The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union were not a legitimate labor
organization within the meaning of the Labor Code. Under this Code, in an unorganized
establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition for certification election.[34] Hence,
while it is not clear from the record whether respondent union is a legitimate organization, we
are not readily inclined to believe otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-labor policies
enshrined in the Constitution and the Labor Code.[35]
Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in order to challenge the
unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against it and its members.[36] It would be an
unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of labor associations
if thereafter such collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their representative
capacity.[37]
Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners against respondent union
prior to the holding of the certification election on September 27, 2000 -- acts that included their
immediate grant of exclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining agent despite the
pending Petition for certification election -- the results of that election cannot be said to
constitute a repudiation by the affected employees of the unions right to represent them in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76673 June 22, 1988
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PANOMEA-FUR), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Juanito R. Carlos, Jr. for private respondent PANOMEA-FUR.
Cenon S. Cervantes, Jr. for respondent PAL.

GRIO-AQUINO, J .:
Petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations in issuing the following orders:
1. NCR Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz' Resolution dated January 13,
1981;
2. BLR Resolution dated November 27,1981 signed by OIC Romeo
Young;
3. BLR Order signed by Director Cresenciano Trajano dated April 4, 1986;
4. BLR Order signed by Director Cresenciano Trajano dated June 26,
1986; and
5. BLR Order dated October 29, 1986 signed by Director Pura Ferrer-
Calleja in BLR Case No. A-034-81 (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80).
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the respondent BLR
Director from proceeding with the certification election in BLR Case No. 034-81 (NCR-
LRD-M-9-361-80) and moves to dismiss the petition for certification election filed by
Philippine Airlines Non-Managerial Employees Association (PANOMEA-FUR).
The records show that prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code on November 1, 1974,
there were four collective bargaining agents in the Philippine Airlines, Inc., namely: 1)
the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippine (ALPAP), representing pilots; 2) Flight
Attendants and Flight Stewards Association of the Philippines, (FASAP), representing
flight attendants and stewards; 3) Philippine Airlines Supervisors' Association (PALSA),
representing ground supervisory personnel, and 4) petitioner (PALEA) representing
ground rank-and-file personnel.
Pursuant to Section II, Rule II of the Labor Code, in relation to Articles 212(k) and 246,
Labor Code as amended, the continued existence of PALSA was rejected, because a
supervisory union could not organize as a labor unit separate from that of the rank-and-
file organization. In anticipation of PALSA's dissolution, the Philippine Airlines Personnel
Association (PALPA-Legayada) filed on November 19, 1974 a petition for certification
election under BLR Case No. 0013. In this case, the BLR Director ruled on November
24,1975 that "all employees with the positions of division heads or above shall be
considered "managerial employees" and ineligible to vote, and all others shall be
declared rank and file."
On April 27,1977, a certification election was held among: (1) PALPA, (2) PALEA, and
(3) No Union. PALEA, as the winner in that election, was certified by the BLR as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employee of the Philippine Airlines,
Inc.
PALEA and PAL signed a 3-year collective bargaining agreement effective October 1,
1976 up to September 30, 1979. Its life was, by agreement of the parties, extended up
to September 30, 1980.
Before the expiration of the agreement in September, 1980, the respondent Philippine
Airlines Non-Managerial Employees' Association (PANOMEA-FUR) filed a petition for
certification election among the "administrative, supervisory, licensed mechanics,
technical and confidential employees" of PAL, alleging inter alia that "there is no other
union existing in the proposed bargaining unit nor is there a certified collective
bargaining agreement which may be a bar to the petition." PALEA, which had an
existing collective bargaining agreement with the Management, was not mentioned in
the petition, nor notified of the filing of the same. Although PAL had filed its position
paper in the said certification election case, the Med-Arbiter issued a resolution on
January 13, 1981, granting the petition for a certification election among the
administrative, supervisory, licensed mechanics, technical and confidential employees
of PAL with the following as the contending parties: P (1) PANOMEA-FUR and (2) No
Union.
Upon learning of the Med-Arbiters resolution. PALEA appealed to the BLR Director on
February 9, 1981 as a compulsory intervenor. The BLR Officer-in-charge affirmed on
November 27, 1981 the Med-Arbiter's resolution calling for a certification election.
PALEA and PAL filed separate motions for reconsideration of the BLR resolution.
Meanwhile, PAL and PALEA concluded a collective bargaining agreement on May 19,
1981, with a three-year life span from October 1, 1980 to September 30, 1983. It was
renewed for another three-year period expiring on September 30, 1986.
While PAL and PALEA's motions for reconsideration were pending resolution by the
BLR Director, the licensed mechanics whom PANOMEA-FUR sought to represent, filed
their own petition for certification election on October 16, 1984 under the name of PAL
Licensed/Amalgamated Federation of Labor of the Philippines (PALMA-AFL).
PAL and PLEA separately filed an answer/opposition to the petition of PALMA-AFL.
PALEA argued that it was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of PAL, including the members of PALMA-AFL who are also embraced within the CBA
that was concluded between PAL and PALEA.
On October 11, 1985, the BLR Director dismissed the petition of the licensed mechanics
only (PALMA-AFL), excluding the administrative, supervisory, technical and confidential
employees. He ruled that the existing law did not allow the creation of a separate
bargaining unit for the licensed mechanics at PAL, because they were considered
members of the existing rank-and-file unit represented for collective bargaining
purposes by PALEA.
However, on April 4, 1986, the BLR Director ordered the holding of a certification
election among the administrative, supervisory, licensed mechanics, technical and
confidential employees of PAL and denied PAL's and PALEA's motions for
reconsideration of the BLR's November 27, 1981 decision.
In his Order of June 26, 1986, BLR Director Cresciano Trajano denied PAL's and
PALEA's motions for reconsideration. However, finding it necessary to conduct pre-
election conferences to delineate the proper composition of the proposed bargaining
unit, the BLR on August 15, 1986 temporarily restrained the holding of the certification
election. On October 29, 1986, BLR Director Calleja lifted the restraining order and
directed the holding of the said election.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by PALEA, alleging that the BLR Director erred:
1. in ordering a certification election among PAL's administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential employees as a separate bargaining unit distinct
from the rank-and-file employees, in violation of specific provisions of the Labor Code
as amended, particularly Article 256 thereof; and
2. in not dismissing the petition for certification election filed by respondent PANOMEA-
FUR (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80) for having been rendered moot and academic by
supervening factors.
Petitioner claims that PALEA is the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-
file PAL employees, and that PANOMEA seeks to dismember or fragmentize the
already existing unit so that another one may be created. Furthermore, petitioner argues
that PANOMEA's petition for a certification election is fatally defective, as it is not
supported by the signatures of at least 30% of the bargaining unit composed of 7,000
rank-and-file employees (only 369 signatures were allegedly obtained), contrary to law
and national policy.
We are not persuaded that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The rule is that factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations which are supported by
substantial evidence are binding on this Court and must be respected (Asian Design
and Manufacturing Corp. vs. Deputy Minister of Labor, 142 SCRA 79). The Bureau of
Labor Relations found that the present CBA between PALEA and PAL covers only the
rank and file employees but not the licensed mechanics, administrative, supervisory,
technical and confidential employees of PAL. The petition failed to prove that
PANOMEA's petition lacked the support of 30% of the employees.
Employees have a constitutional right to choose their own bargaining representative.
The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented (George and Peter Lines, Inc. vs. Association of Labor Unions [ALU], 134
SCRA 92).
Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the
rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a
certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees'
choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby
controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal
vote of the employees themselves. In lifting the restraining order which her predecessor
had issued, and ordering that the certification election proceed, respondent Ferrer-
Calleja opened the door for the employees to express their choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.




FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115077. April 18, 1997]
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT, petitioner, vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Undersecretary of Labor, and
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA (NLM)-KATIPUNAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union)
filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor (National Capital Region)
in behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut)
docketed as NCR Case No. NCR-OD-M-9307-020.
i[1]

Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud,
falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent Union's registration making it void and
invalid. The motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent Union's registration was tainted with
false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the ratification of
the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were
two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have
taken place on June 26, 1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318
members when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were much less; and b) while
the application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the
organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification issued by the federation
KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus,
there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter certification and the
organization meeting of the alleged chapter.
Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner, on August 29, 1993, filed a
Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss,
ii[2]
claiming that:
1) Respondent Union alleged that the election of its officers was held on June 27, 1993;
however, it appears from the documents submitted by respondent union to the BIR-DOLE that
the Union's constitution and by-laws were adopted only on July 7, 1993, hence, there was no
bases for the supposed election of officers on June 27, 1993 because as of this date, there existed
no positions to which the officers could be validly elected;
2) Voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation of Article 241, section (c) of the
Labor Code;
3) The Constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its petition were not properly
acknowledged and notarized.
iii[3]

On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition
iv[4]
seeking the cancellation of the Union's
registration on the grounds of fraud and falsification, docketed as BIR Case No. 8-21-83.
v[5]

Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter requesting suspension of
proceedings in the certification election case until after the prejudicial question of the Union's
legal personality is determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.
However, in an Order dated September 29, 1993,
vi[6]
Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah
directed the holding of a certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees. The
Order explained:
x x x Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor organization in
contemplation of law and shall remain as such until its very charter certificate is canceled or
otherwise revoked by competent authority. The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false
statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which
could be properly ventilated in the cancellation proceedings.
vii[7]

On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in a Resolution dated December 29, 1993
viii[8]
denied the same.
A motion for reconsideration of the public respondent's resolution was denied in his Order
ix[9]

dated January 27, 1994, hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court where the principal issue raised is whether or not the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a
certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees, considering that: (1) respondent
Union's legal personality was squarely put in issue; (2) allegations of fraud and falsification,
supported by documentary evidence were made; and (3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's
registration is pending with the regional office of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
x[10]

We grant the petition.
In the public respondent's assailed Resolution dated December 29, 1993, the suggestion is made
that once a labor organization has filed the necessary documents and papers and the same have
been certified under oath and attested to, said organization necessarily becomes clothed with the
character of a legitimate labor organization. The resolution declares:
Records show that at the time of the filing of the subject petition on 9 July 1993 by the petitioner
NLM-KATIPUNAN, for and in behalf of its local affiliate Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng
Pizza Hut, the latter has been clothed with the status and/or character of a legitimate labor
organization. This is so, because on 8 July 1993, petitioner submitted to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), this Department, the following documents: Charter Certificate, Minutes of the
Organizational Meeting, List of Officers, and their respective addresses, financial statement,
Constitution and By-Laws (CBL, and the minutes of the ratification of the CBL). Said
documents (except the charter certificate) are certified under oath and attested to by the local
union's Secretary/Treasurer and President, respectively.
As to the contention that the certification election proceedings should be suspended in view of
the pending case for the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be stressed
that the pendency of a cancellation case is not a ground for the dismissal or suspension of a
representation proceedings considering that a registered labor organization continues to be a
legitimate one entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto until a final valid order is issued
canceling such registration.
xi[11]

In essence, therefore, the real controversy in this case centers on the question of whether or not,
after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor organization, recognition by
the Bureau of Labor Relations merely becomes a ministerial function.
We do not agree.
In the first place, the public respondent's views as expressed in his December 29, 1993
Resolution miss the entire point behind the nature and purpose of proceedings leading to the
recognition of unions as legitimate labor organizations. Article 234 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 234. Requirements of registration. - Any applicant labor organization, association or group
of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization,
the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual
financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it.
A more than cursory reading of the aforecited provisions clearly indicates that the requirements
embodied therein are intended as preventive measures against the commission of fraud. After a
labor organization has filed the necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes
mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the requirements under Article 234 have
been sedulously complied with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and
serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting
documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's
registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in
accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its
petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.
These measures are necessary - and may be undertaken simultaneously - if the spirit behind the
Labor Code's requirements for registration are to be given flesh and blood. Registration
requirements specifically afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be
lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.
xii[12]
Such requirements are a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and
unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be protected.
xiii[13]

Thus, in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,
xiv[14]

we held:
The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation
may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the petitioner's employees.
x x x
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a
certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for
certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. xxx
x x x
xxx. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona-fide
organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau.
The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and
misrepresentation or ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is
also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of
fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be
lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
x x x
xxx. It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to
make them wiser or to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only
recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as
requisites for local or chapter formation.
x x x
The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local union's right to be
certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely
saying that the local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise
this right. Big federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring their
locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely snapping
union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of
members.
Furthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the Bureau of Labor Relations a period of thirty (30)
days within which to review all applications for registration. Article 235 provides:
"Art. 235. Action on application. - The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within
thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer
of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president."
The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision ensures that any action taken by the Bureau of
Labor Relations is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears
emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a certificate of registration
should be compliance with the requirements for recognition under Article 234. Since, obviously,
recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not merely a ministerial function, the
question now arises as to whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order in spite of the fact that the question of the Union's
legitimacy was squarely put in issue and that the allegations of fraud and falsification were
adequately supported by documentary evidence.
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized
xv[15]
establishments, a petition for
certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights
by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification
election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the
status of a legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioner's prayer that the
former look into the legitimacy of the respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the union
was in the possession of a charter certificate so that "for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa
Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate labor organization."
xvi[16]
Glossing over the
transcendental issue of fraud and misrepresentation raised by herein petitioner, Med-Arbiter
Rasidali Abdullah held that:
The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the issuance of the
charter certificate are collateral issues which could be ventilated in the cancellation
proceedings.
xvii[17]

It cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by petitioner for the cancellation of respondent
Union's registration fall under paragraph (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. to wit:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of
members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto,
the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification;
x x x
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers,
minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents
together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses within
thirty (30) days from election
x x x
The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor
Code constitute a grave challenge to the right of respondent Union to ask for certification
election. The Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits of the petition for cancellation
before issuing an order calling for certification election. Registration based on false and
fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly
recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the
labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the
right to ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.
As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation Labor,
xviii[18]
"[t]he employer
needs the assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has
not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification
and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a legitimate labor organization are contrary to
the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The invalidity of respondent Union's
registration would negate its legal personality to participate in certification election.
Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess
all of the rights and privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and
privileges ultimately affect areas which are constitutionally protected, the activities in which
labor organizations, associations and unions are engaged directly affect the public interest and
should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements for the
acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in order.
Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would
have been more prudent for the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's
request for the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of the
legality of the Union's registration shall have been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and
public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
Resolution and Order of the public respondent dated December 29, 1993 and January 24, 1994,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Med-Arbiter to resolve with reasonable dispatch petitioner's
petition for cancellation of respondent Union's registration
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.

































THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142000. January 22, 2003]
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 is the petition of the Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Incorporated (THIGCI) assailing the February 15, 2002 decision of the
Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Resolutions of November 12, 1998 and December 29, 1998.
On October 16, 1997, the Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU)Philippine Transport
and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter No. 776, a legitimate labor
organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI, filed a
petition for certification election before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch
No. IV.

THIGCI, in its Commentxi[1] filed on November 27, 1997, opposed THEUs petition for
certification election on the ground that the list of union members submitted by it was defective
and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated
and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a
corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the
petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI.
THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names of its 71 actual rank-and-file employees which it
annexedxi[2] to its Comment to the petition for certification election. And it therein incorporated
the following tabulationxi[3] showing the number of signatories to said petition whose
membership in the union was being questioned as disqualified and the reasons for
disqualification:
# of Signatures Reasons for Disqualification
13 Supervisors of THIGCI
6 Resigned employees of THIGCI
2 AWOL employees of THIGCI
53 Rank-and-file employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
14 Supervisors of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands,
Inc.
6 Resigned employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
3 Terminated employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
1 AWOL employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
4 Signatures that cannot be deciphered
16 Names in list that were erased
2 Names with first names only
THIGCI also alleged that some of the signatures in the list of union members were secured
through fraudulent and deceitful means, and submitted copies of the handwritten denial and
withdrawal of some of its employees from participating in the petition.xi[4]

Replying to THIGCIs Comment, THEU asserted that it had complied with all the requirements
for valid affiliation and inclusion in the roster of legitimate labor organizations pursuant to
DOLE Department Order No. 9, series of 1997,xi[5] on account of which it was duly granted a
Certification of Affiliation by DOLE on October 10, 1997;xi[6] and that Section 5, Rule V of
said Department Order provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be subject to
collateral attack, and for as long as there is no final order of cancellation, it continues to enjoy
the rights accorded to a legitimate organization.
THEU thus concluded in its Replyxi[7] that under the circumstances, the Med-Arbiter should,
pursuant to Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order
No. 09, automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
By Order of January 28, 1998, xi[8] DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin ordered the holding of a
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI in this wise, quoted
verbatim:
We evaluated carefully this instant petition and we are of the opinion that it is complete in form
and substance. In addition thereto, the accompanying documents show that indeed petitioner
union is a legitimate labor federation and its local/chapter was duly reported to this Office
as one of its affiliate local/chapter. Its due reporting through the submission of all the
requirements for registration of a local/chapter is a clear showing that it was already included in
the roster of legitimate labor organizations in this Office pursuant to Department Order No. 9
Series of 1997 with all the legal right and personality to institute this instant petition. Pursuant
therefore to the provisions of Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules as amended by Department Order No. 9, since the respondents establishment is
unorganized, the holding of a certification election is mandatory for it was clearly established
that petitioner is a legitimate labor organization. Giving due course to this petition is therefore
proper and appropriate.xi[9] (Emphasis supplied)
Passing on THIGCIs allegation that some of the union members are supervisory, resigned and
AWOL employees or employees of a separate and distinct corporation, the Med-Arbiter held that
the same should be properly raised in the exclusion-inclusion proceedings at the pre-election
conference. As for the allegation that some of the signatures were secured through fraudulent
and deceitful means, he held that it should be coursed through an independent petition for
cancellation of union registration which is within the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional
Director. In any event, the Med-Arbiter held that THIGCI failed to submit the job
descriptions of the questioned employees and other supporting documents to bolster its
claim that they are disqualified from joining THEU.
THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary which, by Resolution of June 4, 1998, set
aside the said Med-Arbiters Order and accordingly dismissed the petition for certification
election on the ground that there is a clear absence of community or mutuality of interests, it
finding that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory employees and
rank-and-file employees) as well as employees of two separate and distinct corporate entities.

Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimalipis-
Baldoz, by authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued DOLE Resolution of November 12,
1998xi[10] setting aside the June 4, 1998 Resolution dismissing the petition for certification
election. In the November 12, 1998 Resolution, Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz held that
since THEU is a local chapter, the twenty percent (20%) membership requirement is not
necessary for it to acquire legitimate status, hence, the alleged retraction and withdrawal of
support by 45 of the 70 remaining rank-and-file members . . . cannot negate the legitimacy it has
already acquired before the petition; that rather than disregard the legitimate status already
conferred on THEU by the Bureau of Labor Relations, the names of alleged disqualified
supervisory employees and employees of the Country Club, Inc., a separate and distinct
corporation, should simply be removed from the THEUs roster of membership; and that
regarding the participation of alleged resigned and AWOL employees and those whose
signatures are illegible, the issue can be resolved during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings at
the pre-election stage.
The records of the case were thus ordered remanded to the Office of the Med-Arbiter for the
conduct of certification election.
THIGCIs Motion for Reconsideration of the November 12, 1998 Resolution having been denied
by the DOLE Undersecretary by Resolution of December 29, 1998,xi[11] it filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court which, by Resolution of April 14, 1999,xi[12] referred it to the Court of
Appeals in line with its pronouncement in National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Hon.
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al.,xi[13] and in strict observance of the hierarchy of courts, as
emphasized in the case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission.xi[14]
By Decision of February 15, 2000,xi[15] the Court of Appeals denied THIGCIs Petition for
Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution dated November 12, 1998. It held that while a
petition for certification election is an exception to the innocent bystander rule, hence, the
employer may pray for the dismissal of such petition on the basis of lack of mutuality of interests
of the members of the union as well as lack of employer-employee relationship following this
Courts ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union et alxi[16] and Dunlop Slazenger [Phils.] v. Hon. Secretary of Labor
and Employment et al,xi[17] petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to support its
allegations.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, raising the following
ISSUES/ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION
DATED 12 NOVEMER 1998 HOLDING THAT SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AND NON-
EMPLOYEES COULD SIMPLY BE REMOVED FROM APPELLEES ROSTER OF RANK-
AND-FILE MEMBERSHIP INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE LEGITIMACY OF
RESPONDENT UNIONS STATUS

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION
DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1998 HOLDING THAT THE DISQUALIFIED EMPLOYEES
STATUS COULD READILY BE RESOLVED DURING THE INCLUSION AND
EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER HAD BEEN DULY PROVEN BY FAILURE OF
RESPONDENT UNION TO DENY THE SAME AND BY THE SHEER WEIGHT OF
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONER AND CONTAINED IN THE RECORDS OF
THE CASExi[18]
The statutory authority for the exclusion of supervisory employees in a rank-and-file union, and
vice-versa, is Article 245 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Article 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-
and-file union, it does not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts
supervisory employees among its members, or vice-versa.
Citing Toyotaxi[19] which held that a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees is no labor organization at all, and the subsequent case of Progressive
Development Corp. Pizza Hut v. Ledesmaxi[20] which held that:
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized establishments, a petition for
certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights
by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification
election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the
status of a legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioners prayer that the
former look into the legitimacy of the respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the union
was in the possession of a charter certificate so that for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa
Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate organization,xi[21] (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied),
petitioner contends that, quoting Toyota, [i]t becomes necessary . . ., anterior to the granting of
an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor
organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article
245 of the Labor Code.xi[22]

Continuing, petitioner argues that without resolving the status of THEU, the DOLE
Undersecretary conveniently deferred the resolution on the serious infirmity in the membership
of [THEU] and ordered the holding of the certification election which is frowned upon as the
following ruling of this Court shows:
We also do not agree with the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in
the membership of the respondent union can be remedied in the pre-election conference thru
the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees who are occupying rank-and-file
positions will be excluded from the list of eligible voters. Public respondent gravely
misappreciated the basic antipathy between the interest of supervisors and the interest of rank-
and-file employees. Due to the irreconcilability of their interest we held in Toyota Motor
Philippines v. Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Labor Union, viz:
x x x
Clearly, based on this provision [Article 245], a labor organization composed of both rank-and-
file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or
purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a
mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot posses any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the
purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of
an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor
organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article
245 of the Labor Code. (Emphasis by petitioner) (Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), v. Secretary of
Labor, 300 SCRA 120 [1998]; Underscoring and emphasis supplied by petitioner.)
The petition fails. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality
cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the
Labor Code (Implementing Rules) which section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed
registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
(Emphasis supplied)
The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for under Article 239 of the
Labor Code, as follows:
Art. 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration. The following shall constitute grounds
for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Failure to submit the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph within thirty (30) days
from adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers,
minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to subject these documents
together with the list of the newly elected/appointed officers and their postal addresses within
thirty (30) days from election;
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the
losing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the
financial report itself;
(e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the cabo system, or otherwise engaging in any
activity prohibited by law;
(f) Entering into collective bargaining agreements which provide terms and conditions of
employment below minimum standards established by law;
(g) Asking for or accepting attorneys fees or negotiation fees from employers;
(h) Other than for mandatory activities under this Code, checking off special assessments or any
other fees without duly signed individual written authorizations of the members;
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required
by the Bureau; and
(j) Failure to comply with the requirements under Articles 237 and 238, (Emphasis supplied),
while the procedure for cancellation of registration is provided for in Rule VIII, Book V of the
Implementing Rules.
The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation,
unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239
of the Labor Code.
THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered to have
already acquired juridical personality which may not be assailed collaterally.
As for petitioners allegation that some of the signatures in the petition for certification election
were obtained through fraud, false statement and misrepresentation, the proper procedure is, as

reflected above, for it to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration, and not to
intervene in a petition for certification election.
Regarding the alleged withdrawal of union members from participating in the certification
election, this Courts following ruling is instructive:
[T]he best forum for determining whether there were indeed retractions from some of the
laborers is in the certification election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice
in a secret ballot. Suffice it to say that the will of the rank-and-file employees should in every
possible instance be determined by secret ballot rather than by administrative or quasi-judicial
inquiry. Such representation and certification election cases are not to be taken as contentious
litigations for suits but as mere investigations of a non-adversary, fact-finding character as to
which of the competing unions represents the genuine choice of the workers to be their sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative with their employer.xi[23]
As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it, at all events, does not lie given,
as found by the court a quo, its failure to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees
are actually occupying supervisory positions.
While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job titles and
ranks,xi[24] there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors respective duties, powers and
prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which
require the use of independent judgment.xi[25]
As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:xi[26]
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees x x x The
mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one.
Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived
of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation vs. Laguesma
(G. R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996), it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employees function and not the nomenclature or title
given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank-and-file or managerial status
or whether he is a supervisory employee. (Emphasis supplied).xi[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the
office of origin, the Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch No. IV, for the immediate
conduct of a certification election subject to the usual pre-election conference.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW),
CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER (CALMASUCO), respondents.

PARAS, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to annul and set
aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095)
entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of Free Workers
(FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California Manufacturing Corporation,
employer-appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo dated August 22,
1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the
Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for brevity) was
filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging
inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly

registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs
one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is filed in
accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a
substantial member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied
as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number of the supposed signatories to the
petition are not actually supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the
law would classify them as supervisors (Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFWCALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular
bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories does not apply; that the "organized
establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a "company" per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different
classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and the
rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted
them to the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were
excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the contested signatories are
indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a certification election be conducted among the
supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the
usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the election The payroll of the company
three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO); and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however, affirmed the above order in its assailed resolution
dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in its order dated November
17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his petition.
a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a
business establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's certification election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of herein petitioner in Paraaque and Las Pias can be
treated as a single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor organizations and not to
establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127) (Emphasis supplied).
Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No.
82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit
separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union
FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly
immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized
establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not even be established with
absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force
asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be
held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent
(Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is
relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of

this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF)
v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja,
et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer
has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain
collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander. Oft-quoted
is the pronouncement of the Court on management interference in certification elections, thus:
On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be
the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing
Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ. concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG., CO., INC., respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.

R E S O LU T I O N


NARVASA, J .:p
The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was
declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with
the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly counted with the
support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification election be held
at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that since the certification of
NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective
bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these
circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code,
1
reading as follows:
SEC. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement submitted in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at
any time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of
issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. Neither may a representation
question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a
bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had
been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of
strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article
231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only
be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the Director of Labor Relations rendered a Resolution on April 30,
1986 setting aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and dismissing KAMPIL's petition for
certification election. This disposition is justified in the Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-year period (mentioned in Section 3 above quoted)
has long run its course since intervenor NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it
could not be said, however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively with the
employer. If a closer look was made on the history of labor management relations in the
company, it could be readily seen that the delay in the negotiations for and conclusion of
a collective agreement the object of the one-year period could be attributed first, on
the exhaustion of all legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the
company before the filing of the present petition and second, to management who had
been resisting the representations of NAFLU in collective bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the present dispute,
especially considering that intervenor had to undergo a strike to bring management to the
negotiation table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied, instituted in this Court the present
certiorari action.

It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification election "within one year
from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result' in this case, from
February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of
rank-and-file workers of VIRON can have no application to the case at bar. That one-year period-
known as the "certification year" during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the
employer, and certification election is prohibited
2
has long since expired.
Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred
because, before its filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent
bargaining agent, had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules above
quoted.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no
such "bargaining deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that
its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's
recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively;
3
but there is no proof that it had taken any
action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could have
charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest
against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions
by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the
resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate
substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and
VIRON.
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 when NAFLU was proclaimed the
exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON employees to April 11, 1985 when KAMPIL filed its
petition for certification election or a period of more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining
agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and
VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to
bargain and for violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was settled by the parties'
agreement, and to another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of violation of
said agreement, a dispute which has since been certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of
Labor & Employment.
4
Obviously, however, these activities took place after the initiation of the
certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as
precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.
WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law
exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the
contested Resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in
BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.














































FIRST DIVISION paragraph paragraph paragraph
[ G . R . No . 118915 . February 4 , 1997 ] paragraph paragraph paragraph
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES - UNIFIED
FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS , ( CMC - ACE - UFSW ) , petitioners ,
vs . HON . BIENVENIDO E . LAGUESMA , Undersecretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment ; CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION -
ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS AND CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
INCORPORATED AND DRA . THELMA CLEMENTE , President , respondents .
paragraph paragraph paragraph
D E C I S I O N paragraph paragraph paragraph

HERMOSISIMA , JR . , J . : paragraph paragraph paragraph
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to reverse and set aside the Order dated
November 18 , 1994 of public respondent Bienvenido E . Laguesma , Undersecretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment , in Case No . OS - A - 136 - 94xviii[1]
which dismissed the petition for certification election filed by petitioner for lack of merit and
further directed private respondent hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with
respondent union , Capitol Medical Center Employees Association - Alliance of Filipino
Workers . paragraph paragraph paragraph
The antecedent facts are undisputed . paragraph paragraph paragraph
On February 17 , 1992 , Med - Arbiter Rasidali C . Abdullah issued an Order which
granted respondent union s petition for certification election among the rank - and - file
employees of the Capitol Medical Center . xviii[2] Respondent CMC appealed the Order to the
Office of the Secretary by questioning the legal status of respondent union s affiliation with
the Alliance of Filipino Workers ( AFW ) . To correct any supposed infirmity in its
legal status , respondent union registered itself independently and withdrew the petition which
had earlier been granted . Thereafter , it filed another petition for certification election .
paragraph paragraph paragraph
On May 29 , 1992 , Med - Arbiter Manases T . Cruz issued an order granting the
petition for certification election . xviii[3] Respondent CMC again appealed to the Office of the
Secretary which affirmedxviii[4] the Order of the Med - Arbiter granting the certification
election . paragraph paragraph paragraph
On December 9 , 1992 , elections were finally held with respondent union garnering 204
votes , 168 in favor of no union and 8 spoiled ballots out of a total of 380 votes cast .
Thereafter , on January 4 , 1993 , Med - Arbiter Cruz issued an Order certifying
respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees at CMC . xviii[5] paragraph paragraph paragraph
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the elections , respondent CMC again appealed to the Office
of the Secretary of Labor which appeal was denied on February 26 , 1993 . xviii[6] A
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by respondent CMC was likewise denied on March
23 , 1993 . xviii[7] paragraph paragraph paragraph
Respondent CMC s basic contention was the supposed pendency of its petition for
cancellation of respondent union s certificate of registration in Case No . NCR - OD -
M - 92211 - 028 . In the said case , Med - Arbiter Paterno Adap issued an Order
dated February 4 , 1993 which declared respondent union s certificate of registration as
null and void . xviii[8] However , this order was reversed on appeal by the Officer - in -
Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations in her Order issued on April 13 , 1993 . The said
Order dismissed the motion for cancellation of the certificate of registration of respondent union
and declared that it was not only a bona fide affiliate or local of a federation ( AFW ) ,
but a duly registered union as well . Subsequently , this case reached this Court in Capitol

Medical Center , Inc . v . Hon . Perlita Velasco , G . R . No . 110718 ,
where we issued a Resolution dated December 13 , 1993 , dismissing the petition of CMC
for failure to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion .
xviii[9] The motion for reconsideration filed by CMC was likewise denied in our Resolution dated
February 2 , 1994 . xviii[10] Thereafter , on March 23 , 1994 , we issued an entry of
judgment certifying that the Resolution dated December 13 , 1993 has become final and
executory . xviii[11] paragraph paragraph paragraph
Respondent union , after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the rank - and
- file employees of respondent CMC by Med - Arbiter Cruz , presented economic
proposals for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement ( CBA ) . However
, respondent CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of the Order
issued on February 4 , 1993 by Med - Arbiter Adap declaring the registration of respondent
union as null and void . In spite of the refusal of respondent CMC , respondent union still
persisted in its demand for CBA negotiations , claiming that it has already been declared as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank - and - file employees of the hospital .
paragraph paragraph paragraph
Due to respondent CMC s refusal to bargain collectively , respondent union filed a notice
of strike on March 1 , 1993 . After complying with the other legal requirements ,
respondent union staged a strike on April 15 , 1993 . On April 16 , 1993 , the
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an order certifying the same to
the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration where the said case is still
pending . xviii[12] paragraph paragraph paragraph
It is at this juncture that petitioner union , on March 24 , 1994 , filed a petition for
certification election among the regular rank - and - file employees of the Capitol Medical
Center Inc . It alleged in its petition that : 1 ) three hundred thirty one ( 331 ) out
of the four hundred ( 400 ) total rank - and - file employees of respondent CMC
signed a petition to conduct a certification election ; and 2 ) that the said employees are
withdrawing their authorization for the said union to represent them as they have joined and
formed the union Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees ( CMC - ACE
) . They also alleged that a certification election can now be conducted as more that 12
months have lapsed since the last certification election was held . Moreover , no
certification election was conducted during the twelve ( 12 ) months prior to the petition ,
and no collective bargaining agreement has as yet been concluded between respondent union and
respondent CMC despite the lapse of twelve months from the time the said union was voted as
the collective bargaining representative . paragraph paragraph paragraph
On April 12 , 1994 , respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal .
It contended that it is the certified bargaining agent of the rank - and - file employees of the
Hospital , which was confirmed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and by this Court
. It also alleged that it was not remiss in asserting its right as the certified bargaining agent for
it continuously demanded the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital despite the latter s
avoidance to bargain collectively . Respondent union was even constrained to strike on April
15 , 1993 , where the Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the dispute for

compulsory arbitration . Furthermore , it alleged that majority of the signatories who
supported the petition were managerial and confidential employees and not members of the rank
- and - file , and that there was no valid disaffiliation of its members , contrary to
petitioner s allegations . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Petitioner , in its rejoinder , claimed that there is no legal impediment to the conduct of a
certification election as more than twelve ( 12 ) months had lapsed since respondent union
was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent and no CBA was as yet concluded . It also
claimed that the other issues raised could only be resolved by conducting another certification
election . paragraph paragraph paragraph
In its surrejoinder , respondent union alleged that the petition to conduct a certification
election was improper , immoral and in manifest disregard of the decisions rendered by the
Secretary of Labor and by this Court . It claimed that CMC employed legal
obstructionism s in order to let twelve months pass without a CBA having been
concluded between them so as to pave the way for the entry of petitioner union . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
On May 12 , 1994 , Med - Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon , issued an Order granting the
petition for certification election among the rank and file employees . xviii[13] It ruled that the
issue was the majority status of respondent union . Since no certification election was held
within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result and there was no
bargaining deadlock between respondent union and the employees that had been submitted to
conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lock out , there is no bar to
the holding of a certification election . xviii[14] paragraph paragraph paragraph
Respondent union appealed from the said Order , alleging that the Med - Arbiter erred in
granting the petition for certification election and in holding that this case falls under Section 3 ,
Rule V , Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code . xviii[15] It also prayed that the
said provision must not be applied strictly in view of the facts in this case . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
Petitioner union did not file any opposition to the appeal . paragraph paragraph paragraph
On November 18 , 1994 , public respondent rendered a Resolution granting the appeal .
xviii[16] He ratiocinated that while the petition was indeed filed after the lapse of one year form the
time of declaration of a final certification result , and that no bargaining deadlock had been
submitted for conciliation or arbitration , respondent union was not remiss on its right to enter
into a CBA for it was the CMC which refused to bargain collectively . xviii[17] paragraph
paragraph paragraph
CMC and petitioner union separately filed motions for reconsideration of the said Order .
paragraph paragraph paragraph

CMC contended that in certification election proceedings , the employer cannot be ordered to
bargain collectively with a union since the only issue involved is the determination of the
bargaining agent of the employees . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Petitioner union claimed that to completely disregard the will of the 331 rank - and - file
employees for a certification election would result in the denial of their substantial rights and
interests . Moreover , it contended that public respondent s indictment that
petitioner capitalize ( sic ) on the ensuing delay which was caused by the Hospital ,
. x x x was unsupported by the facts and the records . paragraph paragraph paragraph
On January 11 , 1995 , public respondent issued a Resolution which denied the two
motions for reconsideration , hence this petition . xviii[18] paragraph paragraph paragraph
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for certification election , and in directing the hospital to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the said respondent union . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
Petitioner alleges that public respondent Undersecretary Laguesma denied it due process when it
ruled against the holding of a certification election . It further claims that the denial of due
process can be gleaned from the manner by which the assailed resolution was written , i . e
. , instead of the correct name of the mother federation UNIFIED , it was referred to as
UNITED ; and that the respondent union s name CMCEA - AFW was referred to as
CMCEA - AFLO . Petitioner maintains that such errors indicate that the assailed resolution
was prepared with indecent haste . paragraph paragraph paragraph
We do not subscribe to petitioner s contention . paragraph paragraph paragraph
The errors pointed to by petitioner can be classified as mere typographical errors which cannot
materially alter the substance and merit of the assailed resolution . paragraph paragraph
paragraph
Petitioner cannot merely anchor its position on the aforementioned erroneous names just to
attain a reversal of the questioned resolution . As correctly observed by the Solicitor General
, petitioner is merely nit - picking , vainly trying to make a monumental issue out of
a negligible error of the public respondent . xviii[19] paragraph paragraph paragraph
Petitioner also assails public respondents findings that the former capitalize ( sic )
on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non -
conclusion of a CBA within the certification year . xviii[20] It further argues that the denial
of its motion for a fair hearing was a clear case of a denial of its right to due process .
paragraph paragraph paragraph
Such contention of petitioner deserves scant consideration . paragraph paragraph paragraph

A perusal of the record shows that petitioner failed to file its opposition to oppose the grounds
for respondent union s appeal . paragraph paragraph paragraph
It was given an opportunity to be heard but lost it when it refused to file an appellee s
memorandum . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Petitioner insists that the circumstances prescribed in Section 3 , Rule V , Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code where a certification election should be conducted , viz
: ( 1 ) that one year had lapsed since the issuance of a final certification result ; and (
2 ) that there is no bargaining deadlock to which the incumbent or certified bargaining agent
is a party has been submitted to conciliation or arbitration , or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout , are present in this case . It further claims that since there
is no evidence on record that there exists a CBA deadlock , the law allowing the conduct of a
certification election after twelve months must be given effect in the interest of the right of the
workers to freely choose their sole and exclusive bargaining agent . paragraph paragraph
paragraph
While it is true that , in the case at bench , one year had lapsed since the time of
declaration of a final certification result , and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock ,
public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in respondent union
s favor since the delay in the forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the fault of the latter
. paragraph paragraph paragraph
A scrutiny of the records will further reveal that after respondent union was certified as the
bargaining agent of CMC , it invited the employer hospital to the bargaining table by
submitting its economic proposal for a CBA . However , CMC refused to negotiate with
respondent union and instead challenged the latter s legal personality through a petition for
cancellation of the certificate of registration which eventually reached this Court . The
decision affirming the legal status of respondent union should have left CMC with no other
recourse but to bargain collectively , but still it did not . Respondent union was left with
no other recourse but to file a notice of strike against CMC for unfair labor practice with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board . This eventually led to a strike on April 15 ,
1993 . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Petitioner union on the other hand , after this Court issued an entry of judgment on March 23
, 1994 , filed the subject petition for certification election on March 24 , 1994 ,
claiming that twelve months had lapsed since the last certification election . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
Was there a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union , before the filing of
petitioner of a petition for certification election , which had been submitted to conciliation or
had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout ? paragraph paragraph
paragraph

In the case of Divine Word University of Tacloban v . Secretary of Labor and Employment ,
xviii[21] we had the occasion to define what a deadlock is , viz : paragraph paragraph
paragraph
A deadlock is xxx the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage ; xxx
There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of
equal and opposed forces xxx . The word is synonymous with the word impasse , which
xxx presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which , despite noble
intentions , does not conclude in agreement between the parties . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
Although there is no deadlock in its strict sense as there is no counteraction of
forces present in this case nor reasonable effort at good faith bargaining , such can
be attributed to CMC s fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were never
answered by CMC . In fact , what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining
deadlock for CMC employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the
bargaining agent of the rank - and - file ; and use it as its leverage for its failure to
bargain with respondent union . Thus , we can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to
negotiate and reach an agreement with respondent union . CMC has not at any instance
shown willingness to discuss the economic proposals given by respondent union . xviii[22]
paragraph paragraph paragraph
As correctly ratiocinated by public respondent , to wit : paragraph paragraph paragraph
For herein petitioner to capitalize on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital
and which resulted in the non - conclusion of a CBA within the certification year , would
be to negate and render a mockery of the proceedings undertaken before this Department and to
put an unjustified premium on the failure of the respondent hospital to perform its duty to
bargain collectively as mandated in Article 252 of the Labor Code , as amended , which
states . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Article 252 . Meaning of duty to bargain collectively - the duty to bargain
collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages ,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievance or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession . paragraph paragraph paragraph
The duly certified bargaining agent , CMCEA - AFW , should not be made to further
bear the brunt flowing from the respondent hospital s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal
to bargain . xviii[23] paragraph paragraph paragraph
If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a bargaining deadlock
submitted to conciliation or arbitration , with more reason should it not be conducted if ,

despite attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation table by the certified bargaining agent ,
there was no reasonable effort in good faith on the employer to bargain collectively .
paragraph paragraph paragraph
In the case of Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino vs . Trajano , 201 SCRA 453 (
1991 ) , penned by Chief Justice Andres R . Narvasa , the factual milieu of which is
similar to this case , this Court allowed the holding of a certification election and ruled that
the one year period known as the certification year has long since expired . We also
ruled , that : paragraph paragraph paragraph
xxx prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case , there was no such
bargaining deadlock xx ( which ) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout . To be sure , there are in the
record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been
unsuccessful because of the latter s recalcitrance , and unfulfilled promises to bargain
collectively ; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to
comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively . It could have charged VIRON with
unfair labor practice ; but it did not . It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest
against VIRON s refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so ; but it did not .
There are assertions by NAFLU , too , that its attempts to bargain collectively had been
delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining
representative in VIRON ; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof , or of how it did
in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON .
xviii[24] toootq toootq toootq
Although the statements pertinent to this case are merely obiter , still the fact remains that in
the Kaisahan case , NAFLU was counselled by this Court on the steps that it should have
undertaken to protect its interest , but which it failed to do so . paragraph paragraph
paragraph
This is what is strikingly different between the Kaisahan case and the case at bench for in the
latter case , there was proof that the certified bargaining agent , respondent union , had
taken an action to legally coerce the employer to comply with its statutory duty to bargain
collectively , i . e . , charging the employer with unfair labor practice and conducting
a strike in protest against the employer s refusal to bargain . xviii[25] It is only just and
equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as similar in nature to a
bargaining deadlock when no certification election could be held . This is also to make
sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous
employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA . Thus ,
Section 3 , Rule V , Book V of the Implement Rules should be interpreted liberally so as to
include a circumstance , e . g . where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of
one party to willingly perform its duty to bargain collectively . Eo toootq toootq toootq
The order for the hospital to bargain is based on its failure to bargain collectively with
respondent union . paragraph paragraph paragraph

WHEREFORE , the Resolution dated November 18 , 1994 of public respondent
Laguesma is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
SO ORDERED . paragraph paragraph paragraph
Padilla , Bellosillo , Vitug , and Kapunan , JJ . , concur . paragraph
paragraph paragraph
paragraph paragraph
paragraph










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8138 August 20, 1955
PLDT EMPLOYEES' UNION, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY FREE TELEPHONE
WORKERS' UNION, (PAPLU), respondents.

Julio R. Tingzon, Jr., Pedro M. Icamina and Oscar G. Nolasco for petitioner.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Associates for respondent company.
Cid, Villaluz and Associates for respondent union.
BENGZON, Acting C.J .:
On September 30, 1953, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, a public utility
corporation locally organized, filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for certificate
under section 12 of Republic Act No. 875. It alleged that, a week before, it received from the
Free Telephone Workers' Union notice of its desire to bargain collectively; that until the receipt
of such notice, the Company believed the only legitimate labor organization existing therein was
the PLDT Employees Union with which it had signed a collectively bargaining agreement still in
operation; and that said Company was in no position to determine which of the two Unions
represented the majority of the workers. Therefore it requested that an investigation be conducted
for the purpose of determining the proper collective bargaining agency for its employees, and in
the event such investigation fails to determine the proper agency that an order be issued requiring
the holding of a certification election.
Upon its petition, the PLDT Employees Union was allowed to intervene, and on October 21,
1953 it submitted a motion to dismiss, which as amended, claimed that it had a collective
bargaining agreement in force until September 14, 1954, and that a favorable action by the Court
on the petition would permit another labor organization in the same establishment to present to
the employer another set of demands and compel said employer to bargain with it during the
lifetime of an existing bargaining agreement, thereby infringing the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts.
The Free Telephone Workers' Union-hereafter designated respondentasserting that it
represented the preponderant majority of the employees, manifested its willingness to let the
investigation proceed; and answering the Employees' Union's motion to dismiss, it contended
that the existing collective bargaining agreement constituted no legal objection, inasmuch as no
certification election had been held within the preceding twelve months. As to the alleged
impairment of the existing collective contract, it argued there was no such impairment, because
'the contract is between the company and the employees represented by the intervenor union who
are the principals and can change their agent at will" by a majority which it is desired to
ascertain.
After considering the pleadings and the arguments, the Hon. Arsenio Roldan, Presiding Judge,
dismissed the petition in December 1953 principally for the reason that the collective bargaining
agreement between the intervenor and the company will expire on September 14, 1954, and that
before such date it may not be changed nor amended.
The respondent Workers' Union asked for reconsideration, which the intervenor opposed. On
August 9, 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, by majority vote, set aside the order of
dismissal and remanded the case for "determination of the appropriate collective bargaining unit,

(agency) after which the holding of a certification election in accordance with law should be
ordered", (if necessary).
Hence this petition for reviewwhich takes the place of an appeal from the order of the Court of
Industrial Relations.
It is the general rule that only final judgments or orders are appealable to this Court. An
interlocutory order may not be appealed. (Rule 41 sec. 2) "An order or judgment is deemed final
when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial
court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the litigation . . . when the order
or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the
merits, it is merely interlocutory. For instance an order denying a motion of dismissal founded on
lack of jurisdiction . . .is merely interlocutory,"
1
and is not appealable.
It would seem from the foregoing that this petition for review or appeal of the intervenor is
premature, the order denying its motion to dismiss not being a final order. The Industrial Court
still had to determine the proper bargaining agency or direct a certification election. There was
something to be done in the Industrial Court.
We are aware, of course, that the law permitting appeals to this Court from "any order" of the
Court of Industrial Relations does not in any line employ the word "final". But it is reasonable to
suppose that Congress did not intend to disregard such well-known rule of orderly procedure,
which is based partly upon the convenience of the appealing party itself, in the sense of
forestalling useless appeals. In this case for example, if instead of appealing, the intervenor
allowed the investigation to continue, and later it is declared to be the proper bargaining
agency, then this appeal would have been useless. If it is not so declaredthen perhaps
2
it is
time to appeal; not before. Before that time it may not claim to be aggrieved by the order
remanding the case for ascertainment of the labor union which represents the majority.
The assertion that the appealed order impairs petitioner's collective bargaining agreement is
unfounded, because the tenor of the order precisely contemplates that any bargaining agreement
between the Telephone Company and the newly-found bargaining agency will have effect only
after September 14, 1954 when the (then) existing collective agreement could be properly
terminated.
On this point petitioner insists the respondent Court could not say the contract would expire on
September 14, 1954, in view of the following stipulation in the bargaining agreement:
that it is hereby mutually agreed upon by the parties that the duration of this Agreement
shall be for a period of one year, counting from the date of its signing by said parties,
with the understanding that it shall be considered renewed or extended from year to year
thereafter, unless it is terminated by any one of the parties in writing to the other at least
thirty days before it is proposed to expire.

Petitioner takes the position that, far from automatically ceasing on September 14, 1954, the
contract is automatically renewedunless it is denounced by one of the parties. Yet when the
court mentioned September 14, 1954, it merely meant that according to the contract on that date
it may be denounced or substituted by one of the parties; and the Telephone Company by filing
the petition obviously and foresightedly manifested its intention to terminate such contract with
petitioner, if and when, it is found that said petitioner no longer represented the majority of the
Company's employees.
3
Furthermore, as explained by the Industrial Court.
"If a certification election is not held immediately, the agreement may be renewed with or
without modification by the parties thereto and again it may be used as an argument to bar the
subsequent holding of a certification election. The result would be to deprive entirely the Free
Telephone Workers' Union (PAFLU) of an opportunity to prove that it, and not the PLDT
Employees Union, has the majority status and, therefore, entitled to represent all the employees
of the Company for collective bargaining purposes.
It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied the present
Industrial Peace Act an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is a bar to subsequent
certification election when . . . it has a definite and reasonable period to run and has not been in
existence for too long a period (history, industry and customs may affect reasonablesness of the
contract term . . ..) (Werne Law of Labor Relations p. 27 citing U. S. Finishing Co. 63 NLRB
575.) Normally, the National Labor Relations Board is inclined to regard long-term contracts,
which have been in existence for more than two years, as no obstacle to determining bargaining
representatives. (Werne op. cit pp. 28-29 citing several cases.)
A contract which provides for automatic renewal in the absence of notice by one of the
contracting parties of intention to alter, modify or terminate it prior to a specified period
preceding the termination date, will operate as a bar to an election. However, this rule
does not apply where a contesting union has given timely notice to the employer or filed
a petition with the Board reasonably prior to the specified date for automatic renewal.
(Werne, op. cit p. 29 citing several Labor Board cases.)
Explaining its position in detail, the National Labor Relations Board said in the case of Reed
Roller Bit Co. 72 N. L. R. B. 927:
Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the problem of balancing
two separate interests of employees and society which the Act was designed to protect:
the interest in such stability as is essential to encourage effective collective bargaining,
and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of the employees to select and
change their representatives. In furtherance of the purposes of the Act, we have
repeatedly held that employees are entitled to change their representatives, if they so
desire, at reasonable intervals; or conversely, that a collective bargaining contract may
preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable period.
In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a contract for a
term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable duration. We have already held that

2-year contracts are presumptively of reasonable duration. In applying this rule, we have
not discovered any compelling conditons which indicate that such agreements unduly
limit the right of employees to change their representatives. Moreover, in entertaining
rival petitions several months before the expiration of the numerous 1-year contracts
which are made, we have found in many instances the contracting parties, having
composed their differences and executed collective bargaining contracts after the
expenditure of much time, effort and money, can feel truly secure in their respective
positions only for the brief period of approximately 8 to 9 months.
For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a
stage of trial and error, during which its techniques and full potentialities were being
slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in
the past upon prolonged adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been
wholly incompatible with this experimental and transitional period. It was especially
necessary, therefore, to lay emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their
representatives. Now, however, the emphasis, can better be placed elsewhere. We think
that the time has come when stability of industrial relations can be better served, without
unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by refusing to
interfere with bargaining relations secured by collective agreements of 2 years' duration.
(Mathews, Labor Relations And The Law (1953) p. 191-192.)
Now then, as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December 1,
1951, it had been in operation more than two years in August 1954 when the certification
election was ordered. It is therefore no bar to the certification even under American labor views.
By the way, this is not to hold that as a matter of law in this jurisdiction the two-year period is a
definite term within which bargaining contracts are not to be disturbed. Indeed, the statute
providing that certification elections shall not be ordered oftener than once a year, (Sec. 12 (b) R.
A. 875) might give ground to the argument that a collective bargaining agreement between the
employer and a labor union representing the majority of the laborers may be terminated, after a
year, by a new majority organization. The quotations are herein made merely to exhibit some
considerations that have influenced or may influence the courts in the exercise of their discretion
in the matter.
Anent the alleged impairment of its contract, petitioner should keep in mind the modern concept
embodied in the New Civil Code, that labor contracts being impressed with common interest are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes, lockouts etc. (Art.
1700.)
In view of the foregoing, this petition for review should be denied. To avoid misunderstandings
however, it should be made clear that the next step is for the court a quo to determine after a
speedy and appropriate hearing upon notice, the labor union that represents the majority of the
such majority, then said court may order a cetification election in accordance with legal
provisions.

Petition denied with costs.
Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B.
L., JJ., concur.





































































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 107792 March 2, 1998

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and order dated November 12, 1992, of Undersecretary of
Labor and Employment Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted among the employees of respondent
company.
The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex
Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the elections were as follows:
National Federation of Labor
(NFL)
235
No Union 466
Spoiled Ballots 18
Marked Ballots 9
Challenged Ballots 7
However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which
they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated
Industries Labor Union (PIILU).
On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent
company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex Producer. On October 19,
1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was
ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it
was certified by the DOLE.
On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Edgar B. Gongalos in an
order dated August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the
Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election
to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer, with the following choices:
1. National Federation of Labor
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex
3. No union
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the
employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting
themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain collectively, the
employer may do one of two things. First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees' claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the
union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement.
Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to
conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the
employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees' representative or a certification election may be held.

The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja, 1 cited by the Solicitor General in his comment filed in behalf of the NLRC, is
particularly apropos. There, the union also requested voluntary recognition by the company. Instead of granting the request, the company
petitioned for a certification election. The union moved to dismiss on the ground that it did not ask the company to bargain collectively with it.
As its motion was denied, the union brought the matter to this Court. In sustaining the company's stand, this Court ruled:
. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a
certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the
employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the
employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE
EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees' prerogative (not the employer's) to determine
whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked
for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to declare
the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective bargaining,
Indeed, petitioner's contention runs counter to the trend towards the holding of certification election. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111,
which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the Labor Code had been discontinued as a
method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agents of the workers. 2 Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way
of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. 3
Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer, 479 supported its application for registration with the DOLE and
that when petitioner signed the CBA with the company, the CBA was ratified by 542 employees. Petitioner contends that such support by the
majority of the employees justifies its finding that the CBA made by it is valid and binding.
But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit
be given the opportunity to express himself. 4
This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted "no
union" in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be
no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the certification election. 5 Here the results,
which showed that 61% of the employees voted for "no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex
Producer already recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.
There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the employees had voted that they did not want any union to
represent them, they would be expressing support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the fact that in sworn affidavits some
employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into signing a document which turned out to be in support of petitioner as its
collective bargaining agent. Although there were retractions, we agree with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by employees
adverse to a company (or its favored union) are oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation. For how could one explain the seeming
flip-flopping of position taken by the employees? The figures claimed by petitioner to have been given to it in support cannot readily be
accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts. 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code and Book V, Rule 5,
3 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within 60
days prior to the date of expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the
relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered
into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of contracts which do
not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts
must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by the
law. 6 Such situation obtains in this case. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.











































































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner,
vs.

HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents.

GANCAYCO, J .:
Is the contract bar rule applicable where a collective bargaining agreement was hastily
concluded in defiance of the order of the med-arbiter enjoining the parties from entering
into a CBA until the issue on representation is finally resolved? This is the primary issue
in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) is a corporation
established and existing pursuant to Philippine laws and is engaged in the manufacture
and processing of copper cathodes with a plant operating in Isabel, Leyte. It employs
more or less eight hundred fifty (850) rank-and-file employees in its departments.
Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with PASAR which expired on April 1, 1987. Several days before the expiration of the
said CBA or on March 23, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations Regional Office in Tacloban City docketed as MED-ARB-RO VII Case No. 3-
28-87, alleging, among others, that no certification election had been held in PASAR
within twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the said petition.
Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its petition. In the order
dated April 21, 1987,
1
Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha dismissed the petition. However, the order
of dismissal was set aside in another order dated May 8, 1987 and the case was rescheduled for hearing
on May 29, 1987. The said order likewise enjoined PASAR from entering into a collective bargaining
agreement with any union until after the issue of representation is finally resolved. In the order dated June
1, 1987,
2
the petition for certification was dismissed for failure of NAFLU to solicit 20"7c of the total
number of rank and file employees while ALU submitted 33 pages containing the signatures of 88.5% of
the rank and file employees at PASAR.
Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. While the appeal
was pending, petitioner ALU concluded negotiations with PASAR on the proposed CBA. On July 24,
1987, copies of the newly concluded CBA were posted in four (4) conspicuous places in the company
premises. The said CBA was ratified by the members of the bargaining unit on July 28, 1987.
3

Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of the appeal alleging that it had just concluded a CBA
with PASAR and that the said CBA had been ratified by 98% of the regular rank-and-file employees and
that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced their membership thereat and affirmed membership with
PEA-ALU in separate affidavits.
In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent gave due course to the appeal by
ordering the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PASAR with ALU,
NAFLU and no union as choices, and denied petitioner 's motion to dismiss.
4


Both parties moved for reconsideration of the said resolution. However, both motions were denied by
public respondent in the order dated April 22, 1988.
Hence, the present petition.
5

The petition is anchored on the argument that the holding of certification elections in organized
establishments is mandated only where a petition is filed questioning the majority status of the incumbent
union and that it is only after due hearing where it is established that the union claiming the majority
status in the bargaining unit has indeed a considerable support that a certification election should be
ordered, otherwise, the petition should be summarily dismissed.
6
Petitioner adds that public respondent
missed the legal intent of Article 257 of the Labor Code as amended by Executive Order No. 111.
7

In effect, petitioner is of the view that Article 257 of the Labor Code which requires the signature of at
least 20% of the total number of rank-and-file employees should be applied in the case at bar.
The petition is devoid of merit.
As it has been ruled in a long line of decisions,
8
a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense
that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.
As such, it is not covered by the technical rules of evidence. Thus, as provided under Article 221 of the
Labor Code, proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by
the technical rules of procedure and evidence. The Court had previously construed Article 221 as to allow
the NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case on the basis of position papers and other documents
submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice.
9

On the other hand, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized labor organizations and not to
establishments like PASAR where there exists a certified bargaining agent, petitioner ALU, which as the
record shows had previously entered into a CBA with the management. This could be discerned from the
clear intent of the law which provides that
ART. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there
is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate
labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty per cent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such
petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
Said article traverses the claim of the petitioner that in this case there is a need for a considerable support
of the rank-and-file employees in order that a certification election may be ordered. Nowhere in the said
provision does it require that the petition in organized establishment should be accompanied by the
written consent of at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees of the bargaining unit concerned much
less a requirement that the petition be supported by the majority of the rank-and-file employees. As above
stated, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized establishments.
The Court reiterates that in cases of organized establishments where there exists a certified bargaining
agent, what is essential is whether the petition for certification election wasfiled within the sixty-day
freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, provides:
ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized
establishments, when a petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Department within the sixty-day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit

must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast
shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an
election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority
of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the choices
receiving the two highest number of votes.
Article 256 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The mere filing of a petition for certification
election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the holding of a
certification election.
Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom period? The record speaks for itself. The
previous CBA entered into by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1, 1987. The petition for
certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well within the freedom period.
The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for certification election was filed either before
or after the freedom period. Petitioner, however, contends that since the new CBA had already been
ratified overwhelmingly by the members of the bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been
consummated and the members of the bargaining unit have been continuously enjoying the benefits
under the said CBA, no certification election may be conducted,
10
citing, Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS
vs. Noriel,
11
and Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services vs. Inciong.
12

The reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. In Foamtex the petition for certiorari questioning
the validity of the order of the Director of Labor Relations which in turn affirmed the order of the Med-
Arbiter calling for a certification election was dismissed by the Court on the ground that although a new
CBA was concluded between the petitioner and the management, only a certified CBA would serve as a
bar to the holding of a certification election, citing Article 232 of the Labor Code.
Foamtex weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's stand. As pointed out by public respondent, the
new CBA entered into between petitioner on one hand and by the management on the other has not been
certified as yet by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
There is an appreciable difference in Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS for short).
Here, as in Foamtex the CBA was not yet certified and yet the Court affirmed the order of the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations which dismissed the petition for certification election filed by the labor
union. In TUPAS, the dismissal of the petition for certification, was based on the fact that the contending
union had a clear majority of the workers concerned since out of 641 of the total working force, the said
union had 499 who did not only ratify the CBA concluded between the said union and the management
but also affirmed their membership in the said union so that apparently petitioners therein did not have
the support of 30% of all the employees of the bargaining unit.
Nevertheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner herein has the majority of the
rank-and-file employees and that some members of the NAFLU even renounced their membership
thereat and affirmed membership with the petitioner, We cannot, however, apply TUPAS in the case at
bar. Unlike in the case of herein petitioner, in TUPAS, the petition for certification election was filed
nineteen (19) days after the CBA was signed which was well beyond the freedom period.
On the other hand, as earlier mentioned, the petition for certification election in this case was filed within
the freedom period but the petitioner and PASAR hastily concluded a CBA despite the order of the Med-
Arbiter enjoining them from doing so until the issue of representation is finally resolved. As pointed out by
public respondent in its comment,
13
the parties were in bad faith when they concluded the CBA. Their act
was clearly intended to bar the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU. A collective bargaining
agreement which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.
14
Such
indecent haste in renewing the CBA despite an order enjoining them from doing so
15
is designed to

frustrate the constitutional right of the employees to self-organization.
16
Moreover, We cannot
countenance the actuation of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not conducive to
industrial peace.
The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the very
reason that the same was not yet in existence when the said petition was filed.
17
The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
18

Petitioner posits the view that to grant the petition for certification election would open the floodgates to
unbridled and scrupulous petitions the objective of which is to prejudice the industrial peace and stability
existing in the company.
This Court believes otherwise. Our established jurisprudence adheres to the policy of enhancing the
welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of
paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a bargaining representative in the unit
concerned is of no moment as long as the petition for certification was filed within the freedom period.
What is imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given the
opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not only some but all of
them should have the right to do so.
19
Petitioner's contention that it has the support of the majority is
immaterial. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit
concerned. Time and again, We have reiterated that the most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election.
20

Finally, petitioner insists that to allow a certification election to be conducted will promote divisiveness and
eventually cause polarization of the members of the bargaining unit at the expense of national interest.
21

The claim is bereft of merit. Petitioner failed to establish that the calling of certification election will be
prejudicial to the employees concerned and/or to the national interest. The fear perceived by the
petitioner is more imaginary than real. If it is true, as pointed out by the petitioner, that it has the support
of more than the majority and that there was even a bigger number of members of NAFLU who affirmed
their membership to petitioner-union, then We see no reason why petitioner should be apprehensive over
the issue. If their claim is true, then most likely the conduct of a certification election will strengthen their
hold as any doubt will be erased thereby. With the resolution of such doubts, fragmentation of the
bargaining unit will be avoided, and hence coherence among the workers will likely follow.
Petitioner's claim that the holding of a certification election will be inimical to the national interest is far
fetched. The workers are at peace with one another and their working condition is smooth. There has
been no stoppage of work or an occurrence of a strike. With these facts on hand, to order otherwise will
be repugnant to the well-entrenched right of the workers to unionism.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court in the resolution dated October 10, 1988
22
is hereby lifted. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167426 January 12, 2009

CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-
PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J .:
Petitioner assails the Resolutions dated February 22, 2005
1
and March 16, 2005
2
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88444, which dismissed its petition for certiorari due to its failure to
file a motion for reconsideration from the Decision
3
of the Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment before filing the petition.
The relevant facts are as follows:
Petitioner Chris Garments Corporation is engaged in the manufacture and export of quality
garments and apparel.
On February 8, 2002, respondent Chris Garments Workers UnionPTGWO, Local Chapter No.
832, filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter. The union sought to represent
petitioners rank-and-file employees not covered by its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with the Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Chris Garments CorporationSolidarity of Union in
the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCGC-SUPER), the certified bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees. The union alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization
with a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter No. PTGWO-832
4
dated January 31, 2002 issued
by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
5

Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition. It argued that it has an existing CBA from July 1, 1999
to June 30, 2004 with SMCGC-SUPER which bars any petition for certification election prior to
the 60-day freedom period. It also contended that the union members are not its regular
employees since they are direct employees of qualified and independent contractors.
6

The union countered that its members are regular employees of petitioner since: (1) they are
engaged in activities necessary and desirable to its main business although they are called agency
employees; (2) their length of service have spanned an average of four years; (3) petitioner
controlled their work attitude and performance; and (4) petitioner paid their salaries. The union
added that while there is an existing CBA between petitioner and SMCGC-SUPER, there are
other rank-and-file employees not covered by the CBA who seek representation for collective
bargaining purposes. It also contended that the contract bar rule does not apply.
7

The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition. The Med-Arbiter ruled that there was no employer-
employee relationship between the parties since the union itself admitted that its members are
agency employees. The Med-Arbiter also held that even if the union members are considered
direct employees of petitioner, the petition for certification election will still fail due to the

contract bar rule under Article 232
8
of the Labor Code. Hence, a petition could only be filed
during the 60-day freedom period of the CBA or from May 1, 2004 to June 30, 2004.
Nevertheless, the Med-Arbiter ruled that the union may avail of the CBA benefits by paying
agency fees to SMCGC-SUPER.
9

In a Resolution
10
dated December 27, 2002, the Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed
the decision of the Med-Arbiter. She ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the union members
are employees of qualified and independent contractors with substantial capital or investment
and added that petitioner had the right to control the performance of the work of such employees.
She also noted that the union members are garment workers who performed activities directly
related to petitioners main business. Thus, the union members may be considered part of the
bargaining unit of petitioners rank-and-file employees. However, she held that the petition could
not be entertained except during the 60-day freedom period. She also found no reason to split
petitioners bargaining unit.
On May 16, 2003, the union filed a second petition for certification election.The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was barred by a prior judgment. On appeal, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter.
11

On June 4, 2004, the union filed a third petition for certification election.
12
The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the petition on the grounds that no employer-employee relationship exists between the
parties and that the case was barred by a prior judgment. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment granted the petition in a Decision
13
dated January 18, 2005. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Chris Garment[s] Workers UnionPTGWO is hereby
GRANTED. The 7 July 2004 Order of Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be remanded to
the Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of a certification election, subject to the
usual pre-election conference, among the regular rank-and-file employees of Chris Garments
Corporation, with the following choices:
1. Chris Garments Workers Union PTGWO Local Chapter No. 832;
2. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Chris Garments Corp. SUPER; and
3. No Union.
Pursuant to Section 13(e), Rule VIII of Department Order No. 40-03, the employer is hereby
directed to submit to the office of origin, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, the certified
list of its employees in the bargaining unit or when necessary a copy of its payroll covering the
same employees for the last three (3) months preceding the issuance of this Decision.
SO DECIDED.
14


Petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 25, 2005. On February 4, 2005, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to its failure to
file a motion for reconsideration of the decision before filing the petition.
Incidentally, a certification election was conducted on June 21, 2005 among petitioners rank-
and-file employees where SMCGC-SUPER emerged as the winning union. On January 20, 2006,
the Med-Arbiter certified SMCGC-SUPER as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank-and-file employees of petitioner.
15

Petitioner now comes before us arguing that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION [FOR CERTIORARI] ON THE SOLE
GROUND THAT THE COMPANY DID NOT FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DESPITE SECTION 21, RULE VIII OF DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 43-03, . . . SERIES OF
2003, [WHICH] PROHIBITS THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FROM A DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE THE MERITS OF THE PETITION AS IT
DISMISSED THE SAME BY MERE, ALBEIT, BASELESS TECHNICALITY WHICH ONLY
FRUSTRATED RATHER THAN PROMOTED SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE . . .
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER AND GIVING
[DUE] COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION FILED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CGWU-PTGWO DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND ITS
MEMBERS.
IV.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE MED-ARBITER THAT THE
PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA
AND/OR THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT.
V.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR FAILURE TO SUBMIT A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING.
16

The principal issues are: (1) Is a motion for reconsideration necessary before a party can file a
petition for certiorari from the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment? (2) Is the
case barred by res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment? and (3) Is there an employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and the union members?
First. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.
17
This
rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when a motion for reconsideration would be useless
under the circumstances.
18

Under Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003,
19
the decision of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall be final and executory after ten days from receipt thereof by the parties and
that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.
In this case, the Decision dated January 18, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was
received by petitioner on January 25, 2005. It would have become final and executory on
February 4, 2005, the tenth day from petitioners receipt of the decision. However, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on even date. Clearly, petitioner availed
of the proper remedy since Department Order No. 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary.
Second. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.
20
The elements of res judicata are: (1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition
of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
21

Res judicata has a dual aspect: first, "bar by prior judgment" which is provided in Rule 39,
Section 47(b)
22
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and second, "conclusiveness of judgment"
which is provided in Section 47(c)
23
of the same Rule.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
24
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or any other tribunal.
25


On the other hand, the doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" provides that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. Under this doctrine, identity of causes of action is
not required but merely identity of issues. Otherwise stated, conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
26

In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the first three elements of res
judicata. The Resolution dated December 27, 2002 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
on the first petition for certification election became final and executory. It was rendered on the
merits and the Secretary of Labor and Employment had jurisdiction over the case. Now, is the
fourth element identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and
third petitions for certification election present? We hold in the negative.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed outside the
60-day freedom period. At that time therefore, the union has no cause of action since they are not
yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formally the status of SMCGC-SUPER as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. Such dismissal, however, has no
bearing in the instant case since the third petition for certification election was filed well within
the 60-day freedom period. Otherwise stated, there is no identity of causes of action to speak of
since in the first petition, the union has no cause of action while in the third, a cause of action
already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-
SUPER as exclusive bargaining representative.
Third. The matter of employer-employee relationship has been resolved with finality by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Resolution dated December 27, 2002. Since
petitioner did not appeal this factual finding, then, it may be considered as the final resolution of
such issue. To reiterate, "conclusiveness of judgment" has the effect of preclusion of issues.
27

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, * Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur

























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107610 November 25, 1994
CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER
ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (UFW), respondents.

Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.

QUIASON, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 25, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment
and his Order dated October 13, 1992 in OS-MA-A-11-334-91.
I
On July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a
petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner, docketed as Case No. RO-400-9107-RU-0107.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition on the following
grounds:
(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization of a local union therein was attached to the petition or
submitted to the DOLE at the time the petition was filed;
(b) That the respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is a legitimate labor organization; and
(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company's place of
business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently,
it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).
On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:
Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is established that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with
Dole Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local chapter in the respondent's company located at
Cainta, Rizal. The existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is evidenced by Charter Certificate No.
82 issued to it by the petitioner, United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office which automatically forms part of
the records of this case.
As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the
respondent that the same is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate and signatories were attached
thereto at the time of filing of this petition is unmeritorious and without legal basis.
The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 6715, which read as follows:
Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75).
Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru respondent Undersecretary, upheld the order of respondent Med-Arbiter.
Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned the following errors:
1
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT
THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION.
2
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL
ERROR IN LIMITING THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY

DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER COMPANY AND
INSPITE OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO BE PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL
REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.
3
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF HIS OWN WILL AND DERIVED A PROVISION OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY BASIS OR AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.
II
As to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, "considering that its local or
chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not undergo the rudiments of registration required under Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code and the pronouncements made by this Court in Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment (205 SCRA 802) . . ." (Rollo, pp. 13-14).
The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and Charter Certificate No. 82.
Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence (Five J Taxi v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA 225 [1992]).
Progressive Development Corporation, (supra.) is inappropriate to the case at bench. Thereat, the union failed to show that it had complied
with the statutory requirements of Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The copy of the
constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations by the union were not certified under oath by the
union secretary.
As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to
petitioner's employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should have also covered those employed in the cinema business.
We agree with the following observation made by respondent Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992:
As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining unit, we stress once more that the call for the conduct of
election covers all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its garment manufacturing corporation. The
use of the pronoun "all" in our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all aforementioned employees at the
garment manufacturing operation based on the finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the
petitioner as clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as embodied in the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April
1992 which was affirmed by this Office on appeal.
Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees at the Cinema operation and those at the garment
manufacturing operation do not share commonality of interest as the former clearly perform work entirely different from
that of the latter. Thus, their separation into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395, 26
November 1988 (Rollo,
p. 42; Emphasis supplied).
As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional office
which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said section provides:
Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the
principal office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath (Emphasis supplied).
The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which
implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v.
Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case (Consolidated
Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]).
Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the
employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the
petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where the place of
work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional
offices. We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into consideration the fact that
there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located.

The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest
governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a
choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 209 SCRA 834 [1992]).
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV,
which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being
unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in
Manila.
Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which has territorial
jurisdiction over the "workplace of the complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the workplace as follows:
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly
assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back
after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. . . .
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The Med-
Arbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning the
venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the subsequent proceedings. He observed:
. . . This practice of deliberately delaying the legal proceedings cannot be countenanced any further, otherwise, the
ends of justice will forever be defeated. We don't see any reason for the respondent to delay as it did, the proceedings
of the case only to assail later on the jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up or objected to
during the initial hearing (Rollo, p. 77).
The stance of the Med-Arbiter, that the question of the venue in representation cases should be raised at the first hearing, was accepted by
respondent Undersecretary. We are not prepared to say that said administrative Officials have gravely abused their discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993
R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, CHRISTIAN
LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CLOP), NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP), respondents.

Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner.
Jose Torregoza for Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines.
Joji Barrios for intervenor ALU-TUCP.
Villy Cadiz for National Federation of Labor Unions.

QUIASON, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the Undersecretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) dated July 22, 1992, affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the
certification election, and August 25, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a
petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the petitioner (NCR-OD-M-91-01-002).
On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent
did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors,
inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.
On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election,which included all the rank and
file employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition constituted res judicata. Petitioner
argued that respondent CLOP should have interposed an appeal to the dismissal of the first petition and its failure to do so barred it from
filing another petition for certification election.
On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the regular rank and file
workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 87-91).
On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-002) and alleged that it
has members in the proposed bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a separate petition for
certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and a motion to consolidate related cases to avoid confusion.
Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the DOLE Secretary, who,
through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the Med-Arbiter in its Resolution dated July 22, 1992 calling for the conduct of the
certification election (Rollo, pp. 25-28). The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The defense of res judicata is not obtaining in the present petition for certification election. It is settled that for res
judicata to apply there must be a final judgment on the merits on matters put in issue. In the instant case, it could not
be said that there is a final judgment on the merits of the petition simply because the composition of the present
proposed bargaining unit is different from that in the first petition. Moreover, there are now other parties involved, and
therefore, it would not be correct to say that the parties in the said two cases are identical.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard however, to the question on propriety of consolidation, there is merit in the argument of respondent-
appellant on the need to consolidate the separate petitions for certification election because they involve the same
bargaining unit. Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-10-058 should be consolidated with that of Case No. NCR- OD-M-91-05-062,
where the petition of NAFLU should be treated as an intervention and resolved by the Med-Arbiter together with the
intervention of ALU-TUCP.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election is hereby
affirmed subject to the resolution of the Med-Arbiter of the motions for intervention aforementioned (Rollo, pp. 27-28;
emphasis supplied).

On July 31, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, again stressing the principle of res judicata. Petitioner further argued that the
second petition for a certification election by respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were barred at least for a period of one year from
the time the first petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as
amended.
On August 25, 1991, Undersecretary Laguesma denied the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 32-34).
On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Questions as an Addendum to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed on July 31, 1992. Petitioner argued that the present case must be indefinitely suspended until the following cases are
resolved by the NLRC and the Supreme Court: a) NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04708-91 entitled "R". Transport Corporation v. Jose S.
Torregaza, et. al., wherein Labor Arbiter de Castro declared the strike staged by respondent CLOP illegal and ordered the strikers to pay
petitioner the amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; b) NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-03415092 filed by respondent CLOP and its
members for illegal dismissal; and NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04389-92 filed by respondent CLOP in behalf of its affected members for
illegal dismissal (Rollo, pp. 139-145).
On September 29, 1992, Undersecretary Laguesma in a resolution denied the motion to suspend the conduct of the certification election.
The pertinent portion of said resolution reads as follows:
The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-08- 04708-91, 06-03415092 and 00-08-04389-92 before the NLRC is not
a valid ground for the suspension of the already stalled petition for certification election which must be resolved with
dispatch.
This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending cases before the NLRC legally remain as employees
of respondent until the motion to declare them as having lost their employment status by reason of the illegal strike or
their complaint for illegal dismissal is finally resolved. (Rollo, pp. 181-182; emphasis supplied)
On October 14, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 29, 1992 which was subsequently
denied by Undersecretary Laguesma on October 29, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Petitioner filed a Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification
Election. Without waiting for the resolution of the motion to dismiss, petitioner resorted to this Court by way of the instant special civil action.
This petition is without merit.
Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the following requisites must be present: a) the former judgment or order must be final;
b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties; and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The first action was dismissed by the
Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys.
The second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave
due course to the second petition for certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that the second petition for certification election should have been filed after one year from the
dismissal of the first petition certification election under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as
amended. Said section provides as follows:
When to file In the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time. However, no certification election may be held within
one year from the date of the issuance of a final certification election result (Emphasis supplied).
Apparently, petitioner misread the above-mentioned provision of law. The phrase "final certification election result" means that there was an
actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. In this case, there was no certification election conducted
precisely because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not include all the employees who should
be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.
Devoid of merit is petitioner's contention that the employment status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the strike must first be
resolved before a certification election can be conducted.
As held in the case of Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992):
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid-off but who have a present,
unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections (Rothenberg on

Labor Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a
case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practices was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in
the elections.
Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike, legally remain as such, until either the motion to declare their
employment status legally terminated or their complaint for illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.
It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification
election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right
to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander (Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, 213 SCRA 759 [1992]).
Finally, petitioner's Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification
Election is still pending with the Undersecretary of Labor. The resort to judicial action by petitioner is premature. Hence, it is also guilty of
forum-shopping in pursuing the same cause of action involving the same issue, parties and subject matter before two different fora.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 128067 June 5, 1998
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC., respondents.

PUNO, J .:

Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution and Order
1
of the public respondent, dated June
28, 1996 and November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's petition for certification
election.
It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU)
is a registered labor union with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25, 1995. On November 6, 1995,
petitioner union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank-and-file employees of
private respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE National Capital Region (NCR).
2

Attached as annexes to the petition are the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies
of union membership signed by thirty three (33) rank-and-file employees of respondent company,
the Charter Certificate showing its affiliation with the National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU-KMU), the list of union officers, the certification of the union secretary of the minutes of
the general membership meeting, the Books of Accounts and its Constitution and By-Laws.
3

Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status of petitioner as a legitimate
labor organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-
KMU has been submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its
execution.
4

In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union, it has "all the rights and
privileges . . . to act as representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining with
employers."
5

On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed the petition for certification
election. He ruled that petitioner, as an affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on
account of its failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule II of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,
6
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union, the rules provide that the
latter shall be considered an affiliate of a labor federation after submission of the contract
or agreement of affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days
after its execution.
Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union concerned to issue a charter
certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which
shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance
of such certificate.
A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal that the federation and the
independent union have executed a contract or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown
that it has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations, within thirty
(30) days from issuance of such charter certificate as amended by the rules.
Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements for certification election
pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code; that the rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the
requirements for certification election.

We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V,
Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F and G, refers to an independently registered
labor organization which has filed a petition for certification election.
In the case at bar, an independently registered union has affiliated with a federation,
hence, strict compliance with the requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and
E of Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code should
be complied with.
Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have executed a contract or agreement
of affiliation nor has it established that is has submitted its charter certificate to the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.
Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement,
there was no valid affiliation. Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality because
the union failed to attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with the
requirements of law.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It reiterated its
contention that as an independently registered union, it has the right to file a petition for
certification election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.
7

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal. It argued that petitioner should
have filed its petition for certification election as an independently registered union and not as a
union affiliated with NAFLU-
KMU.
8

Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the Filsystems Workers Union (FWU), filed a
Petition for Certification Election in the same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the Med-
Arbitration NCR Branch granted the petition. The certification election held on April 19, 1996,
was won by FWU which garnered twenty six (26) votes out of the forty six (46) eligible voters. The
FWU was certified on April 29, 1996, as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees of private respondent. Eventually, FWU and the private respondent negotiated a CBA.

9

On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it has
become moot and academic. It also invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book
V of the Labor Code stating that "once a union has been certified, no certification election may be
held within one (1) year from the date of issuance of a final certification election [result]."
10

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner contended that its appeal is not moot as the
certification election held on April 19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,
11
viz:
Sec. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. The Secretary shall have
fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the records of
the case. The filing of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of
any certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and inappealable.
Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the FWU and the private respondent
could not affect its pending representation case following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code
12
which states:

Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. The representation case shall not, however, be
adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the
last 60 days of the subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case.
On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner on the
ground that it has been rendered moot by the certification of FWU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of respondent company. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated November 18, 1996.
13

Before this Court, petitioner contends:
I
Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the pending appeal in the representation case was
rendered moot and academic by a subsequently enacted collective bargaining agreement
in the company.
II
Public respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely abused its discretion in
failing to hold that the legal personality of petitioner as a union having been established
by its Certificate of Registration, the same could not be subjected to collateral attack.
The petition is meritorious.
I
We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when
he effectively affirmed the Resolution dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing
petitioner's petition for certification election for failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.
The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med-Arbiter is flawed, proceeding as it does from
a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that petitioner is an independently registered
labor union as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As a legitimate
labor organization, petitioner's right to file a petition for certification election on its own is beyond
question.
14
Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU cannot
affect its right to file said petition for certification election as an independent union. At the most,
petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can
pursue its petition for certification election as an independent union. In our rulings, we have
stressed that despite affiliation, the local union remains the basic unit free to serve the common
interest of all its members and pursue its own interests independently of the federation.
15

In fine, the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election on account
of its non-submission of the charter certificate and the contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU
with the BLR. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion in sustaining the Med-Arbiter's
Resolution.
II

We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was rendered moot
and academic by the subsequent certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by FWU
and which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.
Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there exists no pending representation
case since the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Med-
Arbiter. According to the public respondent, the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition was to
leave the playing field open without any legal barrier or prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other
legitimate labor organizations may file an entirely new petition for certification election.
We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's petition
for certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding of any
certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code
is crystal clear and hardly needs any interpretation.
Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the time the CBA was entered
between FWU and private respondent. Following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
Book V of the Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not prejudice petitioner's pending
representation case or render the same moot.
16
This rule was applied in the case of Associated
Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano 17 where we held that "[t]here should be no obstacle to the right of the proper
time, that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement . . ., not even by a
collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation case." Likewise, in Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v.
Ferrer-Calleja,
18
we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a bar to the holding of a certification
election.
Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to petitioner's certification election
petition. Such a stance is not conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have
emphasized that when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization,
it is good policy for the employer not to have any participation or partisan interest in the choice of
the bargaining representative. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions
of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with an inalienable right
to oppose it. An employer that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact
that it wants to create a company union. Thus, in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,
19
we
declared that "[o]n a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a
collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say
the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to
such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. . . . [While] it is true that there
may be circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being heard on the matter, .
. . sound policy dictates that as much as possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off
policy. For it is does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the
contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of collective bargaining. That is against the
letter and spirit of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and promote social justice. The
judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to take part
in the process leading to the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
public respondent are set aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold a
certification election in respondent company with petitioner as a contending union. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., is on leave.
















SECOND DIVISION


YOKOHAMA TIRE
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,



- versus -



YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES
UNION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 159553

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

December 10, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J .:
In this appeal, petitioner Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. (hereafter
Yokohama, for brevity) assails the Decisionxviii[1] dated April 9, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74273 and its Resolutionxviii[2] dated
August 15, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed
a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
Yokohama. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiters order dismissing the petition, the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) ordered an
election with (1) Yokohama Employees Union and (2) No Union as
choices.xviii[3] The election held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following
result:
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION - 131
NO UNION - 117
SPOILED - 2
-----
250

VOTES CHALLENGED BY [YOKOHAMA] - 78
VOTES CHALLENGED BY [UNION] - 73
------
TOTAL CHALLENGED VOTES - 151
TOTAL VOTES CAST - 401xviii[4]
Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other
hand, the Union challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file
employees and another five (5) votes by alleged supervisor-trainees. Yokohama
formalized its protest and raised as an issue the eligibility to vote of the 78
dismissed employees,xviii[5] while the Union submitted only a handwritten
manifestation during the election.

On January 21, 2002, the Med-Arbiter resolved the parties protests,
decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
x x x x
2. The appreciation of the votes of the sixty-five (65) dismissed
employees who contested their dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission shall be suspended until the final
disposition of their complaint for illegal dismissal. . . .
3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) so-called newly-regularized
rank-and-file employees shall be appreciated in the final
tabulation.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.xviii[6] (Emphasis supplied.)
On May 22, 2002, the DOLE Acting Secretary disposed of the appeals as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the partial appeal of [Yokohama] is DENIED and the
appeal of [the union] is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Thus, the Order of the Med-
Arbiter dated 21 January 2002 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
x x x x
2. The votes of dismissed employees who contested their dismissal
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall be
appreciated in the final tabulation of the certification election results.
3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) newly regularized rank-and-file
employees shall be excluded.
x x x x
SO RESOLVED.xviii[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the DOLE Acting
Secretary.xviii[8] The appellate court held that the 78 employees who contested
their dismissal were entitled to vote under Article 212 (f)xviii[9] of the Labor Code

and Section 2, Rule XIIxviii[10] of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor
Code. However, it disallowed the votes of the 68 newly regularized employees
since they were not included in the voters list submitted during the July 12, 2001
pre-election conference. The appellate court also noted that Yokohamas insistence
on their inclusion lends suspicion that it wanted to create a company union, and
ruled that Yokohama had no right to intervene in the certification election. Finally,
it ruled that the unions handwritten manifestation during the election was
substantial compliance with the rule on protest.
Yokohama appealed.
On September 15, 2003, we issued a temporary restraining order against the
implementation of the May 22, 2002 Decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary and
the October 15, 2002 Resolution of the DOLE Secretary, denying Yokohamas
motion for reconsideration.xviii[11]
In a manifestation with motion to annul the DOLE Secretarys entry of
judgment filed with this Court on October 16, 2003, Yokohama attached a
Resolutionxviii[12] dated April 25, 2003 of the Med-Arbiter. The resolution denied
Yokohamas motion to suspend proceedings and cited the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The resolution also certified that the Union obtained a majority of 208 votes
in the certification election while No Union obtained 121 votes. Yokohama also
attached an entry of judgmentxviii[13] issued by the DOLE stating that the April 25,
2003 Resolution of the Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the DOLE Secretarys Office on
July 29, 2003 and became final on September 29, 2003.

In a subsequent manifestation/motion with erratum filed on October 21,
2003, Yokohama deleted an allegation in its October 16, 2003 manifestation which
was included through inadvertence and clerical mishap. Said allegation reads:
x x x x
. . . Notably, the Resolution dated 29 J uly 2003 which affirmed the Resolution
dated 25 April 2003 is still not final and executory considering the timely
filing of a motion for its reconsideration on 15 August 2003 which until now
has yet to be resolved.xviii[14]
In this appeal, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISALLOWING THE APPRECIATION OF THE VOTES OF SIXTY-EIGHT
REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE [DOLE SECRETARYS] DECLARATION THAT [THE
UNIONS] MANIFESTATION ON THE DAY OF THE CERTIFICATION
ELECTION WAS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULE ON
FORMALIZATION OF PROTESTS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ALLOWING THE APPRECIATION OF VOTES OF ALL OF ITS EMPLOYEES
WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND
ABANDONMENT OF WORK WHICH ARE CAUSES UNRELATED TO THE
CERTIFICATION ELECTION.xviii[15]
We shall first resolve the last assigned issue: Was it proper to appreciate the
votes of the dismissed employees?
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the votes of
the dismissed employees should be appreciated. Petitioner posits that employees
who have quit or have been dismissed for just cause prior to the date of the

certification election are excluded from participating in the certification election.
Petitioner had questioned the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees.
Respondent counters that Section 2, Rule XIIxviii[16] of the rules
implementing Book V of the Labor Code allows a dismissed employee to vote in the
certification election if the case contesting the dismissal is still pending.
Section 2, Rule XII, the rule in force during the November 23, 2001
certification election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed
employees to vote during the certification election if the case they filed contesting
their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election.xviii[17]
Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by
petitioner although their cases were still pending at the time of the certification
election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June 27, 2001xviii[18]
and the appeal of the Labor Arbiters February 28, 2003 Decision was resolved by
the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.xviii[19]
Even the new rulexviii[20] has explicitly stated that without a final judgment
declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified
voters. Thus,
RULE IX
CONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. . . . An
employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the
dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the
order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified
voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time
of the conduct of the certification election.

x x x x
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary
and the Court of Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed
employees.
Finally, we need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes
of the newly regularized rank-and-file employees, even if counted in favor of No
Union, will not materially alter the result. There would still be 208 votes in favor
of respondent and 189xviii[21] votes in favor of No Union.
We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli, and
clearly petitioners rank-and-file employees had chosen respondent as their
bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated April 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74273
and the Resolution dated August 15, 2003 are AFFIRMED. The temporary
restraining order issued on September 15, 2003 is hereby DISSOLVED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.























Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION



SAN MIGUEL FOODS,
INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,




-versus-



SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT
UNION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 146206

Present:

CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO,

J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
SERENO,**JJ.


Promulgated:


August 1, 2011

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N


PERALTA, J .:

The issues in the present case, relating to the inclusion of employees in
supervisor levels 3 and 4 and the exempt employees in the proposed bargaining
unit, thereby allowing their participation in the certification election; the
application of the community or mutuality of interests test; and the determination
of the employees who belong to the category of confidential employees, are not
novel.
In G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and
Exempt Union v. Laguesma,xviii[1] the Court held that even if they handle
confidential data regarding technical and internal business operations, supervisory
employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc.
(SMFI) are not to be considered confidential employees, because the same do not
pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances.
Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees
belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community or
mutuality of interests, constitute a single bargaining unit. They perform work of
the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly,
share a common stake in concerted activities. It was immaterial that the three
plants have different locations as they did not impede the operations of a single
bargaining representative.xviii[2]


Pursuant to the Court's decision in G.R. No. 110399, the Department of
Labor and Employment National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) conducted pre-
election conferences.xviii[3] However, there was a discrepancy in the list of
eligible voters, i.e., petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San
Fernando plant and 33 for the Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82,
respectively.xviii[4]

On August 31, 1998, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan issued an
Orderxviii[5] directing Election Officer Cynthia Tolentino to proceed with the
conduct of certification election in accordance with Section 2, Rule XII of
Department Order No. 9.

On September 30, 1998, a certification election was conducted and it yielded
the following results,xviii[6] thus:

Cabuyao San Fernando Total
Plant Plant
Yes 23 23 46
No 0 0 0
Spoiled 2 0 2

Segregated 41 35 76
Total Votes
Cast 66 58 124


On the date of the election, September 30, 1998, petitioner filed the
Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters,xviii[7] questioning the eligibility to
vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong
to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no
existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner. Specifically, it
argued that certain employees should not be allowed to vote as they are: (1)
confidential employees; (2) employees assigned to the live chicken operations,
which are not covered by the bargaining unit; (3) employees whose job grade is
level 4, but are performing managerial work and scheduled to be promoted; (4)
employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong plant; (5) non-SMFI employees; and
(6) employees who are members of other unions.

On October 21, 1998, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directing respondent
to submit proof showing that the employees in the submitted list are covered by the
original petition for certification election and belong to the bargaining unit it seeks
to represent and, likewise, directing petitioner to substantiate the allegations
contained in its Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters.xviii[8]


In compliance thereto, respondent averred that (1) the bargaining unit
contemplated in the original petition is the Poultry Division of San Miguel
Corporation, now known as San Miguel Foods, Inc.; (2) it covered the operations
in Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas and its home base is either in Cabuyao,
Laguna or San Fernando, Pampanga; and (3) it submitted individual and separate
declarations of the employees whose votes were challenged in the election.xviii[9]

Adding the results to the number of votes canvassed during the September
30, 1998 certification election, the final tally showed that: number of eligible
voters 149; number of valid votes cast 121; number of spoiled ballots - 3; total
number of votes cast 124, with 118 (i.e., 46 + 72 = 118 ) Yes votes and 3 No
votes.xviii[10]

The Med-Arbiter issued the Resolutionxviii[11] dated February 17, 1999
directing the parties to appear before the Election Officer of the Labor Relations
Division on March 9, 1999, 10:00 a.m., for the opening of the segregated ballots.
Thereafter, on April 12, 1999, the segregated ballots were opened, showing that
out of the 76 segregated
votes, 72 were cast for Yes and 3 for No, with one spoiled ballot.xviii[12]

Based on the results, the Med-Arbiter issued the Orderxviii[13] dated April
13, 1999, stating that since the Yes vote received 97% of the valid votes cast,

respondent is certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and
exempt employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao,
San Fernando, and Otis.

On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolutionxviii[14]
dated July 30, 1999, in OS-A-2-70-91 (NCR-OD-M-9010-017), affirmed the Order
dated April 13, 1999, with modification that George C. Matias, Alma Maria M.
Lozano, Joannabel T. Delos Reyes, and Marilyn G. Pajaron be excluded from the
bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent. She opined that the
challenged voters should be excluded from the bargaining unit, because Matias and
Lozano are members of Magnolia Poultry Processing Plants Monthly Employees
Union, while Delos Reyes and Pajaron are employees of San Miguel Corporation,
which is a separate and distinct entity from petitioner.

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsiderationxviii[15] dated August 14,
1999 was denied by the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary in the Orderxviii[16]
dated August 27, 1999.

In the Decisionxviii[17] dated April 28, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55510,
entitled San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. The Honorable Office of the Secretary of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Relations, and San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt
Union, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the Resolution dated
July 30, 1999 of the DOLE Undersecretary, stating that those holding the positions

of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the
bargaining unit.
Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsiderationxviii[18] dated May 23, 2000
was denied by the CA in the Resolutionxviii[19] dated November 28, 2000.

Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the following issues:

I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THE
BARGAINING UNIT DEFINED BY THIS COURT'S RULING IN G.R. NO.
110399.

II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE - SPECIFICALLY, THIS COURT'S DEFINITION OF A
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE - WHEN IT RULED FOR THE INCLUSION
OF THE PAYROLL MASTER POSITION IN THE BARGAINING UNIT.


III.
WHETHER THIS PETITION IS A REHASH OR A RESURRECTION OF
THE ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. NO. 110399, AS ARGUED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.

Petitioner contends that with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 110399xviii[20]
identifying the specific employees who can participate in the certification election,
i.e., the supervisors (levels 1 to 4) and exempt employees of San Miguel Poultry
Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, the CA erred in expanding

the scope of the bargaining unit so as to include employees who do not belong to
or who are not based in its Cabuyao or San Fernando plants. It also alleges that the
employees of the Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis plants of petitioners
predecessor, San Miguel Corporation, as stated in G.R. No. 110399, were engaged
in dressed chicken processing, i.e., handling and packaging of chicken meat,
while the new bargaining unit, as defined by the CA in the present case, includes
employees engaged in live chicken operations, i.e., those who breed chicks and
grow chickens.

Respondent counters that petitioners proposed exclusion of certain
employees from the bargaining unit was a rehashed issue which was already settled
in G.R. No. 110399. It maintains that the issue of union membership coverage
should no longer be raised as a certification election already took place on
September 30, 1998, wherein respondent won with 97% votes.

Petitioners contentions are erroneous. In G.R. No. 110399, the Court
explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining
unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate
bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised
of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest
of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.xviii[21]


In National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber
Development Company Workers Union United Lumber and General Workers of
the Phils,xviii[22] the Court, taking into account the community or mutuality of
interests test, ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the
Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley,
Kitcharao, Agusan [Del] Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. It
held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be
reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not
decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is
community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted
bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.xviii[23] Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the
employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions
mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the
company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their
individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit.xviii[24]

Thus, applying the ruling to the present case, the Court affirms the finding of
the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for

the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otisxviii[25] of Magnolia Poultry
Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry
Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line
of work, working conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other
relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest.
Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of
each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which
warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.

Petitioner asserts that the CA erred in not excluding the position of Payroll
Master in the definition of a confidential employee and, thus, prays that the said
position and all other positions with access to salary and compensation data be
excluded from the bargaining unit.

This argument must fail. Confidential employees are defined as those who
(1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations.xviii[26] The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee - that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the
supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of
their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a

principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee
rule.xviii[27]

A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or
with the custody, handling or care and protection of the employers
property.xviii[28] Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel, should
be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to confidential information
may become the source of undue advantage.xviii[29] However, such fact does not
apply to the position of Payroll Master and the whole gamut of employees who, as
perceived by petitioner, has access to salary and compensation data. The CA
correctly held that the position of Payroll Master does not involve dealing with
confidential labor relations information in the course of the performance of his
functions. Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and
regulations and confidential labor relations, it follows that he cannot be excluded
from the subject bargaining unit.

Corollarily, although Article 245xviii[30] of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work
are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and,
hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.xviii[31]
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit.

The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees, because if
allowed to be affiliated with a union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
in view of evident conflict of interests and the union can also become company-
denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the union
membership.xviii[32] Having access to confidential information, confidential
employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may
act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.xviii[33]

In this regard, the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource
Assistant and Personnel Assistant belong to the category of confidential employees
and, hence, are excluded from the bargaining unit, considering their respective
positions and job descriptions. As Human Resource Assistant,xviii[34] the scope
of ones work necessarily involves labor relations, recruitment and selection of
employees, access to employees' personal files and compensation package, and
human resource management. As regards a Personnel Assistant,xviii[35] one's
work includes the recording of minutes for management during collective
bargaining negotiations, assistance to management during grievance meetings and
administrative investigations, and securing legal advice for labor issues from the
petitioners team of lawyers, and implementation of company programs.
Therefore, in the discharge of their functions, both gain access to vital labor
relations information which outrightly disqualifies them from union membership.


The proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and,
therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.xviii[36]
Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the issue in the

present case pertaining to the coverage of the employees who would constitute the
bargaining unit is now a foregone conclusion.

It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers; hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. The
general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of
certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers.xviii[37] Law
and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification
elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from
any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be
effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.xviii[38]
The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to
Article 258xviii[39] of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain
collectively.xviii[40]

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court writes finis to the issues raised so
as to forestall future suits of similar nature.


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 28,
2000 and Resolution dated November 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55510, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions dated July
30, 1999 and August 27, 1999 of the Secretary of Labor, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95011 April 22, 1991
M.Y. SAN BISCUITS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ACTING SECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS,
respondents.
Ambrosio B. De Luna for petitioner.
Pedro A. Lopez for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J .:p
The issue presented by this petition is whether or not the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor and Employment has the authority to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties in a petition for certification election.
On May 12, 1989, private respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (Union for short) file a petition for certification
election as a bargaining agent for a group of employees of petitioner M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc. before the med-arbiter of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
After the parties submitted their position papers, on August 25, 1989, the med-arbiter issued an order dismissing the petition for lack of merit
as there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the delivery drivers/helpers represented by respondent Union.
1

Meanwhile, respondent Union and several others filed before the NLRC Branch of Region No. IV a
complaint for underpayment of wages; non-payment of 13th month pay; service incentive pay and COLA;
damages and attorney's fees.
On February 9, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the said complaint on the ground
that there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties.
2
On February 26, 1990 private
respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In the certification election case, private respondent appealed to the Secretary of DOLE. On December
15, 1989, then DOLE Secretary Franklin Drilon promulgated a resolution reversing the decision of the
med-arbiter, thus finding that there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
private respondent.
3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of this resolution on January 22, 1990 and a manifestation on
February 12, 1990 asking that action be held in abeyance pending consideration of the other case where
the labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties.
4
On April 16, 1990, public respondent issued an order denying the relief sought in
the manifestation of petitioner.
5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom
6
but it was denied
on June 18, 1990.
7


Thus, this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and temporary restraining order based on the following grounds:
I. The Acting Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma abused his discretion in denying the
Manifestation filed by Petitioner on the ground of a Prejudicial question involving the
issue of employer-employee relationship pending before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
II. The Hon. Secretary has no jurisdiction to determine the existence of [an] employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent.
8

On September 19, 1990, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to
comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice and granted the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the questioned orders dated December 15, 1989 and June 18,
1990.
The main thrust of the petition is that the public respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and that its determination is vested
in the NLRC.
The petition must fail.
Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), of which the
med-arbiter is an officer, has the following jurisdiction
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original
and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all work places whether
agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to
extension by agreement of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether
agricultural or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over labor-management
relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties.
Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of such a relationship, the
med-arbiter can then decide the certification election case.
9
As the authority to determine the employer-
employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the exercise of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter,
his finding thereon may only be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate
jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides
Art. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. Any party to an election may appeal
the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts

thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the
election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar
days.
When as in this case Secretary Drilon of DOLE rendered a resolution dated December 15, 1989 reversing
the order of the med-arbiter dated August 25, 1989 by declaring the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties, such finding cannot be rendered nugatory by a contrary finding of the
labor arbiter in a separate dispute for money claims between same parties.
It is absurd to suggest that the med-arbiter and Secretary of Labor cannot make their own independent
finding as to the sentence of such relationship and must have to rely and wait for such a determination by
the labor arbiter or NLRC in a separate proceeding. For then, given a situation where there is no separate
complaint filed with the labor arbiter, the med-arbiter and/or the Secretary of Labor can never decide a
certification election case or any labor-management dispute properly brought before them as they have
no authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such a proposition is, to
say the least, anomalous.
Correctly indeed, the Secretary of Labor denied the prayer in the manifestation of petitioner to await the
resolution of the NLRC as to the existence of such employer-employee relationship.
The Court reproduces with approval the findings and conclusions of the Secretary in the said resolution
dated December 15, 1989.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship between members of petitioning union and the company.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find for the appellant.
It has been well settled in jurisprudence that the factors to be considered in determining
the existence of employer-employee relationship are as follows: (a) selection and
engagement of the employees; (b) the payment of wages; (e) the process [sic] of
dismissal; and, (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the
means and methods [with] which the work is to be accomplished.
On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), [sic] it is very apparent
from the records that the personnel of M.Y. San Biscuits are the one responsible for
hiring of employees. Assuming, it is the salesman that engages his own driver, it could be
inferred however that such authority emanates from the respondent.
On the second factor (payment of wages), while the respondent tried to impress upon us
that the drivers/helpers are not in the payroll of the company and, therefore, not receiving
salaries from it, this at best is but an administrative arrangement in order to save the
respondent from the burden of keeping records and other indirect cost.
On the third factor, (the power of dismissal), it is very clear that herein respondent is the
authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring drivers. This alone proves
that it wields disciplinary authority over the drivers/helpers.
Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent gives
daily instructions to the drivers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it
exercises control over the movements of the drivers/helpers. The drivers are instructed

as to what time they are supposed to report to the office and what time they are
supposed to return.
Viewed from the above circumstances, it is every clear that the herein respondent is the
real employer of the drivers/helpers. They are in truth and in fact the employees of the
respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on its salesmen as the ostensible employer of
the drivers/helpers was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive drivers/helpers their
right to self-organization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the Med-Arbiter's
Order dated 25 August 1989 vacated, and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered calling for
the conduct of a certification election among the drivers/helpers of M.Y. San Biscuits with
the following as choices:
1. Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); and,
2. No Union.
SO ORDERED.
10

On September 19, 1990, the NLRC promulgated its resolution reversing the decision of the labor arbiter
and finding the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
11
A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated November 16, 1990.
12
On all counts,
the petition must be struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order which the Court issued on
September 19, 1990 is hereby lifted, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIJO PLANTATION INC., (HPI), respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in
Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed by the company and three other unions
against the results of the election were denied by the Department of Labor and Employment in its resolution dated February 14, 1991 but, on
motion of the company (HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification election to be held. The DOLE
subsequently denied petitioner NFL's motion for reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated August 29, 1991, December 26,
1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the holding of a new certification election to be conducted in place of the one held on August 20, 1989
and, for this purpose, reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991 dismissing the election protests of private respondent and the
unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in the
choice of "no union." However, on July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company intervened in the election, the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations nullified the results of the certification election and ordered a new one to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City with the following results:
Total Votes cast 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) 39
RUST KILUSAN 5
National Federation of Labor (NFL) 876
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor 4
SANDIGAN 6
UFW 15
No Union 55

Invalid 13
The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines
(ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the certification election on the ground
that it was conducted despite the pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and ULGWP from the order, dated August 17, 1989, of
the Med-Arbiter denying their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it was not informed or properly represented at the
pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it was represented at all in the pre-election conference, its representative acted beyond his
authority and without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the certification election was marred by massive fraud and
irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913, representing 54% of the rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to
vote, resulting in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the company's
claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election of August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the
announcement of the company that the election had been postponed in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the
order denying their motions for intervention. In addition, the election was held on a Sunday which was non-working day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election. It was possible that some people could have voted for those who did not
show up. The election was conducted in an open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated. Management representatives
were not around to identify the workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page listings submitted to the Med-
Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008 names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they had voted) and 784 which were not,
(indicating that they did not vote), or a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the total votes cast in the election was 1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees who claimed that they were not able to vote and who were surprised to
know that their names had been checked to indicate that they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had not been informed of the investigation conducted by Med-
Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the Labor Secretary to hear interested
parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for the annulment of the results of the certification
election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was joining private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting as its own the documentary evidence
presented by the company, showing fraud in the election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL reiterated its contention that
management had no legal personality to file an appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only a bystander which did not even
extend assistance in the election. Petitioner denied that private respondent HPI was not represented in the pre-election conference, because
the truth was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the management and he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of
employees, and posted in the company premises notices of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the election. It claimed that out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually
voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It charged management with resorting to all kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and
make the "Non Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989 certification election. With respect to claim that election could
not be held in view of the pendency of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the Med-Arbiter denying their
motions for intervention, the DOLE said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12 November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a motion
for interventions. The same was however, denied for being filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an order which has become final and executory, ALU filed a
second motion for intervention when a second balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and
intended to delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was
correct and did not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even with the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not
rule on the motion as it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The latter withdrew as a party to the election on September 1988 and
its motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-Arbiter on October motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second
balloting where the choices has already been pre-determined.

Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to participate in the election through valid orders that have become final
and executory even before the first certification election was conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the
proceeding through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are they possessed of the legal standing to question the results of
the second election considering that they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the certification election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities.
Although affidavits were submitted showing that the election was held outside the company premises and private vehicles were used as
makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its premises for the purpose of
holding the election, company guards were allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE representation officers to enter the
company premises, and notice was posted on the door of the company that the election had been postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the August 20,
1989 election and that the secrecy of the ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL was not given notice of the investigation nor the
chance to present its evidence to dispute this finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report was not supported by the minutes of the
proceedings nor by any record of the interviews of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report did not state the names of
the persons investigated, the questions asked and the answers given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule that the choice of the exclusive bargaining representative is the
sole concern of the workers. It said: "If indeed there were irregularities committed during the election, the contending unions should have
been the first to complain considering that they are the ones which have interest that should be protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI and
instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of private respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29, 1991, reversed his resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL filed a
motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order, dated December 26, 1991. Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied in another order dated February 17, 1992. Hence, this petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the employees and the employer is a mere bystander. The only
instance wherein the employer may actively participate is when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code
because it is requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the case here and so the DOLE should not have given due
course to private respondent's petition for annulment of the results of the certification election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation,
Inc. have deluged this Office with their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a new certification
election conducted" and that as a result "the firm position we held regarding the integrity of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded
by this recent declaration of the workers, now speaking in their sovereign capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier rulings was not the petition of the employer but the letter-
appeals that the employees sent to his office denouncing the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989 certification election. The
petition of private respondent was simply the occasion for the employees to voice their protests against the election. Private respondent HPI
attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees who claimed that
they had been disfranchised, as a result of which they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests of
employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14, 1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election. Private respondent is the employer. The manner in
which the election was held could make the difference between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company. What an employer is
prohibited from doing is to interfere with the conduct of the certification election for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an
employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the election should be registered and entered into the minutes of the election
proceedings before it can be considered. In addition, the protest should be formalized by filing it within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that
these requirements are condition precedents in the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot prosper. It cites the
following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question. The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot
question arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer
before the close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. Where the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter within five (5)
days after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the
date of its formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be
appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as provided under Rule V.

In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not make any protest regarding the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive
disfranchisement of employees) during the election. Hence, the appeal and motions for reconsideration of private respondent HPI should
have been dismissed summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were not able to cast their votes because they were not properly notified of the
date. They could not therefore have filed their protests within five (5) days. At all events, the Solicitor General states, that the protests were
not filed within five (5) days, is a mere technicality which should not be allowed to prevail over the workers' welfare. 3 As this Court stressed
in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an opportunity to freely and intelligently
determine which labor organization shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case were denied this opportunity. Not only were a
substantial number of them disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and other irregularities which put in question the
integrity of the election. Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting the conduct of the election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura
who investigated these allegations found the allegations of fraud and irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a showing of disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We
hold the same in this case. The workers' right to self-organization as enshrined in both the Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered
nugatory if their right to choose their collective bargaining representative were denied. Indeed, the policy of the Labor Code favors the
holding of a certification election as the most conclusive way of choosing the labor organization to represent workers in a collective
bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the Association of Trade Union (ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as
well as the representation officers of the DOLE affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the election and they are now estopped from
questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really attest to the fact that we cannot really identify all the voters who
voted on that election except some workers who were our supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation representatives. We also
attest that the polling precinct were not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was conducted outside of the Company
premises. The precincts were (sic) the election was held were located in a passenger waiting shed infront of the canteen across
the road; on the yellow pick-up; at the back of a car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a waiting shed infront of the Guard
House across the road. Herein private respondents also observed during the election that there were voters who dictated some
voters the phrase "number 3" to those who were casting their votes and those who were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the
National Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it expected workers who had been aggrieved by the conduct of the election would
file their protest since it was in their interests that they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written almost two years after the election and they bear the same dates (May 7 and
June 14, 1991); they are not verified; they do not contain details or evidence of intelligent acts; and they do not explain why the writers failed
to vote. Petitioner contends that the letter-appeals were obtained through duress by the company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that as early as August 22 and 30, 1989, employees already wrote
letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of workers. 7 As the Solicitor General says in his Comment, 8 these
affidavits and manifestoes, which were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD" to "DD-33" to private respondent's Supplemental
Petition of September 5, 1989 just 16 days after the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore that the employees slept on their
rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991 bear these same dates because they were prepared by private respondent
HPI and employees were merely asked to sign them, suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which petitioner has not proven by
competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent acts does not have merit. The earlier letters 9 of the workers already
gave details of what they had witnessed during the election, namely the open balloting (with no secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for
polling precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the irregularities of the certification election. Similarly, the letters containing the
signatures of those who were not able to vote are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to vote because they thought the
election had been postponed, especially given the fact that the two unions had pending appeals at the time from orders denying them the
right to intervene in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the questioned orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.


























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994
CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION
(URTMSEU), petitioners,
vs.
REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.
C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner.
Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated January 31, 1991 of the Secretary of Labor which reversed on
appeal the Order dated December 20, 1990 issued by Med-arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaring petitioners as the duly-elected officers of
the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU) as well as the order dated March 5, 1991 denying petitioner
Catalino Algire's motion for reconsideration.
The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the
management of Universal Robina Textile at its plant in Km. 50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna.
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on
September 4, 1990 a petition for the holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such
an election be held.
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners
(Catalino Algire, et al.) and private respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed
representation officer.
The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:
Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:
LINO ALGIRE REGALADO
and DE MESA
his officers and his
officers
1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the two contending parties you desire to be
represented for the purpose of collecting bargaining.
2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings.
1

The result of the election were as follows:

Lino Algire group 133
Regalado de Mesa 133
Spoiled 6

Total votes cast 272
On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 400-9009-AU-002), which
DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the effect that one of the ballots wherein one voter
placed two checks inside the box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to
as the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a valid vote in their
favor. The group argued that the two checks made even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his
political franchise in favor of Algire's group.
During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope containing the spoiled
ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot contained two (2) checks in the box opposite
petitioner Algire's name and his officers.
On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the questioned ballot valid,
thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and accordingly certified petitioner's group as the union's
elected officers.
2

Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in Case
No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January 31, 1991, the latter's office granted the appeal
and reversed the aforesaid Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of another
election of officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU), with
the same choices as in the election of
15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference."
3

Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE set the
hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22, 1991, reset to April 2, 1991, and finally reset to
April 5, 1991.
Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was denied for lack of merit and
the decision sought to be reconsidered was sustained.
Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues:
(1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case, considering that
the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave abuse in the exercise of
authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
(2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.
with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging that the assailed decision
of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public respondent is by nature immediately executory and the
holding of an election at any time after April 5, 1991, would render the petition moot and academic unless
restrained by this Court.

On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of another election of
union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision.
4

There is no merit in the petition.
The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized to
conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from the conduct of
the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence.
Therefore, any ruling made by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an
absolute nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in excess of his functions
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what was agreed to be
held at the company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election,
not a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a
certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority
representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct
process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.
5

The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled is not based on
any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such officer but simply in pursuance of the
intent of the parties, expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit
unauthorized markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in
order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.
If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that the questioned
ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction
to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said
election. Moreover, petitioners even question at this stage the clear instruction to mark a check or cross
opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such instruction was not clear, as two checks
"may be interpreted that a voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or
vice-versa,"
6
notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had already been held where no
such question was raised.
In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should best represent
them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be achieved through the democratic
process of an election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be circumvented but
clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice once and for all in a
determination where anything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and
misrepresentation is minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur
Feliciano, J., is on leave