Third Book Series Review for American Foreign Policy List Scott Abel The years between the

start of the Mexican war and the beginning of World War I witnessed a period of immense intellectual change in the United States foreign policy and in the development of the American frontier. The United States attempted to gain the dominant leadership position in the western hemisphere as justified by a variety of philosophies including of racial, religious, humanitarian, and cultural-linkage ideologies. The United States achieved its goal of becoming the preeminent power in the region through economic links, military victories, and changing geo-politics in Europe and elsewhere. Historians of US foreign policy and expansion during the 1960s and 1970s generally explained Americas policies and ideology through more traditional notions of political, military, and economic power with a bit of cultural analysis in regard to the United States relationship with Great Britain. During the 1980s and 1990s, the historiography shifted toward a more dominant culturally based analysis with focuses on race, religion, and gender based analyses. Bradford Perkins 1968 work, The Great Rapprochement looked at the relationship between the United States and Great Britain when the former found its power growing and the latter saw challenges to its dominance across the globe. Perkins employed a traditional historical methodology such as political and strategic analysis but also a bit of cultural analysis in determining why the two nations warmed up to each other. The United States became the friendliest with Great Britain of all the major powers for a variety of political and cultural reasons including shared racial theory that espoused a common Anglo-Saxon lineage, along with similar political philosophies on

limited government. The United States became more tolerant of the British Empire because it then possessed an empire of its own. Furthermore, Great Britain feared other powers such as Imperial Germany much more than the United States and therefore focused its attention away from the Americas to a large extent.1 The combination of geopolitical, economic, strategic, and a bit of cultural analysis provided for an effective analysis of British-American relations but generally stuck with the more traditional approaches to historical analysis. The work successfully explains how old rivals became partners, despite the various options the United States and Great Britain had in shaping the future of global geo-politics and political hegemony. Perkins looked at the mutual interests of the United States and Great Britain that revolved around strategic interests, along with having similar concepts of Anglo-Saxon racial theory. The United States did not severely criticize the British actions in the Boer War for fear of hypocrisy and setting a precedent for British intervention in American imperial affairs.2 For Great Britain, Germany posed a much bigger threat to her interests than the United States as Germany, Great Britain fought for trade throughout the world, while Great Britain was unable to construct enough warships deal with Germany and the United States in a naval war.3 Both the United States and Great Britain shared concepts of Anglo-Saxon racialism that influenced foreign policy through concepts such as individualism and political liberties tempered by moralism that emphasized development of other lands nominally for the sake of other peoples.4 Perkins explained the strengthening of the relationship through a combination of mutual interest and cultural
1

Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914, (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 8. 2 Ibid., 89. 3 Ibid., 121, 157-158. 44 Ibid., 82-83.

similarities that allowed for the United States and Great Britain to improve vastly their relationship. Charles Campbells The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 18651900, published in 1974, mostly employed traditional historiographical methods such as the reliance on executive and legislative branch documents, focusing on the importance of trade, and the projection of power through political pressure and military might. However, Campbell employed a bit of cultural analysis especially while examining the increasingly close relationship between the United States and Great Britain. After the Civil War, the United States government split between expansionists such as Secretary of State Seward and non-expansionists who dominated Congress. Seward wanted to expand ultimately westward to open markets in China for US goods, but Congress opposed because it did not want to raise additional taxes and incur more racial divisions.5 The United States government transformed its foreign policy from being relatively isolationist with a small military relative to the size of the economy to possessing an overseas empire spread out over vast distances within a few decades. This work was highly informative as it discussed an important period of American history that historian often neglected because it showed how the United States transformed from a regional to a global power in a relatively short period of time. The United States found itself drawn to faraway island through economic ties and the desire to enhance its power. For example, the United States increased its trade with Hawaii by removing duties on its products, which resulted in a boom for the kingdoms sugar industry, while the United States moved to make the islands a strategic asset for

Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations 1865-1900, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 16-17, 23-24.

itself. However, President Grover Cleveland considered the actual occupation of the island highly objectionable because of distaste for occupying foreign lands and oppressing their people.6 The United States established trade relations with Korea in 1882 with the assistance of the Chinese government.7 The United States began to expand overseas trade significantly with the depression of the 1890s and the desire for new markets.8 However, the global politics of the era signaled the closing of markets overseas, which required the United States to change its policy and develop a new navy. An expansion of foreign trade required imperialistic expansion to sustain the new policy of trading in new markets. The war with Spain intensified American imperialistic expansion overseas as part of that global change.9 Economics, therefore, was an important part of Campbells analysis of the transformation of American foreign policy but not to the extent of William Appleman Williams Wisconsin school. Campbell also employed a bit of cultural analysis to understand the relationship between the United States and Great Britain to comprehend better its improvements. The linguistic relations linked by a common language and literature, along with an affinity with democracy improved the relationship.10 In addition, racial ideology linked the two countries as race patriotism and claimed that both nations were of Anglo-Saxon nature.11 Americans not only shared the same heritage as Great Britain to a large extent, they gained more respect for Queen Victoria in her later years.12 Although cultural and

6 7

Ibid., 69-78. Ibid., 109. 8 Ibid., 141. 9 Ibid., 160. 10 Ibid., 331, 333. 11 Ibid., 335. 12 Ibid., 331, 335.

racial analysis played a lesser role in his work, Campbells focus on those issues made for an interesting break from the economic and political motivations mentioned earlier. Campbell also wrote on the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the occupation of the Philippines by showing that the United States became concerned for the stability of the Spanish colonies. Campbell argued the United States went to war with Spain, not solely because the USS Maine blew up, but rather because of Spains inability to control Cuba. After the Havana riots, the sinking of the Maine, Dr. Proctors reports, and the findings of the naval board, the US government concluded that Spain could not control Cuba. The United States government regarded Spanish authority in Cuba as irreparable and sought to end the chronic instability through armed conflict.13 The United States occupied the Philippines, a task unlike any it attempted before, because it had no alternative according to the policymakers in Washington as foreign forces seemed poised to take the archipelago if the Americans left. Furthermore, the United States already had an army present there.14 Also, colonialism was more palatable because of beliefs in Anglo-Saxon racialism, the need for new markets, and shifts in strategic thinking. The desire to expand the country for national glory and to help the Filipinos took hold of the United States during that period.15 Campbell looked at McKinley as a president who sought out advice on the Philippines and carefully deliberated over the occupation of the archipelago. He decided in favor of occupation of the archipelago after consulting people knowledgeable on the Philippines.16 The United States under President McKinley took a

13 14

Ibid., 256-258. Ibid., 296-297. 15 Ibid., 298, 299. 16 Ibid., 299-302.

more aggressive approach than under earlier administrations as McKinley sought greater stability in particular territories and wanted to expand American influence overseas. Peter Stanleys 1974 work, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States 1899-1921, looked at the civil, political, and economic aspects of the colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines. In particular, Stanley looked at the education system in the Philippines, but also looked at the overall administrative system. When the Americans arrived in the Philippines, the entirety of the administration of the archipelago badly needed reform. The colonial government allowed an extension of politics to the Filipinos but under much supervision.17 The Americans instituted an education system as a means to spread their values and train the population for work and economic improvement.18 The colonial government also built infrastructure necessary for transportation such as port systems to handle an import and export economy.19 Stanleys work employed traditional methods for understanding American foreign and colonial policy with a greater emphasis on economics and politics in his historical methodology. The work showed the United States early efforts to ready the Philippines for independence through economic and political development. The Republicans in the government moved them quite slowly toward independence. William Howard Taft took seriously the notion that his job was to prepare the Philippines for independence shortly after its occupation.20 However, he believed that the Filipinos were far from ready for independence and democracy, as he stated, They [the Filipinos] need the training of fifty

17 18

Ibid., 80, 81. Ibid., 85. 19 Ibid., 91. 20 Ibid., 77-78.

or a hundred years before they shall even realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty is.21 In Republican administrations, the Filipino and American leadership split on issues on economic investment and the sharing of political power. Furthermore, an informal cultural and social divide emerged between Americans and the Filipinos that inhibited a better mutual understanding.22 Had Americans better connected with poorer Filipinos, they may have understood the potential problems posed by the Philippines elite. Tafts policies broke under the contradictory notion of evading the issue of independence and personal liberties while attempting to gain the trust and cooperation of Filipinos.23 The policymakers use of economic and political advancement achieved some of their goals but they found their limits with the unwillingness of the government to allow a coherent discussion on independence. According to Stanley, Democrats, once in power, accelerated the Philippines towards independence, but stopped short of granting it. Francis Burton Harrison, an antiimperialist and a Democratic congressional representative, became the governor-general but did not think the territory was ready for independence in 1913 when he arrived. He instituted a program of economic investment in the Philippines and replaced Americans with Filipinos throughout the government.24 Harrison removed Americans from government posts, even capable ones such as Frank Carpenter, and decentralized power to the lower levels of government where Filipinos had more power.25 Furthermore, Harrison became an early advocate of independence and sought economic expansion to further that goal by soliciting investment without political strings and using
21 22

Ibid., 64-65. Ibid., 163-164. 23 Ibid., 175. 24 Ibid., 202, 203, 205, 226. 25 Ibid., 207.

infrastructure, especially railroads, to enhance economic development.26 Harrisons attempt in handing much of the economy over to the Filipinos coincided with World War I, which allowed for a huge growth in exports.27 Such advancements stalled with the Philippines National Banks disaster and the return of Republicans to power in Washington. Republicans such as Leonard Wood and Cameron Forbes refused to grant independence when their party came into power in 1921.28 Under President Wilson, the Philippines moved closer toward self-rule but stopped short of granting independence as Washington lacked the will for such a drastic step. The inadvertent result of the colonization process was the formation of a new Filipino oligarchy that entrenched itself firmly in the political class through particular weaknesses in American colonial policy and culture. Stanley argued that the biggest flaw of the America colonial government in the Philippines was the eventual employment of cultural and economic policies for the legitimization of the occupation rather than independence, which ceded legitimacy to the elite that in turn entrenched itself as the foundation of the Philippine state.29 In certain sense, the economic and political development of the Philippines by the United States failed in creating a prosperous and vibrant democracy. If Stanley had chosen to expand on this topic, a comparison between the colonial systems in Southeast Asia would show how the American system fared in contrast with the Dutch, British, and French systems. David M. Pletcher took an approach to American expansion into the West based on practical interests rather than cultural concepts in his 1973 work, The Diplomacy of

26 27

Ibid., 226-227. Ibid., 237. 28 Ibid., 262. 29 Ibid., 273-274.

Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and The Mexican War. Pletcher expressly rejected a moral analysis of the westward expansion in favor of the United States increasing territory based on its interests. He examined the war with Mexico and the territorial growth of the United States that catapulted it from a third to second-rate power through the concepts of national interest.30 Among the reasons why the United States was successful in expanding into California was because of how Mexico City lost virtual control over the territory with only six-hundred soldiers stationed there and high taxation through tariffs that isolated both foreigners and Native Americans. Simultaneously, the United States desired at least one effective port on the Pacific coast for trade and strategic purposes.31 Pletcher looked at the strategic reasons why the United States wanted new territory to its west during the 1840s and how it was successful in achieving the goals it set through diplomatic and military means. The work did not set the United States as particularly war hungry but rather a nation pragmatically looking toward its interests. Pletcher argued that familial and business ties brought Americans to Texas that made it relevant to US interests.32 Polk had little or no intention to go to war with Mexico, but his desire to see Texas independent from Mexico, along with his improvised and defensive policies increased the odds for war. The president did not know that his aggressive posture was a prelude to conflict with Mexico and did not seriously expect his policies would lead to war in the first five months of his administration.33 Polk sent General Zachary Taylors army to the border area to bluff his way into negotiations with the Mexican government as a last
30

David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War , (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 4-5. 31 Ibid., 94, 109. 32 Ibid., 204. 33 Ibid., 270, 271, 311.

resort, but needed to declare war once US forces came under attack because of public opinion.34 Pletcher employed traditional historical framing to understand how the United States became involved in a war with Mexico through perceived economic and political interests, but also how personalities and individuals made decisions that led to war. If an historian wrote a work on a similar subject using gender and race as frameworks, the historian might focus more infringement on American honor with the attack on US forces or American racial perceptions of themselves in relation to Mexicans. Carl T. Jackson employed a cultural, more specifically religious, methodology in his 1981 work The Oriental Religions and American Thought: 19th-Century Explorations. He argued that Americans possessed an interest in foreign religions since the 1700s, which exploded during the 19th century with a particular interest in Hinduism and Buddhism contrary to the efforts of the people who opposed such research. Such scholars with interests in eastern religions also took some interest in other faiths such as Confucianism, Daoism, and Shintoism.35 American interest in eastern religions arrived with the establishment of the Enlightenment as scholars looked at other religions with greater sympathy. Hannah Adams was one such scholar who looked at religion without openly employing denominational preferences.36 Examining foreign religions without blatant condescension was an important step in examining religious beliefs of others as it showed genuine interest in general theology rather than promoting a single religion. Writing about eastern religions would be extremely difficult if done from a more traditional methodological perspective and required a transnational cultural approach.

34 35

Ibid., 282-283, 392. Carl T. Jackson, The Oriental Religions and American Thought: 19 th-Century Explorations, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), ix, x. 36 Ibid., 13, 16, 18-19.

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Some Americans adopted concepts from eastern religion in their own beliefs according to Jackson. One such example was Ralph Waldo Emerson, who loved the work of Confucius in large part because of his mediation between the ideal and real worlds. Despite such sympathies with eastern religion, neither he nor many other Americans would abandon their beliefs completely for an eastern religion or lifestyle during the first half of the 19th century.37 By the 1880s, Buddhism became fashionable in the United States and Europe and Buddhism became more popular with the publication of Sir Edwin Arnolds The Light of Asia. Eventually Colonel Olcott became an important leader in Buddhism and helped spread it throughout the world.38 However, despite such events most Americans received no direct contact with Asia at that time and remained contained by their western perceptions.39 Jackson employed a cultural exchange methodology as the impact of eastern religion on politics, economics, and the social structure of American life was minimal during the 19th century. Reginald Horsman looked at the impact of American racial theory before Social Darwinism and the cause of Manifest Destiny in his 1981 work. He argued that by 1850, Americans viewed expansionism less in terms of spreading democratic republicanism and more along the lines of spreading the Anglo-Saxon race to new lands. Racial supremacy justified such expansion because many Americans believed that the Anglo-Saxon race was better at governing, creating prosperity, and adhering to Christianity.40 Explanations of American and English success during the 19th century became less based on

37 38

Ibid., 55-56, 59. Ibid., 141, 143, 164-165. 39 Ibid., 262, 265, 257. 40 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981), 1, 2.

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institutional strengths and more based on biological explanations.41 The implication of such philosophies transformed many white Americans beliefs about the Indians from being peoples in need of civilization to being an inferior race.42 African-Americans in the eyes of an increasing number of Americans in the early 19th century became racially and innately inferior, too.43 Such notions spread through scientific journals that became available and widely disseminated to the public by 1850, which reinforced notions of Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy.44 The old republican ideas fell from favor with new scientific rationalisms for the domination of the Anglo-Saxons. Horsmans argument showed a general trend in American historiography toward a new focus on concepts regarding race as a central theme. By 1850, Americans generally adopted a new ideology that fit well with the necessities of the period. Racial theory justified expansion into Indian lands as settlers argued that inferior peoples would corrupt the American system of governance and by 1850, Americans abandoned the notions of Indian equality.45 Many Americans saw expansion as not only good for themselves but for the world in general as part of a general rethinking of Americas relationship with the world filled with latent racism.46 Notions of racial supremacy became a potential justification for world domination by the Anglo-Saxon race according to the beliefs at the time.47 Within a relatively short period of time, America developed new ideas of racial hierarchy over concepts of equality and universal brotherhood. Horsman showed how theories of racial supremacy and racial
41 42

Ibid., 24. Ibid., 106, 110. 43 Ibid., 122, 133. 44 Ibid., 156-157. 45 Ibid., 189, 207 46 Ibid., 228, 298-299. 47 Ibid., 303.

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politics became entrenched in American life in an effective manner and therefore why such opinions have been so difficult to remove. An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 by John L. Offner employed a methodology that focused on the politics of Washington as the main cause for the war in Spain, which placed the work in line with the more traditional historiography. Prompted by Spains inability to end the rebellion in Cuba, Washington legislators entered the war because of the American political situation that gave popular support to Cuban independence. Republicans found war necessary to remain in control of Washington because of the popular demand to avenge the Maines explosion and end the humanitarian disaster in Cuba.48 Also critical to Offners methodology was his extensive travels throughout three continents and many distant countries in addition to the United States for archival research.49 Offners analysis was political as he focused on the goals and thoughts of politicians in both Spain and the United States. According to him, the war was the result of American and Spanish politicians trying to preserve their power. The work did an effective job at examining the various sides of the Cuban crisis and why the states went to war. Kristin Hoganson examined the cultural causations of the Spanish-American War and the Filipino-American War through her 1998 work, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish American and Philippine Wars. She examined the causes of the wars through the prism of gender and cultural historical methodology. She examined how people looked at the politics of the time through gender convictions and at the two spheres of gender during that period. Many people
48

John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 18951898, (Chapel Hill, NC: U. North Carolina Press, 1992), ix-x, 91. 49 Ibid., x.

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associated political power with manhood and used masculine gender ideals as ways to support policy arguments.50 War in particular played into these political arguments as it increased the manhood level for the entire nation.51 Hoganson placed gender and cultural arguments for war and aggression as supplementary to the other justifications such as humanitarian reasons.52 Many Americans wanted war to mold the new generation into a manlier, more chivalrous, and highly civic-minded group of men during the backdrop of a manhood crisis.53 Hoganson placed cultural and gender politics as a means to examine popular support for the wars in Cuba and the Philippines that explains the pressures on politicians as described by John Offner. Her work is an important component in understanding why the United States abandoned its anti-colonial traditions in favor of empire through concepts of manhood and gender politics. Many Americans on both sides of the imperialism argument were less interested in the economic and political arguments for war, but instead focused on the concepts of manhood to better the country in a cultural way. The author focused on concepts of national honor as a means to achieve political ends as both major parties in the debate over war in response to Spains insults. For jingoes, the issue of honor became personal as they portrayed it as impossible for true men to oppose war and women to support it. For them, to become a non-interventionist would be dishonorable, which dovetailed with the anti-suffrage movement that aruged men were good citizens because of their power.54 Colonialism played into the engendered notion of paternalism because of America, now

50

Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish America and Philippine Wars, (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1998), 3-5. 51 Ibid., 6. 52 Ibid., 7-9. 53 Ibid., 11, 12. 54 Ibid., 69, 78, 87, 129.

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an adult nation, had the obligation to seek new dependents, which were euphemisms for colonies.55 However, for non-interventionists, the manliest course of action was waiting because any rash action would be a sign of weak self-control and hysteria.56 Noninterventionists argued that prolonged exposure in tropical climates and sexual debauchery would lead to the degeneracy of American men.57 Both imperialists and antiimperialists used engendered notions for their arguments for people less interested in the economic and strategic reasons for war. Howard Jones published Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations in 2010 using traditional historiographical methods such as tracing the impact of diplomatic incidents and battles on the possibility of foreign intervention in the American Civil War. The Union forces attempted to avert any form of European intervention despite any benign intentions because of the legitimacy it inferred on the Confederate States of America, along with the possibility of leading to recognition by major European powers.58 Abraham Lincoln employed a pragmatic policy of keeping Europe out of the war by appealing to Europes interests and maintaining the war as a domestic problem, whereas Jefferson Davis employed ideology to win over others to his cause.59 Jones looked at the American Civil War through traditional historiographical methods by examining the personalities involved in diplomacy and the way in which various people from America and Europe reacted to crises and formed policies based on their interests and ideologies.

55 56

Ibid.,157. Ibid., 94. 57 Ibid., 181, 189-190. 58 Howard Jones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations , (Chapel Hill, NC: U. North Carolina Press, 2010), 5. 59 Ibid., 11.

15

Jones argued that diplomacy had an important role in the Confederacys struggle for survival and therefore a critical component of understanding the Civil War. Primarily, the South aimed for diplomatic recognition from Great Britain, the major European maritime power, and its secondary goals was the acquisition of financial, economic, and military assistance. The Confederacy would welcome an alliance with Great Britain or any other European power. It hoped to achieve its ends by leveraging the export of cotton as the main bargaining chip and did not expect moral sympathy from Great Britain.60 The Confederacy concluded that even by threatening the loss of cotton to the textile industrial cities would force Great Britain to war with the Union, but failed to account for the oversupply of cotton in Great Britain and France in storage during the early part of the war.61 Furthermore, Great Britain had reasons not to go to war as it needed the United States for the wheat trade and many of its workers supported the Union cause because of its better systems of democracy and free labor.62 The Confederacy ultimately faced a paradox in that it might receive foreign help only when it required none.63 The work explained the importance of diplomacy in preventing the Confederacy from achieving recognition from foreign powers and ultimately how the Union crushed any hope of it. Jones argued that the Confederacy kept a decent chance of receiving foreign recognition at some level and the possibility of mediation until July 1863. Even after the Union victory at Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation, Lord Palmerstone, Prime Minister of Great Britain, considered mediation inevitable as the Union failed thus far to

60 61

Ibid., 11. Ibid., 13. 62 Ibid., 15. 63 Ibid., 19.

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defeat the Confederacy decisively and that the progress of the war ought to determine the peace process instead of his government. Jones argued that the Emancipation Proclamation merely slowed down the process of recognition by Great Britain and other foreign powers.64 Palmerstone moved away from mediation once the Queens cabinet opposed any proposal of armistice and to end of the Union blockade.65 Recognition by Great Britain became no longer viable with the victories by the Union in July 1863 at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and then it became virtually impossible for the confederacy to get loans.66 Employing traditional historiographical methods such as diplomatic and political history, Jones showed that the possibility of intervention lasted halfway into 1863. Publishing the work in 2010, his work represents either potential a return to traditional historiographical methods or an aberration. It is difficult to tell given the recentness of the publication date. In the historiography of the United States foreign relations during the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century, historians altered their focus from mainly economic and political history during the 1960s and 1970s to a cultural approach by the 1980s. The move was a useful supplement to the older historiography by better understanding the general thought processes of many Americans during the 19th century. The combination of the old focuses and the new methodologies resulted in a stronger understanding of American foreign policy as the cultural aspect that showed why citizens pressured policymakers to act a certain way, whereas economic and political history showed how Washington and other capitals hoped to improve their standing and power throughout the world. Overall, the historiography on US foreign relations showed the
64 65

Ibid., 233, 235, 243. Ibid., 271. 66 Ibid., 304-305.

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extensive influences of foreign ideas on the United States and the development of policies, such as imperialism, based on similar British philosophies on colonialism, race, religion, and politics. Even during its most isolationist periods, the United States engaged in diplomacy to protect its interests.

18