Time and Power in the Commission Administration

Klaus H. Goetz*

Paper presented at the EGPA Study Group on EU Administration and Multi-Level Governance, 32nd EGPA Annual Conference, 8-10 September 2010, Toulouse

Please do not quote without prior permission Comments are most welcome!

Abstract This paper explores the institutionalisation of time in the administration of the European Commission and probes its implications for the intra-organisational distribution of power. It examines both formal time rules and temporal regularities governing central administrative processes and time rules and regularities at the level of political mandates and tenures of senior officials. In assessing the linkage between time and power in the Commission, the analysis focuses on two time-sensitive relationships: between the political level the College of Commissioners and the administrative level; and between central coordination units notably the Secretariat-General and line units. A time-centred examination of the Commission administration reveals that there is a strong temporal subtext to growing politicisation and centralisation, two trends that have featured prominently in recent writing on the Commission. Thus, senior administrators tenures have become quite closely aligned with those of Commissioners, so that the formers incentive to take the long view has, to some extent, been eroded; political time-setting, monitoring and enforcement have gained in prominence, reducing the temporal discretion of the administration; and central keepers of the clock have gained in power. It is an open question whether, as a result, the Commission progressively loses the temporal capabilities typically associated with non-majoritarian institutions, especially an extended time horizon and time consistency in action.

* Chair of German and European Politics and Government, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam; Participating Scholar, Kolleg-Forschergruppe The Transformative Power of Europe, Free University Berlin. khgoetz@uni-potsdam.de 1

1. Time and International Public Administration1

Although time has long been an important theme in sociological organisational analysis (Simsa 1996) and in the organisational management literature (Bluedorn and Denhardt 1988; Ancona et al. 2001), the temporality of public administrations has rarely been the focus of empirical analysis and its linkages to power and performance have scarcely been explored in a systematic fashion. Administrations institutionalise time primarily in the form of rules that govern the length and configuration of mandates and tenures of members of government or political councils and un-elected officials; through budgetary, planning, decision-making and implementation rules that determine when (timing), in what order (sequence), how quickly (speed) and for how long (duration) actions can be taken; and through timetables at the political and administrative levels with their mobilising, prioritising and deadlining effects. In addition to formal time rules, administrations operate on the basis of more or less deeply entrenched informal temporal conventions and regularities that pervade organisational behaviour.

The manner in which time is arranged e.g., the length of officials tenures and rotation rules; time-related rules of procedure governing the preparation of policy proposals; or the meeting schedules of administrative co-ordination bodies matter both for the distribution of power within administrations and for policy outputs. It is also generally acknowledged that actors control over time is an important source of power within organisations (Simsa 1996), expressed, in particular, through differentials in actors available time budgets; their authority to set, monitor and enforce the clock for others; and the discretion they enjoy over the timing, sequencing, speed and duration of their own actions. The distinction between organisational time-setters and keepers of the clock, on the one hand, and time-takers is fundamental in this respect. Attempts to exercise power by timetable, i.e. by imposing ones own temporal preferences on others, notably through deadlining, are also commonplace in administrations (Luhmann 1971). Yet, empirical studies of administrative time are very rare (Ekengren, 1996, 2002; see Pollitt 2008 for an overview).

In principle, the European Commission, as an international administration, may be expected to follow a similar path in institutionalising time as national (ministerial) administrations,

1 This paper draws on an ongoing research project on the EU Timescape, funded by the German

Research Foundation DFG. Where not indicated otherwise, the data presented in this paper has been collected in the context of this project.

notably as regards the progressive regularisation, standardisation, formalisation and authoritative enforcement of time rules; the hierarchisation of opportunities for time-setting, monitoring and enforcement; and the top-down distribution of temporal discretion in the organisation. However, as regards the substance of international administrative timescapes, very little is known, though some literature at least briefly hints at the relationship between time and power. For example, Cox (1969) saw the permanence of staff in international organisations as key to their ability to resist political pressure, a point echoed in Jacobsons (1984: 119) classical textbook which notes that Another asset is the permanency of executive heads and secretariats in contrast to the periodic nature of representative bodies. But beyond such brief references, the international administrative timescape has remained almost entirely unexplored.

Against this background, this paper seeks to shed some light on how time is institutionalised in the Commission administration and how this matters for the distribution of power. Special attention is paid to two time-sensitive relationships. The first relates to administrative autonomy: How autonomous from the political level is the administration in setting its clocks? The second relates to organisational centralisation and differentiation: What is the relationship between central coordination units, notably the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, and line units in determining organisational clocks? In short, how does the Commission administration tick and what is the temporal subtext to the distribution of power within the Commission?

In seeking to answer this question, time is understood both as an institution and as a resource, though the emphasis of the present discussion will be on the former. Thus, time as an institution is understood as a system of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may chose, and these rules may be formal or consist of social norms that actors will generally respect and whose violation will be sanctioned by loss of reputation, social disapproval, withdrawal of cooperation and rewards, or even ostracism (Scharpf 1997: 38). Accusations of bad timing, undue haste or playing for time often result from perceived violations of such social norms. Importantly, institutions so understood define repertoires of more or less acceptable courses of action that will leave considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices of purposeful actors (ibid.: 42).

It is when making these choices that time can also be an important resource. As Schmitter and Santiso (1998: 71) have noted, decision-makers learn how to manipulate time, that is, to turn 3

it from an inexorably limited, linear and perishable constraint into something that could be scheduled, anticipated, delayed, accelerated, deadlined, circumvented, prolonged, deferred, compressed, parcelled out, standardized, diversified, staged, staggered, and even wasted but never ignored. This perspective revolves around the scarcity of time and opportunities for time tactics, such as intentional delay, as discussed by Pollitt (2008). The importance of such time tactics in public policy-making should be readily apparent; in fact, it has been suggested that the primary concern of decision makers policy makers, business executives, or top civil servants is to manage time effectively rather than to manage tasks (Zahariadis 2007: 68).

Based on this understanding of time as an institution and a resource, the following analysis proceeds from three basic explanatory assumptions, which combine insights from actorcentred institutionalism (Scharpf 1997); decision-making analysis, which highlights the linkages between temporal discretion, time tactics and the capacity for substantive goal attainment (Pollitt 2008); and sociological accounts of time and organisations, which stress the link between time ownership and organisational hierarchies (Simsa 1996) and the temporal dimension of organisational differentiation through the emergence of different Eigenzeiten (Nowotny 1989). First, actors with longer electoral or appointed mandates and tenures, bigger time budgets and longer time horizons are privileged vis--vis those who have short mandates and tenures, operate under tight deadlines, and have no capacity for taking the long view. Second, the greater actors discretion over the timing, sequencing, speed and duration of their actions, the greater their chances of realizing their own substantive objectives. Third, the greater actors capacity to impose their temporal preferences on others i.e. to act as a time-setters and keepers of the clock the greater, again, their chances of realizing their substantive objectives. Conversely, time-takers are, by implication, also substantive preference-takers.

2. The Commission Timescape: Time Rules and Regularities

If we attempt to sketch the contours of the Commissions administrative timescape, it makes sense to start by examining time rules at the levels of the Treaties, the Commissions Rules of Procedure (RoP) and the so-called Implementing Rules (or rules giving effect to the RoP). Table 1 lists and qualifies these rules.

Table 1: Time Rules of the European Commission

a) In the Treaties Content of Rule Term length Members nomination Review of state aids Monitor of member states' budgets Consultation of labour and management Time Rule Duration Sequence Sequence, Duration Sequence, Duration Sequence, Duration Content of Time Rule 5 years Order of process Order of process Order of process Before submitting proposals in social policy, the Commission shall consult management & labour; they may inform the Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Art. 155. The duration of this process shall not exceed nine months, unless they + the Commission decide jointly to extend it. Reshuffling possible at any time during the Commissions term of office Annually, not later than one month before opening of session of EP Commission lays down the period in which the MS has to respond to the reasoned opinion by the Commission Order of process for the Commission (has 3 months for opinion delivery) Commission sets time limit May alter proposals at any time as long as Council has not acted Article TEU 17/3 (new in TEU) TEU 17/7 (ex TEC 214/2) TFEU 108 (ex TEC 88) TFEU 126 (ex TEC 104) TFEU 154 (ex TEC 138)

Internal allocation of responsibilities General report on the activities of Union Member state (MS) breaking the Treaties MS accused of Treaty breaking by other MS The time a MS has to comply to ECJ ruling Legislative proposals

Timing Regularity, Timing Duration

TFEU 248 (ex TEC 217/2) TFEU 249/2 (ex TEC 212) TFEU 258 (ex TEC 226) TFEU 259 (ex TEC 227) TFEU 260/2 (ex TEC 228) TFEU 293/2 (ex TEC 250/2)

Sequence Duration Duration Timing

b) In the Rules of Procedure (February 2010) Content of Rule Work program Meetings Written procedure Preparation of documents Letters addressed to the Commission Time Rule Regularity Regularity Duration Sequence Duration Content of Time Rule Annually At least once a week Some time limit for reservations and amendments (no general provision) Order of process Answer within 15 days; If not possible: holding reply with date of final answer Rule 2 5 12 23 Annex, Chapter 4

c) In the Implementing Rules (Rules giving effect to the Rules of Procedure) Content of Rule Policy debate Agenda setting up Time Rule Regularity Timing Content of Time Rule Each year the Commission shall hold a policy debate on its priorities and on budgetary issues. Requests for an item to be placed on the agenda must be put into the computer application [] at least nine working days before the Commission meeting in question. In exceptional circumstances, Rule 2 (1) 6 (3.1, 3.2)

Agenda circulation

Timing

Agenda (continuing)

Timing, Sequence

Item Preparation

Written procedure (in general)

Timing

Expedited written procedure

Timing

Urgent written procedure

Timing

Finalisation written procedure Communication on a Council position written procedure Extension of time limits for written procedures

Timing Timing

Duration

Adoption in Written Procedure Exercise of powers under the empowerment and delegation procedures Decision information

Timing Sequence

a Member may ask the President to place an item on the agenda no later than four working days before the [meeting]. The agenda, as adopted by the President, shall be circulated to the Members of the Commission by 17.00 on the day before the meeting. To facilitate preparation of the agenda, the Secretariat-General shall distribute a draft version no later than noon three working days before the meeting. An item can be included in the agenda [] only if the necessary documents can be circulated to Members no later than by noon four working days before the meeting. Documents which are to be discussed in advance at a special meeting of Heads of Cabinet must reach the Members at least 48 hours before the beginning of that meeting, which will normally be held on the Tuesday or Thursday of the week preceding the meeting of the College. In the case of very long documents, the Secretary-General, under the authority of the President, may allow more time. [] the lodging of the necessary documents with the Registry of the Secretariat-General [] must take place on a single date, which shall be the Thursday of the last week but one (week n-2) before that of the Commission meeting. Items for inclusion on the agenda [] shall be prepared at the weekly meeting of Heads of Cabinet, chaired by the Secretary-General. The completion date set by the Secretary-General for each written procedure shall be not less than five working days from the date on which the document was distributed. [] In accordance with rule 12-4.2, the time limit [] may be shortened to not less than three working days from the date on which the document was distributed. With the prior agreement of the President, the time limit for a written procedure may be set by the Secretary-General at less than three working days to enable urgent measures to be adopted quickly. The time limit [] may be set at less than five working days; [] the time limit is at least two working days from the date on which the document was distributed At the request of a Member of the Commission, or where the Secretary-General finds that the draft text does not meet all the requirements concerning substance and form, the time limit [] shall be extended by a period not exceeding that originally set. The date of adoption shall be the date on which the time limit expired. Order of process

6 (4.1)

6 (4.2)

6 (5.1)

12 (4.1)

12 (4.3)

12 (4.4)

12 (4.5) 12 (4.6)

12 (5.1)

12 (10.3) 13 (14.3)

Timing, Sequence

[] shall be produced and circulated by the Secretary-General within 24 hours of their approval, and in any event before the acts mentioned therein are notified or published.

16, 17 (1)

Cooperation and coordination between departments

Speed

Formal interservice consultation

Duration

Alternatives to formal written interservice consultation

Timing

In order to ensure genuine coordination [] the department responsible for preparing an initiative shall contact departments with a legitimate interest and the Secretariat-General as soon as work begins, to inform them of the timetable The departments consulted shall be given at least ten working days in which to submit their comments. This period shall be increased to a minimum of fifteen working days if the total length of the documents [] exceeds twenty pages. The documents submitted for consultation must reach the departments [] at least 48 hours before the meeting.

23 (1)

23 (4.2)

23 (5.2)

Several points deserve highlighting. First, it seems surprising that in the Treaties (TEU/TFEU), apart from regulations on the term length of the Commission President and the Commissioners and the possible reallocation of responsibilities at any time, there are no time rules that relate explicitly to the internal functioning of the Commission, but only some timerelated provisions governing the inter-institutional relations of the Commission (especially orders of process and time limits, sometimes to be set by the Commission, in cases of state aids' review, of state budget monitoring, and of member states' treaty violations). Likewise, the Commissions Rules of Procedure are largely silent when it comes to temporal rules, with the exception of mentioning the annual work programme and the weekly College meetings; the RoP do, however, make frequent reference to the Implementing Rules. It is only in the latter that more detailed rules are found. One focus here is the agenda building for the College meetings, with time limits to propose items or hand in necessary documents (note that there is discretion for the Commission President to accept late additions to the agenda in exceptional circumstances). Second, there is an emphasis on the 'written procedure'. Here it is interesting to note that the Secretary-General with the agreement of the Commission President can shorten the available time period for comments or objections. Also, At the request of a Member of the Commission, or where the Secretary General finds that the draft text does not meet all the requirements concerning substance and form, the time limit [] shall be extended by a period not exceeding that originally set (Implementing Rules, Art. 12, Point 5.1). When it comes to interservice consultation on policy initiatives, the Implementing Rules are also quite brief in respect of time rules (paragraphs 23 (1), (4.2) and (5.2.)).

At least at first sight, then, time in the Commission may appear only lightly institutionalised. Few time rules are set at the highest level of formality the Treaties; formal time rules seem not very detailed and dense; and enforcement mechanisms are largely unspecified. However, 7

for several reasons, such a conclusion would be profoundly misleading. First, many formal important time rules at the level of the Treaties, in Interinstitutional Agreements and also in the Rules of Procedure of the other EU institutions concern different aspects of interinstitutional relations. As such they not only set the time rules of the game governing relations amongst the EU institutions, but also affect the internal operation of the Commission. Second, there are many policy specific time rules that need to be followed, whether it concerns budgetary policy or, for example, the Commissions activities in the field of competition policy. Third, there exist very well developed temporal routines in the Commission and, in particular, a dense web of synchronised meeting timetables governing its internal decision-making, but also external consultation, notably through the numerous advisory expert committees, and cooperation in implementation, notably through the comitology committees. Taken together, these meeting timetables provide the basic rhythm of the Commission administration. Fourth, as explained in the next section, strategic planning and programming have rapidly gained in importance, further intensifying authoritative temporal structuring of the Commissions activities. Each of these points deserves brief elaboration.

As regards, first, time rules governing interinstitutional relations that feed back into Commission administration, they are numerous and can be found at different levels. In the Treaties, they concern, in particular, legislative procedures, notably TFEU Art. 294 and also procedures for Treaty amendments (TEU Art. 48). In Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs), we find, for example, rules on regular meetings involving the President and or/the Vicepresidents of the Commission and the Conference of Presidents in the 2003 IIA on Better Law-making; on early or immediate information to be provided by the Commission in the 2005 Framework Agreement on European Parliament - Commission Relations; or on deadlines for the submission of Commission opinions in the 2007 Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure (The Commission shall, as a general rule, submit is opinion within three weeks of official receipt of the outcome of the European Parliaments vote and at the latest by the commencement of conciliation proceedings; Article 33). Moreover, the rules of procedures of other EU institutions have implications for the temporal ordering of activities in the Commission, such as, for example, Rule 117 of the European Parliaments RoP concerning questions for written answers to the Council or the Commission. It lays down that Questions which require an immediate answer but no detailed research (priority questions) shall be answered within three weeks of being forwarded to the 8

institution concerned () Other questions (non-priority questions) shall be answered within six weeks of being forwarded to the institution concerned.

A further important source of rules affecting organisational behaviour are policy-specific regulations. Of these, the Treaty rules governing decision-making on the multiannual financial framework (TFEU Article 312), the annual budget (TFEU Articles 313 to 316) and on the implementation and discharge of the budget (TFEU Articles 317 to 319) are the most important. The Treaty rules are complemented by the 2006 IIA on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management. As far as the annual budget is concerned, the Treaties contain a detailed timetable governing its preparation and adoption, which binds the Commission and other actors, although as Nugent (2010: 411) has observed in relation to the process prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is worth making the general point that, as with all EU decision-making procedures, the formal rules () provided but a framework that in practice was fleshed-out and adapted by the budgetary actors in response to pressures, necessities, and convenience. The preparation of the budget, an activity which, in some form, involves almost all parts of the Commission administration, financial programming and the implementation of the budget take place within a tight temporal grid that mobilises actors across the organisation.

Other policy areas also follow specific Eigenzeiten, i.e. time-related policy-making rules that translate into more or less elaborate organisational schedules. An especially illustrative example is EU competition policy, encompassing state aid monitoring, antitrust and cartel policy, and merger control. In principle, we should expect considerable temporal discretion for the Commission in this area; after all, European competition policy is de facto a Commission policy. It is the Commission that determines what the policy is and how it is implemented on the ground. It is the Commission that identifies a breach of rules, undertakes the investigation and decides whether to take a formal decision. And it is the Commission that fines, and even establishes the level of the penalty (Cini and McGowan 1998: 41). Yet, if one examines the rules setting out the different procedures, one finds that the latter are governed by detailed timetables, established primarily through Council and Commission Regulations, but also best practice codes. A few examples may suffice. In state aid control, if the Commission decides to open a formal investigation procedure, The Commission shall as far as possible endeavour to adopt a decision within 18 months from the opening of the procedure () Once the time limit referred to () has expired, and should the Member State concerned so request, the Commission shall, within two months, take a decision on the basis of the 9

information available to it (Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, Article 7, Point 6). In antitrust and cartel policy, the Commission has restricted its own temporal discretion to some degree. Thus, in handling complaints, The Commission is under an obligation to decide on complaints within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable duration depends on the circumstances of each case and in particular its context, the various procedural steps followed by the Commission, the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure, the complexity of the case and its importance for the various parties involved (Article 60, Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2004/C 101/05). The Commission will in principle endeavour to inform complainants of the action that it proposes to take on a complaint within an indicative time frame of four months from the reception of the complaint (Article 61).

Tighter deadlines for Commission action apply in merger control. Thus, it has been noted that The fact that the EC decides on mergers within strict deadlines is a notable feature of the Merger Regulation, and one that should be praised (Motta 2004: 36). As Table 2, setting out the procedure for controlling mergers between enterprises, shows the Commission enjoys little temporal discretion when dealing with merger cases. It is, in this case, a time-taker rather than a time-setter.

10

Table 2: EU procedure for merger examination (Legal base: Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004)

Abridged version of a figure in: European Commission - DG Competition (2010: 3 f.)

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Next to time rules laid down in the Treaties, Interinstitutional Agreements, RoPs, Implementing Rules and policy-specific procedural regulations, there are, of course, as in any large bureaucracy, routinised timetables, notably as regards regular meetings at different levels and in different parts of the organisation. Dense scheduling has a mobilising and prioritising effect: actors arrange their activities with a view to the deadlines imposed by the grid of regular meetings. Of importance for the Commission administration as a whole are the meetings in preparation of the regular Wednesday meetings of the College of Commissioners, in which the Commissioners cabinets play a special role. The following quotation gives a good first impression of this coordinating machinery geared towards the Wednesday meetings of the Commissioners: Each cabinets coordinating role is governed by the timetable of the Commissions weekly meetings, normally held on Wednesdays. Issues requiring a Commission decision must be signalled at least nine days in advance of the relevant Commission meeting, usually at the chefs de cabinet meeting held at the beginning of the previous week. The Secretariat General circulates an updated outline agenda each week. Indicative longer-term timetables of the Commission are also circulated. They are designed to help prevent excessive bunching of major issues at particular meetings, to enable all and sundry to manage their own diaries and to set indicative timelines for ending routine coordination by authoritative decision-making () Substantive sectoral policy proposals are discussed at meetings of representatives of all Commissioners cabinets, known as special chefs meetings () During a normal week there are likely to be six or seven such cabinet meetings () Papers for these meetings have to be circulated 48 hours in advance () Coordination between the Commissioners cabinets takes place within a tight time-scale and with firmly fixed procedures. The conclusions of special chefs meetings form the input of the Monday chefs de cabinets meeting () (Spence 2006: 67). This carefully synchronised schedule is complemented by equally routinised meeting schedules within the different Directorates General.

The appearance of dense scheduling is further reinforced if we consider the numerous meetings of the approximately 1,200 expert groups advising the European Commission in the preparation of its initiatives, some of which meet on a monthly basis. As Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2009: 733) have pointed out The large number and the strong growth of the use of expert groups in the European Commission contribute to making this mode of interaction a significant element of the European governance structure, and a routinised and rather standardised mode of consultation. 12

Equally, the Commissions role in the implementation of legislation is subject to dense scheduling, notably through the Comitology committees, of which 266 existed in 2009. They met 894 times in total. The 15 committees active in the field of agriculture alone met 165 times (European Commission 2010); the Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets accounted for 90 meetings in 2009. The most visible results of the committees work were no fewer than 2,091 opinions and 1,808 implementing measures adopted in 2009 (ibid.). These high figures give a first indication of extent to which the comitology committees dense schedule of meetings affect the temporal ordering of activities in the Commission, as the meetings have to be prepared and followed up.

3. Strategic Planning and Programming

A further important device for setting, monitoring and enforcing the administrative clock is provided by strategic planning and programming (SPP) in the Commission, which is a cyclical exercise that affects the temporality of the organisation as a whole in two basic ways. First, the cycle of planning and programming follows a fixed timetable, which effectively sets deadlines for substantive inputs from throughout the organisation; second, and no less importantly, the various documents adopted (see below) contain detailed schedules for the delivery of Commission actions which serve as an important commitment device.

SPP is a complex process. Upon entering into office, the new Commission is expected to adopt five-year strategic objectives for the duration of its mandate. The strategic objectives inform the Annual Policy Strategy, which defines, early in the previous year, political priorities and key initiatives for the following year

http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/index_en.htm) and allocates the financial and human resources to them. Following discussions with the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission adopts an Annual Work Programme, which contains an action plan and concrete deliverables. On this basis, each Directorate-General, in turn, adopts its own Annual Management Plan. The latter is expected to set clear, specific, measurable and verifiable objectives for each activity as well as indicators for the monitoring and reporting on the progress made and the impact of the activities to the EU citizens

(http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/strategicplanning/index_en.htm) and thus enable the management to plan, follow up and report on all the activities and resources of each directorate-general 13

(http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/index_en.htm). For day-to-day management, the annual plans are supplemented by a list of planned Commission initiatives, which is updated monthly. To conclude the annual cycle, each Directorate General must prepare an Annual Activity Report, in which it documents to what extent the annual management plans have been implemented. The main points of these reports are contained in a Synthesis Report submitted by the Commission to the Council and the EP. Table 3 sets out the basic timeline that SPP follows.

14

Table 3: The strategic planning and programming cycle of the Commission

Source: Tholoniat (2009: 229), on the basis of information available from the Commission website

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Not only does the SPP process itself follow elaborate time rules; by setting out the Commissions priorities and initiatives publicly and well in advance, it serves as a very visible commitment device and establishes a timetable for the Commissions activities. But how authoritative is this timetable and where does authority to define and enforce it lie? As regards the first question, a Commission insider has noted that SPP, although elaborate, cannot fully capture the more political and discretionary nature of the Commissions work. In particular, the requirement to conduct an IA [Impact Assessment] may prove cumbersome for political documents produced in response to new events or for a pressing political mandate () Moreover, the system is ill-suited for more confidential, diplomatic or trade negotiation documents. In practice, the risk exists that only the most easily planned items will be registered in the work programme while key, but unforeseen, political initiatives will not, thereby reducing the credibility and use of the instrument. The Commission has, therefore, become used to updating its work programme half-way through its implementation (Tholoniat 2009: 234) As this quotation indicates, the Commission as a collective body certainly retains some necessary discretion; but empirical analysis suggests that SPP works quite effectively, both in translating political guidelines into concrete initiatives and in ensuring that planned initiatives are, in fact, undertaken. This becomes evident when we examine the current set of SPP documents. At present, there are no five-year strategic objectives in place, since the Commission has not (yet?) adopted such a document. Instead, the political guidelines for the work of the Commission established by President Barroso prior to his own confirmation and the later confirmation of the Commission serve as the main strategy document; tellingly, the Commission website (http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm) states that The Commission Work Programme (CWP) 2010 translates the priorities of President Barroso's political guidelines into concrete actions. The CWP 2010 consists of some 10 pages of text, 40 pages of annex tables; a list of strategic initiatives to be delivered by the Commission in 2010; a list of major proposals under consideration during 2010 and beyond; and a list of simplification proposals and withdrawals. Moreover, 'roadmaps' consisting of several pages are set out for all initiatives in the pipeline and are regularly updated. They contain, inter alia, the problem definition, the goals of the initiative, a short impact assessment (and planning for further assessment as well as stakeholder consulting) and an expected date of adoption in the Commission College. Only very few of the issues contained in the political guidelines have not found their way into the CWP 2010; conversely, most of the 34 CWP 2010 strategic initiatives can be linked to Barrosos guidelines. Only five

16

initiatives appear to have no ground in the Barroso paper2, and some others can only be weakly linked to it.

If the CWP is quiet good at translating strategic objectives into concrete initiatives, what is their chance of being realised? In other words, how good is the CWP at programming Commission action? Comparing the CWP 2008 with Commission information on adopted initiatives reveals that 80 per cent of initiatives planned for 2008 were, in fact, adopted by the Commission during the course of the year; some more were adopted in 2009. Of 26 strategic initiatives, 22 were adopted in 2008, 3 in 2009. Of 61 priority initiatives, about 50 were adopted in 2008, and 5 in 2009. These figures indicate that the CWP does work as a commitment device in that it guides the temporal prioritisation of work in the Commission.

4. Mandates and Tenures

In order to get a sense of the administrative timescape of the Commission, our discussion so far has focused on time-centred rules and temporal regularities governing administrative planning and policy-making processes in the Commission. Together, they play a key role in mobilising actors, in shaping their priorities and in structuring their daily calendars. Yet, the importance of such rules and regularities is, in part, dependent on actors individual time budgets and the time horizons that they are likely to adopt in making decisions about their priorities. At the level of top policy-makers, the length and configuration of mandates and tenures is critical in this respect. For example, a Commissioner with a five-year mandate, but with no prospect of returning to his portfolio, has a different political time budget than one who is confident of returning to his post in a new Commission. A Director General who takes over a task for a predetermined time, as is now the case, has a smaller administrative time budget than one whose tenure in his post is open-ended, as used to be the case.

Let us first look at Commissioners. The official length of their mandate is 5 years (TEU Art. 17/3). Responsibilities can be reallocated amongst Commissioners at any time (TFEU Art. 248). A Commissioner shall resign if the President so requests (TEU Art. 17/6), and the
2 Strategic Initiatives 2010 without a basis in the Barroso paper: (Strategic Initiative 17) Regulation

governing translation requirements for the future EU patent; (21) Revision of the Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial judgements; (23) Communication on the European contract law; (25) New comprehensive legal framework for data protection; (28) Communication on a new post-2010 EU biodiversity policy and strategy.

17

whole body shall resign in the case of a motion of censure by the European Parliament (TEU Art. 17/8).3 It is important to note that there is, in practice, a considerable time lag between the nomination of the President of the Commission and the confirmation of the College. Thus, in 2004, five months passed between Barroso's nomination by the European Council on 29 June (and his approval by the European Parliament on 22 July) and the EPs approval of the whole College on 18 November. In 2009-10, there was a gap of seven months between Barroso's nomination on 9 July 2009 (approved by the EP on 16 September) and the EPs approval of the whole College on 9 February 2010. This headstart for the President of the Commission matters because it allows him a lengthy window of opportunity to shape the new Commissions priorities well before the new Commissioners are in place. Thus, already on 3 September 2009, Barroso sent his Political guidelines for the next Commission to the European Parliament, which, as discussed above, formed the basis for the Commissions 2010 work programme.

What is the basic time budget available to members of the Commission? Between 1958 and the beginning of the Barroso II Commission in February 2010, the average tenure of a Commission President was 4.67 years. The average tenure of Commissioners of whom there were 121 in total was 5.82 years; their average tenure in the same portfolio was 4.58 years.4 Wilhelm Haverkamp was the longest serving Commissioner, with 17.5 years. Of the total population of Commissioners, 58 per cent served for 1 full term or less; 30 per cent for two full or partial terms; and 12 per cent for more than two terms. As Table 4 shows, tenures have not changed greatly over time, if we disregard the first generation of Commissioners. Those who left office in the 1960s had, on average, served 6.6 years, while those who left office in the 2000s had served one year less on average, i.e. 5.6 years. The gap is more pronounced of

3 A special case is the new High Representative and Commissioner for external relations: The

European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint [him]. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure (TEU Art. 18/1). He shall resign, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 18(1), if the President so requests (TEU Art 17/6). In the case of a motion of censure, he shall resign from the duties that he carries out in the Commission (Art. 17/8). 4 Included in the data are all Commissioners in office since 1958 and who had left the Commission by 9 February 2010, i.e. at the switch from Barroso I to Barroso II; they exclude Commissioners currently still in office. Commissioners who were also President of the Commission (before or after it) and Commissioners who held office twice, but with interruption, were coded as two individual people. The Commissions under Presidents Malfatti and Mansholt were treated as 1 commission (1 single term). The caretaker status of the Santer Commission between its resignation and the interim appointment of the next Prodi Commission (16.03.1999-15.09.1999) was not treated separately. With regard to calculations on tenures on one portfolio, portfolios of a Commissioner in different (successive) Commissions were treated as the same, when all or at least a substantial part (policy field) of his former portfolio remained under his responsibility.

18

we regard the time Commissioners served in the same portfolio. In the 1960s, Commissioners left office or changed responsibilities after having served 6.5. years in one portfolio, while n the 2000s Commissioners served only 4.4 years in the same portfolio.

and had served 6.5. years in the same portfolio; those who left office in the 2000s had, on average, been Commission members for 5.6 years, and served in the same portfolio for 4.4. years.

Table 4: Average tenure of Commissioners over time (according to the decade of office exit / portfolio change)
Average tenure 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Length of tenure in years 6,62 5,87 6,51 4,61 4,49 4,73 4,39 5,88 Average tenure on s ame portfolio 6,22

5,59

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

Decade of office exit (and/or of portfolio change in the case of the lower graph)

Own calculations. Data basis: all Commissioners who were in office between 1958 and who left office or changed portfolio between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 2009. Commissioners who were also President of the Commission (before or after it) and Commissioners who held office twice (with interruption) were coded as two individual people. The caretaker status of the Santer Commission between its resignation and the interim appointment of the next Prodi Commission (16.03.1999-15.09.1999) was not treated differently/separately. With regard to tenures on one portfolio, portfolios of a Commissioner in different (successive) Commissions were treated as the same, when all or at least a substantial part (policy field) remained under his responsibility.

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Table 5: Re-appointment rate of incumbent Commissioners at the beginning of a new Commission, over time

Own calculations. Data: all Commissioners including those who are still in office(!). Explanation: How many Commissioners who had been in office at the end (only!) of the former Commission were re-appointed again?

Amongst those with more than one term, 53 per cent had to change their portfolio once or even twice. If we consider the reappointment rates of Commissioners (excluding Presidents) at the turning point of two Commissions, between 1958 and 2010, 48 per cent were reappointed, but only 22 per cent to the same portfolio. The re-appointment rate declines in the long run, but it has been quite high again at the shift from Barroso I to Barroso II, with 13 out of 26 Commissioners. Yet, with the exception of Catherine Ashton, who was appointed as High Representative on 1 December 2009 and was re-appointed with the rest of the Commission on 9 February, all Commissioners changed portfolios.

It is instructive to compare the length of time of Commissioners in charge of a portfolio with that of top officials. The Commission administration is, of course, mainly composed of permanent officials; but, since the late 1990s, rules relating to the rotation of senior staff have contributed to a decline in the average tenure of top officials. Based on a decision taken in 1999 by the Prodi Commission, The general rule is that all senior officials serve a minimum of two years in any function and a maximum of five years. At the end of this five-year period, the official would be due for mobility to another function. Exceptionally, a senior officials assignment in the current position could be extended for an additional and final period of two years. At the end of that period, the official would be reassigned to another function (COM Decision 25 Oct 2004). 20

This decision has had appreciable consequences in that the average tenure of DirectorsGeneral in charge of one portfolio has declined substantially over time. As Table 6 shows, the average duration for which a Director-General has been in charge of the same portfolio before he changed responsibilities or left the Commission was 7.2 years in the 1980s, 5.51 years in the 1990s, and 4.88 years between 2000 and 2009.5 At the time of writing (September 2009), no Director-General had been in post for more than 5 years. The time budget of the top officials in the Directorates-General has, thus, come to approximate that of their political principals, i.e. the Commissioners.

Perhaps even more importantly, Commissioners and Directors-Generals tenures coincide in many cases. Thus, at the beginning of September 2010, of the 26 Director-Generals in charge of policy-related portfolios, 13 have come into office since February 2010, when the new Commission took power; a further six are due for replacement before the end of 2010, if the five-year rule s adhered to. This means that in at least half the cases, Commissioner and Director-General operate with an almost identical time budget.

Table 6: Average tenure of Directors-General on 1 portfolio (according to the decade of leaving portfolio)
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Length of tenure in years

7,17 5,51 4,88

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2009

Decade of office exit and/or portfolio change

5 Data drawn from the EUROGUIDE annuals; so only on an annual basis > no exact dates of office

entry and office exit; when one is mentioned as Director-General in the 2005 Euroguide, it has been assumed that he was in office the whole year; when there was another name on the same portfolio in the Euroguide one year later, it has been assumed that the change took place the 1st January 2006 this does not pose a problem as we don't look at individual tenures, but only at averages and averages just depend on how many different people held an office over a certain period of time. As there were no Euroguides in 1995 and 1997 we took the data from the year before, assuming that the office holder from the preceding year was still in office. For DirectorGenerals who started office before the first Euroguide 1977 we asked the Commission for the year of their entry. For those listed in the 2009 Euroguide we checked whether they had left office in late 2009.

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Own calculations: Data basis: all Directors General of policy-focused DGs (no internal services/DGs, except the Secretariat General) who left their office between 1980 and 31st December 2009 (n=103). Data drawn from the EUROGUIDE annuals, so only on an annual basis without exact dates of office entry and office exit; when one is mentioned e.g. as Director General in the 2005 Euroguide, it has been assumed that he was in office the whole year; when there was someone else on the same portfolio in the Euroguide one year later, it has been assumed that the change took place the 1st January 2006. This does not pose a problem as we do not look at an individual tenure, but only at averages. As there were no Euroguides in 1995 and 1997 we took the data from the previous year, assuming that the office holder was still in office. For Directors General who started office before the first Euroguide was published 1977 we asked the Commission for the year of their entry. For those listed in the 2009 Euroguide we checked with the Commission whether they left office in 2009. DGs finally included: Agriculture and rural affairs; Budget, Competition; Development; Education and culture; Economic and financial affairs; Humanitarian aid; Enlargement; Employment; Social Affairs and Equal opportunities; Enterprise and Industry; Environment; Fishery and Maritime Affairs; Information society and media; Justice, freedom and security; Internal market and financial services; Regional policy; External relations; Research; Health and consumer protection; Secretariat General; Customs and Taxation; Trade; Energy and Transport (separated until 1998).

The impression of limited and coinciding time budgets for the key actors within the Commission is further reinforced when we examine Commissioners cabinets, whose centrality in the Commission policy process is well-documented. All cabinets members are appointed by the relevant Commissioner; the cabinets are composed of both permanent Commission officials seconded to the cabinet and outsiders on secondment from national administrations or the private sector. The latter tend to spend an average of two to three years in a cabinet (Spence 2006: 65). As Spence (70) highlights, this temporal limitation may come at a price: members of cabinets are reliant on Commissioners for their job and this might conceivably limit their willingness to give critical advice () it is clearly difficult for cabinets to strike a successful balance between developing a long-term strategy and responding to current and pressing issues.

5. Power in Time

The preceding sections have sought to describe some key elements of the Commission administrations timescape, with an emphasis on time rules and temporal regularities at the levels of policy-related processes and top staff. What do these observations tell us about the distribution of power within this administration? In particular, what does a time-centred analysis reveal about two principal dimensions of the institutionalisation of any administrative organisation, i.e. the degree of bureaucratic autonomy from politics and the degree of centralisation within the organisation? In seeking to answer these questions we need to return to the three basic assumptions about the link between time and power within organisations introduced at the outset, which highlighted the importance of the lengths of mandates and 22

tenures; the size of time budgets, the length of time horizons; actors relative discretion over the timing, sequencing, speed and duration of their actions; and their status as time-setters, time-keepers or time-takers. We also need to keep in mind the distinction between time as an institution, which directs attention to the question which actors are systematically advantaged, and time as a resource, which points to the scope for time tactics.

If we focus, first, on time as an institution, it is noticeable how a time-centred analysis of the Commission administration chimes with recent organisational analysis of the Commission since the Kinnock reforms, which have tended to emphasise both growing politicisation, in the sense of a strengthening of political office holders, i.e. the Commissioners and the President of the Commission, at the expense of bureaucratic discretion; and, linked to the former process, growing centralisation, in the sense of a strengthening of central coordination units a Commission core executive at the expense of the line administration. Thus, it has been suggested that the scope for bureaucratic entrepreneurs, notably heads of unit, has been significantly curtailed, not least since crucial individuals have less time for policy content than they used to have in the past (Bauer 2008: 703). Bottom-up initiatives seem to be restricted through stronger top-down planning and monitoring. At the same time, the accountability system of and within the Commission has evolved in a manner that has, amongst other things, strengthened the President of the Commission and increased the accountability of top officials Directors-General to political actors (Wille 2010). Not surprisingly, this decline in bureaucratic autonomy appears to have gone hand in hand with a strengthening of central coordination through the Secretariat-General, which is directly responsible to the Commission President (Kassim 2006).

Time rules and the management of time within the Commission both reflect these general trends and appear to have acted as stimulus behind them. Thus, Kassim (2006: 85) has highlighted how the management of the elaborate timetables that govern strategic planning and programming have allowed the Commission to take a more directive approach. This point is underscored by Tholoniat (2009: 232), who has emphasised the extent to which the Secretariat-General acts as a time-setter and time-monitor in SPP: The combination of SPPIA [Impact Assessment] tools may have contributed to the (re)centralization, consistency and collegiality of the internal decision-making process. The Secretariat General plays a key role in the operation of these instruments and it has contributed to spreading a culture of upstream co-ordination, inviting services to plan ahead and revisit the timetable of their initiatives in the light of the overall priorities of the College. It also plays an increasingly pivotal role in steering and screening new 23

policy initiatives, with the possibility of being associated with, or to take over the leadership for, essential files. Hierarchisation of opportunities for time-setting; the restriction of temporal discretion at lower levels as a result of authoritative advance scheduling; and, if authors such as Bauer (2008) are correct, a limitation in the time budgets for policy-related work available to administrators lower down the hierarchy would thus have contributed to a shift of power within the Commission administration. The impression of a strong temporal subtext to politicisation and centralisation in the Commission is reinforced if we remember that many of the formal time rules under which Commission operates are self-imposed through the Implementing Rules, which fall under the responsibility of the Secretariat-General, and also the Commissions Manual of Operating Procedures, the content of which is managed by the Secretariat-General.

What is perhaps more ambiguous are the implications of changes in the time budgets and time horizons of the top policy-makers, i.e. the members of the College of Commissioners and the Directors-General. The first important trend to note here is the decrease in their overall time budget, as expressed by the time they stay in one portfolio. Despite the fact that the Maastricht Treaty lengthened the period of office of Commissioners from four to five years so as to synchronise the Commission with the European Parliament, the length of time for which Commissioners retain responsibility for one portfolio has decreased over time, though this decrease is, in part, due to the shortened Delors Commission of January 1993 to January 1995. Given that even in the event of reappointment, a Commissioners chances of retaining his portfolio are, according to present practice, very slim, this portfolio-related time budget is also likely to have a key influence on the time horizon a Commissioner adopts in planning the temporal ordering of his activities over his period of office.

What incentives do Commissioners have to look beyond the likely end of their period of office when it comes to timing their initiatives, notably as regards the initiation of legislation requiring the agreement of the EP and the Council? Tables 7 and 8 show the temporal distribution of the initiation of legislative acts directives, regulations and decisions over the course of the Prodi and Barroso I Commissions. A number of observations are apparent. We can see, e.g., that the last quarter of the year is typically particularly busy in terms of the initiation of legislation, a phenomenon that is likely to reflect both the springing into gear of the Commission administration after the summer break and a desire to fulfil commitments made in the Annual Work Programme and the Directorates-Generals annual management 24

plans. More pertinently in the present context, it is noticeable that there is neither a marked falling off of activities towards the end of a Commissions tenure nor is there unequivocal evidence of a pronounced rush to get initiatives under way as the Commissions mandate is about to expire.

Table 7 Temporal distribution of legislative initiatives in the Prodi Commission

Distribution of Initiatives over the term of the Prodi Commission Initiatives per Quarter (abs. numbers)
200 50 100 150

2000 q1

2001 q1

2002 q1

2003 q1

2004 q1

Prodi Commission in Quarters (13.09.1999 - 21.11.2004)

How to read the Graphs: The bars represent the absolute number of initiatives in one quarter of a year. Example: in quarter one of the year 2000 (2000 q1) the Prodi Commission initiated 109 binding legislative acts (Directives, Regulations, Decisions). In quarter three of the year 2002 the figure was 133.

Table 7 Temporal distribution of legislative initiatives in the Barroso I Commission

Distribution of Initiatives over the term of the Barroso I Commission Initiatives per Quarter (abs. numbers)
200 0 2005 q1 50 100 150

2006 q1

2007 q1

2008 q1

2009 q1

2010 q1

Barroso I Commission in Quarters (22.11.2004 - 10.02.2010)

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How might the time horizons of Commissioners influence this distributional pattern? To answer this question, a brief look at the situation in national parliamentary systems might be instructive. Here, we can typically observe a flurry of legislative activity towards the end of the governments and parliaments terms of office, as the incumbent majority uses legislation to cement its own priorities and preferences beyond the election date; there is also evidence of electoral business cycles, with electorally motivated timing of initiatives designed to curry favour with the governing parties potential voters (Martin 2004). In almost all parliamentary democracies, the discontinuity principle applies, that is legislation still pending in parliament at the time of its dissolution is aborted. Government bills must, therefore, be submitted early enough to allow sufficient time for the conclusion of the parliamentary legislative process.

In the case of the Commission, the situation is more complex. Unlike a government, the Commission does not, of course, run for re-election and whatever a Commissioners individual achievements, his chances of returning to his portfolio are virtually non-existent. This consideration might be taken to suggest that he should time his legislative initiatives early enough so as to be able to see them through whilst still in office. There are, however, two crucial features of the EU legislative process that incentivise Commissioners to keep on initiating legislation until the end of their term of office. First, the discontinuity principle does not apply in the European Parliament, as legislation still pending is routinely carried over into the next parliament (Kovats 2009). Second, as there is no majority-opposition dynamic within the European Parliament, eventual approval of a legislative initiative by the EP and the Council without major modifications is no more or less likely before an election than afterwards. Thus, it is rational for Commissioners to keep initiating legislation until the end of their term of office.

If we turn from the political to the administrative level, we have noted above that the policyrelated time budgets of Directors-General have shrunk significantly over the years as their tenures in one portfolio have shortened. Their budget is now very similar to that of Commissioners and members of cabinets and they do (no longer) possess a power advantage associated with a longer tenure, in the sense of being able to take the longer view. Moreover, in many cases, time budgets coincide, as the appointment of new, and the rotation of existing, Directors-General in cases takes place close to the time when Commissioners come into office.

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Against this background, a case can be made that there is a definite temporal subtext to the oft-alleged power shift within the Commission, from the administrative to the political level, and from line units to central coordination bodies. Administrators at the levels of heads of units are said to have less time for policy work than in the past (Bauer 2008); the time budgets of Directors-General are declining relative to Commissioners and cabinets; and the time horizons of senior officials cannot be assumed to systematically extend beyond those of Commissioners. Time setting and time monitoring within the organisation rely on hierarchy, and time management by the Secretariat-General has become a key device for steering the administration. As a result, temporal discretion lower down the organisation can be expected to decrease.

Although there are different pieces of evidence to support such a case, one must be careful not to overstate the extent to which a complex organisation such as the Commission administration can be made to tick according to centrally set and monitored clocks and to which temporal discretion at lower levels in the organisation can be restricted. First, as was noted above, many of the temporal requirements governing activity in the Commission administration are not self-imposed, but arise from its interaction with other institutions, notably the European Parliament and the Council. Thus, the Commission is as much a timetaker as it is a time-setter notably through its right of legislative initiative. Second, the Commission is a decidedly heterotemporal administration. The steady extension of the acquis has meant that an ever increasing range of policies runs according to policy-specific timetables and leads to a differentiation of organisational time. Third, there is power in temporal routines. Much of what goes on in the Commission is structured temporally by entrenched timetables, whether it concerns the elaborate schedule of meetings building up to the weekly gathering of the Commissioners, comitology meetings or meetings of expert groups. Such organisational routines constitute the basic rhythm of everyday bureaucratic life and they provide a shield at lower levels of the organisation against hierarchical intervention. Finally, as any set of rules, temporal requirements and routines provide rules of the game, but individuals capacity to play the game do, of course, differ. Put differently, some actors are more able to exploit rules (or to bend or, if possible, ignore them) in the pursuit of substantive objectives than others and skilled administrators will be experts at such time tactics.

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6. Concluding Remark: Still a Non-Majoritarian Timescape?

What type of organisation does a time-centred analysis of the Commission administration reveal? There are different angles from which this question can be tackled, but one fruitful way to tease out some of the implications of the above discussion is to engage with arguments about non-majoritarian institutions and their functional specificities. Non-majoritarian institutions are usually defined as governmental entities that (a) possess some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials (Thatcher and Stone-Sweet 2002: 2). Central banks, regulatory agencies and courts are amongst the most frequently analysed, but the European Commission is also often classified as a non-majoritarian institution.

What is especially relevant in the present context are the time-centred arguments made in favour of non-majoritarian institutions. Thus, with specific reference to agencies, Majone (1997: 3), in particular, has stressed their specific temporal capabilities when compared to majoritarian institutions: Long-term policy commitment is notoriously difficult to achieve in a democracy, which is a form of government pro tempore. The time limit imposed by the requirements of elections at regular intervals is a powerful constraint on the arbitrary use by the winners of the electoral contest of the powers entrusted to them by the voters. However, the segmentation of the democratic process into relatively short time periods has serious consequences whenever the problems faced by society require long-term solutions. In the expectation of alternation, politicians have few incentives to develop policies whose success, if at all, will come after the next election. Hence, it is difficult for political executives to credibly commit themselves to a long-term strategy. By contrast, non-majoritarian institutions, because they are dissociated from electoral time, have greater incentives to take the long view and they promise a higher degree of time consistency in their actions, which is why democracies need non-majoritarian institutions (Majone 1996b; and 1996a).

Our analysis of the Commission administration timescape might suggest that its nonmajoritarian character is becoming to some extent eroded, as it is more closely tied to electoral cycles and as key actors time budgets and time horizons appear to shrink. The direct linkage between the electoral cycle of the European Parliament and the five-year tenure of the Commission that has been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and the need for the approval 28

of the Commission by the Parliament have proved decisive forces behind cyclical planning and programming in the Commission. To a growing extent, these planning and programming cycles coincide with personnel cycles at the levels of both political and administrative personnel. Time in the Commission, thus, appears to be increasingly cyclical. As has been noted, democratic political time is strongly associated with the idea of cycles: The cyclical element characterises the temporal structures of political systems much more than linearity. True: political planning and innovation, economic and technical progress and the establishment of strategies for future developmental opportunities () are future oriented linear time arrows () But political time is to a much larger extent characterised by recurring cycles. The reasons for this () lie above all in the temporal limitation of democratic government (Riescher 1994: 230; my translation, KHG). Linear time, by contrast, is typically associated with time arrows, a succession or sequence of events that may occur with a high degree of regularity, but not are bounded by clear start and an end points that would give rise to a new sequence. Political cycles are strongly linked to the idea of discontinuity, institutionalised opportunities for renewal, even ruptures - in institutional practices, personnel and policy. Linear time tends to be identified with ongoingness, continuity of action and open-endedness. Fixed mandates, which are subject to regular renewal, accord with cyclical political time; open or extended mandates suggest linearity.

What we are witnessing in the changing timescape of the Commission could thus be interpreted as an expression of its growing democratic accountability; the price that might be paid for this is a gradual loss in the specific temporal capabilities with which it had been endowed in the past, notably the ability to pursue long-term projects that require extended time budgets, long time horizons and consistency in action over more than one electoral cycle.

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