EN BANCG.R. No. 45116 September 17, 1936 GO OCCO & CO., petitioner, vs.

SIXTO DE LA COSTA, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, and ALEJANDRO S. REYES, as administrator of the estate of Laureana Antonio,respondents. LAUREL, J.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed with this court by Go Occo & Co. against Sixto de la Costa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The complaint recites the following: That the plaintiff is a duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with domicile at Cebu, Cebu, and the defendant is a judge of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Cebu; For its cause of action, the plaintiff alleges: 1. That, on March 25, 1935, plaintiff Go Occo & Co. filed an action with the justice of the peace court of Cebu, Cebu, to recover the amount of P467.25 against People's Bazar representing the purchase price of goods taken on credit. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued on the same against the defendant, and same was levied upon merchandise belonging to the defendant and taken possession of by the provincial sheriff of Cebu. On March 29, 1935, the estate of Laureana Antonio, through its administrator Alejandro S. Reyes, filed an intervention complaint claiming the sum of P1,380 representing unpaid rent of a house occupied by the defendant's in Cebu, Cebu. Over the verbal objection of the plaintiff to the admission of the intervenor's intervention complaint on the ground that intervention complaint cannot be led in the justice of the peace of court and that intervenor's intervention complaint the amount of P1,380 which was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of Cebu tried the case and rendered judgment declaring plaintiff's claim preferred to that of intervenor's. On May 4, 1935, the intervenor appealed from the judgment of the justice of the peace court, paying the amount of P16 for docket fee on that same day. On June 28, 1935, the clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu addressed a letter to the intervenor informing him that he had to pay still he amount of P4 as the docket fee on that appeal was P20. Up to the present time the said intervenor has not made good the payment of the said P4. 2. That, intervention complaint filed in the justice of the peace court was not reproduced by the intervenor on appeal in the Court of First Instance. 3. That, for non-payment of the full docket fees, the case was not ready for trial, even if initiated originally in the Court of First Instance. 4. That, on January 18, 1936, the defendant judge entered an order declaring the plaintiff Go Occo & Co., in default on the intervenor's intervention complaint. On the same date the said defendant judge entered a judgment declaring that the said defendant People's Bazar was in debt to the said intervenor's estate in the amount of P1,380 and that the said intervenor estate's claim was superior to any other credit. Upon being notified of the order of default and of the judgment, plaintiff Go Occo & Co. filed a motion on February 5, 1936, asking for the reinstatement of the case and for the dismissal of the intervenor's appeal. (Here motion is reproduced in full.) 5. That, on motion by the attorney for the intervenor, the hearing of the aforesaid plaintiff's motion which was set for February 11, 1936, was postponed by defendant judge to February 25, 1936, over the objection of the plaintiff's attorneys, the objection being for the reason that the plaintiff's right to appeal might lapse. To assure plaintiff's right of appeal, plaintiff filed an amended motion for reconsideration and for dismissal of intervenor's appeal on February 12, 1936. (Here motion is also reproduced in full.) 6. On March 2, 1936, the defendant judge entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration and ordering the execution of the judgment. (Here order is reproduced.) 7. That, as aforesaid, the defendant judge has ordered the execution of the judgment in the said case, and that unless enjoined not to do so, the said judge will proceed to have his order executed. 8. That, there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the plaintiff. Wherefore, this Honorable Court is respectfully prayed to order the defendant judge to certify the records of this case for a review by that Honorable Court and to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

requiring the said judge to recall the order of execution of the judgment aforesaid. It will be observed that, according to the foregoing petition, the court below issued various orders in civil case No. 10606, Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Go Occo & Co., plaintiff, vs. People's Bazar, defendant, versus Alejandro S. Reyes, administrator of the estate of the deceased, Laureana Antonio, intervenor." Among these orders are: The order of January 18, 1936, declaring the plaintiff therein in default, that of the same date in favor of the intervenor's claim, and that of March 2, 1936, disallowing the motion for reconsideration presented by the plaintiff therein and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution. The petition does not state which of these orders is assailed or was issued by the inferior court in excess or extra imitation of its jurisdiction or with manifest abuse of its discretion. Worse than this, the petition does not even contain a general averment that the Court of First Instance of Cebu in taking cognizance of the civil case aforementioned acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It simply alleges, paragraph 8 thereof that "there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the plaintiff." The petition in this case is vague and indefinite. The administration of justice is not a matter of guess work. While pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties, courts should not be left to conjectures in the determination of issues submitted by the parties litigant or their attorneys. Where, therefore, the pleading is, as in the case, vague, and uncertain, courts will not allow themselves to be led to the commission of error or injustice by exploring in the midst of uncertainty and divining the intention of the parties of their counsel. Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur. EN BANC [G.R. No. L-23426. March 1, 1968.] LEOPOLDO SY-QUIA, HECTOR MORENO, ALEJANDRO DE SANTOS, PEDRO AGUIRRE, and HANS INHELDER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARY MARSMAN, A. L. VELILLA, A.V. SANTIAGO, E.G. VITO, H.A. DOORNBOSCH, Defendants-Appellants. De Santos and Delfino for Plaintiffs-Appellees. Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates, for DefendantsAppellants. SYLLABUS 1. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; GENERAL DENIAL, MEANING OF. There is no difference between an averment that a defendant denies each and every allegation and a plea whereby the defendant denies the recitals of the complaint reproduced in the answer. The first mode of denial is and has been declared to be a general denial and the second should be equally so held. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE DENIALS, EVEN IF SPECIFIC, DO NOT SATISFY REQUIREMENT OF RULES. The Rules require that besides specifying allegations of fact which are not admitted, the answer should set forth the matters relied upon in support of the denial. The Rules are no longer satisfied with mere denials, even if specific, but demand that the defendant should manifest what he considers to be the true facts; he must aver matters to support his denials. 3. ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC DEFENSES WHICH ARE EVASIVE, VIOLATIVE OF RULES. The setting up of special defenses which are evasive and do not touch the heart of the controversy is a strategy that cannot be sanctioned. It is violative of the policy of fair disclosure of facts required by the Rules. DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by Mary A. Marsman Et. Al. from the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) in its Civil Case No. 6759. Leopoldo Sy-quia, Hector Moreno, Alejandro de Santos, Pedro Aguirre and Hans Inhelder commenced quo warranto

proceeding against Mary A. Marsman, A.L. Velilla, A.V. Santiago, E.G. Vito and H.A. Doornbosch in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, with the filing of a complaint alleging as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "1. Plaintiffs are all of age and residents of the Province of Rizal, except Leopoldo Sy-quia who is a resident of the City of Manila, defendants are all of age and residents of the Province of Rizal, except H.A. Doornbosch who is a resident of the City of Manila, Mary A. Marsman, being a widow, and all with place of business at the Marsman Building, Buendia Avenue, Makati, Rizal, where they may be served with summons and a copy of this complaint. "2. Prior to December 29, 1960, defendants constituted the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United Kingdom with principal offices in London and Philippine offices at the Marsman Building, Buendia Avenue, Makati, Rizal. "3. On December 29, 1960, at the annual general meeting and extraordinary general meeting of stockholders of said corporation held at its Philippine Offices (Marsman Building), there being a quorum and all prerequisites, formal as well as essential for the holding of said meetings having been complied with, plaintiffs were duly elected, in accordance with the British Companies Act of 1948 and the Articles of Association of said corporation, the governing law on the matter, directors of said Marsman Investments, Ltd. "4. On January 4, 1961, as such directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd., plaintiffs held an organizational meeting at the Marsman Building, site of its Philippine Offices, and, thereafter, plaintiffs, singly as well as collectively, demanded of defendants, who were then within the premises, the vacation of their respective offices as such members of the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and the turning over of the same to plaintiffs, as well as all the books, accounts, papers and other records of the corporation. "5. Defendants rejected this demand, as well as all other subsequent similar demands made by plaintiff, and, to this date, have been acting and posing as the lawful members of the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. thereby usurping offices lawfully pertaining to plaintiffs. "6. For the enforcement and protection of their rights so grossly and wantonly violated by defendants, plaintiffs had to retain undersigned counsel whose reasonable fee, until final determination of this case, is P15,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library Plaintiffs thus prayed for the ouster of defendants as directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and their recognition and institution instead of the latter; for attorneys fees in the sum of P15,000.00 and costs. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the action, pointing to the pendency of other actions (Civ. Case No. 45935, CFI of Manila and Civil Case No. Q-5934, CFI of Rizal), allegedly involving the same parties and over the same cause of action. Upon its denial by the court, defendants filed an answer that reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "1. With reference to the allegations in paragraph 1, defendants represent that (a) defendant Mary A. Marsman is now deceased, the defendant having died on January 11, 1963 in Palo Alto, California; (b) defendant Alexander Sycip was appointed by the probate court in Sp. Proc. No. 3883 of this Court executor of the estate of Mary A. Marsman; and (c) defendant H.A. Doornbosch no longer resides in the Philippines. "2. They deny the allegation in paragraph 3 that on December 29, 1960 at the annual general meeting and extraordinary general meeting of the stockholders or members of Marsman Investments, Ltd., plaintiffs were duly elected, in accordance with the British Companies Act of 1948 and the Articles of Association of said corporation, the governing law on the matter, directors of said Marsman Investments, Ltd. "3. They have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation in paragraph 4 that on January 4, 1961, as such directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. plaintiffs held an organizational meeting at the Marsman Building, site of its Philippine Offices; and they deny the further allegation in paragraph 4 that thereafter, plaintiffs, singly as well as collectively, demanded of defendants, who were then

within the premises, the vacation of their respective offices as such members of the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and the turning over of the same to plaintiffs, as well as all the books, accounts, papers and other records of the corporation. "4. They deny the right of plaintiffs to attorneys fees."cralaw virtua1aw library As affirmative defenses, it was contended that the complaint should be dismissed as far as Mary A. Marsman and H.A. Doornbosch were concerned; the first having died on January 11, 1963, and the second having vacated his position as director of the corporation. Plaintiffs thereupon filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that defendants, by making general denials in their answer, had in effect admitted all the material averments of the complaint. Over defendants vigorous opposition, the court below sustained plaintiffs stand, reasoning that the mere repetition by defendants in their answer of the averments of the complaint, even if prefaced by the phrase "that he denies", did not constitute specific denial of plaintiffs cause of action; said allegations in the answer according to the Court, are just negatives pregnant which amounted to admission of the averments of the complaint. As the answer allegedly failed to tender an issue, plaintiffs were consequently declared the duly elected directors of the Marsman Investments, Ltd. and defendants were ordered to turn over to them all the books, accounts, papers and other records of the corporation. Plaintiffs demand for attorneys fees, however, was denied, for not being substantiated by evidence. Hence, this appeal by the defendants. We find this appeal to be without merit. A comparison of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 2 of the answer will show that the answer in effect denies each and every allegation of plaintiffs, with the result that the denial is general and not specific as required by the Rules (Revised Rule 8, sec. 10) providing:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SEC. 10. Specific denial. The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial. Where a pleader desires to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial."cralaw virtua1aw library There is no difference between an averment that a defendant "denies each and every allegation" and a plea whereby the defendant, as in this case, denies the recitals of the complaint reproduced in the answer. If the first mode of denial is and has been declared a general denial, 1 the second should be equally so held. For the answer before us, in reality, leaves in doubt all the averments of paragraph 3 of the complaint: defendantsappellants do not specify therein whether what they deny is that the annual general meeting was held, or whether it is the fact that plaintiffs were elected directors, or whether the election was held conformably to the British laws governing the matter. In addition, the Rules require that besides specifying the allegations of fact not admitted, the answer should set forth the matters relied upon in support of the denial; 2 so that, in effect, the Rules are no longer satisfied with mere denials, even if specific, but demand that defendant manifest what he considers to be the true facts. Note that our Rules do not permit a party to deny everything in his opponents pleading, as it could under Rule 8, subsection (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [I Moran, Rules of Court, p. 280, 1963 Ed.]. The defendants-appellants do not aver any matters to support their denials. The rule, it is true, qualifies the requirement with the words "if practicable" ; but the defendants nowhere attempted to demonstrate why it was not practicable for them to aver the facts that negate or contradict the plaintiffs allegations. Hence, the denials in paragraph 2 of the answer are but general denials that operate as an admission of the facts pleaded in paragraph 3 of the complaint. With regard to the plea of lack of knowledge or information set

up in paragraph 3 of the answer, this Courts decision in Warner Barnes v. Reyes, 103 Phil. 662, 665, is authority for the proposition that this form of denial must be availed of with sincerity and good faith, not for the purpose of confusing the other party, nor for purposes of delay. Yet, so lacking in sincerity and good faith is this part of the answer that defendants-appellants go to the limit of denying knowledge or information as to whether they (defendants) were in the premises (Marsman Bldg.) on January 4, 1961, as averred in paragraph 4 of the complaint. Yet whether such a fact was or was not true could not be unknown to these defendants. Very plainly, appellants here systematically adopted the tactic of trapping and confusing plaintiffs as to what facts they had to prove or what issues must be met. Even their so-called special defenses were likewise evasive, and did not touch the heart of the controversy. Such strategy we cannot sanction. It is violative of the policy of fair disclosure of facts required by the Rules. Hence, we hold that no error was committed by the Court below in concluding that the answer tendered no issue, and that judgment on the pleadings was warranted. Defendants-appellants argue that if the answer tended to confuse plaintiffs, their remedy lay in a motion for particulars. But, the Rules placed on appellants the duty to be specific as to their contentions: what facts they denied and what facts they know or believe to have actually happened. They did not do so. To require plaintiffs now to ask for particulars is to enable defendants to delay the trial and disposition of the case by ignoring in their answer what the rules require. They would thus reap benefit from their own wrong. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order and judgment appealed from are affirmed. Costs against appellants in all instances. So Ordered. EN BANC [G.R. No. L-7. January 22, 1946.] ANTONIO CO TIAMCO, Petitioner, v. POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, YAO BOOM SIM (alias Co Hue), YAO KA TIAM (alias Chua Kui), and SY GUI GAM (alias Go Si Pio),Respondents. Ramon Diokno, for Petitioner. Bernardino Guerrero and J. G. Manarang, for Respondents. SYLLABUS 1. ACTION; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; WHEN IS DEMAND A PREREQUISITE. A demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term. 2. ID.; LEASE; EXPIRATION OF TERM; NOTICE UNNECESSARY. A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 72, section 2. 3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER; TACIT RENEWAL OF LEASE A MATTER OF DEFENSE. There may be a tacit renewal of a lease (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days as provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessors acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal, in such case, being a new contract (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense. 4. ID.; ID.; LACK OF ALLEGATION REGARDING NOTICE TO QUIT CURED BY EVIDENCE. Where a notice to quit was in fact made, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint, and said notice had been offered and admitted in the municipal

court as evidence, the deficiency of the complaint, supposing there was any, was cured by evidence. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON MATTER NOT ALLEGED IN PLEADING AGAINST OBJECTION OF ADVERSE PARTY; AMENDMENT OF PLEADING BEFORE ALLOWING EVIDENCE. When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON AMENDMENT NOT TO BE APPLIED RIGIDLY TO MUNICIPAL COURT PARTICULARLY WHERE NO SURPRISE OR PREJUDICE IS CAUSED TO OBJECTING PARTY. Although the municipal court failed to order an amendment before admitting objected evidence, the same may be allowed as a harmless error, since the rule on amendment should not be rigidly applied to said court which is not one of record and where the failure does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the objecting party. Wellknown is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties. 7. COURTS; BRANCH OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO RESPECT FINAL AND EXECUTED JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER BRANCH. Where a branch of the Court of First Instance has judicial knowledge of a judgment of another branch ordering the municipal court to admit certain evidence, which judgment has become final and obeyed, the former is in duty bound to give due regard and full weight to said final and executed judgment. 8. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PURPOSE OF RULES OF PLEADINGS; ELIMINATION OF PROCEDURAL POINTS. Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. 9. ID.; COMPLAINT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REGLEMENTARY FORM. The complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the municipal court, which is not only a substantial, but almost a literal, copy of the form given in the Rules of Court, is sufficient. 10. ID.; ID.; FORM PROVIDED BY LAW IS PART OF THAT LAW. A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in administering the law we have no will but the will of the law. The form provided by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental policy. It discloses that in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING FORM. The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal courts who are in close contact with the masses. 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY WHEN COMPLAINT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR INDEFINITE. Simplicity of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure. Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous or indefinite (See Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery

provided by the Rules. 13. MANDAMUS; PROPRIETY IN CASE OF DISMISSAL OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION. As to the propriety of the present action for mandamus, little need be said. Unlawful detainer is summary in nature and requires speedy action, and since the dismissal is predicated upon a misconstruction of the law regarding the courts jurisdiction, the writ may be granted. DECISION MORAN, C.J. : Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action in the Municipal Court of Manila against Yao Boom Sim (alias Co Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam (alias Go Si Pio) for unlawful detainer of the building located at 503 Sto. Cristo Street, Manila. At the trial, plaintiff offered Exhibit A as evidence, which is a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the action. Objection was made to the evidence upon the ground that the fact sought to be proved thereby was not alleged in the complaint. The objection was sustained, and an action for mandamus was brought by plaintiff to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The writ of mandamus was granted, and when the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was admitted. After trial, judgment was rendered against defendants who appealed to the Court of First Instance. The notice, Exhibit A, was a part of the record elevated on appeal. In the Court of First Instance, the complaint filed in the municipal court was reproduced. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and, as a consequence, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, this action for mandamus against the Court of First Instance of Manila to reinstate the petitioners case. We believe, and so hold, that the order of dismissal is erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case; and (3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself. 1. We will begin by reviewing the construction placed by the respondent court on a provision of our Rules of Court. The position taken by the respondent court is that, in all actions for unlawful detainer by a landlord against a tenant, a demand, as required by Rule 72, section 2, is jurisdictional. Such provision of the Rules is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. No landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon." (Emphasis ours.) It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term. This is in conformity with articles 1565 and 1581 of the Civil Code. "ART. 1565. If the lease has been made for a fixed period, it expires on the day fixed without the necessity of any notice." (Emphasis ours.) "ART. 1581. If no term has been fixed for the lease, it shall be understood as from year to year when an annual rent has been fixed, from month to month when the rent is monthly, and from day to day when it is daily. "In every case the lease ceases, without the necessity of a special notice, upon the expiration of the term." (Emphasis ours.) A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice 1 to the tenant who thenceforth

becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him ever before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 72, section 2. Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days, as provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessors acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal in such case, being a new contract (10 Manresa Codigo, Civil, p. 619), is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense (Canfield v. Tobias, 21 Cal., 349). 2. Passing now to the facts of the case before us, we find that there has been in that case a notice to quit, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. That notice, which is Exhibit A, has been offered and admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even supposing, without conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by evidence. True that this evidence was admitted upon objection of the defendant. But there is nothing wrong in that admission even applying Rule 17, section 4, which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Amendment to conform to evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence." (Emphasis supplied.) Under this provision, when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading, and the municipal court did not do so in the instant case. (Since, however, the municipal court is not one of record, the rule on amendments should not therein be rigidly applied. And, furthermore, where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties. (Rule 52, section 3; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil., 315; Banco Espaol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921.) It is true that when the case was dismissed by the respondent court, it was there on appeal and for trial de novo, independently of any evidence that had been presented in the municipal court. But the admissibility of the notice to quit as evidence, should have been considered by the respondent court as a closed question in so far as its jurisdiction was concerned, for it was for mandamus, issued a writ compelling the municipal court to admit the evidence. The jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ was never questioned. The judgment rendered by the court is such action had become final, the appeal taken therefrom having been dismissed by the court. And the judgment was executed by the municipal court by admitting the evidence then in question. All these circumstances were within the knowledge of the respondent court at the time it acted upon the motion to dismiss. It may be argued that, as a general rule, mandamus does not lie to control rulings on questions of evidence in order not to delay the trial of cases

and because the proper remedy is appeal. But when the writ has been issued and has become final and has been obeyed, it is perfectly valid and should be respected. Specially is this so in the instance case where, as will be shown later, the complaint filed was sufficient and under its allegations the municipal court has bound to admit the evidence. We, therefore, believe and so hold that the respondent court having judicial knowledge of the mandamus proceedings was in duty bound to give due regard and full weight to the final and executed judgment therein rendered and, had it done so, it would have found that the supposed deficiency of the complaint pointed out in the motion to dismiss had already been supplied by evidence admitted by order of one of its branches; that the curative evidence was already before it as a part of the record elevated on appeal by the municipal court; and that to throw away the whole case only because the complaint was silent on a fact well known to all the parties and to the court, was certainly to defeat the paramount interests of justice for the sake of a useless technicality. It was a useless technicality, because if the purpose of the pleading is to apprise the adverse party and the court of the essential facts, that purpose is sufficiently accomplished once the court and the adverse party have acquired a judicial knowledge of the real issues. Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be property laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. The new rules are really simple and liberal and, in the language of Professor Sunderland, "the purpose which they seek to accomplish is to eliminate technical matters by removing the basis for technical objections, to make it as difficult as impossible, for cases to go off on procedural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient, as can be done." (Vol. XIII, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1939 [No. 1], p. 1.) We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of the action is unwarranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case. 3. But we prefer to base our decision not alone upon the peculiarities of the case but upon an important rule of policy. We hold that the complaint filed with the municipal court is sufficient. It reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Plaintiff alleges that defendants unlawfully withhold from him the possession of the building located at No. 503 Sto. Cristo St., Manila. "Wherefore he prays that he be restored to the possession of said premises, with damages and costs. "Manila, 20 April 1945."cralaw virtua1aw library This complaint is almost a verbatim copy of Form No. 1 of the Rules of Court, which in turn is a copy of the form provided in section 81 of our former Code of Civil Procedure. The form as provided in the Rules is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library FORM 1. Complaint for Ejectment "Plaintiff alleges that defendant has unlawfully turned him out of possession (or unlawfully withholds from him the possession, as the case may be) of certain lands and building (here describe the premises), situated in the municipality of __________________. "Wherefore, he prays that he be restored to the possession of said premises, with damages and costs."cralaw virtua1aw library Substantial compliance with this from is sufficient according to the Rules. The complaint filed in the municipal court is not only a substantial, but almost a literal, compliance with the form. It has been held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A complaint in unlawful detainer, before a justice, substantially in the form given in Rev. St. p. 780, is sufficient." (Cabanne v. Spaulding, 14 Mo. App., 312.) "That a statement in unlawful detainer in justice court, which is in the form given in Rev. St. 1880, p. 2262, and Rev. St. 1855, Append., is sufficient, is stare decisis." (Bradford v. Tilly, 65 Mo. App., 181; 2 Mo. App. Repr., 1204.)

"A complaint setting forth a charge of unlawful entry and detainer in the language of the statute is sufficient." (Armour Packing Co. v. Howe, 75 P., 1014; 68 Kan., 663.) "Complaint in a forcible entry and detainer is sufficient if substantially in the words of the statue." (Locke v. Skow, 91 N. W., 572; 3 Neb. [Unof. ], 299.) . "The complaint need not state the particular facts relied upon to constitute the alleged forcible entry or forcible detention, but it is sufficient if it contains the language of the statue." (Rice v. West, 33 P., 706, overruled. [1897], Richardson v. Penny, 50 P., 231 6 Okl., 328 [1903]; Greenmeyer v. Coate, 72 P., 377; 12 Okl., 452.) "In a summary action under Code Civ. Proc., section 1023, for the possession of land, plaintiff need not set out facts constituting his cause of action, the complaint being sufficient where it follows the language of the statue." (Blachford v. Frenzer, 44 Neb., 829; 62 N. W., 1101.) "In forcible entry or detainer, it is not necessary for the complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts relied on to constitute the alleged forcible entry or detention, but the complaint is sufficient if it is in the language of Wilsons Rev. & Ann., St., 1903, section 5090, relating to such action." (Schlegel v. Link, 105 P., 652; 25 Okl., 263.) In Roque v. Logan (40 Off. Gaz. [No. 14], 10th Supp., p. 56), in which damages were not alleged in the body of the complaint but merely in the prayer, the Court, relying upon the form provided in section 81 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, held the complaint to be sufficient. In another case (Aguilar v. Cabrera and Flameo, G. R. No. 49129), for illegal detainer, wherein the complaint was made to conform to Form No. 1 of the Rules, this Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the municipal court to try and decide the case, thus impliedly upholding the sufficiency of the form. Upon the other hand, no case Filipino or American has been cited to us holding the view that such form, or a similar one, is not sufficient in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. This form has been a part of our statutes for more than forty years and has been used extensively in the provinces, as is the observation of members of this Court who had been trial judges in the provinces for years, and its sufficiency has never been questioned until now, and now precisely when it is more in consonance with the tendency of modern procedure which is to liberalize the rules of pleadings so as to preclude the failure of actions upon mere technicalities of form. Our attention is invited to the ruling of this Court in Gumiran v. Gumiran (21 Phil., 174, 179), wherein it was held that "it is a general rule of pleading and practice that in all pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out." But the complaint in said case merely alleged that "the plaintiff has been deprived of the land of which he is and has been the owner for a long period," and, therefore, is not in accord with the form provided by the Rules. One may be deprived of possession without force and there is no forcible entry; but when plaintiff is alleged to have been turned out of possession by defendant, as is the allegation contained in the form, force is implied (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756), and the complaint is sufficient. The syllabus in the case of Melliza v. Towle and Mueller (34 Phil., 345, 346) is also relied upon. But the complaint in such case does not allege, according to the very language of this Court, "that possession was unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, or in any other manner required by virtue of a contract, or in any other manner required by section 80" (of the former Code of Civil Procedure), and, evidently, is not in conformity with the form. The rule laid down in Tengco v. Jocson (43 Phil., 715), applicable in ejection cases, has no application in actions for forcible entry or illegal detainer. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Street in Gonzalez v. Salas (49 Phil., 1), and the ruling laid down in Lizo v. Carandang (2 Off. Gaz. [No. 3], March, 1943), are correct for there is no doubt that a complaint is sufficient where it shows the facts sustaining the action for forcible entry or illegal detainer. There is, however, nothing in said opinion or in said ruling showing the insufficiency or the form here in question. There is no fairness in holding a form of be insufficient after all the litigants were told by our Rules to follow it. It is said that a

form is but an illustration, a guide, or an outline containing a general idea of what may be done. But obviously, it cannot be a good illustration when it leaves something in the dark. It cannot be a right guide when it misguides. And it cannot be an honest outline when it is incomplete and is deceitful. A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in administering the law we have no will but the will of the law. In the instant case, the form provided by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental policy. It discloses that in an action for forcible entry a simple allegation in the complaint that defendant turned the plaintiff out of possession is sufficient, for, undoubtedly, the words "turned out" imply force in the taking of the possession. (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756.) And in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief and concise, and though apparently too general, it is so worded as clearly to apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim. Other details like the one- year period within which the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules, must be proved but need not be alleged in the complaint. It is true that, according to Rule 4, section 3, the complaint in an inferior court shall state "the grounds of action," but no other facts are required in the form to be stated aside from those that are already therein stated, which are thus deemed sufficient grounds for action. In this connection, it must be required to be supplemented by additional facts, the form itself says so by appropriate words enclosed in parenthesis. See, for instance, form No. 3, third paragraph; form No. 4, third paragraph; form No. 7, on third-party complaint, and others. But form No. 1, for complaint in forcible entry or illegal detainer cases, requires no additional statement of facts, except the description of the premises and the name of the municipality where the property is located. The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal courts who are in close contact with the masses. Simple and practical methods of procedure should be afforded these masses so that they may not fail through their ignorance in obtaining a just redress for their grievances. Poor and ignorant people living in distant barrios and towns and peacefully enjoying their small pieces of land and homes, may be driven out of their property and deprived thus of the necessaries of life by unscrupulous and violent individuals, and they may come for protection to the courts of the town completely unaided either because there are no lawyers in the locality or because they have no means to employ the services of such lawyers. By the quality of attention which they may receive in said courts will they learn whether this government is also their own or only of the powerful, rich or intellectual. Moreover, there can hardly be one case out of a hundred which is so fictitious that the defendant is not aware of the trouble complained of, particularly in this kind of cases and in small communities. It is for these reasons that a simple pleading containing a single ultimate fact is made sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the action and to move the court into a prompt investigation of the facts with a view to a quick restoration of the public order perturbed. If, in a singular case, the defendant may not fairly prepare his answer or defense because of the form of the pleading, he may ask for more particulars by discovery through deposition (Rule 18 in connection with Rule 4, section 19), or he may very well wait for the trial and listen to plaintiffs testimony on details and then ask for a short postponement to prepare his defense, a petition which would not be denied if duly justified. We have conscientiously weighed the reasons given by some members of the Court holding a contrary view, reasons which are not altogether wrong except that they are pervaded with a spirit of rigid conservatism in utter disregard of Rule 1, section 2, which counsels liberality in the construction and application of procedural rules with a view "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceeding." Decisions in American jurisdiction prior to the procedural reform may be found in support of the contrary view decisions which are either obsolete or applicable only in ordinary civil actions triable in inferior courts. In solving procedural problems, the progressive and liberal spirit of the reform should be our beacon light. Simplicity of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure. Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rules 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said: "The real test of a good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too generally." (Vol. XIII, Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.) This justifies the form of complaint provided by the Rules in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. As to the propriety of the present action for mandamus, little need be said. Unlawful detainer is summary in nature and requires speedy action, and since the dismissal is predicated upon a misconstruction of the law regarding the courts jurisdiction, the writ may be granted. For all the foregoing, it is ordered that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering it to try the petitioners case after defendant has answered, and to continue the same to final judgment, with costs against defendants-respondents. Ozaeta, Paras, Hilado, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. NO. 167181 : December 23, 2008] SPS. CARLOS MUNSALUD and WINNIE MUNSALUD, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent. D E C I S I O NREYES, R.T., J.: INSUFFICIENCY in form and substance, as a ground for dismissal of the complaint, should not be based on the title or caption, especially when the allegations of the pleading support an action. In pursuit of a reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order of dismissal2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a complaint for mandamus, 3 petitioners-spouses Carlos Munsalud and Winnie Munsalud lodged before this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari. The Facts Laid bare from the records are the following facts: Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late Lourdes Bulado (Bulado) who died on December 8, 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot located at 942 R. Higgins St., CAA Compound, Bgy. 185, Pasay City. The award was made pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" program of respondent. She resided at the said property until her death. When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner spouses' assumption of obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy the lot up to the present. To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as evidence the following documents, viz.: 1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias; 2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner Winnie; 3. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the Assessor's Office of Pasay City in the name of defendant recognizing its beneficial use in favor of petitioners; 4. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27667 over the residential structure erected on the land and issued by the Assessor's Office of Pasay City in the names of petitioners; 5. 'Pagpapatunay' dated September 5, 1989 signed by neighbors and acquaintances of petitioners attesting to their long time residence in the property; 6. Deposit Receipt No. 286444 dated September 27, 1989 issued by the Manila Electric Company attesting to the

installation of electric service in the name of petitioner Winnie on the property.4 On September 14, 1989, petitioners completed the payments of the amortizations due on the property. Reflected on the left side portion of the official receipt evidencing full payment is the annotation "full payment." Consequently, petitioners demanded that respondent NHA issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the property. Respondent, however, refused. On January 28, 2003, petitioners, by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed of sale and title. Despite receipt, respondent did not issue the requested documents. On March 6, 2003, respondent wrote petitioners informing them that petitioner Winnie's name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not respond to the reply. Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the court a quo. RTC Order On April 22, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint for mandamus, disposing thus: Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and substance, there being no reference to any law which the respondent by reason of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or any allegation that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to, the aboveentitled petition is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED.5 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners seasonably appealed to the CA. CA Disposition On August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus petition. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Order of Dismissal is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.6 In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows: It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It is a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. It well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of the rule means a right which is clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law. Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts enjoined by law to be done. The duties to be enforced must be such as are clearly peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. However, appellants failed to point out in their petition the specific law by which defendant is duty bound to perform the act sought to be performed, as well as the law which would grant them the clear legal right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus . Foregoing discussed, we find no error on the part of the court a quo in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by plaintiffsappellants. On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on February 22, 2005. Hence, the present recourse. Issues I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY DATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 WHERE THE LATTER COURT RELYING UPON THE APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-03-492 - DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY BECAUSE THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION DATED AUGUST 23, 2004.7 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due course to an action, the court is fenced within the parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the case without regard to the averments of the pleading. Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance based alone on its designation when, from the

body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an action sufficient in form and substance? Our Ruling Petitioners' action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. This begs the question: when is an action sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?cra lawlibrary To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and procedure.8 It is the order or method of legal proceedings.9 It relates to technical details.10 It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance.11 It is an established method of expression or practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding.12 A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following: 1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket number; 2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading; 3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;13 4. Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative;14 5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory;15 6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the complaint, if the same is not served personally to the parties affected, there must also be an explanation why service was not done personally.16 Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be: A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.17 In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that go into the form of the pleading should be incorporated, viz.: 1. The Roll of Attorney's Number; 2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; andcralawlibrary 3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.18 4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective January 1, 2009).19 In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03 - 49278 designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is sufficient in form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the docket number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners' claims. It has a prayer and the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name of petitioners' counsel, the counsel's IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorney's Numbers. The complaint was also verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk of court. Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?cra lawlibrary Substance is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form.20 It is the most important element in any existence, the characteristic and essential components of anything, the main part, the essential import, and the purport.21 It means not merely subject of act, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements, though it may be stated without recital of any details.22 It goes into matters which do not sufficiently appear or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties who may be interested therein and not to mere informalities.23 As used in reference to substance of common-law actions, substance comprehends all of the essential or material elements necessary to sufficiently state a good cause of action invulnerable to attack by general demurrer.24 Substance is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause of action exists. It is the central piece, the core, and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the court for its consideration. It is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the basis of Rule 65, Section 325of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It found that there was no reference to any law

which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or station, is specifically enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to. Although the complaint was captioned as Mandamus, petitioners' averments, as well as the relief sought, called for an action for specific performance. Pertinent portions of the complaint formandamus provide: 3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the late Lourdes Bulado, and as such is one of Bulado's compulsory heirs. x x x; 4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of land at a "land for the landless" program of the defendant; xxx 6. When Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her obligations over the aforesaid property, particularly the payment of the amortizations therein; 7. Defendant recognized this assumption of Bulado's obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the receipts covering the amortizations, the names of the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the Defendant were indicated therein; 8. In fact, Defendant also allowed Plaintiffs to move into, and occupy, as they continue to occupy up to now, the above described premises; xxx 10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the payment of the amortizations due over the property in question, and this is evidenced by an official receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendant's cashier, Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs themselves, although the official name of the payor indicated therein was still that of the deceased Lourdes Bulado; xxx 12. Significantly, that receipt contained the annotation appearing on the left side thereof, that the amount paid thereon constituted "full payment"; 13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding from the Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and the title over the property in question, but, inexplicably, and without any legal justification whatsoever, Defendant has refused to issue that deed of sale and title; 14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a letter to the Defendant seeking the issuance of that deed of sale and title but, despite receipt thereof, Defendant again refused and failed [to] act favorably thereon; xxx 20. At this point that the lot in question had already been fully paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need to compel the Defendant to comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same property in favor of the same heirs. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered commanding the Defendant, after due notice and hearing, to issue a deed of sale and/or a title, in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, over the property subject of this action.26 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased mother, the original awardee of respondent's "Land for the Landless Program." One of the obligations of an awardee is to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation and religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully paid. Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to comply with what is incumbent upon it. In a letter dated February 21, 2003,27 respondent informed petitioners' counsel that per its records, the name of petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not appear as a beneficiary. For the guidance of respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not actually a beneficiary. The beneficiary of its program is Lourdes Bulado, her deceased mother. This fact was made known to respondent when another letter dated March 6, 200328 was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter, respondent was informed that petitioner Winnie is representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado, viz.: In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado, who, on September 14, 1989 completed her payment for Lot 12, Block 79 of the Maricaban Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your easy reference.

In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the title over the aforesaid property in the name of Lourdes Bulado.29 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this second letter, respondent could have easily verified if the name of Lourdes Bulado appears as a beneficiary and awardee of its "Land for the Landless Program." However, respondent never responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring the action to the trial court. Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although designated asmandamus, is in reality an action to perform a specific act. The averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should contain, the court a quo should have proceeded to examine the essential facts alleged in petitioners' complaint. For what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.30 The cause of action in a complaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the parties. The allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.31 There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondent's duty arose from its contractual obligation under the "Land for the Landless Program." The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.32 The caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced.33 All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of the awardee, becomes a beneficiary of the program is a question best ventilated during trial on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in case an awardee dies are evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court. Even the effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as well as the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be addressed for the court's evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before its eyes. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is ORDERED to reinstate the case and to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.

S PS. CARLOS MUNSALUD AND WINNIE MUNSALUD vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
FACTS: Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of thecompulsory heirs of the late Lourdes Bulado who died in 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" program of respondent. She resided at the said property until her death. Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner spouses' assumption of obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts and they were allowed to occupy the lot. In 1989, petitioners completed the amortization payments evidenced by the annotation full payment reflected on the left side portion of the official receipt. Consequently, petitioners demanded that NHA issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the property. However, respondent refused. In 2003, petitioners by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed of sale and title. Respondent did not issue the requested documents but informed petitioners that Winnie's name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not respond to the reply. Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus with the RTC which dismissed the complaint for the petition is insufficient in form and substance and that there being no reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus is sufficient in form and substance RULING: Yes. The petition for mandamus was sufficient in form and substance. The complaint designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is sufficient in form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the docket number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners' claims. It has a prayer and the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name of petitioners' counsel, the counsel's IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorney's Numbers. The complaint was also verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk of court. Substance is one which relates to the material allegations and the character of the

relief sought for in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause of action exists and is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although designated as mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a specific act. The averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to appraise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondent's duty arose from its contractual obligation under the "Land for the Landless Program."