G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995 AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents. Doctrine: The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for Constitutional offices. Facts: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states: Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service. Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution. Issue/s: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB Held: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside NO 1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.. 2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook. The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency. Dispositive: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.

[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003] SMART COMMUNICATIONS, (PILTEL), petitioners, (NTC), respondent. INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003] GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners, th vs. COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6 Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Doctrine: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers, while quasi- judicial powers involve the adjudication of specialized disputes. Facts: The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities. Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court. Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003. Issue/s: 1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and 2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy. Held: Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Ruling: Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution. Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64274 dated October 9, 2001 and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated November 20, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

[G.R. No. 133530. October 25, 2004] DONATO S. SUYAT, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondent.

Doctrine: Courts cannot take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision by the Office of the President that has become final and executory. Facts: This case stemmed from a criminal case of robbery where herein Prosecutor Suyat Jr was the reviewing prosecutor. Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres following up with the case talked to Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded her the sum of P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against the latters two (2) sons and nephew Marlon Bonson. But after bargaining, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. finally agreed to the sum of P15,000.00 to be given in his office the following day. Upon consultation with her lawyer Imelda Torres immediately sought the assistance Anti-Organized Crime Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who set out to entrap Prosecutor Suyat Jr. After the entrapment, an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Justice accusing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties. Finding a prima facie case of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or any valuable thing in the course of official duties against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr., Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice issued a formal charge against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. After several hearings, Secretary Drilon recommended to the then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. In response, the Executive Secretary issued a memorandum stating his concurrence with the recommendation of Secretary Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval of the proposed Administrative Order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. The Office of the President of the Philippines thru then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued the first questioned order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law as earlier adverted to. Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed his first motion for reconsideration which was denied, this time, by new Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his second questioned order dated February 16, 1996. His two subsequent MRs were likewise denied. The CA dismissed his petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy.

Issue/s: W/N the Courts may validly take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision by the OP that has become final and executory?

Held: NO. Administrative Order No. 95 of the President Had Become Final and Executory When the Petitioner Filed His Petition For Certiorari in the Court of Appeals hence beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify or reverse.

Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner opted to file a second MR which is a prohibited pleading hence the reglementary period within which to file an appeal was not tolled. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the said Rules because he realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed, and that AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an independent action, in lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.

Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.