PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

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PICART vs. SMITH, JR. G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 STREET, J.: FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed. ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages YES The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a

prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OFDOMINGAONG,petitioners-appellants,vs.CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondentsappellees. Facts: In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila,a tank truck was hosing gasoline into theu n d e r g r o u n d s t o r a g e o f C a l t e x . A p p a r e n t l y , a f i r e b r o k e o u t f r o m t h e g a s o l i n e station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Africa.A l l e g e d l y , s o m e o n e ( a p a s s e r b y ) t h r e w a c i g a r e t t e w h i l e g a s o l i n e w a s b e i n g transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to provethis theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire.Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Boquiren) failed to install a concretefirewall to contain fire if in case one happens.Issue:Whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants.Held: This question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was anindependent contractor or an agent of Caltex.Under the license agreement the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sumof P1.00 for the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The operator couldsell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subjectto the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. The operator could not assign ortransfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. Termination of thecontract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator. These provisionsof the contract showthat the operator was virtually an employee of the Caltex, notan independent contractor.Hence, Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants Caltex admits thatit owned the gasoline station as

well as the equipment therein, but claims that thebusiness conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated byBoquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would revealthe nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. What was presented was alicense agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since it was enteredinto shortly before the expiration of the oneyear period it was intended to operate. This socalled license agreement was executed on November 29, 1948, but madeeffective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18,1 9 4 8 . T h i s r e t r o a c t i v i t y p r o v i s i o n i s q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t , a n d g i v e s r i s e t o t h e conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility withrespect to the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for anyi n j u r y t o p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y w h i l e i n t h e p r o p e r t y h e r e i n l i c ensed, it beingu n d e r s t o o d a n d a g r e e d t h a t L I C E N S E E ( B o q u i r e n ) i s n o t a n e m p l o y e e , representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."But even if the license agreementwere to govern, Boquirencan hardly be considered an independent contractor.Unde r that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00

Luzon Stevedoring vs. Public Service Commission (digest)

Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. and Visayan Stevedore Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission 93 Phil. 735 | Tuason, J.

Facts: Petitioners are engaged in the stevedoring or lighterage and harbor towage business. They are also engaged in interisland service which consist of hauling cargoes such as sugar, oil, fertilizer and other commercial commodities. There is no fixed route in the transportation of these cargoes, the same being left at the indication of the owner or shipper of the goods. Petitioners, in their hauling business, serve only a limited portion of the public.

The Philippine Shipowners Association complained to the Public Service Commission that petitioners were engaged in the transportation of cargo in the Philippines for hire or compensation without authority or approval of the Commission. The rates petitioners charged resulted in ruinous competition. The Public Service Commission restrained petitioners from further operating their watercraft to transport goods for hire or compensation between points in the Philippines until the commission approves the rates they propose to charge.

Issue: Whether the petitioners fall under the definition in Section 13 (b) of the Public Service Law (C.A. Act No. 146)?

Held: Yes. It is not necessary under said definition that one holds himself out as serving or willing to serve the public in order to be considered public service. It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary that it must in some way be impressed with a public interest; and whether the operation of a business is a public utility depends upon whether or not the service rendered by it is of a public character and of public consequence and concern. It can scarcely be denied that the contracts between the owners of the barges and the owners of the cargo at bar were ordinary contracts of transportation and not of lease. Petitioners watercraft was manned entirely by crews in their employ and payroll, and the operation of the said craft was under their direction and control, the customers assuming no responsibility for the goods handled on the barges.

C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of the kinds therein enumerated is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele. Public utility, even where the term is not defined by statute, is not determined by the number of people actually served. The Public Service Law was enacted not only to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor, inefficient service, but also to prevent ruinous competition. Just as the legislature may not declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its customers under the guise of private transactions.

Doctrine: An enterprise of any of the kinds enumerated in the Public Service Law is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or with limited clientele.

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO v REGINALD HILL, and MARVIN HILL, G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977

Procedural History: The killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. The appellants filed for a motion for reconsideration reiterating that the action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; the action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata; the complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.But the motion was dismissed. Hence, the plaintiffs-appellants appealed for resolutions on the dismissal of the case, that the present action is against and violates Sec. 1, Rule 111 and that Rules of Court is applicable.

Statement of Facts: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named AgapitoElcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the grounds that the following order was issued, the Court finds the same to

be meritorious and well-founded. Hence, plaintiffs-appellants appealed in the Supreme Court the following resolutions: THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA; THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER.

Issue: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case extinguished?

Answer: The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for civil case and quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Reasoning: According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extracontractual or cuasidelito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as

clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery., (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.) The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delictonly and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

Holding: The order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees. GARCIA v FLORIDO 52 SCRA 420ANTONIO; August 31, 1973 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissingpetitioners' action for damages against respondents Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "withoutp r e j u d i c e t o r e f i l i n g t h e s a i d c i v i l a c t i o n a f t e r conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filedby the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga delN o r t e " , a n d f r o m t h e o r d e r o f s a i d C o u r t d a t e d January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration. FACTS - On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, togetherw i t h h i s w i f e , L u m i n o s a L . G a r c i a , a n d E s t e r Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired andboarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71o w n e d a n d o p e r a t e d b y r e s p o n d e n t , M a r c e l i n o Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, fora roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City,for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of g o v e r n m e n t h o s p i t a l s , h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health OfficeNo. 7 at Zamboanga City.-

A t a b o u t 9 : 3 0 a . m . , w h i l e t h e P U c a r w a s negotiating a slight curve on the national highway atk i l o m e t e r 2 1 i n B a r r i o G u i s u k a n , S i n d a n g a n , Z a m b o a n g a d e l N o r t e , s a i d c a r c o l l i d e d w i t h a n oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan TransitCo., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. Asa r e s u l t o f t h e a f o r e s a i d c o l l i s i o n , p e t i t i o n e r s s u s t a i n e d v a r i o u s p h ysical injuries whichnecessitated their medical treatment a n d hospitalization.- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and thep a s s e n g e r b u s w e r e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in areckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner ingross violation of traffic rules and without due regardto the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car,petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia,and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 withr e s p o n d e n t C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f M i s a m i s Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No.2850) against the private respondents, owners anddrivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passengerb u s t h a t f i g u r e d i n t h e c o l l i s i o n , w i t h p r a y e r f o r preliminary attachment.- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et.al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitionershad no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20d a y s b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n f o r damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged inCriminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaintfiled by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could befiled subsequent thereto unless the criminal case hasbeen finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because theliability of the employer is merely subsidiary anddoes not arise until after final judgment has beenrendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is notapplicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimesof physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligentact or imprudence of the driver.The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. anddismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing thecomplaint for damages on the ground thatsince no express reservation was made bythe complainants, the civil aspect of thecriminal case would have to be determinedonly after the termination of the criminalcase 2. WON the lower court erred in saying thatthe action is not based on quasi-delict sincethe allegations of the complaint in culpaa q u i l i a n a m u s t n o t b e t a i n t e d b y a n y assertion of violation of law or traffic rulesor regulations and because of the prayer inthe complaint asking the Court to declarethe defendants jointly and severally liablefor moral, compensatory and exemplarydamages HELD 1. YES

Ratio A n a c t i o n b a s e d o n q u a s i - d e l i c t m a y b e maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, acomplainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminalcase . ReasoningI n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a t petitioners never intervened in the criminal actioninstituted by the Chief of Police against respondentPedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal actionbeen terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of thepresent civil action for damages, petitioners have ineffect abandoned their right to press recovery ford a m a g e s i n t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e , a n d h a v e o p t e d instead to recover them in the present civil case.- As a result of this action of petitioners the civilliability of private respondents to the former hasc e a s e d t o b e i n v o l v e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n . Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right tointervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, notonly when he has waived the civil action or expresslyreserved his right to institute, but also when he hasactually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case hasdisappeared.A s w e h a v e s t a t e d a t t h e o u t s e t , t h e s a m e negligent act causing damages may produce a civilliability arising from crime or create an action forquasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former isa violation of the criminal law, while the latter is adistinct and independent negligence, having alwayshad its own foundation and individuality. Some legalwriters are of the view that in accordance with Article3 1 , t h e c i v i l a c t i o n b a s e d u p o n q u a s i - d e l i c t m a y proceed independently of the criminal proceeding forcriminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . .and are intended to constitute as exceptions to thegeneral rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also ber e g a r d e d a s a n u n a u t h o r i z e d a m e n d m e n t o f substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the CivilC o d e , w h i c h d o n o t p r o v i d e f o r t h e r e s e r v a t i o n required in the proviso." But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should begoverned by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111of the Rules which require reservation by the injuredparty considering that by the institution of the civilaction even before the commencement of the trial of t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e , p e t i t i o n e r s h a v e t h e r e b y foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or onewhere reservation to file the civil action need not bemade, for

the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation andthe failure of the offended party to do so does notbar him from bringing the action, under the peculiarc i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e , W e f i n d n o l e g a l justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.2 . Y E S , b e c a u s e t h e a c t i o n i n f a c t s a t i s f i e s t h e elements of quasi-delict.

CriminalProcedurea2010page30Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on aquasi-delict when all the essential averments underArticles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,n a m e l y : ( a ) a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f t h e p r i v a t e respondents; (b) presence of fault or negligence ort h e l a c k o f d u e c a r e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumalar e s u l t i n g i n t h e c o l l i s i o n o f t h e b u s w i t h t h e p a s s e n g e r c a r ; ( c ) p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s a n d o t h e r damages sustained by petitioners as a result of thecollision; (d) existence of direct causal connectionbetween the damage or prejudice and the fault orn e g l i g e n c e o f p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s ; a n d ( e ) t h e a b s e n c e o f p r e e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s between the parties. Reasoning-

The circumstance that the complaint alleged thatrespondents violated traffic rules in that the driverdrove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grosslyn e g l i g e n t a n d i m p r u d e n t m a n n e r i n v i o l a t i o n o f traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detractfrom the nature and character of the action, as onebased on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rulesis merely descriptive of the failure of said driver toobserve for the protection of the interests of others,that degree of care, precaution and vigilance whicht h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s j u s t l y d e m a n d , w h i c h f a i l u r e r e s u l t e d i n t h e i n j u r y o n p e t i t i o n e r s . C e r t a i n l y excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clearindication of negligence. Since the same negligentact resulted in the filing of the criminal action by theChief of Police with the Municipal Court (CriminalCase No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, iti s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t t h e a v e r m e n t s o n t h e d r i v e r s ' negligence in both complaints would substantially bethe same. It should be emphasized that the samenegligent act causing damages may produce a civilliability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of theRevised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has beenamply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil.607, 620-621).- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which becameeffective on January 1, 1964, in the cases providedfor by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code,an independent civil action entirely separate anddistinct from the civil action, may be instituted by theinjured party during the pendency of the criminalcase, provided said party has reserved his right toi n s t i t u t e i t s e p a r a t e l y , b u t i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d , however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall bemade. SEPARATE OPINIONBARREDO [concur] - I would like to limit my concurrence.- A r t i c l e 2 1 7 6 a n d 2 1 7 7 d e f i n i t e l y c r e a t e a c i v i l liability distinct and different from the civil actionarising from the offense of negligence under theRevised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 ispredicated on the above civil code articles and not onthe civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code,I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in thecriminal case. As to the specific mention of Article2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my consideredview that the latter provision is inoperative, it beingsubstantive in character and is not within the powerof the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if itwere not substantive but adjective, it cannot standbecause of its inconsistency with Article 2177, anenactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850should be deemed as the reservation required, therebeing no showing that prejudice could be caused bydoing so.- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing theorder of dismissal of the trial court in order that CivilCase No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitationmentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of theC i v i l C o d e , w h i c h m e a n s t h a t o f t h e t w o p o s s i b l

TorrijosvCA G.R. No. L-40336 October 24, 1975MAKASIAR, J.: Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold a parcel of land in Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon,Benguet twice. But the land title is issued in their names and in the names of Kangi Erangyas, and theheirs of Komising Tagle, who owned the remaining portions. Title could not be registered by the buyers.Sentence: 3 months of arresto mayor , to pay a fine of P7,493.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, toindemnify petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum of P7,493.00 and to pay the costs. The trial Judgeadded as the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the decision that "Whatever damages mayhavebeensufferedbyTorrijosbeforetheDeedofSaleinfavorofVictordeGuiawasmadeby theaccused and his co-owners may be the subject of some other action, perhaps civil, but not in this case."On August 5, 1973, the accused died.Ruling: It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminalliability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Thesaid principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originallyfrom the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. The civil liability of the accusedsurvives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations
Salen vs. Balce
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960. Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte. Bautista Angelo, J.:

Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.

Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC.

Ruling: Judgment reversed. Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.

ALDABA VS. CA- DONATION

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form required by law in donations.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which reads, Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo. They also argue that the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners?

RULING: NO
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property

was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.

The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents Jane did not even expect to be compensated.