Pragmatism and Just War Thought in Aquinas and Ibn Taymiya Valerie O.F.

Morkevicius University of Chicago Prepared for Presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 3, 2008, Chicago. This is a very rough draft, please do not cite without the authors permission. In many ways, Ibn Taymiya and Aquinas could not be more different. Yet strangely enough, the just war perspectives of Ibn Taymiya and Aquinas are quite similar. This paper argues that such a convergence is the result of the similar historical and political environments facing the two thinkers. As a conclusion, it suggests that pragmatism has played a more significant role in the evolution of just war theory than is usually assumed. To explore this hypothesis, each section of the paper proceeds in four parts. The first outlines the assumptions underlying the papers central argument. The next two sections explore how the historical and political context in which ibn Taymiya and Aquinas lived may have affected their ethical reasoning about war. The final section considers the theoretical implications of this new perspective for our broader understanding of just war theory. Caveats and Assumptions Why should we think about the historical and social contexts surrounding just war scholars such as ibn Taymiya and Aquinas? After all, a too narrow focus on what these ideas meant in context hundreds of years ago could tempt us into imagining these categories as empty vessels which over time either become irrelevant as circumstances change, or fixed principles from which we should never deviate. Both extremes whether throwing out just war principles entirely or clinging to them in the face of 1change are clearly untenable. Neither of these are my motive in this paper. Instead, I wish to challenge the assumption that just war traditions are engaged in the project of speaking truth to power, or at the very least, to suggest that their relationship with political power is more complex. To this end, this paper draws both on the theoretical works themselves and on relevant secondary historical sources to suggest reasons for questioning the assumption that just war norms are somehow free of realpolitik state power considerations. Of course, deriving a causal relationship between broad-reaching historical events and an individuals thinking is nearly impossible. Obviously, two different individuals can respond to the same historical stimuli in very different ways, and it is rare that a philosopher or theologian discusses at length the underlying social context for his or her theories. Instead of a causal claim, this chapter will make a more limited correlative case: by putting each thinker into his historical context, it will suggest the ways in which this context may have contributed to that thinkers perspectives. The idea here is to suggest a conceptual framework for re-thinking our understanding of just war traditions, as opposed to providing a definitive history. Conceptually, this paper relies on two sets of assumptions, one from international relations theory, the other from political theory. The first set is interested in the relationship between norms and power. Institutionalists in international relations suggest that hegemons can shape developing institutions, including international norms and/or law, to meet their needs. As Ikenberry and Kupchan assert, norms can be used as a subtle component of hegemonic power. 1 The aim of my broader project is to explore the ways in which the just war tradition not only in the West, but elsewhere as well has not only been used as a tool by powerful political entities, but perhaps even constructed as such a tool in the first place. My second set of assumptions focus on the relationship between individuals, society and history. Drawing on Foucault, Bourdieu, and Geertz, I imagine the individual as a jazz musician. Innovation, creativity and individual expression are possible, but within a set of pre-determined musical rules. Individuals are largely constructed by their environment, and although they are the creators of unique interpretations and ideas, those ideas are bounded by social norms. Put simply, individuals can innovate, but even their 1 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan. Socialization and Hegemonic Power, International Organization, 44(3), Summer 1990, pp. 283-315. 2imagination is socially constructed. Political theory contains useful tools for thinking systematically about this relationship between thinker and context. Michel Foucault, for example, suggests that individuals are embedded in relationships of power of which they may not even be conscious which shape not only their behavior, but their beliefs about that behavior. These relationships are as natural to them as the air they breathe. The production of truth and the production of power are thus deeply interwoven. In Foucaults terms: basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. 2 For the purposes of this chapter, the important point here is that all of these thinkers, by virtue of being recognized as authorities on the ethics of war in their respective traditions, are themselves constituents of these power relations. Their theoretical schemas are neither separate from reality in the sense of arising ex nihilo from some other source, nor in the sense of having no effect on the real world. As Foucault explains about the theoreticians who envisioned new penal systems in the nineteenth century: The fact that this real life isnt the same thing as the theoreticians schemas doesnt entail that these schemas are therefore utopian, imaginary, etc. For one thing, the elaboration of these schemas corresponds to a response to the inadequation of the institutions of judicial power to the new economic forms For another thing, these programs induce a whole series of effects in the real... they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things. 3 This is not, however, to say that they were necessarily conscious of that fact. Foucault suggests as a methodological precaution that any such analysis should not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or decision, because ultimately that 2 Michel Foucault. Two Lectures, in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980. p. 93. 3 Michel Foucault. Governmentality, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. p. 81. 3would lead to unanswerable questions about what is in individuals minds. 4 Instead one should examine the network of power, and how it both constitutes and is constituted by individuals. One possible interpretation of the historical sketches which follow, then, is that these thinkers, by producing their work, are subconsciously constructing certain power relations particularly between individuals and the state, and between their state and others while at the same time they themselves are entrapped in those same

relationships. The work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz also suggests ways of thinking about the relationship between the individual and his or her cultural context. Where Foucault saw men as enmeshed in webs of power, Geertz takes culture to be those webs. 5 Just as for Foucault, power as an idea can not be observed in itself, but only in its symptomatic form (as an institution), Geertz sees culture as an ideational concept that can be observed and quantified in the flow of behavior or social action in which it is expressed. 6 Ultimately, he asserts that not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts in man. 7 Ideas cannot be held to be strictly personal, because humans rely on the accessibility of public symbolic structures to build up [their] own autonomous, ongoing pattern of activity, which in turn implies that human thinking is primarily conducted in terms of the objective materials of the common culture, and only secondarily a private matter. 8 This perspective, like that of Foucault, suggests that the work of any individual thinker is thus not completely idiosyncratic. Just as power both constructs and is constructed by the individual, so too are cultural patterns such as theories, doctrines, and rites: they give meaning to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves. 9 Individual thinkers contribute to the development of these patterns, but they cannot be understood as truly separate from the norms they discuss. In other words, these thinkers may suggest new interpretations or even new theories, but in order for those ideas to be culturally resonant (or even understandable), they must be 4 Foucault. Two Lectures. p. 97. 5 Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973. 6 Ibid. p. 17. 7 Ibid. p. 81. 8 Ibid. p. 83. 9 Ibid. p. 93. 4drawn from the existing norms, and expressed in familiar terms. Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu points to the way individuals are embedded in their historical and cultural contexts. Like Foucault and Geertz, Bourdieu suggests that individuals, although generally unconscious of the cultural system they inhabit, not only re-create it but engage in the intentionless innovation of regulated improvisation. 10 This improvisation, like jazz, is not completely free; it draws on established forms, combing them in new ways and sometimes exploiting simultaneously existing yet contradictory social rules. Bourdieus perspective also allows us to see the thinkers to be discussed in this chapter as individuals acting within a framework, like jazz musicians or improvisational comedians. The structures in which they act, their habitus provides them with a source of these moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention. 11 Consciously or not, individuals use the tools their culture provides them to solve problems. Creativity is possible, but ultimately, the habitus is an endless capacity to engender products thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production. 12 In a nutshell, this is the assumption underlying this paper. Without taking away from the creative powers of the individual thinkers, it must be understood that as social creatures, even our creativity is exercised within socially construed boundaries, whether historical or cultural. This chapter emphasizes the historical contingencies, in an attempt to disaggregate culture/religious tradition from just war theory. In sketching out the historical context surrounding ibn Taymiya and Aquinas, I hope to suggest that just war theory is a fully political theory drawing on religious concepts, terms and principles, but not strictly bound by them. Comparing Aquinas and Ibn Taymiya The following two sections will systematically examine Aquinas and ibn Taymiyas just 10 Pierre Bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 79. 11 Ibid. p. 73. 12 Ibid. p. 95. 5war thought, placing it in context of their historical and social milieu. The two sections will share the same structure, beginning with a brief biography of the thinker and a discussion of the major internal and external threats their polity faced. Then, each section will examine the political theories underpinning each thinkers just war thought, namely their beliefs about the purpose of political power and the nature of the idea polity. Finally, each section will unite these broader political understandings with the thinkers specific comments about warfare to discuss the ad bellum and in bello principles each advocates. Thomas Aquinas: The Crumbling Holy Roman Empire, Failing Crusades, and Mongol Hordes: The child of minor nobility although distantly connected to Emperor Frederick II Thomas Aquinas was born in central Italy in 1227. His education began at a nearby monastery; when his intellectual talent was recognized, he was sent to the University of Naples in 1236. Sometime before 1243, he decided to join the Dominican order. His frustrated parents held him under house arrest, calling upon his brothers (soldiers under Frederick II) to do all in their power to dissuade him from his calling. Within a year, his family relented and in 1244 Dominicans sent Aquinas to study at the University in Cologne. In 1252 he went on to Paris, where he received his doctorate and eventually became a member of the faculty. It is sometimes mistakenly assumed that Aquinas lived a monastic lifestyle, insulated from political intrigues. His experiences at the University in Paris are the first of three reasons to doubt this assumption. Secondly, Aquinas moved even closer to the center of church power in 1261, taking up residence in Rome at the invitation of Pope Urban IV. Falling out of favor in Rome, Aquinas spends 1269-1271 teaching in Paris, and 1272 in Naples. At the time of his death, he was on his way to a council called by Pope. But Aquinas was not only deeply implicated in church politics. Apparently, his advice was also sought out by numerous secular authorities as well. The most well-known example is his De Regimine principum, but numerous examples of his letters to various political personages exist. 13 13 Jeremy Catto. Ideas and Experience in the Political Thought of Aquinas, Past and Present, 71, May 1976, pp. 3-21. 6The world around Aquinas was full of conflict, motivated by both religious and political reasons. In particular, the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire fought each other from 1228-1251. This conflict directly involved Aquinas family, as it had members affiliated with both sides. Ultimately, Frederick II would himself be the target of a crusade, after his excommunication. In Spain, the Christian powers continued to fight against the Muslim states in the South, while in Eastern Europe the Teutonic Knights began to make inroads against pagan Prussia. And even farther away the Mongol invaders would reach Kiev in 1240, and Vienna in 1241. Jerusalem was lost in 1244; and the seventh crusade (from 1248-1254) was a failure. In 1268, the last of Frederick IIs heirs would be defeated, and Antioch would fall as well. It was against this very decided lack of peace that Aquinas crafted his thoughts on just war. In terms of his contribution to just war theory, Aquinas drew heavily on Augustine perhaps the first Christian thinker to justify Christian participation in warfare and also on the newly translated works of Aristotle. 14 This section will first deal with his three ad bellum principles (just cause, just authority and just intent) 15 and then with his in bello principles of civilian immunity and double effect. While Augustine provided much of the theological framework for Aquinas thought, it is clear that he did not share some of Augustines basic assumptions about the nature of political life. Augustine had been very pessimistic about the earthly power; the best one could hope for out of political power was the restraint of evil and chaos. There are clear theological reasons for this perspective, namely Augustines belief that the earthly city was merely a transient one, and inherently sinful at that so Christians should focus their attention on the heavenly one. Politically, this Christian community had just emerged from a period of persecution with the

conversion of the Roman emperors and the subsequent Christianization of the empire. Even pagan political authority served the basic purpose of holding mens divergent interests in check and preventing chaos; the new Christian emperors could not let their religious sensibilities get in the way of carrying out this most important duty. If they failed, Rome would either be overwhelmed by 14 Aristotle was translated into Latin in 1260, thus making his work much more widely available in Europe. 15 Just cause if clearly found in Augustine too; but Aquinas not only upholds the older idea of justified selfdefense, but innovates to legitimize righting wrongs as well. Just authority and just intent are also Aquinas innovations. 7barbarians or torn apart from the inside. Aquinas, however, is less pessimistic about political power. Not only could political authorities restrain evil, but they could also actively pursue the good. This view seems to be drawn largely from Aristotle, who had recently been translated. Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas came to see the political sphere as a legitimate and important area of human experience. His work suggests that he felt that the political sphere was outside the realm of theology; politics was a human art, and as the Bible had little to say about it, one could presume that humans were permitted to develop it as they chose, within the limits of natural law. Aquinas belief in the value of the political sphere certainly colors his discussion of the ad bellum principle of just cause. Like Augustine, Aquinas legitimizes self-defense and upholds the rights of polities to protect themselves against outside invasion. But the political context of the two authors is clearly different. Augustine councils self-defense in the face of barbarian invasions that threaten to overthrow the relatively stable Roman empire; Aquinas councils self-defense in a war-torn Europe. Although he makes no specific reference to it anywhere in his works, the wars between the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (with whom his family was linked by blood; two of his brothers were soldiers in the emperors service) and the Papacy led to several invasions of Frederick IIs territory in Italy during his lifetime. Intriguingly, Aquinas does not decry such violence between Christian princes. Earlier medieval scholars had done so, and various popes had used their good offices to try to keep the peace within Christendom. So why does such conflict not seem to trouble Aquinas? While no definitive answer is possible, a reasonable explanation could be his more optimistic view of political life. If political communities (earthly cities) are worthwhile entities if they can do more than just prevent man from sliding backward into a state of nature, but can actually actively work to build up his human nature then they may just be worth fighting for, even against other Christians. After all, Aquinas argues that the nature of political authority itself legitimizes the politys self-defense. He thus asserts that it pertains to the duty of government to protect what is governed, in a section discussing the difference between Divine and human 8government. 16 By nature, the king has three inter-related duties: to establish the good life in the community subject to him [to] preserve it once it is established [and] to improve it. 17 Yet his theological justifications are pure Augustine; paraphrasing Augustine, Aquinas writes a man should always be prepared not to resist or not to defend himself if need be. But it is sometimes necessary to act otherwise than this for the common good: even, indeed, for the good of those against whom one is fighting. 18 Aquinas takes the broad description of just cause for war laid down by Augustine namely, the right to self-defense and the duty to avert or punish injustice and uses it as a foundation for a more clearly articulated ad bellum principle of just cause. Aquinas states that those against whom war is to be waged must deserve to have war waged against them because of some wrongdoing. 19 This turns war into a form of extended lawsuit, much the way as it was understood by the ancient Greeks and Romans. The natural law logic here is a new innovation. Given the historical reality of the crusades, Aquinas discussion of just cause is just as interesting for what he does not permit, as for what he does. Adding the new idea of righting wrongs to the traditional concept of selfdefense could be the first step on a slippery slope to legitimizing all sorts of violence by leaders who identify faults in others polities. While Aquinas does not systematically outline what specifically would qualify as a wrong worthy of a violent response, he does rule out one particular wrong, namely holding a wrong religious belief. Like Augustine before him, Aquinas is concerned about threats to Christendom from the outside, from non-Christian powers on the periphery. In addition to numerous internal threats, the Christian states of Europe faced struggles with Muslim and Mongol powers. While Mongol incursions during Aquinas lifetime were mostly confined to the far off lands of Eastern Europe and the Frankish holdings in the Middle East, Muslims maintained a stronghold in southern Spain, and rather successfully fought off the Crusaders. Louis IX of France launched an unsuccessful crusade from 1248-1254; the death of the Ayyubid sultan provided the invaders with a moment of opportunity, but the 16 Ibid. p. 37. De regimine principum, I.XIV. 17 Ibid. p. 43. De regimine principum, I. XVI. 18 Ibid. p. 241. Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae 40, art 1, ad 2. 19 Ibid. p. 240. Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae 40, art 1, responsio. 9crusaders were nonetheless defeated near Cairo. In 1270, Louis launched one final Crusader campaign. Most of the ships never arrived, forced to divert as a result of storms. Louis ships did arrive in Egypt, but the king died along with most of his army in August of 1270, as a result of disease. After Louis death, the European princes could not agree on a plan to re-capture or even re-enforce crusader lands in the Middle East. Throughout the decade, despite the urging of Pope Gregory X, no European prince was willing to commit to a crusade in the region. The risks were too great the Muslim forces were well equipped, and the European princes had problems enough at home. Aquinas makes direct reference to the crusaders in his writings. While Aquinas explicitly forbids the use of force to spread the faith, he encourages resistance against unbelievers who would actively persecute the faith: These are in no way to be compelled into the faith for belief is an act of will. If the means to do so are present, however, they should be coerced by the faithful lest they hinder the faith by blasphemies or evil persuasions, or, indeed, by open persecutions. And it is for this reason that Christs faithful frequently wage war against unbelievers: not, certainly, to coerce them to believe, for even if they were to conquer them and take them captive they should still leave them the liberty to believe if they wish; but to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ. 20 More specifically, he argues that Christian territories should be defended against incursions by non-Christian powers. The dominion over believers by unbelievers established for the first time (i.e., through conquest), should not by any means be permitted, because it would give scandal and imperil the faith. 21 But if the authority is already in existence, then it may continue, for dominion is institution of natural law, and not abolished simply because some subjects of such a power adopt Christianity. A certain awareness of political realism seems apparent in Aquinas third ad bellum principle, namely just intent. This concept is also new to Aquinas; it is not discussed explicitly in Augustine. Aquinas explains that the authority declaring war must have a righteous intent, to promote a good cause or avert an evil. 22 It is theoretically possible for a prince to have a just cause, but for the war to be rendered unlawful by a wicked intent, such as a lust for domination, a desire for revenge, etc. 23 In a sense, this principle 20 Ibid. p. 268. Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae10, art 8, responsio. 21 Ibid. p. 207. Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 10, art 10, responsio. 22 Ibid. p. 240. 23 Ibid. p. 240. 10ould also be seen as mitigating the scope of the potential for righting

wrongs. A states lack of territory or resources, or a personal insult to a king, may not qualify as wrongs legitimizing the resort to force. Aquinas historical context may also have contributed to some other aspects of his just war thought. In Augustines time, the Roman empire was faltering, but still remained the dominant, unifying actor. Most of Christendom fell within its boundaries. But by the time of Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, temporal authority had been fractured. Political entities of varying sizes and types jostled with each other for greater influence within Europe. Some like the Holy Roman Empire were in a period of decline; others, like the Spanish and French states, and even the papacy, were growing in strength through increasing centralization domestically and foreign conquest. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier periods, religious and temporal authority were now concentrated in separate sets of hands. Yet to the medieval Christian mind, the public welfare did not immediately indicate a sphere independent of religious considerations; right ordering of social life included its subordination to the divine intention. 24 Thus, political struggles were happening on two planes: between church and state over temporal jurisdiction, and between various states over physical jurisdictions. These internal struggles are reflected in two ways within Aquinas thinking about just war. First, they seem to color his discussion of the legitimacy of rebellion; they also inform his principle of just authority. Like Augustine, Aquinas was concerned with the internal stability of polities. While he acknowledged that tyrannical rule was unjust, he too felt that often efforts to resist or overthrow that rule could lead to greater injustices. In the Summa Theologiae, he argues that tyranny is unjust, and that disruption of such a government therefore does not have the character of sedition, unless perhaps the tyrants rule is disrupted so inordinately that the community subject to it suffers greater detriment from the ensuing disorder than it did from the tyrannical government itself. 25 If the leader in question were not a tyrant, then sedition would be a mortal sin, because it is 24 Lisa Sowle Cahill. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory, Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994, p. 91. 25 Thomas Aquinas. Political Writings, R. W. Dyson, ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 250. Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae42, art. 2, ad 3. 11 contrary to the common good of the community. 26 A leader had the right to use force to put down any rebellion. 27 The presumption in Aquinas thought is against rebellion, even though he admits that tyranny leads to oppression and suffering. Still, even a tyrant maintains a certain order. The dangers of overthrowing that order (particularly the risk that greater disorder will ensue) must be balanced against the good that could be achieved. The proliferation of armed powers is also reflected in Aquinas discussion of the ad bellum principle of legitimate authority. This principle is not found in Augustine, perhaps because of the centralization of political power that still existed within the Roman empire. Aquinas Europe was a patchwork of principalities, city-states, kingdoms and other polities, and many of these (being feudal) had similarly decentralized political structures. But times were changing. The very earliest intimations of nation-states were beginning to emerge, as the powerful French and German princes expanded their territorial claims. Aquinas principle of legitimate authority seems to serve two functions in this context. On the one hand, it restricts the scope of political violence by giving the right only to certain individual; on the other, it re-enforces the power and political legitimacy of those individuals. Aquinas specifies that private person cannot legitimately wage war; only a prince has that right. The reason here draws on natural law a private person can turn to a court for redress; a prince cannot, and thus may use force to prosecute his rights. 28 Many modern interlocutors of the just war tradition interpret this principle as denying non-state actors the right to use political violence. In todays state-centered international arena, the just authority principle seems incredibly self-evident. But at Aquinas time, the question would have been much more subtle. In a feudal system, individuals below the king did legitimately have private armies but they were not (necessarily) rebels or guerillas or terrorists. Indeed, the king relied on these lesser nobles to provide him with armed men when needed to fight on his behalf. In moving authority for using violence up to the apex of political power in a particular polity, Aquinas seems to actually providing a theologicallysanctioned legitimization for modern state building, by denying the right of 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. p. 240. Summa Theologiae IIaIIae40, art 1, responsio. 28 Ibid. p. 240. 12the lesser nobles to use their arms. As for in bello restrictions on the ways violence is to be used during war, Aquinas also provides more specification than Augustine. Like Augustine, he upholds a general principle of non-combatant immunity. He argues that if a man uses more violence in self-defense than is necessary, this will be unlawful, whereas if he repels force with force in moderation, his defense will be lawful. 29 But he also creates a new loophole, the doctrine of double effect. Since an act derives its moral nature from its intent, if has two results, only the intended one matters. 30 This principle has been interpreted by later scholars to mean that if civilians are killed in consequence of an act whose intent was to target military personnel, the action is not morally culpable. Ibn Taymiya: Coups, Conquerors and the Collapse of the Caliphate In brief, Ahmad ibn Abd al-Halim ibn Taymiya wrote at a time of great political stress, both internal and external to the Islamic world. A broad reading of his works suggests that he was deeply concerned with the unity of the ummah (community), which he saw as threatened from both within and without. In response to such threats, Ibn Taymiya proposed not only fighting non-Islamic outsiders, but also proposed purifying the ummah from the inside out, by purifying the practice of Islam. Within the Islamic world, the unity of the early, unified caliphate had long since ended. The period of the early caliphs has often been idealized, and even at the time of Ibn Taymiya, scholars wrote wistfully of a return to a politically unified Islam, where the entire ummah (community) would be under the same rule. To some extent, such a unified state had actually existed under the Ummayads up until 750 AD. But with the collapse of Ummayad rule, and the rise of the Abbasids, competition would emerge between the regional dynasties in the Islamic world. In 1258, with the sack of Baghdad, the Abbasid caliphate collapsed entirely, an event seen by contemporaries as the greatest disaster ever sustained by the Islamic world. 31 Just one year later 1259, the Ayyubid dynasty, which had knit together much of North 29 Ibid. p. 264. Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 64, art 7, responsio. 30 Ibid. p. 264. 31 Peter Jackson. The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260, The English Historical Review, 95(376), Jul. 1980, p. 481. 13Africa and the Middle East, including Egypt and Syria, collapsed, as the Mongols pushed forward. By 1260, the Mongols were repulsed by the Mamluk army in Egypt, which rose to fill the political void. The Mamluks, a class of Turkic slave soldiers who had served the Ayyubid, were able to reunite the Egyptian and Syrian provinces, and immediately turned their attention to the remaining Frankish enclaves in the Levant. So in comparison to Aquinas, ibn Taymiya lived in even more troubled times. He was born in Harran, Syria in 1263, but his family fled the invading Mongols for Damascus in 1270. Within the next two years, Harran would be occupied and then razed by the Mongols. In Damascus, however, Ibn Taymiyas father established himself as a teacher in the citys central mosque. Ibn Taymiya studied Hanabalite law, one of the four commonly accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Although he studied all aspects of the law, his focus was on theology. In 1283, he succeeded his father as the chair of Hadith scholarship in several leading Damascus madrasas, and

began to preach in the central mosque, attracting large audiences. In 1299, the Mongols invaded Syria again, and were not successfully pushed back until 1304. In 1300, the Mongols penetrated as far as Damascus in the south, besieging and then sacking the city. Ibn Taymiya was directly involved in the effort to repel the Mongol attackers, even meeting the Mongol Emperor, Ilkhan Mahmud Gazhan and fighting on the frontlines at the battle of Shaqab in 1304. Although Ibn Taymiya won a lot of popular support for his actions, his strict theological interpretations had earned him numerous powerful enemies. In 1306, he was brought before three councils of Qadis, but each time the courts upheld him as orthodox. The third time, he is ordered to proceed to Cairo, the seat of Mamluk power, where he is again summoned before a council of Qadis. He infuriated the chief justice a member of an opposing legal school and was summarily sentenced to prison, where he stayed for 17 months. 32 In 1308 he was yet again put on trial, and forced to stay in exile in Alexandria. In 1310, when his protector, the Mamluk emperor Qalaun returned to power, Ibn Taymiya was released. He spent the next three years in Cairo, retuning to Damascus in 1313. In 1326, he was again put on trial, and was imprisoned in the Citadel of 32 Muhammad Umar Memon. Ibn Taymiyas Struggle Against Popular Religion, With an Annotated Translation of his Kitab iqtida as-sirat al-mustaqim mukhalafat ashab al-jahim, The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1976. p. 53. 14Damascus, where he would die in 1328. For most of this stay, he was essentially under house arrest: he had the liberty to do what he pleased, and the government saw to it that he was kept in comfort. The relative ease and calm of those two years of incarceration provide the leisure to engage even more assiduously in his polemical activity. 33 A broad reading of his works suggests that he was deeply concerned with the unity of the ummah (community), which he saw as threatened from both within and without. In response to such threats, Ibn Taymiya proposed not only fighting non-Islamic outsiders, but also proposed purifying the ummah from the inside out, by purifying the practice of Islam. Within the Islamic world, the unity of the early, unified caliphate had long since ended. The period of the early caliphs has often been idealized, and even at the time of Ibn Taymiya, scholars wrote wistfully of a return to a politically unified Islam, where the entire ummah (community) would be under the same rule. Internally, the Mamluks faced both political and theological dissension. While the Mamluks remained in power until their defeat by the Ottomans in 1517, the political situation within their empire was far from stable. The Mamluks were plagued with quarrels over who should hold control over the government. One historian has described the early decades of the regime as remarkably fragile. 34 Within Ibn Taymiyas lifetime, not only did Syria attempt to revolt, but a series of coups shook the center of power in Cairo. If the ummah was divided politically, it even more fractured religiously. Both Sufism and Shiism had grown in their popular influence. These non-orthodox approaches to Islam raised many challenges to the four major schools of Sunni practice. Ibn Taymiya was deeply troubled by the popularity of these other branches of Islam. In his view, such heterodox practices fractured the ummah as much as any political or military situation might. Additionally, the ummah faced two serious external threats during ibn Taymiyas lifetime: the crusaders and the Mongols. The last of the crusader incursions, under Louis IX of France, have already been discussed, in reference to Aquinas. But if the crusades 33 Ibid. p. 83. 34 Jackson. P. 500. 15were a fading fear, the Mongol threat loomed large throughout much of ibn Taymiyas life. Indeed, these two fears were intertwined, which might explain some of ibn Taymiyas venomous distaste for Christians. After all, in 1280, the Mongols allied with various Christian groups, including the Armenians and Hospitallers, during their invasion of Syria. Although the invasion was largely successful, the Mongols retreated, for reasons of their own. Furthermore, Argun, Mongol Khan in Persia, made offers of cooperation to European princes four times between 1285 and 1290. The Europeans, however, did not respond (although urged to by Popes John XXI and Nicholas V). This left the Christian citystates of the Middle East in a weakened position, vulnerable to attack by the Mamluk rulers of Egypt. Tripoli fell to the Mamluks in 1289; Acre, the last crusader stronghold, in 1291. But although the Mamluks had managed to survive the threat posed by the crusaders, they were still extremely vulnerable to the Mongol empire. Although the Mongol invasion of 1280 was relatively brief, the second time the Mongols returned to the Middle East they were not pushed back so easily. They remained in the region from 1299-1301. The tumultuous historical milieu in which Ibn Taymiya lived seems to have affected his political thought in the sense that it left him longing both for Islamic unity and security. This longing for a stable political order can be seen in his discussion of the human need for society. Sounding very Aristotelian, Ibn Taymiya asserts that man is civil by nature, and the nature of group living is that they need someone to direct them, to coordinate their actions. 35 Ultimately, his ruler or king and all the political authorities of his government are responsible for ordaining what is proper and forbidding the improper. 36 The Quran itself serves as the basis for distinguishing between the proper and improper, but human law can be used to fill in for matters not specifically addressed in the holy text: The ordaining of what is fitting and the proscription of the improper is completed only by means of the legal penalties, for God curbs through ruling power (sultan) what He does not curb through the Quran. 37 35 Ibn Taymiya. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba, Muhatar Holland, trans., Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1985. p. 20. His uncited reference to Aristotle is a bit ironic, given that he also wrote a treatise against the Greek logicians. 36 Ibid. p. 23; p. 38. 37 Ibid. p. 60. 16Although Ibn Taymiya admits that even non-Muslim peoples look to their leaders for such guidance, 38 he makes it clear that this burden lies especially strongly upon Muslim leaders. In that case, the duty to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil is not only the responsibility of the king as a political leader, but as a Muslim just as it is the responsibility of each and every Muslim to do so, as much as he or she is able. 39 As such, enjoining the good and forbidding evil is actually an act of worship in itself. 40 This duty is incumbent on every able Muslim, although the responsibility is collective. 41 Admittedly, some Muslims are more able than others to enforce the good : ability is power and authority, for those who have power are more able than others and so come under obligations which others do not bear. 42 The most complete expression of this duty to command the proper and forbid the improper is jihad. 43 But which jihad does Ibn Taymiya mean here? It is important to look at the context in which he declares that jihad is the ultimate expression of the duty to uphold the good and restrain evil. For jihad, of course, has a broader meaning than the aggressive, violent connotation it has come to have in English. The term actually means in Arabic to struggle. As Ibn Taymiya points out, jihad is achieved sometimes by the heart, sometimes by the tongue, and sometimes by the hand. 44 The jihad to conquer ones heart ones own willfulness and sinfulness is a duty present in every case, since its action cannot be detrimental, and he who shirks it is no believer. 45 Thus, the jihad of the heart is an individual duty. But in the section of the Hisba where Ibn Taymiya upholds jihad as the greatest expression of this duty, he refers to it as a collective duty, for when it is not performed by those whose duty it is, the sin lies with every able person in accordance with his capacity, for it is a duty incumbent upon every human being according to his capacity. 46 Thus, Ibn Taymiya is not

referring here to the jihad of the heart, but rather 38 Ibid. p. 20. 39 Ibn Taymiyah. Al-Ubudiyyah: Being a True Slave of Allah, Nasiruddin al-Khattab, trans., London, UK: ta-Ha Publishers, Ltd., 1999. p. 33. 40 Ibid. p. 36. 41 Ibn Taymiya. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba. p. 23. 42 Ibid. p. 23. 43 Ibid. p. 77. 44 Ibid. p. 78. 45 Ibid. p. 78, 46 Ibid. p. 77. 17the jihad of the tongue and/or hand. This interpretation is further strengthened by examining his later discussion of military jihad; just before discussing the status of professional soldiers, Ibn Taymiya re-iterates the point that jihad is incumbent on the Muslims in general and on a sufficient number of them at any time. 47 He explains that soldiers give booty or funds for the sake of jihad are thus bound to it, for it then becomes a duty for particular individuals, in this case imposed on them by the Sacred Law and the contract they entered into when they contracted with those in authority to serve in the Jihad. 48 But why is this jihad fighting so important for Muslims of his time in Ibn Taymiyas view? The internal religious and political troubles of his time and place may have contributed to his strong condemnation of minority Islamic groups, and his lack of toleration for non-Muslims living in Islamic lands. Such groups not only challenged the ideal of a unified ummah, but may also have been seen as a potential fifth column. Ibn Taymiya is particularly distrustful, for example, of Shiites and Sufis. On the one hand, it is clear that he has theological reasons to justify his dislike of these two minority Islamic sects. Essentially, he considers them to be guilty of shirk or polytheism, for practices such as participating in festivals not explicitly enjoined by the Quran, visiting saints graves and other pilgrimages places, and other innovations. 49 Certainly, for a theologian as committed to purifying practice as Ibn Taymiya, declaiming such beliefs as unorthodox and attempting to sway simple people away from such mistaken (though popular) practices would have who indeed been important. It must be acknowledged that Ibn Taymiya did devote much of his career to sorting through the thousands of hadiths (or traditions of the Prophet) on which sharia law was based to confirm their accuracy and legitimacy. But it also seems reasonable that pure scholastic or religious beliefs were not his only motivation for speaking out against the Shiites and Sufis. Several clearly political motives can be imputed to Ibn Taymiya as well. In particular, the Mongols did ally with both groups against the Mamluks. The Mongols in Iran were converted to Islam by Sufis, 47 Ibid. p. 129. 48 Ibid. p. 129-130. 49 See Memon, p. 11, 46 and Thomas F. Michel, S.J., trans: A Muslim Theologians Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyyas Al-Jawab Al-Sahih, Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1984, p. 15, 56. 18 for example. 50 Later, the Ilkhan Kudabanda made Shiism the state religion of the Mongols. 51 Furthermore, the Shiites in Kasrawan were accused of assisting the Mongols, and Ibn Taymiya wrote a lengthy fatwa to show the permissibility of jihad against them. 52 In a letter to Mamluk sultan Al-Nasir Qalaun, Taymiya urged him to wage jihad against the Shiites, on the grounds that their unorthodox Islamic beliefs are the reason they give preference to the Franks and the Tatars [Mongols] over the people of the Quran and the faith. 53 One reason the Mamluks were so susceptible to the Mongols was the internal instability plaguing the state. In 1260, when the Mongols defeat the Mamluks in Syria, the later had essentially been ruling only Egypt, and were just emerging after a decade of political disarray; in 1281, when the Mongols took Aleppo in Syria, the Mamluks had likewise just been through years of political troubles and instability. 54 The problem had to do with succession to the position of sultan, among other things. Because the position was not hereditary for most of the period, there was constant jockeying amongst the elite. Al-Nasir Qalaun, for example, was sultan from 1293-1340, although his reign was interrupted three times. A desire for security is even more clearly in Ibn Taymiyas discussion of defensive jihad. Given the weakness of the Mamluk state at the time, it is perhaps not surprising that Ibn Taymiya devotes more attention to defensive jihad than to offensive jihad. Ibn Taymiya considered the latter to be a duty of collective action: part of the Muslims assure its execution while the others find themselves free, although the moral merit comes only to those who do it. 55 Defensive jihad, on the other hand, is a duty of 50 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Sufis and Shamans: Some Remarks on the Islamization of Mongols in the Ilkhanate, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 42(1), 1999, p. 27. 51 Thomas F. Michel, S.J., A Muslim Theologians Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyyas Al- Jawab Al-Sahih, New York, NY: Caravan Books, 1984. p. 61. 52 Ibid. p. 57. 53 Ibid. p. 58. The words are Taymiyas own, from the Risala ila al-Sultan al-Malik al-Nasir, cited in Muhammad ibn Abn al-Hadi, Al-Uqud al-Durriya. 54 Reuven Amitai, The Logistics of the Mongol-Mamluk War, with Special Reference to the Battle of Wadi l-Khaznadar, 1299 C.E., in John H. Pryor, ed., Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, Aldershot, UK: Ashcroft, 2006, p. 31. 55 Ahmad ibn Abd al-Halim Ibn Taymiya. Le Trait de Droit Public dibn Taimiya: Traduction annot de la Siyasa sariya, Henri Laoust, trans., Beirut: Institut Franais de Damas, 1948, p. 133. For an alternate translation directly into English, see Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996, p. 53: If we take the initiative, it 19 individual obligation for all the believers, even if they are not personally attacked. It is considered like a duty of solidarity and cooperative help. 56 Defensive jihad is fought out of necessity, while offensive jihad is voluntary. 57 In addition to wars of self-defense (defensive jihad), Ibn Taymiya legitimized wars fought to punish wrongdoing. He criticizes the people of ancient Israel for only defending themselves, and for not [summoning] their opponents and [enjoining] upon them what is proper. They justified fighting on the grounds that they and their children had been expelled from their homes. Even then, they were reluctant to fight. 58 He also described the killing of infidels plus the seizure of their property as a sort of composite punishment, involving both physical and financial punishment for wrongdoing. 59 Ibn Taymiya does not, however, tolerate civil wars. Of course, unjust leaders could exist, but the still should not be revolted against. They might perpetrate injustice and oppression, and might even attempt to justify that behavior based on invalid interpretations of the law, but nonetheless it is not permissible to remove them, on account of the further injustice and oppression involved. For the usual psychological tendency is to remove one evil with another that is even worse Coming out in revolt against them results in injustice and corruption worse than their injustice, so it must be suffered with patience. 60 The greatest ordeals the believers have to bar are sectarianism within it and the differences in matters of doctrine and worship. 61 Group solidarity is of fundamental importance. Appealing to ones clan or ethnicity was objectionable; indeed, one should avoid mans absolute fanaticism for his party after the fashion of the pagans. 62 He is a collective duty [which means that] if it is fulfilled by a sufficient number [of Muslims], the obligation lapses for all others and the merit goes to those who have fulfilled it. Rudolph is drawing on the edition by Muhammad Ibrahim al-Banna and Muhammad Ahmad Ashur, published in Cairo by Dar al-Shab in 1971. 56 Laoust, p. 133. Peters, p. 53: But if the enemy wants to attack the Muslims, then repelling him becomes a duty for all those under attack and for the other sin order to help them. 57 Laoust, p. 134. Peters, p. 53-4. 58 Taymiya, p. 75. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba. 59 Ibid. p. 64. 60 Ibid. p. 126. 61 Ibid. p. 99. 62 Muhammad Umar Memon. Ibn Taymiyas Struggle Against Popular Religion, with an Annotated Translation of his Kitab iqtida as-sirat al-mustaqim mukhalafat ashab al-jahim The 20argues that

Muslim principles have included adherence to the community and renunciation of armed struggle against the leaders, as well as renunciation of civil war. 63 He holds this principle to be one of the defining differences between true Muslims and those sectarians who only claim to be following Islam. When individuals or groups of Muslims thus threaten the community, the community as a whole may use force against them. Ibn Taymiya categorizes three types of Muslims against whom the doctors of the law have prescribed fighting, namely those who renounce authority, those who fight out of partisanship for a group or town, and those who set out against the Muslim community, including highwaymen, revels and dissenters. 64 In terms of in bello principles, ibn Taymiya also upholds a principle of non- combatant immunity. He more clearly establishes that some civilian groups are immune: Those who, like women, children, priests, old people, the bind, the invalid, etc., are not able to be considered as resistants or combatants, will not be killed at least when they have not effectively fought by their words or by their acts We must fight only those who fight us, since we want to make the religion of God triumph. God said: Fight for the cause of God against those who make war against you. But dont commit any injustice in attacking them first, since God doesnt like aggressors at all. 65 Likewise, in regards to nonMuslim prisoners of war, he urges mercy: The law imposes the duty of fighting infidels, but not that of killing them when one has seized them. 66 Other options for handling prisoners of war include ransoming them, enslaving them, or mercifully freeing them. 67 Elsewhere, although he urges Muslim soldiers to show bravery in battle, he also makes it clear that they must show moderation as well. He explains that courage is not the same as rashness or anger; that moderation must be observed on the battlefield as well. 68 Soldiers must not be iniquitous, unjust, or immoral. 69 And they must be gracious Hague: Mouton & Co., 1976, p. 141. (II.72-3) 63 Taymiya. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba. p. 79. 64 Ibid. p. 143. (II.74-5) 65 Laoust. p. 128. 66 Ibid. p. 129. 67 Ibid. p. 129. 68 Taymiya. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba. p. 106. 69 Ibid. p. 133. 21 both in victory and defeat, so that their enemies will be impressed by their spirit. 70 Implications In terms of their just war thought, Aquinas and ibn Taymiya actually share much in common. In this section, I will highlight a few of these convergences, namely their views on what might be called holy war, rebellion, and double effect. In so doing, I hope to raise additional questions about the relationship between their political and historical contexts and their just war theories. One interesting convergence between Aquinas and ibn Taymiya is that both seem to share a concept of insider and outsider polities in their vision of international relations. In ibn Taymiya, this finds clear expression in his understanding of dar al harb and dar al Islam, the world of war and the world of peace. Non-Islamic political entities were inherently part of the dar al harb, because they were not well-ordered (to borrow a Rawlsian term). Thus, there was implicitly a constant state of war between the dar al harb and the dar al Islam. For ibn Taymiya, this inherent threat lead to two responsibilities on the part of the Islamic authorities defending Islamic territories against invasion, and prosecuting jihad against non-believers. What is interesting is that ibn Taymiya spends comparatively more time discussing defensive jihad rather than offensive jihad in comparison with his predecessors, which may reflect the decline in Muslim power. In Aquinas, a similar distinction seems to exist, although he does not employ any specialized terminology to express it. In discussing the crusades, he argues that there is some sort of Christendom which must be defended. Invading non-Christians must not be allowed to take traditionally Christian lands. Yet Aquinas does not advocate expanding Christendom by force. His response is purely defensive. In a sense, he is suggesting maintaining the status quo. Again, there may be a politically expedient explanation for this position: both the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, the two Christian polities with the potential to act in the name of Christendom (both rhetorically and literally, given their relative strength) were internally weak and struggling against each other at the time of Aquinas. So it may not have seemed prudent to advocate a policy of active crusading. 70 Ibid. p. 208. 22Likewise, Aquinas and ibn Taymiya are also very similar in their perspectives on the right of rebellion. While both acknowledge the evils of tyranny, both place social stability and order on such a high pedestal that violent resistance or rebellion are practically ruled out. Considering that both Christianity and Islam as theologies also contain liberating perspectives, which locate value in each individual human and call for the establishment of more just and humane societies, it is not obvious that religious scholars in each tradition would necessarily be so conservative. The explanation for Aquinas and ibn Taymiyas perspectives may thus lie more in the political realties they faced, rather than their religious beliefs. There are, of course, at least two possible alternative explanations for these convergences. Both Christianity and Islam are Abrahamic faiths, and as such, share many of the same theological principles. Perhaps there is something about monotheism itself which sets up the sharp distinction between self and other that can all too often lead to holy war. The idea of the divine right of kings may also be traced to theological sources. A second potential cause for the similarities between ibn Taymiya and Aquinas could be their shared reading of Aristotle. Aquinas directly cites the Greek philosopher in his considerations of just war; although ibn Taymiya does not, he uses very similar reasoning (and his Against the Greek Logicians makes it clear that he is very familiar with Aristotles work). Aristotle had very similar ideas about the importance of the political community and the dangers posed by rebellion, even against a tyranny. Nonetheless, the similarities between the two thinkers works and their historical contexts does suggest that a possible correlation exists. The roles ibn Taymiya and Aquinas played in both their religious and political communities implies that neither was politically nave; they were surely considering political realities as they drafted their work on the ethics of warfare. 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